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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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Publication Date: 
November 4, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777389].pdf408.78 KB
!to 3 !c!�!3!, C piLidorilEerET- 3.5(c) )) Cs //93.3(h)(2) 4 November 1958 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN OLA-S:TX-------''"� ! DEC.L.;,SSiFIED CL:i-a '.::!i,f.1.-:",-1 TO: s DS NEXT liLVI,T.I.V DATE.: k-� AUT., /j DATE In -TOP-SEC-RET- jApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232630/ REVIEWER: =MI A AIle. Approved for for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 0 0 -TOP-S-EeRET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 0 Lunir wripi 1 LH!. 0 LATE ITEM Chtiese Communists Claim Nationalists U� d Poison Gas In 3"1,4k:)vember Bombardment On 4 ovember the official Chine ,le Communist News Agency sen the following announce ent in English Morse to Pyongyang: "During e artillery eattle at 3 P. M. on Nov. 3 between "the ener4 and people's liberation army troops on tii Fukien front, the troops on Quemoy used poison s shells to bombard pLA troops': It has bee / f nd that persistent poison gas was used, and y14 p I troops were affected." "It has to be pointed out at this new military provocation by/he Kuomintang 'hops took place af- ter the Chiang'-Dulles talks and th supply of large amounts of a/mmunition by the Unite States to the Kuomintandtroops. Therefore, it is �extremely serious in/cident. The spokesman of the inistry of national/defense has been authorized to ma e the fol- lowing erious statement: The Chinese peopl 's libera- tion / my expresses the greatest anger over th* crime of the United States and of the Kuomintang troops. Shold the Kuomintang troops dare to continue to ub p son gas shells, our troops will reply with severe" nitive action." , The above charge is the first of its kind to appear in con- nection with the off-shore island situation and may mark a new, more virulent phase in Chinese Communist propaganda directed against both the Nationalists and the United States. Together with the more intensive Communist shelling of 3 November, it raises the possibility of increased military pressure on the is- lands. 4 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 0 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 4 NOVEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC JAEIC statement on Soviet explosion of 3 November. Chinese Nationalists attempt to coun- ter rumors of negotiations with Pei- pg. 2 ping. IL ASIA-AFRICA Israeli naval operations may cause incidents with UAR. USSR has responsibility for "execu- tion" as well as "technical study" of Aswan Dam project. , 0 Iraq- Qasim turns down Aril's request for permission to return. � Algerian rebels seek further shipment of arms from Iraq. EIDER) � Laos - Government's position precari- ous. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 ver 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23006232630 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 November 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC JAEIC statement: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee made the following announcement at 1400 hours on 3 November: "The Atomic Energy Detection System has re- ported that an explosion occurred at about 0929 GMT on 3 November 1958, in an area centered at 49.50 Notth, 480 East (approximately 100 nautical miles northeast of the Kapustin Yar rangehead). Signals have been reported from three acoustic stations. Additional signals may be expected at a later time." Nuclear confirmation cannot be expected prior to 9 November 1958." "Additional evidence on 1 November test: Five low-amplitude electromagnetic signals at 1009:- 16.6 GMT have been obtained for the previously reported event of 1 November. This evidence, together with the event on 3 November at about the same location, definitely establishes the 1 2civernber event as a nuclear explosion. The height of burst of the 1 November test may have been anywhere between a few thousand and 100,- 000 feet." --TOP�SE�RE-T� v,00v,ommogo7//o//mmaogw/owy,7//my-/oz9,m',////,z,///,.//eogoy Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232630' A 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 � 0 TOP SECRET Taiwan Strait situation: The Chinese Nationalists are attempting to counter rumors of negotiations between Pei- ping and Taipei. Vice President Chen Cheng is soon to make a speech denouncing these rumors as a Communist plan "to sow the seeds of distrust" between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. (Page 1) II. ASIA-AFRICA The Arab-Israeli situation: The Israeli Navy plans extensive operations at sea this week. It may operate in waters within a 12-mile limit which the Egyptians have sought to enforce off the Mediterranean coast of Sinai. In early October an Egyptian attempt to capture an Israeli vessel seven miles out from Gaza was thwarted by the arrival of Israeli aircraft. Further similar intidents seem likely. / 4 Nov 58 DAILY BRIEF VA TOP SECRET Approved for A ref 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 ' 0 TOP SECRET Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim has denied a request from Vienna by former Deputy Premier Arif for permission to return to Baghdad and has ordered him to proceed to his post as ambassador in Bonn The Qasim regime apparently believes that the return of the pro-UAR Arif might further threaten the government's stability Arif has been expected by his supporters to return this week. Algeria-Iraq: the Algerian rebels have "urgently" asked Baghdad to ship by air certain weapons and ammunition--including bazookas, antitank grenades, and pistols. The "remainder" of the arms allotment, of unspecified size, was to go by sea to Alexandria. Two Iraqi military transport aircraft arrived in Bengasi, Libya, on 21 October with an earlier arms shipment which was almost certainly destined for Algeria. Iraq has extensive stocks of British-ma small 1 weapons and ammunition. Ry, Laos: me precariousness oi grime minister pnours position is highlighted by recent reports of factional in- triguing and loss of confidence within his own party. His role as champion of reforms which are bitterly resisted by elements within conservative ranks is causing him to question the viability of his government. (Page 3) 4 Nov 58 DAILY BRIEF iii z A4proved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO6232630 A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait Situation The Chinese Nationalists are attempting to counter rumors that negotiations are in progress with the Chinese Communists, according to Chiang Ching-kuo, Nationalist security boss and elder son of Chiang Kai-shek. They plan to have Vice President Chen Cheng make a major speech charging the Chinese Commu- nists with conduct of a widespread propaganda campaign through letter writing, rumors, and other devices. The Nationalists are expressing concern over the activities of Chang Shih-chao, whom the Communists allegedly dispatched recently to Hong Kong with large sums of money to influence pro-Nationalist and Third Force Chinese leaders in the British colony. They are apparently less concerned about the activities of Tsao Chu-jen, a Hong Kong journalist who has passed rumors of negotiations to the press and has written letters containing alleged Communist "negotiation" offers to Chiang Ching-kuo and other top Nationalist officials. The Nationalists believe Tsao to be an opportunist and, unlike Chang, not a bona fide Communist emissary. Some Taiwan "liberal" and anti-Kuomintang newspapers have begun to call for "realism" in admitting that a Nationalist counterattack against the mainland cannot now take place. These newspapers argue that in order to further political preparations for the recovery_of the; mainland, such repressive measures as the restrictive publications law should be repealed. One newspaper, noting that in the past the government has "shouted too much about counterattack," urged the convening of an Anti-Communist National Salvation Conference, represent- ing all free Chinese, to raise the morale of Overseas Chinese and to discuss means of taking the political offensive against the Communists. The American Embassy notes that this de- mand probably stems from a liberal belief that the holding of such a conference would somehow bring about an effective op- position party to the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communists continue to reject the idea of a "cease-fire," describing it as a "vicious plot" which is not rel- evant to the current Strait situation. A People's Daily commen- tary of 3 November reiterates Peiping's standard formula that 4 Nov 58 CFNTRAI INTFI I InFtsrF RI II I FTIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 the principle of renouncing force is useful only in settling international disputes and should never be used as an "in- strument of interference" in the internal affairs of other countries--a label it has applied to the Taiwan Strait issue. The commentary singles out Foreign Secretary Lloyd's sup- port of the United States and his praise of Chiang Kai-shek as "glaringly hostile activities." In a relatively mild rebuke the paper notes that Britain has diplomatic relations with Peiping, yet continues to act "extremely unfriendly toward China." Chinese Nationalist Vice President Chen Chen& references on 1 November to an attack on the mainland probably prompted Peiping to show the Nationalists the realities of the offshore is- lands situation. A sharp outburst of shelling on 3 November totaled over 36,000 rounds, according to the Nationalist Defense Ministry. Besides attempting to emphasize the hopelessness of a "return to the mainland," the shelling was probably intended to dispel any notions that Peiping will allow tension in the area to subside at this time. The Communists' warning from the "Fukien Front' which preceded the 3 November outburst, re- minded "compatriots" on Chinmen of the "odd day" and sug- gested that Peiping hopes it can force the Nationalists to re- supply only on Communist-designated dates. On 2 November a Chinese Nationalist convoy landed 3,200 tons of supplies on Chinmen. This convoy was the first to reach the island since the Communists resumed firing on 20 October. Adverse weather has thwarted all other attempts, except for a negligible amount delivered by air 4 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/61/23 006232630 %of Jug,/ sa-a � IL ASIA-AFRICA Laotian Government's Position Precarious Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone's role as champion of reforms bitterly resisted by members of his own party--the Rally of the Lao People (RLP)--is causing him to question the viability of his government. Phoui attributes the failure of the RLP to support him fully to the "unreconstructed" at- titude of RLP deputies and the ambitions of former cabinet ministers. He also is critical of young reformist members of his cabinet for gratuitously antagonizing RLP deputies. � Foreign Minister Khampan Panya has expressed serious concern as to whether the government is able to withstand pres- sures from disgruntled elements within the RLP. He observed that most RLP deputies are in severe financial straits as a re- sult of expenditures during the May electoral campaign and resent the reforms, which ended the import license bonanza. Khampan believes that the deputies are prepared to take out their resentment on the Phoui government. Illustrative of the precariousness of Phoui's position were developments in the National Assembly on 31 October, when two RLP deputies joined the opposition to bring about a vote of 22 to 20 for a seven-day extension of the assembly. Phoui re- sponded to this challenge by forcing the cloture of the assembly that day as previously scheduled. He has since received reports that the assembly may be called back into extraordinary session to allow dissatisfied RLP deputies an opportunity to join with the opposition and topple the government. TOP SECRET 4 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 Approved for R-eiease: 2026/7725 .606232630 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of -the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 'Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232630 4