THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 12 DECEMBER 1967 - 1967/12/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06752203
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
cret
119
12 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
ILLP-SECTICF
3.5(c)
(
Information as of 1600
12 December 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Units of the 3rd North Vietnamese Division
have lost almost 500 killed in six days of heavy
fighting in Binh Dinh Province.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US and South Vietnamese troops report killing nearly
500 enemy soldiers in Binh Dinh Province in six
days of fighting (Paras. 1-5). US Marines killed
54 North Vietnamese in a day-long battle on 11
December just south of the Demilitarized Zone,
(Paras. 6-8). Some Communist main force units
in northwestern III Corps are apparently avoiding
contact with allied forces (Paras. 9-14),
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Senate has issued a statement denouncing the
National Liberation Front (Paras. 1-2).
There is
IV.
There is
North Vietnamese Military Developments:
nothing of significance to report.
Other Communist Military Developments:
nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi
has sharply denounced US efforts to bring the Viet-
nam problem before the United Nations (Paras. 1-3).
Seven Spanish veterans of the French Foreign Legion
who remained" in North Vietnam after the Indochina
War have recently returned to Spain (Paras. 4-7).
VI. Other Major Developments: Foreign shipping
to North Vietnam in November was lower than the
monthly average for the first six months of 1967
(Paras. 1-5).
TO
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
RET
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
3.5(c)
1. Troops of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and
South Vietnamese infantrymen reported on 11 December
that they had killed nearly 500 enemy soldiers in six
days of fighting in the Bong Son plains of northern
Binh Dinh Province.
2. The US troops reportedly were responsible
for 304 enemy dead. South Vietnamese forces state
that they killed 167 enemy. The allies captured 11
crew-served and 48 individual weapons.
3. American losses were 33 dead and 197 wounded;
South Vietnamese losses were 30 dead and 71 wounded.
After-action reports indicate that the comparatively
light allied casualties were the result of a maximum
,use of artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gun-
ships.
4. In its early stages the action in Bong Son
was characterized by coordinated sweeps by US and
South Vietnamese battalions whiah resulted in a nearly
complete encirclement of a battalion of the 22nd
Regiment, North Vietnamese 3rd Division. Heavy air
and artillery strikes were directed on the enemy posi-
tions. On 9 December South Vietnamese forces sweeping
the battle area engaged several isolated platoon-
size enemy units. The following day the focus of the
action shifted to a nearby fortified enemy hamlet.
US troops made repeated attempts to overrun the complex
during the day, but failed. After a night of air and
artillery bombardment, however, the US forces took
the hamlet early on 11 December.
5. The 22nd Regiment recently moved into the
rice-rich Bong Son area from the An Lao Valley.
This unit, along with the other regiments of the
North Vietnamese 3rd Division, has been among the
most resilient in South Vietnam. The target of
massive allied operations in 1966--MASHER/WHITE
I-1
TOP &CRET
12 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO6752203
No
- Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
RET
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Troops of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and
South Vietnamese infantrymen repotted on 11 December
that they had killed nearly 500 enemy soldiers in six
days of fighting in the Bong Son plains of northern
Binh Dinh Province.
2. The US troops reportedly were responsible
for 304 enemy dead. South Vietnamese forces state
that they killed 167 enemy. The allies captured 11
crew-served and 48 individual weapons.
3. American losses were 33 dead and 197 wounded;
South Vietnamese losses were 30 dead and 71 wounded.
After-action reports indicate that the comparatively
light allied casualties were the result of a maximum
use of artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gun-
ships.
4. In its early stages the action in Bong Son
was characterized by coordinated sweeps by US and
South Vietnamese battalions which resulted in a nearly
complete encirclement of a battalion of the 22nd
Regiment, North Vietnamese 3rd Division. Heavy air
and artillery strikes were directed on the enemy posi-
tions. On 9 December South Vietnamese forces sweeping
the battle area engaged several isolated platoon-
size enemy units. The following day the focus of the
action shifted to a nearby fortified enemy hamlet.
US troops made repeated attempts to overrun the complex
during the day, but failed. After a night of air and
artillery bombardment, however, the US forces took
the hamlet early on 11 December.
5. The 22nd Regiment recently moved into the
rice-rich Bong Son area from the An Lao Valley.
This unit, along with the other regiments of the
North Vietnamese 3rd Division, has been among the
most resilient in South Vietnam. The target of
massive allied operations in 1966--MASHER/WHITE
12 December 1967
I-1
TS/P--8E'CR-kT
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
3.5(c)
WING, THAYER, and IRVING--in which it suffered heavy
losses, the 3rd Division has nonetheless managed
to sustain a damaging guerrilla campaign in Binh
Dinh Province. This year in Operation PERSHING, US
forces have lost 551 killed and over 2,500 wounded
in the Bong Son area.
New Fighting in the Demilitarized Zone Area
6. US Marines backed by artillery and tanks
reported killing 54 North Vietnamese in a day-
long battle on 11 December just south of the
Demilitarized Zone.
7. The action took place midway between
Con Thien and Gio Linh and just north of an allied
strongpoint now under construction. Twenty US
troops were wounded in the fight, the third sharp
clash in the area in a week.
8. The US troops were sweeping the area
between Con Thien and Gio Linh, apparently in
response to communications intelligence reports
which indicated that elements of the North Viet-
namese 90th Regiment were planning an attack
in the sector. During the day enemy gunners
fired nearly 70 mortar and artillery rounds at
allied positions just below the Demilitarized
Zone; they caused light casualties and little
damage to the heavy fortifications.
Communist Maneuvering in Northwestern III Corps
9. Some Communist main force units in South
Vietnam's northwestern III Corps apparently are
avoiding contact with allied forces. In recent
weeks, most of the North Vietnamese 7th Division
has been noted in communications intelligence
moving out of northern Tay Ninh Province to
new locations further east, probably in antici-
pation of new allied operations there.
12 December 1967
T-9
TOP-SEM--
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
(-F-0-13--8-ECITET
10. Northern Tay Ninh Province--known as Communist
War Zone "C"--has long been a Communist stronghold and
the site for the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).
Successful allied operations through the zone earlier
this year drove the Viet Cong 9th Division out of the
area. Some of the enemy forces took sanctuary in nearby
Cambodia while others moved to the east and south.
Shortly thereafter, the 6,100-man North Vietnamese 7th
Division with its three subordinate regiments--the 101st,
141st, and the 165th--moved into Tay Ninh from Communist
War Zone "D" to the east.
11. In recent weeks, however, the 101st Regiment has
apparently relocated to western Binh Duong Province, the
141st Regiment has redeployed into central Binh Long
Province, and the 165th Regiment has moved into southern
Binh Long. These rhaneuvers may have been designed to
protect infiltration and supply routes in sensitive areas
in addition to enemy anticipation of large-scale allied
activity in northwestern III Corps. The Communists may
hope that the positioning of 7th Division units will
enable them to harass allied units in rear areas. Such
operations could be partially designed to limit the con-
centrationof allied units in offensive forays into Tay
Ninh.
12. A similar shift of enemy forces away from areas
of intensified allied operations occurred earlier this
year when elements of the Viet Cong 5th Division moved
from their long-time operational area in southeastern III
Corps. The division's headquarters and one of its two
regiments left the Phuoc Tuy - Long Khanh Province area
and moved northward into northern III Corps.
1-3
3.2.0.2--SECZET
12 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
( �
f52.12_,SEGRET
14. A major new allied operation--codenamed
YELLOWSTONE--i in progress in northern Tay Ninh
Province and is probably the impetus behind the re-
cent enemy movements. Seven US Army battalions of
the 25th Infantry Division and two infantry bat-
talions of the South Vietnamese 49th Regiment began
this operation on 8 December and are to search for
enemy forces and installations throughout the north-
ern half of Tay Ninh Province. In addition, these
forces will construct Special Forces camps and a
heavy artillery position and will clear, improve,
and maintain allied lines of communication through-
out the area.
12 December 1967
1-4
3_041-8EC1ET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
TOP-SteRET
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Senate on 8 December unanimously agreed
to issue a statement denouncing the National Libera-
tion Front. The statement condemned terrorism and
sabotage by the 113'ront and made particular reference
to the recent Viet Cong attack on the montagnard
hamlet of Dak Son. It charged that the -ront, while
usurping the name of "the government of South Viet-
nam," is actually only a tool of North Vietnam.
Recognition of the Front "in any form" was condemned
as a "violation of the Vietnamese people's right of
self-determination."
2. One senator attempted to have a proviso
added calling for legislation to outlaw the Front.
He later withdrew his proposal. Another senator
argued that such legislation could be interpreted
as recognition of the Front as separate from the
Communist Party, which is already outlawed.
12 December 1967
TO-P-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
-T-042-PaReRET
III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
12 December 1967
III-IV - 1
Te_p_sEe.R.ET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi has broken its silence regarding re-
cent activities at the UN related to Vietnam by is-
suing a sharply worded denunciation of US efforts to
bring the Vietnam problem before the Security Coun-
cil. This was the essence of an authoritative "Com-
mentator" article in the party daily Nhan Dan, which
was broadcast on 12 December.
2. The article claimed that the US was up to
its "old tricks" of making the UN serve its "aggres-
sive plan against Vietnam," and of "scrapping the
1954 Geneva agreements." It reiterated Hanoi's long-
standing position that the "UN has no jurisdiction
whatsoever to settle the Vietnam problem," and cited
the Liberation Front's recent denial that it had
tried to send representatives to the UN to discuss
the Vietnam question.
3. "Commentator" also restated Hanoi's most
rigid formulations for a settlement of the conflict.
The article concluded by claiming that Hanoi's
Four Points and the Front's new political program
reflect the basic principles and main provisions of
the 1954 Geneva agreements, which, it said, "the
countries participating in the Geneva conference,
as well as other countries and the UN, have the duty
to respect."
Spanish Refugees From North Vietnam
4. Seven Spanish veterans of the French Foreign
Legion who remained in North Vietnam after the end
of the Indochina war have recently been returned to
Spain. Their repatriation is the latest of Hanoi's
efforts over the past three years to rid the coun-
try of foreign elements, which the regime has felt to
be untrustworthy.
5. The refugees spent most of the years since
1954 in villages outside Hanoi engaged in semiskilled
12 December 1967
V-1
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
and laboring tasks. Most of the information they
may provide will probably be on the areas where
they lived and the attitude of the people there
toward the war.
6. In an initial press statement, the refugees
complained about their treatment by the North Viet-
namese and stated that even after many years they
were considered foreigners. They claimed that the
North Vietnamese were not afraid of the US and were
determined to fight "until none of them is left
standing."
7. Prior to their evacuation on 30 November,
the refugees spent several weeks in Hanoi. In a
report of their impressions of conditions there,
they said that despite North Vietnamese Government
propaganda, bomb damage to Hanoi did not appear to
be extensive and that the government was using
"black smoke" to simulate damage. The refugees ob-
served that traffic in Hanoi was flowing in both
directions across the Doumer Bridge, and that there
appeared to be plenty of labor available for repair-
ing bridges and other vital points. Such repairs
seemed to be made effectively within a reasonable
period of time. The Spaniards also observed numer-
ous small generators in the capital and reported
that electric power was available on some days but
not on others.
12 December 1967
V-2
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C067522nfl
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
CRET
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. About 105,600 tons of cargo were delivered
to North Vietnam by foreign flag ships in November.
Although this is some 17,000 tons higher than in
October, it is still below the monthly average of
128,400 tons delivered during the first half of
1967. Deliveries of bulk foodstuff totaled 20,500
tons. Petroleum deliveries rose to 20,700 tons,
of which 7,000 tons originated in China and 13,700
tons in the Soviet Union. North Vietnam has now
imported about 218,000 tons of petroleum this year
compared with 200,800 tons during all of 1966.
Since the POL facilities in Haiphong were bombed
in June 1966, almost all POL deliveries have come
from the Soviet Far East aboard small tankers.
2. Fifteen Soviet ships--12 freighters and 3
tankers--delivered about 54,400 tons of cargo to
North Vietnam in November compared with an average
of 66,750 tons during the first six months of 1967.
Five ships originated in the Black Sea and the re-
maining ten came from far eastern ports. Cargo
deliveries aboard Soviet flag ships thus far in the
second half of 1967 have averaged about 38 percent
less a month than during the January-June period.
Most of this drop occurred in cargoes originating
from the Black Sea. The greatest drop occurred in
fertilizer and general cargoes--industrial equip-
ment, metal products, and spare parts.
3. The volume of shipping to North Vietnam
may increase in December. Six Soviet ships have
already arrived this month, at least five more are
en route. Several ships are scheduled for December
voyages between Vladivostok and Haiphong.
4. The record level of shipping into North
Vietnam in the fist half of 1967 caused a strain
on Haiphong's cargo handling capabilities and some
some ships remained in port more than 60 days. The
decline in the rate of shipping during the second
half of the year has permitted a significant reduc-
tion in the backlog of ships in Haiphong, and the
turnaround time has been reduced from 33 days in
August to less than 18 days in November.
12 December 1967
VI-1
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
TOP
RET
5. Recent photography shows North Vietnam is
making increasing use of barges in Haiphong both in
lightering ships in the outer harbor and in unload-
ing ships at the commercial pier. Since the rail
bridge out of Haiphong was cut in late September,
increased use of barges has aided in the distribu-
tion of cargoes via the inland water route to such
major distribution centers as Hanoi and Nam Dinh.
12 December 1967
VI-2
TOP-SEeRE-Y
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
To
�Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752203