LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06460905
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01950
• Publication Date: May 24, 1998

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Articles
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Nicaragua: Somocista Influence
in the FDN
The presence of troops in the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force (FDN) who served under former President
Somoza has been a source of controversy�
undermining the insurgents' legitimacy�since the
founding of the group in 1981. For the Sandinistas,
the issue has provided a propaganda opening which
they have fully exploited to capitalize on widespread
domestic and foreign revulsion for the Somoza
dictatorship and the brutality of the National Guard
during the 1979 civil war. For the FDN, the ex-
Guardsmen have proved to be a difficult public
relations problem, which it has attempted to overcome
through successive reorganizations.
While few troops and field commanders of the FDN
served under Somoza, most of the military staff are
former Guardsmen. The controversy over Somocista
influence apparently has not impaired the FDN's
ability to recruit new troops or to establish ties to the
political opposition, although it has hindered efforts to
obtain political support from foreign governments and
has been a barrier to unity with Eden Pastora's
insurgent group.
The FDN's image problem is likely to linger as long
as former Somoza Guardsmen dominate the
organization's military leadership. Nevertheless, the
FDN has made considerable progress in diminishing
the perception as well as the reality of Somocista
influence, and potentially can make further gains.
FDN Troops and Field Commanders
The great majority of the FDN
members in 1981 were former Guardsmen, but their
relative numbers among the troops and field
commanders diminished considerably over the next
two years. With the entrance into FDN ranks of
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thousands of peasants, small landowners, and
deserters from the Sandinista army and militia, the
number of former Guardsmen now stands at about 2
percent of total strength.
Despite press reports to the contrary, most of the
FDN's largest combat units are not headed by
National Guard veterans.
' The FDN subsequently released figures: 27
Sandinistas, 16 civilians, and 13 former Guardsmen among 56
commanders
ALA LAR 85-011
14 May 1985
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The Geneicai Staff
On the :After hand, the FDN military staff is almost
entirely composed of former Guard officers. Rebel
leaders complain that these ollicers have been �
unfairly stigniatized, and that not every soldier
associated with the Guard was guilty of corruption or
brutality. Must staff members were low-ranking
officers under Somoza, and none had close personal
ties to him, We are
unaware of information that would implicate any of
the former Guardsmen now serving in the FDN in
human rights abuses during the Somoza years
Efforts to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the FDN as
an anti-Sandinista force have centered on former
Guard Col. Enrique Bermudez, who has served as
military commander of the FDN since it was founded.
The international press has not, however, challenged
Bermudez's integrity. In fact, the principal Sandinista
army spokesman acknowledged to the press in 1982
that Bermudez had not been involved in "war .
crimes." hi the late 1970s.
one of the most professional officers in the
National Guard and highly respected for his
competence. An engineer, Bermudez was never active
in politics but was considered personally loyal to
President Somoza. He served in posts in the United
States from late 1975 until the revolutionary triumph
in July 1979, finishing his career as Nicaragua's
defense attache
Efforts To Contend With the Somoeista Taint
The FDN is aware that the presence of former
Guardsmen is a political liability and has made
several changes in its political and military leadership
over the past three years to improve its image. These
steps have established civilian control over the
military staff and somewhat increased the
organization's attractiveness
According to press reports, iinage-building was an
important concern when the [MN was founded in
1981. The new organization's political junta included
Jose Francisco Cardenal, a political opponent of
Somoza and former vice president of the Sandinista
legislature. The other junta members were political
unknowns: Aristedes Sanchez, a lawyer and
landowner reportedly connected to Somoza socially,
and union organizer Mariano Mendoza. Some
Guardsmen with unsavory reputations were purged. A
Honduran military officer later told a reporter that
the FDN cleaned house for a year, "getting rid of bad
apples."
New Leadership
The FUN replaced the junta with a seven-member
directorate in December 1982 in an effort to build
foreign and domestic support for its cause and
demonstrate a broader political base. The
directorate�mostly conservative political figures and
businessmen, several of whom had been opponents of
Somoza----was placed in charge of both political and
military affairs. While this step improved the
leadership's prestige, none of the new members had a
popular following in Nicaragua or was, well-known
abroad. Two had Sandinista ties: Indalecio Rodriguez
became involved with the FSLN soon after it was
founded, leaving when Marxists succeeded in
dominating it, and Lucia Salazar had helped shelter
Sandinista fighters during the revolution.
The FDN took an additional step toward improving
its image with the announcement in January 1983
that Adolfo Calero had become a seventh member of
the directorate. Calero, who had just left Nicaragua,
was the head of the Democratic Conservative Party,
the largest opposition party in the country. A lifelong
opponent of Somoza, he had been jailed for a month
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'st-ege�,
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in 1978 for initiating a general strike, along with
other opposition leaders. With Calero, the FDN now
had a recognized leader with strong ties to the
Nicaraguan civil opposition.
Bermudez left his position as military chief of staff to
join the directorate, although he continued to serve as
liaison between the leadership and the general staff.
His new role indicated that the directorate would have
sufficient clout to provide authoritative guidance to
the military leaders. From his new position, Bermudez
slightly reorganized the general staff, the primary
thrust of which was the transfer of Ricardo "Chino"
Lau as intelligence chief to the lower ranking post of
counterintelligence chief. Lau, who had frequently
been accused of human rights abuses during the
revolution, was finally dismissed from the FDN in
early 1984.
Civilian Control of the Military Staff
Calero was named FDN president and commander in
chief in 1983, emphasizing the subordination of the
military staff to civilian authority. The FDN
reorganized again in January 1984 to permit more
effective civilian control by appointing the Honduran-
based directorate members as an executive committee
responsible for day-to-day operations. Bermudez was
again named chief of the staff and is responsible for
tactical planning.
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The new "civil-military command" participates in
strategic planning and exercises real authority,
It controls all finances and
supervises the"strategic command" or military staff.
Calero and Rodriguez
are, in fact, treated as superiors by both officers and
troops, and their opinions and authority appear to be
respected throughout the military arm. There is no
indication that the military staff is consulted on
political strategy.
Vague Political Program
The FDN endorses the original goals of the
Sandinista revolution, but its failure to underscore its
rejection of the Somoza regime probably has hindered
its efforts to escape the Somocista label. The FDN
has concentrated its propaganda attack on current
Sandinista policy, implicitly distancing itself from
Somoza by underscoring its commitment to
democratic norms. The FDN's statement of principles
and goals in March 1983, for example, limited itself
to declaring that the Somocista dictatorship had been
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"Chino" Lau and the FDN
Former National Guard Col. Ricardo "Chino" Lau 's
past association with the FDN has damaged the
organization's efforts to escape the "Somocista" label
more than any other individual. An intelligence
officer under Somoza, Lau has frequently been
accused of having committed human rights abuses
during the 1979 revolution.
The FDN removed Lau from his position as
intelligence chief on the general staff in December
1982 and placed him in the less visible post of chief of
counterintelligence. He was forced to leave the FDN
in early 1984. It is unclear whether he was dismissed
because of his reputation during the Somoza years or
whether the FDN determined that he had been
involved in recent abuses. We have no information to
confirm press reports that Lau maintains informal
contacts with FDN military leaders.
We also have no information to substantiate the
allegation by former Salvadoran intelligence chief
Santivanez that Lau was involved in the 1980
assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Romero,
and the charge appears to be disinformation intended
to influence the US Congressional vote on aid to the
anti-Sandiidsta insurgents. Similarly, press reports
early this year cited the suspicions of some Honduran
military officers that Lau was responsible for
disappearances in Honduras.
"politically buried" in 1979. By neglecting to give the
evils of the dictatorship its rhetorical due, the FDN
probably has missed an opportunity to dispel doubts
about the presence of former Guardsmen in its ranks.
The FDN's reluctance to elaborate a socioeconomic
program clearly distinguishable from the oligarchical
style of prerevolutionary economic policies has
probably also contributed to making it suspect. Most
of the FDN's 13-point program deals with political
structures for guaranteeing civil liberties. The
principal exceptions are the pledges to improve the
agrarian reform, to implement interim economic
austerity measures, including production incentives,
and to return illegally seized property. FDN leaders
say that there is good reason for their reluctance,
since their objective is limited to restoring a
democratic form of government. They explain that it
is the job of political parties to define national policies
through free elections, and the FDN should not
involve itself in partisan debates.
This "disinterested" approach has not been pushed
hard enough to answer critics who say that the FDN
is pursuing a "vague political program." Moreover, it
probably does not aid FDN efforts to attract
Nicaraguans who have benefited from the revolution
and may fear that the insurgents would reverse their
social or economic gains.
On the plus side, the FDN's ability to make political
alliances with other insurgent groups and the internal
opposition has given it an important propaganda boost
by demonstrating its acceptability to other regime
opponents who had overtly opposed Somoza. Last
summer, for example, the FDN joined with Miskito
Indian insurgents and Alfonso Robelo's faction of the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance to form the
Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR). Robelo
was a member of the Sandinista junta in 1979-80, and
his willingness to collaborate indicates outside
recognition of the FDN's successive reorganizations.
In March 1985, UNIR joined a number of prominent
exiled political leaders in issuing a negotiations
proposal to the Sandinistas
How Serious a Problem?
The Sandinistas recently increased their
denunciations of the FDN as "Somocista" in order to
influence the US Congressional vote on funding the
insurgents and to buttress their position that dialogue
with the FDN is impossible. The international press
gives substantial coverage to these charges. The
media is generally skeptical of FDN assertions that
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The FDN Directorate
The FDN installed a new leadership in late 1982,
including known Somoza opponents, in an effort to
overcome charges of Somocista influence and to build
foreign and domestic support. Although the prestige
of the group improved, it generally lacked leaders
with a political base in Nicaragua that could have
helped to dispel international concern about former
National Guardsmen on the military staff. The
membership on the directorate of FDN founder
Enrique Bermudez indicated that the group would
have sufficient authority to guide the military staff.
Nevertheless, Bermudez's service in the National
Guard�although unblemished�was a political
liability
the individual Guardsmen in its ranks were not
associated with abuses during the Somoza years,
although specific accusations have been made against
few individuals. Despite the media's attention to
Guard presence in the FDN's military leadership.
Moreover, the press recent press reporting appears to
be giving credence to the group's claims that only a
tiny fraction of insurgent troops served in Somoza's
military. Moreover, the press more frequently reports
that the insurgents have popular support
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The controversy over Somocista influence has had
much greater impact outside Nicaragua than inside
the country. Despite Sandinista propaganda, the issue
does not appear to have inhibited recruitment and
support in the FDN's operational areas. Some press
commentary has noted that the northern departments
of Nicaragua were a fertile recruiting ground for the
National Guard, and therefore do not harbor the
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same degree of antipathy toward the institution as
other parts of the country. Although this explanation
may help account for the initial growth of the FDN, it
does not explain its success in Matagalpa, Boaco, and
Chontales departments�far away from the border.
Nor can it account for the number of former
Sandinista fighters and army personnel who have
joined the FDN, many from urban areas
The FDN potentially could have more �ran image
problem in the cities because of the strong memories
of Guard excesses during the revolution. Nevertheless,
there is widespread awareness that the FDN is not
dominated by the Guard
The internal opposition does not appear to be
concerned with the controversy, and the insurgents'
links to the political parties have steadily increased.
The opposition, for example, has repeatedly called for
a "national dialogue" that would include the
insurgents, most recently in March. In addition, the
Catholic Church hierarchy has called several times
for the government to conduct a dialogue with the
insurgents, an implicit recognition of the insurgents'
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Internationally, the FDN has had a serious public
relations problem that probably has inhibited its
ability to gain political support. First, the Sandinistas
have capitalized on foreign sympathy for the
overthrow of Somoza, which placed any group
denounced as "counterrevolutionary" at an immediate
disadvantage. Sandinista propaganda is widely
� disseminated abroad through leadership travel and
� the regime's network of solidarity committees.
Foreign fears probably are reinforced by reports of
FDN human rights abuses�at least some of which
are accurate. "Suicida," a renegade commander who
the FDN tried and executed in 1983 for committing
such abuses, was a National Guard sergeant.
Moreover, foreigners probably are greatly influenced
� by Eden Pastora's opposition to joining his insurgent
forces with the FDN because of the presence of
former Guardsmen. Pastora, a former revolutionary
hero, is the best known and most charismatic of the
insurgent leaders
Somocista Influence as an Obstacle to Insurgent Unity
Pastora's opposition to working with the FDN
because of its Guard membership has undermined the
FDN efforts to polish its image. While Pastora has
demanded the removal of several key FDN military
figures for political reasons,
his insistence that he be named the overall
military commander was at least as important a
reason for the failure of unity.
Moreover, FDN officials consider Pastora's criticism
unjustified because some former Guardsmen are
serving in his forces.
Pastora's toned-down rhetoric in recent months, his
willingness to meet with FDN leaders, and statements
to the press last week by his key lieutenant suggest,
however, that some compromise may be possible on
the unity question. Pastora's new peace initiative,
which surfaced in the press in mid-May, called on the
Sandinistas to conduct a dialogue with all opposition
forces, including the FDN.
Outlook
The FDN probably will continue to have an image
problem as long as its military command is staffed by
ex-Guardsmen. A complete purge of the military staff
is unlikely, not only because there is no ready
substitute for its expertise, but also because it would
be seen by FDN leaders as damaging to morale.
Although such a move may facilitate greater
international support for reconciliation talks with the
regime, it would probably not change foreign
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reluctance to give the FDN political and military aid.
Moreover, the Sandinistas are likely to promote the
thesis that the change is cosmetic and the Guardsmen
are merely "waiting in the wings."
Although the FDN is likely to face continued
problems, it has made considerable progress in
improving its image, and potentially can make further
gains. The formation of UNIR has already helped to
some extent, and the FDN probably could gain
additional political benefits if exiled political leaders
such as Cruz were directly incorporated into the
organization's leadership. Moreover, FDN
propaganda on the image issue appears to be
improving. Statements by the unarmed opposition
about ex-Guardsmen in Pastora's forces and recent
charges that there are others serving in the Sandinista
army appear to reflect greater efforts to mount a
propaganda counterattack
Pastora's position on insurgent unity appears to be in
flux, which could soften his allegations of Somocista
influence in the FDN. The FDN undoubtedly
distrusts Pastora and resents his belated attempt to
grab the limelight on the unity issue, but it probably
would welcome his participation in a negotiations
proposal that encompasses all anti-Sandinista, groups.
Nevertheless, a cooperation agreement in which the
two groups "agree to disagree" on the presence of
former Guardsmen in the FDN leadership would be
of limited usefulness for improving the organization's
image, and the FDN would be unlikely to share its
resources with Pastora under those circumstances.
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