THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 25 JANUARY 1968 - 1968/01/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06753735
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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f.'
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
AI:kW/VAL Rze
PLEASE �
AnctizvzsRAr 2'0
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25 January 1968
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RET
Information as of 1600
25 -January 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
� Military action around Khe Sanh. was-light
during the past twenty-four hours although there.
are indicators of impending
large-scale enemy activity-in.Quang Tri Province.
I. The Military Situation�in.South Vietnam:
Enemy action was light on 25 January but there are
indicators of impending enemy activity
in Quang-Tri Province (Paras. 1-9). -There .are in-
creased indications that .a widespread, .coordinated
enemy offensive.may be imminent in. the western
highlands and coastal provinces .of I and II Corps
(Paras. 10-19).
III.' Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Additional information on the-flight of two MIGs
to southern North Vietnam indicates- that they in-
tended to land but were intercepted by. US aircraft
(Paras. 1-4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments:
/ The
No Foreign Dissem/Bac round Use Only
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---T-014�SECRE1
French press agency correspondent in Hanoi reports
that the city is taking on a festive air in antici-
pation of Tet .(Paras. 4-5). Hanoi has offered
only limited comment thus far on the. Pueblo inci-
dent (Para. 6).
25 January. 1968
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THAILAND
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23 JANUARY
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_T-O-P-SSCR ET
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
� 1. Communist-initiated activity in the imme-
diate vicinity of the base at Khe Sanh was gener-
ally light and sporadic on 25 January followin a
250-round artillery barrage on 24 January.
indicators suggest, however,
that this current Communist campaign in western
Quang Tri Province will intensify sharply before
the Tet holiday, period.
2. Incomplete reports show US Marine losses
at 25 killed and 164 wounded since 20 January.
Most of the casualties are from shellings and
small-scale probes. Some 300 enemy bodies have
been counted.
3. The use of 152-mm. artillery, the largest
artillery weapon in the Communist's inventory in
South Vietnam, during the bombardment of Khe Sanh
on 24 January has been confirmed. The weapons,
which have a range of just under 11 miles, were
probably fired from positions to the northeast of
the base or from ridges to the southwest, possibly
in Laos itself. The sanctuary of. the Demilita-
rized Zone is beyond the range.
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A. Continuing interrogation' of a North Viet-
namese defector,/
/sheds additional light 3.3(h)(2)
on the over-all strategy. and unit dispositions of
the enemy in the area.'. The parentunit of the '
defector, the North Vietnamese 325C Division,
allegedly had recently. been reinforced with two -
antiaircraft. battalions. Each of the division?s -
three regiments had an antiaircraft' company. armed
with six to nine 12.7-mm. machine-guns.
25. January 1968
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� 5. This weapon, which is similar to the US
50-cal. machine gun, has been seen in both North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong units in various sections
of the country for some time and is used in ground
support actions as well as an antiaircraft weapon.
Deployment of this weapon on hills surrounding the
Khe Sanh base together with the large numbers of US
aircraft involved in the greatly intensified tacti-
cal air support effort at Khe Sanh probably accounts
for the unusually large number--eight--of US air-
craft downed in the past week.
6. The defector also stated that the mission
of the North Vietnamese 325C Division is to "overrun
Khe Sanh, but not to hold it." This attack would
coincide with simultaneous attacks by the enemy
main force units in the eastern half of the prov-
ince. He also claimed that the enemy's offensive
would be supported by North Vietnamese aircraft
and tanks.
7. Although aircraft support for Communist
troops in South Vietnam appears questionable, the
tactical employment of armored vehicles by the enemy
cannot be ruled out. There have been earlier re-
ports of armored personnel carriers and self-pro-
pelled artillery weapons in southern North Vietnam.
Armored vehicles were also reported used by the
enemy on 24 January when an element of the North
Vietnamese 325C Division overran a Laotian base
camp just west of the Quang Tri Province border.
8. sight-
ing tracked vehicles, possibly tanks, traveling
east on Route 9 in Laos. Despite these reports,
the terrain in the Khe Sanh area is unsuitable for
their use. These vehicles may instead by intended
to protect supply areas and infiltration points.
Their mobility gives them an advantage in this role.
25 January 1968
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ET
Hanoi Supports and Distorts Saigon Seminars
5. Hanoi radio has taken note of two seminars
held recently in Saigon to discuss the peace issue
and claims that the seminars were open criticisms
of the "increasing US intervention in Vietnamese
internal affairs" and denunciations of the corruption
and failure of the "US-puppet clique." The seminars
in actuality concentrated entirely on peace and
negotiations--from opposite viewpoints--and mentioned
. the US only to decry alleged unilateral peace efforts.
-6. One seminar was held on 21 January by the.
Catholic Greater Solidarity Forces and. took a hard-
line on negotiations. The seminar issued a:reso-
lution opposing "plots" to-negotiate with the
-Liberation Front and demanding that the government
take' appropriatesteps toi dispel. fears about the
establishment of a coalition government. The meet-
ing was held probably as much to reassure radical
elements. of. the Greater Solidarity Forces that the
group's leadership is 'still firmly opposed to any
unfavorable settlement as it was to express a' genuine.
concern about a possible coalitiOn. There is also
.the possibility, advanced by the US Embassy, that
the seminar was. the idea of the government or'ele-
ments -in the government. Although the regime came
in for .considerable criticism, the tone of the seminar
amounted to an endorsement of the4government's posi-
tion.
7. The second seminar was held by a group of
university professors who issued an impassioned plea
for immediate negotiations to avoid further bloodshed.
Although the resolution could serve Communist propa-
ganda purposes, its details were not played up in the
Hanoi broadcast and it does not appear to represent �
the opinion of the academic community in general.
Most of the resolution's 65 signatories, according to
the embassy, are minor lights, mostly extremist
Buddhists, leftist Catholics, And sincere but naive
'young professors.
25 January 1968
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TUP--SEGR ET
Thieu's "State of the.Nation"-Address-
8. In a lengthy-"state-of:the nation" address
before a joint session of the Vational..Assembly
on 25 January,. President .Thieu reiterated familiar
positions on a negotiated settlement of the war.
He stated that bombing of .North Vietnam could not
be stopped unless all hostilities ceased, but
added, that bombing could be reduced. proportionately
if the Communists decreased their efforts. He noted
recent confusion sown by Communist propaganda re-
garding a coalition government in the South, and re-
affirmed the unacceptability of this concept, which.
he termed an effort to conquer South Vietnam from
within by political means.. -
9. Thieu considerably softened his earlier
criticism that the US might be indirectly playing
into Communist hands by exploring the possibility of
unilateral negotiations with North Vietnam. He stressed
instead the importance of US assistance and the es-
sential identity of purpose between Saigon and Washing-�
ton despite minor differences. He repeated, however,
that South Vietnam must determine its own future and
that a political solution depends principally upon
the leaders of North and South Vietnam.
10. Although a.complete test of Thieu'.s re-
marks on domestic issues is not yet available, .he
evidently stressed his plans for reforms of both civil
and military. administration. He spelled out few de-
tails and gave no. precise timetable for pending
reorganizations. He presented-in-some. detail programs
submitted by-various:ministries, and announced a 95-bil-
lion piaster ($800,000,000).budget,broken down to 66
percent for defense, 20 percent- for economic, social
and educational programs, and .10 percent for develop-
ment. He.declared.that-South.Vietnam would meet more
of its expenditures through ..its own resources this
year, promising improved taxcollection and the
eventual submission of new tax legislation to the
assembly. Thieu appealed for nationalunity and co-
operation between-the executive and the legislature
and for.understanding.on.the partial mobilization law
which he declared would be implemented firmly but
equitably and with continued student deferments.
25 January 1968
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
2. The attempted landing at Vinh may indicate
that North Vietnam is trying to establish at least
a limited jet fighter capability in the panhandle
region. Three MIG-21 flights in the Thanh Hoa -
Vinh area have been noted so far this year. Fighters
based in this region could oppose US air strikes on
infiltration routes and might support North Vietnam-
ese Army operations in the vicinity of the Demilitar-
ized Zone. A North Vietnamese soldier who defected a
few days ago at Khe Sanh reported that Communist
forces in that area would be supported by North Viet-
namese aircraft.
4. It is possible that the runway at Vinh has
been repaired in the past three weeks. If Hanoi
elected to use Vinh as an emergency field, only
limited facilities would be required. Soviet-built
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fighters are designed to operate from primitive. air-
strips and would require no maintenance or hangar
facilities if the �field were used only as an occasional
refueling and re-arming station.
25 January 1968
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There. is nothing of significance to report.
25 January 1968
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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Hanoi Prepares for Tet
4. Hanoi is �taking on a festive air in anticipa-
tion of the celebration next week of the lunar new year
(Tet), according to an account by the AFP correspondent
there. He reports that the city is crowded with evacuees
returning from the countryside to �take pert in tradi-
tional family reunions and notes that the reappearance
of children is especially striking. The report says
there were no air raid warnings in the city in the five
days prior to 24 January and this contributed to a more
relaxed atmosphere.
25 January 1968
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5. .In'contrast' to last year.when strict limi-
tations were placed on. the celebrations,- including
only a half-day holiday, the government has-ex-
tended this year's holiday period by two-and-a-half
days, placed.more goods on display in. state stores,
and. provided extra food rations and holiday speci-
alities. While encouraging -the populace to celebrate
"joyfully and enthusiastically"; the regime has also
cautioned against excess which would not be in keep-
ing with wartime conditions. .In particular, stress
was placed on preventing the festivities from inter-
fering with agricultural and security or weakening
the country's antiaircraft defenses.
North Vietnamese Reaction to Pueblo Incident
8. In brief' reports on 24 and 25 January, Hanoi
radio. rehashed North Korean material on theseizure
of the Pueblo and called the incident part of a-US
plan of-17E-r�provocation and preparation" in South -
Korea. There was no attempt to link.the incident
with the situation in Vietnam. The party daily Nhan
Dan on 25 January described the Pueblo -affair as an-�
other provocative act against North Korea which has
"further aggravated tension in that part of the
world."
25 January 1968
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