<SANITIZED> THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. MILITARY STRIKE AND ON THE UN OIL-FOR-FOOD SALES PROGRAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06565964
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02480
• Publication Date: January 28, 1998

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Classified by: UNSPECIFIED
Reason: UNSPECIFIED
Declassify on: X1
(SWOCtIsIF) SU BJ: THE POSSIBILITY OF A (W(1 )
U.S. MILITARY STRIKE AND ON THE UN OIL-FOR-FOOD SALES PROGRAM (b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency
28 January 1998
Doc Number
(S/NF)
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
(U) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
(U) INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS rui-(N--URC,ON - - - -
EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT
DIST: 28 JANUARY 1998
(U) THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED SZC-1.71,11J Illt--Y-LaRZN IN ITS ENTIRETY.
(U) REPORT CLASS S E/R E TNOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAI S-DISSFMINATInN AN py-mArnom QF
INFORMATIONCS)IN 'TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. END OF
MESSAGE SECRET.
IRAQI PRESIDENT
((SADDAM)) HUSAYN WILL BACK DOWN AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR IF FACED WITH THE REALITY OF A
MILITARY STRIKE BY THE UNITED STATES. EVERY TIME THE U.S. (b)(1)
GOVERNMENT GOES THE EXTRA MILE DIPLOMATICALLY REGARDING THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION(b)(3)
(UNSCOM) INSPECTION TEAMS OR OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO THE UN SANCTIONS, SADDAM IS
ONLY TOO HAPPY TO TAKE THE EXTRA MILE.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S C/NF) 2. SADDAM DOES NOT MIND "PIN PRICK" MILITARY STRIKES OR (b)(1)
ACTIONS, RATHER HE LIKES THEM BECAUSE SADDAM HAS THE ILLUSION THAT IF IRAQ IS ATTACKEI(b)(3)
THE ACTION WOULD GARNER ARAB SUPPORT AND ENTHRONE HIM AS THE LEADER OF THE ARAB
WORLD. HOWEVER. SADDAM DOES NOT WANT TO ENDURE (b)(1)
SUSTAINED, STRATEGIC BOMBING LIKE HE SAW IN JANUARY 1991. AT THE TIME OF THE INVASION 0(b)(3)
KUWAIT IN JULY 1990, SADDAM HAD NOT EXPERIENCED SUSTAINED BOMBING AND BELIEVED HE
WOULD WIN ANY WAR. REALITY HAS SUNK IN AND HE DOES NOT WANT A REPEAT EXPERIENCE.
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SADDAM TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTRA DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO
RESOLVE THE STANDOFF IHOWEVER, THE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN THE
IRAQI PRESS OF THE MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND
S-U-GESTIONS THE PRESIDENT WILL ORDER A STRIKE AS A DIVERSIONARY MEASURE.
FSADDAM VERY LIKELY THINKS THERE WILL BE A STRIKE AS A POLITICAL DIVERSION IF
NOTHING ELSE.
�3"/Zer711f1 4
THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S (b)(1)
COMMENTS ON IRAQ AND THE UN SANCTIONS DURING A TELEVISED INTERVIEW ON 21 JANUARY. (b)(3)
HEN ASKED ABOUT LIFTING SANCTIONS IF IRAQ IS GIVEN A CLEAN BILL (D)(])
OF HEALTH, THE U.S. RESPONSE IS USUALLY TIED TO WHETHER OR NOT SADDAM IS STILL IN (b)(3)
POWER. HOWEVER, THIS TIME THE RESPONSE WAS NOT TOTALLY PREDICATED UPON SADDAM'S
STATUS, BUT THAT THE QUESTION OF LIFTING SANCTIONS WOULD BE A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE
AMFRICAN PFOPI F (b)(1)
IF IT IS (b)(3)
PERCEIVED THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY FOR IRAQ TO GET OUT FROM UNDER THE SANCTIONS,
EVEN AN IRAQ WITH SADDAM, THIS COULD BE USED AS A CARROT TO PURSUADE SADDAM TO
COMPLIANCE.
73G.Z1F) 51 THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN VERY STERN IN THEIR ADVICE THA(b)(1 )
1
IRAQ MUST DEVISE A FORMULA PROVIDING THE UNSCOM INSPECTION TEAMS WITH ACCESS iTAD_TA(b)(3)
PRESIDENTIAL SITES. IF THE RUSSIANS, OR OTHERS, ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT
THFRF WII I RE A RRiTisH-U.S. ULTIMATUM DELIVERED TO (b)(1)
SADDAM. IF THAT HAPPENS ITHE UNITED NATIONS WILL HAVE TO PULI(D)(3)
OUT THE UNSCOM OFFICIALS IN IRAQ, AS WELL AS THE 100 PLUS PEOPLE WHO ARE MONITORING
THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM AND OIL SALES WILL BE SUSPENDED (b)(1)
I IN THIS CLASH (b)(3)
BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE U.S., THE OIL SALES WILL BE SUSPENDED AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE.
6,LALE) 6. REGARDING THE OIL-FOR-FOOD SALES, RAQ IS NOT (b)(1)
OFFICIALLY ASKING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE VOLUME OF OIL IT CAN SELL. RATHER, THE (b)(3)
GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED IN INCREASING THE STAFFING AND STREAMLINING THE APPROVAL
PROCESS FOR CONTRACTS FOR HUMANIWIAN SUPPI IFS HOWFVFR IF AN INCRFASF IN CRUDE
VOLUME IS APPROVED IRAQ WILL TAKE IT I (b)(1)
(b)(3)
IRAQ'S CURRENT EXPORT CAPACITY IS 1.5 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY. ,
(S//0 F) 7. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME (b)(1)
MINISTE TARIQ (('AZIZ)) HAS SAID THAT WHEN THE NEW INSPECTION TEAMS BEGIN THEIR (b)(3)
TECHNICAL REVIEW OF FILES AND DOCUMENTS IN FEBRUARY, EVERYONE WILL SEE THE PROGRESS
IRAQ HAS mAnF TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH WEAPONS DESTRUCTION/DISPOSAL. IN REALITY,
AZIZ IS UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT THOSE TECHNICAL REVIEWS WILL BE A (b)(1)
SUCCESS. (b)(3)
(S) /NF) 8.IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER MUHAMMAD SAID (b)(1)
KAZIM L-USAHHAF11 HAD JUST RETURNED TO BAGHDAD FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN TEHRAN. (b)(3)
ITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE TALKS. A MAJOR STUMBLING (D)(1)
BLOCK CONTINUES TO BE THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF IRANIAN POWS REMAINING IN IRAQ (b)(3)
FROM THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQ'S POSITION IS THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE, WHILE IRAN INSISTS THE
NUMBER IS MORE LIKE 5,000.
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(SHOC/NF) 9. HIKMAT AL-HAJJU, THE IRAQI (b)(1)
DIPLOMAT RECENTLY MURDERED IN JORDAN HE IS PUZZLED BY THE CASE. ON (b)(3)
THE ONE HAND, HIKMAT HAJJU WAS FAIRLY CLOSE TO SADDAM'S FAMILY AND TO THE IRAQI
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ASSASSINATION WAS PERPETRATED IN A
SMOOTH AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER, TO INCLUDE THE USE OF THE KNIFE TO SLIT THE
DIPLOMAT'S THROAT, SUGGESTING THE SERVICE WAS INDEED INVOLVED.
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