CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/12/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06232654
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: December 2, 1958

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2 December 1958
Lopy NO. I; U
C EXTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
1-1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: ,12.4i Lco
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
REVIEWER
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2 DECEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Plotting against Libyan Government
continues; prime Minister calls for
renegotiation of base agreement with
United States. �
Pakistan - Ayub seeks mOre arms.
Thai-Cambodian relations rennain
strained; further incidents possible.
Laos - Military and civilian elements
resume coup planning.
Japan -Socialist party split over issue
of joining with Communists to oppose
revising treaty with United States.
III. THE WEST
� Honduras - Certain military leaders
continue. planning to overthrow gov-
ernment.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 December 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Libya: Plotting continues for the overthrow of the gov-
ernment. Some Libyan officials believe King Idriss is not
acting vigorously enough against subversive elements, which
have support from the UAR and the Soviet Union, and has not
taken adequate steps to ensure the succession of the crown
prince, Hasan al-Rida. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kubaar
has announced to Parliament his intention to renegotiate the
American aid and base agreements.
(Page 1)
Pakistan: The Ayub regime is pressing for further
modernization of its armed forces, and the President is re-
ported to have approved the purchase of three submarines
from Britain. Alleging, border violations by unidentified twin-
jet airaraft, the Pakistani defense secretary has requested
F-100 jet fighters and up-to-date radar equipment from the
United States. (Page 3)
Thailand-Cambodia: Thai-Cambodian relations continue
badly strained. Thai demands for the restoration of diplo-
matic relations at the ambassadorial level and the return of
32 detained Thai nationals will only antagonize Cambodia
further. Many Thai military leaders are urging Marshal
Sarit to undertake strong measures. (Page 4)
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Laos: Army officers in cooperation with key civilian re-
formist leaders are said to be considering a military take-over
of the government in early January. Such action would prob-
(.7 ably be intended to coincide with a government crisis expected
during a special session of the National Assembly tentatively
scheduled for that time. (Page 5)
o16.
*Japan: A crisis is developing within the opposition Japan
Socialist party over plans of the left wing of that party to form
a joint front with the Japan Communist party in opposing revi-
sion of the security treaty with the United States. The left-wing
Socialists, who slightly outnumber the right wing, intend to send
a "good-will" mission to Communist China to discuss strategy
for defeating the security treaty. Right-wing Socialists are fight-
ing the proposed front with the Communists and may split from
the tarty if the move is annroved
III. THE WEST
Honduras: Certain military leaders, restive under, the
Villeda Morales administration, continue to plot to install a
junta. The year-old Villeda government still has considerable
popular support. and a COUD attempt could spark serious dis-
orders. (Page 6)
2 Dec 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-up Material)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Libyan Situation
Plotting for the overthrow of the Libyan Government is
continuing, but there is no firm evidence that a coup attempt
is imminent. A clique of influential individuals, headed by
Royal Chamberlain Busayri Shalhi and backed by Cairo and
the USSR, is reported considering plans for eliminating or at
least discrediting King Idriss' chosen successor, Crown Prince
Hasan al-Ricla.
The 69-year-old King is said to have taken no effective
moves to limit the activities of this clique, and he has delayed
giving the crown prince any executive functions which might
contribute to an orderly succession. Libyan officials who sup-
port the prince are reported ready to retire unless the King
acts soon.
Several reports on the deteriorating situation are of British
origin and probably reflect London's concern over the possibility
of a further loss of British influence in the area. Public disap-
proval in Libya of Prime Minister Kubaar's policies has been
carefully nurtured by pro-UAR and other anti-Western elements,
however, and there is little popular support for his government.
Kubaar's speech on 30 November calling for renegotiation of the
American aid and base agreements was at least partially de-
signed to counteract adverse criticism of his pro-Western pol-
icies.
The loyalty of the Libyan Army and security forces in the
event of a crisis is uncertain, but the presence of approximately
2,800 British troops in the country probably would act as a
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deterrent to any immediate attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment by force.
SECRET
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Pakistan Pressing for Further Modernization of Its
Armed Forces
The new Pakistani military regime is pressing for
further moderniiation of its armed forces. The timing of
the action indicates it may have been based as much on
Pakistan's desire to test Western attitudes toward the new
regime and US intentions regarding future military aid
programs as on Karachi's analysis of immediate military
needs.
The Pakistani defense secretary has asked the United
States to replace Pakistan's F-86 jet fighters and ten-year-
old radar equipment with F-100 fighters and more modern
materiel. As justification for the request, the secretary
claimed there have been 34 violations of West Pakistan's
air space this year.
President Ayub is reported to have authorized the
purchase of three modern submarines from the United
Kingdom, one within the next year and the other two later.
Pakistan previously approached the US, Britain, and Sweden
for submarines but was discouraged by the first two countries
because of the financial burden such vessels would en-
tail and because Pakistani acquisition of a weapon not pos-
sessed by India would probably revive the arms race in South
Asia.
A decision to renew the request for submarines at this
time may in some measure reflect Ayub's desire to ensure
the Pakistani Navy's support for his government. Last May,
prior to his assumption of power, Ayub told the American
ambassador that Vice Admiral Chaudhri, commander in chief
of the navy, had been "very persuasive" on the subject of
submarines.
2 Dec 58
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Thai-Cambodian Relations
Thailand has abruptly stiffened its terms for a resolution
of the crisis set off by Cambodia's withdrawal of its ambas-
sador last week on the grounds that it had been unduly
criticized by the Bangkok press. The Thais now insist on
the renewed exchange of ambassadors and the return of
32 Thai nationals recently apprehended by Cambodian bor-
der authorities before Thailand cancels the "precautionary
measures" it has taken to ensure its security. Some leaders
of the ruling Thai military group advocate punitive military
measures against Cambodia.
Marshal Sarit has made two hasty trips to the border to
dramatize the seriousness with which he views the crisis.
Sarit is said to have admitted privately that the crisis has
been useful to him in restoring unity in the ruling military
group. The crisis also distracts attention from his failure
to take effective follow-up action after his abrogation of the
constitution on 20 October, While Sarit may intend merely
to keep the issue alive .for domestic political reasons, there
is always the danger that the situation may get out of hand.
Thailand's attitude, which will convince Premier Sihanouk
that the Bangkok regime is hostile, probably rules out any
early settlement of differences. In the past, Sihanouk has
warned that Cambodia would react to any threat from its
"SEATO-supported" neighbors by seeking aid from the Com-
munist bloc.
2 Dec 58
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Military Take-over of Laotian Government Planned
Army officers, in cooperation with key civilian reformist
leaders, are said to be planning a military take-over of the
government in early January. Such action, probably timed
to coincide with a cabinet crisis expected during a special
session of the National Assembly tentatively scheduled for
that time, presumably would be intended as a last resort
to ensure an effective anti-Communist government.
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, although primarily
a politician with a vested interest in the parliamentary sys-
tem, has also come to believe that an army coup probably
offers the only workable solution for purging the country
of Communism and of providing long-range government
stability. In a memorandum to the American ambassador,
Phoui points to the serious danger that disgruntled elements
within conservative ranks may join the opposition to over-
throw his government during the special session of the
assembly.
Phoui2still hoping that his government can survive the
special session, would prefer that a coup be deferred'until
absolutely necessary. He believes, however, that a coup
mounted by both civil and military elements would have the
support of army, police, and administrators as well as the
population.
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III. THE WEST
Honduran Military May Seize Power This Week
Armed forces leaders in Honduras are considering action
as early as this week to oust the government of President
Ramon Villeda Morales,
They are hesitating,
nowever, because they prefer first to have some unofficial in-
dication of ITS annrovnl
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The military leaders have become increasingly restive un-
der the civilian government they grudgingly helped install a
year ago, after constitutional government had been in abeyance
for over three years. Friction between the civil government
and the autonomous armed forces has been mounting steadily,
and each has good reason to Suspect the other of scheming
against it. Opposition political parties, too weak and divided
for effective action by themselves, have long been trying to
stimulate and exploit this tension between the civilian admin-
istration and the military leaders.
Villeda, named President by the Constituent Assembly
elected in September 1957, heads the first government in Hon-
duran history to be based on a free election. His administra-
tion has lost some of its popular support, however, because
of governmental inefficiency and graft and a serious financial
crisis. The President now realizes the gravity of these short-
comings and seems intent on overcoming them. His remaining
popular backing is sufficiently strong to suggest that a coup at-
tempt at this time would snark CPrinliCdic
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THE PRESQENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices ,of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
.The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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