THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766068
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766068
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 12
(As of 5:30 P.M. EST)
There have been no major changes in the mili-
tary situation since our report of 8:30 A.M. EST
on 3 February. The following, however, are the
most significant of the developments reported.
I Corps
1. The military situation in northern and
western Quang Tri Province remains generally quiet,
although intercepted North Vietnamese communications
continue to reflect increasing tactical preparations
in the DMZ area from Khe Sanh to the South China
seacoast.
2. Elements of the 90th Regiment, formerly
engaged in logistical activity north of Khe Sanh,
began submitting reconnaissance reports on 2 Feb-
ruary. These reports have included detailed accounts
of helicopter flights from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh and
allied traffic along Route 9 in the Rockpile area.
The shift by the 90th Regiment from a transportation
to a reconnaissance role suggests impending combat
activities.
3. On 2 February, the 1st Battalion, 803rd
Regiment, 324B Division, which has been moving south
toward Lam Xuan Village (YD2868) in the southeastern
DMZ area, was instructed to reconnoiter the terrain
in preparation for an attack by the entire regiment.
A three-stage attack was planned against an unspecified
target, possibly US forces on Operation SALINE.
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4., The Communists have the capability to strike
at any time against Khe Sanh with two divisions,
against the Camp Carroll-Rockpile area in the north-
central DMZ with one division, and against the Con
Thien - Gio Linh area in the east-central DMZ with
a division equivalent.
� . 5. The alli-pd situation at Hue seems to have
improved somewhat. '.While there has been no significant
change in positions.occupied_by enemy or allied ,forces, US
Marines in battalion strength have recaptured the
provincial jail which had been held by the Viet Cong.
Some 2,500 prisoners, 300 to 500 of whom were con-
sidered hard-core Viet Cong, were liberated by the
enemy during their initial attack. against the prison
compound. An ARVN force equivalent to division-strength
is continuing to press clearing operations against
Communist forces holed up in the citadel area.
6, In the Quang Tri city area, although the
Communists have been pushed out of the urban area,
they are said to still hold about two-thirds of the
RD campaign area, in the district north of the city.
It is believed allied forces will have to move in
and clear them out, probably with substantial damage
to civilian interests.
7. A US Marine battalion has been reported in
heavy contact with a large enemy force south of Da Nang,
but no further details are presently available. The
Communists are believed to pose a very serious threat
to the entire Da Nang - Hoi An area, with two regiments
of the NVA 2nd Division, the NVA 31st Regiment, and
the NVA 368 "B" Artillery Regiment located within
striking distance.
9. A major buildup of Communist forces has been
reported near the Quang Tin Province capital of Tam Ky,
but no significant new fighting has yet developed.
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II Corps
10.
Late reports indicate
that the Dak To airstrip has come under heavy rocket
and recoilless rifle attack, but apparently remains
operational. Elsewhere in the western highlands, no
new information has become available on the status
of enemy and allied forces in and around the cities
of Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot.
11. The Communist B-3 Front command has now
committed its entire regional force as well as elements
of three of its subordinate NVA regiments to the
Tet offensive in the highlands. The Front's entire
NVA 1st Division, however, with three regiments sup-
ported by 122-mm. rockets and 120-mm. mortars, has
apparently been kept in reserve. This division poses
a continuing threat to allied units and installations
in northwestern Kontum and western Pleiku provinces,
and also is capable of joining the attacks against
population centers which have been initiated by local
forces and independent regiments of the Front.
12. In the coastal provinces of II Corps, Phan
Thiet, the capital of Binh Thuan Province, is under
attack by three Viet Cong battalions. Meanwhile,
Communist forces have ambushed two South Korean
army convoys in or near the Binh Dinh provincial
capital of Qui Nhon.
III Corps
13. Information on this area is not up to date,
but a field wrap-up as of noon (Vietnam time) on 3
February indicated that most of the provinces in the
Corps were quiet.
14. Fighting apparently continues in the prov-
incial capitals of Xuan Loc and Phuoc Le, with Viet
Cong forces possibly holding positions in both cities.
Meanwhile, brigade-strength base camps of the US 1st
Infantry Division at Lai Khe and Quan Loi came under
heavy rocket and mortar bombardment on the evening
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of 3-4 February. Enemy forces have also been re-
ported moving toward the Binh Duong Province capital
of Phu Cuong, although no major attack has yet
erupted.
The Saigon Area
15. Press reports indicate that heavy fighting
erupted between elements of the US 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment and a large Viet Cong force near Thu Due,
just northeast of Saigon, on the morning of 3 February
Saigon time. Vietnamese Marines and other American
units were also engaged. There are no reports yet on
the outcome.
16. In the capital itself, light sporadic con-
tact and sniper fire continues throughout the city.
Firing incidents were reported still occurring near
the National Palace, the US Embassy, the embassy
Marine barracks, and along the main road to Tan Son
Nhut airport on the evening of 3-4 February. Police
stations and roving security patrols remain prime
enemy targets.
17. There is little evidence in COMINT to sub-
stantiate earlier reports of an estimated 25-30 Viet
Cong battalions reportedly staging for a major offen-
sive against Saigon from positions immediately north
and south of the city. It is possible, howeyer, that
an enemy force engaged near. Thu Due constitutes some
of the reported Communist elements.
18. To the west of Saigon, the 7th NVA Division
(101st, 165th and 141st Regiments) and the 88th NVA
Regiment continue to pose a distant threat to the
Saigon area. These forces, generally located around
the Michelin rubber plantation, have not been identi-
fied in any recent actions according to available
information.
the 165th Regiment of the 7th
Division had moved in a northwesterly direction be-
tween 25 January and 2 February. This regiment is
now located about two miles northwest of the Minh
Thanh Special Forces Camp in Binh Long Province.
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IV Corps
19. There has been no significant change in
the situation here, according to the fragmentary re-
ports now available. Only sporadic sniper fire was
reported in Vinh Long City where friendly forces
continued clearing out VC elements. Enemy attacks
during the night of 2-3 February were repulsed at
cities in Kien Phong, Kien Hoa and Bac Lieu provinces.
Throughout much of the corps area, Viet Cong ele-
ments continued scattered harrassing fire. There is
no firm information on the situation at Ben Tre, al-
though two Viet Cong battalions on the outskirts of
the city are believed preparing for renewed attacks.
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Political Reactions
20. Vietnamese Communist propaganda is con-
tinuing to claim that their military offensive has
evoked broad popular support particularly in Hue
and Saigon and has generated the formation of politi-
cal "alliances" throughout the country which will
eventually overthrow and replace the Saigon govern-
ment. �The composition of these alliances, their
function, and their relationship to the Liberation
Front continues to be vague, but it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that the Communists probably intend
them to be the instrument for the establishment of
a coalition government in conjunction with the Libera-
tion Front.
21. An appeal from the "alliance" in Hue, broad-
cast by the Front on 2 February, is the clearest state-
ment of this objective to date. The appeal stated
for the first time that one of the alliancets objec-
tives was the establishment of a national coalition
administration in the South and the normalization of
relations with the North in order to affect reunifi-
cation. Previous appeals by the Saigon and Hue al-
liances and by the National Leadership of,the Alliances
have called only for negotiations with the Front but
have not mentioned the formation of a government, or the
issue of reunification.
22. Despite the suggestions that the Communists
really intend to march ahead with the formation of
a government, there continues to be scant evidence
that the Alliances have gained any popular support.
23. Meanwhile, several Hanoi commentaries have
suggested that the current military offensive is but
one battle in a more prolonged struggle. The Hanoi
party paper on 3 February said. thecurrent fight-
ing was., creating Conditions for additional. Mili-
tary. victOries.-:.The .North Vietnamese army journal
the previous day called for the southern forces to
maintain and develop their victories, enlarge their
fronts, and develop their revolution.
24. The AFP correspondent in Hanoi reports that
the DRV military command has sent a message to the
Front unit in Hue and Saigon assuring them that the
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DRV armed forces stand "ready every second to coordi-
nate their actions with them." In Hanoi itself,
according to AFP, mass meetings are being held by
various political and religious groups in support
of the southern offensive. It would appear that the
North Vietnamese authorities are utilizing the suc-
cesses in the South to pump up popular morale in
the North.
North Vietnam
25- There are continuing COMINT indications
of Hanoi efforts to establish a fighter intercepter
capability in the southern DRV. A possible height-
finder radar has been detected in the DMZ area. The
recent North Vietnamese air activity in the Vinh
area, the establishment of a GCI controller there, and
the possible placement of this radar in the DMZ sug-
gests that the North Vietnamese are possibly planning
some type of air intercept of US B-52 strikes in the
DMZ area.
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