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Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCL-mooiricutiry uoc VINILT IF INTELLIGENCE IN FOCUS DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Strategic-Levelting � Surprise JANUARY 2013 CIA-DI-12-01775 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PRACTICAL USE UNCLASSIFIED//FoRFELcjL USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIL 01-1-1LAHL UJt.UIMLY Anticipating Strategic-Level Surprise JANUARY 2013 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PRACTICAL USE This assessment was prepared by the Office of Russian and European Analysis. It may contain copyrighted material that is for official use only. Further reproduction or dissemination of that material is subject to copyright restrictions. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Eurasia and Regional Dynamics Issue Manager, OREA, UNCLASSIFIED//FOR S L USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ FICIAL USE ONLY fable Of Contents Key Findings Scope Note Anticipating Strategic-Level Surprise: 1 Analytic Frameworks for Practical Use Introduction: Anticipating 1 Discontinuities �Why It Is Hard 1 A Typology of Surprise�An Aid to Early Recognition Type I Surprise: Sudden Hostile Action 7 7 Subtypes and Examples of Sudden Hostile Action 14 Barriers to Early Perception of Type I Surprise 17 Aids To Anticipating Type I Surprise Stealthy Surprise? Sudden Hostile Actions Using Novel Methods 74 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Type II Surprise: System Shock 28 (b)(3) Subtypes and Examples of 28 (b)(3) System Shock Barriers to Early Perception of 30 (b)(3) Type II Surprise Aids To Anticipating 34 (b)(3) Type II Surprise Daisy Chains of System Shocks 38 (b)(3) UNCL "-^1 z fl RI I S/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ICITTZ-8-1--Z1C AL Type III Surprise: Tectonic Transformation 39 (b)(3) Subtypes and Examples 39 (b)(3) of Tectonic Transformation Barriers to Early Perception of 42 (b)(3) Type III Surprise 42 (b)(3) Aids To Anticipating Type III Surprise "Epiphanies" as Clarifiers of Type 44 (b)(3) III Change �The Case of the Atomic Bomb Techniques Helpful in Anticipating 46 (b)(3) All Types of Surprise for Analysts 48 (b)(3) Resources Appendix A: Alternative Ways of 49 (b)(3) Categorizing Surprise Appendix B: Academic Resources on Surprise 51 (b)(3) Appendix C: Unclassified IC Training Aids 56 (b)(3) Table Of Contents UNCLASSIFIEDUF0 USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE FICIAL USE ONLY Key Findings Anticipating strategic-level surprises�the sudden outbreaks of wars, revolutions, genocides, or economic calamities that affect core US interests�remains the hardest task for Intelligence Community (IC) analysts. Such surprises can include sudden hostile actions targeted at the United States or its allies, as well as unexpected developments�such as the sudden fall of a government�that are not aimed at the United States but that directly or indirectly affect US interests, for good or ill. A review of the many strategic-level surprises that have befallen all the major powers since the onset of World War II indicates recurring patterns of surprise, including in the following areas: The three types of events that tend to surprise us. The barriers to early perception and warning of these various types of surprise. The approaches and tools that can assist early recognition and warning of looming surprises (see figure 1). Type I. Sudden Hostile Action. This type of surprise involves abrupt, deliberate action by a unified actor�an armed force, a state, a terrorist cell, or a radical group�intended to disorient, defeat, or destroy an unprepared opponent. Typically concentrated in space and time, subtypes of such actions include surprise attacks, coups, diplomatic surprises, strategic power plays, military-technological surprises, or the initiation or escalation of major human rights abuses. Type II. System Shock. This type of surprise involves the abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems, such as a state, an empire, an economy, or an international organization or alliance. The action in system shock can occur in weeks, months, or years, but it still represents a dramatic acceleration in the rate of change from the previous status quo. Type II surprises are the result of human actions but not the result of a master plan executed by any one controlling actor. Subtypes of such shocks include the popular overthrow of a ruler, the failure of a state, the onset of a genuine revolution, a deep recession or hyperinflation, the breakdown of an alliance or international body, or the outbreak of widespread communal violence. Type III. Tectonic Transformation. This type of surprise often includes sweeping nonlinear changes to an entire domain or region, such as a continental economy or a regional military balance. Unlike the first two types of surprise, it does not involve sudden, obvious change but rather large-scale, cumulative evolutionary changes that transform with gathering momentum the entire domain over a period of years or decades�along with the strategic, political, and economic systems therein. Subtypes include industrial and technological revolutions, the rise of new powers; the birth of new ideological and social movements or the transformation of existing ones, or revolutions in military affairs. These transformations disrupt the status quo, force leaders and institutions to respond, punish maladaptive systems, and often lead to further discontinuities of all types. UNCL Acciricrl"r 1'1 A I Iler Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 �Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED// IAL USE ONLY ome barriers to early recognition of looming dangers are internal to intelligence agencies. These barriers include: IC organizational barriers to information sharing and learning; pressures for group consensus and "clean story lines," which tend to limit discussion of nonlinear or unlikely outcomes; analysts' mind-sets, biases, and cognitive limits, which weaken their ability to anticipate discontinuous changes; and a reluctance to warn for fear of crying wolf, of being wrong, of upsetting the group consensus, or of riling superiors. The following approaches, tools, and concepts may help analysts to surmount the barriers to early recognition and warning of looming discontinuities, even in cases where actionable intelligence reporting is wanting. These methods are intended to supplement�not replace�substantive expertise and sound tradecraft. Indeed, they will work most effectively when employed by teams of analytic experts. Sudden Hostile Action. Analysts can better anticipate sudden hostile action by familiarizing themselves with the strategic patterns that tend to be more conducive to surprise and by rigorously examining the incentives and motivations for would-be hostile actors, including by: dentifying historical patterns of sudden hostile action drawn from case studies of precedents that may be analogous to current strategic circumstances in some significant aspects. Evaluating how closely current situations align with the preconditions for surprise identified in scholarly literature on intelligence and strategic surprise. Getting into the heads of would-be hostile actors to assess their calculus for considering surprise in analytically sophisticated ways that avoid mirror imaging, rational actor assumptions, or caricatures. Conducting simulations, war games, and exercises to identify possible situational incentives and,pressures on adversaries to strike suddenly. Monitoring the rhetoric and vocabulary of foreign actors for signs that they are losing patience with the status quo, heralding their readiness for drastic remedies, or mobilizing followers to prepare them for sacrifice and violence. ) Brainstorming the vulnerabilities of would-be victims of sudden hostile action, via such methods as intelligence prennortems and defensive casing�critically surveying one's own defenses to assess blue force weak points, critical targets, and readiness. System Shock. IC analysts can supplement intelligence reporting on the systems and networks that they are responsible for�states, alliances, insurgencies, or economies�with concepts and approaches that bolster anticipation of the possibilities for rapid, discontinuous change, including by: Assessing the strengths and vulnerabilities of an entire system to better anticipate system shifts and tipping points; applying some basic concepts from the study of complex adaptive systems�including feedback loops, emergence, herd behavior, nonlinearity, or butterfly effects�can help. Employing far-domain analogies from the realms of science, medicine, and engineering�phase transitions, critical mass, contagion, perfect storm, brittleness, or "normal accidents"�to help conceptualize sudden, dramatic departures from a seemingly stable equilibrium in the domains of national security and economic affairs. Widening the range of imaginable outcomes via well-crafted scenarios, alternative futures, or simulations can help analysts avoid single-point predictions� the bane of sound strategic foresight. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) iv Key Findings UNCI AssiFiFM/FnP IISF (1NI v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIEW/F FICIAL USE ONLY Tectonic Transformation. Tectonic transformation involves such long-term, large-scale changes that traditional intelligence sources are of even less use than they are in anticipating system shocks. Instead, the following techniques can help analysts dispel the "poverty of imagination": Adopting multiframe perspectives via outside opinions, nonmainstream thinking, or new sources of data and information can provide insights besides those circulating in the usual intelligence channels, challenge the conventional wisdom, and test mainstream hypotheses. Brainstorming the core drivers or signature technologies of national, regional, or global systems and their variegated effects on other domains with a diverse group of experts across disciplines can help analysts expand the range of imaginable scenarios and boost their anticipation of transformational changes on a large-scale. Aids To Anticipating All Types of Discontinuities. For all types of looming surprise, FC analysts should scrutinize anomalous events, outlier data, and incongruous information. The initial clues of impending discontinuities�analogous to the preshocks of an earthquake�are often isolated, irregular, and ragged, but they deserve extra attention. Hunches prompted by anomalous data can be valuable prods for reexamining baseline assessments. If done on a regular basis, stability audits�analytic surveys designed to spur respondents' thinking about evolving system dynamics, possible surprises, existing assumptions, and key information gaps�can expose the weaknesses of once-stable systems and the breakdown of old analytic paradigms over time. Intelligence premortems�which postulate that an existing analytic line is wrong�can also help the IC prevent premature closure, go beyond straight line extrapolations, and brainstorm hypotheses that could better explain new or discrepant data. Integrating analysis of possible discontinuities into mainline analysis can help IC products to address a wider range of possible outcomes. Key Findings 7re44.-Q_FFICIAL USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24C06606667 ) Type I. Sudden Hostile Action ate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or ist an unprepared target CT 7.3 [U/ i 01 Type II. System Shock Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems (such as a state, empire, or economy) uo] Type III. Ti Sweeping changes in regional o system, ideologies and religions, so in Pearl Harbor in 1941 m Israel in the 1973 .Arab-Israeli war 11 September 2001 -ate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force, 734 utionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or >?ared opponent 1:3 1:3 CD . r E such as the Soviet Unions blockade of Berlin fro:in-land- � 73[948 or,.its emplacement of offensive�weapons in Cubain 1962 0- (11 2 Ise, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's ouster of Soviet .1�). l972 of his yiit to Israel-in 1977 cD �so) ation cob-- Lion of mass human rights abases -P- enial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an � e foe co c) Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear cs) 0) fallacious rational actor assumptions I changes�the butterfly effect c) cs) CT cs) of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action ---- � a) -4 co niation ...,- � CT Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock � � 4:3) cD co The widely distributed nature -V- plain sight 0 The large scale of change�im Scope, dimensions of change- assess:Warningr:indicator0,:ori:regular�baig. � Apply., 0i4p1.0(�yate th's4rialY,0 ani/fnferfsic'as'sessinerits'of actor's inea,ns, motives, and" c4S�iblettiggefor'Catal' � ig,an,d;.prerrintstertis...of wealcnesses,.,'system sni � ys,temtliat mayiiivite.npporturiisticatt4ck ; level Of political commitment, assess an a ,out e ort. ; asess strategic red lines � AntiCipate-prediCtable-sufprie,crige's caused -Bygysteiniirirespptisivene .� � :- Ltegic stability audits to identifiable -problems, .growing aiieisdefiit�'bi." to deferiordtiti" environmental conditions ' - ' Employ far-domain analogies�such as ,Phase transitions; avalanches, or. earthquakes�to examine possible tipping points � Fall of the Shah of Irariiin.1978�79" -Collapse of tornmunigifiri-Eastern Europe and Soviet Uniiinin 1989-91 Ouster of Egyptian President HOsni Mubarak in 2011 � China's economic transformatic 'Growth', oftivil rights, human r Rise pf the World Wide Web, It Emergence of political Islam Rapid transformation of a complex system or systems�a state, economy, cr or international organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive system (ari,3 empire, an alliance, or a war effort) � � � � � Extensive long-term changes, ft economic systems, demographic pa often culminating in an epiphany > -cs significance of change -cs Industrial revolutions cp -Eddnomietranaformatien , Emergence anew powers, dec � � 'Rise or fundamental changes4ff belief systems, such: as Marxism-I .Ouster of a'lorigtirne-politicaLruler� Outbreak Of'ciVitWar.of kCessionist niovernen Outburst of communal violence Depression,.: Supply shock, such as the�OPEC.oil�einbargb .1.73 -74 Financial panics and hyperinflations � � --Growth of social movements System complexity, chaos, and randomness :Foster acute spns4i.v.i to anpmalous occurrnes , , incongruit.ics;: anticipate in cc points 11 ff nEkanaltiercOr.SY..ste.m. drivers, ie ectrwith-WidellietWOrkof ong eranalogn4histbfiC prf oi*Ot:of RItli#,INeusiadt and App1y'mdt relevant far-domair engineering;.tich a.,tectonic chatiE Gerierdte::stenafios to expand ti � . Apply concepts systems thin] Fukiiyarna;�Samuel Huntington), 0( Joseph Schnnipeter) and strategy (1 Howard, John Keegan, Paul Kenne( 'tectonic change�technological or military innovation, economic Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR rFICIAL USE ONLY [mon Figure 1 A Typology of Surprise Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 CO6606667 Cr CA) Abrupt, deliberate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or `-- Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems (A) terrorist cell) against an unprepared target (such as a state, empire, or economy) (U/ Um Type I. Sudden Hostile Action tuft oi Type II. System Shock : � � Diplomatic surprise, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's ouster of SOW 0- 'tar.), adviser's in 1972 or hisvisit to Israel in 1977 � .0 Political assassination:. CA-) . � Initiation,f M ha b JaPan'S--,attacknMPearl Harbor in 1941 - Egyo'a attack�orriarael'iri the 1973 Arab Israeli war � The attacks Of 11 September 2901' CT C.a.) [UP 1101 Type III. Tectonic Transformation' Sweeping changes in regional or global domains (such as an interstate system, ideologies and religions, societal mores, technology, or economy) Abrupt, deliberate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force, terrorist cell, revolutionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or destroying an unprepared opponent Fail 6fthe Shah of if79 Collapse of conamunisin. MEas:t,ern Europe and Soviet Union in 1989.-9i "--' � � Oliste.1::Of Egyptian President HOSiir Mubarak in 2011 _ Rapid transformation of a complex system or systems�a state, economy, or international organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive system (an empire, an alliance, or a war effort) CT Cr � Abrupt power play such as the Soviet Unions blockade of Berlin from land. � corninunicat1onS in 1946nrits emplacement of offensive weapons in Cuba in 196 ; . . _ escalation o ass man rights a uses I ,---, 0 Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an Cr � System complexity, chaos, and randomness improvising, adaptive foe ....--�� ----, � Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear CT � ..._.... � Mirror-imaging; fallacious rational actor assumptions 0�-) changes�the butterfly effect ....--.0 0,.) � Underestimation of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action 1 � Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations �6, � Failure of imagination -----.... � nifirigt.;=, ' Monitor and reassess warning indicators on regular. basis eonceP4/...S_'...") � 'Conduct red ceanificirenaio assessments Of actor's means ; nionyes, ariel Approachei " opportunities to commit a sudden hostile ant. . " Ouster of a longtime political ruler Revolution � Outbreak of civil War or secessionist niciyernent Outburst of eorninunal violence- Depression Supply shock, such' as the OPEC odembargo of 1973-74 EFinancial panics and hyperinflations Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock tfilna's economic transformation since late 1970a' GiOwthlOf civil rights human rights movements Rise of the World Wide Welo, Internet, surge of social e. � � Emergence of political Islam _Extensive long-term changes, fundamental alterations of core technologies, economic systems, demographic patterns, political allegiances, or ideologies� often culminating in an epiphany, an event that exposes the sweeping scale, significance of change � Industrial revolutions �-�;. Economic transform lions Emergence of new powers, decline of old ones' . . � _ Rise or fundamental changes of political ideologies, religions: decay of old � belief systenii, such is Marxism Leninism � Growth of social Movement's CT (a) � The widely distributed nature of bottom-up change that is hidden in plain sight CT (a) The large scale of change�impossible for an observer to monitor in entirety Scope, dimensions of change�too diverse, contingent to forecast accurately � .....��� � 'Appli, complex systems an-41y* focusing on identifYin feedback I ' CT cx.) .possible triggers, or catalysts for change. - . � . ;:'� I � ' "---"' .---... '1:� E Brainstorm possible black swans "wild cards Mat would impose � 0�-) , --, 's " ' � Defensive casing and piernortems of imaginable surprise: assess weaknesses," system shift � I . . -----.. 0vulnerabilities in systems that May invite opportunistic attacks � - .�...., � Foster acute sensitivity to anomalous occurrences, data outliers, CT :7-1----. F�Measure actor's level of political commitment, especially an all-out effort to "63 incongruities; anticipate inflection points ....--�� 0�-) bolster capabilities; assess strategic red lines .....�.... � EAhticipate predictable surprises�crises caused by System unresponsiveriei 0) : ...--...----� to identifiable problems, such as growing debts and deficits or to deteriorating'�', . Cr Cr environmental conditions I ....._........-..-� .. -----.... ,....�..,....--, Employ far-domain analogies�such as phase transitions, avalanches, or CT .....�(k). ....._.W earthquakes�to examine possible tipping points -----.... ....._, 0 Do regular strategic stability audits In most instances, the driver(s) of tectonic change�technological or military innovation, economic xpansion, and the rise of new powers or ideologies�will be widely known. However, the scale of the change nd its effects on states, organizations, and societies will not be comprehended because the consequences areas Widely distributed and their ramifications for strategy and politics are not understood or anticipated. Key Findings Cr (a) Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen eases of intelligence e experienced by US, British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services between 1939 and 2010. Lii ExeninecOre system drivers, identify, signature technologies; brainstorm their effects with Wide network of interdiiciplinarynxperts , - , , .. , DCpl.:Bider analogous historic precedents�employ "Thinking in Time" . concepts of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May � � 01 Apply most relevant far-domain analogies from science, medicine, or engineering, Such as tectonic change, evolution LGenerate scenarios to expand the range of imaginable future outcomes Apply conceptsnf systems thinkers in politics (for example, Francis .uyama, Samuel Huntington), economics (David Landes, Douglass North, Joseph Schumpeter) and strategy (Robert Jervis, Thomas Schelling, Michael Howard, John Keegan, Paul Kennedy) ....... �.--- ...... ..... Junta nova 12�554114DOMG020/ UNCLASSIFIED//F0 FICIAL USE ONLY vi Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED// FICIAL USE ONLY Scope Note The purpose of this training aid is to help IC analysts better anticipate major discontinuities, including surprise attacks, political upheavals, major economic dislocations, and mass human rights abuses. It assumes that clear, timely and actionable intelligence reporting before future discontinuities will�as in historical cases�remain the exception, rather than the rule, and that IC analytic teams will therefore need to supplement empirically based intelligence analysis with a variety of techniques to boost analytic anticipation of looming dangers. This training aid seeks to help analysts understand: The nature and properties of real-world discontinuities. The many cognitive and organizational barriers to strategic foresight and warning of looming discontinuities. Methods to enhance early recognition of looming discontinuities. The concepts offered in this training aid were drawn from a sabbatical on intelligence surprise undertaken in 2010 by a senior analyst in the Regional Dynamics Program, the tradecraft cell of the Office of Russia and Eurasian Analysis in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. The analyst conducted an in-depth study of more than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise affecting all the great powers since the onset of World War II across all domains�strategic, diplomatic, political, economic and technological. The author also reviewed many of the keystone academic studies of intelligence surprise published since the appearance in 1962 of Roberta Wohlstetter's classic work, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, which ushered in the modern field of intelligence studies. This training aid focuses on practical applications and tools that analysts, working alone or in small teams, can employ to better anticipate discontinuities, particularly in cases where accurate, timely reporting on warning indicators is scarce. It does not address quantitative models that Can help predict the likelihood of outlier outcomes. It is unclassified to broaden its availability. UNCL A CCICIE'lli/Cr�in I AI 11C.L. Rh Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Introduction Gunmen of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad fire into the reviewing stand, killing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and 11 other Egyptian and foreign officials and wounding 28 more during a military parade on 6 October 1981. Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED FFICIAL USE ONLY Anticipating Strategic-Level Surprise: Analytic Frameworks for Practical Use Anticipating major discontinuities�sudden outbreaks of wars, surprise attacks, revolutions, genocides, diplomatic reversals, or economic calamities�remains the hardest job for Intelligence Community (IC) analysts. Historically, the inability of collectors and analysts to persuasively warn of looming dangers has been the precondition for most cases of intelligence surprise. The purpose of this training aid is to help IC analysts in the trenches to anticipate discontinuities and thereby reduce the risks of future surprises and intelligence failures. The paper begins with a discussion of the numerous barriers to analytic perception and warning of major discontinuities. It then offers a typology of intelligence surprise, discusses three key classes of surprise in depth, and suggests ways for IC analysts and managers to anticipate surprise. Introduction: Anticipating Discontinuities�Why It Is Hard Major discontinuities in any one domain or geographic region are rare events. Even dynamic open systems�the global balance of power, a regional economy, or a political order�will usually exhibit considerable continuity, inertia, and only incremental changes over the short and medium terms. As a result, most analytic accounts on a day-to-day basis will exhibit a fair amount of orderliness, predictability, and only modest, incremental change. Analysts seeking a baseline understanding of their account will often treat these "typical" periods as ones of "normalcy." These periods of normalcy, which may have begun long before an analyst started following an account, will often habituate analysts to see what they expettla-�ee�continued normalcy, defined as gradual incremental changes in their areas of responsibility. This tendency to expect the status quo in the near and medium terms is compounded by cognitive habits. Experiments from cognitive psychologists suggest that most people have a deep-seated need to perceive the world as orderly, comprehensible, and predictable. � Moreover, evidence of impending discontinuities is usually sparse and in some, cases never appears at all. Even if such evidence is received, it usually appears noteworthy only in hindsight. Before the event, such clues�if they are observed at all�tend to be obscure, irregularly timed, and inconsistent with or even contradictory to most of the other incoming data. Such clues often come as "weak signals" and are hard to discern from the other "noise" that overwhelms most analytic systems. � As a result of these tendencies, analysts may not be in the appropriate analytic posture for recognizing or reacting when their account or issue is at increasing risk of a "phase transition"�a rapid shift from peace to war, stability to instability, order to disorder, popular apathy to public engagement�that is, from predictability to unpredictability. A Typology of Surprise�An Aid to Early Recognition The typology of intelligence surprise discussed in this paper is designed to help intelligence analysts identify looming discontinuities early on. Based on an extensive review of historical cases and academic UNC17777rITI111-F-fi-P-4.Z.E.L1IAI IISF CINI v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFI OFFICIAL USE ONLY Discontinuity, Surprise, and Warning Definitions The discussion in this paper refers to a series of related terms. A discontinuity is a rapid increase in the rate, scale, or scope of change�or a sudden shift in its direction�in any country or region or in any field relevant to US national interests. It can include events targeted at US interests as well as events not aimed at the United States but that significantly affect it, such as the sudden onset of instability in the Arab world in 2011 or the collapse of the Soviet bloc beginning in 1989. Examples of discontinuities include the following: � A surprise attack on the US Homeland or on US forces or targets at home or abroad. � The sudden departure from power of a key national leader or collapse of a government for any reason. �r�rhe outbreak or sudden escalation of widespread human rights abuses or a genocide campaign. Surprise is the jolt that an analyst, an intelligence service, or an unprepared government experiences in the face of unexpected, often dangerous, new developments that confound one's assumptions, expectations, and strategy. Examples of the jarring disorientation that can ensue as a result of a discontinuity include the following: The surprise attacks on France, the Soviet Union, and the United States early in World War II and al-Qacida's attacks on US targets, starting in 1998. The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978-79 and the swift ousters in 2011 of President Ben Ali from Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak from Egypt. The onset of the global financial crisis�with all its attendant effects on politics, society, and strategic events worldwide�starting in 2008. Surprise can be positive if the discontinuity is beneficial to US interests, as was the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, even if the event is favorable to US interests, lack of advanced notification from the IC is still a bad outcome because it leaves US policymakers less prepared to take advantage of opportunities than they would have been if they had been expecting it. Warning�a core IC mission�is the clear, convincing, accurate, and timely notification of policymakers of a threatening or potentially dangerous development. Persuasive strategic warning convinces policymakers of the existence and gravity of the looming event. Timely warning gives policymakers the opportunity to deliberate on the issue, decide on a course of action, and implement it in time to avert the danger or�should it occur anyway�to mitigate the damage to US interests. An intelligence failure is the label often given to episodes in which the IC did not provide policymakers with adequaie warning of events�often discontinuities�that gravely damaged US interests. Examples include the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941; the USSR's detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, five years before CIA weapons analysts estimated that it was possible; North Korea's invasion of South Korea and communist China's intervention in the Korean war in 1950; the outbreaks of the Arab- Israeli wars; the fall of friendly governments in Iraq (1958) and Iran (1978-79); the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Rwandan genocide in 1994; and the attacks of 11 September 2001. In some of these cases, policymakers had, in fact, not received warnings from the IC; in others, policymakers judged that they had not been adequately warned�as then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger publicly claimed after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war�because the warnings that they received were poorly sourced, ambiguous, or not emphasized repeatedly. 2 JAN 13 OREA 12-304INDD(462646) Introduction uNci Accirirniirno 1AI IICC Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIEDi7trQ..FFIClAL USE ONLY writings, it breaks intelligence surprise into three types, based on the essence and origins of that type of surprise: sudden hostile action, system shock, and the effects of tectonic transformation. The goal is to improve analysts' foresight of discontinuities by bolstering understanding of the types, patterns, and diversity of discontinuous change, based on previous historical examples. Each section's accompanying matrix examines five aspects to each of these surprise types (see appendix A for other ways of classifying surprise). Classic examples of that type of discontinuity. The essence of that type of discontinuity. Various subtype's of that discontinuity. � � Barriers to early perception, which can differ based on the nature of the surprise involved. Concrete measures that can help analysts better anticipate discontinuities. This typology does not imply that there is always a clear division between the various categories of surprise or that they only occur in isolation. In major upheavals, multiple types of surprise are typically in play, making the task of analysis even harder. Foresight Based on Early Pattern Recognition Educating analysts about past patterns of surprise can help them anticipate future discontinuities. The Recognition-Primed Model (RPM) of rapid decisionmaking�first described in the 1980s by behavioral scientist Gary Klein� suggests that humans by default react to new situations by trying to put them in a more familiar context. They do this by recognizing�based on prior experiences and expertise�the similarities between the current situation and past ones with which they are familiar. Critical to this effort is acquiring rapid situational awareness, which can only be based on an expert's sensitivity to relevant cues and expectations about how the situation might evolve, derived from extensive prior experiences with roughly similar but rarely identical problem types. The RPM model suggests that familiarizing analysts with past categories and patterns of surprise can increase the speed with which they recognize emerging crises that could lead to future discontinuities, thereby increasing the odds of early assessment and warning. EIMMIVIE,MEITILIT=.q.MCMCLUMIZZYZ�71MMIL Introduction UNCL C'C""E"-1 ilor Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 �Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED// ICIAL USE ONLY The Overlapping Nature Of Surprise: The Case Of Cuba The events leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962 demonstrate the multiple, overlapping dimensions of surprise that frequently precipitate major crises and geopolitical upheavals. The long-term changes that created the preconditions for the crisis are all examples of Type III surprises, Tectonic Transformations. They include the rise of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that inspired Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro; the growth of Soviet power in the middle of the 20th century; the onset of the Cold War; the revolutions in physics, engineering, and weaponry that led to the development of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads; and the spread of radical, anti-US nationalism in Cuba and Latin America in the 1950s and early 1960s. The rapid crumbling of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship to a radical insurgent movement under Castro's control in late 1958 was a Type II surprise, System Shock, that reverberated throughout Latin America for decades. The Soviet effort to covertly emplace nuclear weapons in Cuba, which escalated into the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War, was a Type I surprise, Sudden Hostile Action�a strategic power play that Soviet leader Khrushchev intended as a fait accompli to spring on the United States and the world as soon as the missiles were operational. Agency T Hughes of the Defense Intelligence gency briefs Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and reporters in February 1963 on US intelligence on the Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba and their subsequent withdrawal in the fall of 1962. JAN 13 OREA 12-305IND13(462647) Introduction UNC' 1-.1A I /-*/111%, Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 �. Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLAssiHEwiF IAL USE ONLY "El.5 c.) =1 C.) a� CL) I CD I -a = =1 Checklist A Checklist on Anticipating Discontinuities in My AOR: A 10 +1 Point Inspection Plan Page 1 of 2 1 4 actoJp,trr,1 otivations azdf�tiiiibns for SuddenrHostile:AciroitiWho are the:ektiethe alpha area of orisileaders who,are'fiXate to the point' s24:Stp!.$Xif, -only via extreme are tolerant of apabilities and Plans for Sudden Hostile Action. Are any actors�states or subnational groups�developing the capacity for sudden hostile action? Do they now possess such capabilities? Are any such actors making a maximal effort to acquire the means for a strategic strike against their enemies? Are there signs or clues that they are undertaking a major denial and deception effort to conceal these efforts? Escalation Potential. Are there opportunities foisudd�hostile action? Are there one or others.,s more enduring belligerent , the trategic red lines? Has a state been weakened by internal factors or foreign pressure in ways that make it vulnerable to surprise attack? How vulnerable are k yAOR? Do they possess single wivalries or frozen conflicts in my AOR? Is one side growing eaker more desperate? What is the trend line? Are one or more parties close breaching points of strategic failure? e actorsm,m Brittleness of Key "Systems': What are the critical actors�states, organizations, institutions, militaries�in my AOR? How adaptive are they? Are they coping with current problems? Can they cope with added strains, novel problems, or one or more crises? What might be driving my AOR toward System Shock or Tectonic Transformation, or constraining such discontinuities? What are the "normal accidents" waiting to happen�involving maladaptive states, organizations, businesses, militaries�in my AOR? I,asek transitpolitical or financial� ions � s 4-61-1 ikrei.transilafiOjia far ok like in myAOR? How interdependent are the key actors? How influences�media ideological commercial�in my AOR? What phase utterfly effects seismic shifts�from other (m - transitions anticipate_discontinuous change? Drivers of Tectonic Transformation. What are the core system drivers, signature technologies, principal ideologies, defining military systems in my AOR? Is my AOR undergoing profound economic, technological, or social changes? Are there multiple tectonic "plates" in my AOR? Are they shifting in divergent or conflicting directions? What previous epochs or eras might my AOR current resemble? How might current times compare or contrast to previous epochs? (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) JAN13 OREA12-551INDD(466029) (b)(3) Introduction 5 UNCLASSIFIEDLCIAL USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIEDUF FICIAL USE ONLY Checklist 1 Anticipating Discontinuities in vly AOR: A 10 +I Point Inspection Plan [Continued) , Page 2 of 2 70 80 90 100 Gila-engin& Status sstnn .. , ... ,, ,. ,,. . . -agsdinytionOn.'14,AOR? appro , oinorro*AiOptetty,:innt look likeitoday; ,.4vni'dibei*rininhed,tia::the curnnlativeiwei es can atchan e.wi 0owledge Gaps. What are the critical variables in my AOR? What are the biggest information gaps regarding them? What can I do now to close those gaps and/or compensate for them? Would I know it if the situation were close to a tipping point, a sudden phase transition from peace to war, stability to instability, state function to failure? Why or why not? sight?" What. ar,e,:thepossiwith seismic impacts�that.mihtun Warning. Are there looming crises or discontinuities that I should warn of now? Do my management chain and IC peers need to be alerted? Should Tissue an "intermediate" warning that shines a light on changing system dynamics and increased precrisis tensions in my AOR? Who is the right audience for such a warning? What is the best way to convey a warning? Are there opportunities for deterrent or remedial actions? What sorts of arresting graphics and visualization aids might I employ to persuade skeptical audiences? Should I brief this problem to my chain, IC peers, and key customers? And Finally... 11 cStrategk:E'64;:$2136. I have the proper fdcqs on key tegi( issues ih my AOR to eep from being blind-'sid� Is the urgent crowding out the important? Am Ltackling the ard problems with sufficient otus4an resources? Is the need for current intelligence drivin my focus? Am I publishing the right mix of near eT.11:1 'and tactical assessmenfs on the one hand and ,standback,:strategic es ,on the other? Am I stuck in the weeds?iAm I limitin � int *04:ti,riy{:00:kcilgItnirlaf,i oselssues', which I group in ways a e collaborating have reporting? me see big picture? JAN 13 OREA 12-551INDD(466029) (b)(3) (b)(3 (b)(3, E ,-4- c.fc% (b)(3) 1 -c-.1 CD I I (b)(3) CD I =1�� CD I Cit=1, CD I I 1= CD �1 ci'D I E. CD 1 CD CD I = (b)(3) (b)(3) 6 Introduction uNci neciric'nlirr) IA1 IISF ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Type I Surprise: SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION The US Navy's Battleship Row at Pearl Harbor minutes into the attack by Japan on 7 December 1941. Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED7t1F4C.LAL USE ONLY Type I Surprise: Sudden Hostile Action (b)(3) Sudden hostile action involves abrupt, deliberate action by an actor aimed at disorienting, defeating, or destroying an unprepared opponent. The actor can be a state, an armed force, a terrorist cell, or a revolutionary party (see figure 2). � The action in Type I surprise takes place by human design and agency, often in a concentrated geographic place (a capital city or a military base, for example) in a concentrated time span that can usually be measured in days, hours, or even minutes. Subtypes and Examples of Sudden Hostile Action Surprise Attack. Surprise attack includes any initiation or escalation of military violence using conventional or unconventional weapons against an unprepared target-adversary.a It includes surprise attacks by states and nonstate actors, such as terrorist organizations. Strategic surprise attacks may initiate war, as was e case in Japan's raid on Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. � Alternatively, surprise attacks can also occur in ongoing wars in which the element of surprise involves the attack's location, timing, or novel methods and capabilities (see figure 3). ri Examples of surprise attack include the following: a The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950. The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Iraq's invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990). he start of all the major conventional wars of the Middle East (1956, 1967, and 1973). This training aid focuses mostly on strategic-level surprise attacks that initiate, escalate, or widen wars and conflicts. It does not focus on the use of surprise at the operational or tactical levels of conflict. Argentina's seizure of the British Falkland Islands in 1982. � he al-Qa'ida attacks of 11 September 2001. Military-Technological Surprise. This type of surprise involves the rapid development and deployment (b)(3) of new weapons systems or the novel adaption and employment of existing ones that an enemy or potential foe lacks the ability to counter. Examples of military-technological surprise include the following: Nazi Germany's wartime development and use of early-generation cruise and ballistic missiles (the V-1 and V-2, respectively). The Soviet Union's development and test of an atomic bomb in 1949�at least five years earlier than US intelligence analysts had estimated. �F�The Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, which stunned the US Congress and public. India's surprise nuclear tests in 1974 and, again, . in 1998. Abrupt Strategic Power Play. This subtype of sudden hostile action includes any move by an adversary to seize strategic advantages on the ground short of overt war. Examples of strategic power plays include the following: Nazi Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and its annexation of Austria in 1938. � Jrhe Soviet blockade of Berlin from all land communications in 1948-49. � East Germany's construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. oviet emplacement of strategic weapons in Cuba in 1962. (Continued on page 12) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016268/24. -666666.667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//Fl - CIAL USE ONLY Figure 2 Anticipating Sudden Hostile Action Abrupt, deliberate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or terrorist cell) against an unprepared target ZeRY'Ret: /..E4ssence "attaCks.o etSe eti2 Abrupt, deliberate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force, terrorist cell, revolutionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or destroying an unprepared opponent crsmswialm? 3�LlliprIsOaqc communicatinns:m- 4nitiationesca itiorvo ;mass humanfrights,abuses Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an improvising, adaptive foe Mirror-imaging; fallacious rational actor assumptions Underestimation of actor's commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action Failure of imagination onitor andsr, eas�,essiIxampj itdrs:Ontr� orensic assessmen simeAnsi.motive,s;.arld,opportunities efensive:casin -remor erns,,o ,imaginable 4,ssessi,weakneses 'StOn-isgthatqria. ,i0ifefopportunistic 1t0C Measure actors eye political commitment an all -05.foretii; 's-e-ss.$'strategic iT.e. lines stability co,re arstrategic Jo .60i:in-nit 'Olstercapabilitie: Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise experienced by US, British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services between 1939 and 2010. JAN 13 OREA 12-555INDD(466021) 8 I. Sudden Hostile Action uNcL ACCIPIFIMCCID�rpr-g_irial IICF CUM V Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED ICIAL USE ONLY Varieties of Military-Technological Surprise Numerous situations can give rise to the kind of surprise involving an adversary's capacity to inflict military damage that the victim has failed to anticipate, including the following: .F�NIew weapons technologies, such as US development and use of the atomic bomb and Germany's development of cruise and ballistic missiles in World War II, and Britain's introduction of tanks to the Western front in 1917 in World War I. � Significant improvements to or adaptations of existing technologies, such as the Japanese development of shallow-running aerial torpedoes to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941; the USSR's mass production of the T-34 medium tank, with its sloped armor, reliable engine, and turreted gun early in World War II; and the Iraqi insurgents' effective use of and adaptations to improvised explosive devices. IIJThe effective integration of two or " more existing weapons or systems, such as the Germany's use of radios, tanks, close air support aircraft, and airborne troops in the blitzkrieg invasions of the 1939-41 era or the rapid development by the US Navy and Marines of amphibious landing ships and craft, naval gunfire support, and close air support before and during World War II. Tactical or doctrinal innovations that make one or more existing military systems more effective, such as the US development of amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s or the use of B-29s�originally designed as a high-level daylight "precision" bomber�in low-level incendiary bombing missions against Japanese urban areas. In most cases, military-technological surprise usually involves one or more new or adapted technologies coupled with tactical or doctrinal innovations and improved command and control to maximize their effectiveness. JA radar operator of the UK Women's Auxiliary Air Force watches her cathode ray tube monitor for signals of incoming enemy aircraft during World War II. The Royal Air Force's (RAF) development of an integrated air defense network, centered around early warning radar facilities, allowed the RAF to detect inbound German bomber formations early in their missions and to vector RAF Fighter Command planes to intercept them in a timely and efficient manner. Britain's superior early warning system and air battle management capability surprised German commanders and played vital roles in the United Kingdom's victory in the Battle of Britain in 1940-41. Rn. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action JAN 13 OREA 12-306INDD(462648) (b)(3) 9 UNC' 1-elel I Ile, /11\11 ,/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//F FICIAL USE ONLY Figure 3 The Dimensions of Strategic Military Surprise Page 1 of 2' SOVIET DECLAIM WAR ATTACKS MANCHURIA.? ATOM BOMB LOOSED a Effective use of military surprise maximizes the likelihood of operational success and reduces the costs of an operation�in time, resources, and blood�to the attacker. Surprise attacks that succeed typically exploit multiple dimensions of surprise: To achieve surprise, would-be attackers often conduct extensive denial and deception operations to keep their intentions, plans, and capabilities secret from the target-actor and the international community. .,,,,' perspeetw , would-be,34; � defender) - 4 ' T -; (to the woula be attacjcen) ,hr gSSI. 1 i Stategic siii=, fis attacks;onNorway(194O) :,ii` , (1941) Japan dns3attac .cir0 Pearl Harbor i.North KoreasiriviSion,O, South Korea 50 � Arabs - spe iy,War',(19,56;,,19,67,-:anii:y.. .. , r cntitiainVaidn'..tif UK Falkland Islands 198 a �tde 4it 'a ipitiateA*0.1,e ; :'. ,,,,=1,24,..--,, ,,,�..-'-: be, eVa'S' atm ecause,,t, they � .exploitll them ,cndimensions i of :int 1 ar, sui Os' 7, . e et a,-,:p�ntial d versary will attak .. Scale: How The would-be attacker� invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria (1945); China's intervention in the Korean war (190); North Vietnam's Tet offensive (1968); the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on US Homeland widespread and intense the attack will be particularly at the outset of a conflict�can try to calculate how much to risk and how many strategic resources to commit to an attack. i',-',1�!;i5.77: frrnn e r ,.-....q��=, 4 *'erien? ;Can Germany sfinVasiornn ,:Fraike,;� ow q-Oti,r,*s 40 ;' 2 641-1,94:bqr;Me�teen Allies, 4 . ., , 111�Vagitny,.0N;Cornian01(1.944.);',ChinaaSSanlVon, Indian for00962 . .the '"a ac NI hoccp . , .. . , , ' concentrate C p,,,,time , picking .,. ;�z.,Win ow,MOSta Vanta etins,to "e'prospects 'ot.i. success such ,, ___ a limn a' erjo4Otrjij#4,ym , 1749-, .1 Aptici4,4p, .,',-044A-10.'s-c or , �Cii.NPI.g a i'arijfi:ijkiia16:i-i _ oh a, or aa. : y.ofres Location: Where An enemy can German army attacks through the "impassable" Ardennes Forest (1940 and 1944); the D-Day invasion at Normandy (1944); the US invasion at Inchon, South Korea, (1950); Vietnamese communist assault on French base at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954) concentrate in space to achieve local superiority against the defending force; lack of intelligence on the location of the attacker's military forces obliges the defender to disperse its defensive systems. the attack will occur JAN 13 OREA 12-303INDD(462112) 10 I. Sudden Hostile Action 11,1AI 11C.1� elk11%, UNCL Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE FFICIAL USE ONLY Figure 3 The Dimensions of Strategic Military Surprise [continued] (b)(3) Page 2 of 2 fend irogssza attack will , eattac erYea ;newtacties;',4-iew octtineS',..Of'ile* thaximize the iectivene'sfe, Nfr:7% A�4:;;;Af.,..,,=5. `..-t anapit them agqinst a: .eneiny,s*ea nes'se� .� . eisnlanyi"sluse-o , luseco ^ aviation�includin u ial torp� does4n i r: piercing shells as DutchTibs�against US UK and nava forces 41 42) Pkistans tr _ t* n si-Ra 'corees ltry and irregular forces disguised �a- _gaipst 999 the hijacking in 11 2001 , SttVotritt,; passenger ,.., ,mitsa,,,--sA 4 je f;simultaheduslyand Novel Capabilities: Whether and how the enemy will employ new or untested military technologiesa A subset of novel means of attacking; use of new weapons can be devastating because the victim state's forces have no experience against them or training to counter or defeat them. nThe UK Royal Air Force's use of radar against the German air force in the Battle of Britain (1940-1941); Germany's use of jets, V-1 and V-2 missiles (1944-1945); US use of the atomic bomb to end the war in the Pacific (1945); US use of reliable precision-guided munitions against Iraq (1991) and Serbian forces (1990s); use by al-Qdida and affiliates of well-trained, well-equipped suicide bombers in multiple simultaneous attacks (late 1990s to present); Iraqi insurgents' widespread use of reliable improvised-explosive devices, delivered and detonated by multiple means (2004-08) a Use of novel weapons and military technologies is a subset of the dimension of means�how an attack will transpire. It is listed here separately because the operational and strategic effects of new military technologies, effectively employed, can be devastating. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of (b)(3) unclassified accounts of more than two dozen cases of strategic military surprise experienced by the United States, Great Britain, France, Israel, the USSR, and other powers between 1939 and 2010. JAN 13 OREA 12-303INDD(462112) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 11 NC. ACCICICrli/CArl IICC f1R11%, Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//F CIAL USE ONLY rECLUra:=ZEVin=,===...aat nhe Strategic Effects of a Successful Surprise Attack Gen. Charles de Gaulle in his postwar memoirs described how French leaders crumbled under the weight of the German panzer thrust across France in the campaign from May to June 1940 that precipitated his country's surrender. His account stresses the role of shock�intellectual, psychological, emotional, and moral�in a successful surprise attack. The devastating shock that de Gaulle describes, which leads to the cascading failure of the target's entire defensive system, remains the holy grail of planners of surprise attacks. The crumbling of [France's] whole system of doctrines and organizations, to which our leaders had attached themselves, deprived them of their motive force. A sort of moral inhibition made them suddenly doubtful of everything, and especially of themselves. From then on, the forces of disintegration were to show themselves rapidly.), Gen. Charles de Gaulle, in his postwar memoirs, The Call to Honor Coup d'Etats. This subtype of surprise, sometimes referred to as a putsch, is the sudden, illegal ouster of an incumbent state leadership by elements of the armed forces or security services�often by force or the threat of force�in order to replace it with another group, either civil or military.b Coups were especially prevalent in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Turkey during and after the Cold War era. Examples of coups include the following: Jr he overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq by a nationalist army general and his followers in the 14 July Revolution" in 1958. � he toppling of the Greek Government by a group of rig htwing army colonels in 1967. Massive Police Crackdown or Martial Law.c Authoritarian states pressed by demands for democracy or threatened by lawlessness or insurgencies will sometimes resort to a show of overwhelming force or to a massive crackdown on opposition to maintain their grip on power. Typically such events are preceded by secret planning for "emergency rule," the preparation of propaganda justifying the repression, and the quiet US battleships at Pearl Harbor under attack by Japan on 7 December 1941. The telltale wakes of Japan's new shallow- running aerial torpedoes can be seen. US planes caught on the ground at Hickam air base burn in the distance. ..-zenamarn.. dispersion of police and security forces to key sectors in the capital and other cities. Government security forces will then move rapidly to seal the borders, arrest dissidents and opposition journalists, and occupy opposition strongholds, such as universities or public squares. Coups are often followed quickly by crackdowns or the imposition of emergency rule or martial law. Examples include the following: � LlJrhe bloody quashing of the Tiananmen Square prodemocracy movement by the Chinese army and police in 1989. � he Polish army's imposition of martial law in December 1981 in response to the rise of the Solidarity labor opposition movement and to intense Soviet pressure to quell unrest. Diplomatic Surprise. This includes any unexpected diplomatic move that has a major impact on the regional or global balance of power. b Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in his 1968 book, Political Order in Changing Societies, identified three classes of coup d'etat: 1. A breakthrough coup, in which revolutionary elements of the armed forces�often led by junior officers�overthrow the traditional government and creates a new ruling elite, such as occurred in Egypt in 1952. 2. A guardian coup, in which the avowed goal of the coup plotters�typically more senior army commanders�is to "save" the state from disorder, party strife, violent opposition, or foreign foes. 3. A veto coup, in which the army blocks democratic participation in the affairs of state. Usually led by senior commanders, this last type of coup often result in violent confrontations and suppression of civil opposition, such as occurred in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina multiple times during the 20th century. a The temporary use of martial law can be a legitimate tool of civil government in bona fide cases of civil or natural disasters, when civil authorities alone are unable to maintain order, or provide basic services. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (h)('31 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 12 I. Sudden Hostile Action UNCL ASSIFIFD/ IAL USE ONLY Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 ----Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED FICIAL USE ONLY nExamples of diplomatic surprise include the following: �Lllilhe Nazi-Soviet "nonaggression" pact in August 1939, which led to Germany's surprise attack on Poland one week later and the USSR's forcible annexation of eastern Poland by late September of that year and the Baltic states in 1940. � F-1-he US rapprochement with Chairman Mao Zedong's China in the early 19705 after three years of secret diplomacy, which blindsided the Taiwan Government and rattled Soviet leaders. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's "electric shock diplomacy," including his sudden expulsion of Soviet military advisers in 1972 and his peace offer to Israel in 1977. Political Assassination. This type of sudden hostile action involves the premeditated killing of any influential political actor in or out of power by a person or group motivated by a political grievance. It excludes assassins motivated by psychotic impulses. Assassins can be "lone wolves" or members of a conspiracy. Examples of political assassination include the slayings of the following: Egypt's President Sadat in 1981. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Pakistani presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto in 2007. Violent Escalations by Revolutionary or Terrorist Movements. Such movements tend to start as small, cell-like clandestine organizations and gradually build their strength through clandestine measures. However, once they reach a critical mass of personnel, resources, weapons, and training, such groups will typically initiate political, guerilla, and/or terrorist campaigns to destabilize the state. � xamples include the Bolshevik party in czarist Russia, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong in Vietnam, the FARC in Colombia, and al-Qa`ida in the Middle East and North Africa. Even after these groups launch their initial wave of attacks and declare war on the state, they will continue to exploit the tactical advantages of surprise in follow-on hostile actions, such as raids, robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. Initiation or Escalation of Major Human Rights Abuses. Extremist actors and governments tend to shroud the full scope of their plans to persecute and kill political foes and ethnic and religious minorities. They will The Fait Accompli: g Tool for Radical Leaders ii Decisive unilateral acts that create new facts on the ground and catch foreign actors�including intelligence services�unprepared are a favorite tool of action-oriented actors seeking to upend the status quo. Intelligence scholar Michael Handel notes, for example, that Adolf Hitler made repeated use of faits accomplis to catch opponents off guard and hinder opposition actors from mobilizing against him. Handel notes that Hitler established early on the pattern behind his frequent use of surprise. The preparatory stage of deception was intended to divert attention from his actual goal and reassure potential opponents that he did not intend to do what they feared he might. The fait accompli was then followed by a flood of new assurances that since Germany desired peace, this was the last such act of its kind; in this manner, he allayed fears and set the stage for his next move.)) F7�Intelligence scholar Michael Handel, in The Diplomacy of Surprise, 1981 "TPX"' -C4167==="56=3:=2,-',11EZZEZIS (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 1(b)(3) �(b)(3) (b)(3) gb)(3) often covertly distribute orders, weapons, and rewards to the militants carrying out the violence in order to (b)(3) minimize the ability of the victimized group to resist and of outside actors to intervene. Examples include the following: Nazi Germany's escalations in its campaign to harass, persecute, and ultimately exterminate European Jews between 1933 and 1945. �JThe Khmer Rouge's "autogenocide" during its rule from 1975 to 1979, carried out through mass executions and the starvation of more than 1 million Cambodians deemed corrupted by Buddhism, foreign influence, money, property, or education. � Multiple rounds of "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans during the 1990s, the worst of which occurred during the Bosnian war of 1992-95, when more than 2 million people were displaced and tens of thousands killed. � he Rwandan genocide, in which the Rwandan military and Hutu militia groups killed more than 500,000 Tutsis in 1994. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 13 UNCI IrtIA I I I C r r1RII%/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//F0 ICIAL USE ONLY Barriers to Early Perception of Type I Surprise (U//FOU0) There are several barriers to early perception and timely warning of Type I surprise. Secrecy on the part of the aggressor-actor planning to surprise an unprepared foe is foremost. Denial and Deception by Smart, Adaptive Actors. e goal of would-be attackers is to conceal hostile plans and preparations from onlookers and prevent the intended victim or the third parties from taking effective counteraction. The ability of US enemies�from Imperial Japan and Mao's China to North Korea and al-Qa`ida� to conceal preattack plans and preparations has been amply demonstrated. F�Scholars of surprise observe that even rudimentary denial and deception efforts often work in thwarting timely warning and response by the target actor. These efforts can include the following: � Publicly denying aggressive intent. Lying about the purpose of prestrike activities. Announcing "routine" military training maneuvers to mask preattack staging. Publicly demobilizing token numbers of reservists. Feinting in another direction. Intimating that the prestrike activities are merely a bluff. Heralding bogus eleventh-hour peace initiatives or offering to enter into negotiations. Sound operational security and standard military cover, camouflage, and concealment of hostile forces can go a long way to countering even the most sophisticated intelligence collection systems, judging from unclassified assessments of surprise and intelligence failure. Bold, Resourceful Enemies. The sheer audacity of a surprise attack can catch an adversary unprepared. Roberta Wohlstetter�the doyenne of intelligence surprise studies�discussed in her 1962 book, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, the inability of US officials to conceive of a radical Japanese response to its military quagmire in China and escalating tensions with the United States. Wohlstetter identified the US officials' "poverty of imagination" as the root cause of US vulnerability to a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. Racist stereotypes also played a part: many US Navy commanders could not believe that the Imperial Japanese Navy could pull off such an ambitious and complex strike operation so far from Japan. 6thCIA1eadthIip in an essay on profihn This pattern�disbelief that an actor would embark on a course of action that was potentially catastrophic�was repeated before the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962: US officials knew that the Kremlin was increasingly anxious about the strategic balance and about US pressure on Cuba, but few in the ICd believed that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would risk a nuclear war by secretly emplacing nuclear weapons 90 miles off Florida. The 9/11 Commission Report makes clear that the key organizations involved in US air safety�the Federal Aviation Administration, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the airlines�were utterly unprepared for foreign terrorists to take over US civilian passenger jets and use them as weapons. hen Director of CIA John McCone was an exception. He r.easoned that the Soviets were building surface-to-air missile sites in western Cuba�which US intelligence had confirmed�in order to protect covertly deployed Soviet nuclear forces rather than to defend Cuba from US invasion, an assessment that turned out to be accurate. Proceeding from rational unitary actor assumptions, Sherman Kent�then the head of the CIA's Office of National Estimates�and much of the rest of the IC judged such a course of action too risky and out of character for the Soviet leadership. 14 I. Sudden Hostile Action UNCL 1ce'rirr"1 rirtni Iler v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE OFFICIAL USE ONLY Oenial And Deception In Cases Of Mass Atrocities Anticipating the initiation of mass human rights abuses and comprehending their scale and intensity as they occur are difficult analytic challenges. Past cases of mass atrocities demonstrate the ability of hostile actors to conceal their intentions and plans and deceive outside observers until it is too late to thwart or mitigate their violence against the victims. A policy planning handbook on responding to the dangers of mass atrocities recently published by the US Army notes, for example, that: II Perpetrators decide to conduct mass atrocities, mobilize their resources, draw up "death lists" or otherwise identify intended targets, and possibly segregate victims into ghettos or camps. A pretext for such actions may be arranged, or an unforeseen event may spark these measures. Additional preparations may include transportation of victims, identifying locations for mass killing, and determining means of disposing of bodies. Perpetrators will also take measures to disguise their actions or deceive both victims and outsiders as to what will occur (e.g., victims may be relocated and collected together in order to "protect" them). The many individuals involved in the actual conduct of the mass atrocities may need to be convinced of the legitimacy of the actions as well as the need for secrecy ... Perpetrators will attempt to obfuscate mass atrocity situations, blame the incidents on the victims or deny their occurrence. They will impede external efforts to determine the truth of events. Strong denial may presage future waves of mass atrocities. . . Fr RFrom Mass Atrocities Prevention and ;onse Options: A Policy Planning Handbook, published by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in 2012 The infamous Arbeit Macht Frei�work makes you free�gate to Auschwitz concentration camp. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) JAN 13 OREA 12-307INDD(462649) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action LINCr /C"IA1 IICC CARII X/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 15 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED FFICIAL USE ONLY "He Had a Gambler's Heart": Adm. Yamamoto's Bias for Action nalysts can evaluate the risk tolerance and bias for action of key actors. A leading US scholar of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 provides a glimpse into the mentality of one particularly bold actor. Gordon W. Prang� author of the 1991 book, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor�wrote of Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet at the time of the attack: nil Yamamoto's temperament also had much to do with the strategy he eventually conceived [for attacking Pearl Harbor]. Some of his maxims . . . reveal his turn of mind: 'An efficient hawk hides its claws'; 'A cornered rat will bite': 'If you want the tiger's cubs, you must go into the tiger's lair' . . . An inveterate gambler, he enjoyed nothing more than a competitive round of chess, poker, or bridge . . . 'In all games Yamamoto loved to take chances just as he did in naval strategy,' explained [one of his favorite staff officers] Capt. Yasuji Watanabe. 'He had a gambler's heart'', Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku. JAN 13 OREA 12-550INDD(465995) 16 I. Sudden Hostile Action L4 UNCLApproved for Release: 16/08/24C06606667 ----Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ FICIAL USE ONLY The Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb in August 1949�five years before the IC judged it to be likely. Soviet leader Josef Stalin's implacable determination to acquire the bomb and the resourcefulness of Soviet research and development efforts�abetted by Soviet espionage penetration of the Manhattan Project during World War II� enabled the USSR to greatly accelerate its program to build, test, and deploy atomic weapons. Mirror-Imaging a "Rational" Actor. In the history of surprise, zealous alpha actors with outsized appetites for power, tolerance for risk, and biases for action�Adolf Hitler, Gamal Nasser, Khrushchev, Sadat, Saddam Husayn, Kim II-Sung, and Kim Jong-II�have sought to seize the initiative against their presumed foes. Often, such actors tend to pit their own audacity against the normal human tendency to assume that "tomorrow will look like today," that "the other guy" thinks the way "we" do, and that dramatic departures from the status quo are impossible. Assumptions about the permanence of the status quo and the presumed "rationality"�often narrowly defined or confused with reasonableness�of hostile actors increase the victim's vulnerability to denial and deception efforts by crafty, adaptive enemies. The difficulty of comprehending the full psychological, cultural, political, and organizational context in which would-be hostile actors operate compounds the problem. � The head of Israeli military intelligence in 1973 could not conceive that Sadat would initiate a war that Egypt could not win militarily. The intelligence chief assumed that the Egyptian armed forces would wage war the way that Israel would�by first seizing air superiority over the region�which the Egyptian air force clearly lacked the capability to achieve. ' �r�lks then chief of the CIA's Office of National Estimates, Sherman Kent wrote after the Cuban Missile Crisis to explain the IC's failure to anticipate Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba, "no estimating process can be expected to divine when exactly the enemy is about to make a dramatically wrong decision. We [in the IC] were not brought up to underestimate our adversary [in this case, Soviet leader Khrushchev]." Aids To Anticipating Type I Surprise (b)(3) (b)(3) Timely, accurate intelligence reporting on the (b)(3) hostile intentions, strike capabilities, and secret plans of would-be hostile actors remains the surest aid to analysts trying to avert Type I surprises. However, if the history of intelligence failures experienced by all major powers since the onset of World War II is any guide, conclusive intelligence reporting on an adversary's plans and decision to attack will remain the exception, rather than the rule. Therefore, while developing and maintaining close ties to intelligence collectors remain essential, analysts should assume that critical intelligence collection gaps will persist and that analysts will need other means to bolster their ability to anticipate possible hostile action. These supplemental approaches and tools attempt to: (b)(3) Identify patterns of sudden hostile action based on historical case studies and help analysts to determine how similar current situations may be to historical analogues. Get into the heads of would-be hostile actors in realistic, sophisticated ways and anticipate their possible moves using methods that reduce the dangers of mirror-imaging. Assess the vulnerabilities of would-be victims of sudden hostile action in analysts' areas of responsibility. Assess an Actor's Commitment and Hostility, Not Just "Rationality." This approach requires a deeper focus on actors' motives and intentions in analytically sophisticated ways. It seeks to fix analysts' attention on would-be hostile actors who may be motivated by pride, fury, revenge, aggrandizement, and ideology. Such actors are subject to opaque psychological, political, and organizational pressures to act. They often receive flawed, politicized intelligence. These actors will often seek to change the rules of the game or to destroy the old game completely and replace it with one of their making via sudden hostile action (see figure 4). For examples, Adolf Hitler sought to overturn the post�World War I Versailles Treaty order in Europe as a prelude to his campaign of genocidal expansion; Josef Stalin to project Soviet power into and communize the states of Central Europe and to subvert liberal democracies in Western Europe; Fidel Castro to check US "neocolonialism" and promote radicalism in the Western Hemisphere; and Usama Bin Ladin to oust the United States from the Arab-Islamic world and depose "apostate" regimes in the region. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 17 UNC' Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE FICIAL USE ONLY A US expert on strategic warning during the Cold War era, Cynthia Grabo, noted that would-be hostile actors miscalculate for various reasons: misjudgments of an adversary's strength, ideological fixation, hubris, domestic pressures, nationalist hysteria, pique, or just plain desperation. Under the spell of such pressures, an actor may embark on an imprudent or even disastrous course of action. Scrutinizing assumptionse about the full range of factors that can influence an actor's behavior�including personal, professional, organizational, and social Pressures�and tracking them over time can help analysts account for zeal, folly, honor, revenge, and malice in forecasting leaders' actions and determine the trend in an actor's extremist rhetoric and actions. Using well-crafted red teams to consider alterative explanations for adversaries' behavior and to simulate would-be hostile actors' calculus for employing surprise can help analysts draw on deep expert insights in ways that avoid mirror-imaging, rational actor assumptions, or caricatures. APPLICATION �PatwArdmievaal Analysts�working individually or in analytic teams�can identify who the possible alpha actors are in their, areas of responsibility, study the political pressures acting on them, assess their timeline for action, track their rhetoric and behavior over time, and anticipate their possible recourse to various options for sudden hostile action. Recognize Historic Patterns of Surprise. Sudden hostile actions sometimes resemble historical precedents for surprise action or follow discernible patterns. Such actions are rarely what leading intelligence scholar Richard K. Betts in his 1982 book, Surprise Attack, calls "bolts from the blue." The author noted that "... there are no significant cases of bolts from the blue [that is, a major surprise attack not preceded by an earlier political crisis] in the 20 century. All major sudden attacks occurred in situations of prolonged tension, during which the victim state's leaders recognized that war might be on the horizon." Instead, sudden attacks tend to occur during or after an escalation in tensions that is often observable to intelligence organizations. Analysts should be aware of the relevant historical precedents for surprise action under various circumstances in their areas of responsibility. Studying such precedents can help analysts expand their intellectual inventory of relevant historical analogies and aid in early pattern detection and recognition. A senior Japanese naval aviator who helped plan the attack on Pearl Harbor told US interrogators after the war that he was dumbfounded that the United States had not studied Japan's use of strategic surprise to initiate its 1904-05 war against Russia. Political and military analysts would benefit from being proactive in assessing the risks of surprise attacks as tensions escalate, even if reporting on force postures and deployments is scarce or recourse to a military "solution" seems unfeasible or reckless. Another critical development for analysts to watch for is mobilization in all its forms. Large-scale national mobilization of military power that imposes a high opportunity cost on the civilian economy remains the best'predictor that a state is preparing to undertake major military operations, according to a leading scholar of surprise. Political analysts will usually have the lead responsibility for recognizing the rise of radical factions and leaders, analyzing escalating tensions, identifying the breaching of possible strategic "red lines," and warning of the rising urgency and extremism of the political or diplomatic dialogue. Military analysts, by contrast, will have the lead in closely monitoring shifts�real or perceived�in the interstate balance of power and balance of threats as well as indicators of preparations for sudden action by the military and/or security forces. In similar fashion, terrorism analysts can gain insight by closely tracking the substance and tone of extremist groups' public communications. Increasingly aggressive rhetoric that employs violent imagery, blunt threats, and apocalyptic visions to spur psychological mobilization, demonize enemies, and legitimize mass killings are often indicators of a looming escalation of violence. APPLICATION ) Analytic teams can study the academic and intelligence literature on a potential adversary's past uses of strategic surprise and assess its current doctrine arious models and premises have been used to describe and justify models that attribute rationality to actors. The basic idea is that actors try to maximize benefits, minimize costs and risks, and weigh options for action via some form of cost-benefit-risk analysis�however crude, intuitive, or informal. In shorthand usage, rationality has often been confused with "common sense" or reasonableness. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 18 I. Sudden Hostile Action UNCI. /11 11,, ,�.11 't/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 CO6606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//FS L USE ONLY Figure 4 A Spectrum For Measuring an Actor's Extremism . ` . ' 11 - ' " .� 'Rational" Status_ .. Actor' � ,,,441:-.. . , - � L',- ' 0.Tommitted HostileAdor ' OLIAIL IF, ' - ' V . _ . .... Strategic Goal Content Feasible Attarnablevl in I Radicala Safel:incompatible oqi i .,-1.f '-'�,',:v744...,,idi=4:1s , prevailinginclude'.stirateOlariaseaTeP',Examples total offrcon4uestrano erl,Stale;,wnoCide.of group otal( ,,J,:,,$- -.4-,..'9 .,,,.= ' � - '---=' ',,,,elv--� ,,,,,,-.:- � -,incrementalgoals.minority -,cx.).�.0.4g,,systgposuc as maintaining --.,,,� ,:-:-,-...,,..-,-,?;:,------, statiis,q004a 1:6(, irmoderate or Strategic Goal Measured. Actor willing to settle for Intense. Actor is "fanatical"; adheres Commitment less than maximal goals. stubbornly to maximal goals. Tolerance of Risk i ow -Ctorc-isi prudent;-,pcnse on .1. ,... i Actor,, rope- Q a, ven urism. high -ris Pursuing Goals ,.. , .,;:i,,,.._i'�.:::,,:--;', , risk avoidance or minimization tions,acce acceptable Means-Goal Instrumental. Actor desires to be Delinked. There is a disconnect between Relationship rational, minimizes costs, links means to goals, adheres to at least some norms. goals and means. Actor fixates on goals, ignores costs, exalts "sacrifice," distrusts calculus that subverts ideology. ,. Degree of Slf..,Ciiiitrol,:, � e atively high Personalgrievances Low Pride;,fury resentmentrevenge;t exert Emotional Stability endettas do not drivetstrategic : behavior: sizableinfluence onv ' `:nierii.;4Ctinns aHThis matrix is derived from the model of "crazy actors" developed by Professor Yehezkel Dror, an Israeli scholar of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the 1970s. It modifies some of Dror's definitions and nomenclature. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) JAN 13 OREA 12-308INDD(462650) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 19 UNC' ..--..., Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR S USE ONLY on surprise. Teams can also monitor, evaluate, and track over time a would-be hostile actor's strategic "red lines"�actions by rival players that an adversary would deem hostile to vital interests and, therefore, as a cause for war. Similarly, "tacit understandings" between the opposing parties in enduring strategic rivalries�for example, China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Georgia and Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan�should be examined and evaluated over time because breaches of them can lead to crises that typically increase the risk of war and surprise. An-o,eteetwee.m.egunsmakum,,,g,,w1z.o.rmas...,sce,warar......r,,,,nroemmentrussesessano.cugm. Apply Theories of Surprise Action. Awareness of the academic theories of surprise, which are principally based on historical case studies, can also help IC analysts assess increasing risks of Type I surprise. These theories tend to focus on two key conditions as particularly salient risk factors for surprise attack! The first is an actor's acute sense of strategic vulnerability, particularly if communicated by warnings of encirclement or fears of extinction. � Jhe second condition is an actor's heightened sense of its own offensive capacities via the possession of elite strike arm�such as Imperial Japan's carrier battle group, Nazi Germany's armored forces, Israel's air force, or al-Qa`ida's suicide bombers. ''-k--ziaredavasas, nAPPLICATION Analysts can assess whether these preconditions for sudden hostile action�the presumed advantages of near-term offensive action or the perception of adverse long-term strategic trends�apply, as seen from the optic of an increasingly desperate or zealous actor or actors. If so, these conditions would suggest higher risks of sudden hostile action than would otherwise be the case. Military journals and doctrine, formal strategy pronouncements, warnings via diplomatic channels, and political rhetoric can all shed light on aspects of foreign thinking on these strategic matters. Conduct "Forensic" Analysis of Possible Hostile Actors. Analysts can examine which actors possess the motives, means, constraints, and opportunities to engage in various options for hostile action against foreign or domestic actors. Motive refers to the intentions, ideology, and animating beliefs of a potentially hostile actor, particularly as they define his threat perceptions and enemy images. It also covers incentives to act suddenly, such as the desire to seize a neighbor's resource-rich territory or "redress" specific grievances, such as the loss of territory to a neighboring state in a previous-war or concern about a rival's threats or military capabilities, as he perceives them. Means refers to the totality of capabilities for a major hostile action, including preventive war, surprise attack, a coup, or genocide. These means can be at hand or in development. Development of costly means of attack remains a key guide to an actor's possibly hostile intentions. The trend line�whether these capabilities for surprise action are increasing or decreasing�are as important as their level at any given point in time. (b)(3) (b)(3) Opportunity refers to the feasibility and (b)(3) practicality of sudden hostile action in obtaining the goals sought by the actor, such as the ouster of a hated or inept leader, the elimination of a despised minority group, or the neutralization of a rival state's deterrent forces. The focus is on the opportunities that the would-be actor perceives as he surveys the relevant operating environment. Opportunities cover environmental factors that may create a more permissive environment for sudden hostile action. Factors leading to a more permissive environment might include the following: LIIiA rival actor's focus on domestic upheavals, events in another theater of war, or an ongoing military campaign. For example, Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini of Italy and Imperial Japan both took advantage of Germany's crushing defeat of France in 1940 to seize French territories; Husayn's Iraq sought to exploit Iran's postrevolution instability to seize contested territory in 1980. � he international community's preoccupation with grave economic conditions or with another crisis. Examples include the Suez Crisis in 1956, which distracted Western powers from the Soviet Union's preparations to suppress the Hungarian uprising against communist rule; and Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, when Western states were trying f Offense-defense theory and offensive realism are hypotheses from international relations and strategic theory that seek to explain the outbreaks of war. Offense-defense theory posits that war becomes more likely when great powers judge that: 1. Conquest is relatively more feasible than in other periods. 2. Their own strategic offensive capacities are greater�or are deemed greater�than those of a rival power or powers. 3. They are vulnerable�or fear that they are�to strategic attack from one or more foreign powers. It also holds that false evaluations of points 1, 2, and 3 are relatively common on the part of great powers because of ideological distortions, poor intelligence, faulty net assessments, and the influence of expansionist interest groups. Offensive realism posits that great powers will seek to maximize their absolute and relative power vis-a-vis other states and will seek to do so by expanding their military capacities and by seeking to expand and achieve dominance when the opportunity avails itself. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 20 I. Sudden Hostile Action UNCL IICC Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//F CIAL USE ONLY Academic Theories of Surprise Attack One scholar of intelligence affairs, Professor James J. Wirtz, summarizes the theory of surprise in three propositions. � � � Surprise temporarily suspends the reciprocally antagonistic nature of the battlefield by catching the enemy when he is unprepared to resist effectively. A military organization in a state of unreadiness is more akin to a large peacetime bureaucracy in custody of scarce commodities (weapons and ammunition) than it is to a combat force that is ready to fight. Strategic surprise will be an especially enticing option to the militarily or economically weaker party in a strategic rivalry. The advantages of surprise offer the weaker side the prospect of achieving decisive results against a stronger opponent that would probably be unobtainable in a war of attrition. The party that is clearly stronger, by contrast, often hopes displays of might can deter a foe or intimidate him into making concessions without having to resort to war. Strategies based on strategic surprise appear to all concerned parties as extremely risky before the attack and often turn out to be reckless and ill advised. The very "unthinkable" nature of an audacious plan of attack makes it more likely both to achieve success� surprise�in the short run and to infuriate and unify the victim of surprise in the long run, if he can absorb the initial blow. Other scholars note that the risks of surprise attack are particularly high in two cases. When one side judges that long-term trends in t e strategic balance are unfavorable because of inferior geographic position (often perceived as "enemy encirclement"), economic decline, or slower population growth; in such cases, an actor�such as a Adolf Hitler or the leadership of prewar Japan�is strongly tempted to seize the initiative via decisive action to head off what he fears will otherwise be a protracted deterioration in his strategic position. LIIIWhen military planners judge that the attacking side holds a decisive advantage because offensive action would allow the attacker to seize the initiative, maximize the presumed superior elan on the part of the attacking force, and exploit the advantages that current weapons, doctrine, and tactics may hold for the attacker. nThe charred west facade of the Pentagon; days after the terrorist strike on 11 September 2001. The attack killed all 64 people on board American Airlines Flight 77�including the five al-Qdida hijackers� � as well as 125 people who were at work in that portion of the building. he remnants of two Egyptian jets destroyed on the grbithd'during-the Israeli Air Force's surpriSe'attaek at the-Oid.set Ofthe Si.k-Day �: War. The Israeli air dttaek, Operation FocuS, achieved total surprise, eliminated Egypt's air force from the war, and assured Israel of air supremacy for the duration of the 1967 conflict. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) JAN 13 OREA 12-310INDD(462652) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 21 UNC Approved for for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE I S OFFICIAL USE ONLY to manage German unification and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the case of a potential coup, a leader already weakened by ill health or declining popularity. MOOR- ,S1V.aTe APPLICATION Examining these forensic factors enables analysts to do a quality of information check regarding the reporting available on each of these criteria (motives, means, and opportunities) and to develop signposts to help warn of new developments�such as a hostile actor's decision to heavily invest in strike weapons, evidence of a more permissive strategic environment, or increased incentives to act against a historical foe. To conduct this type of forensic analysis, terrorism analysts should stay particularly close to collectors�including domestic law enforcement�and do various types of link and network analysis to gain a fuller appreciation of the structures, plans, and operations of extremist organizations. AloseliewrlYttlal,... � Cr ..-1611.2atr� Vulnerability Assessments. Vulnerability assessments, sometimes called defensive casing, can improve analysts' understanding of hostile actors' priorities among various potential targets for surprise attack. This technique focuses on the would-be target's vulnerabilities. It involves a structured effort by a diverse team of brainstorm various categories of potential targets�a state, military force, security force, specific leader, or critical infrastructure�and assessing the relative merits, drawbacks, and risks of each potential target from the perspective of a would-be attacker. APPLICATION Prospective targets of possible hostile action� particularly in cases of strategic military surprise and terrorism�can be assessed, categorized, and ranked from multiple perspectives. One perspective is that of the potential victim: how might he "objectively" rank his own strategic centers of gravity, essential infrastructure, economic core, and renowned religious or historic sites in terms of importance, vulnerability, and symbolic value. This exercise could be repeated from the perspective of prospective attackers: how might they assess a would-be victim's possible targets in accord with these criteria. How might they rate a would-be victim's readiness and resilience in the event that surprise action is successful? 004(foi P.8 the thotivation,-- means ,-:ma� 11,:,..:4,y�eiti,;., 9 ,s, i r,a, : 4.21p, , ic power l i cal ' ., ec000T,. , 40-�k include' political eels .-required , �ILf'''''' urnty The Pr, ... eneraIIy ..9,qq4 Red Teaming. This technique relies on a rigorous, systematic effort to zero in on the strategic and tactical calculus of would-be hostile actors. Ideally, red teams include participants who can accurately represent the ethos, intentions, structures, and capabilities of a hostile actor or organization. For example, red teams could help estimate terrorist group's relative priorities for target selection. Red teams cannot be expected to divine plans for a specific attack, which still requires timely and accurate intelligence. Empathy as an Analytic Tool. One intelligence commentator, psychology professor Ralph White, recommends that analysts cultivate empathy to hone their understanding of foreign actors "from the inside looking out, not merely from the outside looking in." To foster empathy, White advises analysts to continually pose such questions as the following:g � How would I feel if I were facing the situation they pre facing now? � How would I feel if I had been through the experience I know they have been through? � How should I correct my first answers to those questions on the basis of what I know about the differences between their political culture and mine? g Psychology professor Ralph White draws a sharp contrast between empathy as a tool for understanding an opponent and sympathy, which he characterizes as "sharing (or agreeing with) the thoughts and feelings of others." 22 I. Sudden Hostile Action UNCL 1,1 A I her Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 �....Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCL IFTt OFFICIAL USE ONLY Analysts can hone White's technique to counter biases and stereotypes and to zero in on how foreign actors might rate the attractiveness of various options for sudden hostile action. APPLICATION Well-composed red teams could also assist in generating, expanding, updating, and monitoring the list of specific, observable indicators�signposts�for prestrike activities by insurgent or terrorist groups, including in such areas as target casing, bonnbnnaking, personnel deployment, and movement to the target. An unclassified JASON report for The MITRE Corporation that discusses the use of red teaming to anticipate catastrophic terrorist attacks notes the importance of recruiting team members immersed in both the foreign culture and the "professional culture" of the terrorist group�its mission, history, beliefs, and tactics� that the red team wants to mirror. This immersion into the terrorist group that is being assessed should include deep insight into the group's experiences, education, skills, training, contacts, and past targets. 23.-1,1261,17-.JG36.4lIA.VERS=.-VS, ) Exercises, War Games, and Simulations. These tools are intended to simulate the dynamics of actual strategic interactions, including combat operations. Such efforts to game out the possible outcomes of force-on-force encounters often come with high startup costs in resources, planning hours, and personnel� but they can also help simulate the conditions and pressures conducive to sudden hostile action. Military exercises have multiple purposes, including measuring the temptation for the "red" team�the postulated hostile actor�to undertake a surprise attack and revealing weaknesses in the "blue" team's defenses and force posture. In 1932, nearly 10 years before the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, for example, approximately 150 US Navy carrier-launched planes successfully "attacked" the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor on a Sunday shortly before dawn in a war game exercise. Navy umpires initially declared the attack a total success, news of which was reported in The New York Times days later. However, according to one academic assessment, Navy commanders failed to absorb and disseminate the lessons of the widely publicized 1932 exercise, whereas Japanese intelligence personnel and military planners appear to(b)(3) have closely studied the exercise. (b)(3) APPLICATION (b)(3) Military Indications and Warning. The collection (b)(3) and assessment of data about the intentions and capabilities of foreign military forces has been the basis for warning of war in the modern era and can also enhance the effectiveness of war games. Since World War II, the major powers have spent enormous sums� the majority of their intelligence budgets�to augment their ability to collect data on the military strength, weaknesses, operations, training, and weapons of hostile (b)(3) and potentially hostile states. The collection of military indicators will remain one of the linchpins of strategic warning for three reasons: (b)(3) Military preparations are a necessity for war. (b)(3) Many of these military preparations are discernable (b)(3) or at least potentially discernable to outside states seeking the information. (b)(3) any,of these preparations are costly and (b)(3) disruptive to the civilian economy, so states do not undertake them lightly, purely for purposes of political theater, or bluff. For that reason, they tend to be reliable indicators of seriousness of intent and (b)(3) readiness to act. Checking for Vulnerability to Coups. Anticipating (b)(3) military coups based on intelligence reporting alone is rare because the coup plotters�unless they are seeking the approval of outside powers�have a powerful incentive to maintain secrecy to achieve their aims. However, examining five preconditions that correlate closely with increased odds of military coups may help analysts to anticipate their risks, if not their actual timing. Class privilege. To what degree does the military� (b)(3) particularly its officer corps�draw from a privileged element of society? Is the officer corps perceived as a societal elite�such as the Prussian Junkers, who controlled the German army before World War I�at odds with other elements of society, such as the middle class or workers? Historical role. Does the military have a special or historical role in upholding the constitution or preserving the domestic order, such as the Turkish army has had since at least 1960? Does it view itself as the custodian of the state or as a state within a state, as the Japanese army did in pre�World War II Japan? (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 23 U NC t A 4t-� 1,1,1 a I 11,, 1/11,11 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//F IAL USE ONLY ecurity crisis. Does the country face a difficult national security challenge, such as a serious domestic insurgency, revolutionary activism, or a menacing strategic rival? Are the commanders of armed forces preoccupied with domestic "enemies," such as Chile's were before the 1973 coup led by General Aug usto Pinochet against President Salvador Allende? �nCivil-military strife. Is the military at odds with the civilian leadership, such as the Chilean army was during Allende's presidency in the early 1970s? Does the military tend to distrust democratic or civilian elements of the government? Is there a sizable civilian element�landowners or privileged classes�that support the military's vision against that of the government? ^ olitically ambitious officers. Is the military led by "alpha actors" contemptuous of civil authority or threatened by militant junior officers who are antagonistic to existing political conditions, such as those in Japan in the mid-1930s? Is there a cohort of junior officers who equally disdain their senior commanders or political leaders? nAPPLICATION Evaluating civil-military relations by these criteria�and comparing them with the available reporting�can help analysts identify situations that are relatively more likely to lead to ruptures in civil-military relations, including Coups. Such evaluations should also cover the national police and domestic security and intelligence forces�particularly if they are uniformed or politically influential. Assessments should be tracked over time to monitor the trends in civil-military ties and determine if the factors conducive to coups are worsening or abating. (1211 Stealthy Surprise? Sudden Hostile Actions Using Novel Methods (UHFOU0) Surprise attacks have traditionally had one positive consequence for the decisionmakers of the targeted actor: they afford the benefit of strategic clarity. Once the attack occurs, the victim state in most cases has a general idea of what has happened, who the enemy is, what his intentions are, and how the enemy is going to pursue them. Future cyber and biological attacks might not afford such clarity. � The vast majority of such attacks will almost certainly employ surprise to maximize effectiveness. However their nature and goals will probably not be immediately obvious, even after the attack has been launched and it is harming the victim state's population, economy, or IT infrastructure. � Biological warfare attacks, for example, may be masked, at least initially, as the onset of natural epidemics. Targeted cyber attacks may be impossible to distinguish from the work of hackers or of individual lone wolves or spontaneous networks. 24 I. Sudden Hostile Action uNcL cciricniir rlf"1/11 licr v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 �"Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//Fl IAL USE ONLY [jsthe onc released virusveiopers;g�rllyiOe l throf seek 6utandatt��h n�sdf innceht e ountriesthatpossss', temptedoffensive cyber capability will be nchief nuclear[strategic] assets were missiles with ' wa common knowledge awasthe nino e the oneit.wou I. Sudden Hostile Action UNC. nectrirnI rIrst AI lier rtRIIN/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFlED//r017-17f-i-+ "A Fatal Lethargy of Mind": A Wartime Commander's Take on Preparedness and Surprise n the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign�just eight months after the Pearl Harbor attack�the Imperial Japanese Navy surprised and routed US and Allied surface combatants guarding the Marine beachhead on Guadalcanal. The Battle of Savo Island, which took place on 8-9 August 1942, resulted in the sinking of one Australian and three US Navy cruisers, with the Japanese sustaining only light damage in return. In his after-action report, Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of US Naval amphibious forces in the Pacific, observed the following: . . . The [US] Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence of enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the Japanese and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind, which induced a confidence without readiness and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise.rf .--,:agf,maimummugg JAN 13 OREA 12-558IND0(468160) 26 UNCL-13.-.CIFFICIA1 11Cr ()NH v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 I. Sudden Hostile Action Tear out along perforated edge for personal reference! Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED ICIAL USE ONLY Rfi Checklist 2 A Checklist of Key Warning Indicators F�Pynthia Grabo, a leading DOD warning officer during the Cold War, boiled down her extensive research on strategic warning into the following five risk factors for surprise attacks: Intentions: Feasibility: Capabilities: Options: Perceived risk: actorthe mmit e 0 so,MP' that,goa ideological obession? Is that objective obtainable via military or coercive means, at least under certain optimal circumstances that the potential actor thinks achievable? Do other options exist short of military or coercive means to achieve the objectives? (U) These five risk factors can be condensed into two sets of questions that analysts and IC teams can pose regarding potentially hostile actors in their areas of responsibility. (1) Goal fixation: (2) Mobilization: (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) s the presumed objective prompting the possible use of hostile action a national (b)(3) o session? Examples of national goal fixation include France's desire to regain the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from Germany before World War I or Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev's desire to weaken the West's ties to Berlin in 1948-61, before the construction of the Berlin Wall. Note: From Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (pp. 100-103), by Cynthia M. Grabo, 2004. (b)(3) JAN 13 OREA 12-309INDD(462651) (b)(3) I. Sudden Hostile Action 27 LINCI A A I IICC !NMI X/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Type II Surprise: SYSTEM SHOCK Demonstrators demand the ouster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ L USE ONLY Type II Surprise: System Shock (b)(3) System shock involves the abrupt failure or rapid transformation of one or more complex systems. It includes sudden transitions from stability to instability, from order to disorder, from boom to bust. In Type II surprise, the focus is not on any unified actor but on a system or set of systems (see figure 5). �nA system can be a nation, a political arrangement, a country or regional economy, or a multi-ethnic community. sn It can also be a multilateral organization, alliance, or empire, such as communist Yugoslavia or the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. he action in Type II surprise is the result of manifold human actions and reactions, but the outcomes are not the result of design by any one actor. In contrast to the action in Type I surprise, system shocks usually take place in a more geographically diffused place (a country or a region) in a somewhat longer period of time�weeks, months, or even years�but the rate of change is much faster than in "normal times." In Type II surprise, once-stable regimes and systems can quickly unravel after a long period of apparent solidity. Subtypes and Examples of System Shock Theilverthrow of a Government. Such shocks result in to the ouster of a political leader, rather than the he term "butterfly effect" is one of the terms used to describe sensitive dependence on initial conditions in chaos theory. The term gained popularity after its use in the early 1960s by mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, who used it to explain the drastic, nonlinear changes in weather forecasts generated by his computer model of weather patterns. Lorenz attributed these large differences in forecasts to slight variations in his initial model settings, which he surmised could be caused in the real world by the flapping of a butterfly's wings. .(b)(3) Defining a Complex System (b)(3) A complex system can be defined as any whole (b)(3) or entity consisting of diverse, interdependent, interacting components that exhibit properties not evident in the behavior of the individual (b)(3) members�a trait known as emergence. Relationships among the parts contain both negative (dampening) and positive (amplifying) feedback loops. They are nonlinear, which means a small disturbance of the system may result in big changes (the so-called butterfly effect),h a proportional change, or no change at all, depending on particular conditions, which makes prediction even more difficult. Examples of complex systems include ecological communities, economies and social structures, global climate, � (b)(3) living organisms, regional and global strategic ' relationships, and modern infrastructures, such as telecommunications or energy. (b)(3) (b)(3) transformation of the social, political, or economic order. (b)(3) Examples include the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, the fall of President Mobutu Sese Seko in then Zaire in 1997, and the toppling of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan (b)(3) in April 2010. (b)(3) The Failure of a State. Such failures are caused by the (b)(3) state's weakness and inability to adapt after one or more shocks, such as acute sectarian or ethnic strife. Such state failures are often associated with widespread social(b)(3) dislocation and hardship as well as with other types of system shock, including revolutions and civil wars. Examples include Afghanistan during 1992-96 and(b)(3) 2001-02, Somalia during 1991-2004, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997-2002, Bosnia in 1992-95, and Lebanon in 1975-90. f11\11 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFI FFICIAL USE ONLY Figure 5 Anticipating System Shock Abrupt failure or transformation of a complex system or set of systems (such as a state, empire, or economy) � Rapid transformation of a complex system or systems�a state, economy, or international organization�or the rapid failure of a maladaptive system (an empire, an alliance, or a war effort) Bawler 0 System complexity, chaos, and randomness -Perception � Inherent unpredictability of the tipping points that lead to nonlinear changes�the effect butterfly � Observer's tendency to make straight line extrapolations � Difficulty of timing the onset of a system shock .os,tery.acji�,e,csensitnu '`..' eardir81in ous�Uecurrerices Source: Based on a review by a senior CIA analyst of more than two dozen cases of intelligence surprise experienced by US, British, French, Israeli, and Soviet services between 1939 and 2010. JAN 13 OREA 12-556INDD(466022) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 29 II. System Shock uN ..r�pir a IICP (11�11 v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED AL USE ONLY US Embassy personnel in Tehran--taken hostage by Iranian militants shortly after the fall of the Shah of Iran� are paraded in front of photographers. The collapse of the Shah's regime in 1979 demonstrates the rapidity with which system shocks can occur, as well as the lasting effects that such shocks can inflict on a wider region for years and decades to come. The Onset of a Revolution. Revolutions that sweep away an entire sociopolitical order and replace it with something different are rare. They include the revolutions in Russia, China, and Cuba; the uprising against the Shah of Iran and the emergence of an Islamic state in 1978-79; the breakup of the Soviet empire in 1989-91; and the dismantlement of the apartheid system in South Africa in the early 1990s. A Severe Recession or Grave Economic Calamity. In the economy, a system shock can originate in a specific market�the stock market, real estate, the financial sector, a fast-growing industry�and spread to an entire national or regional economy. The initial shock can be induced by an asset bubble that bursts or by a physical disruption of critical supplies because of war, embargoes, or labor trouble. Examples include the Great Depression and, on a lesser scale, the global financial crisis. The twin oil shocks of the 1970s�caused by pricing policy of the OPEC oil cartel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, respectively�are examples of supply-origin shocks. Environmental catastrophes�such as the accident at the nuclear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the USSR Famines caused by state actions that are motivated by ideological ambition, such as the large-scale Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 (early in Josef Stalin's rule) or Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward in 1958-61, are more akin to Type I surprise� sudden hostile action�in their origins and in their effects on the victim population. Communal violence includes ethnic, tribal, linguistic, or religious disturbances that involve violence or the threat of violence and damage to property. in 1986�or famines' because of natural disasters, poor land use, or inept state policies can also trigger system shocks. Poor central bank management of the money (b)(3) supply can lead to hyperinflations, such as the one that plagued Weimar, Germany, during the early 1920s or Zimbabwe in the 2003-08 period. The Outbreak of Communal Violence. The outbreak (b)(3) of communal violence may illustrate system shock if it is primarily because of an unplanned flareup of longstanding social or ethnic tensions sparked by a random clash or incident, rather than to premeditated action by states or armed groups, which may choose to exploit the outbreak of communal violence as a pretext to further their goals. Examples of communal violencei include intermittent Hindu-Muslim violence in India, the Uighur-Han Chinese violence in mid-2009, the anti-Uzbek riots in Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and the anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia in 1969. Such riots are usually localized and rarely lead to state-backed genocide. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) The Collapse of an International Organization or (b)(3) Alliance. The breakdown of an international organization or alliance under mounting duress�unless it is the direct result of hostile military action�is also an example of system shock. Some military alliances�the World War ll "Grand Alliance" that defeated Nazi Germany, for example� break up because they achieve their immediate objective and then the member-states fall out over postwar security arrangements. Others, such as the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, crumble to the result of dramatic changes in regime type or collapse of the dominant member. Still others fall victim to irrelevance and poor leadership, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the 1970s. Barriers to Early Perception of Type II Surprise (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) There are two key barriers to early perception (b)(3) of Type II surprises, which tend to be obscured mostly by the unpredictability and uncertainty inherent in complex (b)(3) affairs, rather than by the secrecy of hostile actors. Real-World Complexity, Chaos, and Chance. Tumultuous events that engulf participants and onlookers alike�such as revolutions, state failures, the breakup of empires, and financial crises�result from the unceasing interplay of countless diverse variables, most of which are interdependent. The longer the list of II. System Shock 30 UNC' A C C I I I r rrr..r 1..1,1111 11,, J1,1\11 %I Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE FFICIAL USE ONLY Patterns of Financial Bubbles: One Economist's View The features of. . . manias and financial crises are never identical, and yet there is a similar pattern. The increase in prices in commodities or real estate or stocks is associated with euphoria; household wealth increases and so does spending. There is a sense of 'We never had it so good'. . . . . Rational exuberance begins to morph into irrational exuberance, economic euphoria develops and investment and consumption spending increase. There is a pervasive sense that it is 'time to get on the train' . . . Asset prices increase further. The seers in the economy forecast perpetual economic growth and some venturesome ones proclaim no more recessions�the traditional business cycle .. . is obsolete. . . . An increasingly large share of the purchases of these assets is undertaken in anticipation of short-term capital gains and an exceptionally large share of these purchases is financed with credit . . . Then the asset prices peak, and then begin to decline . . . . . The decline in the prices of some assets leads to the concern that asset prices will decline further and that the financial system will experience 'distress.' The rush to sell these assets before prices decline further become self-fulfilling and so precipitous that it resembles a panic .. . The implosion of a bubble has been associated with declines in the prices of commodities, stocks, and real estate, and often these declines have been associated with a rash or a financial crisis. Some financial crises were preceded by a rapid increase in the indebtedness of one or several groups of borrowers rather than by a rapid increase in the price of an asset or security. Yr F7--Charles P. Kindleberger in Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 2005�three years before the 2008 financial crisis. Economic analysts can assess the resiliency of an economic system's financial sector, monitor early indicators of rapid inflation in assets prices, and brainstorm the broad economic, political, and social consequences if an asset bubble were to burst. JAN 13 OREA 12-312INDD(463892) 31 II. System Shock uNcLAccicirtiicno IICP Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR 0 E ONLY Anticipating Irrationality? An economic expert on financial crises, Charles P. Kindleberger, once listed some phraseology historically applied to speculative bubbles: Ct.. . Manias.. . insane speculation. blind passion . .. financial orgies. . . frenzies ... feverish speculation . . wishful thinking . .. intoxicated investors. .. turning a blind eye.. . a fool's paradise ... overconfidence. . . overspeculation . overtrading . . . a raging appetite .. . a craze. .. a mad rush to Economic analysts have to be alert to occasions when the strongly positive feedback loops associated with the early stages of a bubble develop, resulting in "herd behavior" that belies assumptions about rational economic actors. -.1205=VMarGarWrIfUg2M,11g.4.7i. ,2:1,12=7,20,,ONIWAX'St&reZVMMLIMM112d1=74a-LittelLa. actors and factors at play, the harder it is for observers to disentangle causal relationships or distinguish between clues that are relevant ("signals") and those that are not ("noise"). � Frequently, the causes and effects of accelerating instability blur when one variable�such as economic performance�is so tightly linked to other variables, including labor peace, tax revenues, welfare state outlays, and political stability. .n Natural disasters, accidents, blunders, weather, and chance further complicate strategic foresight by adding a bewildering element of randomness. Straight Line Extrapolations. Historical studies of intelligence failures and recent research into cognitive science both suggest that expectations that "tomorrow will look like today" are deeply rooted. Most human beings�including the foreign leaders and institutions that analysts monitor�have an ingrained need for order and predictability. On a day-to-day basis, analysts' expectations that any change in the short term will be modest and incremental will usually be borne out. � Most organizations�state bureaucracies, militaries, political parties�generally try to maintain an orderly state of affairs and adhere to standard operating procedures. The customs and protocols of diplomatic relations and international organizations channel and contain quarrels via orderly procedures and established patterns of interaction. � The Search for Universal Indicators of Political Instability Intelligence organizations and political scientists have long sought reliable indicators of looming political instability that are valid across systems and regions�so far with only modest success (see figure 6). Many experts deny such universal indicators even exist because of the importance of national and local idiosyncrasies and the sheer indecipherability of foreign actors. However, a contributor to the CIA journal Studies in Intelligence in the 1980s noted that, although the existence of reliable, truly universal indicators is doubtful, the presence of a youth bulge is often a common denominator of political instability. � The author observes that young people are generally more volatile than older people, have less in the way of vested interests to lose, and are more willing to protest. Thus, "if in the relevant population [nation, city, or ethnic group], the youth bulge hits a certain [undetermined] high percentage, a major change becomes more likely." A youth bulge skewed toward young males, especially in poor countries, may be a particularly acute early indicator of sociopolitical instability. The same author notes the importance of monitoring possible breaches of "implicit promises and bargains"�expectations shared by the leaders and the led regarding minimally acceptable standards for national security and honor, domestic order, economic well-being, and state accountability. Breaches of such understandings can, under the right conditions, lead to a powerful backlash among hitherto acquiescent populations. (b)(3) _azatrrazarwirgl (b)(3) (P) (3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) �._ Status quo�oriented leaders bent on keepinc(b)(3) power have a vested interest in projecting an image of strength, steadiness, and invulnerability�an image (b)(3) that may influence both the local populations and the IC analysts observing them. Taken together, these factors often buttress (b)(3) analysts' status quo assumptions, even as system volatility is increasing. II. System Shock 32 uNc ACCICIrr--7/../...C...;.........."7-11,) STM.L.Cini r-snre Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIE FFICIAL USE ONLY figure 6 Triggers of Instability: The Importance of Precipitating Events A trigger of political instability can be any catalyzing event that prompts significant numbers of once apathetic or intimidated citizens to take action against a government. Such triggers can take a wide variety of forms, depending on regime type, culture, popular grievances, and the state of civil society. Such triggers are usually unpredictable, driven by tactical conditions, and not always unobservable to outsiders�especially foreigners. Most governments can usually ride out one or two such triggers, unless they happen in rapid succession or the regime botches its follow-up response, resulting in a radicalization of once apathetic citizens. : k e of 'Rugger % � - . � ,, ,.: � taA4.W.P 141 I dan Destabilize a PilliikalW iDegree a&stem - � of Vteclictabihty 9 14 Cllii a ss'in into people,si,sensei'afin'figtie .. Iirlg 11-,6 b eritiat o dsitiornStSi 1::,take ,.actio Very crs,c-, esponse',1 i e en e nt �go_ d symbolic act .0 rbte'S ,i.. � ituatiop Snowballing Destabilizes regime; stretches or Very low. Response is local protest strains local security forces; may provoke bloody government crackdown. situation dependent. :,.. Eli td 'defections,t,Undercutsriartait'VeK) - 4,, P{J.,s,i,4"ifq,,q,1-;',..1;:ii. - ,3s- . O:Veintne , E'. Coup plotters Very ow .:aid power,grabs 'r4- ,siiiciyding cou , unityi'llf.Vit pera i t itraets.sleb. leaders hi .., .: e en ,orrsecree for success ' Natural or Botched or ineffective response exposes Low. Some weather-related earthquakes are More in terms of general location, civil disaster weak state capacity, ineptitude, or indifference of leaders, disasters or predictable vulnerability. 4. , f .:; ec huff q ,,,:' ,4,,;x,,, , Impedes1 (Weil:triter' to act Moderate-' Leadersten health but enefal;effect�0 ' diseases are predictable ' ,,Ars,i.,zais- 5:, . ect;4'raise0;, 0.1, 6 ',,about' ea er01 6ssttece*Orrs rules"Jandcountry sfuture :4m rom ,ambitious rivl elites o-take ',=action rice ill age and some,. health" sudden e of ea er "i n , Rigged or � orsentit ,rVA; to,pdhpriS Alffi,�?`-ei,rSYt'j4'4W4g', - erceirye , Orl'e Moderate. Presence of NGOs in some countries to hide. Exposes government's lack of stolen election ..,, legitimacy; galvanizes people to take to streets; may provoke external criticism or sanctions, experienced makes it harder uts,,we ars,ian iye 1 od _v.o c104'enr, 0 erate, c.onorrucr,-, - , ,p1,,,,,,N,- ,,t, .econorriic' T heealise o .,V.TA'Zitt% gpernr,hpri, q0r0fta 'at risk; m increaS'eseiiSef:O es efationv,reduces'. i';',WW''1141',07,Wr:-.'� ' 'citizens toleranceelite':fofs t' corruption t.aitbr�Tr:prtyateysctb.tact.9,rsTi4y. signal?�approaching7.,tippingipdirir Mismanaged national Exposes government's failure to fulfill Moderate to high. war effort; security fiasco its fundamental duty to protect the nation; strains civil-military relations; may reveal shortcomings of intelligence services. ar ressure e'.'Se Cif� an; emora tze:elites`-ran ,!embolden ,Moderate,,to'f;higb,:iFbreign*: ,inerea'se'iiii. frontOilesi outsiders,, oSSIO foreignpatron ot.the;iMpositionro ... ontsi 'e,sanctions;:q , OW o lows'iri�l weakening i'e' une:' nhients!i,stateMents:and,aCtidns-:, , n , _yerJ mill:ofteptie,o1),seryOle: JAN 13 OREA 12-552INDD(466025) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 33 II. System Shock uNri. A C.C.11.1liC Clr`1111 IICC (11%11 V � Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ � IAL USE ONLY Aids To Anticipating Type II Surprise Traditional intelligence sources are often of limited use in anticipating Type ll surprise, because system shocks often result from cascades or "tipping points"�when a system transitions rapidly from apparent stability to instability�that not even the actors within the system can accurately forecast. Herd effects and reinforcing feedback loops can rapidly destabilize or shatter a once-stable system more quickly than the typical reaction times of traditional intelligence reporting and analysis cycles. Intelligence reporting that comes into the analyst's work station is "old" news. Whether it was , collected only minutes, hours, months, or years ago, it provides a picture of what once was�not necessarily what will be. Analysts' long-established mental models and paradigms will no longer reflect the fast-changing situation on the ground, as a tipping point looms. IC analysts could therefore benefit from supplementing scrutiny of intelligence reporting with other means to enhance strategic warning of system shocks. These approaches and concepts focus on improving analytic anticipation of system shocks by: Assessing the potential brittleness and fragility of apparently stable systems. Enhancing awareness of the signs of rapid change in complex systems. Applying far-domain analogies from other fields, particularly the sciences, to anticipate phase transitions in intelligence targets. � Widening the range of imaginable outcomes. nticipate System Shifts and Tipping Points. ere is a growing body of scholarly and popular literature on the dynamics of nonlinear change in various domains. In journalism, academia, and intelligence, the use of such terms as "tipping points," "phase transitions," and "black swans" have become widespread. Awareness of even the basics of complex adaptive systems�reinforcing feedback loops, snowball effects, herd behavior, nonlinearity�can help analysts get ahead of the curve, without waiting for hard intelligence to come in after the system shock has already occurred. Although sophisticated mathematical modeling is required to fully exploit the potential of complex systems analysis, even a qualitative, graphics-based approach to the actors and the feedback channels can help analysts map a system's interactions and assess its vulnerability to system shock. : P On Black Swans Black swan" events�a term popularized by author and philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb in 2007�are extreme events outside the realm of popular expectations. They are difficult to model and carry heavy impacts, such as the rise of the Internet or the global financial crisis. Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface . .. These artificially constrained systems become prone to black swans�that is, they become vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from statistical norms and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.. . catching everyone off guard/3 Essayist and philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb and scholar Mark Blyth in an essay from 2011 in Foreign Affairs magazine on the LArab Spring. (p)(3) (b)(3) b)(3) (b) (3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Analysts can pursue a complex systems scoping analysis to identify the most important (b)(3) actors in a system, the basic rules for modeling actor behavior�such as maximizing profits for a company (b)(3) or bolstering security for a small country�and the system's most important and volatile networks. (b)(3) This assessi-nent makes linkages explicit and highlights those situations when herd behaviors can intensify the effects of an initial perturbation in a once-stable system. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Employ Far-Domain Analogies. Analogies from the realms of engineering, medicine, and the sciences (b)(3) can help IC analysts conceptualize sudden dramatic departures from a seemingly stable equilibrium in the regions or issues they follow. Such analogies should not be transferred automatically across domains, but they can spur creative thinking about possible discontinuities in many analytic disciplines (see figure 7). � For example, concepts such as the "butterfly effect"�originally derived from meteorological modeling�can illustrate the idea that small initial changes may produce nonlinear results (or sensitive dependence on initial conditions), such as was the case in Tunisia when a minor altercation between a fruit vendor and a low-level civil servant triggered the unrest that deposed strongman Ben Ali in 2011 after 28 years in power. Continued on page 38 (b)(3) (b)(3) II. System Shock :.'"""""'.'""""""""""""""""""""'"""""rrrrer'�44X--Crkir'l ACC IIC fftIIw Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 34 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED FICIAL USE ONLY Figure 7 Far-Domain Analogies: Aids To Anticipating Discontinuities Page 1 of 2 Concepts for rapid change from other disciplines or domains can help spur analysts thinking about the ways that discontinuities might crop up in the systems that they monitor. Simply brainstorming the types of "seismic forces" that may build up under an autocratic government, for example, can help analysts think creatively about the forms that a "phase transition"�a rapid transition from one state to another, from predictability to unpredictability�may take in their areas of analytic responsibility. Similarly, employing the analogy of "brittleness" from materials science to diagnose a maladaptive system�an alliance, an international organization, or an armed force under severe strain�may help analysts to think about system vulnerabilities in a new way. , ..., . ,. �,,, ,.. ) , Analo . .,,: , � .., � Cirigiiik i IA *.t,, Domain , . . � Hel ,.... - , ps . ysts' Better , 4 t".,,_,,,,n erstand. xthfples , ' � -FI . --....., ., . . Structural failure Engineering Failure of subsystem or system to adapt to new stresses placed on it se,,q ..!ar;regin*.!inrayelip ire; such as the Soviet bloc oslayia Breakup of an alliance or international organization; such as the collapse of the League of Nations, SEATO i'dtercb'd�dc kaYnmzF):?_ s em,:;, Failure ma _ at:tsar:11w qspiContagion/ lover effects Epidemiology Rapidly accelerating spread of behavior rpread of financial panics, stock bubbles, pandemics, computer viruses, fads arthquake/ avalanche Geology Sudden unleashing of formerly pent-up system strains or tensions, resulting in system shock and destabilization e evolution of the global balance ower; such �the system transition in' ostcornmunist states Onset of a revolution that ousts the old regime; such as the revolutions in Russia or China ystem,such as communist in. astern Europe and the of seCulr,.,diC't:torsh'i.PS:hi:'Egypt. and Tunisia efOre:201-1'� JAN 13 OREA 12-553IND0(466024) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3);b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 35 II. System Shock UNC1 IICC V Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED CIAL USE ONLY igure Far-Domain Analogies: Aids To Anticipatin (b)(3) Discontinuities [Continued] A irialogy Chigul#1 11117 ' 't. Helpg , ystsltb Better .. , , nderstand Exfitriples. A Dolliam Butterfly Small initial changes echnological innovation and I effect/Snowball effect Meteorology that lead to large variations in long-term conditions 1 usion; crisis escalation Perfect storm :efeoiolti areo' ..�. :.,, f'cm inatiohs 'Tv.21.e.4.g., . ? nse o 614 a ,Tc, no o Ica . ., ..- est,4b,ilfiiii ,s:i,tuat.ion'or4cris'Is 4:,Intic,,sry �eyerits;A that taya e fsastersuc del i.V.Ai.r4, as e erno Ifnuele en Critical mass/ Physics i Threshold number Spread of the Internet, computer use, chain reaction of people or self-sustaining agents to trigger a phenomenon social races; networking media; regional arms (b)( mass unrest FITV -- 'Popular Tipping . - 1 I :N;,,,-.,:,--. b a i ,adce er�6ns inThe a &Ise 'of:a e iesSion,4riajor, 1 ,,- , ,*.J'.'','f,4 eof:,t ap e>cirlii e's re'a, 7 ;',o.1 efinancial on practices s ' crisis`-.�regime ::cO a S' ppints, - - s6C1616 . swans"/wild cards "Black sociology Popular "Random or extreme, Assassinations; extreme terrorism; I hard-to-predict shocks onset of World War I; diffusion of disruptive technologies Herd -. ljZoology/R4 id imitation or coied Sread'o mangial behaviors beliefs;.'coordinated to Without planned directionrrimiitta.48719 p�cs-�-,:s c u e-s; ideological.-cUrr,eri s spread,,of elle behavior! -demonstration � effects 'soc.1610 sy-dh6 6behavior b)(3) b1(31 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) )(i) (b)(31 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (h)(3) (3) )0) (h1C31 (b)(3) b)(3) )(3) (b)(31 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) b)(3) (b)(3) JAN 13 OREA 12-553IN0D(466024) (b)(3) II. System Shock 36 uNci AccIFIFF1/ IAI ii nmi v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED CIAL USE ONLY The term "contagion," originally from epidemiology, is often used to describe the spread of financial or political instability from one country or region to areas previous thought stable (immune) from such volatility. "Brittleness"�a concept borrowed from materials science�can be applied to political systems that have endured over time but that may yet be vulnerable to unforeseen shocks. This far-domain analogy is particularly applicable to personalist authoritarian states that have not adapted to social or technological changes and that may be vulnerable to swift overthrow if a political challenge arises suddenly or from an unseen direction. Analytic teams can brainstorm the pillars of traditional authority in the countries or institutions that they follow and examine the relative degree of brittleness of each pillar, over time. nAPPLICATION Analysts can list or brainstorm in small groups the possible discontinuities that may loom in their areas of analytic responsibility. Using a handful of far-domain analogies for massive discontinuous change�earthquakes, perfect storms, "black swans," phase transitions�can spur creativity. Such metaphors for big change can help analysts get past status quo assumptions and dispel entrenched mind-sets regarding the permanence of only linear or evolutionary change. For example, analysts might regularly ask the following questions: What sorts of fault lines exist in my area of analytic responsibility�such as the aspirations of a rising social class versus the power and privileges of an entrenched autocratic ruler, the enduring enmity between two ethnic or religious groups, or the irreconcilable goals of two parties locked in an enduring strategic rivalry? With these fault lines in mind, what keeps the lid on? How strong are those forces for restraint? Might these inhibitors be weakening? What factors might bring those latent antagonisms into open conflict? What might make an "earthquake" more likely? What might trigger a catastrophic event? What might happen after such a catastrophe occurs? The discussion should include the nonobvious, indirect, and long-term effects, as well as the more immediate, likely, or obvious ones. (b)(3) Conduct War Games or Crisis Simulations. Apart (b)(3) from their utility in assessing the risks of sudden hostile action, these exercises can also help analysts game out a complex sequence of events. A war game or simulation is a technique designed to model�either rigorously or creatively�the operations and responses of a real-world process, organization, or system over time. No other tool is as helpful in scoping the dynamics and in bounding the imaginable outcomes of multiple interactions among many interdependent actors, such as those precipitated by the launch of a separatist movement or the escalating tensions caused by a radical state on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. Academic studies�amply supported by centuries of military experience with simulations�demonstrate that no other method consistently provides players with a more realistic sense of the volatility, time pressures, perceptions, and risks of unexpected moves by actors in a strategic game environment. Simulations can also provide players with a laboratory to challenge assumptions, test the readiness of actors for escalation and discontinuities, and explore the effects of randomness, friction, and wild cards on crisis scenarios. APPLICATION As a historian of technological failures, Charles Perrow in the 1980s examined "normal accidents"� his term for the "inevitable" failures of tightly coupled technological systems, such as nuclear power plants, space vehicles, and oil rigs. Other analysts of technological systems speak of "cascading failure." Perrow's concepts can be applied to complex political and economic systems, such as the EU, the Chinese Communist Party, or the global financial system. Analysts planning a simulation can ask, "What are the 'normal accidents' waiting to happen?" in their areas of analytic responsibility�such as the inability of a stagnant authoritarian system to manage a serious economic downturn. They can then examine what other systems�economic, security, or military� may be at risk of spillover effects should the political system fail. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 37 U;CL lA I II CC v Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 II. System Shock --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ IAL USE ONLY Identify and Monitor Breached Social Contracts. Just as deep understanding of a potential foe's strategic red lines is critical to assessing the risks of a surprise attack, so is awareness of informal social contracts�the unwritten expectations of accountability and obedience between the rulers and the ruled�critical to the assessment of political stability. Implicit promises and bargains are key elements of political stability. Such understandings limit uncertainty and set ground rules, according to one intelligence officer involved in instability analysis. When a social contract is breached, it creates preconditions for political instability. Examples of such breaches might include blatant electoral fraud, a policy blunder, flagrant corruption, scandalous conduct by an unpopular member of an autocrat's inner circle or family, or unprovoked violence against unarmed protestors, especially if such breaches are captured in visual media that can be disseminated widely. APPLICATION Periodic reviews of the terms of various country-specific social contracts and of possible signs of a violation may tip off political analysts to an erosion of legitimacy that often precedes a political system shock. Analysts can ask, "Is country X now breaking an implicit social contract, or is it likely to do so in the near-term future?" Seasoned substantive experts are the best sources for identifying the terms of implicit promises between the leaders and the led and for assessing the indicators of a possible breach. t ,=r.vmm.xuaaea, Conduct "What If" and High-Impact Scenario Analyses. Well-crafted scenarios and alternative futures can also help analysts move beyond near-term tactical assessment and straight line extrapolation. Academic postmortems of various intelligence failures often point to the penchant for single-point predictions�often (b)(3) anchored around the yesteryear's status quo�as the bane of sound strategic foresight. Well-depicted scenarios that are based on valid key drivers and fleshed out by multidisciplinary experts can widen readers' range of imaginable outcomes. APPLICATION IMO (b)(3) (10)(j) "What If" analysis involves postulating that (b)(3) a possible discontinuity has already occurred. This allows analysts to sidestep irresolvable debates over the likelihood of the event and focus on the possible drivers, proximate causes, and signposts of the postulated (b)(3) event. Analysts can work backwards to, envision one or more plausible paths to the event and reason forward to assess its direct and indirect implications. High-impact scenario analysis is similar. It (b)(3) allows analysts to move beyond status quo assumptions and expectations of small-scale change and focus on the more worrisome discontinuities that could be looming., the probabilities of which are generally thought to be low but are actually uncertain or variable. (b)(3) �(b)(3) Unlike in the physical world, a shock in the realm of human affairs does not typically result in a swift return to a stable, if drastically altered, new status quo. Instead, system shocks often lead to relatively long stretches of grinding instability and unpredictability, as various actors try to comprehend and cope with new conditions, exploit or resist opportunities for further change, and pick their way amongst the ruins of the old order. Major wars, widespread regional unrest, and the falls of empires are notorious for ushering in years and decades of heightened instability in their turbulent wake. (b)(3) Analysts working such intractable circumstances should have little expectations of a rapid return to preshock normalcy or stability. Daisy Chains of System Shocks (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) II. System Shock 38 UNCI ir-ini liar N/ Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 Type III Surprise: TECTONIC TRANSFORMATION nA Chinese high-speed train makes its way toward the main line. Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 --Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED/ FICIAL USE ONLY Type III Surprise: Tectonic Transformation (b)(3) Tectonic transformation involves the alteration of an entire domain or region, such as a continental economy, a regional military balance, a belief system, or technological network. Unlike sudden hostile actions or system shocks, tectonic transformations are not discrete events but extended historical processes, often lasting years or decades (see figure 8). They do not involve sudden or immediately obvious change, but rather large-scale, cumulative evolutionary changes that transform with gathering momentum entire domains, along with the strategic, political, and economic systems therein. In Type III surprise, the main actor is a national, regional, or global system�such as the industrialized Western economies or the global security system�made up of a huge number of interdependent actors that include people, societies, states, and institutions, none of whom control the domain. The engine of change�for example, the emergence of a revolutionary new technology, a compelling new ideology, or a new global power�drives the gradual but deep-rooted transformation of politics, society, economic life, and military affairs. � In Type III surprise, the surprise is usually not the main driver of change itselfbut rather the social, political, economic, and military consequences of that driver. The widely distributed, cumulative nature of tectonic change often eludes observers, including intelligence organizations. The changes associated with Type III surprise are usually imperceptible at first and then deceptively inconspicuous�"hidden in plain sight"�compared with the day-to-day "crises" featured in much of the global media. Subtypes and Examples of Tectonic Transformation Economic Transformations. Sustained, tt-.4t0' IsiandtiMathematically iflen e!;,Eate4o s theeind deMvatie']. positive, tis -with vinfle2,9;4r etu ii�14 ie ur;q Is5,6 ve 1.4. 01 ill CI,'.1-1jelci:1.14''Cl'EPI; techniques vastly increase long-term labor productivity and overall productive capacity. These gains, in turn, permit large jumps in living standards, food production, public health, state capacity, and military potential. These transformations are invariably linked to dramatic changes in business organization, working conditions, and producer-consumer relations. Over time they also transform politics, societies, and education. � �Lilirhe Industrial Revolution that began in Great Britain in the middle of the 18th century and that made the United Kingdom the world's most powerful state by the middle of the next century remains the leading example. Other examples include a unified Germany's explosive industrial growth between 1870 and 1914, the expansion of the aerospace industry in the United States between 1930s and early 1970s, the global revolution in information technologies since World War II, and China's meteoric economic ascent since 1979. (b)(3) b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) accelerated improvements in tools, technologies, and C7-7-71-er--izur�ci rs I A I I Ic RII Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 006606667 Approved for Release: 2016/08/24 C06606667 UNCLASSIFIED// CIAL USE ONLY Figure 8 Anticipating Tectonic Transformationa (U) Sweeping changes in regional or global domains (such as an interstate system, ideologies and religions, societal mores, technology, or economy) ves1/4 Bapriers ma s/onornic ormatiomsincei', mer encel.o 22. Extensive long-term changes, fundamental alterations of core technologies, economic systems, demographic patterns, political allegiances, or ideologies�often culminating in an epiphany, an event that exposes the sweeping scale, significance of change , ustrial1f.045�I, c o i&;:tr an�s Ogg' edc�ew, griidtita 'elfef.s steha' rarkjrnL�jnism ro*th of social';.movemen (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) The widely distributed nature of bottom-up change that is hidden in plain sight (b)(3) The large scale of change�impossible for an observer to monitor in entirety Scope, dimensions of change�too diverse, contingent to forecast accurately Xdritmei,cbrer system, rlyersoden i technologies brainstorma,theiteffeets wit ,, . , , ; ,,, . �Aii--vf..4755,;5/5,4545,.