[SANITIZED]LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 6 JULY 1984 - 1984/07/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628147
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: July 6, 1984

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
tki cr 0
Directorate. of
Intelligeocc
t
0-013
Latin America
Review
6 36ly 1984
3.5(c)
_Cue
ret
ALA
ALA LAR 84-013
6 July 1984
Copy 3 1 8
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Latin America
Review
6 July 1984
3.5(c)
-SetTer
Page
Articles Cuba: Weighing Policy Options Toward Argentina and Chile
3.5(c)
NR
Havana is facing a major dilemma over its conflicting goals in
Argentina and Chile because stepping up efforts to overthrow
Pinochet�which Castro would like to do�is likely to harm Cuba's
increasingly warm economic relations with Buenos Aires.
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Briefs
_Sean'
ALA LAR 844fl3
6 July 1984
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Articles
Cuba: Weighing Policy Options
Toward Argentina and Chile
Havana apparently is undertaking one of its periodic
reassessments of policy toward key South American
countries
Castro is facing a major
dilemma over conflicting goals in Argentina and
Chile. On the one hand, he has long aspired to
support, and even sponsor, an armed rebellion led by
the radical left to overthrow the Pinochet regime. As
unrest has periodically flared in Chile, Cuban leaders
have hoped that conditions there might be ripening to
the point where Pinochet would finally be forced from
office. On the other hand, Castro reportedly worries
that increased meddling in Chile would harm
Havana's relations with Buenos Aires, which have
continued to warm since thc inauguration of President
Alfonsin last December
Because prospects for ousting Pinochct in 1984 do not
appear promising�and we suspect the Cubans
increasingly will share this assessment�we believe
that Cuba's policy review will reaffirm the overall
guidelines governing its actions toward South
America during the past two-and-a-half years. We
believe Cuban policymakers, in the near term at least,
will keep their support for Chilean radical groups in a
low key to avoid antagonizing Buenos Aires. They
also probably wish to avoid jeopardizing Havana's
drive to improve ties with other South American
countries or to undercut their propaganda
campaign�dictated largely by concerns over Central
America�that portrays Cuba as a responsible
international actor.
3.5(c)
in our view, be inclined to jettison his current
approach and provide major support and direction to
these groups. Otherwise. Havana probably will
continue striving to enhance its relations with the
Alfonsin government through increased trade,
exchanges of high-level visitors, and closer
consultation on international issues. The Cubans
already are angling for several high-ranking
Argentine officials to visit Havana, and Castro may
soon seek an invitation to visit Buenos Aires.
Doeloping Relations With Argentina
From the start of Cuba's campaign to strengthen tics
with South America, Cuban planners have assigned a
high priority to Argentina. The turnaround in
Havana's relations with Buenos Aires occasioned by
the Falklands crisis was striking. As of March 1982,
according to reporting of the US Interests Section in
Havana, relations were cool and worsening. Havana
had kept its Ambassador away from Buenos Aires for
over a year to show disapproval of Argentine support
for the US position in Central America. Buenos Aires
had reciprocated by withdrawing its representative in
Havana. The Cuban media increasingly referred to
Argentina as one of the "repressive tyrannies"
considered by Castro to be "beyond the pale." Within
days after Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in
April 1982, however, Havana rushed its Ambassador
to Buenos Aires, reportedly with instructions to
express firm Cuban support. Cuban Vice President
Rodriguez announced that Havana was even willing
to supply direct military aid
Only in the unlikely event that the anti-Pinochet
movement develops into an open insurgency�with
radical leftist groups in the forefront�would Castro,
1
3.5(c)
ALA LAR 84-01J
6 July 1984
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c) shipments.
Wc believe the Cubans may also have been
responding to advice from Moscow�to which
Argentina is important as a grain supplier�that
Havana restrict itself to trade while marking time on
thc political front.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
>eel
Buenos Aires responded in kind. Its Ambassador
returned to Havana shortly after the crisis erupted
and began preparing for a visit by the Argentine
Foreign Minister in May 1982. The Ambassador also
helped to extend the expiration date of Argentina's
S1.2 billion line of credit to Cuba, which had been
negotiated in 1973 but was about to lapse. Both he
and his replacement, who arrived in Havana that
September, were welcomed enthusiastically and given
an entree to high-level Cuban officials rarely
accorded to non-Communist diplomatic personnel.
Havana and Buenos Aires quickly developed mutually
beneficial collaborative relationships in international
settings that focused ostensibly on promoting pro-
Argentine and anti-US resolutions related to the
Falklands. Despite the apparent cordiality, however,
both sides remained wary. Some Argentine officials
were leery that close relations would give the Cubans
an opening to revive insurgency by the terrorist
Montoncros and others. The Cubans were cautious
because of their animosity toward the Argentine
military, which had decimated the pro-Castro
Montoncros in the mid-1970s. Reflecting this caution,
Havana and Buenos Aires concentrated on expanding
economic ties, and by 1983 Cuba had become
Argentina's third-largest export market in Latin
America.
Cuba's economic
difficulties were a further motivating factor. Havana
recognized the opportunity that Argentina's export
requirements offered for hard bargaining, however,
and successfully pressed the Argentines for
concessions, such as unprecedented credits for grain
Courting Alfonsin
Judging by Cuban news commentary
Havana expected a
Pcronist victory and was as surprised as most outside
observers when Alfonsin and his Radical Party were
the winners. Leaping at the chance to portray Cuban
diplomacy as functioning normally following the
Grenada debacle, the Cubans sent Vice President
Rodriguez at the head of a large delegation to the
inauguration last December. Rodriguez met with
Alfonsin and other senior officials. Publicly and
privately, he exuded satisfaction over the Castro
government's relations with Buenos Aires.
Havana soon announced it was sending a senior
diplomat as its new Ambassador to Buenos Aires,
reportedly because it believed its previous
representative had been identified too closely with the
Pcronists. At the time, a Cuban foreign affairs official
reportedly commented that Havana regarded Cuban-
Argentine relations to be at their best point in recent
history.
Reflecting this climate, in March 1984 several trade
and technical cooperation agreements were
concluded. These included Argentine credits worth
S200 million annually for the next three years,
additional credits for Cuban purchases of Argentine
agricultural products, and plans for joint ventures in
fisheries and other industries. As noted by the US
Embassy in Buenos Aires, full utilization of the
Argentine credits could result in Argentina becoming
Cuba's largest non-Communist lender.
At the same time, according to Foreign Minister
Caputo, the Alfonsin government warned Havana
that support for Argentine terrorists would be
considered a hostile act, presumably resulting in the
termination of economic tics. Moreover,
Buenos Aires closely
monitors the activities of the Cuban Embassy
2
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
11,
1982
June
July
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Cuba-Argentina: Key Economic Detelopments
June 1982�May 1984
Argentina agrees to extend for one year the
remainder�about 5300 million�of $1.2
billion line of crcdit originally opened in
1973 due to expire on 30 June.
Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade,
attending special SEL A session in Buenos
Aires, discusses greater bilateral trade but
fails to persuade the Argentines to provide
credits for exports of foodstuffs.
September High-level Cuban delegation signs a trade
and financing agreement further extending
the 1973 credit; secures Argentine approval
of a moratorium until 1985 on S100 million
in Cuban debts falling due through
September 1982.
1983
March
June
July
October
December
For the first time, Argentina agrees to
provide credits of $68 million for foodstuffs
purchased during 1983.
Top Cuban trade official obtains additional
long-term credits of $100 million and
reaches agreement on purchase of four
Argentine ships for $60 million.
Argentine trade delegation, including 40
businessmen, visits Cuba to negotiate
adjustments in existing Argentine credits
and to increase credits for exports of
Argentine foodstuffs.
Agreement on rescheduling of Cuban debt
of about S100 million falling due during
October 1982�December 1983.
Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade
delegation visits Buenos Aires to arrange
purchases under the credits granted in July.
Vice President Rodriguez, heading
delegation to inauguration of President
Alfonsin, reportedly tells Argentines
3
et
Havana has targeted purchases of
Argentine goods at 5200 million in 1984, up
from $125 million in 1983: requests
increased Argentine credits. disc,isses a new
bilateral trade agreement, and presses for a
meeting of the bilateral working group on
foreign commerce.
Argentina increases credit to $105 million
for Cuban purchases of foodstuffs in 1984.
1984
March Argentine Secretary of Commerce leads
government/private-sector delegation to
Cuba and concludes an Economic
Cooperation Agreement replacing the 1973
accord; it provides 5200 million annually in
new credits through 1986. Third meeting or
bilateral working group on foreign
commerce produces several preliminary
accords and creates new commission for
economic and industrial cooperation.
Arrangements made for exhibition of
Argentine products in Havana in
September.
April
May
Bank of Cuba representatives meet with
Argentine Central Bank officials in Buenos
Aires to discuss implementing credit
arrangements under the Economic
Cooperation Agreement.
Argentine Chamber of Deputies delegation
discusses mutual assistance agreements in
science, technology, and rural housing with
Cuban officials.
High-level Cuban delegation scheduled to
visit Buenos Aires in July for first meeting
of economic and industrial cooperation
commission; will complete negotiations on
preliminary agreements reached in March
in Havana.
ret
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
,17
Wrs:i
a �t�
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Although Cuban hardliners probably continue to
advocate more active support for the Montoneros�
particularly within Argentina�they apparently have
not rev:tiled.
a Cuban foreign affairs official said in May
that Castro had instructed the Embassy in Buenos
Aires to give complete support to the Alfonsin
government
Meanwhile, Cuban officials have continued to shower
high-level attention on visiting Argentine officials,
such as the delegation to a recent SELA meeting in
Havana and a parliamentary group that visited in
May. Havana reportedly has informally broached the
possibility of visits by the Argentine Ministers of
Economy and Foreign Affairs, but we have no
indication of the response.
_re,stro
earlier this year was considering a trip to Buenos
Aires to sign an economic-cultural agreement, but
Foreign Minister Caputo informed our Embassy that
Argentina had no plans to invite him. Nevertheless,
we believe that if the two capitals maintain their
current pace of high-level contacts�Cuba's Minister
for Economic Cooperation is scheduled to visit Buenos
Aires for trade talks in July�Castro may actively
push for a formal invitation to visit Argentina in 1985.
Targeting Chile
Of all the South American governments coming to
power during the past two decades. Castro's strongest
animosity has been directed toward the Pinochct
regime. Following the overthrow of the Cuban-backed
Allende government in 1973, Castro promised to
provide opponents of the military junta with "all the
aid in Cuba's power." Nevertheless, as the prospects
of the Chilean left�and of opponents of the regime in
general�languished, Havana apparently realized it
had little chance to change the situation.
In linc with Castro's general policy during the 1970s
of downplaying "armed struggle" in Latin America,
Havana provided only minimal support to Chilean
radical leftists until near the end of the decade. With
the ranks of Chilean insurgents decimated by the
�Zet
security services�as occurred in most countries
during this period�Cuba could offer little more than
safchaven and training, principally to exiled members
of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).
Havana was careful, however, to maintain contact�
often bolstered by financial contributiens�with
Chilean exiles in Western Europe and elsewhere
The seizures of power by the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua and Maurice Bishop in Grenada in 1979
led Havana to espouse "armed struggle" again.
Although applied primarily in Central America,
Cuban leaders apparently also believed that their new
"insurrectionist line" might be effective in other,
carefully selected cases. In mid-1979, Castro told
visiting Chilean leftists that developments in
Nicaragua demonstrated that the Chilean situation
could not be resolved without military action. Cuban
training of Chilean leftists reportedly increased, and
several groups were infiltrated into Chile during
1979-80.
The resulting surge in terrorist activity, however, was
counteracted successfully by Chilean security forces,
and by early 1981 the MIR reportedly suspended
operations for several months. The ineffectiveness of
the Chilean leftists, and Havana's decision by late
1981 to try to improve its relations generally with
Latin American governments, caused Cuba to revert
to a policy of low-key supper
The eruption of serious discontent in Chile during
1983, however, evidently prompted Cuban leaders to
conclude that a viable opposition movement against
Pinochet was about to be created. The Cuban media
portrayed public demonstrations and the numerous
confrontations with security forces as evidence of
Pinochet's growing isolation and that "progressive
forces" were likely to oust him soon
I the Cubans hoped
radical leftist groups would play a leading role in the
anti-Pinochet movement. They were optimistic that
4
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
the MIR and other militants�trained in Cuba and
directed by Havana�would ultimately lead a
successful armed rebellion. Once again, however.
Havana's expectations were not met.
3.5(c)
By late 1983, the anti-Pinochet protest movement
faltered, violent tactics were rejected by most
opposition political forces, and radical groups were
isolated. Moreover, the MIR suffered a blow in
September when security forces wiped out a key
commando group and followed up by repressing other
MIR personnel. As a result.
the MIR leadership concluded that
Chilean security had effectively penetrated their
movement, ordered a halt to violent tactics until
further notice, and sent 30 or more party militants to
safchaven in Cuba.
Some evidence suggests that Cuban policymakers
were confused about political developments in Chile
during this period.
Nevertheless.
Havana still wants to lay the foundation tor an
eventual large-scale insurgency. To that end, the
Cubans reportedly are seeking to promote closer ties
and greater cohesiveness among radical groups,
including the MIR, the Communist Party, and the
terrorist factions of the Socialist Party.
�Seri(
Those supporting this decision reportedly argued that
it is fundamental to maintain an armed presence in
Chile if ever the MIR hopes to mobilize popular
support against Pinochet.
Castro is reconsidering his support
to the Chilean left because of President Alfonsin's
likely reaction.
For example, revelations of Cuban
Embassy personnel dealing with the MIR in
Argentina could seriously set back otherwise warming
relations with Buenos Aires.
Prospects
In our view, Castro's pragmatism probably will lead
him to recognize that "objective conditions" in Chile
are not yet propitious for a major "armed struggle"
effort led by the radical leftists. In any case, a
substantial expenditure of Cuban resources would be
necessary to sustain such an effort, and Cuba's
Central American commitment is likely to have first
priority for some time. Moreover, the damage to
Havana's propaganda campaign and its drive to
improve diplomatic ties with Venezuela, Colombia,
and Peru would be extensive, as Castro undoubtedly
realizes. Finally, Havana probably believes that for
now the benefits flowing from its expanding economic
ties with Buenos Aires should not be risked for the
sake of the dubious short-term gains that accelerating
its Chilean activities might bring.
3.5(c)
5
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
�4t0;t 4IP
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Nevertheless, if political agitation in Chile
unexpectedly assumes major proportions in the near
future, we believe Castro could not resist the
temptation to expand Cuba's commitment to thc
radical leftists. Short of this. Havana probably will
continue to provide only modest support�such as
training and some financing�in order not to provoke
the Argentines.
ret
tit
3.5(c)
6
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628147