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June 2, 1976
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Ap�proved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 J.Se-cr0 3.5(c) CI SNLA 7:67022 No, 070273 June 2, 1976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 NR Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS publication is prepared for regional specialitts in the Washington com- munity, by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of IntelliRance. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articIes. � ON TENTS, June 2, 1916 Latin American Terrorism � The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) . 1 Argentina: Censorship Questioned 10 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 Latin American Terrorism, - The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) , Shortly after the murder last month of the Bolivian ambassador to France, General Zenteno, we speculated that a South American guerrilla organiza- tion known as the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (CR) might be responsible for his death. So far the only leads developed by 'Paris police point to a simi- lar conclusion--.that- some form of international ter- rorism was at work. Ballistic tests reportedly con- firm that the gun used to kill Zenteno was the same weapon that wounded the Spanish military attache in Paris last fall. Speculation abOut,-the-adtivities of the Revolu- tionary Coordinatin41,t'Ota Iii!#A-ris was also fueled by an advertisement it placed in the May 9 issue of Le Monde entitled 'Latin America Fights in Ardentina." While the manifesto consists largely of the revolu- tionary cant common to such publications, it is the junta's first open attack in France. It focuses atten- tion on the repressive activities of the new Argentine government and callsfo'r a world-wide mo- bilization to free Edgardo Enriquez, the founder of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left and a member of the junta's secretariat, who was, arrested by Argentine security forces on April 10. This may be the beginning .of an international propaganda ef- fort to discredit the military government--at least it serves to arouse the sympathies of the French left on this issue. _Information oh.the-Coordinatinq Junta is fraci- mentarv'. June 2, 1976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 3.3(b)(1) Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 and arrests of extremists in Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia confirm that such an organi- zation does exist, The junta may have originated during informal contacts between various South AMerican leftist movements as early as 1968, but its formal existence was declared in a joint communique in February 1974 when representatives of guerrilla groups in Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina announced that they were uniting under the leadership of Roberto Santucho, the head of the Peoples Revolutionary Army in Argentina. In March 1975 a Paraguayan extremist organization reportedly joined the junta and later that month a meeting wad held in Lisbon "to unify the Latin American revolutionary movements." . The junta is now said to have representatives in several European countries, including Portugal, Sweden, and France, but available evidence indicates that its headquarters are-stillin Argentina and that most of its funds, and probably its,members,- come from the Peoples Revolutionary Army. Until now the 'Revolutionagy-,Coordinating Junta . has not taken credit for - any tettoriSt operations, as has been the common .' pra�ctice, of, individual ' tilla:OrganizatIons in $0iltn Afite,kita. This does not 3.30m1 mean that it has. been On the ..0ohtrary, it 'would !appear the organi- zation takes 2�-s name serioug',Y an. - exists for the 'purpose Of coordinating activities and providing logistical support to its member groups, These Despite the lack of hard data on assets or numbers involved, it would appear that the junta has : , June 2, 1976 3.3(b)(1) --; Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 �1 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 , Already achieved a status and operational capability that exceeds past efforts by Latin American revolu- tionaries to form intra-hemisphere or regional or- ganizations Which existed largely on paper. It will Play an even more significant role if its member organizations decide to return to their own countries and to focus on foreign targets.. ' Security conditions in Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay make it extremely difficult for extremists to operate effectively within national borders, and the Argentine military seems to be having some suc- cess against terrorist activities. Many students of international terrorism PredgCt that instead of being destroyed or driVenzUndergrOund4 the sophisticated guerrillas in, ArgentIna,willWehtUaiXY turn their attention to,-turope' or perhaps conduct Operations on a World-wide scale. 3.5(c) :JUne 2, 1976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 3.5(c) Argentina: Censorship Questioned � The junta's reticence and its imposition of media censorship have left the public ignorant of important matters and are creating potentially serious prdblems, according to the prestigious Buenos Aires Herald. In recent articles the paper has commented that the lack of hard information on the state of the government and its Plan-0:s fueling 'harmful. speculation and could eventually lead, to a loss of confidence in the regime. - The paper points out that the failure to put an end to or at least answer charges of human rights vidlations, for example, in effect confirms the worst fears of many who make such charges. The relative silence of the press reinforces the impression that 1-ie situation is indeed grave. y The junta could make a start toward refuting the charges that it tacitly condones repressive tactics, Suggests the Herald, by eating the restrictions on ,the press. If, on the other hand, the regime continues on its present path, it will likely be subjected, however unfairly, to the kind of international criticism that has hurt the Chilean militarY,gOvernMeht- The junta's blantiPu.4lic statements also en- Coutagt speculation that 1141.rY unity Is insufficient to permit confident action, according to the paper. This is dangerous, says the Herald, because unless refuted by strong policy making, the public--and potential military dissidents--will assume it to be so.' The end result would be a self-fulfilling proph- ecy that the Herald and other news organs greatly fear. � President Videla and his, moderate supporters are: bound to find the Herald's questions unsettling. � June 2,. 1,976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543 ,The junta does indeed seem somewhat immobilized by the enormity of the _problems it confronts and by questions of military unity.:t _After more than two months in power, the rffaime has -relatvely little to show for its effort's. 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628543