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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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October 25, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777355].pdf658.53 KB
11 "Approved///7///////////// 6--6/ 3.5(c) / 3.3(h)(2) 25 October 1958 Copy No. C 59 CENTRAL TELLIGENCE BULLETIN LanaCvycfr=1TO c5/() DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X Li DECLASSIFIED AUT Hp 7 ') � DAT REVIEWER: -TOP-SECRET ZrAPproveTfc7r 2020/6153'.0(162326227 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 0 ../ N., -T&P-SEORET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Approved for Release 2020/01/23 006232622 25 OCTOBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOCS- USSR - Nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya on 24 October probably in megaton range.0 Taiwan Strait - Shelling sporadic dur- ing afternoon of 24 October. Hungary threatens retaliation for alleged US "interference in internal affairs." II. ASIA-AFRICA Cairo and Damascus concerned over possibility Israel may attack Jordan.� Tunisian Government may become target of some Algerian rebel ele- ments. Pakistan - Mirza announces new cab- inet, headed by General Ayub. 0 Philippines - Some military groups exploring possibility of eventually taking over government. 0 Indonesia - Government receives "peace"-overtures from North Celebes rebel group. LATE ITEM GMIC statement on 11 October Tyura Tam launching. (TOP SECRET EIDER) TAP crrrnIT Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 C TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25 October 1958 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet nuclear test: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee made the following announcement at 1530 hours on 24 October: "The Atomic Energy Detection System has reported that an explosion occurred at 0803 GMT on 24 October in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. *Comment: This is the 15th explosion detected since 30 Septem- ber, when the USSR resumed nuclear testing in the Novaya Zemlya area, and the seventh with a yield greater than one megaton. Taiwan Strait situation: Communist artillery fired more than 900 rounds during the first two hours of the bombardment which resumed at 1100 (Taipei time) on 24 October. but firing during the afteriron was described as sporadic. (Page 1) (Map) Hungary: Hungary is threatening to take retaliatory action against the US Government because of "contemptuous acts in Hungary and in international organizations" by US officials. The most recent threats followed US actions on behalf of the Vatican in the Mindszenty case and official American statements on the second anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. The Hungarian deputy foreign minister hinted earlier this month that the US Legation in Budapest might be asked to reduce its staff. (Page 3) AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 A omilApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO6232622 ker) TOP SECRET d II. ASIA-AFRICA � UAR: The press and officials in Cairo and Damascus profess to be concerned that Israel, supported by Britain and France, is "plotting" to attack Jordan following the de- parture of the British forces from that country. While the UAR probably is genuinely apprehensive that developments in Jordarl, at least partly inspired by UAR propaganda and clandestine activity, may in fact lead to Israeli action, Cairo seems even more anxious at the moment to use this apprehension to justify any new arms deal with the Soviet bloc. Israel's repeated warnings that action might have to be taken if events in Jordan developed unfavorably for Israeli interests are also worrying UN circles at this time. (Page 4) Algeria-Tunisia: The regime of Tunisian President Bourguiba may become a target of frustrated and confused Algerian rebel elements operating from Tunisia. These elements are said to be siding "completely" with Nasir in the UAR-Tunisian dispute and to be ready to act against Tunisia. While there is no evidence that such drastic ac- tion is imminent, the inadequately equipped Tunisian secu- rity forces by themselves would probably be unable to sup- press a hostile move by any substantial number of the re- ported 10,000 rebel troops located in or near Tunisia. (Page 6) *Pakistan: President Mirza on 24 October announced the formation of a new cabinet composed of four army pfficers and eight civilian specialists. General Ayub was named prime minister in addition to his duties as chief administrator of martial law, which continues in effect. Indications of an eventual rift between Mirza and Ayub, who has emerged as the ,dominant figure, are growing. (Page 7) 25 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF ii e : ,2020/01 /23,C 06232622 A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 � TOP SECRET Philippines: Certain military groups have been explor- ing the possibility of an eventual take-over from the Garcia regime. These talks, which appear to have been given im- petus by recent governmental changes in Pakistan and Burma, V___have most likely not reached a serious stage. If conditions b\ in the Philippines continue their slow deterioration, however, the climate for a coup attempt might ultimately be created. (Page 8) Indonesia: The Djakarta government has received over- tures for a peace settlement from the North Celebes rebel group, according to Foreign Minister Subandrio. Although the central government will refuse formal negotiations, it apparently is willing to make covert contact. (Page 9) LATE ITEM GMIC Statement�of 24 October 1958: Supplemental State- ment on the 11 October 1958 Tyura Tam Activity-- 1. On 11 October 1958 the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) reported the probable launch of a space vehicle from Tyura Tam at 1740 EDT that date. 2. Information which has become available since 11 Oc- tober has tended to establish that the operation failed to achieve its intended purpose. there is insuf- ficient evidence to judge the operation as being successful or unsuccessful. 25 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET ZI=ITTITa=rS:MiriM'COERM, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 ~w Communist troop * vuu strength � Nationalist troop vvv strength � 1�f Pistons fighter -4- Jet fighter + Piston:light bomber 4 Jet light bomber Ground-attack SELECTED AIRFIELDS INDICATED IN BOLD TYPE Hengyang, 80806/ 81020 Hit koW. NANCHANG CHENGNAI lANTON HUtANG Swath H NG KONG SOUTH CHINA SEA , Nanking HANGCHOW � FoochoW. NANTA LUNGTI .CHINGyHAUIAN MACHIANG NGCHIA- � WEITOU. PEN. KAOCHI � P CH IN M EN IS. 86,000 Amoy MN AO IS. IzEingh ai HOW SHAN I. - � � NINGPO. Wenchow u � p EAST CHINA SEA -4�BANTU BAY 4.-MATSU IS. 23,000 INGTAN TAIWAN 331,000 !STATUTE MILES TOP .SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 TOP SECRET I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC � Taiwan Strait Situation Communist artillery fired more than 900 rounds against the Chinmens during the first two hours of the bombardment which resumed at 1100 Taipei time on 24 October after a 23-hour lull. The initial firing, which was directed against: all of the islands in the Chinmen group, was described as "moderately harassing"; later in the afternoon the firing was described as "sporadic." Nationalist guns returned the fire. the Commu- nists are continuing to rotate jetfighter units in the coastal ' area. About 32 jet fighters, possibly a regiment, flew from Swatow's Chenghai airfield to Canton on 23 October. Several TU-2 piston tight bombers, posiibly subordinate to the 23rd Air Division, were operating in the Huiyang area on 23 October, A total of three TU-2's of the Chenghsien-based 23rd Air Divi- sion flew to Changsha on 6 and 14 October, but TU-2's were not detected in flight to the Huiyang area from Changsha. In view of the small number of aircraft involved--three to five-- no particular significance can be attached to this move. There is evidence that the Chinese Nationalists may be planning to resume night propaganda airdrops over the China mainland. Taipei Radio reported on 24 October that the Taiwan tobacco and rice monopoly bureau has prepared 100,000 packs of cigarettes for airdrop, each of which will contain a safe- conduct pass to "freedom." In commenting on the Dulles-Chiang communiqu�the of- ficial Kuomintang newspaper Central Daily News asserts that the only way to deal with the Chinese Communists "is by means of force." The paper also says that the Nationalist campaign to recover the China mainland "seeks to couple a war in the Taiwan Strait area with a revolution on the mainland." It is not be be TOP SECRET 25 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 "a defensive war limited only to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu." Another Kuomintang _newspaper, the Hsin Sheng Pao, says that the only effective measure the Nationalists can adopt is an "offensive attack against the aggressors." These comments, which appear to contradict the spirit and possibly also the letter of the communiqu�probably were intended to offset any public impression that the government had weakened in its resolve to recover the China mainland. It is possible that the word has been quietly passed through party circles that the communiqu�epresents an accommodation to American opinion rather than a shift of Nationalist policy. The initial Soviet reaction to the communiqu�haracterizes the statement as a clear expression of "American intentions to continue its policy of blunt interference in the internal affairs of China." According to one widely broadcast Soviet commentary, the purpose of the visit was to "increase tensions" in the area and pave the way for "further provocations" against the Peiping re- gime. The broadcast also assailed American propaganda for "falsely" claiming that the secretary intended to persuade the Nationalist Government to adopt a "moderate course, especially toward the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu." Peiping has not issued a numbered "serious warning" against alleged US intrusions into Chinese Communist territorial waters sinpe 22 October. TOP SECRET 25 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 SECRET Hungary Threatens Retaliation Against United States The Kadar regime on both 22 and 23 October threatened undefined retaliatory action against the United States for "con- temptuous acts in Hungary and in international organizations" by American officials. These threats were made in connection with a Vatican request, presented to Hungary by the Ameri- can charg�n Budapest, that Cardinal Mindszenty be allowed to attend the Sacred College of Cardinals now convening in Rome. Hungary abruptly rejected the request, characteriz- ing this as another US intervention in Hungary's internal affairs, which "compels" it "to follow this matter with in- creasing attention." In answer to a speech by Ambassador Lodge commem- orating the second anniversary of the Hungarian revolution, the Hungarian permanent representative in the UN charged the United States with attempting to "undermine the peaceful life of the people and the state order of Hungary," and he threatened that if the attempts continue, his government � iNdir find the appropriate ways and means of giving a commensurate reply." 'The Hungarians' current bellicose attitude is consistent with the violent anti-American campaign which has been waged within Hungary for the past two months, admittedly in preparation for a counterattack against Western arguments when the Hungarian question comes up for debate in the current UN General Assembly session. The Hungarian Government hinted on 2 October at possible action against the American Legation in Budapest. An immediate break in relations is unlikely, but, according to the American charg�n Budapest, the possibility of an eventual break cannot be ruled out. This possibility has added significance, since any break in relations would presumably leave the cardinal, whom the regime considers a convicted criminal and unpunished "counterrevolutionary," at the regime's tnercy, SECRET 25 Oct 58 (-FNMA! 11%1TFI I inFKirF RI III FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Page 3 Approved for Release 2020/01/23 006232622 SECRET II. ASIA-AFRICA UAR Concern Over Possible Israeli Move Against Jordan The current campaign of the UAR, denouncing what it judges to be a military build-up of Israel by France and Britain, appears in part intended to justify UAR arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, actually begun prior to the Israeli purchases in the West. At the same time, however, the Arabs appear genuinely ,suspicious that Britain and France are preparing to support an Israeli move into Jordan if trouble should break out following the departure of British troops. The Egyptians may also be attempting to maneuver the United States and other UN powers into preventing any Israeli military move against Jordan, while the UAR proceeds to work for establishment of a pro-UAR regime there. Recent Israeli efforts to purchase arms abroad have resulted in a British agreement to sell 200 armored half- tracks and about 30 miscellaneous service and maintenance vehicles from surplus stocks. Between 11 and 20 October, three Israeli ships unloaded between 65 and 75 half-tracks and 20 to 30 one-and-one-hall-ton trucks at Haifa. The ori- gin of these shipments is unknown. Israel has recently purchased recoilless rifles from the United States, and two submarines and possibly 55 medium tanks from Britain. Israel has also sought arms, particularly combat aircraft, from France, although the results of this effort are unknown. Israel, however, has recently purchased three more French Nortlas aircraft suitable for transporting paratroops. Israel now has at least six of these transports, in addition to 16 C-47's. In the event of an attack on West Jordan, Israel would probably commit elements of its parachute brigade to seize the Allenby Bridge over the Jordan River, thereby gaining control of the most important line of communication between Transjordan and the West Bank. UAR-Soviet arms negotiations seem to have gone forward without any close relation to Israeli requisitions; UAR Vice President Amir's mission to Moscow this week was almost SECRET 25 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN page,. 4. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 SECRET C) certainly planned well before Britain announced the sale of the two submarines, which ostensibly triggered the current UAR press campaign. 25 Oct 58 t^GILITD A I IkITCI I le!tckle`r DI II I Glriki Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622' " Page 5 f�...\- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 o SECRET C.) Algerian Rebel Troops Displaying Increased Hostility Toward Bourguiba Elements of the 10,000 Algerian rebel troops reported op- erating from Tunisia have reportedly become increasingly hostile toward President Bourguiba in recent weeks. these elements side "completely" with Nasir in his dispute with Tunisia, are receptive to Cairo radio's claims that Bourguiba is holding back the Algerian independ- ence movement, and are prepared to take over Tunisia at any time. Heightened rebel suspicion of Bourguiba--especially as to his dealings with France-- Responsible American journalists who had contact with rebel troops.in July and again in September encountered widespread contempt for Bourguiba and much criticism of his "pro-French views." Top level rebel political and military leaders, who clashed ' publicly with Bourguiba last summer over an oil pipeline con- cession he granted to a French company, have not recently evinced any serious dissatisfaction with the Tunisian President. These leaders, however, now may be losing control of some of their front line fighters who are reported confused and frustrated over recent developments with respect to the Algerian situation. ,Drastic action by Algerian rebels against the Bourguiba re- gime does not appear imminent. Should an attempt be made, however, by a significant number of the rebel forces deployed in or near Tunisia, the inadequately equipped Tunisian security forces by themselves would probably be unable to suppress it. SECRET 25 Aug 58 rCkITD Al IkITCI I letCklr'C DI II I CTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622" ' Page 6 Q Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Q SECRET Pakistan President Mirza on 24 October announced the formation of a cabinet to deal with the new Pakistani regime's major ad- ministrative and economic problems. Army commander Ayub was named prime minister. The cabinet includes three other army generals and eight non-political civilian experts. Mansur Qadir, a little-known lawyer from Lahore, was appointed foreign minister; The constitution has not been restored; martial law continues. This move, following the reorganization of old ministries and the reassignment of senior civil servants ordered on 19 October, should help fill the policy vacuum which has hindered the operation of government departments since the take-over on 7 October. Implementation of the reforms promised by Mirza and Ayub has been slowed by administrative confusion and lack of direction. Civil servants have been afraid to act without in- structions from the martial-law authorities, who apparently have not been certain how to direct them. General Ayub, who will continue to function as chief martial- law administrator and army commander, will head the ministries of defense and Kashmir affairs besides serving as prime minis- ter. His prominent position, along with the presence of the other top army officers in the cabinet, suggests the Pakistani Army will play a dominant role in civil affairs even after martial law is lifted. Indications of an eventual rift between Mirza and Ayub are growing. Each appears to be trying to top the other in state- ments to the press. Mirza is reported increasingly worried over his ability to control the more powerful Ayub, and already may be considering ways of eventually removing him from gov- ernment leadership. As long as Ayub's prestige with the people and his support among the armed services remains intact, how- ever, Mirza is not likely to risk a move against him. Ayub, who has emerged as the dominant figure in the regime, is more likely to try to oust Mirza if the President fails to cooperate or attempts to undermine Ayub's position. 25 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Approved for Release 2020/01/23 006232622 Q SECRET U Military in Philippines May Be Considering Eventual Action Against President Garcia Certain military elements in the Philippines appear to be continuing exploratory discussions of a coup to unseat President Garcia's regime. The army chief of staff, accord- ing to one source, was approached about such an effort, but is said to have refused. Another report alleges that Vice President Macapagal has been confidentially informed of a "planned build-up" leading to a military coup, possibly to be led by Defense Secretary Vargas. The Philippines director of intelligence, in assessing the situation, is said to believe now that a well-planned coup could succeed. Ile,speculates that the recent take-overs in Burma and Pakistan, executed under the anti-Communist banner, might provide a good excuse for similar action in the Philippines. In this connection, he noted a consistent build-up of Defense Secretary Vargas as a strong anti- Communist. These reports are similar to earlier ones of dissatis- faction among military elements. Their vagueness suggests that in any event discussions along these lines probably have not reached a serious stage. There is, however, considerable disgruntlement in the Philippines over both economic and political conditions, abetted by the marked failure of Garcia to excite popular enthusiasm. Criticism of corruption and maladministration has grown in recent months, and the continued slow deterioration eventually could provide the rAwessarv_m_atilmtinn for an anti-Garcia move. 25 Oct 58 rCkITD Al IkITGI I se.ekit-e DI II I Ti Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232622 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 Q SECRET 0 Celebes Dissident Leaders Repotted Making Peace Approach Foreign Minister Subandrio told the American ambas- sador that the central government has received a communica- tion from North Celebes dissidents led by Colonels Kawilarang and Warouw indicating that they are ready to accept Indonesia's present constitution. The message implied that the dissidents are convinced that the central government is meeting their demands by taking anti-Communist measures and steps toward solving regional financial problems. Subandrio said the government would not negotiate with the rebels, but he did not rule out the possiblity of reaching a covert understanding. He said the North Celebes rebellion would be easier to solve than the one in Sumatra, since the former had less popular support. Periodic peace feelers from various dissident spokes- men as well as the central government have been reported, particularly since the fall of major towns in North Celebes last August. As described by Subandrio, the Kawilarang- Warouw approach is a more moderate dissident position than any previously expressed. Any follow-through, however, would probably depend on government terms for treatment of dissident leaders. When and if a settlement is arranged, it is likely to be piecemeal as the dissidents become less hopeful of the success of their revolt and more factionalized. Colonels Kawilarang and Warouw may not be acting for all leaders in North Celebes and are even less likely to be speaking for Sumatran dissidents. Kawilarang, former military attach�n Washington, holds no post in the rebel regime, having refused the position of com- mander in chief for North Celebes. Warouw is acting premier of the rebel regime. SECRET 25 Oct 58 CFNITRAI !KIM I IMFKIrF RI III ETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 � 4�.��' /mpg � M. � AP1� CI) THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser 10 the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander,- Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232622 V/1/1/////////1 ,/p