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November 13, 1958
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Approved or Release:'��I��t�Cg I-OP-SKR-ET CI) 13 November 1958 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Copy No. CENTRAL 60 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANCE IN CLASS. I CLASS. CHANCED TO: Iv NEXT REVIEW DATE� AUT 7 DAT -TOP-SECRET- /ZApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638/ REVIEWER: 0 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 . .... ..,........... C T I P SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 _ � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 - 13 NOVEMBER 1958. I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Gromyko says Berlin. change Will not be long delayed; Bonn official states change "must" affect Bonn's relations with USSR. Yt.igoslovia threatens to break rela- tions with East Germany. Comment on Soviet tactics at Geneva.� II. ASIA-AFRICA UN officials fear new trouble between Israel and Jordan over Mount Scopus area. 0 Haniniarskjold suggests Jordan not press charges against UAR on plane incident. Syrian students strike against VAR 'education policy. a 0 Soviet arms to arrive in Iraq 15-16 November. 0 Iraq- Pro-UAR party plans more vigorous tactics. III. THE WEST 0 Argentina- Petroleum workers continue defiant; pressing for nationwide strike. LATE ITEM Soviet central committee now meeting. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 r4/7 Approved rZ'ag/ 2020/01/23 006232638 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 November 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Berlin: Gromyko has told the Swiss ambas- sador to Moscow that while action to implement changes in the four-power administration of Berlin would not be taken immediately, it would not be long delayed. Follow- ing a special cabinet meeting, Bonn's press chief said that Soviet-German relations "must" be affected if Moscow pro- ceeds with its plan to transfer its responsibilities in Berlin to the East German Government, and pointed to diplomatic and economic relations as "ties which might suffer." (Page 1) Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: Recent Soviet and East German declarations regarding the status of Ber- lin probably represent the beginning of a concerted effort to make Western access to the city conditional on de facto recognition of the East German regime. Yugoslavia - East Germany: Yugoslavia has threatened to break diplomatic relations with East Germany. Belgrade on 11 November protested remarks made by Premier Grote- wohl on the occasion of the 41st Soviet anniversary celebra- tions. Until recently, the East German regime has appeared hesitant to take a strong line in the bloc campaign against Yugoslavia because of the importance it has attached to main- taining diplomatic relations with Vucinslayia�thp only nonhloc country recognizing it. 11 74 � TOP SECRET V. for Release: r re7/17./ c''17/effZ:ZZZZZZZZZZ/7/ZilMf iJ ,b\( *USSR-Geneva talks: The deadlock on an agenda for the talks on nuclear tests continues, despite some adjustments by both sides on procedural points. While the Soviet delegate has refused to discuss a control system until agreement has been reached on a permanent cessation of tests, he has given no indication of a desire to break off the negotiations. At the opening sessions of the talks on prevention of surprise attack, the Soviet delegation took a firm line insisting that unless this subject is "organically linked" with broaderdis- armament issues--such as a ban on nuclear weapons, liqui- dation of foreign military bases, and reduction of conven- tional armaments and forces--any discussion of controls is useless and inspection could only be regarded as an intelli- gence-collecting device. (Page 2) Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait situation: The Chinese Communists are likely to continue military action against the offshore islands to the degree they deem necessary to demonstrate their capability to retain the military initiative; and to support their political objectives in the strait area. The Chinese Communists retain the capabilities to launch major attacks with little or no warning against the offshore islands and, by air, against Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores). While the Chinese Communists may expand the scope of their military activities against the offshore islands, available evi- dence does not indicate that they will do so to the extent of deliberately risking hostilities with the US. II. ASIA-AFRICA Arab-Israeli tension: Tel Aviv is following up the Syrian border incident of last week with pressure on local UN offi- cials for a further extension of Israeli control over the demil- itarized zone in the Lake Hula area. UN officials, moreover, fear new trouble may soon occur with Jordan over the dis- puted Mount Scopus area of Jerusalem. (Page 3) II 13 Nov 58 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET EIDER dafygZ,IZZM/g/fril,ZZAApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638WZIWZA ii TOP SECRET Wateh Committee conclusion�Middle East: The sit- uation remains unstable throughout the Middle East and incidents and coups could occur at any time. A deliberate initiation of open hostilities in the area is unlikely in the immediate future. The attempted Syrian interception of King Husayn's aircraft on 10 November has had the short- term effect of considerably strengthening the personal po- sition of the King and, to that extent, has improved Jordan- ian stability. It has also caused a sharp deterioration of Jordanian-UAR relations, and Husayn's regime remains basically vulnerable. Jordan-UAR: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has counseled the Jordanian Government against pressing charges against the UAR on the plane incident on 10 Novem- ber involving the King. He has also advised Nasir that the UAR should apologize even though it may technically be in the right. Additional information on the circumstances of the King's flight indicates that a request for blanket clear- ances of several flights over Syria was never answered by the UAR. (Page 5) UAR student strike: Syrian University students in Damas- cus have been out since a November on a strike in protest against new regulations integrating the Syrian'and Egyptian higher educational systems. This is the first demonstration of organized opposition to government policy since the crea- tion of the UAR. ) (Page 7) Iraq-USSR: The first consignment of Soviet arms is ex- pected to arrive at Basra about 15-16 November. A Soviet military delegation, numbering from three to five men has arrived in Baghdad 0 ii Iraq: me pro- UAlt 13aath party now believes that its tactic of avoiding criticism of the government and clashes with Communist elements has been unwise. 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THE COMMUNIST BLOC Further Comments on Status of Berlin The Soviet Union probably will follow up Khrushchev's statement on Berlin with some form of agreement providing for at least the de jure transfer of its functions in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). An East German Foreign Ministry official reportedly stated some action would be taken in December or January following a meeting of Soviet and East German representatives to work out the details. Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Swiss ambas- sador in Moscow that while the action would not be taken im- mediately, it would not be long delayed. West German press chief von Eckardt, in a prepared statement on 12 November, hinted that Bonn might consider severing relations with Moscow if the USSR should abrogate the four-power agreement on Berlin. The USSR probably will not permit East Germany to go so far as to provoke Western military action, but there is likely to be a new series of harassments by the Communists of allied lines of communication to the Western,sectors of Berlin. Brit- ish officials in Berlin point to the danger of a "self-imposed" blockade if the Western powers refuse to accept East German control over access to Berlin. In a press conference on 12 November, East German Pre- mier Otto Grotewohl made strong anti-Bonn statements stress- ing Violations of the Potsdam Agreement by both the Western powers and the Federal Republic. He,also discussed the possi- bility of negotiating troop withdrawa c frr"" h"th "'"i'a "f Germany on a, quid-pro:quo basis. 13 Nov 58 c=kITD A I IkITCI I irtnarc Dl iii Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638' Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638 LIE,1 V / I fri 0 Geneva Talks oly_T--..7t Cessation Still Deadlocked Over Agenda The deadlock over the agenda for the Geneva talks on nuclear tests has extended through the second week of the conference without any apparent movement in Moscow's basic position that the first order of business must be an immediate permanent and unconditional test-cessation agreement. The discussion of a second Soviet agenda proposal--modified to appear as a concession to the West by providing for discussion of a control system before sign4tuTe of an .agredment4,clearly indicates that Mos- cow wants only a general directive for the establishment of a control organization. The details of such an organiza- tion would be relegated to a subsequent separate agreement, There is .no: indication, however, that the Soviet Union desires to break off the negotiations. Meanwhile, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. V. V. Kuznetsov, who is the chief Soviet delegate at the talks in Geneva on prevention of surprise attack, has stated that this subject must be "organically linked"mtith broader dis- � armament issues such as a ban on nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign military bases, and reduction of conventional armaments and forces. He insisted that an inspection system not linked with definite disarmament measures would promote rather than hinder the prospects of a .surprise attack since the system would provide the would-be aggressor with intelligence data of value in launching such attack. CONFIDENT 13 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTFI I inFtsirF RI III FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638' Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 %La a II. ASIA-AFRICA Arab-Israeli Tension King Husayn's decision to remain in Jordan following the incident involving his aircraft over Syria apparently has temporarily relieved Israeli apprehension over the future of Jordan. During the past week, the Israeli Army had alerted its mobilization cadre, a precautionary measure which would enable it to move and mobilize with a minimum of de- lay in the event of trouble. Reserve transport units with civilian vehicles are reported to have been alerted since 7 November. Localized Israeli-Jordanian trouble, however, may oc- cur, again in Jerusalem to exacerbate the broader tension. The chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization fears a new crisis may develop involving the Israeli enclave on Mt. Scopus. The Israelis insist on including new-type rifles and ammunition--to be exchanged for older weapons currently in use on Scopus--in the manifest of supplies for the next convoy to the enclave. The Jordanian � are expected to reject the request. Israeli patrols, moreover, have con- tinued to enter a disputed area of the Mt. Scopus demilita- rized zone where a conflict with Jordanian forces earlier this year, resulted in the death of a Canadian UN official. The Israeli Foreign Ministry is following up the incident of 6 November on Israel's Syrian border by protesting to UN officials regarding the UAR "attack." The Israelis also have requested a survey of the area in the demilitarized zone where an Israeli tractor was fired on. Israeli accounts of the inci- dent do not conform with the facts as available to the UN teams, and UN observers reportedly were prevented from fulfilling their function. Some UN officers were detained at Israeli check points, the view from one of the UN observation posts was obscured by Israeli smoke bombs, and observer radio communications were jammed by the Israelis. Israel ap- parently will oppose any investigation by the Mixed Armistice 13 Nov 58 rrk171% Al ikrrei nil. 'rviki 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638' Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 4.1 L.A Nos A Commission on the ground that the commission's compe- tence does not extend to the demilitarized zone. Israel's alleged conduct during the incident and its position regard- ing the commission is a continuation of persistent Israeli efforts to exercise sovereignty over the demilitarized zone in contravention of the General Armistice Agreement. 13 Nov 58 reklITTI Al I \MEI it.krar,e ni la t 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638` Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 4.041.41,6s, I %LI S Developments in Jordan UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has advised the Jordanian Government against attempting to press charges in the UN against the UAR over the incident involving the royal aircraft on .10 November. According to UN Ambas- sador Spinelli in Amman, the Jordanian Government had failed to obtain clearance for overflight of the King's air- craft; a request for blanket clearance of three overflights, one of them to be the King's, was never answered. Despite the absence of an official clearance from UAR authorities, the completion of a test flight without incident led the Jor- danians to assume that all three flights were approved. Hammarskjold reportedly advised Nasir to apologize even though the UAR might technically be in the right. Nasir is most unlikely to do so, however, whatever the cir- cumstances, particularly in view of the propaganda play be- ing given the incident by Amman. King Husayn has confirmed that some Jordanian Army units were preparing for an attack on Syria by the time he returned to Amman, and that it became necessary for him to make a personal appeal to Bedouin troops to return to their camps. While residents of Amman and the Bedouin, with official encouragement, rejoiced over the survival of the King, the reaction in West Jordan has been largely one of indifference. The American charg�n Amman points out that the aircraft incident demonstrated the extent to which King Husayn alone provides the cohesion necessary to hold Jordan together. The charg�elieves that without the King's physical presence the army might have fragmented along Bedouin-Palestinian lines, accompanied by popular demands for overthrow of the pro-Western Rifai government. Tension resulting from the aircraft incident probably caused the exchange of fire between a Jordanian outpost and a Syrian gendarmerie patrol on 11 November, in which the Syrians accused the Jordanians of stealing 69 cows and wounding a gendarmerie sergeant. The American military attach�n Amman reported on 11 November that although SECRET 13 Nov 58 CCAITD A I IlkITC1 I Ir'Lklie"L DI II I Link! Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638' Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 troarmea %LI the Jordanian Army had increased the strength of its border patrols, there were no indications of preparations to attack Syria. The Rifai government, apparently reluctant to con- cede its share of responsibility for the aircraft incident, has continued to exploit the upsurge of anti-UAR feeling. It is possible that Rifai's enemies will attempt to discredit his government by charging that inadequate arrangements for the flight endangered the life of the King. The first two of twelve British-made Hawker Hunter jet fighters being supplied to Jordan under the American mil- itary aid program arrived in Amman via Egypt without inci- dent on 11 November. 13 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638. _ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 �6.0 V A A-AA A AA AA-A Anti-UAR Syrian Student Strike Syrian University law and medical students went on strike on 8 November in protest against the unification of Syrian and Egyptian higher educational systems. After their protests had been rebuffed by the university president, a delegation of students and faculty protested to Minister of Interior Sarraj and the minister of education. The strikers have threatened a university-wide strike unless student demands for rescinding the directives are met. Two faculty members are said to have resigned from the university in sympathy with the strikers. Antigovernment 'politicians have often used the stu- dents as tools to serve their political objectives. In the past, several Syrian governments have been pulled down by student strikes and demonstrations. While the strike may have been sparked by what the students believe to be genuine grievances, anti-UAR elements, possibly the Com- munists or Baathists, may have seized upon it as a means to embarrass the regime. There is no indication that this protest will serve as _ a catalyst for widespread unrest, but it is the first demon- strationo of organized oppOsition'sSinte the fc rmatiorr of the UAFt in February 1958. CONFIDENTIAL 13 Nov 58 r�CkITEt Al IkITEI I le�Ekll'E DI III CTINJ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 Iraqi Political Situation The pro-UAR Iraqi Baath party now believes that a con- tinuation of its tactic of avoiding clashes with the Communists would result in Communist control of the "street" mob and the government. The party has therefore decided to meet the Communists "head-on" and to provoke elashes whenever possible in the hope that this will stimulate the government into moving against the Communists. At the same time, the Baath will undertake a campaign to undermine Prime Minister Qasim by .encouraging criticism of the government's failure to live up to its earlier promises. Fighting between anti-Communist Iraqi nationalists and Communists, possibly Baathist-inspired� occurred in Baghdad on 10 November near the home of relatives of arrested former Deputy Premier Arif. Troops had to be used to disperse the crowd. l"the Communists and nationalists are planning identical demonstrations" 'for either 13 or 14 Novem- ber and that Iraqi officials fear "Urge-scale incidents:" Senior military officers and General Rubai, head of the Council of State, again urged Prime Minister Qasim to establish a military Revolutionary Com- mand Council, release Arif, remain neutral between right- and left-wing civilian groups, and depend on the army in- stead of the Communists for sunnort senior military officers had urged Qasim to issue a decree suppressing all political activities. SECRET 13 Nov 58 CF MTD A I IMTCI I irIckirc DliiicTik4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 1 IL/ I-4 di 1 I I I I .C11. ICJ THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638 rVa II (0 1/1 71 7.7/4/1 #1////nA rp< role cAl/for Release: r20 �Z12'3# 'CA 0 6 W/////////////W / a / / / / / 0 / / //z 7z r/ voe 7,4 v/t // r# rf r% //:////://4/7/1./././/1,06;01;c1701'.449"2.6c'_6'42:6738307,407,41.14000771:40007/7 40/,