Document Type: 
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Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
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Publication Date: 
November 19, 1958
- � I Approved P Release: 99 )/ )3)975' (7) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 19 November 1958 Copy No. C 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: ToteSoCt NEXT REVIEW DATE: AVM 70- DAM --11`0P-SKRM REVIEWER Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06531975 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06531975 -SECRET-- III. THE WEST The Berlin Situation he West cannot prevent the eventual transfer of Soviet functions in Berlin to the East German re- gime, and that nobody in the West would believe that avoidin recognition is worth a war. 7 the West should make an initial attempt to deal with represent- atives of the GDR on practical matters without implying recog- nition, it anticipates almost immediately being confronted with a further choice between recognition of East Germany or expos- ing Berlin to a blockade which could only be broken by force. � Even de facto dealings with East German officials would be strongly opposed by Chancellor Adenauer as undermining his entire foreign policy, which is, in effect, based on Bonn's claim to represent all of Germany. In addition, Western con- tacts with East German officials would sharply increase the already growing sentiment found in all West German parties, favoring direct talks with East Germany on unification. � Chancellor Adenauer has maintained that his "policy of strength" within the NATO alliance, will eventually force Mos- cow to agree to Western terms for unification. Recognition of East Germany, however, would place Adenauer in an iso- lated position and could force a modification of Bonn's whole European policy. 19 Nov 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06531975