THE JUNE 1967 AND OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06540279
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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-01107

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THE JuNE 1967 AND OCTOBER 1913
ARAB -Is RAE LI WARS
Ent& A. Nakhidi
The. lune 1967 and October 1973 &rub.. israeli wars otret'
4 vivid picture Of the role olintenigence analysis in
informing crisis decision-making at the highest levels
of our government, In. L967, prior. during. and.immediately
at-ter the war, intelligence analysis pro�Jcleti a valuable warn-
itig function. Altbriugh the OnOly$6..ram co ftl, rary to the view.,;
'ray hcld by sertkir prilicyntalwrN, the President liti.l'his
National SeCUT ity team ultimawly adopted policy hased on
intelligence ttnaly* that alerted then1 to Ant) troop moye-
ments, the thinking behind EgH.Itia n plans Ngarding the Gulf
Of Aqaba,. the likelihood of potential Soviet intervention 41
support of the Arabs, and f$rael's ability 1.0 defeat Arah mill -
I
lit). contrast. in I 973� in nigence 4111AIYSIS failed to ,IS'SeS Antb
military rnoveintmt nd preparations and'concluded.�as late
ai. the night preceding the lig'yptiun int-ick across The Suez
Canal�that the Arah5 wolAil not atiadt. The result of this
analytic failtm was that the. joint li.gyptian-Syrian ;Ittlek
Against Israel su r pried LtSp011cymikesas well .i. ttrel
Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts (and their Israeli
cotinterpartsl believed that IraIniditary interiority would
militate �ODA: zw Arab ltrac.15 on Dlo.halysis.did ncn
expiore the roWhility that 'mica, might to go to war�Orert
tt the risk or lo they believed they could t herebrata in
Emile A. Nakfrieh At nfinding btr ot the 'Senior Ana4 Service, hig Inc CIA since
uo I anuud Potir-ics the Mu thitworLdgo* l'ormailun and atabillity, and the r Palestbtitin con
I1KI Dr Nuldileh was college profos$or for 26 yew hcfore joimog the Agency,and ha publisho4 broaditon
Arab and US tmlusin the Middle East and Persian Ciutl, He is mcntbel of the Council on Foreign Relations
ind.speilks Arabic, Whrete3 and Far:4L
2.03.
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
certain national political objectives. DI analysts were
unable to break out of the "cultural blinders" that
might have underpinned their analysis of Arab war
preparations.
Intelligence Analysis and the June 1967 War:
A Success Story
An examination of intelligence reporting and analy-
sis in the period leading up to the June 5, 1967 war
indicates that a specific set of circumstances contrib-
uted to the critical impact of intelligence on national
policy in the three weeks preceding the war. Accord-
ing to an article by a former branch chief in the
Directorate of Intelligence who dealt with the
Middle East during that period, these circumstances
and reasons included the following:
� First, the basic question which the policy makers
asked�who will win if the US stays out?�was
sharply defined. Second, the duration of the
'crisis'.. .was only three weeks, from mid-May to
dawn of June 5.... Third, the impact of the intelli-
gence judgment was the more explosive in that
this judgment ran nearly head-on into the initial
impressions of some, at least, of the administra-
tion's top advisers."
With Egyptian President Nasir's closure of the Gulf
of Aqaba to Israeli shipping on 23 May, senior US
policymakers began to voice certain concerns about
the impending crisis and tasked the Intelligence
Community (IC) to address them. These percep-
tions�greatly influenced by reports from and con-
versations with Israeli government and intelligence
officials�included the following:
� Nasir's moves on Aqaba were part of an elaborate
Soviet-Egyptian conspiracy to conduct an "offen-
sive" war against Israel with the objective of elimi-
nating Israel and US military and political
influence from the region. Egyptian military
J. L. Freshwater Ipen-namel, "Policy and Intelligence: The
Arab-Israeli War," Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1969), p.I.
This article is available in declassified form in Record Group
263 (CIA) at the National Archives and Records Administration
in College Park, Maryland. "J. L. Freshwater" worked in Cl/Vs
Office of Current Intelligence.
maneuvers included preparations for chemical
warfare.
� Since Arab military capability was perceived to be
superior to Israel's, such a war would result in
Israel's military defeat, which meant the US would
have to get involved�"quickly and tangibly"�in
the war on Israel's behalf in order to save "little
Israel" from the "Red-Arab" menace, thereby
potentially jeopardizing US national interests in
the Arab world.'
� The Soviet Union would intervene in an Arab-
Israeli war on the side of the Arabs, thereby raising
the specter of a superpower confrontation.
The President and his advisers tasked the Intelli-
gence Community to address these perceptions and
to respond to Israeli policy and intelligence reports
pushing these perceptions. In a series of papers pre-
pared by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and
unanimously supported by the Intelligence Com-
munity, DI political and military analysts refuted all
of the above perceptions and offered the following
judgments:
� Nasir's military moves were based on misinforma-
tion and misperceptions of Israeli actions and
intentions and were not a result of a Soviet-Arab
conspiracy to attack Israel.
� Nasir, together with other Arab leaders who
jumped on Nasir's bandwagon, was caught up in
the nationalist euphoria and demagoguery of that
time and believed the Arabs could defeat Israel.'
� Direct Soviet involvement in the war was highly
unlikely, and in fact, the Soviets would most likely
advise Nasir against going to war with Israel. Mos-
cow's objective was to score propaganda points
against the US in Arab countries.
Ibid., p. 5.
3 Directorate of Intelligence, "The Current Focus of the Near
East Crisis," 3 June 1967, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, The Arab-Israeli War
(Washington, DC: Department of State, forthcoming), pp. 268-
269.
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
� Egyptian military moves in Sinai, as well as Arab
troop movements elsewhere were defensive and
for political effect.
� The possibility of the Egyptians using chemical
warfare was insignificant because of unfavorable
local conditions.
� Most importantly, in case of war, Israel could hold
the line on three fronts and simultaneously mount
a successful offensive on the fourth front (the
fronts include Sinai, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon),
could attain air superiority over Sinai in 24 hours,
could regain the initiative on the ground in a few
days, and, once fighting with Egypt had subsided,
could occupy most of the West Bank in a few days.
Based on this analysis, which was delivered to the
White House ten days before the war, the President
and his senior advisers "adopted a policy posture in
consonance with the intelligence judgment" and
decided against a heavy involvement in the war.
They also advised Israel against initiating hostilities,
since Egypt's military moves were defensive in
nature. Furthermore, the administration told the
Israelis that "if they chose to take the military initia-
tive, they would have to go it alone." On 3 June, DI
analysts at CIA warned of mounting pressure on the
government in Israel�especially on the new minis-
ter of defense, Moshe Dayan�to make a decision in
favor of war.4 Two days later, Israel fired the first
shots, although it claimed it was responding to a
movement by Egyptian air and ground forces�a
claim that was refuted by DI analysis.5
1967 Lessons Learned
The impact of intelligence on national policy in the
June 1967 war offers lessons to DI analysts today.
These include:
� Make sure the analytic bottom line judgment is
clear, thoroughly vetted throughout the Intelli-
4 Foreign Relations, p. 268.
5 Office of Current Intelligence, "The Arab-Israeli War: Who
Fired the First shot," 5 June 1967, reprinted in Foreign Relations,
pp. 316-317.
gence Community, and based on the latest avail-
able information.
� Communicate precise, clear, and timely collection
requirements to the field, especially in the midst
of an impending crisis that is anticipated to seri-
ously impact national security policy.
� Ensure that the analytic judgments reach top,
senior policymakers in a quickly and immediately
usable form.
� Try not to be cowed by policy views and "conven-
tional wisdom" perceptions, especially if they con-
tradict your initial analytic instincts and
conclusions.
The October 1973 War:
A Story of Intelligence Failure
In 1973, intelligence analysts failed to perceive the
growing possibility of a deliberate Arab attack
against Israel, misread the large body of reporting�
human and technical�on Egyptian and Syrian war
preparations, and advised senior policy makers that
a war, if one came, would be the result of one side's
accidental or pre-emptive reaction to the other's
defensive preparations. Whereas the Intelligence
Community was unanimous in its "correct" analysis
of events leading up to the 1967 war, intelligence
analysts across the IC were equally unanimous in
their misreading of the evidence in 1973. The US
and Israel were broadsided by the Arab "October
surprise," in which Egypt and Syria on 6 October
launched concerted assaults along the Suez Canal
and the Golan Heights. Intelligence analysts today
can learn several important lessons from that war.
The errors of evaluation were caused by attitudes
and preconceptions underpinning the analysis, by
the analysts' reliance on the analytic judgments of
their Israeli counterparts, and by their misreading of
Arab intentions in the two weeks preceding the
attack. As late as the evening before the attack, intel-
ligence continued to insist that Arab war prepara-
tions were nothing out of the ordinary�that the
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Arabs believed they would be defeated by Israel and
thus would not resort to war. Analysts also dis-
missed any possibility that Egyptian President Sadat
could be orchestrating a deception in order to lull
his administration into a false sense of security. The
following statements from late-September, early
October Central Intelligence Bulletins (ClBs) illus-
trate the analytic misjudgments:
� "President Sadat's address to the nation last night
was primarily a fence-mending effort designed to
mollify and undercut domestic and foreign�pri-
marily Soviet�opponents of his policy innova-
tions. Although generally circumspect toward the
US, Sadat made some uncharacteristically benev-
olent statements, reflecting a guarded optimism
that Washington intends some action to break the
Middle East impasse."6
� "The exercise and alert activities under way in
Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and
more realistic than previous exercises, but they do
not appear to be preparations for a military offen-
sive against Israel."'
� "Previous Egyptian exercises have been more
paper-and-communications exercises than the
current one, which evidently involves the mobili-
zation of larger numbers of personnel.... The call-
up of air force reservists is on a larger scale than
that which occurred during the last major exercise
in March, but this may be necessary because of the
length of the alert. Tel Aviv assesses the Egyptian
activity as normal, large-scale maneuvers and has
not alerted its forces."8
� "Both the Israelis and the Arabs are becoming
increasingly concerned about the military activi-
ties of the other, although neither side appears to
be bent on initiating hostilities."9
� Analysts assessed that most of the Russian flights
in early October were used to evacuate Soviet
dependents from Egypt and Syria.'�
6 DI/Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), 29 Sep 73.
7 CIB, 5 Oct 73.
8 CIB, 5 Oct 73.
9 CIB, 6 Oct 73.
"CIB, 6 Oct 73.
� "For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense
at this critical juncture of President Sadat's reori-
entation of domestic and foreign policies. Another
round of hostilities would almost certainly destroy
Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate the econ-
omy and would run counter to his current efforts
to build a united Arab political front, particularly
among the less militant, oil-rich states. For the
normally cautious Syrian President, a military
adventure now would be suicidal, and he has said
Although it is difficult 30 years later to explain away
the misreading by DI analysts of all the evidence on
the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, it is possible to
identify several causes that led to the failure.
� Accepting statements, and their implications, at
face value. Intelligence analysts seemed to have
accepted the statements made by Presidents Sadat
and Asad about Israel's military superiority as an
ironclad proof of their intent not to wage an
offensive war. The analysts reasoned that if Arab
leaders rationally concluded that they would be
defeated in a war with Israel, it would not make
sense for them to go to war, and, therefore, they
would not.
� Denial and deception (D&D). Because intelli-
gence analysts did not have recent case studies
pointing to Egyptian and Syrian denial and decep-
tion and may not have been trained and attuned
to look for D&D, they failed to explore the possi-
bility of such actions.
� Blind faith in Israeli intelligence. Intelligence ana-
lysts accepted the Israeli intelligence assessments
that seemed to dismiss the military significance of
Egyptian and Syrian military preparations on the
eve of the war. If the Israelis judged those prepara-
tions as insignificant, why should we second-guess
them?
� Cultural Biases. Analysts' cultural blinders toward
the Arabs might have blurred their vision and led
them to conclude that the Arabs could not have
devised such an elaborate war plan without
"CIB, 6 Oct 73.
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
someone finding out about it, or that they could
not have possibly recovered so quickly from their
humiliating defeat in the 1967 war. If Arabs could
not stand in line to get on a bus, how could they
plan to cross the Suez Canal in the face of massive
Israeli defensive lines on the other side?
1973 Lessons Learned
The wrong analytic judgments regarding Arab war
preparations in 1973 offer DI analysts today a few
important lessons, including the following:
� Question the conventional wisdom and regularly
examine your assumptions, especially if analytical
consensus emerges quickly on a particular judg-
ment.
� Park your preconceptions and cultural assump-
tions at the door.
� Learn and relearn the behavior of other leaders,
and factor into your analysis their assumptions
about war and peace�and success and defeat.
� Constantly review the evidence from all sources
and consider alternative explanations and
scenarios to question current judgments.
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
Chapter IV
Significant DI Documents and Illustrations
1. Current Intelligence Bulletin [Excerpt],
8. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
23 May 1967
211
5 October 1973
225
2. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
9. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
3 June 1967
213
6 October 1973
226
3. Mid East Map-1967 Conflict
215
10. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
10 October 1973
229
4. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
6 June 1967
216
11. Map of Egyptian Front-
1973 Conflict
232
5. Notated Mid East Map�
June 1967 Conflict
219
12. Current Intelligence Bulletin, 'Excerpt]
18 October 1973
233
6. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
8 June 1967
220
7. Current Intelligence Bulletin, [Excerpt]
29 September 1973
223
209
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IV/I. CIB [Excerpt], 23 May 1967.
*Egypt-Israel: Nasir 's announcement yesterday that
Egypt will close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has
brought him to the brink of war.
Israel has repeatedly made clear that any blockade
of the gulf would be considered an act of war. Nasir
nevertheless stated that Egypt was prepared to fight and
expressed confidence about the outcome. "Israel today
is not backed by Britain and France as was the case in
1956," he said in his announcement. "It has the United
States, which supports it and supplies it with arms."
�
Having thus laid his prestige on the line, Nasir has
assumed a position from which it would be very difficult
to retreat. U Thant, who arrives in Cairo today, un-
doubtedly will try to dissuade him from carrying out his
declaration, but the chances of success seem very slim.
Nasir stated that ships flying the Israeli flag would
not be permitted to transit the gulf, and according to
press reports from Cairo, said that non-Israeli ships
carrying strategic materials to Israel would also be
stopped. A British ship, the Benvorlich, was heading
northward toward the Strait of Tiran this morning and
may be bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. The nature
of its cargo is unknown.
Israel probably will not take any action until a ship
is forcibly stopped, but the possibility of preemptive ac-
tion cannot be discounted. The Israeli response is not
likely to be confined to the Gulf of Aqaba.
�
Egypt, in preparation for enforcing its policy, has
despatched a coastal artillery company to Sharm ash-
Shaykh, near the Strait of Tiran. Cairo also is building
up its naval and air strength at Hurghada, on the Egyp-
tian coast of the Red Sea about 50 miles from Sharm ash-
Shaykh. Nine torpedo boats were to arrive there yester-
day and a squadron of twelve aircraft, presumably jet
fighters, apparently are to be stationed there. Other
23 May 67 1
'TOP SECRET
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evidence indicates Egypt also has two submarines, a
destroyer, and four OSA guided-missile patrol boats
in the Gulf of Suez. e
If Israel attacks Egypt, Syria almost certainly
would intervene. Iraq and Algeria might also provide
some form of military aid in addition to full political
support. The other Arab states would give Nasir
vocal support but would be unlikely to join the fight.
404
Moscow has not yet commented on Nasir's threat
to close the gulf. Cairo's Middle East News Agency
reports that yesterday the Soviet Party and Govern-
ment sent Nasir a message pledging support for the
Arabs against "imperialist conspiracies." Cairo has
already asked Moscow to speed shipments of .commu-
nications equipment, jet and diesel fuel, ad naval
mines, 4 J and may
have levied other requirements for military materiel.
The Soviets will probably comply, but they are unlikely
to assume a more direct military role. There has.
been no indicationL of any unusual Soviet mili-
rx moves relate e Agle East. flPOP-SEeitET
23 May 67 2
Jb- �
�Peia-c4Heit-er4-'
":1 �
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IV/2. CIB [Excerpt], 3 June 1967.
TOP SECilliT
*Arab States - Israel: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
Cairo has threatened to close the Suez Canal to any
nation which attempts to break the blockade of the Gulf
of Aqaba.
Egyptian Foreign Minibter_Riad said yesterday
that the interests of the maritime countries would be
"endangered" by any:joint action. Cairo's semi-offi-
cial Al-Ahram was more explicit--warning that nations
seeking to break the blockade would be branded "aggres-
sors" and denied use of the waterway.
Israeli
motor torpedo boats may have reconnoitered yesterday
near the Strait of Tiran and been pursued by an Egyp-
tian destroyer
The Syrian Government appears disturbed by the
Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact and is censoring Egyp-
tian news releases circulated in Damascus. Local
press attacks on King Husayn continue.
even before the Nasir-
Husayn rapprochement, officials in Syria's ruling Baath
party were concerned by the way Nasir was re-estab-
lishing himself as leader of the Arabs.and winning both
popular acclaim and the open admiration of many Syrian
army officers. As a result the Baathist regime has
taken precautions to ensure internal security, including
the arrest of some supporters of Nasir.
(continued)
3 Jun 67
1
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-T-GP�SEG-R-E-T
Nasir apparently is making soundings through
King Husayn toward a possible rapprochement with King
Faysal. - �
Nasir
had discussed the question of the Strait of Tiran with the
King and asked him to seek Faysal's cooperation in
stationing Saudi forces opposite the Egyptians at the
Strait so that the blockade would have "an international
stamp."
Yesterday's clash between a group of Syrians and
an Israeli patrol was the most serious incident in sev-
eral weeks. One Syrian and two Israelis were killed,
according to Israeli radio reports which described the
Syrians as Palestinian commandos.
Palestinian saboteurs are also continuing to operate
. _ _
along the Lebanese-Israeli border. '
members of Fatah and other
. _
Palestinian terrorist groups in refugee camps in south-
ern Lebanon are ready to take new action against Israel.
_ within the past few days
Lebanon's army has apprehended 11 infiltrators from
Syria near the Israeli border.
Israeli Labor Minister Yigal Allon insisted yes-
terday that some protection of Israel's borders against
a renewal of Arab terrorist operations was one of three
conditions to be fulfilled if an otherwise "inevitable"
military clash were to be avoided. He said withdrawal
of Egyptian troop concentrations along the border and
the lifting of the blockade in the Strait of Tiran were
the other two conditions. (TOP QECRET
(Map)
3 Jun 67
.TOP SECRET
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1V/4. C1B [Excerpt], 6 June 1967.
C TOP SECRET
Arab States - Israel: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
Cairo may be preparing to launch a campaign
urging strikes against US interests throughout the Arab
world.
Cairo's Voice of the Arabs last night claimed it had
actual proof that US and British aircraft carriers played
a role in the Israeli "aggression," Both Egypt and Syria
in their domestic radiobroadcasts this morning called
on the "Arab masses" to destroy all US and "imperial-
ist" interests in the "Arab homeland." Such statements
have not yet been monitored on Cairo's international
broadcasts, however.
Demonstrations have already taken place against
US embassies and installation all over the Arab world.
Mobs have attacked the US and British embassies in
Tripoli and the US consulate in Benghazi. A march on
Wheelus Air Force Base was prevented, but the head-
quarters of the American-owned Oasis Oil Company was
reportedly taken over by its Libyan employees, who have
been issued orders to close down all oil operations. US
and British embassies in Tunisia have also been sacked,
and the British consulate in Basra, Iraq, has been at-
tacked. The US cultural center in Algiers has been
ransacked, and demonstrations took place in Khartoum.
Arab oil-producing countries, now meeting in
Baghdad, say they will stop selling oil to any country
which supports Israel in the Middle East fighting. Any
oil company making oil available to Israel "from any
source or in any form" would be subjected to a collec-
tive ban in the Arab world. Baghdad radio said this
morning that the pumping of Iraqi oil had been stopped
"because of US and UK attitudes."
Israel appears to have gained an early and perhaps
overwhelming victory in the air but the progress of the
war on the ground is still unclear.
(continued)
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(Continued)
1.5,117,4,1
TOPSECRET'
In Egypt, Israeli air raids were directed against
� Egyptian airfields and also against Port Said. Three
Syrian. airfields were hit. In Amman, Jordan the air-
field, the radio station, and the royal palace were
bombed. .
, ten Israeli planes which entered Leba-
non withdrew after being met with antiaircraft fire.
The Israeli military has stated that Syrian and
Jordanian planes have attacked targets within Israel.
According to Baghdad radio, Iraqi planes raided an
Israeli airport and destroyed seven planes, but this
is unconfirmed.
� If Israeli claims regarding damages to Arab com-
bat aircraft�mostly by strafing and bombing--are valid,
they have destroyed the entire Jordanian inventory of
21, two thirds of the Syrian inventory of 69, and 250 of
about 430 Egyptian aircraft, The Egyptians still had at
last report at least 43 of their original 55 SU-7 fighters
and about 120 MIGs, but their light bomber force ap-
pears to be no longer effective. Lebanon's 20 fighters
are still operational, and the Iraqis have apparently
lost only nine of approximately 135 fighters and bombers.
The Israelis also claim to have destroyed several Arab
transports and helicopters.
Arab counterclaims of 158 Israeli combat aircraft
destroyed seem grossly exaggerated, but the exact losses
to the Israeli force of approximately 270 planes are not
known. The Israelis announced the loss of 19 pilots and
19 planes, which presumes none were destroyed on the
ground.
Firm information on ground action remains sparse.
The Israelis claim they have captured the "outer posi-
tion' of Al Kuntillah in southeastern Sinai and reached
the outskirts of Al-Arish in northern Sinai. They also
say they have taken Khan Yunis in the southern part of
the Gaza Strip, the scene of the heaviest fighting. If
their :claim is true, the Israelis have cut off Egyptian
and Palestinian troops in the northern section of the
Strip. (continued)
6 Jun 67 . 2
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TOP DECRET
AP%
Yesterday evening, Egyptian Foreign Minister
Riyad told Egypt's ambassador at the UN that the Is-
raelis had been forced to move out of Khan Yunis in
the direction of Abu Uwayqilah, "but suffered severe
losses." .
Riyad seemed generally optimistic about the course
of the fighting. earlier- he had
been less confident,
There has been no evidence to confirm an Israeli
claim that prior to the outbreak of fighting, the Egyp-
tian 4th armored division had moved forward to the
Al Kuntillah area along with a force of division strength,
comprising infantry and armored elements. The Is-
raelis claim that hostilities broke out when they moved
to intercept a force in this area moving toward Israeli
territorY.
In Jordan, King Husayn said this morning that the Is-
raelis seem intent on pulverizing Jordan's army and the
country's border areas. He claimed that Jerusalem's
holy places were also endangered. Without an air force,
the King said Jordan is defenseless, but that Israel is
pushing ahead in a "punitive fashion.']
yesterday's official Soviet statement on the war
predictably condemned Israel and promised "resolute"
support to the Arabs. Moscow said it reserved the right
to take "all steps that might be necessitated by the situa-
tion" but made no specific commitment.
The UN Security 'Council reconvenes at 11:30 EDT
this morning to again consider a ceasefire resolution.
_ Egypt would insist on a withdrawal of armed
forces to their pre-hostilities position. He also suggested,
'however, that Egypt mint change its mind if, in the mean-
time; its own armed forces had moved Into Israel. (TOP
-smelter � (Map)
6 Jun 67
3
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
IV/6. CIB [Excerpt], 8 June 1967.
AST,
*Arab States - Israel: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
Military Developments: The Israelis may. have
broken their agreement with Jordan to comply with the
UN's cease-fire order, which is also being disregarded
on other fronts.
Israeli tanks were moving into
northwestern Jordan. '.
fighting had slackened following announcement of the
cease-fire at 4:00 PM EDT yesterday--the UN deadline--
but that it picked up during the night. The Israelis are
said to be shelling Jordanian positions near the Syrian
border city of �Daria.
The Israelis may be making a thrust into Jordan
with the ultimate aim of attacking Syria. So far, Israeli-
Syrian encounters have been relatively small-scale. The
Syrians, however, issued a communigue this morning
stating that Israeli planes were raiding Syrian positions
"in the northern and central sectors of the front."
Amman has not communicated with Jordanian
forces remaining west of the Jordan River since late
on 7 June. Jordanian officials are claiming privately
that "80 percent" of the Jordanian brigades have been
lost, and all military combat vehicles are out of action.
Israeli forces took an estimated 4,000 Jordanian pris-
oners during the capture of the Arab part of Jerusalem.
41rab refugees are reported streaming eastward across
the Jordan River.
Advance Israeli armor elements approached the
Suez Canal so rapidly on 7 June that they apparently cut
off a major portion of the retreating Egyptian forces.
At least half of Egypt's armor and about 100,000 troops
were in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip prior to
5 June.
public realization of the Arab defeat has generated
strong feelings against Nasir and "Soviet betrayal in
Egypt's hour of need."
(continued)
8 Jun 67
1
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Continued)
r TOP �EGRET
Nevertheless, the Egyptians have officially an-
nounced their refusal to comply with the cease-fire order.
Arab Reactions: LAM Government installations
and ARAMCO facilities at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, have
been damaged by mobs, and the consulate in Aleppo,
Syria was attacked and burned yesterday. Inflamma-
tory broadcasts claiming US and British participation.in
the hostilities, continue to fan anti-American sentiment.
UAFt officials at the UN are reported to be circulating a
charge that the US gave Israel intelligence obtained from
satellite photography.
Saudi Arabia has joined Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Syria, and Iraq in cutting off oil shipments to the West.
Bahrain has decided to stop tanker loading and refinery
operations have been slowed. Libya has stopped oil
pumping and banned exports although operators and ex-
perts have been told to stand fast.in order to reonen
production when it becomes feasible. I
1
Lebanon has decided only to recall its ambassadors
from the US and Great Britain at this time.
Lebanon decided
not to break relations completely
The Sudanese foreign minister has stated that
althougl the Sudan is breaking off diplomatic relations,
the government would like to retain economic, cultural,
and consular relations.
(continues)
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
(Continued)
TOP SECRET
..7
Soviet Activities: The Soviets delivered a harshly
worded note to Israel yesterday threatening to break-re-
lations if Israel did not comply with the cease-fire order.
They warned, of the posaibility of further unspecified
measures.
�
�
Izvestia yesterday carried a dispatch from its corres-
pondent in London attributing the Arab severance of:
relations with the UK-to "information on the Arab side"
about British participation in the war. The paper did
not mention the US or comment on the Arab charges
against the UK. Soviet propagandists continue, however,
. to accuse the US and UK of. encouraging Israel to begin
the war.
Late Note: ..Israel's Foreign Office this morning denied
that Israel had breached the cease-fire agreement with
Jordan. iSECIZFAI
8 Jun 63 3
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Chapter IV
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IV/7. CIB [Excerpt], 29 September 1973
EGYPT: President Sadat's addresa.to'the'aaiiiin
last-Hight was primarily a fence-mending effort de-
signed to mollify and undercut domestic and foreign--
primarily Soviet--opponents of his recent policy in-
novations. At the same time, he made no apologies
for those policies and made it clear that he will
pursue them. Although generally circumspect toward
the US, Sadat made some uncharacteristically benevo-
lent statements, reflecting a guarded optimism that
Washington intends some action to break the Middle
East impasse.
' The most dramatic portion of the speech, made
on the anniversary af,President Nasir's death, came
at its conclusion when Sadat announced an amnesty
for a group of students arrested during demonstra-
tions early this year, as well as the reinstatement.
of a large number of journalists purged for their
leftist views. The conciliatory gestures are de-
signed to head off the possibility of further stu-
dent disturbances when the school year opens next
month, to answer legitimate student grievances, and
to give substance to Sadat's moves toward social
liberalization. �
On the subject of his domestic and foreign
policy reforms, Sadat, in essence, invoked the
memory of Nasir to support his program of change
away from Nasirism and socialism. Noting that one.
of Nasirism's most important characteristics is
"its ability to respond to constant movement," Sadat
explained his own policy of "evolution"' as both.
based on his predecessor's movement and unique in
itself. Although intending to ease the misgivings
of remaining Nasir devotees, Sadat could not resist
the temptation to emphasize the greater merit of .
his own program oVer.Nasir's; his government has
proved, he said, "that the man came from the nation,
and not the nation from the man."
(continued)
29 Sep 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
(Continued)
'1943 SECRET.
Although Sadat derided the US for supporting
rsrel and echoed his usual rejection of an interim
agreement to reopen the Suez Canal and institute
a partial Israeli withdrawal, he expressed pleased
surprise at Secretary of State Kissinger's meeting .
on 25 September with Arab representatives at the UN.
Sadat noted that Egypt has already* made its position
clear to the US, but he did not use the occasion to
spell out the controversial specifics of that posi-
tion. Sadat remains skeptical of US intentions,
but his approach reflects a sense of expectation .
toward possible US moves on the Arab-Israeli conflict
and a desire to avoid dampening prospects for move-
ment. He made a point of noting at the end of his
speech that he had deliberately avoided rhetoric on
"the battle."
Sadat took a balanced approach toward Egypt's
delicate relations with the USSR. Without ever
mentioning the Soviets directly, he explained policy
changes that have been disturbing Moscow in terms
intended to ease Soviet misgivings, but he did not
give any indication that he plans to alter his new
moves away from socialism. Sadat is not a friend
of the Soviets, but he wants to maintain good rela-
tions with them, and he has been at pains, since
initiating his policy realignment in July, to por-
tray the Soviets as political allies.
This relaxed attitude has met with a testy
Soviet reaction.
His statements last night!
indicate greater restraint, but further Soviet
. chiding could bring a heated Egyptian response that
yould risk further damaging Soviet interests.
29 Sep 73 Cerund Intelligence Elulletin
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
IV/8. CIB [Excerpt], 5 October 1973.
EGYPT: The exercise and alert activities under
way in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and
more realistic than previous exercises, but they do
not appear to be preparations for a military offen-
sive against Israel.
eti
WSW<
Cairo usually conducts such exercises in the
fall and spring. The scenario usually involves
defending against an Israeli assault across the Suez
Canal and then launching a counterattack. It is
unusual, but not without precedent, for Egyptian
forces to exercise during Ramadan, the Moslem month
of religious fasting.
Previous Egyptian exercises have been more
paper-and-communications exercises than the current
one, which evidently involves the mobilization of
larger numbers of personnel. The actual number of
troops involved is not known. The movement of com-
mando units and the use of a more secure means of
communication make the exercise more realistic. .Be-
cause of this realism, Cairo may have put its air
defense and air forces on alert in preparation for
the exercise and as a precaution against an Israeli
reaction. The call-up of air force reservists is
on a larger scale than that which occurred during
the last major exercise in March,-but this may be
necessary because of the length of the alert.
Tel Aviv assesses the Egyptian activity as
normal, large-scale maneuvers and has not alerted
its forces. (Tor ODCREIT
5 Oct 73
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
IV/9. CIB [Excerpt], 6 October 1973
-TOP SEC-RBT--
ISRAEL-EGYPT-SYRIA: Both.the Israelis and the
Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the
military activities of the other, although neither
side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities.
81W4,1
Most of these flights probably are being used
to evacuate Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria.
_
6 Oct 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
=CV=
(continued)
1
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Continued)
--T-AP CEC
In any case, Soviet attention to the Middle East '
has risen sharply in the last few days.
-
Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are con-
tinuing, but elements of the air force and navy ap-
pear to be conducting normal training activity. While
the Israelis have reported a build-up of tanks and
artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot be con-
firmed. The Egyptians usually conduct such exercises
in the fall and spring, but the current exercise is
more realistic in that it includes the movement of '
troops and the mobilization of more reservists.
Syrian air activity appears to be normal, but
there have been a number of reports,
, that Damascus is redeploying .
some of its ground forces in the Golan Heights area. �
The Israeli attitude toward these developments
has changed considerably since 1 October, when they
viewed the activity in Egypt as normal and that in
Syria as defensive in nature. During the past few
days, the Israelis have conducted air reconnaissance
of both the Suez Canal and Golan Heights areas.
. but the tlights apparently drew no
Syrian reaction.
For Egypt, a military initiative makes little
sense'at this critical juncture of President Sadat's
reorientation of domestic and foreign policies.
Another round of hostilities would almost certainly
destroy Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate
the economy and would run counter to his current
efforts to build a united Arab political front, par-
ticularly among the less militant, oil-rich states,
(Continued)
6 Oct 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
(Continued)
For the normally cautious Syrian President, a
military adventure now would be suicidal, and he has
said so. Far from seeking revenge for the loss of
their MIG-21s to the Israeli Air Force; the Syrians.
appear to be bracing for a possible second blow from
Israel.
Syrian fears, now being reflected in Damascus
radiobroadcasts, could lead to a mobilitatibn of �
their defenses, which in turn could alarm and gal-
vanize the Israelis. Such a cycle of actions and
reactions increases the risk of military clashes
which neither side originally intended. tr&P-SECRZT
�
k.S�.713te
6 Oct. 73
'Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
IV/10. CIB [Excerpt], 10 October 1973.
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: The war continues to be
bitterly contested in the Sinai and the Golan Heights,
with no sign that hostilities will,. end soon.
Both sides have seen heavy fighting, but few
successes on the Sinai front. The Israelis have
mounted air strikes against Egyptian forces on the
east bank, the Port Said area, at least two airfields
in the interior of Egypt, and the bridges that the
Egyptians keep rebuilding across the canal. This air
activity, however, has failed to halt the cross-canal
reinforcement and resupply of the formidable Egyptian
force on the east bank. The Israelis have publicly
acknowledged that they have had to withdraw from the
Bar Lev defense line to positions slightly within
the Sinai. The Egyptians have solidified their con-
trol.of the east bank, but have not made significant
advances. In naval action, the Israelis claim to
have sunk three Egyptian Osa-class missile patrol
boats in an engagement midway between Port Said and
Alexandria.
Hard fighting continued on the Golan Heights
after dark last night, with both sides attempting to
gain control of the much-disputed town of Qunaytirah.
Effective Israeli control of the air allowed constant
air strikes with relatively few losses--an advantage
not enjoyed during much of the earlier fighting. Un-
der this cover, the Israelis stabilized their posi-
tions along lines roughly paralleling the pre-October
cease-fire line. This improvement in the Israeli po-
sition, however, has come at a high cost. After four
days of fighting, Israeli losses are believed to ex-
ceed 80 aircraft, 600 tanks, and 1,000 men, against
Arab losses of 140 aircraft, 650 tanks, and 6,000 to
7,000 men.
Israel yesterday mounted its first air strikes
against Damascus proper, seeking to destroy the Syr-
ian Air Force Headquarters, the Defense Ministry, and
General Army Headquarters. In the process, the So-
viet Cultural Center was hit, giving rise to press
accounts of substantial Soviet casualties. Damascus
later denied that any Russians were killed.
(continued)
1
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
(Continued)
The Israeli Government is being criticized--al-
beit quietly--by some elements of the public for its
failure to launch a pre-emptive military strike and
its failure to mobilize earlier. When the relatively
high casualties and materiel losses are made public,
bitterness may well intensify, and pressure for deep
.ground strikes into Egypt and Syria might grow. The
government has attempted to prepare the public for a
drawn out war, acknowledging that "in the south, the
struggle is becoming more intensive and decisive
turns are awaited."
:(47.44
� Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Tunisia reportedly have contributed or are consider-
ing contributing military support to Egypt and Syria.
Such support--and the motives of those offering it--
is, important more for its political than its military
implications. Saudi Arabia, for example, is reported
to have expressed its willingness to enter the battle
if requested to do sb by Sadat. Saudi participation.
would be only symbolic, but it would further enhance
the conservative Faysal's growing prominence in Arab
politics. Both King Husayn of Jordan and President
Franjiyah of Lebanon are hard pressed to explain
their inaction, and have been humiliated by Israeli
violations of their territory.
. The Arab press has begun to criticize the US,
both for the stand taken.by the US at the United
Nations and for the "menacing .deployment of the
Sixth Fleet." According to press reports, Kuwait
has called for an immediate meeting of Arab petroleum
ministers to discuss how oil might be used as a
weapon in the current conflict. Palestinian media,
but no Arab governments, have called on the Arab.
states to halt the flow of oil to the West.
Yesterday's Security Council meeting on the
Middle East was dominated by Arab-Israeli recrimina-
tions resulting from Israeli air attacks on the
Damascus and Cairo areas. Israel apologized for
causing civilian casualties, but Soviet delegate
-Malik, incensed by erroneous press accounts of So-
viet casualties, blasted the Israelis and walked-
out of the session. No resolutions were tabled
_
(continued)
10 Oct 73 CentralIntelligmweBOdin 2
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Continued)
�P0? 3ECREF-
At hOme, the SOviets appear .to be playing down
the Middle East conflict. Premier Kosygin mentioned
the figEting Only briefly in his Speech yesterday at
a luncheon for visiting Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka. In Arab capitals, however, Soviet diplomats
have been active. In Cairo, Ambassador Vinogradov
had his fourth meeting in As many days with Presi-
dent Sadat, and top Soviet officials have met with
Palestinian leaders and government officials in A.17
geria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen (Sana). The
thrust of the Soviet message is-that Moscow is on
the Arabs' side, but that it is Up to other Arab
states to provide Egypt and Syria with "the greatest
possible aid and support." 0(TO 3DCRflT
10 Oct 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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. . . _
IV; 1 I. Nkip of 1,g,Pro
= WWI Oft
10 Mx-Mbar 1973
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
IV/12. CIB [Excerpt], 18 October 1973.
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Military action in the
Sinai-Was.heavy yesterday, while fighting on the
Syrian front was primarily limited to artillery duels
and some air action.
Both Egypt and Israel reported that large-scale
tank battles were under way throughout yesterday in
the central sector of the Egyptian front. An Is-
raeli military spokesman characterized the armored
clashes as the biggest in Israeli history; he claimed
that 90-100 Egyptian tanks were destroyed in the
fighting. Concentrated air strikes on the Port Said
area continued yesterday and a raid by Israeli frog-
men against the port took place, reportedly damaging
several ship. The Egyptian Air Force was more ac-
tive against Israeli aircraft and on several occa-
sions pursued attacking planes back across the canal.
Egyptian aggressiveness in the air may reflect a de-
crease in the effectiveness of their SAM defense sys-
tem.
The fate of the small Israeli force on the west
bank north of the Great Bitter Lake remains uncertain.
Cairo claims that the force, which crossed the canal
two days ago, has been wiped out. The Israelis, how-
ever, say the force is still operational.
There was little movement on the Syrian front
yesterday. Minor ground clashes and artillery ex-
changes took place approximately along the same lines
as the previous day. In the air, the Israelis re-
portedly struck Latakia and Tartus, and claim to have
downed eight Syrian aircraft. The Syrians claim five
Israeli aircraft were destroyed. The Saudi Arabian
force in Syria, which has yet to see battle, is lo-
cated just south of Al Harrah.
18 Oct 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Fifty Years of Informing Policy: The Directorate of Intelligence
(Continued)
T.
POIPt.'`
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban indicated yester-
day that Tel Aviv is ready to examine a cease-fire
proposal, either for a cessation of hostilities "in
place" or along the lines, which existed prior to the
current fighting. Eban'said he thought Damascus was
"psychologically" ready to Accept a cease-fire, but
he doubted Cairo's readiness. Egypt, according to
Eban, is "living In a euphoria that goes beyond the
realities of its military situation." Eban discounted
the likelihood that Moscow is now in a mood to par-
ticipate in a peace effort. � He said that the Soviet
Union is either unable to influence Egypt or finds
the present situation to Moscow's advantage;
Eban said that Israel accepts the precise terms.
of Security Council Resolution 242, and would agree
to withdraw to secure and recognized boundaries, but '
not to "total, immediate, or unconditional withdrawal."
He went on to explain though that withdrawal to the
June 1967 borders is out of the question, .and would
mean'suicide.for Israel. Eban said that the clear
lesson of the last two weeks to every Israeli is .the
need for secure boundaries. He said-he. hoped that if
a resolution is introduced in the Security Council
that it would simply call for a cease-fire. No at-
tempt should be made, he said, to combine in one .
package elements of a final settlement and a cease-
fire itself.
In his first public statement since the outbreak
of the current hostilities, King Husayn yesterday' told
Israel that it could have peace or territory, but not.
both. He urged Tel Aviv to opt for peace before time
runs out. The Jordanian monarch described Tel Aviv's
policy as an expansionist one, sugar-coated Under the
guise of trying to maintain secure boundaries. Secure
boundaries, he added, cannot be assured by positions
on the ground, rather security can only be established
"when people have a willingness to live together." .
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
18 Oct 73
'OP SECRThT
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Chapter IV
The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Continued)
CHe added that Jordan will never give up its claim to
territory lost during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The
King made no mention of the demands of some Arabs that
the Jordanian Army launch an attack against Israel
from Jordanian territory, opening up a third front.
Rather defensively, he described the Jordanian-Israeli
border as the "longest confrontation line" and said
that his army's defensive posture prevented Tel Aviv
from mounting an operation which would endanger the
entire northern front. Israel's Prime Minister Meir
advised Husayn yesterday to stay out of the war.
18 Oct 73
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