THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 14 DECEMBER 1967

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06752205
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 14, 1967

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Toret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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14 December 1967
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Information as of 1600
14 December 1967
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HIGHLIGHTS
Communist China continues to beef up its air
defenses near the North Vietnamese border.
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM:
Sharp clashes between small units were reported in
widespread areas of South Vietnam on 14 December
(Paras. 1-3). A B-3 Front - associated unit is
apparently assisting with the movement of supplies
and reinforcements into III Corps (Paras 4-6). New
Chinese automatic rifles have been captured in the
delta (Paras. 7-9).
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: -
The government is making little progress in fashion-
ing new programs for the co:vntry and is concentrat-
ing primarily on organizat4ma1 matters (Paras. 1-6).
The Upper House has completed debates on its rules
(Para. 7). The proposed trial of 26 leaders of the
1966 "struggle" movement has aroused little public
interest, but pressure is developing for light sen-
tences (Paras. 8-9).
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS: At
least six more Chinese Communist fighters have
moved to airfields in South China (Paras. 1-2).
significant change
in the air defense structure on the Sino - North
Vietnamese border (Para. 3). There have been un-
usual communications involving the Chinese 13th
Army headquarters and its subordinate units (Paras.
4-5).
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14 DECEMBER
25 50 75 100 Wes
25
50 75 100 Kilometers
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A number of sharp clashes between small
units were reported on 14 December.
2. US 1st Cavalry Division units killed 30
enemy in the coastal lowlands of Quang Tin Prov-
ince. A South. Vietnamese force ambushed in Binh
Dinh reportedly suffered heavy losses; enemy
casualties were 30 dead. In northern Tay Ninh
Province, the Civilian Irregular Defense Camp at
Katum was shelled on 13 December for the third
time in less than a week. Allied casualties were
light.
3. On 13 December North Vietnamese gunners
fired 55 mortar rounds on the allied base at Dak
To, killing three Americans and wounding 12./
/enemy forces in this region have�been re-
supplied and that additional mortar attacks are
likely. Between 7 and 9 December a radio station,
believed to serve the 40th North Vietnamese
Artillery Regiment, was noted moving northward
toward a known Communist base area in southeastern
Laos and then returning to the triborder area.
This movement, coupled with increased sightings
of trucks moving southward in the lower Laotian
panhandle, suggests that the artillery unit was on
an ammunition resupply mission. In addition, re-
connaissance units of the North Vietnamese 1st
Division have been making
positions in the Dak To area
In recent days.
B-3 Front Coordination with COSVN
in the western
highlands show increasing cooruiliation between the
B-3 Front, the over-all command authority in the
highlands, and a section of the Central Office of
South Vietnam (COSVN) in northern Tay Ninh Prov-
ince.
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6. This is farther south than any B-3 Front -
associated terminal since the North Vietnamese 88th
Regiment moved from the highlands into northern III
Corps. This activity suggests that subordinate
elements of the B-3 Front are assisting in the move,-
ment of men and supplies destined for Communist
main force units in III Corps.
New Chinese Rifles Captured in Delta
7. Chinese-automatic rifles produced only a
few months ago are turning up in South Vietnam.
Examination of two weapons captured during a recent
skirmish in the Mekong Delta area indicates they were
made during the third quarter of 1967.
8. The factory that manufactured these rifles
is in northern Manchuria, over 2,000 miles from the
delta. Older models of the same weapon have been
captured in South Vietnam for some time.
9. The rifle is a Chinese copy of the Soviet
AK-47, which is the standard shoulder weapon used
by Soviet and East European forces. It has a
maximum cyclical rate of fire of 600 rounds per
minute. Although somewhat heavy for a Vietnamese,
it is considered a good weapon for use in both
the jungle and delta areas.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. President Thieu has been in office a month
and a half, but his government has shown few signs
of developing promising new programs for the country.
Tile government seems chiefly concerned with its own
internal organization and relationships. The un-
settled feud between Thieu and Vice President Ky may
be complicating the process of working out future
programs. Although not deliberately sabotaging
Thieu's efforts, Ky has adopted a wait-and-see at-
titude in the apparent expectation that the Pres-
ident will commit serious political errors which will
enhance Ky's own future political prospects.
2. Persons close to the government have com-
plained about what they call Thieu's dilettante
approach to the day-to-day problems of governing.
Moreover, Thieu is evidently not providing adequate
guidance to Prime Minister Loc who appears to be
waiting for cues from the President. Loc's cabinet,
composed largely of technicians, has yet to come up
with a significant new program. It appears partic-
ularly reluctant to take any steps in the economic
sphere which might draw criticism from influential
circles.
3. The performance of Foreign Minister Tran
Van Do has been a notable exception. He recently
strengthened his ministry by placing more professional
and experienced men in charge of critical divisions.
He will visit Africa shortly to refurbish South Viet-
nam's image in that area.
4. In addition to the internal pressures which
contribute to the government's lack of decisiveness,
Thieu reportedly faces a rising tide of resentment
from certain military officers who fear they may lose
their prerogatives under the civilian government.
Awareness of this resentment seems to be delaying
the government's anticipated reorganization of the
military establishment, and may further hinder
promised reforms in the civil administration, in-
cluding the anticorruption drive.
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5. Neither house of the National Assembly is
in a position to enact legislation, and no legisla-
tive proposals have been proposed. Both the Upper
and the Lower Houses are preoccupied with their own
internal organizations--a process which may continue
into early 1968. Members of both houses have been
content to present resolutions criticizing the gov-
ernment for its mobilization decree and its handling
of political prisoners.
6. Certain antigovernment elements, particu-
larly in the Lower House, may be expected to go on
trying to embarrass the government. Although a
majority in each house appears basically inclined
toward cooperation with the government, National
Assembly members generally seem eager to demonstrate
their independence of the executive branch and to
ingratiate themselves with their constituents.
Upper House Developments
7. The Upper House completed debate on its
rules on 13 December and is to meet on the 15th to
take a final vote. Several of the latest could
only be approved provisionally since they deal with
Upper House - Lower House procedures and require
Lower House concurrence.
Trial of Struggle Movement Leaders
8. The proposed trial of 26 leaders of the
1966 "struggle" movement, tentatively set for 19
December, has aroused little interest in Saigon.
Most local papers have carried stories about the
trial, but few have run significant editorials on
it. Moderate Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau has,
however, sent a letter to President Thieu request-
ing amnesty for all those who were involved in the
"struggle" mdvement "in order to help promote re-
conciliation and unity in the country." Thich Tam
Giac, prominent in the Chau faction, has advocated
that the trial be postponed until after the National
Assembly drafts an amnesty law.
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9. Pressure from within the National Assembly,
especially that from essentially progovernment mem-
bers, and the appeals from the two government-sup-
porting monks may lead the government to go easy on
the defendants. The presiding officers of the
court still have to be chosen and the trial date
is only tentative pending their selection. The
trial may even be postponed.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of Significance to report.
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IV. OTHER OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. At least six Chinese Communist MIG-19 jet
fighters have moved from East China to airfields along
the Chinese - North Vietnamese border since 7 De-
cember. This brings the number of fighters moved
to South China airfields since 10 September to at
least 44.
2. On 7 December, at least two of the MIGs
were noted in a flight from East China to Nan-fling.
A transport aircraft which accompanied them moved
on to Meng-tzu on the 8th, suggesting that Meng-
tzu was also the final destination of the MIGs,
although they were not noted flying there. On
11 December, at least four MIG-19s moved from East
China to Nan-fling. On the 13th they continued to
Meng-tzu, accompanied by the same transport which
accompanied the 7 December movement.
3. \No-
vember show a significant change in the Chinese
air defense structure along the Vietnam border.
It appears that the authority of the Nan-ning sub-
district of the Canton Air District has been up-
graded to at least a district headquarters, or pos-
sibly higher. Administratively, however, Nan-fling
remains subordinate to the Canton Air District.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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1. There is nothing of Significance to report.
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� VI. � OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
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1. The Paul Doumer Bridge is apparently un-
servicable to rail and vehicle traffic after air
strikes on 14 December.
2. Photography taken minutes after the attack
showed that the mile-long span bridging the Red River
at Hanoi was damaged at several points. None of
the bridge spans, however, appeared to have been
dropped. The bridge was last attacked on 25 Octo-
ber and two spans were dropped. Photography of 17
November indicated that the bridge had been reopened
to truck traffic. Prefabricated concrete spans rest-
ting on new piers were used to close the two-span gap.
Western observers in Hanoi reported the bridge open
to rail and vehicle traffic on 24 November.
Soviet Flight to Hanoi
3. A Soviet AN-10 military transport with 11
passengers aboard completed a flight from the USSR
to Hanoi on 14 December. This is the first such So-
viet flight since last June and the tenth of its
kind to Hanoi this year. The purpose of the flights
is not known; presumably they are flown in support
of the Soviet military aid program in North Vietnam.
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