THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766062
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766062
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 10
(As of 5:00 P.M. EST)
1. The Vietnamese Communists may be trying to
put together some new kind of political facade to
back up claims that their current offensive has
touched off a popular uprising in favor of objec-
tives long sought by the Communists.
2. The Viet Cong radio on 2 February broadcast
as "appeal" from the "National Leadership Committee"
of the new organization called the "Alliance of Na-
tional and Peace Forces." The appeal is dated 30
January to coincide with the nationwide surge of
Communist attacks which began then. The appeal is
designed to show that a popular "revolution" has
"broken out." It calls on all elements of the
South Vietnamese population to join the "ranks of
the peop).e" and says that "we must at once set up
a revolutionary government." The goals of the
"Alliance" are said to include overthrowing the
Saigon regime and replacing it with a "really"
representative "administrative power," recovering
national independence by demanding the withdrawal
of the US and ending the war, building an independent,
democratic, and neutral South Vietnam, and negotiating
with the National Liberation Front to achieve these
goals.
3. It is difficult to perceive how the new
"Alliance" will be any more useful to the Communists
than the National Liberation Front itself in accom-
plishing Communist objectives. The Front's basic
weakness since it was formed in late 1960 has been
its almost total failure to attract support from
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politically significant individuals and groups in
South Vietnam.
4. So far the new "Alliance" shows no signs
of being anything more than a paper organization.
Although it is presented as a "national" apparatus,
Communist broadcasts have referred specifically only
to alliances in the cities of Saigon and Hue.
5. There are no details about the organization
in Saigon. A Hanoi broadcast reported its establish-
ment and said it issued a manifesto. Hanoi claims,
however, that in Hue the alliance is headed by Le
Van Hao, a doctor of ethnology and professor of Saigon
and Hue universities. Hao reportedly read an "appeal"
over Hue radio.
6. Le Van Hao seems to be a non-Communist politi-
cal nonentity of the same stripe found throughout the
ranks of the National Liberation Front. He was active
in the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement and was im-
prisoned.for his participation between June and October
of that year. He has also been mentioned in connection
with the Hung Viet Party, a small, little known anti-
government group formed in central Vietnam during or
shortly after the struggle movement, and, at some time be-
fore the struggle was editor of a leftist magazine
Vietnam Vietnam.
7. Little is known of Hao's influence in central
Vietnam or even at Hue University, but he may be able
to generate some support for his "alliance" among
university students, who have frequently been active
in antigovernment agitation. There is no evidence
that Hao has had Viet Cong or Liberation Front con-
nections, but this is possible in view of his ap-
parently leftist, aatigovernment tendencies.
8. The enemy may believe that by stressing
themes of peace, war weariness, Anti-Americanism,
and neutrality in the name of a new organization un-
tainted by any known links with either the Communists
or the Liberation Front, they can muster greater
support for their objectives than they have in the
past. The effectiveness of this tactic, however
would still seem to hinge on success in generating
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some real popular enthusiasm and ferreting out solid
political support in order to create a power base.
9. It also is conceiveable that, even if the
Communists do not rally much support for the "Alliance,"
they might try to fashion an administration structure
to pass off as a "coalition government"--an objective
frequently mentioned in captured documents as a goal
of the "winter-spring" campaign. This could eventually
involve staging some kind of "negotiations" between
the Front and groups represented by the "Alliance."
The ensuing "coalition" could then be presented as
the "real" government of South Vietnam. The Communists
have avoided such a course with the Front itself,
presumably because the Front's failure to develop a
political base makes it so patently a creature of the
Communists.
The Military Situation
10. There has been no significant change in
the overall military situation.
11. Hue continues to be the focal point of heavy
enemy pressure in I Corps. A large concentration of
Communist troops has been reported massing for an at-
tack against Quang Ngai City. This is unconfirmed,
however. Da Nang Air Base has again been subjected
to 122-mm. rocket fire.
12. Regimental-sized North Vietnamese forces
are continuing to occupy extensive areas of Kontum
City and Ban Me Thuot in the western highlands, with
heavy fighting reported in both cities. In coastal
II Corps, heavy fighting between allied reaction forces
and three Viet Cong battalions continues in and around
the Binh Thuan province capital of Phan Thiet.
13. In III Corps, the provincial capitals of
Xuan Loc and Ba Ria are reported to be under heavy
Communist attack, with the latter city at least 50
percent under enemy control. While no substantial
fighting is currently underway in the Saigon area,
there are reports that major concentrations of enemy
forces have infiltrated into the southern portion of
the capital and into the New Port area to the north-
east. These reports are unconfirmed, however.
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14. The situation in the delta remains essentially
unchanged, with heavy fighting apparently still con-
tinuing in some major population centers.
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