THE MONSTER PLOT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE CASE OF YURITY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06775695
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 222
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-02079
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976

ItIs% Approved for Release: 2019/06/25 C06775695
THE MONSTER PLOT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE CASE OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
December 1976
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Chapter
Introduction
IX
XI
XI
Appendix
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Organizational. Background:
CIA's Handling of Soviet -
Positive Intelligence and
CI Matters
Biographical Data:
1927-1962.
Chronicle: 19627-1969
Nosenko's Contribution:
A.Summary Evaluation
The Analytical Foundations
of the "Monster Plot"
Disinformation: Origin's of
the Concept and Application
in the Nosenko Case
Golitsyn vs Nosenko:..
A Comparison of Their
Handling by CIA
Use of the Polygraph in
the Nosenko Case
Psychological and Medical
Findings
� Impact of �the "Monster Plot"
on CIA's Positive Intelligence
and CIMissions
Page
1
8
12
90
100
125
133
146
152
166
MethOdology and Leadership 183
'Conclusions and Recommendations � 191
Chronology of the Yuriy
ivanovich.Nosenko Case �197
(b)(3)
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.INTRODUCTION
On 5 June 1962 Yuriy- Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official
temporarily assigned to Geneva; contacted an American Foreign
Service Officer in a move which was eventually to lead to
Nosenko's defection:. This act was the first in a chain of
events which is unequaled in complexity by any other .Soviet
operation.handled by the Central Intelligence Agency Since
its establishment. Because the case still has important
implications for the overall.SoViet intelligence effort of
the United States, and because it raises many basic questions
about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors,
a reinvestigation of the case .was commissioned by the Agency.
in June 1976. :The results are embodied in this report and
its annexes.
Although United States officials of many .agencies, up to
and including �a President of the United States, were briefed
on the case, and either played some role in making decisions
concerning it or actively participated in running the operation,
it does not new appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any single
individual has ever been fully informed as to all its aspects'.
The complexity of this investigation therefore stems in largemeaSure from the fact that the case has proceeded along at
least two, and often more, compartmented tracks. 'Thus, the
effort to.get.a total picture of what transpired has involved
an unusual amount of research in the files of various compo-
nents of the Agency, plus personal interviews with a large
number of present and former Agency employees.
Even so, the present investigation cannot pretend to be
complete. Limitations of time, personnel and authority have
precluded an investigation of the rather extensive involvement
in this case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. .The
present report should therefore be regarded as adequate only
in its coverage of CIA's principal.role; the important, but
secondary, role played by the FBI has been covered hardly at
.all.
At the outset, it had not been intended to mention names
of the CIA officers involved in this operation. �It was felt
that no post hoc investigation can ever capture the perspec-
tive in which events are seen -as they take plate. Thus, to
allude. to individuals �by name might unjustly and unfavorably
reflect on their judgment, because.. of the superior wisdom of
hindsight_
Unfortunately, our�initial resolve has:had to be
reversed. The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not
the result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a
corporate.entjAy; rather, in this Case more than in most,
decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the
basis of.their own strongly-held views; which sometimes .
conflicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of: other
senior colleagues. Thus, while it would be unfair for this
report to attempt to fix blame, it must, if it to be
comprehensible, attempt. to depict the decisionmaking process
in all its complexity by naming when necessary the individual:
participants.
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The quintessential quality of a report such as this
is that it be objective. At the same time, the events which
we were assigned to review made necessary the employment of
persons; all of whom, including the senior author, are or
have in the past been long-term employees of CIA's Plans
Directorate.
Present leadership of the Directorate apparently decided,
however, that a more effective review could be Conducted by
persons of our experiance than by outsiders, however qualified
otherwise, who would not have first-hand familiarity with
the intricacies of the positive intelligence and counter-
intelligence processes. In light of this decision, we have
taken seriously the trust placed in us, and have tried through-
out to correct for whatever biases we have as "insiders."
We have not,, on the other hand, refrained from expressing
our opinions. Even to have tried to do so would have been
futile for two rather obvious reasons. First, into the re-
construction of events of the complexity herein described
there always enters a degree Of selectivity and judgment;
in this sense, "opinion" provides the essential matrix of
our product. Secondly, we have viewed our task as one of
constructive criticism-. All the members of the small task
force which produced this paper have spent half a lifetime
in an Agency whose task they believe to be essential; yet we
find itS.conduct of its affairs to have been in many ways
faulty. Our rather harsh criticisms., particularly in the..
final chapter,. are therefore offered in the hope that they:.
will point the way to much-needed improvements.
Finally, a note is in order concerning documentation.'
To the rather large number of documents drawn upon directly
in writing this study, we have assigned reference numbers.
It is these numbers which will be found periodically throughL
out the text, following direct quotations as well as many
statements of fact or opinion which are supported by individual
documents._ To facilitate 'reference, a number of documents
have been reproduced and'segregated.as annexes to this study.
Other documents too cumbersome to reproduce, as well as
certain documents relevant to the study but not directly
used in writing it, are listed. ma complete index of all
relevant documentation. This index indicates the locations
of all indexed documents as of January 1977.
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CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND: CIA'S HANDLING
OF SOVIET POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MATTERS
The history of the Nosenkci case can only. be comprehended
within the framework of the organization :and day-to-day
functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole.
In fact, opinions regarding the handling Of the Nosenko case
may differ substantially according 'to individuals': differing
views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning.
This being the case, it is usefUl at the outset to make
explicit our understanding. of how the .Agency actually
functioned in the relevant period, the 1960's, as distinct
from how it might theoretically have functioned according
to Agency organizational charts and regulations:
It is first necessary to specify and, delimit the role
played by Richard Helms. As of Nosenko's first approach to
the Agency in 1962, Helms was the ranking man in the
Clandestine Service in his capacity as Deputy Director for
Plans- (DDP).: By the time the case reached its denouement'
in 1969,- Helms was the Director Of Central Intelligence (DCI),
having in the interim advanced through the intermediate rank
of Deputy DCI; Throughout this progression, however, he
retained an active role in supervising this case although,
as we shall now see, the nature and extent of this role are
difficult to define.in a few words.
By the time Nosenko first established a relationship with
the Agency in 1962, Helms' position as the officer principally
responsible within the Agency for the conduct of Soviet clan-
destine positive and counterintelligence operations had long
been established. The reasons for this fact can probably. no
longer be determined with certainty, though they seem to have,
stemmed from Helms' role as Deputy to the two DDP's who pre-'
ceded him. The latter had chosen to concern themselves .
primarily with the fields of political, propaganda and para-
military activity, leaving to Helms the supervision Of the
Agency's more ,traditional clandestine operations role.- In
any case, and for whatever reason, it was Helms who exercised
top-level supervision in the Soviet intelligence and counter- -
intelligence fields; when any such matter. was referred to a
higher level, this was usually done at his suggestion or; at.
least, with his approval.
Helms' two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-
day operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc.
,Division (known successively by this and several other naMesw),
and the: Counterintelligence Staff. In the nature and inter-
relationship of-these two organizations, we find the key to
much of what was to happen in the Nosenko case.
Although the SB Division was censidered a "line" organi-
zation, the CI Staff's name would imply. (if the Agency's
formal organization were to be taken at face value) that its
function was limited to advising a command echelon. .In fact,
such a distinction was hever enforced.
. "CI Staff" was actually a:Misnomer, 'because -the organi-
zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any
appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of
the Agency on -a worldwide basis. Rather, it_concentrated on'.
This area component during the-period of this report was
known as Soviet Russia Division D952-7196,6)- and Soviet
Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used
interchangeably.
vLi tija.
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the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries,
The CI Staff was almost entirely the creation of one man,
James Angleton, who set it up in 1953 and exercised virtually:
total control of its activities until he was asked to retire
from the Agency in 1974.' Angleton's relationship with Helms
appears to have been a close�one, and he. remained responsive
in a general way to Helms' desires during the latter's
progress upward, but was virtually independent of anyone
else within the Agency. It is probable, although not provable,
that even his responsiveness to Helms diminished as the
latter was promoted, since Helms was decreasingly able to
devote time to CI matters as time Went on.:
c.)
� . Angleton's organization operated according to 'a doctrine
. of which he was both the author and sOle arbiter.- One of its
features was extreme compartmentation. Although his Staff
claimed the right to monitor the activities of other organi-
zations, including much of what the SB Division did; those �
other organizations did not enjoy reciprocal:privileges.. The
basis for CI -Staff contentions regarding the value of,SB
Division operations was shrouded in mystery; the_Staff
offered its conclusions freely but for the_most_part_w_iIhout
supporting evidence. During the most active period of the.
Penkovskiy case, for example, when it was producing voluminous
information.of great strategic value, Angleton is known to
have volunteered to persons outside the Agency the opinion
that Penkovskiy was a Soviet provocation.
'
_
case which was later to be 'a key factor in the
Nosenko operation, that of Anatoliy Golitsyn, Angleton sought
and received Helms' permission to exercise exclusive juris-
diction over this defector, and remained the final arbiter of
how and to whom his information should be made available by
-CIA. Durinjtje Nosenko case, David E. Murphy, who was Chief,-
SB from Rgge-41963 to March 1968, was allowed to see
A -Golitsyn on onl one occasion, and was to a large extent
V exclu ed from the raw in ence product of the Golitsyn
case. By contrast, -the CI Staff had full access-to all infor-
mation regarding Nosenko, although in at least one important
case they were not consulted before SB took a crucial oper-
ational decision.
The SB Division position was more fluid. Insofar as it
had an operational doctrine at all, this doctrine had evolved
over the years as a result of the success or, in most cases�
failure of successive Operational programs. That the Division
nonetheless enjoyed considerable prestige was due not so
much to its-own active operational efforts as to the high
incidente (relative.' to other nationalities) of defections by
important officials of the Soviet and Soviet Bloc Governments_
/JO
Angleton's position was/Strengthened by longevity. By
contrast With Angleton's 22.(year tenure as Chief of �Counter
intelligence, the SB Division had four chiefs between the
onset of the Nosenko operation in 1902 and its resolution
as a problem -case in 1969.�
Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-.called
Angleton officially retired on .31 December 1974, although
he continued to work in the Headquarters building for
some-time after that date.
4
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the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries,
(W(1 )
(b)(3)1)
(b)(3)
The CI Staff was almost entirely the creation of one man,
James Angleton, who set it up in 1953 and exercised Virtually
total control of its activities until he was asked to retire
from the Agency in 1974.* Angleton's relationship with Helms
appears to have been a,close one, and he remained responsive -
in a general way to Helms' "desires during the latter's
progress upward, but was virtually independent of anyone
else within the Agency. It is probable, although not provable,
that even his responsiveness to Helms diminished as the
latter was promoted, since Helms was decreasingly able to
devote time to CI matters as time went on.
I� lations, including much of what the SB Division did, those
basis for CI Staff contentions regarding_the value of SE
'_
Division operations was shrouded in mystery; the_ Staff
other organizations did not enjoy reciprocal privileges. The
offered its conclusions freely but for .t.ILe_mas:L._.part_mithout
supporting evidence. During the most active period of the
Angleton's organization operated according to a doctrine
of which he was both the author and 'sole arbiter. One of its
features was extreme compartmentation. Although his Staff
claimed the right to monitor the activities of other organi-
Penkovskiy case, for example, when it was producing voluminous
information of great strategic value, Angleton is known to
have volunteered to 'persons outside the Agency the opinion:.
that Penkovskiy Was a Soviet provocation. :
In a case which was later to be a key factor in the
Nosenko operation, that of Anatoliy Golitsyn, Angleton sought
and received Helms' permission to exercise exclusive juris-
diction over this defector, and remained the final arbiter of
and to whom his information should be made available by .
CIA. Duringtir Nosenko case, David E. Murphy, who was Chief,
SB from RgV2e411-41963 to March 1968, was allowed to see
.Golitsyn on onl one occasion, and was to a large-extent
exclu ed from the raw inte igence product of the Golitsyn
case. By contrast, the CI Staff had full access to all infor-
mation regarding Nosenko, although in at least one important
case they were not consulted before SB took a crucial oper-
ational decision.
The SB Division position was more fluid. Insofar as it
had an operational doctrine at all, this doctrine had evolved
.over the years.as a result of the success or, in most cases,.
failure of successive operational programs. That the Division
nonetheless enjoyed considerable prestige was due not so '
much to its own active operational efforts as to the high,
incidence (relative- to. other nationalities) of defections by
important officials of the Soviet and Soviet Bloc Governments_
/40 . �
Angleton's position was/strengthened by.longevity. By
contrast with Angleton's 22"-"year tenure as Chief of Counter7
intelligence,�the SB Division-had four chiefs between the
onset of the Nosenko operation in 1902- and its resolution
as a problem case in 1969.
Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called
.*
Angleton officially .retired on .31 December 1974, although
he continued to work in the Headquarters building for
some time after that date.
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Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of
the CI Staff. it concerned itself, during most of the
period to be covered in this report, primarily with infor-
mation on the intelligence and Counterintelligence organs
of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant
since the same field was the major preoccupation of the
CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report,
there was during mest of the period with which we are con-
cerned a substantial congruity of views between the SB/CI
-Group and CI Staff which militated in favor of coherent
operational policy, even though the two organizations might
disagree on matters of detail.
One curious aspect of the organizational problem should
be mentioned at this point because, while Seemingly minor, it
may have played a significant role. While the SB Division.
understandably had a number of competent Russian .linguists,
the CI Staff did not have a single Russian linguist who could
be brought to bear on either the Nosenko or Golitsyn case.
The Staff was, therefore dependent for its data on translations
of Nosenko material and, in the case' of Golitsyn, 'on infor-
mation obtained from discussions conducted with:him in English,
a language in which he was not fully fluent.
A .thitd organizational participant in the Nosenko case
was the Office of Security. This Office had overlapping
jurisdiction with CI Staff and, to a lesser extent, SB Division
in any matter which involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet
Bloc penetration of the Agency. While not usually a problem,
the overlapping: jurisdiction was considerable in both the
Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity
in connection with both operations revolved around.allegations
that the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level
Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited
Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn,
it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a
complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi.
He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which
to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the
Agency, in particular Angleton, were already predisposed.
Golitsyn thus became the ideologues ideologue..
Prior to GolitSyn's defection, the AgencY_La_l_ELD__U_basl
been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet pene7
trations of Western governments. There is no need to go
into detail on them, since they have been well documented
elsewhere, but they included British representatives such .
as Kim Philby and George Blake. Another important penetration
was. Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy.Chief of Soviet counter-
intelligence in the Bundesnachrichten4ien,st� (BND). The Felfe
case is particularly significant because it was believed by
a number. of counterintelligence specialists in the Agency that.
Felfe's career had been systematically, promoted by the Soviets
through what. came to :be known as the ''throw-away" technique. .
According to the theory of this group, a considerable number
of valuable and productive Soviet Intelligence operatiOns'in
Germany-were made available to Felfe -so that, by detecting
them and signaling their presence to the West German authorities,
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he could build up his reputation as a counterintelligence
Specialist. -.While there is debate about fhe value of the
assets which the Soviets made available, there 'appears to-be
enough substance to this theory for it to have had a strong
impact within the Agency, particularly upon those persons
who were. members of the former Eastern Eurapean (EE) Division
of the Plans Directorate. Whether or not by coincidence,
the two officers who wielded the most influence over the
Nosenko case within the SB Division, David E. Murphy (Division
Chief) and -Tennent H. Bagley (Chief, SB/CI) had previously
served most of their Agency careers within the EE Division.
Like most officers who had served in that Division, their
thinking had been deeply influenced by the-Felfe case.
In the course of time; the continuing record of KGB'
success in penetrating Western governments made-it.the most
feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services.
Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the
Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place
such as Popov and Penkovskiy.- Not since 15 February 1954,
when Petr-,Sergeyevich Deryabin,.had defected, had we received
up-to-date and high-level information about the KGB, and the
defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus
a major event. -
Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details
:regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered exten-
sively in a recent Study. However, two.points are worth
A. First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in 1962
as a "paranoid personality.", Although account was
taken of this psychological problem, it was con-
sidered in the light of a threat to the continuity
of the debriefing process rather than as a factor
reflecting on the validity of the purported intel-
ligence which he gave us. It was apparently felt
that if we could maintain his stability, we could
depend not.only upon the objectively verifiable
facts which he gave us, but also upon his often
very theoretical generalizations.
B. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us right from
the beginning, and continually elaborated through-
out the years, a complicated rationale for believing
.that the KGB was successfully pursuing a:mammoth
program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the
United States and its Western allies. This ratio-
nale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of
this report.'
fi� It is against this. background that we view the approach
to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so; .
we shall for ease of reference from time to:time allude-to
the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions --
elaborated by Galitsyn, Angleton, Bagley;,Murphy,.and
others -- as the "Monster Plot." In fairness, it must be
allowed that this term was in common usage not by the thesis'
proponents, :but rather_by its detractors; yet no other name
serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers envisaged .
as a-major threat-to United States' security: If the term
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he could build up his reputation as a/ counterintelligence
specialist. While there is debate about the value of the
assets which the Soviets made available, there appears to be
enough substance to this theory for it to have had a strong
impact within the Agency, particularly upon those persons
who were members of the former Eastern European (EE) DiVision
of the Plans Directorate. Whether or not by coincidence,
the two officers who wielded the most influence over the.
Nosenko case within the SB Division, David E. Murphy (Division
Chief) and Tennent H. Bagley (Chief, SB/CI) had previously
served most of their Agency careers within the EE Division.
Like most officers who had served in that Division, their
thinking had been deeply influenced by the-Felfe case.
In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB
success in penetrating Western governments made it the most
feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services.
Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the
Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place
such as Popov and Penkovskiy. .Not since 15 February 1954,
when Petr.Sergeyevich Deryabin had defected, had we received
up-to-date and high-level, information about the KGB, and the
defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus
a major event.
Once. again, it is not necessary here to go into details
regarding Golitsyn, 'because this case has been covered exten-.
sively in a recent study. However, two points are worth
noting:
� A. First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in 1962
as a "paranoid personality Although account was
taken of this psychological problem, it was con-
sidered in the light of a threat to' the continuity
of the debriefing process rather than As a factor
reflecting on the validity of the purported intel-
ligence which he gave us. It was apparently felt
that if we could maintain his stability, we could
depend not only upon,the-objectively verifiable
facts which he gave us, but also upon his often
very theoretical generalizations. ,
B. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us Tight from
the beginning, and continually elaborated through-
out the years; a.complicated rationale for believing
that the KGB was successfully pursuing a_mammoth.
program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the'
United States and its Western allies. This ratio-
nale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI 'of
this-report:
It is against this background that we view the, approach
to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so, .
we shall for ease of reference from time to'time allude to
the thesis.regarding:KG3 operations and intentions
elaborated 'by Golitsyn, Angleton,'Bagley,..Murphy, and.
others -- as the "Monster Plot" 'In fairness, it must be
allowed that this term was in .common usage not by the thesis'
proponents, but rather by its detractors yet no other name
serves so :aptly to capsulize what the theorizers envisaged
as a-major threat-to United States' security. If .the term
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carries with it emotive cOnnotations:, the:latter were
certainly Shared by both sides to .the controversy; and:
this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster
Plot" in the lexicon of this study.
7
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CHAPTER II
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA: 1927-1.962
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in
Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan IsidoroVich Nosenko
and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in
1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death,
the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, member of
the Central Committee of the CPSO, a deputy to the Supreme ,
Soviet of the USSR, and. recipient of a number of the highest
Soviet awards and medals. He received a State funeral, and
is commemorated .by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young
Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student
at the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.
From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev.
In 1934 he and-his mother joined the senior Nosenko in .
Leningrad where the latter was working as chief engineer at
the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nesenko continued his
schooling in Leningrad until late 1938-at which time he .
and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, ,wbere-
he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Ship�
building Industry.. �
In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and
his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Nosenko
stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the front,
but they were caught and returned_home. At age 14 Nosenko,
entered a Special Naval School- which, in August 1942, was
relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was forced to
relocate again, this time to Achinsk.in Siberia. Nosenko did
not want to go to Siberia and, through the influence of his
father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School'
in Leningrad (not to be confused with the Frunze Higher Naval
School, also in Leningrad), which by this time had been.
relocated to Baku.
Some time after Augusi.1943, Nosenko tried on two Separate
occasions to get to the front, but failed. He and a friend .
did succeed in returning home to Moscow without authorization..
These escapades seem to form part of 4 behavior pattern which
was eventually to culminate in defection.
By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the
Frunze Naval Preparatory School which had returned to its
original location in Leningrad. .Cadets from this school Were
sent to a forest '(some two hundred kilometers :from Leningrad)
on 'a wood-cutting detail.. In about November Of that year he
wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and'was hospitalized
He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory School
and again, through his father's intervention in about January
1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in Leningrad.
At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow.
He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of
the shipbuilding college which attested to his study in, and
the completion of, the tenth class.
At some time prior to July. 1945, Nosenko accompanied his
father, who went to East Germany with 4 group of engineers.
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For purposes of that trip. Nosenko received temporary rank
as an Army Senior Lieutenant, with appropriate- documents and
uniform.
Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations
in Moscow in July'1945. Upon completion of the second year
at the Institute, and. by virtue of his participation in a
military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC,
Nosenko received the rank of Junior Lieutenant in the
"administrative service" [sic].. (The exact meaning of this
term is unclear.)
In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his
parents' wishes; a student whom he had gotten pregnant.- He
obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage.
In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lt. General
-(Major. General, U.S.-style) Telegin. This marriage, too,
was neither successful nor long-lived. Nosenko reported he
had found his wife in bed with her brother: A girl was later
born with a harelip and a cleft palate. Nosenko insisted
that this. was not his child,
Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute of
International Relations, but actually received his. diploma
a year later'; in 1950,. because he had failed the examination
in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra.year-in order to
retake this examination.
In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English language
translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU), serving first in
the Far East. While on leave in Moscow (late April 1952),
he developed an illness which caused him to cough up blood,
and entered a TB sanatorium near Moscow for treatment. For
reasons of health, he did not return to the Far East but was
sent instead to the Baltic area.
While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied
his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a -
certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko
indicated interest in changing jobs, the. General Made a vague
offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State
Security (MGB), In March 1953, while again in MosCow,. Nosenko
was called to KobuIov's office. JCobulov had just returned
from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD
(Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov
personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the
Deputy .Chief of the Second- Chief Directordte-(internal counter-
intelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he. was
hired.
His first MGB assignment was in the First (American
Embassy) Section of the-First (American) Department of the SCD.
In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy Beriya
emerged from the resultant reshuffling of�the top leadership
as Chief of both the MVD and MGB. iln March 1934, the new
"Committee" for State Security -7 the KGB -- was formed..
In June .1.953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila
Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student., at theNoscow
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State 'University.
Nosenko, a.member of the Komsomol since 1943, was
-elected Secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit, in June 1953 and
served as Secretary of that unit until about June .1954.
However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal'
disease and gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he
used operational documentation in alias in applying for
treatment. When he did not go back for final treatment
as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible
place of work as shown on the alias document. The MVD found
out about this improper use of alias documentation, and
reported it to the SCD. Nosenko. was not only disciplined
by the Chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for
fifteen days), but the Komsomol also removed him as Secretary
and expelled him from its organization.
In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor
kharakteristika (performance evaluation) which described him
as unsuitable for work in the First Department. Nonetheless,.
he was neither dismissed nor transferred...
' Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode as well as
the poOr performance report; these events caused him to go :
on what he has described as a "big. drunk," which resulted in .
his having to spend a month under hospital care. To keep '
Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened by �
making a telephone call to Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov, Chief
of the SCD. Seemingly as a result of her efforts, Nosenko
was transferred in the.latter part of May 195.5:to the Second
Section (which operated against tourists) of the Seventh
Department, SCD. In late 1955, Lt. General Oleg Mikhayloviqh
Gribanov was appointed Chief of the SCD:' From a number of
indications, Nosenko's relationship with Gribanov developed,
despite the difference in rank and position, into a social
relationship involving evenings 'on the town together, heavy
drinking, and women. Despite numerous indiscretions', Nosenko's
survival within the KGB and his subsequent promotions to
increasingly responsible positions may well have resulted in -
part from Gribanov's patronage. To a considerable degree; of
course, his rise must also be.attributed to his being the son
of a highly-placed member of. the Soviet Government.
At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his
Komsomol membership and not' achieved CP-member status_ It was
not until 1956 that he was accepted as a-candidate member of
the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a full Party'
member. Once this happened, according to Nosenko; the
Komsomol removed its reprimand from his file:.
In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of
captain. He held this rank until his 4efection in February.
1964, despite having been promised hp'would be promoted and
the fact that he had held several positions which were usually
'filled by officers -of higher military tank.
Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD, until
January 1960 when he was. transferred back to the First Section
'(American Embassy) of. theFirst'Department Then he held the
position of a Deputy Chief of the Tirst Section. He was re.-
transferred back to the' Seventh Department as of late
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December 1961-early January 1962. In. July 1962, he was
appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. He con-
tinued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date he
left Moscow on TDY to Ceneva.
Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving
behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters.
His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to
England in 1957 and 1958, TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the first
TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He also went
on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his defection and
subsequent developments are covered in Chapter III.
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I: Initial Contacts
When Nosenko first approached the. CIA on 9 June 1962,
he had been assigned, as a representative of the KGB Second
Chief Directorate, to be Security Officer of the Soviet dele-
gation to the Disarmament Conference being held in the Palais
des Nations in Geneva. Taking advantage of the .fact that he
was the watchdog for the Delegation whereas its members could
not watch 'him, Nosenko used his freedom of movement to
approach the Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assist-
ance.
As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a-Swiss
woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official funds �
which he had on his person at the time; inability to reimburse-
: this relatively trivial amount (about US$250 at the time)
would jeopardize his -career. In exchange for 2,000 Swiss
Francs-, he therefore proposed that he provide us with two
items of information. These items; subsequently verified,
related to:
A. KGB recruitment of a U.S. Army sergeant while
he was serving in the American Embassy in Moscow as
a "code machine repairMan."-
B. A Soviet official whom the Agency had osten-
sibly recruited but who was being run against us
under KGB control.
At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming- in response to
general intelligence requirements on which we tried to quiz
him; excluded the possibility of becoming an agent, and flatly
refused to consider meeting Agency representatives inside the.
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he "agreed 'perhaps' meet us
when abroad" again at a later date. For our part, our
interest in him was whetted by his identification of his
deceased father as a former Minister of the USSR. In addition,
such information as he gave about himself indicated that he
would be of high operational interest.: Inter alia his most -
recent assignment in Moscow was as head of a KGB sub-section.
working against American tourists.
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2: Bona Fides
' By 11- June, the two case officers one a native Russian
speaker).Who-were handling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters
mhith read in part:
SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED
INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW
COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN
ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS
POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.3
.With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the
principal case officer, Tennent ("Pete") Bagley, who at the
time was assigned to Bern,� flew to Washington carrying the
tapes Of the meeting. Bagley's arrival and sojourn at Head--
quarters.were described by James Angleton, on 23 July 1976,
as follows:
. . . we got the first message from Pete Bagley
on Nosehko from Geneva, and Bagley was ordered
back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday
morning, and Bagley thought he had the biggest .
fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and
everything I heard from. him was in direct contrast
from what we heard from
What you're saying is that it was Unreasonable for
a Second Chief Directorate man to be there . . .
.Under the circumstances, getting-drunk and. needing
$300. to . . ."not to be recruited but to give us
three full, big Secrets" for an exchange for the
Money in order that he couldreplenish.the .account
from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So
I brought Pete in here one evening, j think it was
Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about
10 to 15 volumes of. s interrogation,
without prejudicing him in any way, just to read:
,it, and he had all the books out, .and.at the end
of it all he Said that there was no question about
it, that they were being had. 1 mean, mind you,
he was of split motivation because this was the
big case of his entire life and yet there he was
reading material, etc: So we went to Dick [Helms,
.then-DDP] and we put up a.proposition that we
should permit 4fteirnimpr to read the real. material,
II mean the transcripts and everything from Nosenko:.
And* he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a corn-.
promise and that was to take the material and-
falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter
sent to the Embassy by an alleged KGB person. . So
the anonymouL.Jetter,:was_drawnnand Pete inter-
Viewed plaimi with the anonymous letter, and
11111111111111ft stateMent was that "this is a person
under:control, I want to see the letter" .which
created a situation because we didn't havea'letter,
But he began to point out in some detail exactly
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2: Bona Fides
* By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian �
speaker) Who were handling Nosenko sent a,cable to Headquarters
which read in part:.
SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED
INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW
COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN
ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS
POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.3
With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the
principal case officer, Tennent ("Pete") Bagley, who at the
time was assigned to Bern, flew to Washington carrying the.
tapes of the meeting. *Bagley's arrival and sojourn at Head-
quarters were described by James Angleton, on 23 July 1976,
as follows:
JA:
JA:
. . . we got the first message from Pete Bagley
on Nosenko from Geneva, and Bagley was ordered
back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday
morning, and Bagley thought he had the biggest
fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and
everything I heard from him was in direct contrast
from what we heard from
What you're saying is that it was unreasonable for
a Second Chief Directorate man to be there . .
lUnder the circumstances,:getting*drunk and. needing
$300. to.. ."not to be recruited but to give us
three full, big secrets" for an exchange for the
money in order that he could replenish the account
from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So
I brought Pete in here one evening, Ithink,it was
Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and.I brought about
10 to 15 volumes of 41111.1111Mms� interrOgation,
without prejudicing him in any way, just to read
it, and he had all the books out, and at the' end
of it all he Said that there was no.question about
it, that they were being had. I mean; mind' you,
hewas of split motivation because this was the
big case of his entire life and yet there he was
reading material, etc. So we went to Dick [Helms*,
then DDP] and we put up a proposition .that we
should permit OiliWgiston to read the real material,
I mean the transcripts and everything from Nosenko:.
And he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a corn-
promise. and that was to take the material and
falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter'
sent to the Embassy by. an alleged KGB person. So
the anonymous letter was drawn :up, :and Pete inter-
viewed IMMOIWN with the anonymous letter-, and �
111111.111111MI statement was that "this is a person .
under Control, I want to see the letter" -which
.created.a situation because we_didn:-chave_a letter.
But he began to point out in some detail exactly
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what was instigating and inspiring -- in terms
of--what he'd already given to us and he very�
wisely stated that he wanted everything on tape,
because he knew that as time passed in hundreds
of. interviews and their counteraction took place,
there would be 'people accusing hit of not having
divulged certain information. 133-
Bagley's review of the NOMMOMIMPinformation had indeed
converted himto the view that Nosenko's defection was bogus.
Equally. convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of docu-
ments which he drafted, was Bagleys.superior, David Mtirphy,
who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963.- The
reasons for Murphy's conviction may not have been the same
as Bagley's (see 131), but for all practical purposes .the -
views of the two men at the time were identical.
A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore
made to Helms that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings
if\ be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed,
with the single reservation that Nosenko not be Identified by.
0 name as the source. As a result, Bagley had a number of
items of information from Nosenko embodied in a letter osten�
sibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; in this form,
it was assumed, the information could be shown to Golitsyn
Without disclosing the source, (This ruse seemed plausible
enough, since a previous' defector, MithalGoleniewski, had -
written CIA a number of anonymous letters before eventually
defecting and disclosing. .his identity.)
In carrying out the plan, Bagley made his own views clear
to Golitsyn:
I told [Golitsyn] that . I thought it quite
possible, in view of his own statements about
disinformation, that this was the beginning of a
disinformation operation possibly relating to
[his] defection
Golitsyn felt, in general and without having the
full details necessary to an assessment, that
there were indeed serious signs of disinformation
in this-affair. He felt such a disinformation
operation, to discredit him: was a likelihood,
as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be
permitted to'-tell everything he knew, now, if he:
worked in the same general field as Golitsyn' had.
When told that so far, this source had not done
anything to discredit Golitsyn, and had in fact
reported that the KGB. is greatly upset about .
Golitsyn's defection, and asked what he thought
the purposes ef such a'. disinformation operation
mow�might be, Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was
a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for
Also, to divert our attention from investigations
of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to
protect their remaining sources. He also added,
"There could bp other aims aswell. ''The matter
Should be looked..into. It seems serious to me:."
He thought the KGB-might allow a first Series of:
,olirect.meeting8 with the KGBefficer, to build dp
our:confidence, and "t'h'en in. the next .sesSion do
whatever the operation's purpose might be (dis-
credit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass serious disinforma-
tion items, etc.). -
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what was instigating- and inspiring -.- in terms
--what he'd already given to us and he very'
wisely stated that he 'wanted everything on tape,
because he knew that as time passed in hundreds
of interviews and their counteraction took place,
there would be people accusing him of not having
divulged certain information. 133
Bagley's review of the MOMMOMPrinformation had. indeed
converted him to the YiQW- that Nosenko's defection was bogus.
Equally convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of docu-
ment's which he drafted, was Bagley's superior, David Murphy,
who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963.- The
reasons for Murphy's conviction may not have been the same
as Bagley's (see 131), but for all:practical purposes the
views of the two men at the time were identical.
A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore
made to Helms that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings
be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed,
with the single reservation that Nosenko not be identified by
name as the source. As a result, Bagley had a number of
items of information. from Nosenko embodied.in a letter osten-
sibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; in this form,.
it was assumed,' the information could be shown tb Golitsyn
without disclosing the source, � (This ruse seemed plausible:
enough, since a previous defector, Michal Goleniewski, .had
written CIA a number of anonymous letters before eventually
defecting-and disclosing his identity.)
In carrying out the plan, Bagley made his own views clear
to Golitsyn:
I told [Golitsyn] that'. . . I thought it quite
possible, in view of his own statements about �
disinformation, that this was the beginning of a
disinformation operation possibly relating to '
[his] defection.. . �
Golitsyn-felt, in general�and.without having the-
full details, necessary to an assessment, that
there were indeed serious signs of disinforMatiOn:
in this �affair. He felt such a. disinformation '
operation, to discredit�him: was a likelihood,
as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be
permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he.,
worked in the same general field .as Golitsyn-had:.-
When told that �so far. this source had not done �
anything to discredit Golitsyn, 'and had in fact
reported that the KGB � is. greatly upset about .
,Golitsyn's�defection,-and as-Iced what he thought
the purposes. of such a.disinformation operation .-
now might be, 'Golitsyn agreed that- kidnapping was
a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for me."
Also, to divert our attention from investigations:
of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to
protect their remaining sources. He also added,
"There could be .other.aims.-as: well. The matter ��
Should be-looked..into:. It seems .seriods:to me..!"
He thought the.KGB-might allow � a first Series of.�
direct_meetings with the KGB. officer, to :build up;
our.confidence,�and:then in. the. next session do ,
whatever the operation's purpose might be (dis-
�ctedit Golitsyn,:kidnap, pasS,sedous disinformaT. �
tion items, etc.).
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3: The Case Against Nosenko
� During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division
continued to buildup a case against Nosenko. Virtually
any .information provided by Nosenko, or action. taken by
him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation," If
his inforMation was in accord with that from other sources,
this fact not only confirmed Our susp_icion of Nosenko, but
was interpreted as. casting doubt on the other sources as
well.
While the Above aspect will be covered at length in
.Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight the
attitude which prevailed. Nosenko had, 'during our meetings:
with him in 1962, contributed information which materially
aided in the identification and arrest of William Vassall,
a British Admiralty official who was also a KGB agent: Because
Golitsyn had previously provided similar, but less specific
information the usefulness of Nosenko's_Antelligence was
discounted; on-Eh Vassall had 15een identified, Thwas-oOncIuded
that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to. .
support 'his own- bona fides: The argument ran that Vassall -
would in, any case have, been identified sooner or later On the.
basis of Golitsyn's leads
In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva accompanying
another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had
been well established in the minds of those dealing With the
matter, and the record is therefore replete with manifestations
of suspicion. A particularly colorful example of our tendency
to interpret unfavorably almost anything Nosenko said is pro-
vided by notes which Murphy forwarded to Helms on 27 January
1964, with the suggestion that they "convey .very well the
10
flavor of the man . . . and the complexities of the operation."
By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at this
juncture was AEFOXTROT, he had previously been designated
AEBARMAN. This bit of history led to the following incident
during a safehouse meeting, as reported by.Bagley:
-I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre
remark AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. -As I
went behind a bar which stands in the, apart-
ment, to serve drinks to AEFOXTROT . .
AEFOXTROT saw me standing there behind the
.bar and his face lit up and he said with a
'smile, "Ha. -You' are the barman." Now'this
' could be an idle pleasantry about my standing
there like a bartender, but it is not funny
as AEFOXTROT (ex-AEBARMAN) seemed to think
it was and I aM afraid it means that he knows
IliSown CIA cryptonym. 10
The above incident eXemplifies a main. theMe'of Bagley's-
notes, his fear (shared by Angleton and Murphy) that CIA was
itself,penetrated. This fear had existed before Golitsyn
defected, but it .was fed -constantly by the latter's allegations
that information c'once'rning him was leaking to the KGB, and
Bagley's conclusion that the leaks must have originated
within the Agency...
Thus it lv.a.s that a memorandum :from Murphy' on 27 January
1964, submitted toand approved by HeIms,:began as follows:
7
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3: The Case Against Nosenko
During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division
continued to build up a case : against Nosenko. Virtually
any .information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by
him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation." If
his information was in accord with that from other sources,
this fact not only confirmed Our suspicion of Nosenko, but
was interpreted as casting doubt on the other-sources as
well.
While the AboVe aspect will be covered at length in
Chapters V and: VI, one example will serve to highlight the
attitude which.prevailed:, Nosenko had; during our meetings
with him in 1962, contributed information which materially
aided in the identification and arrest of William Vassall,
a British Admiralty.official who was also a KGB agent Because
Golitsyn had ureviously_provided less_specific
information, the usefulness of Nosenko's_intelligence was
discounted onEe VasSall:had 15-eel-I identified, It was concluded
that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to -
support 'his own bona fides,. The argument ran that Vassall
would in any case have, Deen identified sooner or. later .On the
basis of Golitsyn's leads.
In January 1964;_Nosenko reappeared in Geneva accompanying
another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had.
been well established in the minds of those.dealing With the
matter, and the record is therefore replete with manifestations
of suspicion. A particularly colorful exatple of .our tendency
to interpret unfavorably almost anything Nosenko said is pro-
vided by notes which Murphy forwarded to Helms on:27 January -
1964, with the suggestion that they "convey verT well-the
flavor of the man . . and the complexities of the operation."
By way of background, although NOSenko's cryptonym at this
juncture was AEFOXTROT, he had .previously been designated
AEBARMAN. This bit of history led to the following incident
during a safehouse meeting, as reported by Bagley:
cannot attribute.to coincidence a bizarre..
remark -AEFOXTROT made. on 24 January. As -I
went behind a bar which stands in the. apart-.
.ment, to serve drinks to-AEFOXTROT: , .
AEFOXTROT..saw me standing there behind the
.bar and his face. lit.up and he said with a
smile, "Ha. :..-You are the barman,' ,Now this
could be an idle pleasantry .about my standing
there like a bartender,' but it is not .funny
as.AEFOXTROT.(ex-AF,BARMAN) seemed to think -
it was. and I am afraid it means that he knows
his own CIA cryptonym.
.. The. above incident.eXemplifies a main theme of Bagley's.
notes, his fear (shared by Angleton .and. Murphy) that. CIA was
itself penetrated. .This fear 'had existed before Golitsyn
defected., .but it Iaas ..fed .cOnstamtly by the, latter's allegations
that inormation cbncerning him was leaking to the KGB, and-
Bagley's conclusion that the leaks Must have 'or.iginated.
within .the Agency..
Thus it -was_ that .memorandum. from Murphy' on 2/ 'January
1964, .submitted to and approved by Helm's, began .as
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Our goal in this case must be eventually to
break .Subject and learn from him the details
of his mission and its relation to possible
penetrations of U.S. intelligence and security
agencies and those of allied nation's as well
as to broader disinformation operations in
the political sphere. Ideally, our interests
would be best served if Subject were broken
as early as possible but since this is unlikely,
our actions must be conceived and carried out
in a manner which contributes to our basic
goal without alerting Subject unduly at any
stage. 11
Far from "alerting Subject unduly," Nosenko was .on the
surface welcomed with both cordiality and generosity. The
following excerpts from a 30 January 1964 meeting with
Bagley make the point clearly:
Nosenko: . . . the only. thing I wanted to know
I asked this question, "What should I
expect in the future?"
Bagley:- The following awaits: As I presented it,
you wanted to come to the United States and
have some job, some chance of.a future life,
which gives you security and if possible
the opportunity to work in this field which
you. know. Is that correct?
and
Nosenko: Absolutely.
Bagley: Mr. Helms Said. yes, flatly absolutely yes,
in fact I would say enthusiastic . . .
that's �the only word to describe it. We
talked about, and since this was a business
discussion repeat all of it whether .
it Was pleasant or unpleasant.. So the next
thing will be some details that we spoke
about: We talked about the means by which
[you]. could have a solid career with a
certain personal independence. Because of
the very great assistance you've been to us
already and because of this desire to give
you a backing; they will give you:a:little
additional personal security, we want to
.give you an account of your own, a sum of
at the beginning just plain $.50,000 and ,
from there on as a YWorking contract $25,000
a year. But in addition Iecatse of the.
arrest of Vas sail which would have been
impossible without your information we are
goina to-:add at least $.10,000 to this initial:.
� 6
:sum. -12
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A: 'Defection
As might be expected, Bagley devoted a-good deal of
effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko
to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand
the possibility of' remaining in contact with CIA from within
the Soviet Union, and became increasingly anxious to defect
immediately. When Bagley Continued to press him to remain
in Geneva long enough to effect an audio penetration of the
local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting
on 4 February, he announced that a cable had been received
from Moscow ordering him back home for a "toutiSm conference.."
Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of almost
endless controversy, it was accepted at the time without
apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began
for evacuation to' the. United States
The layover in lasted about .a fortnight. It
was used for further debriefing and assessment, but While
useful from the operational handlers' standpoint, the delay
.raised problems as their charge became impatient:
CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW
DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES, SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY
NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD.[i.e., Second
Chief Directorate, KGB] OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH
HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO
HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO-AVOID ARRIVING WITH:
EMPTY HANDS. WORKING QN� THIS MATERIAL WILL
OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST
SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND
PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT
SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION.
HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY.
REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS 'JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS
DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE.
.SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY.
AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME
IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS.
REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEADQUARTERS PROVIDE SOME
RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN
SUGGEST ARE: �
A. [MURPHY] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DIS-
CUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD MOVE . . 15
The above cable triggered a visit to by Murphy:
Nothing that happened during this visit modified his already,:
well-formed views. After a:conference with the two principal
handlers, Bagley and Serge Karpovich, he wrote:
Both . . . were unanimous in their view that
Subject. was not a genuine defector. - His
Contact with 'us in. Geneva and subsequent..
defection -.wereatcording to these officers,..
clearly undertaken at .the direction of the KGB_
I was particularly interested- in.Karpovich's
statement that .he had suspected .Subject from .
the very �first meeting on the basis of' Subject's
14
/7:
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0.1 � ,
fan-vor lc,.V.d* �
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-- 17 --
4: Defection
As might be expected, Bagley devoted a good deal of
effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko
to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand
the possibility of remaining in contact with CIA. from within
the Soviet Union, and became increasingly anxious to defect
immediately. When Bagley Continued to press him to remain
in Geneva long enough to effect an audio penetration of the
local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting
on 4 February, he announced that a cable had been received
from Moscow ordering him back home for a "tourism conference.ft 14
Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of' almost,
endless controversy, it was accepted at the time without
apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began
for evacuation to the United States .0DX1)
(b)(3)
The layover in lasted about a fortnight. It MO)
was used for further debriefing and assessment, but While (b)(3)
useful from the operational handlers' standpoint, the delay
raised problems as their charge became impatient: .
CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW
DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY
NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD [i.e., Second
Chief Directorate, KGB] OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH
HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO
HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID ARRIVING WITH:
EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS MATERIAL WILL
OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST
SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND
PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT
SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION., �
HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY.
REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS
DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE.
SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY.
AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME
IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS.
REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEADQUARTERS PROVIDE SOME
RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN
SUGGEST ARE:
A. 'MURPHY] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DIS-
CUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD MOVE . . 15
The above cable triggered a visit to by Murphy: (WO)
Nothing that happened during this visit modified his already..(b)(3)
well-formed views. After a conference with.:the two principal -
handlers, Bagley and- Serge Karpovich, he wrote:.
Both . . were Unanimous in their view that
Subj-ect was not a genuine defector. His
contact with.Us in Geneva and subsequent
defection were, ''according to these-officers,-
clearly undertaken at. 'the direction of ,the KGB.
I was particularly interested' in Karpovichs
statement that 'he had suspected Subject from
the very first meeting on the basis of ..Subject's
/
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18 --
emotionless and mechanical delivery of his
statement announcing his intention to defect.
'After my talks with the case officers, I had
my first visit with Subject at the safehouse.
This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included
dinner with Subject and the case officers.
Conversation during this first meeting was
general in nature and followed no special
agenda. However, it did give MQ �an oppor-
tunity to take Subject's measure. I started
by telling Subject that I had come to form my
own impressions of him as a person and an
intelligence officer who desired to place his
knowledge and. experience at the disposal of
the United States Government. I added that
',wished to determine for myself whySubject
had come to the West, a most: serious step.
which neither we nor Subject should under-
estimate in terms of its lasting effect on
Subject's own life and those of his family
left behind. Subject rose to this opening by
first assuring.me in a most fawning manner
that he, as an intelligence officer, fully
understood the need for a senior officer to
make his own judgments .on the spot. He then
went on to explain his motivation for first
contacting us., his reasons for defecting and
his intense desire to collaborate with us in
Soviet operations.since he has no specialty
other than intelligence. These remarks were
repetitious of his original statements
delivered in the same Mechanical fashion:, the
Major difference being that Subject Was intensely
nervous at the outset, calming down only after
it appeared that I was accepting his statements
at face value.
By the end of the evening 'I had come to the
same conclusions reached by Bagley and Karpovith,
The totality of our conclusions are treated in
detail separate memorandum. However, in
reaching them, I was beset by a Sense of irri-
tation �at the KGB's obvious- conviction they
could pull off an operation like this Success-
fully and by a feeling of distaSte forthe
obvioUS and transparent manner in which Subject
played his role. 17
Murphy's distaste Was sufficient to overcome any interest
he might otherwise have had in a recruitment opportunity
suggested by Nosenko:
One other subject touched upon . . was the
possible recruitment of Vladimir Suslov, Under�
Secretary in the UN Secretariat and top-ranking
Soviet in the UN organization . . . Subject
[describedj SuSlov as a playboy who liked liquor
and women and who could be easily blackmailed
into cooperation for fear of hurting his career
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I objected
to the blackmail angle saying that it could
Ii
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11,4,b1 L.
19 --
cause a tremendous political flap if it back-
fired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position
to assure us that it would not have to be "crude
blackmail" in which we would have to get .
directly involved,. I certainly got the impres-
sion that Suslov's recruitment is part of the
plan and that we would succeed no Matter how
half-heartedly we tried. 17
Despite'his. misgivings, however, Murphy remained-Con-
vinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble;
It will be necessary to maintain an effective
degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge
of Subject's true status and our plans td try
to secure from him a full confession. If;..
Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our
intentions, we will probably be forced to act
prematurely. 18 .
With these considerations in minoti he therefore renewed
the commitments previously made by Bagley . �
I informed Subject that I was.satisfied that he
was genuine. Based on this and assuming his
continuing "cooperation,"'I said we would pro-;
'ceed�to make arrangements to bring him to the
States. Second, I confirmed our agreement:to
pay him $25,000 for each year in place ($50,000)
plus $10,000 for his part in the Vassall case
and our readiness to contract for his services at
$25,000 per year. 17
� �
On 12 February; consistent with the above commitments,
Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a
safehouse,.under close supervision of the Office of Security,
,Now that he .was in the United States-, the Agency. (and the U.S..
Government as a whole) found themselves faced with a seeming
dilemma, much more crucial than the problems facing them
while he remained abroad. The Agency's perception of the
dilemma, and the possible solutions: to it, are covered in
paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and -7 .of a memorandum written by Murphy
and approved by Helms on 17 February 1964:
While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB
directed mission, it has been generally agreed
by both us and the FBI that he still possesses
valid information which we would like to obtain.
At the same time, we, at least, believe that '
Subject must be broken at some point if we are
to learn something �of the full scope of the
KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and
the role played'.by -others in it. In addition,
we must have this information if we �are to
decide what countermeasures-we should take in
terms of counter-propaganda', modifications in .
our security practices, and planning for future
operations "against the Soviet target. Admittedly,
our desire to continue debriefing to obtain
additional information may conflict With the
'need to break Subject.. Clearly', the big problem .
is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject,
�4 11
�
.41
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�adi..tifUlt . 7.'f'''' '''-
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19 --
cause a tremendous political flap if it back-
fired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position
to assure us that it would not have to be "crude
blackmail" in which we would have to get
directly involved. I certainly got the impres-
sion that Suslov's recruitment is part of the
plan and that we would succeed no Matter how -
half-heartedly we tried. 17
� Despite.his misgivings, however, Murphy remained con-
vinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble;
It will be necessary to maintain an effective
degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge
of Subject's true status and our plans .td try
to secure from him a full confession. If.
Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our
intentions, we will probably be forced to act
prematurely; 18 .
7/11Aii\P'1'
With these considerations in mind, he therefore renewed
the commitments previously Made by Bagley.: .
yqv
I informed Subject that I was satisfied.that he
genuine. Based on: this. and assuming his
continuing "cooperation," I said we would pro-
ceed to make arrangements to bring him to the
.States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to
pay him $25,000 for each year in place ($50,000)
plus $10,000 for his part in the Vassall case
and our readiness to contract for his services at
$25,000 per year. 17
On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments,
Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a
safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of Security.
Now that he was in the United States, the Agency (and the U.S,
Government as a whole) found themselves faced with a.seeming
dilemma, much More crucial than the problems facing them :
while he remained abroad. The Agency's perception of the
dilemma, and the possible solutions to it, are covered in
paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7 of a memorandum written by Murphy
and approved by Helms on 17 February 1964:
While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB
directed mission it has been generally agreed
by both us and the FBI that he still possesses
valid information Which we would like to obtain.
At the same time, we, at least, believe that
Subject must be broken at some point if we are
to learn something of the full Scope of the
KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and
-the role played'by others in it. In addition,
we must have this information if Are are to.
decide what countermeasures.me should take in
terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in
our security practices, and planning for future
operations :against the Soviet target. � Admittedly,
our desire to continue debriefing to obtain
additional information may conflict With the
'need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem
is one of timing. MOW long can we 'keep Subject,
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-- 20 --
or his KGB controllers, ignorant Of our aware.-
ness of this operation and. how long will it
take us to assemble the kind of brief we will
need to initiate a hostile interrogation in
conditions of maximum control?
If we are to proceed along the lines indicated
above .we should. accept in advance the premise
that we will not be able to prevent Subject
from evading our custody or communicating with
the Soviets unless we place him under such
physical restraint that it will become immedi-
ately apparent to him that we suspect him.
This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is
not, we should so determine right away and
decide on'a completely different course of
action. If this is to be the case, we should
agree' to forego additional debriefings, place
Subject in escape-proof quarters away from-the
Washington area under full-time guard and com7
mence hostile debriefing on the basis of the
material We already have (although the prospects
for success would not begreat). Disposal would
probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press
�release to the effect that Subject had con- .
fessed to being a plant and had been allowed to
return. to Soviet control. [In.the meantime,.
SR 'Division would:]
�Advise Subject that during this. phase he will
centinue to live and work in the safehouse
and will be escorted' at all times when on
shopping trips, visits to movies,-etc.,
because of his faulty English and unfamil-
iarity witb the country; customs; etc.
While we can explain this regime as needed
for his security, we cannot keep him locked
up in the house 24 hours a day.
Provide Subject with 'flash" documentation in
:another�name to be carried on his person
during excursions from the house. They may
also help persuade him he has-been accepted.
Make available to Subject a portioliof the.
$60,000 promised him.which he can use for -
purchases of clothes, cigarettes; personal
effects, etc. .
Agree that.-whenever this first phase is -.over-
(four to six weeks) that he be permitted:to �
:take a two--week vacation with escort.
The vacation period will be of greater benefit.to
us since it will provide us with an opportunity
�to review .andmake judgments�on the. value.ofthe
information already obtained and also .to con
sider the progress-made-in the other aSpects� of
the case outlined below. � During the Vacation we
can decide on whether we .should.proceed to the
phase or are ready to commence 'hostile �
interrogation under controlled conditions... If
it is�theformer, we will have to reckon with :�
47wilD"Thp7V4
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-- 21
the need to modify the living and Working
arrangements for Subject in a Way :which will
inevitably give him some additicinal freedom.
At the same time, we would be expected to
move forward with Subject's legalization,
i.e., final decision on a name he will use,
securing an alien registration card, estab-
lishing a bank account, etc. Therefore, it
will be terribly important to make the proper
decision at the end of phase one.
This decision will depend not only on our
evaluation of the material obtained during
the debriefings but on how far we have been
able to .go in clarifying other cases which
are related to Subject case and form an impor-
tant part of any explanation of the KGB's goals
in this operation 21
Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi-
valence and uncertainty., On the one hand, he was housed
in circumstances which his principal day-to-day handler,
John B. McMahon of SR Division, describes as "our typical.,
luxurious s'iyle . ." He continues by saying that "there
was all the food and drink one could possibly want . I.
remember all of the effOrt and the money we spent to get
�
a billiard table -- something like $1,000 was spent on that
table . . ." On the other hand, McMahon, who was assigned
to this case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair;
was told at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had
been sent by the KGB . . ." 134
. Writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on13 February,
McMahon recorded his first impressions of Nosenko:
In this brief meeting lasting actually less than
two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from
putting him in three successive categories..
In the first few minutes I put him in the cate-
gory of a Cuban exile living in the Harlem' 'section
of New York City. This impression came to my
mind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark
trousers and :sport shirt, black elevated shoes,
sharply pointed and with a desigh) and his,
mannerisms .:. �
Half way through the session I put him in the
category of a big city but 'small-time con' man.
While dictating to Nick [i.e., Serge Karpovich]
from his notes, he knew exactly what he Wanted
to say and how he wanted to say it. But .when
I had brief conversations with him on other
topics, or wherLI saw him stealing glances' in
my direction to size. me .up,. I could almost see
the con man's wheels turning rapidly in his.head.
.1 had-an urge to check my wallet just to make �
sure it was still safe.
As the session-endedand we tovedino the.
living root .1 put him in.a third category.
'Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed how
he' touched Nick on the shoulder.. When Nick went.
i trA P77 Orm�r7. '. 47,7:w 7,-0 --T:Fci 1.7
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-- 21 --
the need to modify the living and working
arrangements for Subject in a way .which will
inevitably give him some additional freedom.
At the same time, we would be expected to
move forward with Subject's legalization,
i.e., final decision on aflame 'he will use,
securing an alien registration card, estab-
lishing a bank account, etc. Therefore, it
will be terribly important to take the proper
decision at the end of phase one.
This decision will depend not only on our
evaluation of the material obtained during
the debriefings but on how far we have been
able to go in clarifying other cases which
are related to Subject case and form an impor-
tant part of any explanation of the KGB's goals.
in this operation', 21
Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi-
valence and uncertainty. On the one hand., .he was housed �
in circumstances which his principal day-to-day handler,
John B. McMahon of SR Division, describes as "oar typical,
.luxurious style . . ." He continues by saying that "there
was all the food and drink one could possibly want-. . I
remember all of the effort and the money we spent to get
a billiard table -- something like $1,000 was spent on that
table . . ." On the other hand, McMahon, who was assigned
to this case after having worked on 'the GolitSyn affair;
was told at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty; that he had
been sent, by the KGB . . ." 134
Writing of his first meeting withi\Tosenko on 13 February,
McMahon recorded his first impressions of Nosenko:
In this brief meeting lasting actually less than
two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from
putting him in three successive categories.
In the first few minutes I put him in the cate-
gory of a Cuban exile living in the Harlem' section
of New York City. This impression came:to:my
Mind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark
trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes,
sharply pointed and with a design) and
mannerisms .�.
Half way through the session I put him in the
category of a-big city but small-.time con man.
While dictating to Nick [i.e, Serge Karpovich]
from his notes, he knew exactly what he Wanted
to say and how �he wanted to say it. But when
I had brief conversations with him on other
topics, or when I saw him stealing glances in
-
my direction to size me up,- I'coUld aimost'see
the con man's wheels turning rapidly in his head
I had an urge to check my wallet just to make
sure it was still safe.
As the session ended,.and we'toved into the,
living room I put him .in,a third category7
Before leaving the..debriefing room I noticed how
he touched Nick on the shoulder. When Nick went'
z
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uL y 1
-- 22 --
downstairs for .a few minutes, George and I
walked into the living room. During that
brief walk I decided to give him a President .
Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas
style). on departure and a few sincere words
about how pleased I was to meet and talk with
him, but his'actions soon changed .my mind.
As soon as we reached the middle of the living
room he gave me an unexpected and prolonged
hug around the shoulders and waist, the type
that One man gives another well known to him
only after some achievement such as making
the decisive point, in a football game. His
embrace really took me by surprise and I had
to pull away from him without hurting hi
feelings. At this point I realized that I
couldn't go through with the President Johnson_
handshake; he'd have to. settle for less.- In
this, the third category, I saw him as a jazz (
musician who. sells heroin an the side and has
homosexual tendencies. 20
A week later, on 20. February, however, McMahon reported
more favorable impressions, those of the Office of Security
personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the safehouse:
Subject is not at all concerned about his aiwn
security or the threat of assassination or
kidnapping. He seems to think the present
security system is fine . [This was in
marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.]
,Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never
"under the influence" . . .
Subject is not a heavy smoker .
At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table
with the guards and acts as if. he is. one 'of .� �
the boys: � He does not sit at the head of the .
table but to the side.. He always offers the.
boys a drink, asks them to take more food, 'and
kids them . . .
He dos not play cards, has shown no interest
in chess, and has. not mentioned checkers.. :He,.
does mot gamble and doesn't seem to have any �
hobby or inside activit)i'to keep himself busy.
He has shown a desire to play pool
Subject does not say anythin..for�or against the-
USSR.or the.�Cammunist:Party Even -when. Viewing
the Olympics on TV.Subject.never. once commented
an how good the.Soviets�were. and haw poor a -
showing the Americans, made. The same could ,not
be said for 'Big Bad John" [Golitsyn] ��.
the contrary Subject wants to be an American-
as soon 'as possible.
Subject's sexual ,desires' appear:to:be normal.
Subject has made several joking. references to �
gaing.tagether. to house af-prosti-.
tution. . . Subject definitely _wants a woman
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-- 22 --
downstairs for a few minutes, George and I
walked into the living room. During that
brief walk I decided to give him a President -
Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas
style). on departure and a few sincere words
about how pleased I'was to meet and talk with
him, but his actions soon changed my mind.:
As soon as we reached the middle of the living
room he .gave me an unexpected and prolonged �
hug around the shoulders and waist, the -type
that one man gives another well known to him
.only after some achievement such as 'making
the decisive point in a football game. His
embrace really took me by surprise and I had.
to pull away from him without hurting his
feelings. At this pOint I realized .that I
couldn't go through with the President Johnson_
handshake; he'd have to settle for less. In
this, thethird category,-I-saw him as a jazz ti
musician who sells 'heroin on the side and has
homosexual tendencies. 20
A week later; on ZO February, however, McMahon reported
more favorable impressions, thOse of the (Office of Sec14'ity.
personnel assigned to guard Nosenk6 at.tEe safehouse:
Subject is not at all concerned about this .own
security or the threat of assassination or
kidnapping. He seems .to think the present
security system is fine . . [This was in
-marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.]
Subject is not a- heavy drinker and is never
"under the influence" . .
Subject is not a heavy smoker .
At mealtime Subject sits at the .dining table
with the guards and acts 'as if he is one of
the boys.' He does not sit at the head of.the
'table but to the side. He always, offers the
boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and
kids them . . .
He does not play cards, has shown no interest
in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. .He.
does not gamble and doesn't Seem to have any
hobby br inside activity'to keep himself busy:
He has shown a desire to play pool .
Subject does not say anything:for Or against the
USSR or the Communist Party. Even when Viewing
.the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented
on how good' the Soviets were and ,'how poor a
showing the Americans made, The same could not
be said for -"Big Dad John" [Golitsyn] , On
.the contrary Subject wants-to be an American..'
as soon a.s-possible.
Subject's sexual desires appear to .be normal
Subject has made several joking references to.
their. all going.together to -a house .of prosti-
tution. . . . Subject definitely wants d-'Womain
-77
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and the sooner, the better .
Subject has not commented one way or another,
for or against, any person associated with. him,
including the housekeepers. Compared with other
cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid,
doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have
a mental problem, and wants to become an
American and work like and with Americans as,
soon as possible.
:Subject became angry only once and even then it
was not a loss of temper in the true sense.
The day that Pete discussed the schedule with
him, Subject became moody and started to drink
alone. He told the guards that he want � to use
his brains and work hard as Americans do. He
feels that the present schedule does not utilize
his talent :to the fullest. 23
The."sthedule" referred to above had been outlined to
Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which Bagley had-
assured him that "both Mr. Murphy and myself. are enthusias-
tically optimistic about' future .cooperation with him in
operations against the USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for la
period devoted to systematic debriefing with the statemen-L
that this "might represent. an -attempt to extract all his-
information from him, after which he would' not be needed.
He- also said he needed 4 vacation at "an early date in order.
to help him forget and get over the strain and worry' of his:
abrupt change of situation, particularly the strain of
leaving his family behind." 22
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24 --
�,;
5: The Problem of Disposition-,
�
Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation" With
Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility of
forcibly returning him to the 'Soviets if the "Overall effort.
to break him" came to naught In addition, an alternative
plan was being developed for the incarceration of Nosenko,.
so that "there can be no question of [his] escaping after he
becomes aware :of our attitude.tS 24 Finally, it was agreed,
between Murphy and Helms that Golitsyn,.who had meanwhile
recognized Nosenko as the author of the Ostensible "anonymous
letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation
to back up our interrogation. Helms originally had some mis-
givings about.this procedure, but appears eventually'to have
agreed to giving Golitsyn "full access" to material from
�
Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself. 24
Within less than a week of McMahon's favorable teport on
Nosenko'S behavior, the situation deteriorated. .By,
24 February, Nosenko was reported as being in a "highly. tense,
nervous, and emotional state" following an interrogation by
the FBI. 25 He complained that "the :FBI agentswere treating
him like a criminal and he deeply resented their attitude and
-would not talk to them again." He then persuaded his security
guards:to take him to downtown Washington
several night clubs.
NOtwitfistanding this incident, the guards still had :favorable
things to say about Nosenko when McMahon�questioned them .on
28 February. They described him as "very bright . a neat
dresser . . . not a heavy drinker . the easiest and nicest
defector they have worked. with."240
Despite-the fact that .an FBI interrogation seems to' have
triggered Nosenko's first disruptive episode, the FBI viewed
him much more favorably than did CIA. As early as 8 February-
1964,'when Murphy was in Frankfurt to 'assess Nosenko, Angleton
had sent hit d.cable reading in part:
FOLLOWING YOUR'DEPARTURE, SAM [Samuel' Papich,
FBI liaison officer with CIA] STATED VERY
INFORMALLY THAT FRIEND OF.HIS WHO IS EXPERT
.IN FBI QUICKLY SCANNED AEFOXTROT PRODUCTION
AND CAUTIONED US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD:
IN :TERMS OF CASES KNOWN 1D THEM, 1.6
Later, in 'a memorandum .to HelmS'on 9 MarCh, Murphy:stated that
"the FBI personnel on the case have so far indicated they
believe Subject to be a genuine KGB defector." By implication,
-both' Murphy and Angleton regatded this divergence of view as
a serious problem. Their concern is understandable, because
a-subsequent paragraph of the Murphy memorandum contained
plans for the following action, tQ be initiated around 1 April
1964, which would not.be apprOpriate if CIA were forced, as
a.result.of inter-agency.consultations, to treat Nosenko as
a bonafide defector:
a. _'Subject to be moved to a high security -
safehouse under maximum guard-.
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5: The Problem of Disposition'
Far from being optimistic. about our "cooperation" With
Nosenko, SR Division was discussing- the possibility of
.fercibly returning him to the �Soviets if the "overall effort
to break him" came to naught. In addition, an alternative
plan was being developed for the incarceration of Nosenko,
so that "there can be no question of [his] escaping after he
becomes aware Of our attitude." 24 Finally,- it was agreed
between Murphy and Helms that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile
recognized Nosenko as the author of the Ostensible "anonymous
letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation
to back- up our interrogation. Helms originally had some mis-
givings about this procedure, but appears eventually to have
agreed to giving Golitsyn "full access" to' material from
Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself: 24
. Within less than a week of McMahon's-favorable report on
Nosenko's behavior, the situation deteriorated. By
24 February, Nosenko was reported as being in a "highly tense,
nervous, and emotional state"-following an interrogation-by-
the FBI. 25 He complained that "the FBI agents were treating
him like a criminal and he deeply resented their attitude and
would not talk to them again." He then persuaded his security
guards.to take him to downtown Washington where he visited
.several night clubs.
Notwithstanding this.incident-, the guards still had favorable
things to say about Nosenko when McMahon questioned them on
28 February. They described him as "very bright . . a neat
dresser . . not a heavy drinker . . the easiest and nicest
defector they have worked with." 26
Despite the fact that an FBI interrogation seems to have
triggered Nosenko's first disruptive episode, the FBI viewed
him much more favorably than did CIA. As early as 8 February
1964, when Murphy was in Frankfurt to assess Nosenko, Angleton
had sent him a cable reading in part;
FOLLOWING YOUR'DEPARTURE,SAM.[Samuel Papich,
FBI liaison officer with CIA] STATED VERY
INFORMALLY THAT FRIEND OF HIS- WHO 'IS EXPERT,
IN FBI QUICKLY SCANNED AEFOXIROT PRODUCTION
AND CAUTIONED US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD"
IN TERMS OF CASES KNOWN TO THEM- Later, in in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Murphy' stated that
"the FBI perSonnel on the case have so:faT indicated they
believe Subject 'to 'be a genuine KGB defector." By implication,
both-Murphy and Angleton regarded this divergence of view as :
R serious problem. Their concern:is understandable, because
a subsequent paragraph of the Murphy memorandum contained
plans for the following action, to be initiated around 1.April
1964', which would not be appropriate if CIA were forced, as
a result of inter-agency consultations', to treat Nosenko as
a bona'fidedefector:
a. 'Subject to be moved to a high security
safehouse under maximum guard.
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b. The DCI to inform the President, Secretary
of State, Director, FBI, and USIB Principals '
that Subject is a KGB plant whom we intend to
return to Soviet control after (1) trying to
break him, and (2) publicizing his case..
Retain Subject incommunicado for about
three weeks during which time we will continue.
efforts to break him.
d. At the same time, commence the publicity
campaign which will precede Subject's deporta-
tion. As a first step there will be a brief
official announcement probably by a State
Department spokesman to the effect that Subject
has confessed to having faked his defection at
,KGB direction in order (1) to penetrate U.S.
intelligence and security agencies; and (2) to
'discredit the act of defection by Soviet .
citizens At .the same time, a presssback-:
grounder will be made available which Will.
characterize this KGB operation as an act of
.desperation following a decade of defeCtion and
disloyalty to the regime on the part of a.
score of senior SoViet intelligence .officers
(from Deryabin to Golitsyn). As a follow-up,
we will have ready for press and magazine out-
lets :special stories on Subject's ..case 'ranging
from the gory details of tourist operations to
his vitriolic views on Aftican-students 27
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- 6:- Erratic Behavior and .Its Aftermath
While planning was going on for his confinement and
hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken to Hawaii for two
weeks' relaxation, beginning on 12 March. During- this period,
his consumption of alcohol was enormous, and his behavior
became increasingly erratic. Prior to his departure, he
had on several occasions been violent; On one occasion he
took a Swipe with his fist at Bagley, �and on another tried
to strangle one of the Office of Security escorts.
McMahon, who spent the first part of the.
vacation with Nosenko-, recorded these impressions:
In my opinion Subject is .under extreme tension
�and pressure. Any man who skips breakfast and
starts the day .off with -alcohol is on his way
to becoming an alcoholic. He drinks net for
the enjoyment .of it, but with an attempt to
erase or lessen problems of a.serious nature.
I'suspect that these tensions are the result of
two things:: one, fear on his Tart that he can-
not follow through with his assignment; and, two,
his homosexual desires. I predict that the situ-
ation will not improve but grow Worse. 28.
Yet McMahon concluded on the following note:
Despite our oral arguments and the various
incidents we experienced, Subject and I parted
� on the best of terms. He gave me an affec-
tionate embrace on the night of my departure,
and in front of Pete thanked me for my attention
to: his needs and patience in dealing with him.
We agreed to see each other upon his return to
Washington. 28
During the last half of the vacation, Bagley arrived and
took charge of the escort team. Nosenko was more -restrained-
in his: presence than he had:been previously, but Bagley had
no success in eliciting information from him during this
period. Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according to
Bagley, but he was also very tense and unable to sleep More
than a few hours at .a time.
Although debriefing was resumed upon return to Washington,
it cannot have been very successful. Nosenko was still
drinking .enormously. and had by now discovered the unfettered.
nightjife ; it is doubtful that he was physically
able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during the day,
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7 4,
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27 - -
On 30. March 1964, Murphy wrote a memorandum to the DDP
entitled "Final Phase Planning," which Helths duly initialed
and returned without written comment. Inter alia, Murphy
had this to say:
We have concluded that there is little to be
gained by prolonging the status quo beyond
next weekend and every reason to Suspect that
if Subject learns we doubt him, he will try to
escape; Accordingly, we have instructed the
security guards. to be alert to any attempts on
.Subject's part to elude them . . .
On either Thursday or Friday evening [2--3 April],
while Nosenko is readying himself for his. usual
evening outing, we will have him taken into
custody by three OS officers he has never seen
and transported by secure means to the OS maximum
security safplinirise in
He will be placed in 4 detention
cell and left alone (but-under:constant and
direct observation) for approximately 24 hours..
Further scheduling must depend in considerable
degree on the results of the interrogation.
However, since we do not anticipate that Nosenko
will ever break to the point of becoming corn-.
pletely cooperative,, and since we must 'assume
that within five or six days after the cOnfron
tation:begins, news of our action will have
leaked out through the briefings (however neces-
sary they may have been), we should be ready to
take this 'action:
Have State Department spokesman. issue low key'
statement indicating that NoSenko is plant
with mission. to seek out and report on bona.
'fide defectors living in the United States.
'Follow up with backgrbunder to be given to
newsmen.by Public Affairs.or-used as basis
for "exclusive'.story to be given to
selected news outlets..
Mail'Ietter in Moscow (or. from Helsinki
Moscow) addresSed to Lt. Gen. Oleg Mikhailovich
.Gribanov which makes It.clear that we were on.
to operation all along but also that choice
of Nosenko as -key'. figure in 'operation Was a.
-mistake. To emphasize latter point include
as. an 'attachment a, description of .Nosenko
behavior. This would be couched in dry,
almost clinical, language with such touChes,
as fact. that
Aside trom the not inconsiderable satis-
faction we will have in preparing it, this
letter will serve to dissuade the Soviets
from an overly hasty' reaction to our press
'stories and should-also:make them-reasonably .
anxious to get Nosenko back to determine what
happened. 30
s
Vica9 L
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Since failure to "break" Nosenko -- i.e., force him to
admit that he had come to us, not as a genuine defector .but
ass-a KGB-dispatched agent -- was considered virtually certain,
plans were also being laid to return him to the Soviet
authorities. Before doing this, however, it would be necessary
to:
. . Discuss With Legal Counsel the legal
problems which might be encountered in
arranging Nosenko's deportation. The
sim lest method still anpears to
to TemPelhof in Berlin. Thence
to S-Bahnhof Tiergarten where Subject, in his
best civilian clothes, with diplomatic pass-
port, would be placed on an S-Bahn which then
stops inside East Berlin only at the control
point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse. 30
PPTI,
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'7: The Decision to Incarcerate
On 2 April, Helms, Murphy and Lawrence Houston (CIA
General Counsel) carried the Nosenko problem to Deputy
Attorney General KatzenbaCh. The Justice Department position
was that, 'inasmuch as Nosenko had been admitted on "parole" -
to the Agency, this .arrangement "can be interpreted to pearl
parole to a specific locale whith would provide some justi-
fication for our detaining him for questioning.- It was
then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to
leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically
we would. not be able to detain him further." 33 Though the
record is not specific on this issue, it is a legitimate
presumption that at the .2 April briefing Helms had presented
the case in the same light as he had on the Trevious-dayto
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and his colleagues.at the. State
Department, i.e., ". Nosenko isnot a genuine defector.
but more probably an agent planted on us by the KGB:" 32 :
Had the presumption of guilt not been so forcefully presented,
Justice's position might have been less permissive.
Although Nosenko had already contributed considerable ,
intelligence of value (see Chapter including information
which led directly to the arrest of William Vassall in 1962,
there is no indication in the files from this period that
the possibility of his being a bona fide defector was given'
.any credence whatsoever; either within the Agency or
in dis'-
cussions with other parts of the Government.
On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose guilt.
had been established, Since the only problem in the minds of
Murphy and Bagley was that of forcing him to admit his guilt,.
it Was decided to apply to him techniques the KGB had employed
with ProfesSor Frederick Barghoorn in 1963. ' The logic of
doing this, in light of their conviction that Nosenko would
never break to the point of becoming completely cooperative,
is not clear from the files. Nevertheless, even while Murphy -
was registering with certainty his lack of hope for a favorable -
resolution, plans were drawn up fOr an "arrest," strict con-
finement and hostile interrogation. These plans are worth
quoting at length: 30 (�c4
The operational and psychologiCal assessments
of AEFOXTROT suggest strongly' that the timing
and the staging of the "arrest," and the .
physical surroundings and psychological -atmo-
�sphere of the detention could:influence.. .
.AEFOXTROT .Strongly, .and if properly done, could
go a long way towards "setting hit up" for the
interrogators.. For this reason we'yish to �
emphasize that apart from the purely mechanical
problems involved, every member.of:the'guard
:forte will have an important part to play As
an attar.
:Briefly, the plot is as follows: On the evening'
of April 2 (the' actual date may yet be moved up
or delayed a few daysj,Ha teanuof'four.or :five
security officers will pull up to the present
'safehouse in a van or panel truck.. :Three of
them,'all unknown to Subject, will enter the
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29 --
7: The Decision to Incarcerate
On 2 April, Helms, Murphy and Lawrence Houston (CIA
General Counsel) carried the Nosenko problem to Deputy
Attorney General KatzenbaCh. The Justice Department position
was that, inasmuch as Nosenko had been admitted on "parole"
to the.Agency, this arrangement "can be interpreted to pearl
parole to a specific locale which would provide some justi-
fication for our detaining him .for questioning. � It was
then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to
leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically
we would not be able to detain him further." 33 Though the
record is not specific on this issue, it is a legitimate
presumption that at the 2 April briefing Helms had presented
the case in the same light as he had on the previous day-to.
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and his colleagues at the State
Department, i.e., ". . Nosenko is not a genuine defector,
but more probably an agent planted on us by the KGB." 32
Had the presumption of guilt not been 'so forcefully presented,
Justice's position might have been less permissive.
- Although Nosenko had already contributed considerable
intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), including information
which led directly to the arrest of William Vassall in 1962,
there is no indication in the files from this period' that
the possibility of his being a bona fide defector was given"
any credence whatsoever, either within the Agency or in dis-
cussions with other parts of the Government. :
On the. contrary, Nosenko was treated as .one whose guilt
.had been.established. Since the only problem in the minds of
Murphy and Bagley was that of forcing him to admit his guilt,
it was decided to apply to. him techniques the KGB had employed
with Professor Frederick Barghoorn in 1963. The logic of
doing this, in light of their conviction that Nosenko would :
never break to the point of becoming completely cooperative,
is not clear from the files. Nevertheless, even while-MUrphy:-
was registering with certainty his lack of hope for a favorable
resolution, plans were drawn up fOr an "arrest," strict con-
finement and hostile interrogation. These plans are worth
quoting at length:
The operational and psychological assessments
of AEFOXTROT suggest strongly that the timing
and the staging of the "arrest," and the
physical surroundings and psychological atmo-
sphere of the detention could influence � . � .
AEFOXTROT Strongly, and if properly done,, could
go a long way towards "Setting him up" for the
interrogators. For this reason, weyish to
emphasize that apart from the purely mechanical
problems involved, every member of.. the guard
:forte will have an important part to play as
airacter.
� .
Briefly, the plot is as follows: OR the evening
of April 2 (the actual: date may yet�be moved up
Or delayed a few dayS)., a team of four or :five
security officers will pull up to the present
safehouse in a van OT panel truck. .:Three-of.
them, all unknown to Subject, will enter the
�;4,
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safehouse, will inform Subject that he is
under arrest, slap handcuffs on him, lead
him out to the van and hustle him into the
rear of it. All of this is to be done as
quickly as possible, and with an absolute
minimum of conversation.. AEFOXTROT is not
to be allowed to take anything with him, and
any questions or requests on his part are to
be completely ignored. It is anticipated -
that he will put up physical resistance and;
if necessary, the security guards already
at the house can bear a hand; however, if
possible it would be desirable that they
-stand completely apart. What we are after
in this initial scene is complete surprise,
and also to keep Subject in suspense for as
long as possible as to who is perpetrating this
outrage on him and why. Therefore, it would
be desirable for the new "hostile guards" and
the old "friendly guards" at the safehouse
not to let on that they know each other.
The van will then proceed to the Detention
House (Clinton). AEFOXTROT will remain hand-
cuffed throughout; seated in the rear.Of the
van with three guards he should be unable to
see anything of the route. The guards should
continue to ignore anything he may say; nor
should they.speak to each other an atmo-
sphere of stony and even unnatural silence is
just what we want.
Upon arrival at the Detention House, AEFOXTROT
is to strip completely and to put on prison
attire. Again, for psychological reasons, it
would be desirable to have genuine prison
clothes; failing that, coveralls and slippers
without laces, or something along those lines
will do. The senior officer at the Detention
House should play the part of "warden." He is
the one who should explain the 'prison rules"
to Subject and "assign him to his cell."
For a cell, Subject should have the smallest
room in the house. From the description, one
of the attic bedrooms SOunds about right. It
is to be.. furnished with a cot, a hard ,chair and
a slop pail. Nothing else. The window will be
grilled, and there should be a single overhead
light bulb (about 60 watts) for illumination.
This light will remain on at all times. There
should, be a screened observation window in the
cell door', .and Subject is to be under observa-
tion.at all times that he is in the cell.. There
is no need for this to be covert; in fact, we
want Subject to feel that he is under a micro-
scope. Under np circumstanCes'ShoUrd -the guard
talk to Subject, however. The prison routine is
to be 'patterned aftet.the.description provided by
Prof. Earghoorn of his stay in the KGB prison in
Lubyanka. -_Subject will be made to rise at 0600..
He will then he 'taken to the WC where he. will be
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31
allowed to empty his slop pail and wash up
(cold. water only). Meals will be brought to
him, and will follow the following pattern:.
Breakfast: weak tea (no sugar), porridge
Dinner: watery soup, macaroni or porridge,
bread, weak tea
Supper: weak tea and porridge
After the first few. days, this diet may be aug-.
mented if Subject is cooperative at the inter--
rogation sessions Subject is not to receive
any tobaccO ot.alcohol. A doctor will'be on .
call at all times if'medical treatment is
required.. There should be.a buzzer outside the
cell door so that the duty guard can summon -
help without leaving his post. ..Some provision
should be made for a half hour's outdoor exercise
once a �day, but this is not necessary for the
first few days of detention. Subject is not
allowed to lie on his cot after reveille; he,
may sit on his cot or chair... He may.retire at
2200. Every several days he will be requited
to sweep and mop his cell.
There' is to be no use of brutality, threats, or
third-degree measures Of any kind. However, if
resistance is encountered, forceJs to be used
whenever necessary during the. arrest, or to en-
force the prison regulations, .Force should 'be
applied as swiftly and efficiently and imper-
sonally as possible, without unnecessary talking,
and preferably in total silence. Specific
measures Will have to be considered for. viola-
tions of or refusal to follow the prison regula-
tions. For example', the first time Subject
tries to unstrew the light bulb, he .could be'
placed in a straitjacket for the remainder of
the night. On cleaning days, food will not be
brought to. him until he has cleaned his cell,
and so on. We do not expect Subject to be an
easy prisoner, but if we are ready to counter his
every move from the beginning, it is not likely
that he will give much trouble for very long,.
Suicide is, a.temote.possibility; constant observ-
ation and the ready availability 'of a doctor
should be adequate-safeguard:, �
It might be worth listing our objectives in the
security aspect's of Phase' -3. First of all, we
want to he sure that we take Subject by surprise,
before he tan destroy or swallow anything, or take
any defensive measures of any kind. We want.to
prevent him from escaping or from communicating
with anyone, We want te'keep him from harming
himself.1 We.want no one to know where he is
All -these Objectives Could be achieved by more
or less routine security Trieasures. On a deeper
level, we would like for Subject to be over-
whelmed by the sudden change in his fortunes;-me
want:to exploit the-shock to his system when he
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allowed to empty his slop pail and wash up
(cold water only). Meals will be brought to
him, and will follow the following pattern:.
Breakfast: weak tea (no sugar), porridge
Dinner: watery soup, macaroni or porridge,
bread, weak tea
Supper: weak tea and porridge.
After the first feW days, this diet may be aug-
mented if Subject is cooperative at the inter-
rogation sessions.. Subject is not to receive
any tobacco or. alcohol. A doctor will .be on .
call at all times if 'medical treatment is .
required. There should be a buzzer outside the
cell .door so that the duty guard can summon
help without leaving his post. Some provision
should be made for a half hour's outdoor exercise
.once a"day, but this is not necessary for. the..
first few days of detention. Subject is not
allowed to lie on his cot after reveille; he
may sit on his cot or chair. He may retire at.
22001 Every several days he will be. requited
to Sweep and mop his cell.
There is to be no use of brutality, threats; or
third-'degree measures of any kind. However, if
resistance is encountered, fOrce 'is to be Used
whenever necessary during the arrest, or to en-
force the prison regulations... Forte should be
applied. as.swiftly,and efficiently and imper-
sonally as possible, without unnecessary talking,
and preferably in total silence. Specific .
measures_will have to be considered for viola-
tions of or refusal to follow the prison regula-
tions. For example, the first time Subject
tries to unscrew the light bulb, he could be
placed in a straitjacket for the remainder of
the night. On cleaning days., food will not be
brought to. him until he has cleaned his cell,
and so on We do not expect Subject to be an
easy prisoner, but if:we are ready to counter his
every move from the beginning, it is not 'likely
that he will give much trouble for very long.'
Suicide is a remote possibility; conStant observ-
ation and the ready availability of .a doctori
should be adequate safeguard.
It might be worth listing out objectives in. the'
security. aspect's of Phase 3.: First of all, we
want to he Sure that we take Subject by surprise,
before he Can -destroy or swallow anything, or take
any defensive measures of any-kind. We want to
prevent 'him from escaping or from communicating
with anyone,- We want to keep him from harming
himself.j We want no one to know where he is
All these objectives could be.achieved by more
or less routine security measures. On a deeper
level,.we would like for Subject to be over-.
whelmedby the sudden. change in his fortunes; we
Want to exploit the shock to his system when he
;.�
�
7.)L.
7r,,71
11
3/
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learns that he was not really fooling everyone
as he thought. Particularly at first we.want
.to keep him as much in the dark as possible as
to what.went wrong, who are the new people who
arrested him, where was he taken, and above all,
what is in store for him. In the Detention
House, we want to create an atmosphere in which
he feels totally cut off from the world, trapped
in a situation from which there is no escape,
caught in a dismal trap, in which he may be stuck.
for:the rest of his life. To this end, we .
would like for him not even to hear the sound
of human speech any more than is absolutely .
necessary. The section of the hoUse, in which'
the cell is located should be sufficiently well
Shielded acoustically from the rest of-the .
house so that Subject cannot hear the sounds of
voices, laughter, ,telephone calls, comings and
goings, etc. No one should ever $o much as
smile in his presence. No one except the inter-
rogators should ever talk to him. In addition,.
it would be well if everyone behaved as if the,
Detention House were-a permanent installation and
tried to give Subject the impression (without
words) that they had been working there for
years and that he was just another nameless and
faceless prisoner brought there to rot- Although
we are ruling:out the use of threats, there is
no harm in letter [sic] Subject's imagination do
the job for us. The best way to do.thisis to
keep him from getting any cluesasto what the
true state of affairs is. 31
The above plans were modified slightly by the Office .Of
Security. The chronological record states that ". . . OS does
not want the SR Phase 3 to be carried, out as originally
planned. They desire a heated. room for SUbject, no slop_paiI;
and no aggressive arrest at 'night. They propose Subject be
lured to [safehouSe in] Clinton [Marylandr-during daylight
hours for a _poly '0)4_1141Trocessin_gj . . . Poly operator
would say that Subject was withholding'and Pete [Baglei]
would be called in." 13.
The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered
on 4 April 1964. It did not, however, take place under
standard conditions. In his report of 8�April 1964; the poly-
'graph operator stated:
During the pre-polygraph conferences with repre-
sentatives of SR Division, the Undersigned was
informed that' the polygraph interview was part
of an overall plan to help break Subject and
elicit the truth from:him. SR Division's 'instruc-
tions were that, regardless of whether Subject
passed his polygraph test OT not, ,he was to be
informed at the termination of his_poZygra,..ph
interview that he was lying and had not_passed
his pOlygraph interview. 31-2-
L
32.
^
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a P.11. 1 I
learns that he was not. really fooling everyone
as he thought. Particularly at.first wewant.
.::.to keep him as much inthe dark as.Tossible.as
to what went wrong, who �are the new people who',
arrested him.; where was he taken, and above a.1.1.
what is in store for him. in the Detention
House, we want to create an atmosphere in whith
he'feels totally cut off from the world; trapped'
in:a situation from which there Is no eStape,
caught in a dismal trap. in which hemay..be stuck::
for the rest of his life. TO this end, we
.would like for him not even -to hear the sound
of human speech any more than is absolutely-:.:
necessary. The section of the house in which'
the cell is located should be sufficiently well
Shielded acoustically from the rest of the
house so that Subject cannot hear-the sounds of
voices, laughter, telephone calls, comings and
goings, etc. No one should ever so much as
smile in his presence. No one except the inter-
rogators should ever talk to him. In addition:,:
would be well if everyone behaved as:if the
DetentiOn House were a permanent installation .and '
tried to give Subject the impression (without
words): that they ,had been working there for. ,
years and that he was just another nameless and .
-faceless prisoner brought there to. rot_ lAlthough:
we are ruling out the use of threats,. there' is
no harm in letter [sic] Subject' imagination-do:
the job for us.. The best way to do_thisis tcL.
keep him from getting any clues as to. what the:
true state .of affairsis. 31
� The above plans were modified slightly by the Office ,Of
Security. The chronological record states that ". . . OS does.
not want the SR Phase 3 to be tarried out as originally .
planned. They desire a heated room for Subject, no sloL_pail.;
and no.aggressive-arrest at 'night... They propose Subject be
lured to [safehouse in] Clinton [Maryland-IT-during daylight'
hours-for a poly -(P1:11.0 processing)� , Poly operator:
would Say that Subject was withhoIding:and Pete,[Bagley].
would be called in," 13 -
The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered
on 4 April 1964. It did not, however, take place under -
standard conditions. In his report of 8 April 1964, the poly:
graph operator stated:
0
During.the Ipre-polygraph conferences with repre-
sentatives of SR Division, the undersigned was
inforted that .the polygraph interview was part
of an overall plan to help break Subject and
elicit the truth from him. SR Division's instruc-
tions were that, regardless of whether Subject'
passed his polygraph test OT not, he was to be..
informed at the termination 61 his:polygiaph
interview that he was lying, and had not. paSsed
his pplygraph interview. -36
a P'ff,
3'2.
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if
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-- 33
8: First Polygraph Examination
To raise Nosenkots level of apprehension and reduce his
supposed defenses against the polygraph interrogation tech.-
nique, an additional Mechanism was also attached to him
which he was told was an electroencephalograph (EEG)
Murphy later told
that "Nosenko was completely Confident of the polygraph when
told that it would be used until he discovered that an
electroencephalograph was used at.the same time. The
unexpected addition of the EEG to the polygraph was successful
and materially aided the interrogators. Nosenko proved to
be an excellent reactor . . ." 47
Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the exami-
nation, the polygraph operator's. conclusions, as stated in.:
his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical:
It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject -
is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched
agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific
mission or missions.
According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the
different phases involving various pertinent
areas were covered with Subject Tolygraphically,'
Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect
and "soft." On no occasion did Subject even
attempt to volunteer any explanation of the
possible causes for his polygraph reactions_ ,
He continually denied and refused to admit that
there was anything to any of the questions which
were asked of him. When the final test queStions
were completed and a record was.obtained of all
of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature
of the challenge and probing was changed.
Subject was told that he was lying to numerous
pertinent questions and was accused of being
a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation
to the undersigned's direct accusation was:that
he could not be a dispatched agent because of
the amount of information he had volunteered to
American Intelligence.
Subject, who before and throughout testing .
reflected complete selfcontrol and composure,
now exhibited a completely different:picture.
His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered,
and his hands trembled. Prior to being con-
fronted with the Undersigned's opinion that
Subject was a dispatched agent; when Subject was
aSked on one of the last test runs (a) if he
was sent to penetrate American Intelligence, and
(b) if Subject received instruct.ions.frem KGB
on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his
answers were given in a voice that actually
trembled..
After completion of .the' interview,' the SR tepre-,
sentative at the safesite was informed., in:front
33
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-- 33 --
8: First Polygraph Examination
To raise Nosenko's level of apprehension and reduce his
supposed defenses against the polygraph interrogation tech-
nique, an additional Mechanism was also attached to him
which he was told was an electroencephalograph. (EEG)
Murphy later told (W(1)
that "Nosenko was completely confident of the polygraph when .(b)(3)
told that it would be used until he discovered that an
electroencephalograph was used at the same time. The
unexpected addition of the EEC to the polygraph was successful
and materially aided the interrogators. 'Nosenko proved, to
be an excellent reactor . . ." 47
Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the exami-
nation, the polygraph operator's-conclusions, as stated in
his report of .8 April 1964, were categorical:
It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject
is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched
agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific
mission or missions.
According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the
0, different phases involving various pertinent
areas were covered with Subject polygraphically.
Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect
and "soft." On no occasion did Subject even
attempt to volunteer any explanation of the
-possible causes for his polygraph reactions. .
He continually denied and refused to admit that
there was anything to any of the questions which
were asked of him. When the final test questions
were completed and a record was obtained of
of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature
of the challenge and probing was changed.
Subject was told that he was lying to numerous
pertinent questions and was accused of being
a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation
to the undersigned's direct accusation was that
he could not be a dispatched agent because of
the .amount of information he had volunteered to
American Intelligence.
Subject, who before and throughout testing .
reflected complete self:-control and composure,
now exhibited a completely different picture.
His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered,
and his hands trembled. Prior to being- con-
fronted with the undersigned's opinion that
Subject. was a dispatched-agent, when Subject was
asked on one of the last:test-runs (a) if-he
was sent to penetrate American Intelligence, and
(b) if Subject received instructions from �KGB
on how to-attempt -to beat the polygraph, his
answers were given in a voice that actually
trembled.
After-completion of the-interview, the SR repre-
sentative at the safesite was informed, in front
33
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responding to questions under intense cross-
examination, particularly with regard to the
sourcing of some of his information, he became
quite erratic, contradicted himself many times
.and became upset physically.
As a result of this session, we know that
Subject can be thrown off balance by aggres-
sive_gyestioniu_in those areas which 'we' know
to be important parts of the entire, KGB oper-
ation. Thus., we will continue along these
lines for several days with a specific interro-
gation plan.mapped out for each session.
At the end of the first interrogation session,
Subject noted that he had not' harmed the United
States in any way and that if we did not -
lbelieve him, he would consider going to a third
country because as he put it, "I could not
.... _ .. _
return to the USSR." When we begin-The�next
session With him, we will tell :hit that his .
statement with respect to not having harmed, the
U.S. is erroneOus." We will refer to his direct
participation in the:Barghoorn case and to the
fact. that his very mission itself is directed
against U.S. internal- security. If. he again
raises the third country approach (but, only, if
he raises it),. We will advise hit tha-Lwere he
to go to a third country at some point in the
future that country would be fully apprised to
Our information concerning his mission to the
West and the details of his personal behavior. 35
Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions .
under which the polygraph was administered cannot be ascertained
Trom.the record. Murphy simply told him that the examiner had
ohtalne_diguific...ant reactions". and-that "Subject can be
thrown off balance . . .".35. In this connection, it. is useftl
to note here that in a number of documents related to this
case, this polygraph examination is referred to as valid
evidence of NosenkO's duplicity, without giving the reader
any hint'of the unusual circumstances:surrounding it. � Even
in Bagley's lengthy study of February 1967 (commonly referred
to as "the thousand-page paper"); and the shorter "green book"
formally published in February 1968,, one finds no 'cautionary
notes. ,To put in perspective, the developments of 'this case,
both thase already reported and those still to come, we shall
therefore jump ahead briefly to quote from a formal Office of
Security report covering a review of the. 1964 examination.
The senior of the three polygraph specialists whO reviewed it
-stated his conclusions as follows, in a memoranduM dated
1 NovembeT
,Even without. the 'review .by reviewing examiners,
considered the formal report dated S April 1964
k.:tc.to have been' in error in that the conclusions
reached in the case were a gross.misinterpretation
of the extent to which the reactions.added up.
:le, � In .fact, -in,some instances the'Suhject was deemed
-) to-be lying when it is known he was telling the:
truth-. With the review by the reviewing examiners,
L can conclude only that the initial examiner did
eXattly what the requestor asked, i:e.,:he,was
, Li! LA ln :
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- 35 --
responding to questions under intense cross-
examination, particularly with regard to the
sourcing of some of his: information, he became
quite erratic, contradicted himself Many times
.and became upset physically.
As a result of this session,. we know that .
altject can be thrown off balance by aggres-
sive questioning in those areas which we know
to be iliportant parts of the entire KGB oper-
ation. Thus, we will continue along these �
lines for several days with a specific interro-
gation plan mapped out for each session.
At the end of the first interrogation session,
Subject noted that he had not harmed the United
States in any way and that if we did not �
believe him, he would Consider going to a third
country because as he put it, "I could not 7--
. .
return to the USSR.'Y When we begin-The next
session with him, we'vill tell hit that his ,
statement with respect to not having harmed the
U.S. is erroneOus. We will refer to his direct
participation in the Barghoorn case and to the
fact that his very mission itself is directed
against U.S. internal security. If he again
raises the third country approach (but only, if..
he -raises it), we will advise hit that were he
to go to a third country at some point in the �.
future that coUntry would be fully apprised to
our information concerning his mission to the
West and the details of his personal behavior. 35
� Whether Helms 'was informed of the peculiar conditions
under which the polygraph was administered cannotlpe ascertained
frot the record. Murphy.simply told him that the examiner had
"obtainejol -significant reactions" and that "Subject can be
thrown off balance . . ." 55. In this Connection, it is useful
to note here that in a number 'of documents related to this
case, this polygraph examination is referred' to as valid
evidence* of Nosenko's duplicity, without giving the reader
any hint'of the unusual circumstances surrounding it: Even
in Bagley's lengthy study of February 1967 (commonly referred
to as "the thousand-page paper"), and the, shorter "green book"
formally published in February 1968, one finds rip cautionary
notes: ,To put in perspective the developments of this case,
both those already reported and those still to .come, we shall
therefore jump ahead briefly to quote from a formal Office of
Security r,eport covering a review of the 196.4 examination.
The senior of the three polygraph specialists who reviewed it
stated his conclusions as follows, in a memorandwn dated
1 November 1966:
Even -Without the review by reviewing examiners,
considered the formal report dated S April 1964
to have been in error in that the conclusions
A\ feach ed in thecase were a gross misinterpretation
o r
of the extent to which the reactions.added up.
InJact,:i, nsome instances the Suhject-was deemed
to be lying when it is known he-was tellinLthe
truth. With the review by the reviewing examiners,
I can conclude only ha the initial examiner did
e:xttly what the requestor asked, i.e., he was
55
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-- 36 --
told to collect reactions and he did. The fact
that reactions were not conslstent (and indeed.
may not have occurred) was not important since,
it had already been decided Subject. was wrong
and the polygraph was used only to support his
decision. (These findings a dealt with more
at length in Chapter
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-- 39 --
emphasize our Willingness to keep his 'sic]
indefinitely and to heighten his tensions. 40'
�
Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case and
:was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant in
connection with the interrogations. Golitsyn was given for
analysis voluminous material relating to the Case, and was
told that "one of the most perplexing aspects of the NoSenko
case to us at the present time is not whether he was sent
(we all certainly agree with your View that he was sent on a
mission) but the exact nature of his service with the KGB." 38
Golitsyn's role will be covered more thoroughly in a separate
chapter.
To ensure cooperation in the interrogation, an "Outline
of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse to Answer
Requirements" was drawn Up on 25 August�1964. The' tenor of
this Outline, which essentially set the basic policy of the
incarceration until late 1967, is conveyed by the following.
.excerpt:
Shotld Subject refuse to answer the case officets
questions, Subject will be returned to his cell:
at a time chosen by the case officer, there will
be no further conversations between Subject and
the guards except that which is absolutely
necessary, and the case officer will notify:
Chief, SR. At the:case officer's discretion,
Subjett may lose his cigarette privileges imme-
diately. Each day for an indefinite period the
case officer will return and begin a session
With Subject. If Subject refuses each day to �
discuss the questions, he Will lose an additional
privilege in the following order: cigarettes,
table, chair, reading material, ruler, paper and
pencil. In no case; however, will any of these
privileges be removed except with the prior
approval of Chief, SR. 46
The basic policy to be followed during interrogations was
outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum of 2 November
1964, Like all other documents on this subject, it assumed
that Nosenko was lying and had to be "trapped'!:
How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject
will initially be confronted only, by interro-
gators already known to him. They will begin
detailed and apparently routine questioning on
carefully selected operations or other aspects
of the 1960-1962 period.. This time, however,
the interrogators will be prepared.to stick .
doggedly to the particular subject. -They will
probe deeper and deeper for detail, never
allowing Subject to dismiss them with su:ch
statements as "that is the way it was"-or "that
is all I' remember." We would prefer to begin
in this way so that Subjeet will already be
under pressure,_cornered and in trouble by the'
time he realizes that this is not .a:routine
questioning but the climax of his long period
of detention. In view Of Subject's personality,
one psychologistlielieves that Subject Would:
otherwise' welcome this :.climax 'and Sharpen his
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evr-prq--r.
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V;1
-- 39 --
-emphasize our Willingness to keep his [sic]
indefinitely and to heighten his tensions... 40
Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case and
-AAra.s being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant in
connection with the interrogations'. Golitsyn was given for
analysis voluminous material relating to the case, and was
told that "one of the most perplexing aspects of the Nosenko
case to �us at the present. time is not Whether he waS sent
(we all certainly agree with your view that he was sent on a
mission) but the exact nature of his service with the KGB." 38:
Golitsyn's role will be covered more thoroughly in a separate
chapter.
To ensure cooperation in the interrogation, an "Outline
of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse to AnsWer
Requirements" was.drawn up on 25 August 1964. The tenor of
this Outline,- which essentially set the basic policy of the
incarceration until late 1967, is conveyed by the following
excerpt:
Should Subject refuse to answer the case officers
questions, Subject will be returned to his cell
at a time chosen by the case officer, there will
be no further conversations between Subject and
the guards except that which is absolutely
necessary, and the case officer will notify.
Chief, SR. At the case officer's discretion,
Subject may lose his cigarette privileges imme-
diately. Each day:for an indefinite period the
case officer will return and begin a session
with Subject. If Subjett refuses each day to
discuss the questions, he will lose an additional
privilege in the following order: cigarettes, '
table, chair, reading material, ruler, paper and
pencil. In no case, however, will any of these
privileges be removed except with the prior
approval of Chief, SR: 46
The basic policy to be followed during interrogations was
outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum of 2 November
1964. Like all other documents on this subject, it assumed
that Nosenko was lying and had to be "trapped":
How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject
will .initially be confronted only by interro-
gators already known to .him. They will begin.
detailed and apparently routine questioning on
carefully selected operations Or other aspects
of the 1960-1962 period. This time, however,.
the interrogators will be prepared.to stick .
doggedly to the particular Subject_ They will
probe deeper and deeper for detail, never �
allowing Subject to dismiss them with such
statements as "that is the way it was" or "that
is all I remember." We would prefer�tO begin
in this way so that Subject will already be
under pressure, cornered and in trouble by the
time he realizes :that this is not 'a:routine
questioning but the climax of his long period
of detention. In view of Subject's personality,.
one' psychologist believes.that.Subject would:
otherwise welcome this climax and sharpen his
4q
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JAL
-- 40 --
wits for a final battle to hoodwink us and.
regain his freedom.
Position Into Which Subject is to be Put: Once
Subjec-Lhas been trapped and cornered a few
times, the basic theme of the interrogation
will be put to him. He has protested his Sin-
cerity and desire to convince us of his truth
He must do this.now;,otherwise �he is here to
stay. . He can only talk his way out by convincing
us. In fact, he has shown in the present session
and over the past months that he is unable to
support his legend. He simply does not know the
facts that anyone in his alleged position would
have to know. We will confront him with our
collateral knowledge, and insist that he answer
our questions and prove his point. As he
repeatedly fails to do so, he will be repeatedly
accused of lying and of proving What we already
know: that the entire service in the American
Department was a clumsy fabrication, and he
must confess it in order to get out.
Interrogation Guides: We will identify every
detailed weakness, contradiction-and.omissiOn in -
his stories, line them up with care according to �
priorities designed for maximum impact on Subject,
and prepare interrogation briefs accordingly .
The Question of Attacking Him. Personally or
Placing the Blame on his KGB Suariors: In plan-
ning this interrogation we have examined two
alternative methods of approach: (1)� to attempt.
to destroy his own self-confidence by attacking'
him personally, exploiting our knowledge of his
weaknesses and misbehavior, or (2) to pin the
ultimate blame on his superiors', who sent him
out under serious misapprehensions and with
inadequate briefing. Psychologists who have .
examined Subject agree that he is pathologically
self-centered. Since his own pride and his
illusions of infallibility may constitute his
last bulwark of self-protection, he may resist
us more doggedly in this area than any other.
The, other course seems best. As he intreasingly,
fails to answer our questions, we will point out
to him the inadequacy of his briefing and the
stupidity and fraud of which he has been, made a
victim. We will confront him with actual incidents
which he must know aboutand then ask him for
details. .Over and over. again, we will demonstrate
and emphasize how inadequate his training and pre-
paration was: We-will demonstrate to Subject
:that the KGB consciously and callously sent him .
on an impossible mission and purposefully deceived
him about the information that Subject himself
considers the most important to .the establishment
of his bona fides . . . 49
The possible outcomes foreseen as a result of the interrogation
were also based on the assumption that'he had been lying about
his reasons for coming to us:
Full Success: If Subject confesses fully, he will
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41
have broken-with the KGB: and will become depen-
dent upon us for his security and well-being.
After full debriefing and establishment of bona
fides he will presumably be returned to a con-
ventional,safehouse and a life similar to the
January to April 1964 period in which he will
be permitted to go .out with .a security escort .
while we continue his exploitation and plan his
future.
VI
Partial Success: If Subject makes significant
admissions and falls back on a second level .
cover story, he will be kept in the present
safehouse. His:personal circumstances and
intensity of interrogation will be determined
by the situation obtaining at that time.
Failure: If the interrogation fails, we would
plan to put him "on ice" for a period, then:
interrogate- him again. For this interim period,
Subject would be transferred to visibly more
permanent and more secure quarters From the .�
makeshift physical set up of his present quarters,
the large number of guards who rotate weekly and
the round-the-clock visual observation by two.
guards, it is obvious to Subject that his, quarters
(and therefore his situation) is temporary. As
long as he knows this, he can hope.. Our only
hope of breaking Subject will be to allow him
to convince himself that he.has got into a situ-
ation from which he can extricate himself only
by cooperating. This could be best achieved by
breaking sharply.with the present situation,
placing him in permanent quarters, preferably
remote and more primitive than his present
quarters, physically secure and resembling jail,
and capable of being manned by a minimum of .
guard personnel' who would hot keep him under
constant direct.visual observation. No Head-
quarters case. officer would visit him, until he
has given sign that he has changed his mind.
This period would last for several months,
pending another attempt to break him based on �
information obtained in the interim, 49
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-- 51 --
and that the, time has come to. prepare Subject
for his move to the ostensibly permanent -
-detention site . . It will be ready for
occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI I(.&(-1/41)
visited the site on 11 June and reports' that
the installation is excellent from eve_Ly ppint
of view. 63
Before returning the memorandum to Murphy, Helms penned
d marginal note next to the above paragraph:. '.'" would like'
both you and JA [Angleton] to.examine this site." 63
If Helms had had any doubt aboUt the site's suitability,
he must have been reassured by a .28 July 1965 memorandum
addressed to -him by the Director of Security, Howard Osborn:
On Tuesday; 27 July; the Chief, CI Staff, the
Chief, SR Division and the undersigned visited
ISOLATION to inspect the newly�constructed .
special detention facility there.. As you know,
while it is planned to utilize this facility to .
hold AEFOXTROT for an indefinite period, it has
a long-range potential 'in :fulfilling a need:'
which has always existed for a maximum security
site in an area completely under Agency .control,
We not only inspected the site and its surround-
ings but also the building itself and the security
safeguards that have been included in its con-
struction . . . This represents the first time
that the Agency has' constructed an operational
I1 detention facility based on actual operating
/1 experience and needs and it is our opinion that
iwe have come close to achieving the ultimate
both in utility as well as security.64
By mid-August, the time had come for Nosenko's transfer.
The events surrounding it are recounted in a 19 August 1965
memorandum for the record:
As planned; after Ted [Deryabin] had concluded.
his interrogation of Subject on the afternoon of
13 August, Pete Bagley had 'a brief "confrontation
scene" with Subject on the same.evening,.immedi-
ately prior to his removal to new quarters. The
purpose of this session was not to deliver a new
Message of any-sort, or to give Subject ''another
chance to_confess"; everything that could be.
said had .already been said by Ted and the pre-
vious interrogators, and there was no doubt that
Subject understood perfectly well the meaning
and importance of what had been said-to him; also,
it was recognized that Subject' would sense an
impending move or change of some sort, and that
it was inevitable that he would hope that the
change would be for the better until he saw
otherwise. The purpose of the confrontation was
rather to close the circle: to. show him that
although .Bagley had tiOt seen him for over a year
nothing :had changed, and nothing would change
until he told the truth. An additional effect
would be to emphasize that the interrogators who
had worked with him in the interim were fully
respohSible-and authoritative, and that just as.
(;74-
1;j:17
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and that the time has come to. prepare Subject
for his move to the ostensibly permanent
detention site . . It will be ready for
occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI (1::/lgal4-4).
yisited the site on 11 June and reports that
the installation is excellent from evelly point
of view. 63
Before returning the Memorandum to Murphy, Helms penned
a marginal note next to the above paragraph: "I would like
both you and:JR [Angleton] to examine this site." 63
If Helms had had any doubt about the site's suitability,
he must have been reassured by a .28 July 1965 memorandum
addressed to him by the Director of Security, Howard Osborn:
On Thesday, 27 July, the Chief, CI Staff, the
Chief, SR.Division and the undersigned visited
ISOLATION to inspect the newly constructed
special detention facility there. As you know,
while it is planned to utilize this facility to
hold AEFOXTROT for an indefinite period, it has
a long-range potential in fulfilling a need
which has always existed for a maximum security
site in an area completely under Agency .control.
We not only inspected the site and its surround-
ings but also the building itself and the security
safeguards that have been included in its con-
struction . . This represents the first time
that the Agency has constructed an operational
4 detention facility based on actual �operating
experience and needs and it is our opinion that.
we have come close to achieving the ultimate
both in utilit)' as well as security.-64
By mid-August,. the time had come for Nosenko's transfer.
The events surrounding it are recounted in 'a 19 August 1965
memorandum for the record:
As 'planned', after Ted [Deryabin] had concluded
his interrogation of Subject on the afternoon of �
13 August, Pete Bagley had a brief "confrontation'
scene" with Subject on the same evening, .immedi-
ately prior to his removal to new 'quarters. The �
purpose of this session was not to deliver a new
message of any sort, or to give Subject'"another-
chance to. confess"; everything that could be.
said had .already been said by Ted and the pre-
vious interrogators, and there was no doubt that
Subject understood perfectly well. the meaning.'
and. importance of what had been said to. him;, also;
it was recognized that Subject' would sense an
impending move or change of some sort, and that
it was inevitable that he would hope that the.
Change would be for the better until he saw .
otherwise. The purpOse of the confrontation was
rather to close the circle: to show him that
.although Bagley had Jiot seen him for over a year
nothinglaad changed,: and nothing would .change
until he told the truth...An additional effect
would be to emphasize that the interrogators who
had. wotked:with him in the interim were fully.
responsible and authoritative, and that just as.
.57
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pot 15es 5792 - ivus.5_57
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-- 56
The new detention facility, code-named LOBLOLLY,:thad
been designed and staffed With the intention .of engendering
in Nosenko a feeling of hopelessness, from which the only
escape would be through confession .that he was a KGB agent
and revelation Of the full details Of how he had been
briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities. With the
exception of being allowed certain books, carefully selected
for hiM by the Covert Action Staff of. SR Division, Nosenko
was confined under, conditions which were as close to stimulus-
free as was consistent with maintaining him in gob(' physical
:health. For example, the TV used by the guards was fitted
with earphones, so that there was no risk of his overhearing
snatches of dialogue. Bagley was assured, in answer to' an
inquiry, that "while he does note planes going' overhead as
well as animal noises from the woods during exercise periods,
everything else . . . is excluded." As to the guards', if
Nosenko were to attempt to open conversation with them on
any subject, "the guards should instruct him in rude terms to
shut up." 61
* * * .* * � *
At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment .
how the period which follows is to be covered. Because there:
were long periods of time when no human being. other than the
guards was in contact �With Nosenko, and because he was not
allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn atLOBLOLLY
from August 1965 to October 1967 does not lend itself easily
to narrative presentation.
Yet this period cannot be ignored: It constituted over
.half of Nosenkq's solitary confinement. And that three-and--
a-half-year period amounts to five percent of the total life
span of.a man OW lives to be 70.
Obviously, then, this period will in the
findings made at the conclusion of our study. For these -
findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as
much empirical evidence as can be gathered... Because the effect
on Nosenko.of.this long period of confineMent can only be
dealt with speculatively, such few remarks as we have on
that subject will be confined to the relatively discursive
chapter on "PsychologiCal and Medical Findings." -Within the
body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage
of the main recorded .events, none of which are seen through ,
the eyes of Nosenkohimself. In addition, as a special annex,
we have provided.excerpts from the daily "morning reports"
to SR/SB Division, which may give some feel for how the
prisoner reacted and behaved on a day-to-day basis. These
reports cover minutiae, such as the frequency.of bowel move-
ments;but the very fact that such matters were worthy of
recording may 'serve to give us some insight into the sUbjec-
tive experience of Nosetko's confinement. It was of just
such details that his life primarily consisted, and not to
report them would' be to distort reality. -
.We now resUme our narrative.
* * * * * * * *
On 13 August 1.965; before Nosenko was locked intb his,
cell fox the firSt:time, he was .read the following instructions
which outlined the basic rules to be followed from then on:
-77 in 7,-,
� �
CAo
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Approved for Release: 2019/06/25 C06775695,,,,
-- 56
The new detention facility, code-named LOBLOLLY, had.
been designed and staffed With the intention of engendering
in Nosenko a feeling Of hopelessness, from which the only
escape would be through confession that he was a KGB agent
and revelation of the full details Of how he had been
briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities. With the
exception of being allowed certain books, carefully selected
for him by the Covert Action Staff of. SR Division, Nosenko
was confined under conditions which were as close to stimulus-
'free as was consistent with maintaining him in good physical
,health. For example, the TV used by the guards was fitted
with earphones, so that there was no risk of his overhearing
snatches of dialogue. Bagley was assured, in answer to. an
inquiry, that "while he does note planes going overhead as
well as animal noises from the woods during exercise periods,
evrything else . . . is excluded." As to the guards, if
Nosenko' were to attempt to open conversation with them on
any subject., "the guards should instruct him in rude terms to
shut 61
* * * * * �' *
At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment
how the period which follows is to be covered. Because there
were long periods of time when no human being other than the
guards was in contact with Nosenko, and because he was. not
allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn at LOBLOLLY
from August 1965 to October 1967 does not lend itself easily
to narrative presentation. .
Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted over
half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that three-and-
a-half-year period amounts to five percent of the total life
span of a man who lives to be 70.
Obviously, then, this period will in the
findings made at the conclusion of our study. For these
findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as
much empirical evidence as can be gatherecL Because the effect
on Nosenko of this long period of confineMent can only be'
dealt with speculatively; such few remarks as we have on
that subject will be confined to the relatively discursive
chapter on "Psychological and Medical Findings." Within the
body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage '
of the main recorded events, none of which are seen through
the eyes of Nosenko himself. In addition, as a special annex,
we have provided excerpts from the daily "morning reports"
to sg/sB Division, which may give 'some feel for how the
prisoner reacted and behaved on a day-to-day basis. These
reports cover minutiae, such as the frequency.of bowel move-
ments; but the very fact that such matters were worthy of
recording may serve to give us some insight into the subjec-
tive experience-of Nosenko's confinement. .It was of just
such details that his life primarily consisted, and not to
report them would be to distort'reality.
.We now resume our narrative.
* * * *' * * � * * �
On 13 August 1965; before Nosenko was.locked into his .
cell far .the firstHtime, he was .read the following instructions
which outlined the basic rules to be'followed from then on:
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'
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Cell
This is your cell. You are to keep it Clean and
will be given cleaning materials for this-, purpose.
Reading Privilege
You will �be permitted one �book a week which you
may retain in your cell.
Smoking Privilege
You will receive a daily cigarette ration
Exercising Privilege
Every day, weather and other factors permitting,
you will have an exercise period.
Writing Material
Writing material will be provided only for
correspondence with the appropriate authorities
concerning your confession.
Schedule
This priSon operates on a schedule. You -will become
familiar with this schedule and adhere.to:dt at all
times. 65
Within the framework of the above rules, Which Were
.strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading the
one book per week which he was at first. allowed. Jie did not
even have the distraction of being questioned, for, when
queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Murphy stated that nO
one from SR Division had seen Nosenko since the beginning of
his confinement there, five months earlier. 70
On l_November 1965, his privileges began to be reduced,
for reasons that .are not always clear from the record. From
�that date on, for instance, he no longer received books to
read, and for minor acts of indiscipline, soap, towel and.
tooth brush were temporarily denied him.
Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko
to be suffering from auditory hallucinations. In a
dated 18 February 1966,- Murphy reported:
. . . There are hopeful signs that the isolation
is beginning to have an effect on Subject. JDr.
Bohrer's visit may have had further impact in
this direction when Dr. Bohrer told Subject that
his visit constituted an "annual" physical exam;
as. he left Subject's room, Dr,. BOhret also remarked,
"Iill-see:you next year." Subject's reaction was
visibleJ
No we have just received further cbnfirmation of
the development 'of Subject's. attitude. ' On. the
evening of 16 February...1966', he shouted :for a--feW
seconds in English, apparently to guards, that he
would commit suicide and,kept'repeating, "You'll
see. You'll see." .He asked to see the local
0-1
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claimed �
memotandum
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i
I
-- 57 --
Cell
This is your cell. You are to keep it clean- and
will be given cleaning materials for this. purpoSe._
Reading Privilege
You will be permitted one book a week which you
may retain in your cell.
Smoking Privilege
You will receive a daily cigarette ration.
.Exercising Privilege
Every day, weather and other factors permitting,
you will have an exercise period
Writing Material'
�
Writing material will be provided-only for
correspondence with the appropriate authorities
concerning your confession.:
Schedule
This prison operates on a schedule. .YOuwill become.
familiar with this schedule and adhere to'it at.all
times., 65
Within the framework of the above rule's, which were
.strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading the
one book per week which he was at first allowed. He did not
even have the distraction of being questioned, fer, when
queried by Helms on 12 January 1966MutRhy_stated thaf-no
one from SR Division had seen Nosenko since the-geginning_of
his confinement there, five months earlier. 70
' On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be reduced,
for reasons that are not always clear from the record. From
that date on, for instance, he no longer received .books to
�read, And for minor acts of indiscipline, soap, towel and
tooth brush were temporarily denied him.
Some time in January or Febtuaty 1966, Nosenko Claited.
to be suffering from auditory hallucinations. In a memorandum
dated 18 February 1966, Murphy reported:
. . There are 'hopeful signs that the isolation
is beginning to have an effect on Subject.
Bohrer's visit may have had further impact in
this direction when Dr. Bohrer,told Subject that
his visit constituted. an "Annual" physical exam;
as he left Subject's room, Dr. Bohrer also remarked,
"I'll see you next year." Subject's reaction was
visible.)
Now we have just received further confirmation of
the development of Subjects attitude. On the
evening of; 16 February .196.6, he shouted for a few
seconds in English, apparently to .guards, that he
would commit suicide and kept repeating, "You'll
see. You'll see." He asked to see the local
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-- 58
"doctor" (he has been told that the medical.
technician at the. base is a.doctot), but the
guards told him it was too late in' the evening.
When the technician came the following day,
17 February, Subject talked at some length �
-about his worries that he might be going mad.
He has repeatedly stressed his belief that he
.is 'being drugged,. but said on this occasion
that he recognized that.there'are no drugs
'designed to make a person mad. Consequently.;
he said, he was concerned about the fact that
during the past day or two he had heard voices
emanating from various objects, such as 'his shoe
and his spoon, the engine of an aircraft over
head, and 'a' bird in a nearby tree. When
questioned, he said that the voices were saying
in English "first die" While the bird was
saying "kid." He asked if the "dottor" con-
sidered him insane.: He was told that he did
not appear to be so,,, upon which he reiterated
his worries and spoke of, his desire to die_
He expressed his recognition that his present
circumstances do not afford means to commit
suicide. 71
Nosenko's alleged hallucinations, triggered a special
meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum for
the record, written by Atherton Noyes of SR/CI,'is worth
quoting in its entirety:
Representatives of SR Division, the Office of., -
Security, and the Medical Staff met, in the SR
Conference Room from approximately 1400 to 1430
.hours this date to discuss recent incidents in
Nosenko's behavior and a forthcoming examination
of Nosenko by Dr. Present from SR -
were Mr. Bagley, Mr. Karpovich'and the undersigned,
while the Office of SeOrity was represented by
MT. Jack Bauman and.Mr. Joe Langan, and the
V)/ ,j Medical Staff by Doctors Bohrer and
The undersigned entered the conference Room after
distussions had begun, so some of the initial
remarks are not noted here.
.Dr. Bohrer first described to those present 'his .
examination of Nosenko on 21 January 1966 and
.stated his-opinion, based on observations made
at that time, that the recent outbursts by Nosenko
and his threats of suicide are aIl contrived and
do not represent an involuntary reaction on his
part. Nosenko's recent-behavior started with
suicide threats, then progressed to auditory
hallucinations, and has now reached the.' stage
where every inanimate object in his envirOnment;
including the trees and the wind outdOors, are
talking to him. Doctor Bohrer expressed his view
that, if Nosenko actually does hear voices, it
could normally be expected that they would speak
to him in his native language, rather tharLin
English as he told the .base medical technician
duringa recent visit. �Nosenko apparently now
realizes this (Bohrer didn't describe how, but
presumably the technician commented on it to
cV
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"doctor" (he has been, told that the medical
technician at the. base is a doctor); but the
guards told him it was too late in the evening.
When the technician came the following day,
17 February, Subject talked at some length
about his worries that he might be going mad.
He has repeatedly stressed his belief that he
is being drugged, but said on this occasion
that he recognized that there are no drugs
designed to make a person mad. Consequently,
he said, he was concerned about the fact that
during the past day or two he had heard voices
emanating from various objects, such as his shoe
and his spoon, the engine of an aircraft Over-
head., and a bird in a nearby tree. When
questioned, he said that the voices were saying
in.English "first die" while .the bird was
saying "kid." He asked if the "doctor" con-
sidered him insane. He was told that he did
not appear to be so, upon which he reiterated
his worries and spoke of his desire to-die.. .
He expressed his recognition that his present �
circumstances do not afford means to commit
suicide. 71
Nosenko's alleged hallucination's triggered a special
meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum for
the record, written by Atherton Noyes of SR/CI, is worth
quoting in its entirety:
Jy
fyi
Representatives ,of SR Division, the Office of
Security, and the Medical Staff met in the SR
.Conference Room from approximately 1400 to .1430
hours this date to discuss recent incidents in
Nosenko's behavior and a forthcoming examination
of Nosenko by Dr. , Present from SR
were Mr. Bagley, Mr. Karpovich-and the undersigned,
while the Office of Security was represented by
Mr. Jack Bauman and Mr. Joe Langan,
Medical Staff by Doctors ,Bohrer and
The undersigned entered the. Conference Room after
discussions had begun, so some of the initial
remarks are not noted here.
Dr. Bohrer first described to those present. his
examination of Nosenko on 21 January 1966 and
stated his opinion, based on observations made
at that time that -the recent outbursts by Nosenko
and his threats of suicide are all contrived and
do not represent an involuntary reaction on his
part. Nosenko's recent behavior' started. with.
suicide threats, then progressed to auditory
hallucinations, and has now reached the, stage
where every, inanimate object in his environment,
including the trees and the wind .outdoors, are
talking to him. Doctor Bohrer expressed' his view
that, if Nosenko actually does hear voices, it
could normally be expected thatthey would speak
to him in his native language; rather.thail-in
English as he told the, pase medical technician-
during a recent visit. Nosenko apparently now
realizes this (Bohrer didn't describe how; but
presumably the �technician commented on it to
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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,;YrAT4',
.21
Nosenko) and Nosenko, in Behrer's opinion, has
now picked this up and is trying to recoup by
saying that he now does 'everything in English
-- think, speak, everything.
At this point, Mr. Bagley described Nosenko's
'recently begun word games, in which he takes -a
Russian word and then figures out. as many root
derivations as possible, as an illustration of.
how ridiculous Nosenko's claim is,
Dr. Bohrer continued to say that Nosenko is now
agreeing to take medication and is asking for
additional medication to help raise his spirits.
Dr. Bohrer has told the base medical technician
not to answer Nosenko directly, but to "let it
be known" .to Nosenko that the medication he is -
now receiving will help him out in this respect.
Dr. Bohrer then repeated that he thinks that
Nosenko is reacting to his isolation, his lack
of.human contact, and his environment, - but that
he is responding in a planned, contrived; and
non-spontaneous way, from a-psychiatric point Of
view. Dr. Bohrer added.that.the only thing that
is worrying him at present concerning Nosenko
is his possible urinary problem, which is now
being looked into. � '
Mr. Bagley next explained to those present that
Nosenko's current behavior is consistent with
our knowledge of Soviet training in techniques.
of resisting.interrogation.and imprisonment.
However, because of intelligence and cunning
(although he has a. fair share of each), Nosenko.
has made some mistakes. Mr. Bagley agreed that
Nosenko is probably feeling the effects of iso-
lation and is making this try to get out.. When
he finds that this doesn't work, he may eventually
decide "to hell with it" and start to talk.
Speaking to Dr. Mr. Bagley Said that (W(3)
he and Dr'. Bohrer .a.ree:that, should Nosenko
raise the issue of his alleged insanity.during
the upcoming examination, the best response
should be to the effect that, if Nosenko actually
is going out of his head, the best possible thing
for him. is isolation, lots of rest, and -a place
where he can't hurt himself. This is what is
usually prescribed and this is, in fact, the situ-
ation Nosenko already enjoys. 'Mr. Bagley added
.that the wording.of any such.response would, of.
course, be up to Dr. Bohrer.
In support. of .the_above, D. Bohrer then said that
he had gone over things very .carefully during his.
January visit and, on this basis, can see no baSic
change in Nosenko. When Dr. Bohrer arrived at .
the site he had remarked that he had come for:
Nosenko's annual physical examination and:when he
was leaving he. told:-.NoSenko that he mould see him.
again next year. In Dr. Bohret's opinion, Nosenko
reacted to-thiSby saying to himself: 9-low can I
get out of here?" He has apparently decided that
the best way to escape his present.situation-is to
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-Pn7
MV .C,
be sick with 'something that Can't be handled
locally and,then:it. will be necessary for
him to be moved to a hospital. Dr. Rohrer
said that, fram,Nosenka's point of view, any
change will be for the better and agreed with
Mr. Bagley that it is important to indicate
that there will be none. The simple statement
suggested by Mr.. Bagley may give Nosenko the
.
message and no further explanation is necessary.
MT. Bauman then asked if, under conditions of
prolonged confinement, there is .not a chance
that a person actually will go off his rocker.
Dr. Bohrer replied that this is absolutely so,
that this happens in many cases under less
stringent conditions of imprisonment, and that
the person usually improves quickly when these�
conditions are relaxed. Dr. Bohrer does not
believe'however that Nosenko fits in this cate,-
gory.
Mr. Bautan then asked what sort of behavior can
be expected in a person who is actually So
affected by his imprisonment. Whether-he could
be expected to become violent or behave errati-
cally. Mr.. Bauman Said that he was asking this
question from the point: of view of his respon-
sibilities for guarding Nosenko. Dr: Bohrer
replied that such behavior Can take almost any
fort, that there may be changes in physical
behavior, eating and sleeping habits, etc- He.,
added that there certainly has been a caange in
Nosenko since the Janualy 1966, examination�
that he doesn't know :for certain what it means,
and that there surely is a risk that he May:go
out of his head. Mr. Bagley pointed out that
Dr. Bohret's remark about the "annual physical"
may have triggered this reaction. Dr. Bohrer
agreed, saying that while he cannot dismiss true
insanity as a real possibility, he doesn't think
that this is what is going on right now. -
Thi by .a discussion between Dr. Bohrer,
Dr. Mr. Bagley, and Mr. � Bauman con-
cerning t e scheduling of Dr. Borcherding's Visit.
Mr: Bagley said that he and the undersigned! would
like to go along and Dr. Bohrer said he would
like to be present too. It was decidedthat
Tuesday., 1 March, would be most convenient for all
concerned and Mr. Bauman said he would arrange for
air transportation and a vehicle directly to the
site. Mr. Bauman will eitherJly down with the
rest or will meet them there;
Mr. Bauman next commented that Nosenko is again
asking for reading material and asked MT. Bagley
if he wanted to give him any. 'Mr. Bagley replied
,absolutely not and Dr: Bohrer concurred that no
,changes should be made. MT. Bauman then_asked
whether Nosenko has any sort of skin disease,
pointing out that the :guards have to wash his
shirts two or three times to get-them.clean.. Both
dpctors .said that Nosenko is not afflicted i as far
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s. tk-r3p77,(97.,:- T. .-.;?,FE
-- 61 -_
as they 'know and Mt. Bauman asked whether iit is
still policy that Nosenko is to have a clean
change Of clothes only once a week. . Dr. Rohrer
expressed the opinion that nothing should be.
changed, at least until after the examination
on T Match.
Dr. Bohrer remarked that..things are bound to .
change as:far as Nosenko is concerned -- he is: .
. either going to stop faking or things will get
worse.. Mr.Bagley added that We (SR) are woxking-
:hard on other sources of .information, that things
seem optimistic right now, and that this is no
time to falter. HO added that Mr. Helms is
keeping current of the situation and goes along
fully .with present plans, without changes.
Mr. Karpovich asked Dr. .Bohter what medication
Nosenko is now receiving.: .Bohrer replied that he
is getting 1/4 of a grain of phenobarbital
together with an antispasmodic (for gas); which
won't have any medical effect on Nosenko's mental
.state. This is why, he explained, he had insttUcted
the base technician to let Nosenko. know that the
medication will help hit: It can have no real
effect and if Nosenko suddenly improves, this will:
be.added'confirmation that he is faking. 72
On 1 MaTh_la66_.�Ba_gleyand_Noyes_accompanied Doctors
Bohreran.cL jo LOBLOLLY for another examination of
Nosenko, -Conducted: the examination, while the
other members of t e party observed it on a television- screen.
None of the fOur men gave much.eredence to Nosenko's claim.
of hearing voices, but Noyes recorded an evolution of the
Situation: .
Though Nosenko's mental difficulties are apparently
a sham. it is also evident that there has been a
change in his outlook since SR last had direct
contact with him in August 1965, If by nothing
else, .this is evidenced by the single fact that he
-.has taken 'a new tack in his relationship with CIA:
He has apparently _given up hope that his legend.
QI "another source". can help hilt escape his pre-
dicament and, as Dr...Bohrer earlier proposed; is
using his "voices" (except for which Nosenko Claims
to be sane) to_force sgme sort of change_ For the
first time �in the undersigned's recollection,'
�Nosenko said that he noW.knows that his CIA handling
Officers will never (Nosenko's emphasis) believe
him because of his behavior .and for other reasons,
and that there is nothing he can do about it.. Rut',
beyond this, 'it is difficult to interpret the -
significance of his remarks and behavior during:
Dr. interview -- on one hand there
were indications of deterioration. on the other
Nosenko is an astute actor. Who was clearly playing
a role:for Dr. .3earing�in mind that
these superficial indications may well be:a part
of this act,. Nosenko appeared far more subdued,
almost despondent, Compared with six months ago.'
For most of. the interview, he slouched or Sat
listlessly in:his chairandonly seldom did helean:-
forward and, by" the motions of his .hands, attempt
r
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as they know and Mr. Bauman asked whether,it is
still policy that Nosenko is to have a clean
change of clothes only once a week. . Dr. Bohrer
expressed the opinion that nothing should be
changed, at least-until after the examination
on 1 March.
Dr. Bohrer remarked tha.t.things are bound to
'change as far as Neseriko-is concerned -- he is
either going to stop faking or things will get
worse. Mr. .Bagley added that We (SR) are working
hard on other sources .of information, that things
seem optimistic right now, and that this is no
time to falter. He added that Mr. Helms is
keeping current of the situation and goes along
fully with present plans, without changes.
Mr. Karpbvich asked Dr. Bohrer what medication
Nosenko is now receiving. Bohrer replied that he
' is getting 1/4 of a grain of phenobarbital _
together with an antispasmodicJfer gas), which
won't have any medical effect on Nosenko's mental
state. This is why, he explained, he had -instructed
the base technician to let Nosenko know that the '
medication will help him. It can have no real
effect and if Nosenko suddenly improves this will
beaddedconfirmation that he is faking ..:72 -
On I March 1966, Bagley and Noyes accompanied Doctors
RahreT;anA�Rorclierdin. j0 LOBLOLLY for another examination of:
Nosenkp, conducted: the examination, while the
other item ers o e party observed it on a television screen
Nene of the four men gave much Credence to Nosenko's claim
of hearing voices, but Noyes recorded an evolution of the
Situation:
Though NosenWs_mental_ difficulties are apparently
i�ShaM,jt- is also evident that there has been A -
change in his outlobk since SR last had direct
contact with him in August 1.965 by nothing,
else, this is evidenced by the single fact that he
.has taken ,a new tack in his relationship with
He has apparentll_given up hope that his lend'
Qr "another source" can help.him escape his-pre-
dicament and, as Dr. Bohrer earlier proposed, is'.
using his "voices" (except for which Nosenko Claims
to be sane) to force_some-sort:of change, For the
first time in the undersigned's recollection,
Nosenko said that 'he new knows that his CIA handling
officers will never (Nosenko's emphasis) believe
.him because of-lais behavior and for other reasons,
and that there is' nothing he can 4o about :it.- But,
beyond this, it is difficult to interpret the
significance of his remarks and behavior during:
Dr, interview, -- on one hand there
were indications of deterioration; on the other
Nosenko is an _who_ was_clearly playing
a roIe:for Dr. . Tearing in mind that
these superfica in icatiens may well be a part
of this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued,-
almost despondent, Compared with six months ago.
For most 'of' the interview, he slouched ,or Sat '
listlessly in his chair and only seldom did he lean-,
forward and, by the motions of his hands, attempt
/
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.flE1717T
-- 62
to reach and to secure the understanding and
'belief of:the- interviewer. There appears to be
a_slight_deterioration.in.his_English-JanguAgp
fluency _(see transcript below) and his replies
were broken by frequent pauses, incomplete
.sentences, and confusing revisions. 73 .
Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two
letters to Bagley, written in Mid-April 1966 (although incor-
rectly dated, because by now his Calculation of the passage
of time was no longer completely accurate). The first, and
briefer of the two, read:
I ask you to excuse Me for my baseness in 1962
and 1964. Now I have completely realized all
my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past
I want to live an exclusively honest and modest
life and I am ready to work in whatever place
that it may be possible, taking into account
my knowledge of Soviet Russia, I.believe that
I have sufficient strength to live only a real
life.
I ask you to help me_ 75
. The second letter. was even more self-accusatory, and Was:
clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted from
prisoners in the Soviet- Union. It began:
My despicable behaviour from the beginning
of my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to
it being necessary to Create. special conditions
for me and to assist me, which has finally
helped me to realize all my delinquencies and
mistakes and to reevaluate all my past "life."
I should have honestly told you everything .
about myself, about my moral principles and
my life in Soviet Russia in order.to start a
conscientious life in June 1962. 75
This letter next summarized Nosenko's.career from child-
hood .until his arrival in the United States, and admitted that.
although he had been documented "erroneously" as a lieutenant
colonel he had actually :never held a Military tank higher -
than captain in the KGB. It concluded:
Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding
period of my degradation.-- drunkenness,
debauchery, baseness, and falsehood.
I should. have told you all about this. in
1962 Or in 1964,. before flying to America.
I stated my life in the United States of
AffteTiaa absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour
was base, dirty, and boorish,
'Tbecreation of.isolated.living conditions
and the appropriate assistance were necessary
for me. ]31.11 1 Was unable to: honestly and
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-- 62 --
t6 reach and to secure the understanding and
belief of:the interviewer. There appears to be
a slight deterioration in .his English-language
fluency (see transcript below) and his replies
were broken by frequent pauses, incomplete
sentences; and Confusing.revisions. 73 .
Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two.
letters to Bagley, written in mid-April 1966 (although incor-
rectly dated, because by now his calculation of the passage
of time was no longer completely accurate). The first, and
briefer of the two, read:
I ask you to excuse.me for my baseness in 1962
and 1964. Now I have completely realized all
my �delinquencies and have reevaluated my past
I want to live an exclusively honest and modest
life and I am ready, to work in whatever place
that it may be possible, taking into account
my knowledge of Soviet Russia. I believe that
I have' sufficient strength to live only a real
life. -
I ask you to help me, 75.
The second letter was even More self-accusatory, .and was
clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted from
prisoners in the Soviet Union. It began:
My despicable behaviour from the beginning-.
of my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to
it being necessary to create. special conditions
for me and to assist me, which has finally
helped me to realize all my delinquencies and
mistakes and to reevaluate all my past "life."'
I should have honestly told you everything
about myself, about my moral principles.and
my life in Soviet Russia in order to start a
conscientious life in June 1962. 75
This letter next summarized Nosenko's career from child-
hbod.until his arrival in the United States, and admitted that
although he had been documented "erroneously" as a lieutenant
colonel he had actually_never held a military rank. higher
-than captain in the KGB. It concluded:
Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding
_period of my degradation -- drunkenness,
debauchery, 'baseness, and falsehood.
I should. have told you all about this in
1962 or in 1964, before flying to America.
I' started my life* in the United States of
America absolutely incorrectly: My behaviour
wasbase,dirty, and boorish.
Thecreatioh of isolated living conditions
and the appropriate assistance were .necessary
for me.- But d was unable to honestly and
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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7r117:111:)-
d J
-- 63. --
directly tell everything about myself in
1964 or in 1965, right. up to the last con-
versation with you. And only in 1966 did
I gradually begin to realize and to correctly
understand 311 my mistakes and Hdelinquencies
and to think about my behavioUr. And only
here was I able to reevaluate all my past
"life."
Now. I can think correctly about real .life
and work, and therefore I address myself to
you because you know me more and better than
anyone else, with the request to decide the
question of my future life. By work-againSt
the Communists, and only with real life, I
will try to justify the confidence placed
in me. 75
Yurphy forwarded bath letters to Helms (still. DDCI), rv,--
L -together with a memorandum which read in part:
The letters themselves do not represent a com--
plete break but they reveal that his defenses
are weakening and he may be seeking a way- out.
He tells essentially the same story as before
but with more discrepancies of detail which
suggest further d-SIISIrdAMLLiJ11 and, by this time;
an inability tp recount his legend consistently;
The most significant change is that he now .
admits he_was on.ly a_Captain the_KGB and not
a Lt. Colonel.. On the other hand, this may be
a prearranged fall-backposition. We recall
that [a Soviet agent] -- who, in telling us
repeatedly in 1964 of the importance of Nosenko,
said .he-was_a_LI�C.P,1. informed the FBI in
February 1965 (after our doubts about Nosenko
had become well known and Nosenko himself had
possibly missed pre-arranged contacts with the
KGB) that [a Soviet agent] had heard that
although Nosenko was a Deputy Department Chief,
he was Only a Captain and not a Lt. Colonel.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that
the rank of Lt. Col. was part of the KGB pre-
pared legend for Nosenko, and not simply his
own improvisation. This �is proved by the fact
that one of the personAl documents that Nosenko
brought with him to Geneva �in 1964 was a TDY
travel order which Nosenko claims to have used
to.travel.to Garkiy . . (and) was clearly a
deliberate plant by the KGB and there can be no
question of its being filled out erroneously.
Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain
the fiction of Nosenko's high supervisory posi-
tions, which in turn were necessary to explain
his access to the information he claims to have.
Aside from the hope they Offer for success in
breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect of
the letters is their tone. ,He does not complain
of our treatment of hith but on the contrary
expresses appreciation for it and says that it
was .entirely-justified. They are the latest in
4,
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.a series of indications that Nosenko is
weakening. They follow an attempt to feign
insanity, an abortive hunger strike and. some
erratic behaviour concerning his �exercise
period.
We plan to answer him along the. lines that
we are willing to forgive his "baseness and
falsehood" and discuss his rehabilitation but
only when he is prepared to drop the legend
which he seems to maintain in his letter.
If he is, as we think, getting desperate to
get out, he may reply with further admissions.
We have clarified the medical 'questions which
were delaying further interrogation. We are
now reviewing with Chief, TSD the propoSals.
discussed with you earlier, concerning the use:
of special interrogation techniques. The
attached letters afford an ideal opportunity.
to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever
we wish. 75
(Murphy's reference to "special interrogation techniques"
harked back to a 13 January.1966 discussion with Helms, during
which the latter had stated that 'the was inclined to try
special techniques on Subject in the hope that they might,
somehow provide the answers we are seeking." 70 In this
context, "special techniques"!: was a euphemism for the use of.
drugs, specifically sodium amytal and LSD,-as aids in inter-
rogation. As will be shown later, although' Helms was willing
to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in
fact never gave his consent and they were never employed.
Nevertheless, the use of drugs- for interrogation purposes
seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is.
foreseen in handwritten .notes made by Bagley aS'early as
November 1964, and Murphy and Bagley continue to press for
permission to employ them until a final negative decision by
Helms on 1 September 1966.) 51, 85
. 0n-.26 April 1966, Murphy again wrote Helms to: say that
a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed in order to
allow time for discussion with Angleton and Bohrer. Their
combined judgment seems to have been that the letters were
"an attempt to relieve the isolation by reestablishing per-
sonal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered
this view by. an appeal to medical authority:
It is Dr. BohreT's opinion, in which we fully
concur, that any such contact would in fact
constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it
would be a serious mistake to grant him this
at the very moment that his, psychological
.d-e-fens-6-S-Tiii-ay-e-cracking. On th-E. contrary,
Dr. Boh-T-6T-feeIS we ShbUld cut off any hopes
Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his
present situation without a full confession.
Since it is the of isolation and
rejection that has lad to the recent promising
changes in.Nosenkos attitude and behavior, we
believe that it is logical to continue along
�the same lines and that there is a reasonable
1_1
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N
7.... .1"'.
-- 64 --
a series of indications that Nosenko is
weakening. They follow an attempt to feign
insanity; an abortive hunger strike and some
erratic behaviout.concetning his exercise
period.
We plan to answer him along the lines that
we are willing to forgive his "baseness and
falsehood" and* discuss his rehabilitation but
.only when he is prepared to drop the legend
which he seems to maintain in his letter.
If he is, as we think, getting desperate to
get out, he may reply with further admissions.
We have Clarified the medical questions which
were delaying further interrogation. .We are
'now reviewing with Chief, TSD the proposals
discussed with you earlier, concerning the use
of special'interrogation techniques. The .
attached letters afford an ideal opportunity
to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever
we wish. 75
'(Murphy's reference to "special interrogation techniques"
harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms, during
which the latter had stated that "he was inclined to try
special techniques on Subject in the hope.that they might
somehow provide the answers we are seeking." 70 In this
context, "speCial techniques": was a euphemism for the use of
drugs, specifically sodium amytal and LSD,:as aids in inter-
rogation. As will be shown later, although Helms was willing
to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in
fact never.gave his consent and they were never employed.
Nevertheless, the use of drugs for interrogation purposes
seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is
foreseen in handwritten notes made by Bagley as early as
November 1964, and' Murphy and Bagley continue to press for
permission to employ them until a final negative decision by
Helms on 1 September 1966.) 51, 85
0n.26 April 1966, Murphy again wrote Helms to' say that
a response to Nosenko's letters-had been delayed in order to
allow time for discussion with Angleton and Bohret. Their
combined judgment seems to have been that the letters.were
"an attempt, to relieve the isolation by reestablishing per-
sonal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered
this view by an appeal to medical authority:
It iS Dr. Bohrer's opinion, in which we fully
concur, that any such contact would' in fact
constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it
would be a serious mistake to grant him this
,at the very moment that his psychological. .
de-fensffy�be-craCking. Ott the contrary,
Dr. Bohret feels we 'Should cut off any hopes
Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his
present situation without a full confession.
--Since-it-is the technique of isolatiOn and
rejection that.has led to the recent promising
changes in Nosenko's attitude' and behavior, we
believe that it is logical to continue along
the same lines and that there is a reasonable
/11
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As I told you in August, however, we have no
further interest in reading or listening to
the legend (or its variations) that you con-
tinue to repeat; We are only interested in
evidence that you really want to talk truth
fully, In the �future we will:reply only to a
true written account of your life and low your
legend was prepared. Do not waste our time
with the lies of the past. This legend cannot
be the basis of a new life for you. 78
Helms was taking sufficient interest in the details of
the .case to have sent the. following handwritten note to '
Murphy on 26 April: "Please phone me about the text of the
letter. I havea. couple changes to suggest." Though there
is written evidence that 'a discussion did take plate; tHe
letter was nonetheless sent in the exact form Which Murphy
had originally proposed. 76
Murphy's next blow-by-blow report to Helms, dated 11 May
-_1966, was the following:
As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note
was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier
note and slightly amended biographical state-
ment. He made no response upon- receiving our
note (although he did not touch his meal that
night); but On the evening of 4 May he asked
for a, pencil and paper, indicating, .in reply
to a question from the guard, that he had a
statement to make in response to our note.
After writing his note, Ie.sealed it in an
envelope and gave it to the guard to be delivered.
The note, written in English, states:
Allow me to thank you very much for your kind
letter.. Nowl understood fully what-degrada-
tion.the Soviet. Russia had forced me into.
At last. I can tell you that I really want to
talk truthfully.
I want to begin the job against the Soviet
Russia. My only wish isAo-establish a: real
life with your help as you are willing to do so.
[signed] *paw Nosenko
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-- 65
expectation that this treatment will produce
further results in the near future. We
therefore intend to send Nosenko the attached
letter and to:wait.approximately 60 days
before changing our.tactics. 76
. The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in Bagley's name
read as follows:
�.
I have received your letters and so-called m
"autobiography ." We understand fully what r
m
degradation the Soviet system has forced you
into and and as you have been told, we are willing
to help you establish a real.life.- m
,IJ
r
.3
o
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PirMIT
��
T,3
-- 65 --
expectation that this treatment will produce
further results in the near future. We
therefore intend to send Nosenko the attached
letter and to wait approximately, 60 days
before changing our tactics. 76
The letter thereupon sent �to Nosenko in Bagley's name
read as follows:
I have received your letters and so-called
'autobiography.' We understand fully what
degradation the Soviet system has forced you
into and as. you have been told, we are willing
to help you establish a real life.. '
As I told you in August, however, we.haVe no
further interest in reading or listening ,to
the legend (or its variations) that you con-
tinue to repeat. We are only interested in
evidence that you really want to' talk truth-
fully.. In the future we will reply only to a
true Written account of your life and how your
legend was prepared. . Do not waste our time �
with the lies of the past. This legend cannot.
be the basis of a new life for you. 78
Helms was taking sufficient interest: in the detail$ of
the case to have sent the following handwritten note to
Murphy on 26 April: "Please phone me about the text of the
letter. I have a couple chanles to suggest,' Though there
is written evidence that a discussion did take plate, the"
letter was nonetheless sent' in the exact foruLwhich Murphy.
had originally.proposed. 76
. Murphy's next blow-by-blow report to Helms, dated 11 May
1966, was the following:
As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note
was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier
note and slightly amended biographical state-
ment. He made no response upon receiving our
note (although he did not touch his meal that
night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked
for a pencil and paper, indicating,.in reply
to a question from the guard, that he had a
statement to make in response to our note.
After writing his note, he sealed it in an
envelope and gave it to the guard to be deliVered.
The note, written in English, states:.
Allow me to thank you very much for your kind
letter. Now I understood fully what degrada-
tion the Soviet Russia had forced me into.
At last I.can tell you that I really want to
talk truthfully.
I want to -begin the job against the Soviet
Russia, My only wish is.to.establiSh a:real
life with your help as you are willing to do so.
[signed] *paw Nosenko
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ft
g-FP
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We have discussed his note with-Dr. Bohrer,
who feels that the final sentence of the
first paragraph probably. reflects. no real
desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truth-
fully at this time, but is rather a further
attempt by him either to generate .a personal
dialogue with us or at least to continue
this written exchange.
We feel that it would not be in our interest
to answer this latest note with another note,
thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko,
psychologically necessary contact and involve-
ment -- albeit impersonal. In order to tut
off this effort on his part, but at the same
time to Allow for the possibility that this
latest note might actually convey an intention
to talk -truthfully, we intend to deliver to
Nosenko the attached statement. -The require-
ment for direct "YES" or "NO" answers accom7-
panied-by his signature allOws:for no mis-
understanding.of the questions and does not
permit lengthy discourses on peripheral
tatters:
Dr-Bohrer. concurs in our plan and recommends
that it be carried out as soon as possible to
achieve maximum effect. If we get a positive
response we will follow up immediately. 78
In accordance with the above memorandum, the following
�forTiLwas passed to Nosenko at LOBLOLLY on 15 May 1966,
apparently by the Security guards
�
The next .major inaneuver on Nosenko's part was a hunger'
12 strike, in the course of which he lost some forty-pounds.79
.This-tactic. was counteracted with the .help of an Agency
-medical officer while administering a �physical check.-up- on,
�fi 22 June 1966.: -
In the--courseTof the-examinatiOh� Dr. �Borcherding
questioned Subject on the reasons _for .his fast
and got him to admit that this was a deliberate
Answer "YES" or "NO":
1) Do you admit that you came to the United States
on a KGB mission?
� YES [ NO [--1
2 Ate you ready to tell us about your KGB Mission
and how your legend was prepared and taught
to you?
-YES
NO [
Date Signed.
If the answers to both questions are "YES" aoteone
will tome to talk to you. If not, there is no .
need to write any more letters. 78
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ernnzii"*7::,
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We have discussed his note with Dr. Bohrer,
who feels that the final sentence of.the
first paragraph probably. reflects no real
desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truth-
fully at this time, but is rather a further
attempt by him either to generate a personal
dialOgue with us or at least to continue
this written exchange.
WO feel that it would not be in our interest
to answer this latest note with another note,
thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko,
.psychologically necessary �contact and involve-
ment albeit impersonal. In order to tut
off this effort on his part, but at the same
time to Allow for the possibility that this :.
latest note might actually cOnvey an intention
to talk truthfully, we intend to .deliver to
Nosenko the attached statement. The require-
ment for direct "YES" or "NO" answers accom-
panied by his signature allows for no mis�
understanding.of the questions and does not
permit lengthy discourses on peripheral -
Matters... .
Dr. Bohrer concurs in our plan and recommends
that it be carried out as soon As possible to
achieve maximum effect. If we get a positive
response we will follow up immediately. 78
In accordance with the above memorandum, the following
-form was passed to Nosenko at LOBLOLLY on 13 May 1966,.
apparently by the Security guards.:
.Answer "YES" or "NO".:
1) Do you admit that you came to the United States
on a KGB mission?
YES [--] NO [ ]
Ate you ready to tell us about your KGB mission
and how your legend was prepared and-taught
to you?
YES [ ---] NO [ --]
Date .Signed
If the answers to both questions are "YES"-someone
will come to talk to you. If not, there is no
need to write any more letters. 78
,LO : the net major Maneuver on Nosenko's part was a hunger:
IV strike,:in the course of which he lost some forty 1)ounds.79
This tactic was counteracted with the help of an Agency
medical' officer while 'administering a physical check-up on.
�Y9 . 22 June. 1966:
In the course:of the examination, Dr.
questioned Subject on the reasons for 11,1s tast
;and got 'him to admit that this was .a deliberate
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tactic. As planned, the doctor showed no
concern, assured Subject, that he was still
in good health, described to him in some
detail the physical and mental consequences
of prolonged undernourishment, and emphasized
that Subject would not be allowed to do him-
self any damage in this manner. The doctors'
description of some of the standard methods
of forced.feeding and his matter-Of-fact -
emphasis that all .appropriate medical measures
could and would be taken at the present site'
made an. instant and evident impact on Subject,
who nevertheless continued-to assert that he
had no need or desire for more food. (Despite
the weight 'loss, the results of the medical
exam showed that Subject is in good overall
condition.)
01123 June; the day following the doctor's
visit, Subject began to eat ravenously and he
has been consuming,all his meals since.. By
6 July he had gained 15 lbs. 81
The Agency's next step was to have Bagley see Nosenko.
This interview, which took place on 6 July 1966, lasted for
about 45 minutes and "was the first time that a Case officer:
had talked to Subject since he was moved to [LOBLOLLY]
The interview resulted in another stand-off, Bagley isf�j
that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and the latter_
refusing. Once again,howe.ver,Agency_Officers_in_charge.,
felt they were making ,progress:
Dr. Bohrer, who monitored the entire interview,
was impressed by the fact that Subject had used
it solely to appeal to the pity and sympathy
of the interviewer, and felt that the way in
which the interview was ,conducted would Very
..effectively slam shut still another psycho-
logical door. It is believed that for the
first time Subject has come to appreciate the
measure of our resolve and determination, and
that he is actively grappling With the realities
of his present situation. Subject's pattern. of
behavior over the: past few months suggests that
he will need some time to fully digest the import:
of the 'Bagley interview, but :that he will then
be impelled�to initiate some new�effort to
releive lot. Very few alternatives
short of 'confession -- real or false -- appear
to be left to hit. 81
.
Following the ,above interview, the Division planned an
interrogation assisted by the use of drugs. The primary drug
to be employed would be sodium amytal, but the possible use .
of LSD was also foreseen; there had. already been some experi-
mentation With the latter substance,: which Was included in
the category of "special techniques.' On 21 June 1966, Helmsi
approved in writing:.a'memorandum which included the following
plans:
Amytal Interview. It was agreed that previous
operational experience with odium amytal does
mot _give cause for great -expectations, at least
(07
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tactiq, As planned, the doctor showed no
concern, assured Subject_that he was still
in good health, described to him in Some
detail the physical and mental consequences
of prolonged undernourishment, and emphasized
that Subject Would not be allowed to do him-
self any damage in this manner. The doctors'
description of some of the standard methods
of forced:feeding and his matter-of-fact
emphasis that all appropriate medical measures
could., and would be taken at the present site
made aninstant.and evident impact on Subject,
who nevertheless continued.to assert that he
had no heed or desire for more food. (Despite
the weight loss, the results of the medical
exam showed that Subject is in good overall
condition..)
On' 23 June, the day following the doctor's
visit, Subject began to -eat ravenously and he
has been cohsuming.all his meals Since. By
6 July he had gained 15 lbs. 81
The Agency's next step was to have Bagley see Nosenko.
This interview, which took place on 6.July 1966, lasted for
about 45 minutes aid "was the first time that a Case officer
had talked to Subject since he was moVed to [LOBLOLLY] _
The interview resulted in another stand-off, Bagley:in-SI-Stiql�
that Nosenko admit to being a KGB .agent_and_the fatter_
'refusing. Once again, however, in in-charge
felt they were' making progress: -
Dr. Bohrer, who monitored the: entire interview,
was impressed by the fact that Subject had-used
rN,
it solely to appeal to the pity and sympathy
,of the interviewer, and felt that the way 'in
)r7)\ i
which the interview was conducted would Very
A effectively slam shut still:another psycho-
logical door. It is believed that for the
first time Subject has come ,to appreciate the
measure of our resolve and determination, and
that he is actively grappling with the realities
of his present situation. Subject's pattern of,
behavior over the past few months suggests that
he will need some time to fully digest the import
of the Bagley interview, but that he will then '
be impelled-to initiate some new effort to
releive lat. Very few alternatives
short of -confession -- real or false -- appear
to be left to hit. 81
Following the above interview, the Division
interrogation assisted by-the use of drugs. The primary drug-,
to be employed would be sodium amytal,.but the possible use
of LSD was also foreseen; there had already been some experi-
mentation with the latter substance, which was incltded in
the category of "special techniques."' On 21 June 1966, Helms:
approved in writing 'a' memorandum which included the following
plans:
lanned an .
Amyt1 Interview. It was.agreed that'previous
operationalexperience withSadium'amytal_does
'not give cause for great expectations, at least,
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so fax as extracting a confession.is concerned,
and that the most we can realistically expect
is to place Subject in lowered state of resis-
tanCe-and awareness during which WO can 'probe
the weak parts of his legend and search for
additionaLfissures for later exploitation.
In addition; there is some chance that if �
Subject were conditioned. by special techniques
in preparation for his mission., that some cl-dre-s
_to_this_conditioning might turn up .d.u.ring_t_e
amytal interview. Dr. Bohrer emphasized tli-aTE
in order to maximize stress, the build-up to the
interview will have to be planned and staged
as carefully as the interview_itself. It was
,agreed that essentially.the amytal -interview is
a 'matter of preparing as carefully as possible,
and then hoping that something useful will pop
out. It is impossible to predict the nature of
Subject's reactions and responses, and.we should
be prepared to run a series of such interviews
should the first ones giVe'une2gectedly good
results.
�
Special Techniques. It was agreed that we are
not in a position right now to do any specific
planning bey6nd the amytal interview, but that
we will:have to regroup at that time to evaluate
the results of the steps outlined above and to
consider the further use of special techniques. 80
A subsequent memorandum to Helms, who had become pci on
30 June 1966, advised him of plans for a drug-assisted inter-
view to take place at "the end of August." The reason for
delay was explained., in the last paragraph of an 8 July
memorandum,,as
As proposed in paragraph 9 of reference, our
next step is to be the sodium amytal interview.
Barring any dramatic developments we proPOse to
schedule this for the end of August.. Both we
and Dr. Bohrer believe that the intervening
interval of isolation will be extremely valuable
in terms of allowing Subject to ponder on the
complete failure of his recent gambits .and of.
building up tension and frustration that can_be,
exploited in. the autal interview. Happily,. this
schedule is also compatible With the summer 81
vacation pIanS,of the keyLpersonnel Concerned.
On. the cover Sheet of the above metorandum Helts.wrote:.
.21( on last para." Nevertheless, by some six weeks later he
had begun to change his mind. While he 'did not order cancel-
lation of plans for .the .drug-related interrogations, on
23 August 1966 he did instruct Desmond FitzGerald, thenTbDP, _
and Murphy to close the case "within about sixty days assuming
there are no new developments which would warrant reconsid-
eration of this development." Murphy gave this account of
Helms' reasoning;.
. . . the Director adVised us that in, his View
the time had -come to consider disposal. of �
:Subject. He was Willing, he said, to proceed
with the immediate plans we 'had for the sodium
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so far as extracting a confession-is concerned,
and that the most we can realistically expect
is to place Subject in lowered state of resis-
tanCe--and awareness during which we can probe
the weak parts of his legend and search -for
additional_fiSsures for later exploitation.
In addition; there. is some chance that if
Subject were conditioned. by special techniques
in preparation for his mission, that.some clues
conditioning might turn up_during_the
amytal interview. Dr. Bohrer emphasized that
in order to maximize stress, the build-up to the
interview will have to be planned and Staged
as carefully as the interview itself. It was
agieed that essentially.the amytal interview is
a matter of preparing as carefully as possible,
and then hoping that something useful will pop
out. It is. impossible to predict the nature of
Subject's reactions and responses, and.we should
be prepared to run a series of such interviews
should the first ones give unexpectedly. good
results.
Special Techniques. It was agreed that we are
not in a position right now to do any specific
planning beyond the amytal interview, but that
we will have to regroup at that time to evaluate
the results of the steps outlined above and to
consider the further use of special techniques_ 80
A subsequent memorandum to Helms, Who had become DCI on
30 June 1966, advised him of plans for a drug-assisted inter-
view to take place at "the end of August." :The reason for
delay was explained, in the last paragraph of an 8 July
memorandum, as follows:
As proposed in paragraph 9 of reference, our
next step is to be the sodium amytal interview.
Barring any dramatic developments, we propose�to
schedule this for the end Of Au.gust. Both:we
and Dr. Bohrer believe that the intervening
interval of isolation will be extremely valuable
in-terms of allowing 'Subject to ponder_on_the
complete failure of his recent gambits, and of
building_ up tension and frustration that ,can be
exploited in the amytal interview. . Happily,, this
sthedulei_s-also compatible with the summer
vacation plans of the key personnel concerned. 81
On the cover Sheet of the above 'memorandum Helms wrote:.
"9,1conLlast_Rara." Nevertheless, by some six weeks later he
had begun to change his mind. While he did not order cancel-
lation of plans for the-,drug-reiated interrogations, on
23 August 1966 he did instruct Desmond-FitzGerald, then:DDP,
and Murphy to close �the case "within about ,sixt da 8 assuming
there are no new develuments which- would warrant reconsid-
eration of this development." Murphy -gave this account of
Helms' reasoning:.
. the Director advised us that in his view
the time had come to .consider disposal of �
:Subject. He was Willing, hosaid, to proceed
with. the immediate plans we �had for the sodium
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amytal. interview and to consider proposals
for use of special techniques within the time
frame we suggested but unless these steps .
developed new information or indicated definite
progress in resolving the case, he wanted us tb
wind it up. He emphasized that he was not
willing to accept the kind of press attacks
which would be directed at the Agency if it
became known that we had held Subject in
these circumstances and in what would be inter-
preted as outright defiance of law and custom.
He commented that we had to recognize as almost
inevitable the possibility that some day-,
directly or indirectly; someone connected with
the ease would become concerned at this viola-
tion of Subject's rights and surface the
matter in Congress or in the press . _
.Regardless of the importance of the case or the
professional correctness of our position; the
Director said a matter Of this kind could not
be contained in our society . . . The Director
made it clear that he would favor some form of
return to Soviet control on the grounds that one
could handle accusations by Pravda with Senator
Fulbright,. but 4 live AEFOXTROT,'able to speak .
to the press.in.whateVer country we had resettled
him; or even to return to this country would be
disastrous. 83
Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity within:
the SB. Division. Murphy, noting that "there is no appeal .
unless we uncover new, compelling data," reconstituted 4
special.Task Force to work on the case, headed by .Bagley,-
who had by now become DepUty Chief of SB Division. 8.
� Bagley, in a Series of handwritten notes, set forth the
Task Force objective as he saw it: "To liquidate & insofar
as possible to clean up traces of a sitn in which CIA .cd be
accused- of illegally holding NoSenko." Further on, he summed
up a number Of "alternative actionS," including:,
5. Liquidate the man.
6. Render him incapable of giving coherent
story (special dose of drug etc.) PosS
aim Commitmt to looney bin.
-7_ Commitment to loony bin w/out making him nuts.82
A problem which Bagley found particularly thorny, to judge
by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness .to accept
.CIA's evaluation of Nosehko.
�Our case is based primarily on analysis, not
confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence',
and-this ahalysisis so complex that it pro-:
bably could not be made more understandable to
laymen thani.t:has been to.the FBI, Which has
largely failed to understand it . Action
serving the interests of this Agency may run .
counter to the interests of the FBI, since our:
b.asiC position on Nosenko is different from the
Bureau's, and the Nosenko case is inextricably
6,9
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amytal interview and to consider proposals
for �use of special techniques within the time
frame we suggested but. unless these steps
developed new information or indicated definite
progress in resolving the case, 1e wanted us. tO
wind it up. He emphasized that he was not .
willing to accept the kind, of press attacks.
which would be directed at the Agency if .it
became known that we had held Subject in
these circumstances and in 'what would be inter-
preted as outright defiance of law and'custom
He commented that we had to, recOgnize as'alMost
inevitable the possibility that some day;
directly or indirectly, someone connected with
the ease would become concerned at this viola-
tion of Subject's rights and surface the
matter in Congress or in the press .
.Regardless of the importance of the Case or the
professional correctness of our position; the
Director said a matter Of this kind could not
be contained in our society:. . The Director�.
made it clear that he would favor some form of
return to Soviet control on the grounds that one
could handle accusations by Pravda with:Senator
Fulbright,. but 4 live AEFOXTROT,'able to speak
to the press.in.whateVer cOuntry we-had resettled
him; or even to:return to this country would be
disastrous. 83 ,
Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity within:
the SB Division. Murphy, noting that "there is no. appeal .
unless we uncover new, compelling data," reconstituted a
special Task Force to work on the case, headed by.Bagley;
who had by now become Deputy Chief of SB Division.
. Bagley; in a series of handwritten notes, set 'forth the
Task Force objective as he saw it: "To liquidate insofar -
as possible to clean up traces of a sitn in which CIA .cd be
accused of illegally holding NoSenko." Further on, he summed
up a number Of "alternative actions," including:
5. Liquidate the man.
6. Render' him incapable of giving coherent
story (special dose of drug etc.) PosS
aim commitmt to looney bin.
^ Commitment to loony bin w/out making him nuts8.2
� A problem which Bagley found particularly thorny, to judge
by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness to accept
CIA's evaluation of-NoSenko.
Our case is based- primarily ;on analysis, 'not
confirmed by juridically acceptable.evidence,
and�this 'analysis is so complex that it .pro7:
Apably, couid-not-'be made more understandable to
laymen than �it,has been to the .FBI which has '
largely failed to understand . :Action
serving the interests of this: Agency. may run
counter. to the interests of the
basic position on Nosenko is different from the.
Bureau's,and*the �Npsenko case is inextricably
. �
(09
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linked with [a. Soviet agent] and linked to.
� some degree with [a Soviet agent], on'which
.the Bureau official position is most Ihflex-.
ible. -84
The FBI also played a role in Bagley'S handwritten rumi-
nations over the value of a bogus "confession" by means of
which Nosenkowould ostensibly discredit
"Confession" wd lessen zeal of congress for
-a session w/him. Or wd It? FBI might leak
to cong/press that they don't know of conf.
And they might object to the whole premise,
view .their interests. "Conf" wd also provide
basis for explanation �of removal to another
ctry --.if feasible: Q: Cd we fake to FBI-
(CSCI, all other contacts) squaring only w/top?
Then cd we fake under similar circum-
stances?- Any action on Nos likely affect
[a Soviet agent] & hence FBI interests. :This
considered under each alternative foractiOn.82
Despite Helms' expressed preference for returning Nosenko
to Soviet 'hands, Bagley continued to have mis-gikagS about.
such a course:
Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in
holding him, but in bringinghis case to public.
notice again, and especially in allowing the
Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our
.denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly
if they are in some doubt about his teal: �
status/loyalty, is a fort of guarantee that
the Soviets cannot take the many damaging
actions available to:them if they had the body.)
The course of action therefore must balance
the respective dangers. 84
Helms, on the other hand, hardened his:position. He was
perhaps influenced by pr. Bohrer's pointing out that in. his
0 experience with sodium amytal it had only Worked'once, and.
11 ..then by accident.; Helms promptly revoked :his permission for
use of this drug. After hearing an explanation by. Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb, of Technical Services Division, on the use of LSD.
and similar drugs, Helms remarked. that Nosenko was "one person
on whom these techniques-were never going to be used."85
The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms.litited the.
interrogators �to the polygraph in any futute interrogations,
and reiterated his preference for. "having Subject turned back
.to the Soviets ." 85
On 2 September, Murphy- Saw 'Helms again, to ask that under.
the new circumstances the sixty-day deadline-be-extended.
-Helms agreed on until the end of the year. A-
:discussion Of a-final report and "disposal" -then ensued,.
reported by Murphy .as follows:
. . .it.mOuldbe-impTudent I thought not to.
have-ready :for eventuality-a�detailed- study
Of out findings: This�wbuld provide backup to
our final report.to.the intelligence cOmmunity.
principals, the -Secretary: of .State,. Attorney:.
� General and others. ,In the case Of the FBI;
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,
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linked.with- [a' Soviet agent] and.linked'to
some degree with [a Soviet agent], on which
the Bureau official position is most Inflex-.
ible. 84
The FBI also played a role in Bagley's handwritten rumi�
nations over the value of a bogus "confession" by means of
which Nosenko would ostensibly discredit himself:
"Confession" wd lessen zeal of congress for
4 session w/him. Or wd it? FBI might leak
to cong/press that they don't know of conf.
And they might object to the whole premise,
view their interests. "Conf" wd also provide
basis for explanation of removal to another
ctry.--.if feasible. Q: Cd we fake to FBI'
(CSC1, all other contact) squaring only w/top?_
Then cd we fake under similar circut- (b)(1)
stances? Any action on Nos likely affect ODA
[a Soviet agent] & hence FBI interests-. This
cOnsidered under each. alternative for action. 82'
.Despite Helms' expressed preference for returning Nosenko
to Soviet hands Bagley continued to have mis-givings..about
such a course:
Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in
holding him, but in bringing his case to public
notice again, and especially in allowing the
Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our
denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly:.
if they are in some doubt about his Teal
status/loyalty, is a fort of�guarantee that'
the Soviets cannot take the many damaging
actions available to them if they had ,the body.)
:The course of action therefore must balance
the respective dangers. 84
Helms, on the other hand, hardened his, position.. He was
perhaps influenced by Dr. Bohrer's pointing out that in' his
experience with sodium.amYtal it had only Worked once', and
.then by accident; Helms promptly revoked his permission for
use of this drug. After hearing an explanation by Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb, Of Technical Services Division, on the use of LSD
and similar drugs, Helms remarked that.Nosenko was "one person
The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms litited the
.85
:on Whom these techniques-were never going to be used.
"85
the polygraph 'in any futuie interrogations,
and reiterated his preference for "having Subject turned back
to the Soviets . .. 85 �
jOn 2 September, Murphy- saw Helms again, to ask' that under,
the new circumstances the sixty-day deadline, be extended
Helms agreed 'on an extension until the�end of the 'year.
.discussion of a final report and "disposal" then ensued,
reported by Murphy as follows:
. .it would. be imprudent I, thought not to
have ready for any eventuality a-detailed study
'.of our findings. This wbuld provide backup to:
our final report to the intelligence, community
Principals, the Secretary of State, Attorney,
- General:and other's. ,In the case of the F3.1,
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71 --
I added, we would most certainly 'have to
have such a document: [This remark stemmed
from the fact that the FBI had never fully
agreed with the Agency's views on-Nosenko.]
As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed -
that return to Soviet control is the Only
practical solution.. Third country disposal
might only delay our having to face the same
problems and if accusations are leveled at
the agency it would be far preferable to
have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director
did not believe the Soviets would refuse to
accept Subject and felt we could take the-
sting.out of any Soviet reaction by our own
statement concerning Subject's mission, If ,
our position is publicized first, anything
the Soviets or anyone else Says about the
case thereafter will have very little effect.
In the conclusion the Director emphasized the
need to bring this case to an end in a Manner
which will permit us to arrange events and
timing to bur advantage. He does not Want
to be stampeded by publicity .beyond our
control. 80
7/
- Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation -
of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on
18 October 1966. Assisting in the interrogation was Nicholas
Stoiaken, the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes
were at this very time under review by the Office of Security,
on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially -
and in writing pronounced to have been invalid.
� 'Hope nevertheless seemed to spring eternal in the breasts
Of the investigators, and this is what Murphy had to report
on 25 October 1966:
NosenkoAcnows he is reacting in sensitive areas
and this is worrying him because.he is not sure
how much we know or how we learned it.. Nosenko's
reactions have given us hope that we may by
this procedure have .begun to strike home. We
do .not know : what it is that keeps this man sitting
month after month in his present situation. We
speculate that one factor may be confidence that
the KGB will get him out. Related to this may
be the thought that the KGB:has CIA so 'deeply
penetrated, that it would be unhealthy for him
to confess. OUT current line of interrogation,
expanded and used even more' forcefully, might
break down some of his obstacles to. confession� .
by showing us in a different and stronger posture.
88
Despite eight days of interrogation employing the poly-
olaph iloweverLSB Division did not achieve their- oal:-
Nosenko did not "confess" to being a "provocateur." Operating
under the constraint of Helms' injunction to wind up the
case bY.the :end 'of' the year, Bagley made one last attempt to,
shatter Nosenko's resolutibn. In a lon letter Baale out-:
lined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation-and adduced
a number Of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in
part from a fictitious '"KGB officer . Sent out as a
�
(.7'3 7' :7) '7, �
;
:
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Zira
44. a
tj
-- 71 --
I added, we would most certainly have to
have such a document. [This remark stemmed
from the fact that the FBI had never fully
agreed with the Agency's views on. Nosenko.]
As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed
that return to Soviet control is the: Only
practical solution. Third country disposal.
might only delay our having to face the same
problems and if accusations are leveled at
the agency it would be far preferable to
have Subject in Soviet hands. :The Director
did not believe the Soviets would refuse to
accept Subject and felt we could take the
sting .out of any Soviet reaction by our own
statement concerning Subject's mission. If. .
our poSition is publicized first, anything
the Soviets or anyone else says about the
case thereafter will have very little effect.
In the conclusion the Director emphasized the
need to bring this case to an end in a manner
which Will permit us to arrange. events and
timing to our advantage. He does not Want
to be stampeded by publicity beyond our
control_ 80
1/
Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation:'
of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on
18 October 1966. Assisting.in the interrogation was Nicholas
Stoiaken, the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes
were at this very time under review by the Office of Security;
on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially
. and in writing pronounced to have been invalid.
-Hope nevertheless seemed to spring eternal in the breasts
Of the investigators, and this is what Murphy had to report
on 25 October 1966:
Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive areas
and this is worrying him because he is not sure
how much we know or how we learned it. Nosenko's
reactions have given us hope that we may by
this procedure have begun to strike home. 'We
do not know what 'it is that keeps this man sitting
month after month in his present situation. We
speculate that one factor may be confidence that
the KGB will get him out. Related �to this may
be the thought that the KGB has CIA so 'deeply '
� penetrated that it would be unhealthy. for him
to .confess. Our current line of interrogation,
� expanded and used even ..more.forcefully might.
break down some�of his. obstacles to. confession'
by showing U5 in a different and stronger posture.88-.
Despite eight days of interrogation employing, the poly-
graph however,..SB Division did not achieve their gsAl:
Nosenko did not "confess" to being. a "provocateur." Operating
under the constraint of Helms' injunction to yind up the
case by the end of the year, Bagley made one laSt'attempt to,
shatter Nosenko's resolution. In a lon letter, 'Bagley out-
lined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation ,and adduced
a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in
part from a fictitious l'I(GB officer . sent out�as a
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a. A LL A CILL..^.JJ
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12: Inter-Agency Disagreement
�, Despite the injunction of Director Helms, the end of the
year came and passed without resolution of the case. Nosenko
continued to be_incarcerated at LOBLOLLY, with his privileges
reduced to a minimum; he had not even been allowed to have
.any reading material (except Bagley's written injunction's)
since November. 1965. 96 SB Division personnel were no longer
seeing Nosenko, who was relegated exclusively to the custody
of the Office of Security. The only recorded exception was
a.visit by Dr. Bohrer.. Murphy remarked in a memorandum that
"since this will mark the third anniversary of AEFOXTROT's
arrival in the West, Dr. Bohrer.will advertise his visit as
'the routine, annual physicalr.in order to gain maximum
.psychological advantage , .
it 94
Meanwhile, enormOus effort went into preparation of SB
DiviSion's:"final report" on the case. This document; fre-
-quentlyreferred to as the "thousandpage report," was des-
cribed by Murphy as follows:
[It] will reflect-all of AEFOXTROT's statements
concerning his personal life; alleged KGB
career and other matters as well as subsequent
Contradictions or denials of earlier' statements
plus the results of our investigations at home
and abroad of these statements. Jt will also
cover statements pertaining to AEFOXTROT made
by various Soviet officials some of whom have
been or are now in operational contact with the
CS [Clandestine Service] or the FBI. This
factual portion will be followed by. analysis �
and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely
unequivocal on these points:
a. AEFOXTROT is a dispatched KGB agent whose
contact with us and ultimate defection were
carried out at KGB direction.
b. AEFOXTROT's claim to service, in the KGB was
an integral and vital part of his KGB agent .
mission, forming as it did the basis for all
that he has had to.say about KGB operations and
personnel. Yet, the results of our interro-
gations of AEFOXTROT supported by polygraph
examination demonstrate conclusively that
AEFOXTROT did not and could not have served in
any of the specific staff-positions he has
described.
c. Whatever the ultimate goals of this KGB
operation .might be, it has been possible to
determine that among the most significant KGB
aims in directing AEFOXTROT to us were: '(1) to
persuade us of KGB ineptitude and lack of success
in developing technical and human penetrations
of the U.S. Government, itssecurity and intelli-
gence services while at the same time delib-
erately diverting these services from specific
areas of investiaation� an �which the KGB hasbeen
..,successful; (2). to offer us leads to new sources
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12: Inter-Agency Disagreement
Despite the injunction of Director Helms, the end of-the
year came and passed without resolution of the case. Nosenko
continued to be incarcerated at LOBLOLLY with his privileges
reduced to a. minimum; � he had not even been allowed to have
any reading material (e.xcept Bagley'.s written injunction's)
since November 1965. SB Division personnel were no longer
seeing Nosenko, who was relegated exclusively to the custody
of the Office of Security. The only recorded exception was
-a visit by Dr. Bohrer. Murphy remarked in a memorandum that
"since this will mark the third anniversary of AEFOXTROT's
arrival in the West, Dr. Bohrer will advertise his visit as
'the routine, annual physical' in order to gain maximum
psychological advantage'.. if 94.
Meanwhile, enormOus effort. went into preparation of SB
Division's "final report." on the case. This document, fre-
quently referred to as the "thouand7page-report," was des-
cribed by Murphy as follows:
[It] will.reflect.all of AEFOXTROT's Statements
concerning his personal life, alleged KGB.
career and other matters as well as subsequent
Contradictions or denials of earlier statements
plus the results of our investigations at home
and abroad of these statements. It will also
cover statements pertaining to AEFOXTROT made
by various Soviet officials some of whom have
'been or are now in operational contact with .the
CS [Clandestine Service] or, the FBI. This
factual portion will be followed by analysis
and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely
unequivocal on these points:
a. AEFOXTROT is a dispatched KGB agent 'whose
Contact with us ,and ultimate defection were
carried out at KGB direction.
b. AEFOXTROT's claim to service in the KGB was
an integral and vital part of his KGB. agent
mission, forming as it did the basis for all
that' he has 'had to say about KGB operations and
personnel. Yet, the results of our interro-
gations of' AEFOXTROT supported by polygraph
examination demonstrate. conclusively that
AEFOXTROT did not and could not have served in
any of the specific staff positions he has
described.
c. Whatever the ultimate goals 'of this KGB
-operation might be, it has been possible to
determine that among the most significant KGB
aims in directing 'AEFOXTROT to us were fl) to
persuade us of KGB ineptitude and lack of success
in developing technical and human penetrations -
of the'U.S. "Government, it's security and intelli-
gence services while at the same time delib-
erately diverting.these services from specific
areas of :investigation in which the KGB hasHbeen
successful; 1_2_). to offer us: leads to-new sources
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ko, 1K
rLa, n
13: Voices of Dissent
r:;����:
Meanwhile, although the top leaderShip of SR Division
remained unassailably certain of its� thesis regarding .Nosenko
as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent at the
lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well
received by the leadership, however, and thus had nO effect
on the handling of the .case.
A former member of SR/CI 137 remembers that it was
sometimes possible to discuss, alternative ways of presenting
very specific points in preparing the written case against
Nosenko (which was .,eventually to become the so-called "thousand-
page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was
tolerated. Bagley was notorious for his outbursts of temper
when even his Most hyperbolic statement regarding the guilt'
of "the no-good son-of-a-bitch" Nosenko was questioned.
The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside
SR Division, and it was a tentative one. .John Gittinger; the.
senior Plans Directorate psychologist, had been asked to
interview Nosenko in depth', which he did during a series of
meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a'result of his
questioning, he became convinced that at the very least Nosenko
vas in fact Nosenko. Even this rather bland assertion, however,.
was met by Murphy with the statement, "John, :there are things
in this case that you do not know about." 128 Nonetheless, in
summing up the sessions, Gittinger had this to say:
I am totally at a loss to even attempt to
rationalize why a story with this much pathol-
ogy would be used as a legend. Nothing could
be served other than to discredit the man to
whom. it was assigned. In some remote sense --
to me -- it might have been felt it would
evoke sympathy but this is really far out
and a very dangerous gamble on their part.
The manner in which he has told his, story and
the nuances he has introduced Would require
great ingenuity and preparation. From my stand-.-
point, he has been essentially' Convincing and
accurate in general if not always truthful in
'detail. Here I am talking about the psycho-
logical data only -- I am not prepared to
express an opinion on other aspects. Within
whatever frame of reference I can operate; I
am forced to conclude that all the psycholog-
ical evidence Would indicate that he is Nosenko,
the son Of Ivan Nosenko. His life 'Story is.
essentially as he has described it. It. is
obviously distorted in places but..in each case
there is .a probable psychological reason for
the distortion:and deception'. No man is a
good reporter on himself and'we all use rational-
ization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see
us. My opinion, .for whatever it is worth, is
that Nosenko cannot be broken -outside the con-
text of-his life story ..and personality struc-
ture. .Itshould be noted here that the life
story is completely compatible with the per--
sonality structure as projected by psycho-
logical tests. 62 � �
vtatuennemeslossamsgsam......
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76 --
13: Voices of Dissent
Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division
remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding Nosenko
as a KGB-dispatched .agent, there was some dissent at the
lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well
received by the leadership, however, and thus had. nb effect
on the handling of the case.
�
A former member of SR/CI 137 remembers that it was �
sometimes possible to discuss alternative ways of presenting
very specific points in preparing the written Case against
Nosenko (which was eventually to become the so-called "thousand-.
page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was
tolerated. Bagley was notorious for his outbursts of temper .0m3)
when even his most hyperbolic statement regarding the guilt
of 'the no_lgood son-of-a-bitch" Nosenko was questioned.
�The. first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside
SR Division, and it was a tentative one. John Gittinger; the
senior Plans Directorate psychologist, had been asked to '
-interview Nosenko in. depth, which he did during a series of:
meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965, As a result of his
questioning, he became convinced'that at the very least Nosenko
was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather bland assertion, however,
was met by Murphy with the statement, "John, there are things
.
in this case that you do not know about." 128 Nonetheless, in
summing up the sessions; Gittinger had this to say:
I am totally at .a loss to �even attempt to
rationalize why a story with this much pathol-
ogy would he used as a legend. Nothing could
be served other than to discredit the man to
whom it was assigned. In some remote sense --
,) f, to me -- it might have been felt it would
evoke sympathy but this is really. far out
' and a very dangerous gamble on their part.
The manner in which he has told his story and
the nuances he has introduced Would xequire
great ingenuity and preparation. From my stand-
point, he has been essentially Convincing and
accurate in-general if not always truthful in
detail. Here am talking about the psycho-
logical data only -- I am not prepared to
express an opinion on other aspects. Within
whatever frame' of reference I can operate, I
am forced to conclude that all the psycholog-
i_cal evidence Would indicate. that he is Nosenko,
the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life Story is-.
essentially as he has described it. It is
obviously distorted in-places but in each case
.there is a.probable psychological reason for
the distortion:and deception.. No. man is a
good reporter on himself and we all use rational-
ization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see
us. My opinion,:for.whatevet it is worth; is
that Nosenko cannot be broken outside the cOn-
-text of his life story and personality strucL
ture. It should be noted here that the life
story is completely compatible with the per�
sonality structure as projected.:by psycho-
logical tests. 62
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4:+,7f11
I
77 -
Gittinger claims now that he had more doubts about the
validity of the Murphy-1Bagley-AngTeton view of Nosenko than
he felt it wise to express.. The following excerpt from a
memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives his
-memory of the situation facing him:
ii
In discussing his lengthy series of inter-
views with Nosenko on 3 - 21 May 1965, .
Gittinger said that he was very hesitant to
express the full extent of his doubts about
the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched
agent. The reaSon for his hesitation was
that, when David Murphy got a hint of
Gittinger's doubts about the theory, Murphy
told Gittinger that such doubts might make
Gittinger suspect of himself being involved
in the KGB/Nosenko plan.-
Gittinger:stated that he took Murphy's threat
seriously because Gittinger had previously
been associated :With two staff employees,
and Peter Karlow, who had been
torced to resign from the Agency for what
many of.us considered Somewhat flimsy- security
reasons- In
(b)(3)
� There is no evidence in the files tb indicate that
Gittinger's doubts were accorded any impartial consideration..
Murphy, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (Who was by now .
DDCI, but still riding herd On the case), described the inter-
views as "unrewarding in terms of Producing new information
or insights . . . It was obvious that Subject had given
some thought . . to improving and smoothing over some of the
rougher spots in his story." 63
By the end of 1965, there were others in.SR Division who
doubted the Murphy-Bagley-Angleton thesis, and one of them
was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on
paper at great length. Leonard McCoy, then a GS-14 and
DC/SR/RR for Requirements, wrote a 31-page memorandum to
Murphy commenting on SR/CI's "notebook" documenting the case
against Nosenko. It began:
'Introduction
At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko
notebook and I hope you will honor my right to
dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a
bona fide defector far more convincing than the
evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as
a KGB agent.
It is because I �am..conterned-about .the serious
ramifications ,of a Wrong verdict that I .wish to
set forth my dissenting views in considerable
detail. If the present verdict of-"guilty"�is
�right.I'believe there must.. be satisfactory
answers.to the questions raised .herein;. if it is
wrong. -- as �I:believe� it is it should be
rectified as soon as possible.
Intelligence: Production:
There are several references in. the Nosenko note-
book to the extent and quality of the Intelligence.
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he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo. to
DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of
his positive intelligence with that of other
Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom
we have had an operational relationship shows
that all of them were consistently better able
to provide useful positive intelligence than
has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo
states "His positive intelligence production
is practically nil," and later: -"Viewed
overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelli-
gence production has been so meager for a man
.of his background, training and position as to
cast doubts on his bona fides, without refer-
ence to other criteria," All of these state-
ments- are incorrect. �
The three persons in the Clandestine Services
�with the background and experience to make such
a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and
access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB
officer has been able to. provide more useful
intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has
shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB.
officers in general is "practically nil."
.Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper con-
text, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence produc-
tion cannot be used in his defense, but neither
can it be said honestly to cast any doubt what-
soever on his bona fides. In the realm of sub-
stance, judgment regarding his bona fides must
therefore be made on the basis of his.counter-
intelligence information,
Counterintelligence Production
.The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona
fides, as .of March 1964 DDP memo and others
indicate must be based on his production -- how
much did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that �
the evidence shows that le has damaged the Soviet
intelligence effort more than all other KGB
defectors combined. 68
Murphy's reaction, within the circle of those privy toy'
all ramifications of the.Nosenko case, was quite restrained.
The "notebook" which MtCoy had read was a "sterile", version,
purposely 'assembled for those not, cleared for all aspects.
Yet Murphy was plainly frustrated at his inability, because
of the sensitivity 'of the subject matter, to convert the
unconverted by disclosing to them the totality of his arguments.
He wrote to Karpovich:
I. have read this document and am of'mixed.:minds:
First, it Shows clearly that the so.-called �
"sterile" book in the hands of a person With
none of the other background on 'other cases or �
appreciation of the penetration problems -
affecting us .and the 'FBI can be a very' damaging
document. I question seriously whether we
should �make it a�Vailable to others in it's:.
present form. Second, the book's weaknesses
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77 If
-- 78 -7
he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to
DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of
his positive intelligence with that of other.
Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom
we have had an operational relationship shows
that all of them were consistently better able
to provide useful positive intelligence than
has-been 'Nosenko." Tab D of .this same Memo
states "His positive intelligence production
is practically nil," and later: "Viewed
overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelli-
gence production has been so meager for a man
of his background, training and position as to
cast doubts on his bona fides, without refer-
ence to other criteria." .All of these state-
ments are incorrect.
The three persons in.the Clandestine Services
with the background and experience to make such
a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and
access .agree that.they are incorrect. No KGB
officer has been able to, provide more useful
intelligence than Nosenko has;, experience has
shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB
--
officers in general is."practically. nil."
Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in_ the proper con-
text, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence produc-
tion cannot be used in his defense, but neither
can it be said honestly to cast any doubt what-
soever on his bona fides. In the realm' of sub-
stance, judgment regarding his-bona fides must
therefore be made on the basis of his counter-
intelligence information,
Counterintelligence Production-
The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona '
fides, as of. March 1964 DDP memo and others
indicate, must be based on his production -- how
much did he hurt the Soviets. . I believe that
the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet
intelligence effort more than all other KGB '
defectors combined. 68
� Murphy's reaction, within the circle of those privy to
all ramifications of the Nosenko. case, was quite restrained-.
The "notebook" which MtCoy had read was.a "sterile" Version,
purposely assembled for those not :cleared for all_ aspects.
Yet Murphy.was plainly frustrated.at.his inability, because
of the sensitivity of:the subject matter, to Convert the
unconverted by disclosing to them the totality of his. arguments.
He 'wrote to Karpovich: .
I, have read this document and:am of mixed mindS:
First, it Shows clearly' that the so-called ..
"sterile" book in the hands of a person with
.none of the other.background on other:cases.or
appreciation of the penetration problems
affecting us and the FBI can be a very' damaging
document. I question seriously whether we .
should make it 'available to others ih its
present -form. Second, the book's weaknesses '
(
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-- 79 --
are principally its language and the fact
that it was made up of memos from various
periods and as our evaluation matured, or we
developed additional information, the tone of
the subsequent memos changed but the reader
can suggest our approach has been super-
ficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot,
make the book available unless we are' pre-
pared to deal 'with the totality or near
totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book
is to be used at all in briefing individuals,
it should be re-written.and questions of
the kind posed by this DC/RR paper trrated [Sic]
no matter how irritating we find them to be.
If one person has this view, others might at
some point . . 68
� In his turn, KarpOvich in replying to Murphy also
attempted to take a balanced view:
The paper suffers from many faults. These
include bias, intellectual arrogance, and .
lack of CI background. Needless to say, the
conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found
it to be a useful paper, and I think that we
would be wise to treat it seriously, because
it does highlight Some. problems which we have
all been aware of for-some time.
It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us..
who contributed substantially to the black
books will feel personally attacked by many
of, the' uninformed judgments and intemperate
comments contained in Len's paper. I-urge
-that we all strive to overcome the temptation
to reply in kind. Despite the paper's short-
comings, it is one reader's serious and sincere
response to the black book, and it reflects
some serious faults in the book which we must
correct.
This is not the first indication we.have had
that some of our analytical methods, and
particularly the style and language.we have '
become addicted to, are not easily understood
by.floutsiders.0 We have all been on this pre-
blem- so long that we've gotten into the habit
of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical
proofs, considering the gaps and omissions to
be self-explanatory . . 68
'To 'those not within his=inner circle, however, Murphys
'0?
balanced view seems to have been less obvious a covering
letter which McCoy later.wrote to Richard Helms on 4 April
1966, this was how he recalled the submission of his com-
mentary, and its direct aftermath:
On-JO December 1965 I presented the 110 December
1965] Memorandum to CSR [Chief, SR Division] and
told him that I was sending copies to other SR
Division elements 'concerned. His reaction was
quite emotional. He asked in rapid succession
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:SrE
,
ir
L
-- 79 --
are principally its language and the.fatt
that it was made up of memos, from various
periods and as our evaluation matured, or we
developed additional information, the tone of
the subsequent memos changed but the reader
can suggest our approach has been super-
ficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot'
make the book available unless we are pre-
pared to deal with the totality or near
totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book
is to be used at all in briefing individuals,
it should be re-written and questions of
the kind posed.by this DC/RR paper trrated [sic]
no Matter- how irritating we find them to be.
If �one person has this view, �others might at
some point . . . 68
In his turn, Karpovich in replying to Murphy also
attempted to take a balanced view:'
The paper suffers from many faults. These.
include bias, intellectual arrogance; and
lack- of CI background. Needless to say, the
conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found
it to be z useful paper,. and I think that we'
would be wise to treat it seriously, because
it does highlight some problems which.we have
all been aware of for some time.
It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us.,
who contributed substantially to the black
'books will feel personally attacked by many
of the uninformed judgments and intemperate
comments contained in Len's paper. I urge
that we all strive to overcome the temptation
to reply in kind. Despite the paper's short-
comings, it .is one reader's serious and sincere
response to the black book, and it reflects ,
some serious faults in the book which we mist
correct.
. This is not the first indication we have had
that some of our analytical methods, and .
particularly the style and language:we have
become addicted to, are not easily understood
by "Outsiders.'' We have all been on this pro-
blem so long that we've gotten, into the habit
of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical
proofs, considering the gaps and omiSsions to
be selfTexplanatory . 0,8
To those not within, his inner -circle, however, Murphy's
balanced view seems to have been:less obvious:. In a cOvering
letter which McCoy later, wrote to Richard Helms on 4 April
1966, this was how he recalled the submission of his com-
mentary and its direct aftermath: �
On-10 December 1965.1 presented the [10 December.
1965] Memorandum to CSR [Chief, SR Division] and
told him that I was sending copies to other SR
Division elements concerned. His reaction was
quite emotional. .He asked in rapid succession
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-- 80 --
who had authorized me to see the notebooks,*
when I had read them, who had authorized me
to discuss the case with other persons in
the division, who 'had' read my comments, when
I had written them, and why I had written
them. He stated that the U.S. Government'
was seriously penetrated and manipulated by
the KGB. He said that J had taken advantage
of him, that my action would. necessitate
restriction of the circulation of the note�
books; and that I had no competence whatso- �
ever.to comment on the case. He stated further
that my action was very serious, that the
possibility of official reprimand would have
to be considered, and that the question of my
continued employment naturally would enter
into any such consideration. He ordered me
to ,discuss the case with absolutely no one,
and to bring him at once all copies Of my
memorandum, including drafts., and the note:-
books themselves. '
Later on 10 December,. CSR called C/SR/RR.,
DC/SR/RR and-me.to his.office,.as:these were
the persons whom ,I had identified as fully
aware of my views on Nosenko as stated in my
memorandum. He stated that my.action was
very serious and that all present were for-
bidden to discuss Nosenko with anyone but him-
self. He said that the Nosenko case was en-
twined with many highly sensitive cases for
which we had no need-to-know. :He added that
even if he felt it advisable to discuss those-
-cases and Nosenko freely with us, he would
not be permitted to do so, and that he would
be subject to criticism if it became known
that he had made the notebooks..available to
me.' He concluded with a vigorous assurance -
that if we did not follow his instructions,
serious measures against us. would be required .74
When interviewed on 2.2 November 1976, McCoy recalled the
next chapter- of the story as follows:,.
[In April 1967] at an SB Division meeting,
Murphy had announced that "there was some
question as.to why Admiral Taylor had access.
to the thousand-page paper on Nosenkci, but
that it was okay for him to have it.""McCoy
was worried by this comment, feeling that some-
thing was going on behind the scenes but not
knowing what it. waS; he hoped that, .whatever
happened would lead to A constructive solution
of the case. �He therefore consulted with
Katharine Colvin.on the advisability of get-
ting 4 copy ,of his 10 December 1965 paper to
According to notes made by atharine Colvin, Murphy,
in September 1965, had personally. requested McCoy' 'to
review .the "Nosenko noteboo-ks."
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some level of authority above the Division
Chief. Colvin replied that it would of
course be improper to go out of channels
in such a matter, but that, if he were to
do so, it would probably be best to get the
paper to the persOnal attention of Director.
Helms. McCoy therefore took a copy of the
paper to Mr. Helms' secretary, asking her
to show it to the Director. 139
Part of the.letter covering his. reasons for submitting
.the memorandum to Helms has already been quoted above, but
another paragraph is of interest here:
My primary reason for bringing the attached
bootleg copy of my memorandum to your atten-
tion is the morbid effect that the Nosenko
case has, and will continue to have, on intel-
ligence.collection against.the'USSR by all
agencies of �the U.S. Government. The accu-:-
sations against Nosenko, which I believe to.be
entirely false, have contaminated all current
agent operations against the USSR and most
of the past operations, ex post facto . . .
Any case which we get from now on which sup-
ports Nosenko, especially the GRU and KGB .
cases, will likewise be considered tainted.
Since all such good cases are bound to sup-
port him, U.S. intelligence faces a bleak
future. The explicit ramifications - of the
concept Of an all-powerful KGB, which can with
impunity present us one of their senior per-
sonnel, or a knowledgeable facsimile, are
already apparent in the negative moods of CIA
.personnel here and overseas. 74
Not long'thereafter, Helms called McCoy by phone and
told him he was having a great deal of trouble with the
Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore going to turn
it over to Admiral Taylor, who he hoped could get to the
bottom of it for. him. Helms also asked McCoy if he would
agree to Helms' passing McCoy's paper to John Gittinger,
McCoy of course agreed.. .A few days later, Helms again called
McCoy by phone and asked if he would agree to his paper being
passed to both Admiral Taylor and Howard Osborn.
�As a postlude, may be mentioned that although a pro-
motion which McCoy had previously, been promised was briefly
held up in June 1967; it was made effective after he protested
to the Assistant DDP, Thomas Karamessines. The latter did,
however, --enjoin McCoy to confine himself to reqUirements
and leave counterintelligence to those who understood
Finally, Karamessines stated. that "we had treated Nosenko
in a gentlemanly manner, which was more thah the Soviets
would do in a similar case" 101
�
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-- 82 --
14: Helms Takes Control
With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement
drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight,
The FBI continued to take what Murphy described as a .
"neutral position" in regard to Nosenko, while continuing
to believe in the bona fides of Soviet agents whom it was.
running in the United States. On the other hand, the
Bureau's agents had to be provocateurs within the framework
of CI Staff'and.SB Division logic, for all in varying degrees
supported Nosehko's reportinit.
The conflicting views of the various interested parties
are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of this study
to require a detailed coverage. What is relevant is the
fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with
continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures
which gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter
out of the hands of the SB Division. The first of these
measures was to instruet Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, the
Deputy DCI, to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case;
in doing so. he told Taylor that, if he could make sense of
the affair, he would earn "three gold stars" and Helms' '
undying gratitude. 136
When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September
19/6, Rufus Taylor remembered his. involvement as follows:
RT: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms
[saying] that there was a-matter that worried
him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he
doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst
the people in the Agency who handled it so far
to arrive at any kind of a really objective
solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive
indeed, would I please look into it and let him
know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me
about Nosenko, the defector. who WPS. At that
time incarcerated And he
mentioned that there was a .aicnotomy of views
in the DDP as to whether Nosenko was a bona fide
defector or whether he had been sent on a mission,
and that in any case he, Helms, felt that it was
wrong to keep him confined and .we had to do
something with him one way or the Other.
Q:
He said that it waS wrong to keep him confined?
RT: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that
this fellow had been in confinement so long and
that they had never been able to arrive at,a con-
clusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether
he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved
and something had to be done to get this fellow
in a . . oh, -I've forgotten just how he put it,
but in a more acceptable position.' So, I said;
yes, I would undertake this job and I sent .for -
all the background papers on it and studied them.
first. Then I interviewed Angleton and Murphy
and arrived at the conclusion . . ..I think I
talked to some other people in the Soviet Division
of the DDP also, but I arrived at the .conclusion
that people had their feet so mired in concrete of
opinion as to one side or the other of the case,
that it was just damned near impossible to get any
worthwhile information out of interview:. And I
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orr):777
"�'
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14: Helms Takes Control
With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement
drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight.
The FBI continued .to take what Murphy described as a
"neutral position" in regard to Nosenko, while continuing
to believe in the bona fides of Soviet agents whom it was
running in the United States. On the other hand, the
Bureau's agents had to be provotateurs Within the framework .
of CI Staff and SB Division logic, for all in varying degrees
supported Nosenko's rep'orting.
The conflicting views of the various interested parties
are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes. of this study
to require a detailed coverage What is relevant is the
fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with
.continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures
which gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter -
out of the.hands.of the SB Division. The first of these
measures was to instruct Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, the
Deputy DCI, to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case;.
in doing so. he told Taylor that, if he could make sense of
the affair, he would earn "three gold stars" and Helms'
undying gratitude. 136
When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September
1976, Rufus Taylor remembered his. involvement as follows:
RT: I became concerned as. a result of Dick Helms
[saying] that there was a matter that worried
him very deeply, that needed resolution., that he
doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst
the people in the Agency who handled it so far
to arrive at any kind of:a really objective
solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive
indeed, would I please look into it and let him
know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me
about Nosenko, the defector, who was: .t that
time incarcerated And he
mentioned that there was a dichotomy of views
in the DDP as to whether Nosenko Was a bona fide
defector �or whether he had been Sent on a mission,
and that in-any case he, Helms, felt that it was
wrong to keep him confined and we had to do
something with him one. way or the other.
Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?
RT: YQS, he.was really distressed about the fact that
this follow had been in confinement so long and
that they had never been able to arrive at a con-
clusion as to whether he was a bbna �fide or whether
he was a plant; and he just had to get it resolved
and something had to he done to get this fellow
in a oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,
but in a more acceptable position. So, I said,
yes, I would undertake this job and I sent for -
all the background papers on it and studied. them
first. Then I interviewed Angleton and Murphy
and arrived at-the conclusion . . . I think I
talked to some other people in the Soviet Division.
of the DDP also, but I arrived at the :conclusion
that people had. their feet so mired in concrete of
Opinion as to one side ar the other of the. case,
that it was just damned near impossible to get any
worthwhile information out of interviews. .And I
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I
indicated that I had, after' reviewing the ... .
making a preliminary review of the case, that
I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was .a
plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he. was
planted for.. Nor could I get out of anybody
else what he was supposed . . . what his mission
was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis
� � . My second memorandum to Helms was to the
effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe
that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the
Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and
I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with .
the idea of rehabilitating him. And Howard Osborn
then had him moved . . .
Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms'
reactions to your recommendations?
RT: He seemed rather pleased with the information. I
got the impression from .discussing the case with
him that he never had been able to get what he
felt was a really fair appraisal. of it from anybody;.
and I got the impression that he felt at last he
had a fair appraisal of it.
How did his attitude impress you at first? Was it
one .of worry or.annoyance or .a combination of the
two, or what?
It was worry. It was clearly worry. 'He was Worried
about the failure to have any kind of a conclusion
with regard to the treatment of this defector that
he could accept one way or the other. . And he was
really . . . I got the impression . '...:quitecon-
cerned that the right thing was not being done,"
and that the right answers had mot yet been adduced,
and he. wanted somebody who had no axe to -grind
whatsoever to look at it and he thought I would be
that someone,. As you know,.there Was a lot of .
chit-chat back and forth about penetrations of the
Agency and perhaps. there was a penetration inithe
:Soviet Division of the DDP, most of it suspicion
and most of it speculation . .
. . . Another off-shoot of the Nosenko case [was]
that I told Dick that I thought the situation was
so bad in that Division [$B] that there ought to
he some major personnel changes, owing to the way
in which people had gotten at odds with one another
over this question of was there a penetration and
whether or not Nosenko was a plant, and so on;
That' it was a very unhealthy situation, and that
recommendation was accepted; as I recall: 136
Regrettably,.it'is not possible to 'document this transi-
tional phase as completely as has been done for the years
19-62 through 1966. Helms took a number of actions but did
.not record them. Admiral Taylor played.a major role, but
'wrote :only two .Memoranda in the course of doing so; neither
has-been retrieved,- despite our, best efforts to: do' so. What
had happened was that the Director and his Deputy had taken
personal charge of the Nosenk.O case on an interiM �basis, but
did not have time to 'record their every 'move as had .the DDP
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components involved.
The measures Helms took in early 1967 may have been
triggered by word carried to him by Howard Osborn, Director
of Security, regarding the state of .affairs at LOBLOLLY.
Osborn, in turn, had been alerted by uneasiness expressed by
the LOBLOLLY guards, who Were contract employees rather than.
.Agency staff employees. In Osbbrn's words:
. . . They were getting 'uneasy and restive and
� unhappy about the whole damned thing, because
they didn't like to treat human beings that
-way . . Essentially, the guy was a pretty .
decent fellow and they began to admire his guts.
You know, he just took this, and took it and.,
took it, and had great fortitude . . 138
There is no accurate record of when 'Helms brought Taylor
into the case but this assignment appears to have been made
around March 1967;. on the 28th of that month, Murphy wrote 97
to the DDP expressing puzzlement at Taylor's Interest in
Nosenko, and .asking for an explanation.. 'Taylor then made a
personal study of the case. He visited AnglotOWs office to
examine evidence relating. to Angleton's allegations of
monster KGB disinformation operation, of which Nosenko was
part. From his examination of this documentation; the Admiral
concluded that "there was evidence of a great' KGB interest
in penetration [of CIA], but no evidence that they actually
had succeeded." Taylor also talked to David Murphy; but
found him "reticent . . . it was like pulling teeth to really
get him to say anything, and I also got the .impression that
he didn't like my looking into it . . The Admiral
was able, however, to get the SE Division point of view by.
reading in its entirety Bagley's 1967 "thousand-page paper,"
just recently completed.
� On 26 May 1967, Taylor called Howard Osborn,.. Director of
Security, to his office and Osborn recorded the meeting as
follows:
[Admiral Taylor] started by asking me whether
or not I had seen the eight hundred page report
summarizing the Soviet Bloc Division's interro-
gation and..exploitation of [Nosenko]. 1' said
that I had not read it personally but that
Mr. Bruce Solie, of-my Security Research Staff,
was now in the process of reviewing it and :
commenting on selected portions-bf it. HO:then
asked if. I agreed with its conclusions. I told
him that I did not; that it had been the con-
sistent position of thiS Office that 'while we
did not, under any circumstances, 'consider him
bona fide, we were not convinced that, he was a
provocation dispatched by the KGB with a specific
mission. Rather, our position has always been
that there is something.wrong.with [Nosenko] and.
his story but we do not know enough in order to
Make a final decision.
I:went on to point-out to the Admiral-that I had
thought, and had so recommended on numerous.
occasions in the past, that it Would make a lot,.
of sense :for:Mr. Bruce�Solie, of my.:Office, to
take over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in OrdeT
td resolve several 'discrepancies that' had always
cdncerned us, Further, I said that the polygraph
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components involved.
The measures Helms took in early 1967 may have been
triggered .by word carried to him by Howard Osborn, Director:
of Security', regarding the state ofaffairs at LOBLOLLY.
Osborn, in turn, had been alerted by uneasiness expressed by
the LOBLOLLY guards, who were contract employees rather than
Agency staff employees. In OsbOrn's words.:
. . They were.gettirig uneasy and restive and
� unhappy about the whole damned thing, because
they didn't like to treat human beings that
way , . - Essentially,. the guy. was a.pretty
decent- fellow and they-began �to admire his guts.
You know, he just took this, and took it and.
took it, �and had great fortitude . . .138
There is no acturate'record ofwhen*Helms brought Taylor:
into the case but this assignment appears to have been made
around March 1967; on the 28th of that month, Murphy wrote '97.
to the DDP expressing puzzlement at Taylor's interest in'.
Nosenko, and asking for an explanation. Taylor then made a
personal study of the case. He visited Angleton's- office -CO
examine evidence relating-to Angleton's allegations of a.
monster KGB.disinformation operation, of which Nosenko was
part.. From his examination of this documentation, the Admiral.
concluded that "there. was evidence of a great KGB interest
in penetration [of CIA], but no evidence that they actually
had succeeded." Taylor. also talked to David Murphy, but
found him "reticent . it was like pulling teeth to really
get him:to say anything, and I also got the impression that
he didn't like my looking into it.. . ." 136 The Admiral
was able, however, to get the SB Division point of view by
reading in its entirety Bagley's 1967 "thousand-page paper,"
just recently completed.
On 26 May 1967,. 'Taylor called Howard Osborn, Director of
Security, to his office and Osborn recorded.the meeting as
follows:
[Admiral Taylor] started by asking me whether'
.or not I had seen the.eight hundred � page, report
summarizing the Soviet Bloc Division's interro-.
gation and exploitation of [Nosenko] .� I said.. -
that I� had not ,read it personallybut.that
Mr.' Bruce. Solie, of..my Security Research Staff,
was now in�the process of reviewing�it .and'.
commenting on selected portionS-of it. .He�then
asked if. I agreed with its Conclusions. -I-told
him that I did not; that it had .been the, con-
.sistent position of this .Office that while we
did not,. under any circumstances,. consider him �
bona .fide, .we were .not convinced that he was a
provocation dispatched' by. the KGB with a..specific�
mission. Rather, our 'position has.alwayS.been
that there is something wrong .with [Nosenko] and. -
his story .but we do not know enough in order to�
Make a final decision:
� . �
I.went.-an to-pOint:out to 'the .Admiral that. I had
.thought, and had so. recommended on-nutherous
occasions in the past, .that it would make .a lot,
of sense for Mr. Bruce.Salie� of my Office, to-
take-Dver�the interrogation of INosenko] in. order,
:tO 'resolve several discrepancies that had .always�
� concerned us, further., I.said that the polygraph.
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"'''''''.
v4L:Jall.,u .L..d
� 84-
'
13
examination given [Nosenko] at the outset was
designed only to "break him" and was not an objec
tive polygraph examination designed to establish
or deny his bona fides. I indicated that the
Director had approved this idea.but that I had
been unable to sell the idea to Mr.. Murphy,-
SB Division.
Admiral Taylor said that he thought this was an
excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had
everything to gain and nothing to lose through
such a course of action and that he, would. so
recommend to the Director. I pointed out to
him that one of the things that had always con-
cerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had
never released any verbatim transcript's covering
their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that
we could make our judgment only on the basis of
written summaries prepared by the Division. 100
Thus., acting under Taylor's orders, the Office of Security
transferred Nosenko from LOBLOLLY.to what Osborn describes
as "a decent, respectable safehouse." .SB Division was cut- .
out of the case,.as was the CI Staff, because Taylor did not
want "either one to have anything to do with�our reinter-ro-
gation." 138
In fact, no one from SB Division had visited Nosenko
for about a year (since October 1966), but to make sure that.
the Division remained in ignorance of the changes.being made,
Office of Security personnel were instructed to cOntinue
sending morning reports, ostensibly from LOBLOLLY, to the
Division on a daily basis; thus a pretense was maintained
that Nosenko was still being held there. 138 �
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15: Resolution of the Case'
Bruce Solie, of the Office of Security, took over. the
handling of Nosenko in October 1967. He immediately inaugu-
rated a rapid transition from maximum-security incarceration
to normal living conditions. .Throughout this process, he
found Nosenko fully cooperative, and without any tendency
toward drunkenness or other aberrant behavior.
The following is a summary report which Solie prepared
on 16 November 1967:
Nosenko was moved to his current location. on
27 October 1967 and the first interview with
Nosenko occurred on 30 October: During the
first interview, particularly the first hour,
Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain
reticence to talk. This cbndition ameliorated
rapidly and it is considered that the current �
situation is better than could have ever been
anticipated in view of the conditions of his
previous confinement.
Nosenko on the first day indicated his complete.
willingness �to answer all questions and.to write,
his answers to questions on areas of specific
interest. It was determined that his.English
is adequate both for interview and for prepa-
ration of written material. Interviews are
not usually over two .and a half hours a .day,
six days a week, with Nosenko preparing from
six to ten pages of written material each day.
Prepared material has included life history,
individual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for
defection, and detailed drawings of pertinent
offices during his claimed period of KGB employ-
ment.
There. does not appear to be any impairment of
his memory. His current living conditions;.
:although physically secure, are luxurious com-
pared to .those he had been in during the past.
three years and have resulted in a relaxation
.of physical tension.
Definitive resolution of. the complex problems in
this case will require a considerable period of
time for further interviews, preparation of
written Material and a comparative analySis
against his previous 'statements. and information
from other sources, interviews and investigation..
Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies con-
cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and
having, received certain awards or decotations.
All interviews with Nosenko are'tecorded.and
transcripts of the interviews are being. prepared,.
In addition, all written material from Nosenko
is being typed with certain explanatory re-
marks'. . . .In addition; the-.Deputy Director of
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-- 85
15: Resolution of the Case
Bruce Solie, of the Office of Security; took over. the
handling of Nosenko in October 1967. He immediately inaugu-
rated a rapid transition from maximum-security incarceration
to normal living conditions. Throughout this:process, he
found Nosenko fully cooperative, and without any tendency
toward drunkenness or other aberrant behavior. -
The following is a summary report which Solie.prepared
'on 16 November 1967: '
Nosenko was moved to his current location on -
27 October1967 and the first interview with
Nosenko occurred on 30 October.' airing the
first- interview�particularly the first hour,
Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain.
reticence to talk. This cbndition ameliorated
rapidly and it is considered that the current
situation Is better than could have ever been:
anticipated in, view of the conditions of his
previous confinement.
Nosenko on the first day indicated his Complete
willingness to answer all questions and�to,wtite
his answers to questions on areas of specific
interest. It was determined that his English
is adequate both .for interview and for prepa-
ration of written material. Interviews are
not usually over two and a half hours a day,
six days a week, with Nosenko preparing from
six to ten pages of written material each day.
Prepared material has included life history,
individual cases, trips..of Nosenko., reason for
defection, and detailed drawings of pertinent
offices during his claimed period .of KGB employ-
ment.
There does not appear to be any impairment of .
his memory. His current- living condition's,'
although physically secure, are luxuriouscom.T.
pared to those he ha4 been in during the past
three years and have resulted in, a relaxation
of phySical tension.
DefinitiVe resolution of the complex problems in
this case will require a considerable period of
time for further interviews, preparation of
written Material and a comparative analysis
against his previouS Statements, and information
from other sources, interviews and investigation..
Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies con-
cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and.
having received certain awards or decorations..
All interviews with 'Nosenko are. recorded and
transcripts of the interviews are being prepared.
In addition, all written material froM'NOsenko
is being typed with certain explanatory -re-'
marks . . . .In addition, the Deputy Director of
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71.- �
LAJL
86 -
Central Intelligence has been orally briefed.
by the Director of Security. As of the �
present time, it is estimated that there are
1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting
completion. All of the finished material is
form which will permit dissemination to
the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemi-
nation is considered appropriate.
Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a
clarification of certain 'areas of previous
controversy. As an example, it is considered
that there can be at this time little doubt
that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approxi-
mate period which he claiMs to have been in
the KGB. The matter of the actual positions
held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953 -
early 1964 period-is'not considered adequately
resolved at this' time and any speculation con-
cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be
completely premature.
If even a degree of optimism is.realistic, it
is felt that the additional interviews ,and Work
in the Nosenko 'case together with a detailed
comparative analysis .of all information will:
provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion
of. the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very.
responsive the-.normal consideration he is now
receiving, e.g:, our current work with him, and -
if it accomplishes nothing else, will at least
condition Nosenko more favorably for whatever
future action is, taken relative, to' his dis-
position. 102
Solie's questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a
separate investigation conducted by the FBI. .Results were
covered in two reports published at about the same time, the
FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's.
on 1 October 1968.
'The essence of Solie's findings was expressed in his
covering memorandum to the Director of Security:
In brief, the conclusion of this summary is
that Nosenko is the person he Claims to be,
that he held his claiMed positions in the KGB.
during 1953 - January 1964, that Nosenko was
not, dispatched by the'KGB, and that his pre-
vious lies and exaggerations are not actually
of material significance at this time. 108
-The,conclusions of the FBI report were more sweeping:
.(1) The current interrogations and collateral
inquiries have established a number of 'significant
omissions.and inaccuracies in the February 1968
CIA paper' and have invalidated the vast.Majority
The.19.6.8 paper Was a briefer version of Bagley's 1967
document, which reconciled disagreements between SB
Division and the CI Staff.
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� Central Intelligence has been orally briefed
-by the Director of. Security. As of the
present time, it is estimated that there are
1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting
completion. All of the finished material is
in a form which will permit dissemination to
the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemi-
nation is considered appropriate.
Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a
clarification of certain :areas of previous
controversy. As an example, it is considered
that there can be at this time little doubt
that �Nosenko was in the KGB during the. approxi-
mate period which he claims to have been in
the KGB. The matter of the actual positions
held by Nosenko during, the approximate 1953 -
early 1964 period is not considered adequately
resolved at this time and any speculation con-
cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be
completely premature.
If even a degree of optimism is.realistic, it
is felt that the additional interviews. .and work
in the Nosenko case together. with adetailed
comparative analysis of all information will
provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion
of the Nosenko problem. 'Nosenko has been very
responsive the:normal consideration he is now
receiving, e.g., our current work with him, and
if it accomplishes nothing else, will at least
� condition Nosenko more favorably for whatever
future action is taken relative to his dis-
position. 102
Solie's questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a
separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results were
covered in two reports published at about the same time, the
FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's
on 1 October 1968_
The essence of Soliels findings was expressed in his
covering memorandum to the Director of Security:
In brief, the conclusion of this summary is
that Nosenko is-the person he claims to be.,
that. he held his claimed positions in the KGB
during 1953 - January 1964, .that Nosenko was
not dispatched by the:1GB, and that his pre-
vious lies and exaggerations are not actually
of material significance at this time. 108
'The 'conclusions of the TBJ report were more sweeping:
(1) The current interrogations and collateral
inquiries have established a number of significant
omissions.and inaccuracies in the February 1968 .
CIA pap'er' .and have invalidated the vast 'majority
The 1968 paper Was a briefer version of BagIey's 1967
document', which reconciled disagreements between SB
Division and the. CI Staff.
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7,7 ir-7-'77?�75.701:
)
0.f conclusions on which that paper relied to
discredit Nosenko.
(2) The current interrogations and the poly.-
graph examination* disclosed no indication of
� deception on the part. of Nosenko. He is.know-
ledgeable in the areas and to the extent he
should be; he furnished logical explanations
for acquisition of information which would not
normally have been accessible to him in.his
claimed positions. There is no substantial
basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector.
-(3) The variety and volume of information pra-
*Vided by Nosenko is such that it is.cOnsidered
impossible that he acquired the information .
only by KGB briefing, It is also illogical
and implausible that the KGB would have dis-
patched an officer of his caliber: with instruc-
tions to disclose the variety and volume of �
valuable information furnished by him. No
compensatory objective is apparent.
(4) The current interrogations show that
Nosenko is in possession of information not
previously obtained. In the interest of both
intelligence and counterintelligence agencies
of the government, interviews should be con-
tinued to exhaust his knowledge,
.14
(5) There should be. a thorough re-examination
of all information and cases emanating from
Nosenko and other defectors where the decision
- for action, or lack of action, was previously
influenced by the presumption that Nosenko
was not a bona fide defector. 107
Despite the above findings, the -CI Staff never gave up.
its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. On
31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept Nosenko's
bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the only proven
,reliable -source about the KU for a period of time which
appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA:" 113
Angleton presented his arguments at a meeting in Helms'.
office on 31 January 1969, the conclusions of which were
embodied in a memorandum signed jointly by Osborn and Thomas'
'Yaramessines; the DU_ The Tnemorandum included the following
statement:
The doubts about Nosenkos bona fides are"
substantial and there is a basis for honest
disagreement:. The TCI,stressed the need to
Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph
examination of NosenkO performed by -CIA between 2 and
6 August 1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken
by Bruce Solie.
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maintain the investigative momentum of the
� concerted effort to resolve the question of
bona fides and he expects to be kept advised. 114
Osborn wrote a memorandum dated 10 February 1969,
implying disagreement with the above statement, and :empha-
sizing infead-fhe need�Tor a maximum effort directed at
Nosenko's rehabilitation.:
I know that you will appreciate that this
Office takes its responsibilities for the care
and handling and ultimate rehabilitation of .
Nosenko very seriously. You will, I am sure,
appreciate that through the more than fifteen
months of arduous work of Bruce Solie's, we
believe we have changed a vegetable back into V/A
.a human being. We are trying to move very,
very Slowly and �are relaxing restraints as
gradually .as is consistent with his attitude
and frame of mind. The amount of time we will
have before achieving final resettlement will
depend to a:large degree on our skill in pro-
longing this process. I think, however, that
all of us must clearly understand that we
cannot delay the process to .the point where
he regards this as retrogression or a reversion
to his former situation. If we do, then all
of the good work thus far will have been wasted
and his ultimate disposition will become
extremely difficult. 115
The record does not disclose what reception the above
recommendation received from Karamessines, to whom it had
been addressed. Nevertheless, since Osborn had control of
Nosenko, whereas Karamessines and Angleton did not, subse7
quent events indicate that Osborn carried the day. An
undated memorandum written by Bruce Solie essentially brings
this chronicle to a close:
Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own
private residence and since June 1969, his own
automobile. Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko
could have, if.he chose to do so, acted in a
way seriously adverse to the best interests
of this Agency since control was not of such
ajiature as to preclude .independent action by
Nosenko.
It is the opinion of Agency representatives
in regular contact with Nosenko that he is
genuinely, interested in maintaining the ano-
nymity of his current identity, that is, not
becoming publicly known as identical to Nosenko.
As an example, he was very interested in having
a facial birthmark removed: :However, he has
on numerous occasions indicated his interest
in participating under the Nosenko identity
in some action or activity which would "hurt
the KGB." Nosenko considers that he has
certain capabilities and knowledge which could
be useful in 'the effort of the United States
Government. against the KGB. This interest has
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not been associated with any particular
curiosity in regard to the activities of
this Agency . . .
Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep -
interest in obtaining United States citizen-
ship as soon as possible. He realizes that.
under normal circumstances., citizenship could
not be obtained until. February 1974,.but� also
is aware that citizenship can be obtained in
less than the normal waiting period by legis-
lative action.
.Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and
FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have
Made an unusual adaptation to American life.
He lives like a normal American and has an
obvious pride in his home and personal effects.
His home life from all appearances is quite
calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English
language has greatly increased and there is
no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in
his ability-to express his thoughts. HObviously-
his.accent and occasional incorrect sentence
structure (and misspelling of words) has not
been eliminated and probably will never be
entirely eliminated.
Nosenko continues to complete work assignments
expeditiously and with interest. As indicated
above,.Nosenko is very interested-in doing �
"something active" which is understandable.
Full consideration should be given to this
interest since if properly controlled and
channeled, could be used in a way. adverse to
the best interests of the KGB. 121
Nosenko has since become a United States citizen, has
married an American woman, continues to lead a normal life,.
and works productively for the CIA.
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CHAPTER IV
NOSENKO'S CONTRIBUTION: A SUMMARY EVALUATION
.Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the U.S.-
Government must begin by painting out that he might well
have been able to contribute more had he been Permitted,
to do so. Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious
consideration to his stated desire to assist us:in making
recruitments of 'Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's
suggestions along this line as possibly part of.a plan to
embarrass the U.S. Government. It may have been for this
reason, therefore,.that when Katharine Colvin, Chief of
SR/Reports and Requirements, recommended to David Murphy
in 1964 that Leonard McCoy of her staff "be authorized
'.to review the case for positive intelligence exploitation,",
-.her recommendation was not accepted. There is no telling
what potential recruitment targets might have emerged had
.we, soon after Nosenko's defection, debriefed him with such
targets In view.
. In this part of our study, we therefore confine our-
-selves to a summary of the contributions which, despite
considerable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take
them, very briefly, one by one.
1: Information on KGB Personnel
. The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up Nosenko's
contribution in this field as follows:
Nosenko has furnished information concerning
perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agent's
or operative contacts (here theterms agents
OT operative contacts are used to, refer to
Soviet nationals),'mainlyi_n the Second Chief.
Directorate or internal KGB organizations.
However, he has identified approximately 250
former or current First Chief Directorate -
officers and there, is a considerable exchange
of Officers between the FCD and SCD. In
addition, numerous officers of the scp and
other internal KGB organizations travel 'abroad
with delegations, tourist groups, and as
visitors to various, major exhibitions such
',as World's Fairs, It is impossible at this
time to estimate the number of KGB. Officers
identified by Nosenko who have been 'outside
the Soviet Bloc since:his-defection or who
will be out some time in the future.
There has been very little attempted exploi-
tation of information furnished by Nosenko
concerning other:KU. officers and,. therefore,
the posSible value of this information to
United States Intelligence-cannot be esti-
mated nor can the potential damage to the
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KGB be estimated. [This remark reinforces
a similar point made in the introduction to
this chapter.] 106
2: KGB Recruitment Efforts Against U.S. Citizens
Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with the
KGB involved efforts against U.S. citizens, either visitors
to the USSR or members Of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: As a
result of this background, Nosenke was able to provide some
238 identifications of, or leads to, Americans in whom the
KGB had displayed some interest..
Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in
"recruitments"-which, according to Nosenko-, were more
statistical than real; the KGB played the numbers game, just
as components of CIA occasionally have done, for purposes of
year-end reporting. Nonetheless, Nosenko's reporting did
result in the Uncovering of certain U.S. 'citizens genuinely
working for Soviet intelligence:
� A. U.S: Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, who
had been recruited in 1953,. was arrested in 1965
on the basis of a Nosenko lead to an agent assigned
to a U.S. military installation outside Paris, who
was providing the KGB with important documents aS
of 1962--1963. Johnson was custodian of classified.
documents at Orly Field Armed Forces Courier
Transfer Station during this period, and provided
documents from there. .Excerpts from a preliminary,
damage assessment are included below:
The full extent of damage will only be known
when the current, review of documents by all.
affected agencies is completed: The damage
assessments prepared by the military services,
however,' based on a review of .their docu-
ments to date, indicate that as a result of
access to documents in the Orly vault, the
Sbviets may have learned:
:1. Details of the Single Integrated Oper-
ational Plan (STOP) including the attack
plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the iden7
tity of Soviet targets, the tactical plans -
of USAF elements including weapons systems
and methods of. delivery.
2. U.S. Intelligence holdings on Soviet
military capabilities, atomic -energy produc-
tion, weapons storage facilities:, industrial
cOmplexes and order of battle,
3,- Daily U.S. Intelligence summaries
in-
cluding our comments and reports on military
and political developments around the world.
4. Comprehensive comparisons of U.S.
and 'Soviet SAM Systems,
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from Golitsyn and Nosenko. Their reply, although very,
. cautiously worded, states in.essente. that, although Vassal]:
probably would "eventually" (underlining is that of MI-5)
have emerged as a "leading candidate" for suspicion as a
result of the Golitsyn information, it was in fact Nosenko's
information which "was to clinch the identification of
Vassall as the spy." 135
MI-5 added that "[Nosenko's] information affecting UK
interests .seems to have been consistent with his position
and we cannot recall any indication in the leads of UK
interest that LNosenko's] object might have been.to mislead
or deceive." 165
3: Leads to Foreign Nationals
Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to.have.provided some
200. identifications of, or leads to, foreign nationals
(including recruited. agents) in some 36 countries in whom the.
KGB had an active interest.
Summary Evaluation
It is not feasible, within the .terms of this study, to
-make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelligence produc-
tion and that of other similarly qualified defectors. Enough
,has been said, however, to demonstrate on an absolute basis
that, both in terms of quantity and quality of information,
Nosenko's contribution was of great value to the U.S. Govern-
ment.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE "MONSTER PLOT"
. In the words of one woman who participated in. the
Nosenko case, its handling was from the outset "accident-
prone." In fact, she is too charitable;- a better descrip-.
tion Would be "incompetent."
The above-mentioned participant, was (b)(3)
a junior member of SR/CI at the time Nosenko first approached
the Agency in Geneva, and her involvement in the 'case dates
from 19 June 1962. Because her involvement continued until
about 1970, she was naturally sought out as a source when
research for this stud Was initiated. It then became rapidly
apparent that in Jwe had found not only a first-hand (b)(3)
source- with a superb grasp of detail, but also a person whose
analytic ability matched her knowledge. Because she is
herself a first-hand source,, we have in case (b)(3)
abandoned the:anonymity-in which one usua y c oaks authors
of studies such as this. By so doing, we �gain two advantages:
A. We are not forced to cite name 00)
repetitively in the text of this chapter as the.
source of individual items of information; and
B. We can present her contributions much
as she wrote them-
A word now about what we asked
to accomplish.
For purposes of this study, we have not chosen' to dupli-
cate the mammoth.effort put into analyzing and validating
Nosenko's information by Bruce Solie of CIA and Bert Turner
of the FBI; we have reviewed their work-, and can find no
possible reason to challenge their findings.- On the other
hand, this study can do y what Sone. and Turner did not attempt:
that is, explain how an organization purportedly devoted �to
professional handling of intelligence and counterintelligence,
the Central Intelligence Agency, could have mishandled a
highly significant case as badly as it did this one,
'Chapter III, the Chronicle, has already furnished some
of the answers. . It provides ample insight into how the
largely mythical concept of disinformation developed into.a
Juggernaut, which commanded blind obedience and drove several:
of the senior participants. 'in the case �to ever-increasing
excesses.
(b)(3)
.There remains, however, the question of how these* intel-
ligence officers, supposedly experienced in the careful ollec-
tion and evaluation of information, could have drawn so many
erronebus -conclusions from data tendered by a source whom
we now believe to have been cooperati cting in good
faith. Therefore, rather than asking to review the
whole enormous fiasco in the handling, o Nosenko's infor-
mational product, we requested her to. Separate the sources
of confusion and Misunderstanding into certain categories,
then to select a few examples' and examine them,, n detail.
Her response to this 'requirement is contained in the pages'
which follow.
(b)(3)
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CATEGORY ONE: �Lack of Systematic Interrogation
.At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was
Nosenko afforded the kind of systematic, objective; non-
hostile interrogation by well-informed professional intel-
ligence officers which had otherwise been Standard oper-
ating procedures in dealing with defectors and in-place
sources from Soviet and East European intelligence services.
We now examine the manifestations and consequences of
this problem at various stages of the case.
1: June 1962 Meetings -
The transcripts of the 1.962 meetings reveal a disastrous
problem of communication:.
- Nosenko spoke fair English, but preferred-to use
Russian 'for the sake of precision. He spoke
Russian very rapidly, and his voice ranged from
loud and. dramatic to excited whispering,
-- Bagley spoke fair Russian, but preferred to speak
English when saying anything important. Bagley
Was largely unable to follow Nosenko's "machine.-
gun style" of delivery in Russian. 2 Nosenko
and Bagley frequently interrupted one another at
important moments.
Kisevalter, with native Russian, arrived On the
scene fOr the second meeting filled with assurance.
of his own omniscience concerning the Soviet Union,
derived from his involvement in two important
operations concerning CIA sources in Soviet
Military Intelligence: Popov from 1953 to 1938,
and Penkovskiy (who was still working in-place
as of the June 1962 Nosenko meetings). Unfortu-
nately, the communication problem was exacerbated.,
not only by Kisevalter's showing off his know-
ledge to Nosenko rather than listening to what
.Nosenko had to say, but also by Kisevalter's
inaccurate summarizationS in English rather than
translations of Nesenko's statements in Russian.
Kisevalter's presence was justified by the fact
that Bagley could not tope with Nosenko's Russian,
but kisevalter distorted so muchof what was
Said that he was a -barrier to commilnicatiOn.6
The second meeting, the longest of the five, .was further
disorganized by the fact:that Nosenko_arrived half-drunk from
partying the previous-dayand most of the. night.. Even during
the nearly -eight-hour interview, Nosenko continued to drink.
This point was consistently overlooked or ignored in .later
examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during this
meeting; Nosenko personally handled the langelle/Popov
case, Nosenko personally ran the operation against Security
Officer Edward Ellis Smith, Nosenko personally talked to
cede clerk James. Storsberg to try to recruit him, etc.
When confronted im_hostile interrogations in 1964 and 1965
with these Claims, he denied personal participation in all
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three instances (other than directing the Storsberg case
behind the scene), and said that if he had said such things
in 1962 it was because he was either drunk or under very
strong tension at the time. 58 Such explanations were not
considered acceptable by his interrogators, and the claims
were let stand as evidence of his mendacity.
While Nosenko provided a substantial amount of infor-
mation during these five meetings, there was little or no
follow-up questioning on most. of it, partly because of
lack of :time but also because of the case officers' lack
of background on the KGB in general and the Second Chief
Directorate in particular. Ignorance of the Second Chief
Directorate was only to be expected, of course', since Nosenko
was the first KGB officer ever to talk to CIA who had spent
his career in this component:
2: January--March 1964
The second series of, meetings in Geneva, in January and
February 1964, were somewhat better organized, but -- given
the already prevailing belief that Nosenko was a KGB Con-
trolled agent -- he was not carefully questioned on the
�information he gave. This was partly because it was con-
sidered of primary importance not to reveal even by impli-
cation how much we already knew, lest his mission include
elicitation of information CIA had received from Golitsyn
or other sources considered bona fide.
Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's defec-
tion were similarly limited to noncontroversial generalities,
and were not noteworthy for attention to accuracy and detail.
(Although most of the debriefings of this period were taped,
none of these tapes was ever transcribed. Notes. were taken,
and reports were then written up on the basis of the notes.
This three-stage process did not always result in an accurate
version of what had been said.) 77,105
3: April 1964--October 1966
The hostile confrontation which took place for 'some two
weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered systematic interro-
gation; ushoutingmatches" would better. characterize these
sessions. -54
During one period -- May .to November 1964 -.- Nosenko was
systematically debriefed in neutral fashion to obtain addi-
tional information on.leads :to American and .other Westerners
recruited by the KGB, in part to meet requirements provided
by the FBI. The other two objectives of. this debriefing
period, of greater importance to the CIA concerns in this
case., were:
-- to obtain answers to questionsposed in writing
by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into
exposing his ignorance or "lies about topics
Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's "KGB
missions."
- to acquire fuller 'background. on Nosenko's alleged
.duties and activities in his variousJKGB positions
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CATEGORY TWO: Faulty Record of Conversations with.Nesenko
The outcome of the Nosenko case Was prejudiced at the.
outset by the establishment of a faulty record. Not only
was the record grossly inaccurate, but there is reason to
believe that Bagley (although perhaps not Murphy or other
overseers of the case) knew that it was.
. Let us look first at what happened during the June 1962
Meetings. The inadequacy of Bagley's Russian for use in an
interrogation has already been mentioned. The problem:was
exacerbated; however, �by the fact, that he nonetheless took
notes on what Nosenko is purported to have said, which became
part of the official record without their being compared with
tape transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist. -
If anything, the role Of George Kisevalter, who had �a
native command of Russian but little patience With detail,
simply compounded. Bagley's errors. Returning from Geneva on
.15 June, Bagley on 18 June began to dictate, using his own
notes, a series of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the
'meetings as he had understood them. These memoranda were
reviewed: by Kisevalter as they were typed, but he made only
minor additions or corrections.
. The so-called "transcript's of the tapes" from the five -
meetings :were. then prepared by Kisevalter between the week of.
-19 June and mid-August 1962. Contrary to the usual procedure,.
Kisevalter did not first transcribe from the tapes into the
combination of Russian and English (predominantly Russian)
actually used in the meetings, and .then make his translations
on the basis of transcriptions. Rather, he dictated them
into English directly, using the error-filled Bagley memoranda
for guidance.
- In March 1964,.Petr Deryabin, a KGB defector of11954.
vintage, was brought into the case to examine Nosenko's
'reporting, in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file
procedures, reorganizations-, etc.. He concentrated on" the
early years of Nosenkols career, particularly 1952 and 1953.
In a resultant memorandum dated 12 'Match 1964, Deryabin com-
-mented as follows:
The undersigned began work on this special project'
by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings
only, without reference to the meeting transcripts,
believing that it would. be possible and preferable
to get all the necessary information and other
material firsthand in this way: From the begin7.
ning, however, it was obvious that this would be
very difficult, if not in many cases impossible;
the early, tapes (Nos: 1 - 6 and especially No. 1)
were very poor in quality.- (These, are the tapes
for meetings No. 1 and .2.)
After proceeding thus far in a review of the tapes,
the.undersigned then switched over and .began anew,
revieWing the transctipts alone and Without ref-
erence. tothe.tapes. This method also quickly
proved unsatisfactory; from his memory Of the
awe
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CATEGORY TWO: Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko
The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at the.
outset by the establishment of a faulty record. Not only
was the record grossly inaccurate, but there is reason to
�
believe that Bagley (although perhaps not Murphy or other
overseers of the case) knew that it was.
Let us look first at what happened during the June 1962
Meetings. The inadequacy of Bagley's Russian for use in an.
interrogation has already been mentioned. The problem was
exacerbated, however, by the fact that he nonetheless took
'notes on what Nosenko is purported to have said, which became
part of the official record without their being compared with
tape transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist.
If anything, the role of George Kisevalter, who had a
native command of Rus'sian but little patience with detail,
simply compounded Bagley's errors'. Returning from Geneva on
15. June, Bagley on 18 June began to dictate, using his own
notes, a series of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the
meetings as he had understood them. These memoranda were
reviewed by Kisevalter as they were typed, but he made only
minor additions or corrections.
The so-called "transcript's of the tapes" from the five. .
meetings were then.prepared by Kisevalter between the week of
\ 19 June and mid-August 1962. Contrary to the usual procedure,
Kisevalter did not first transcribe frOm the tapes-into.the -
combination of.Russian and English (predominantly Russian)
actually, used meetings, and then make his translations
.on the basis Of transcriptions. Rather, he dictated them
into English directly, using the error-filled Bagley memoranda
for guidance.
- In March 1964, Petr Deryabin, a KGB defector of 1954
:vintage, was brought into the case to examine Nosenkos.
reporting,in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file.
procedures, reorganizations, etc. .He concentrated on-the .
early years of Nosenko's.career, particularly 1952 and 1953.
In a resultant memorandum dated 12 March 1964; Deryabin com-
mented-as follows
The undersigned began work on this special project
by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings
only, without reference to the meeting transcripts,
believing that. it would be possible and preferable
to get all the necessary information and other
material firsthand in this way: From the beginT
ning, however, it was obvious that this would be:
very difficult, if not in many cases impossible;
the early tapes (Nos. 1 --6 and especially No. 1)
were very poor. in .quality:. (These are the tapes.
for meetings No. 1 and
After proceeding thus far in a review of the tape,
the undersigned then switched: over and began anew,
revieWing the transcripts alone and without ref-
erence to the tapes:. This method also quickly
proved unsatisfactory; from his memory Of the
-17aommmmmommatiEranWaR
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discussions as actually presented on the early--
tapes, although poorly reproduced and hard to
"catch," the undersigned soon was able to tell
that the transcripts are, to say the least, .
faulty.
A point-by-point review of the tapes and tran- �
scripts was then initiated and has been pursued
until the present time by the �undersigned. In.
the course of this review, a:large number of,.
errors .7- omissions and other discrepancies 7- .
have been discovered scattered throughout the �
transcript Coverage of the meetings recorded on
the tapes:
It is�impossible to Make enduring pronouncements
of the following type without knowing the whole
situation and being fully aware of all the
motives and factors -- personal and professional
involved, yet it should be noted that the under-
signed in many places throughout the records of
the meetings has encountered examples of what
he would consider errors in the handling and
conduct of these meetings. Let it suffice
merely to register this .point here; notes on
this subject will be drafted and presented in
later papers. .29
Deryabin then proceeded to cite nine major examples .of
,
1 errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic
L
1 of the KisevaIter transcripts (and, performance during the
; meetings). He concluded by saying:
L--------------
The fbregoing present but a few examples. of errors,
discrepancies, distortiOns, etc., to be found
throughout the transcripts. A complete report of
� all such errors, etc., will be prepared upon. �
request.
The "complete report" was never prepared., and-may never
have �been requested -Bagley's-friendship and working rela-
tionship with Deryabin were exceptionally close. There can
therefore be little doubt that Bagley was made aware of
the inadequacies of the record by Deryabin; thus., the fact
that no "complete report" was prepared may have been based
on a decision by Bagley.
Later, the first series of hostile interrogations of .
Nosenkp, beginning On _6 April 1964 was monitored by Deryabin.:
who listened from an adjacent room. On 17 April, Nosenko was
challenged concerning a claim he had supposedly made in June
1962 (according tp:thelasevalter "transcripts") that he in
person had recruited an American professor of Slavic languages
visiting in Bulgaria during the time NoSenko Was on TDY for
briefing sessions with the Bulgarian internal- counterintelligence
service. Nosenko denied ever having made such a claim, and -
went into lengthy detail explaining just what had happened.
In effect, because by .chance he was in Sofia when the Bulgarians
were planning their operation against:Professor'Horace G. Lunt,.
he gave the Bulgarians advice on how to go about the compromise.
'operation -- a homosexual one and how:Ao handle the actual
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confrontation and recruitment. Apparently as a result of:
listening to Nosenko tell his story, and his vehement denial
of any claim to personal meetings with Lunt, Deryabin went
back to the 1962 tape recordings and retranscribed exactly
what Nosenko had said on the two different occasions in 1962
when he had referred to this case. The rettanscription
clearly verified Nosenko's denial, Nonetheless, all subse-
quent, papers on the Nosenko bona fides question included
reference td.his having claimed in 1962 that he recruited
Lunt in person. His denial of such a statement in all sessions
from 1964-onward was lost from sigh.t.48
Nowhere in the records of this Case is there any indication
as to why Deryabin's'obServation concerning the Lunt case was
ignored. Yet, like the 12 March 1964- memorandum, it had.
certainly come to Bagley's- attention.
. In the course of the second series of hostile.interro-
gations in January--March 1965, 4 still further discoverk was
made by Deryabin when Nosenko was challenged on another -"claim"
supposedly made in 1962, which Nosenko also denied having made.
Reviewing the tape recording of the 1962. meeting in which 'the
alleged claim had been made," Deryabin once again established
that the recOrd was erroneous, and that Nosenko. was right again.
(Specific details of this incident have not been retrieved, �
but was present when it occurred and can attest (b)(3)
to it personally.) - �
Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes Was
begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian was used,
and English when English was spoken. These transcripts were:
not translated into full English, however, until mid-1968
under the auspices of the Office of Security reexamination
of the entire Nosenko case, In late 1968--early 1969, a
line-by-line commentary on the more significant discrepancies
between the two versions was prepated. It required some 35
pages to cover only the major errors and the effects they
had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false
defector who "lied" and "changed stories."
In judging this aspect of the case, it must be pointed.
out-that the misunderstandings which resulted from a faulty
record were not simply the result of inefficiency. Deryabin
had the confidence of, and easy access to; both Bagley and '
Murphy to a degree otherwise rare for any but rather senior
staff officers of the Agency. Furthermore, Deryabin Was
meticulous in preparing Written reports to ,Bagley concerning
discrepancies which he-found'in the record. Bagley himself
was therefore certainly aware of these discrepancies. That
he did not take them into account, but instead continued to
depend on a record which he knew to be faulty in establishing
his thesis that .Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent, indicates
'clearly the total latk of_objectivity of Bagleys approach.
� IT*
14 4 3 3
���""
�
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CATEGORY THREE: CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's
Life Story
� The first step in debriefing a new defector is to.obtain
his most "perishable" infOrmation, i.e., positive intelligence
and important agent leads. The next step usually is to
obtain, a biographic statement, highlighting his personal
history, family members, education and career.
In February 1964,. all information relating to his life
story-, collated from transcripts of meetings with Nosenko
�(in Geneva, 1962 and 1964), was presented in written form to
Nosenko for him to correct or expand upon. This draft was
so full of errors derived from defective transcripts that
only in the most general terms did it correspond to his �
:actual statements. At this time, however, Nosenko was rest.-
less., tense, and impatient with the tedious interviews with
which CIA was trying to keep him occupied. It appears obvious
that he paid scant attention to the dates or terminology used.
in this draft, because he made only one noticeable change;
he insisted on deletion of .a statement attributed to him to
the effect that he had attended a one-year course in counter-
intelligence at the beginning of his KGB career (a. mistake_
dating from the. 1962 Kisevalter "transcripts"), Given the..
volume of other erroneous statements in this "biogtaphy".
which he left untouched, one can only assume that, he con- .
sidered this biography an exercise of no particular importance
When.hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1964, the
inaccurate biography was used as the base point for measuring
so-called "lies" about Nosenko's entire life story. It
therefore caused him to be accused time and again of "changing
his stories."
One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile inter-
rogations concerned his responses to questions on his schooling.
Among other aspects of this subject, Nosenko told his inter-
rogators that he had-spent approximately three years .during
World War II in various naval preparatory schools -- (rough
equivalent of American high school-level military "academies"):
The problem which arose in this instance was. traceable first
to a careless transcription by Kisevalter, but was exacerbated
by ignorance on the part of the interrOgatots concerning 'the
subject under discussion.. Because it typifies other misappre-
hensions which complicate the Nosenko case, this. example is
worth relating in detail'.
Kisevalter "transcribed" the tape of the 25 January 1964
meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko thus '(underlining is ours).:.
. "When 'I first came here I graduated from the
Institute Of Foreign Relations. . I specialized
in International Law .and on the USA there. I
came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this .
Institute I was in a. naval school. I also studied
in Baku in a -navy.preparatory school and I even -
studied in Ftun.ze. :And then the war ended, �
The only time I participated in wartime acti-
vitieS.was;when 'heavy combat was' going. on near
DNVdJUDS IQ
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-- 107 --
CATEGORY THREE: CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's
Life Story
' The first step in debriefing a new defector is to. obtain
his most "perishable" information, i.e., positive intelligence
and important agent leads. The next step usually is to
obtain a biographic statement, highlighting his personal
history, family members, education and career.
In February 1964, all information relating to his life
story, collated from transcripts of meetings with -Nosenko
-(in Geneva, J962 and 1964), was presented in written form to
Nosenko for him to correct or expand upon. This draft was
so full .of errors derived from defective transcripts that
only in the most general terms did it correspond to his
actual statements. At this time, however, Nosenko was rest-
less', tense, and impatient with the tedious interviews with
which CIA was trying to keep him occupied. It appears obvious
that he paid scant attention to the dates or terminology used
in this draft, .because he made only one noticeable change;.
he insisted on deletion of a statement attributed to him to
the effect that he had attended a one-year course in counter-
intelligence at the beginning of his KGB career (a m.istake.
dating from the 1962 Kisevalter "transcripts"). Given the
volume of other erroneous statements in this "biography"
which he left untouched, one can only assume that, he con-
sidered this biography an exercise of no particular importance.
When hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1904, the
inaccurate biography was used as the base point for measuring
so-called "lies" about Nasenko's entire life story. It
therefore caused him to be accused time and again of "changing
his stories."
One of the first wrangles that arose. in the hostile inter-,
rogatians concerned his responses to questiofis on his schooling.
Among other aspects of this subject, Nosenko told his -inter-
rogators that he had.spent approximately three years during,
World War II in various naval preparatory schools -- (rough
equivalent of American high -school-level military "academies")
The problem which arose in this instance was traceable first
to a careless transcription by Kisevalter, but was exacerbated
by ignorance oh the part of the interrogators concerning the
subject under discussion. Because it typifies other misappre-
hensions which complicate the Nosenko case, this example is
worth relating in detail.
Kisevalter '!transcribed" the tape of the 25 January 1964
meeting.in Geneva, quoting Nosenko thus .(underlining is ours):'
. "When ;j'first came here I 'graduated from the
Institute :of Foreign Relations. I specialized
in International Law and on the USA there. I
-came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this .
Institute I was in a naval school. I also studied
in Baku in 'a 'navy preparatory school and I even -
studied in Frunze. 'And then the watended.
The only time I participated in wartime acti-
vitieS.was when heavy combat was 'going on near
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Novorossiysk. They threw the students from Baku
into the-battle.
After We lost Novorossiysk the remnants which
were somewhere between one third and one half
of the students were brought back to Baku.
When the war ended I had., not yet graduated �
from Frunze and I was demobilized. I didn't
want a military career so I -went to the Insti-
tute of Foreign Relation's in 1945 and graduated
in 1949. Toward the end of the year in early
1950 the placement commission (rasprediteInaya
komissaya) [words missing in original trans
cript] where I wanted to work.. I said that. I've
had some military experience and I'd rather
have something along that line rather than go
to MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairsl. They .
said I would be called on the phone and they
would let-me-know. I was called 4p, by the
personnel section of the old MGB.
r�
To Kisevalter, as well as to Bagley and Karpovich,-NoSenkO's
interrogators in April, "Frunze" meant only, one thing -- the
FrUnzeJUval-Academy, equivalent to the U.S. Naval�Academy at
Annapolis. Unfortunately, the naval preparatory school to
which Nosenko referred was named Frunze also; it was the prep
school for those Soviet boys with aspirations for naval com-
mand positions, who would later go on to the-Frunze Naval
Academy.
When NoSenko was asked in April 1964 to discuss his
schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory
school at roughly the high school level, and in Russian
Called a uthilishche. This was, said*he, the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School named after Frunze In 1942, the school
was relocated to Baku because of the fighting around Leningrad.
Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not understand what he was
talking about, as they had no background on these naval pre-
paratory schools; the only Frunze they knew of was :the Academy
and every time Npsenko mentioned the prep school carrying
Frunze's name confusion erupted. At the end, of several heated �
exchanges on this topic., with the interlocutors invariably
at cross purposes, the conclusion was reached that Nosenko
had lied in saying originally that he had attended the Frunze
Naval Academy. The claim was then made that he had been made
to admit that he had .not done so. He then was accused of
telling stories, Which were cOnfused and contradictory, about
the secondary schools' he claimed to have attended. .
Asked repeatedly if he was then saying that ,he did not
attend the Frunze Academy, he consistently replied no, it Was.
the Frunze preparatory school.' This discussion waS repeated
several times during these interrogations, Without :the problem
area being resolved in the minds of the interrogators.
In the Russian language; the fact that a school is named
after a great man is always made explicit. Thus, in .
Russian, the 'George Washington .University would be called
the 'UniverSity named after, George Washington."
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109
Because of the lack of background on the, part of the,
interrogators (as well as their ignorance or disregard of
the distortions in the Kisevalter transcription), a memo-
randum for the-record, dated 14 April 1964, Subject:
"Interrogation of Yuriy I. Nosenko, 4--11 April 1964,"
contained the. following relevant quotations (underlining
is ours):
. . On 10 April, Subject was interrogated in
the Morning and afternoon for a total of nearly
five hours. Questioning covered his early
schooling, his'studies at the Institute [of
International Relations], and his service in the
naval GRU, both in the Far East and in the Baltic.
Gaps and contradictions in his accounts cast '
doubt on whether, he was telling the truth about
the early years of his life and even raised.
some possibility that we may not be dealing with
the real Nosenko . . .
. . . Under pressure, Subject admitted that--he
had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval School
(Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola imeni Frunze)
in 1944, but that he had merely attended the
Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningrad-
skoye Voyenno-MorSkoye.Podgotovitelnoye
Uchilishche) of the Frunze Higher Naval School'.
His story now is that he attended the Moscow
Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya
V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev from 1941 to 1942,
then entered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School in Baku, completing two classes of this
school in Baku (1942--1943 and 19437-1944),
and the third class in Leningrad (1944--1945),
Subject insists that he was given credit for
successfully completing each of the four years
of secondary schooling, but says that at the
end he had the equivalent of 10 years' educa-
tion. He can offer no explanation for the
discrepancy -- by his chronology he would have
completed 11 years of schooling plus one year
of kindergarten. Subject has been very weak
in providing names of teachers and:classMates
and descriptions of school layouts and curric-
ulum for this period, particularly for the
period in Baku. It is interesting that:
[Nikolay Artamonov], who has ,identified pictures
of Subject as being identical with the :son-of-a7
minister Nosenko whom he knew at the Leningrad
Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the ,period
1944-71946, has provided information about the
history and Take-up of this school which is
incoMpatiblew with_Subject!s story, as is
This is not a true statement. AttamOnov's statements
are more confusing than clarifying. The possibility
that Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was:
.not considered.
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[Artamonov's]* 'statement that Nosenko was
a class junior to [Artamonov] and would not
have graduated from the prep school until
1946. Subject has never mentioned [Artamonov
and has not yet been'challenged on this part
of his story. -37
Further compounding the confusion on this one Subject
was the development of suspicion that Artamonov; Cited in
the 'memorandum above, �was himself not bona fide.. This doubt
arose because Artamonov claimed to have known the Nosenko
in question, and; as shown in the paragraph cited be1oW
from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for, the
second week, because his "own elementary and .secondary
schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's . . ." (Under-
lining is ours). The following is quoted as an excellent
example of the reasoning process by which one could at one
and the same time be suspicious of Artamondv's bona fides
�because some of his information supported what 'Nosenko said,'
while also citing his -reporting as evidence that Nosenko
was lying because Artamonov's memaries.of the schools_
differed from Nosenko's:
. . . Adding to the Mystery of Nosenko's War-
time years is the information provided by
Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector.
When Nosenko's defection was first made public,
Artamonov volunteered the information that; if
this was the same, Nosenko who was the son of a
minister, he had attended school with him in
Leningrad. Later, when shown photographs of
Nosenko he positively identified him as the
same man he had known in Leningrad in the
period 1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided
the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad
that Nosenko should remember because they were
prominent members of the student body there.
Nosenko was subsequently queried. about three
of these names, but out of .context and with
no indication of who and what they might be.
He immediately identified them as schoolmates,
but positively affirmed that two of them had
been the roommates in Kuybyshev in 19417-1942,
while the other had been in the school in Baku.
According to Nosenko, none had gone on to
Leningrad. Of the names provided by Artamonov,
Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently,
but although he originally placed him in
Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybyshev and
stated categorically that he saw him for the
last time in Moscow in .1942, before going to
Leningrad.. Artamonov, whose, own elementary
and Secondaty schooling is a curious parallel
to Nosenko's, has provided other information on
the schools and dates 'which Nosenko claims to
have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko"
storylput it has not been believed advisable to
Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who had
defected in 1959.
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requery Artamonov on this until we can be
certain that Artamonov is not deliberately .
� trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides
� according to a prearranged plan which mis-
� fired owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's
'poor memory.. 39
In May 1965, in preparation for his own set of interro-
gations, it apparently occurred to-Petr.Deryabin that the .
original "transcript" should be-rethecked for accuracy (he
was right). �After transcribing it into Russian first, he..
then translated.it into English, but with one unfortunate' �
mischoice in wording. He translated the Russian word
"uchilishche" into English as 'academy." The Russian equiv-
alent to the English "academy" in the sense of a college-
level institution is "akademiya." The following is Deryabin's
translation of meeting No. 3 on 25 January 1964:
Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU,
Nosenko says: . . . I went there . . I com-
pleted the Institute of International Relations
in 1949. I Studied in the Juridical Faculty,
� i.e., specialist in international law and spe-
cializing on the U.S... Before the Institute, I
studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye
uchilishche), etc- In the beginning, I was
still in the Special School (spetsshkola)� .
Following the Seventh Class, of the School, 'I
� then studied at the Preparatory School. ,(podgo-
tovitel'noye uchilishche), was transferred to
� the Frunze Academy [sic -- uchilishche]. The.
war ended. -1Ate weren't successful in getting .
� into battle. The only time they sent us in was
when we were in Baku. There was heavy fighting
near. Tuapse. We students were sent in near :
Nov., i.e., near Novorosiysk: There was heavy -
.fighting there. We 'tool part in these battles
there and then returned when Novorossiysk
.surrendered. Our health, was gone: less than
one-half of one-third of all the students '
remained, and they sent us back to the..school.
SACI the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze -
Academy 'sic 7- uchilishcheI after demobilization.
What to do? Be a soldier? I didn't want to.
Study? Where? I went to the Institute of
� 'International Relations and entered it in 1945,
And I graduated from there in 1949 .-- the end
of 1949 or the. beginning of 1950. When the
� placement commission asked me where I wanted to
work -- it is mandatory for the commission to
ask -- I said that I..was a military man and asked
that they give me something related to military.9
�To sum up, the following problems typical of the Whole
.ease are evident in this episode:
Nosenko had been misquoted in the Kisevalter
.trat.script,'becauseKisevalter did not understand
what he was talking about. He had referred specifi-
cally to. the "Leningrad Naval Preparatory School .
named after Frunze," �a fact once again uncovered '.by
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'Deryabin's rechecking Of the meeting tape, but not
until May 1965. When Nosenko 'admitted" to his
interrogators in April 1964 that he had not :attended
the Academy, he didn't know this was considered. an -
admission.; he never realized his interrogators had
thought he had made such aclaim.- -
B. In general, Nosenko's interrogators over-
estimated their substantive background, Nosenko's
"stories" about the several naval preparatory schools
he had attended during the war are difficult to
follow, because war conditions brought about a number
of relocations of these schools: the Leningrad �
.School was relocated to Omsk oblast, but was still
called Leningrad School; the Moscow School was.re-
lotated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev, but '
was still the Moscow School, etc. Nosenko's inter-7
rogators were almost totally, ignorant of these
matters, but did not know they were. Because they
were unable to follow his detailed description of
all these changes (documented by other informed
sources, including. Soviet historians), they thought.
something was wrong with Nosenko, not with themselves;
� . ; '4.
, A � j
/J.
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-- 113
CATEGORY FOUR: Errors or Omissions in Available CIA
Headquarters Records
In this category lie many of the causes of error in..
building the case against Nosenko. We are not speaking here
of transcript errors,.but rather of sometimes quite under-
standable lacunae in CIA's collateral records..
� Two important examples concern John Abidian; the State
Department Security officer in Moscow who was, according to
Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was operationally
solely responsible.
One point at issue was whether Abidian employed a maid
in Moscow who would have been in a position to treat Abidian's
clothes with a so-called "thief powder" used by the KGB to
facilitate postal.surveillance. Nosenko claimed there was
such a maid, and that her actions enabled the KGB to pick.
up three operational letters Abidjan mailed for CIA, When the
powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal System.
The second point concerns the question of whether Nosenko
lied in claiming that 'Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow
which we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial to the KGB appre-
hension of Oleg Penkovskiy.
. On the first point, CIA had no record of. Abidjan's having
a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few.
Months after his last letter mailing for CIA. However, the
maid who served an .American woman in the Embassy-, with whom
Abidian was regularly sleeping, also informally took care .of
Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question.
Thus, we were wrong, Nosenko was right.
The second point has yet to .be subjected to confirmation,
but there is strong .circumstantial evidence that Abidian."cased"
the Penkovskiy dead-drop site net once, but twice. The CIA
officer tasked with the first casing had been too afraid to
go himself, as ordered, and therefore apparently prevailed
upon Abidian to handle the job for him. The report submitted'
by the case officer, however, could lead the reader to believe
that the CIA man had carried out the first. casing mission --
under circumstances and in the time period when, according to
Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.'
Evidence discussed in a memorandum of 15 September 1970
regarding Abidian and the dead-drop site leads one to believe
that Nosenko was entirely accurate about Abidian's first visit.
An interview of Abidian about these. two Penkovskiy casing S to
verify Nosenke's story may reveal that the CIA record was
deliberately falsified by a delinquent case officer.
Both these problems seem minor in. and of themselves. But
they were not minor in the context of the :inquisition to which
Nosenko was subjected_ Rather, the discrepancies involved
were evoked, as was-every other discrepancy arising. from what-
ever cause, to bolster the case against him.
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CATEGORY FOUR: Errors or Omissions in Available CIA
Headquarters Records '
In this category lie many of the causes of error in.:
building the case against Nosenko. We are not speaking here
of transcript errers,'but rather of sometimes quite under-
standable lacunae in CIA's collateral records..
-Two important examples concern John Abidian, the State
Department Security officer in Moscow who was, according to
Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was operationally.
solely responsible.
� One point at issue was whether Abidian employed a maid
in Moscow Who would have been in a position to treat Abidian's
clothes with a so-called "thief powder" used by the KGB:to-
facilitate postal surveillance. Nosenko claimed there was
such a maid, and that her actions enabled the KGB. to pick.
up three operational letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the
powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal System,.
The second point concerns the question of whether Nosenko
A.i.ed. in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow
which we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial to the KGB appre-
hension of Oleg Pehkovskiy.
On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian's having:
a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few
months after his last letter mailing for CIA. However, the
maid who served an American woman in the Embassy, with whom
Abidian was regularly sleeping,, also informally took care .of
Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question.
Thus, we were wrong, Nosenko was. tight.
The second point has yet to be subjected to confirmation,
but there is strong circumstantial evidence that Abidian "cased"
the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not once, but twice'. The CIA
officer tasked. with the first casing had been too afraid to
go himself, as ordered, 'and therefbre apparently prevailed
Upon Abidian to handle the job for him. The report Submitted
by the case officer, hOwever, could lead the reader to believe . �
that the CIA man had' carried out the first casing mission -.-
Under circumstances and in the time period when, accOrding.to
Nosenko, Abidjan handled the assignment.'
Evidence discussed in a memorandum of 15 September 1970
regatding Abidian and the dad-drop site leads one to believe
that Nosenko was entirely accurate about Abidianis�first visit.
An-interview of Abidjan about these two ?enkovSkiy casing S to.
verify NosenRO's story may reveal that the CIA record was
deliberately falsified' by a delinquent,case officer.
Both these problems seem minor in and of themselves. 'But
they were not minor in the context of the. inquisition to which
Nosenko was .subjected_ Rather, the discrepancies involved
were-evoked,as was�every other discrepancy arising from what-
ever cause,' to bolster the case against him.
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CATEGORY FIVE: CIA Assumptions about the Second
Chief Directorate
Lacking contemporary information on the organization,
responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB'S.
Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources other
than Nosenko, it was necessary for.Nesenko's interrogators
to extrapolate from pre-1954-defector information plus that
received from Goleniewski and Golitsyn. Not one of the
sources, cited below by Bagley had ever been regularly
employed in the Second Chief Directorate -- except Nosenko..
In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, .Bagley set out to.
demonstrate at great length that Nosenko's claim to the
position of Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section
between early 1960 and late 1961 was completely .false,.
Having informed his readers that this position was one of
the most important in. the entire Second Chief Directorate,
he then proceeded to present a "job description" for it:
Functions of a KGB Deputy Section -Chief: -Within
,this framework, an understanding of the functions
and responsibilities of-any deputy chief of
section in the KGB is important. The ;following
description of' this position has been confirmed .
by Deryabin, RaStvorov, Golitsyn; Goleniewski*
and even in large part by Nosenko-when speaking
in general terms:
a. He must be broadly informed-on the section's.
operations and individual case officer duties
in order to act in the chiefs absence, when
he assumes responsibility for the entire
section's work.
b. He approves and retains monthly schedules
for planned use of safehouses by the section.
c. He discusses agent meeting schedules with
indiVidual case officers and approves and then
-retains a list of planned agent meetings for
each case officer on a monthly 'basis.
'd. He approves�the acquisition of new agents
and new safehouses and their transfer from one
operation to another.
He usually maintains liaison with other
KGB units ph matters related to the sections
target.
f. Based on file ..reviewS and discussions with
individual case officers; he assigns priorities
for the- operations that each case officer
handles.
He reviews and approves ,by signature the
periodic Written reports, 'general operational
plans of the section; periodic ,section progress
.S7,,77,77 1;2717.'-'
�
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- 114 --
CATEGORY FIVE: CIA Assumptions about the Second
Chief Directorate '
. Lacking contemporary information on the organization,
responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's
Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources. other
than Nosenko, it was necessary for.Nosenko's interrogators
to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector information. plus that
received from Goleniewski and Golitsyn. Not one of the
sources, cited below by Bagley had ever been regularly
employed in the Second Chief Directorate -- except Nosenko.
In a memorandum af 2.0 October 1964, Bagley set out to
demonstrate at great length that Nosenko's claim to the
position of Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section
between early 1960 and late 1961 was completely false,. ,
Having informed his readers that this position was one of
the most important in the entire Second Chief Directorate,
he then proceeded to present a "job description" for: it:
Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief Within
this framework, an understanding of the functions
and responsibilities of any deputy chief of
section' in the KGB is important. :,.The 'following
description of this position has been confirmed
by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn,; Goleniewski,.
and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking
in general terms:
a. He must be broadlT.informed-on..the sectian's
operations and individual case officer duties
in order to act in the chief's absence, when
he assumes responsibility for the entire .
section's work. .
b. He approves and retains monthly schedules
for planned use of safehouses by the section._
c. He: discusses agent meeting schedules with
individual case officers and approves and then
retains a list of planned agent meetings 'for,
each case officer on a monthly basis._
d. He approves the acquisition of new agents
and new safehouses and their transfer from one
operation ta another.
e. 'He usually maintains liaison with other
KGB units on matters related to the section's
:target.
f. 'Based on file'rev'iew 8 and" discussions with
individual case officer's, he assigns priorities
for the operations that each case officer'
handles.
g. He reviews and approves by signature the_
periodic Written reports, general operational
plans of the section, periodic section progress
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;�,.
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reports, and specific operational proposals
of individual case Officers which are re-
quired by the KGB. If the department [sic --
.meant to read "section"] chief Signs these
papers, the deputy chief still reads them in
order to keep himself informed on the section's
activity.
h. He assigns priorities for processing micro-
phone material and,telephone taps, for selec-
� ting targets for surveillance, etc.
i. He participates directly in important oper-
� ational activities and is often in contact
with agents or.agent prospects. As a senior
officer responsible for the section's operT.
ations, he or the section chief are almost
invariably present during the compromise and
recruitment of important target individuals.
He periodically participates in control meetings
with the section's agents in order to check
on the development of individual operations
and case officer's performance. 48
� Hostile interrogations in January_1965 produced a different
picture.' Nosenko said that as deputy section chief, his
principal responsibility was to supervise operational activity:
against American Embassy code clerks. His detailed knowledge
of this activity, and his description of-innovative-programs
he had instituted in this area of operations have, with few
exceptions, been fully verified by investigations and already:
existing collateral reporting.
As for other aspects of his "job description," Nosenko
said simply that he did whatever his chief told him to do,
and while he granted that. he did from time to time perform
some, of the tasks outlined above by Bagley, he denied that
he had any such fixed administrative responsibilities. He
contended that the other officers in the section were not
children-and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to-
do and how t.o do it.
Bagley's outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" Was
both erroneous and tendentious,. It. was erroneous because
it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian Word .
zamestitel, the term which Nosenko applied to himself when .
speaking his native language. When the meaning of this term
was researched in 1968, a clear .distinction was drawn betWeen
the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy":
"Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureau-
cratic practice and' usage is not:limited-to �
denoting what we think of as the number 2
in the office,' but rather "is a broader term
which can perhaps most accurately be. .
rendered in English as "assistant." 'Soviet
offices, at least at the higher levels,
commonly have several "Deputies"; some may -have
five or six or even more. In keeping.with
this multiplicity) the Soviet term does not
carry with it the same sense of responsibility
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..and authority paralleling the Chief and of
automatic replacement as the American term.
The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably
not as intimately associated with a specific
slot as is the American position of Deputy,
if indeed it is so associated atall. 106
In addition, Bagley's outline of a "deputy chief's" .
duties can be considered tendentious because it was designed
to establish a criterion of knowledgeability Which Nosenko
clearly did not meet. Had Bagley, examined the validity of.
the criterion more closely, he could easily have determined
for himself that it was unrealistic. .
How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be
Was also brought out in a paper written hree SB Division
officers -- and Serge
Karpovich in January 1969. The following excerpt is
instructive.:.
In the absence of 'a firm infor-
���15�, we were obliged to formulate
a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate
_(scp)- against which to compare Nosenko's
information. That stereotype contains a
variety �of quite fixed assumptions regarding
the authority, of the SCD in the USSR, the
extent of SCD cooperation with �the First
Chief Directorate, and the manner in which
the SCD operates. Of particular relevance,
with respect to some anomalies found in
Nosenko's statements, are assumptions re-
garding the relative weight the SCD placed
on the recruitment of agents among foreigners
as compared to the control of foreigners,
how much the SCD itself might know of certain'
events, and how much a specific SCD officer
(Nosenko) should have known and recalled.:
I believe that Some of our assumptions are
too finely drawn, with the consequence that,
at least in some instances, Nosenko's asser-
tions have been improperly impugned..:
The SB Study is, I believe, generally
reflective of an exaggerated view as to the
overall capabilities of the SCD. There are
implicit judgments made 'that the SCD had to
be aware of certain things; therefore;
Nosenko should have known about them in his
various positions. For' example, there 'is
some question in my mind as to the validity
of the assumption that KGB surveillance of
Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is
such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko
is unaware of. certain operational activities
these CIA officers are known to have performed
This possibly exaggerated view is also
apparent -when We question Nosenko's ignorance
of incidents that we know occurred and which
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we conclude, or at least suppose, are KGB-
inspired.
Finally, and possibly the most important, is
the question of control .as opposed to -
recruitment of American officials (excepting
code clerks). While these two missions are:
not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's
or our eyes, many times (particularly in the
case of Abidian) we have *faulted him for not
knowing information that would be-significant
only in terms of interest in recruitment. If
controLwas the main interest, as in Nosenko's
claim, it would appear appropriate to judge
Nosenko's information more in this context
(perhaps a comparison with the FBI'S mission
with regard to Soviets.would.be helpful.)
than in the context of CIA operations against
Soviets abroad. I Sense that the latter was
the case.112
Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn, the
Agency greatly .exaggerated the competence and, indeed, the
authority of the KGB. Even though this defector's claims
were often extravagant, they were received with very little
reserve by Bagley, Murphy, and Angleton; who; in turn applied
them across-the-board. On a different conceptual level,
this pattern of exaggeration was applied to individual
positions*within the KGB; since that organization was con-
ceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to follow that indi-
vidual officers within it wouldApartake of its omniscience.
Such habits of thought, regrettably, were self-reinforcing
in a situation where the objective of CI analysis Was not to
uncover the truth, but rather to prove that a particular
present or former Soviet official was part of a grand plot
against, the security of the United States:* It made possible
constant exciting discoveries of duplicity on the part of
any Soviet source who came under analysis,.simply because he
could rarely ever measure up to our expectations of what he
ought to have known, accomplished, or said.
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CATEGORY SIX: The A Priori Assumption. of Disinformation
as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases
Editor's Note: Like Euclid's geometry, the reasoning- of .
Messrs. Bagley and Murphy in the Nosenko case was founded
upon principles presumed to be self-evident. Without *being
fanciful, we could add that they seemed- to share With Kant'
the idea that experience was not intelligible unless it could
be interpreted in the light of one's presuppositions.
The particular set of presuppositions on which the disinfor-
mation hypothesis was foUnded have already been dealt with
briefly, and will be covered in more detail in Chapter VI.
Here it is worth noting that Bagley's conversion to these
,presuppositions took place in such a remarkably short time
that to "presupposition" we must add "predisposition" as _a
factor helping to explain the problems which ensued. In --
1968, Bagley himself told the senior author of this study
that he and Murphy were looking for some explanation for
their lack of success in the field of Soviet operations, and
that it was in the "disinformation", or "provocation" hypothesis
that they found the needed rationale. They were thus pre- .
disposed by lack of operational success to support a hypothesis,
no matter how convoluted, which placed blame for their troubles
on an evil, almost omnipotent enemy.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to account
of Bagley's conversion to. the Angleton-Golitsyn hypothesis
and, by way of illustration, to a. retrospective analysis of
the Popov case and the involvement of Nosenko therein.
1: Prologue
� It is-irOnic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have
become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the
'Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it.
Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not
been for James Angleton's conversion of Tennent .Bagley to
belief in the disinformation hypothesis. -
Some time after 19 June 1962 (date. supplied by writer,
who was brought into the case on that date) Bagley was given
access by Angleton to tape transcripts of debriefings of
AnatoIiy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in
Helsinki in December 1961.. Debriefing of Golitsyn had been
going on for over six months, compared with five relatively
short, hectic conversations with Nosenko.. According to Bagley's
statements in a 1976 interview, he spent "three weeks" in
June 1962 studyina' the GOlitsyn materials. According to
Angleton in 1976,. however, Bagley spent only three day-�-- -
studying 10 to 15 volumes, of Golitsyh's interrogation, 129,133
. Given 20 June as the earliest possible date Bagley could
have started reviewing-the .Golitsyn transcripts, Angleten's
statement of-a two- to three-day review is undoubtedly closer
to the amount of time involved than Bagley's -estimate of
three weeks. The amount of time involved is important because
of amemorandum Written by Bagley dated 27 June 1962, the
day after his interview with Golitsyn, in which he set forth.
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� CATEGORY SIX: The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation
as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases
Editor's Note: Like Euclid's geometry, the reasoning of
Messrs. Bagley and Murphy in the Nosekocase was founded
upon principles presumed to be self-evident. WithoUt:being
fanciful, we could add that they seemed to share with Kant
the idea that experience was not intelligible unless it could
be interpreted in the. light of one's presuppositions.
The particular set of presuppositions on which the disinfor-
mation hypothesis Was founded have already been dealt with
briefly, and will be covered in more detail in -Chapter y1:
Here it is worth noting that Bagley's conversion to these
presuppositions took place in such a remarkably short time
that to "presupposition" we must add "predisposition" as a
factor helping to explain the problems which ensued. In
1968, Bagley himself told the senior author of this study.
that he and Murphy were looking for some explanation for
their lack of success in the field of Soviet operations, and
that it was in the "disinformation" or "provocation" hypothesis
that. they found the needed rationale. They were thus pre-
disposed by lack of operational success to support a hypothesis,
no matter how convoluted, which placed blame for their, troubles
on an evil, almost omnipotent enemy.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to account
of Bagley's conversion to'the,Angleton'-GOlitsyn hypothesis
and, by way of illustration, to a retrospective analysis of
the Popov case and the involvement of Nosenko therein.
(b)(3)
1: Prologue
It is ironic that'both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have
become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the
Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it.
Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not
been for:James Angleton's conversion of 'Ferment Bagley to. .
belief in the disinformation 'hypothesis.'
Some time after 19 June 1962 (date supplied by writer,
who was brought into the case on that date) Bagley was given
access by Angleton to tape transcripts of debriefings of
Anatony Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in
Helsinki in December 1961. Debriefing of Golitsyn had been
going on for over six months., compared with five relatively
short', hectic conversations with Nosenko. According to Bagley's
-.statements in a 1.976 interview, he spent "three weeks" in
June 1962 studyina the Golitsyn material's_ According to
Angleton in-1976,however, Bagley spent. only three
.studying 10 'to 15 volumes bf.Golitsyn s interrogation. 129,133
Given 20 June as the earliest possible date Bagley could'
have started reviewing the Golitsyn transcripts, Angleton's
statement of a two- to three-day review is undoubtedly closer
-to the amount of time involved than Bagley's estimate 'of
three weeks. � The amount of time involved is important because
of a:memorandum written by Bagley dated 27.June 1962, the
day after his interView with GOlitsyn,-in which he set, forth
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his views on "Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened
with a:Statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] produc-
tion in the light of [NosenkoT.s] has suggested the
possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major Soviet.
disinformation operation . . ." 5 (Underlining supplied
by
2: Implications of the Popov Case
Unfortunately for Nosenko he had,, at the end of his
first meeting with Bagley in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell �
you how Popov was caught." Feelings ran high over this case,
with which Bagley had been personally concerned in a minor
capacity as a junior case officer in Vienna.
Petr Popov was a CIA source within, the GRU from January
1953 to October 1959, when the KGB rolled up the operation
in Moscow. He was the first CIA penetration of the GRU, and
was the most important Soviet source CIA had ever had until
the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any information
Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned of Popov's
clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest.
In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise, he
explained that in January of 1959, the KGB had had under sur-
veillance a member of the American Embassy in Moscow who,
they were certain, was a CIA officer -- as indeed he was.
When they observed�this man, George Winters, clandestinely.
mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter,,
found that it was addressed to Petr Popov,', and came to realize.
that this Soviet was working for .CIA. He was arrested soon
thereafter and sent under KGB direction to make several .
clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, Russell Langelle.
Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle imme-
diately after 'such a meeting, with material in his possession
just received from Popov. The Popov case was over.
. Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning
the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defec-
tion in 1961, he only knew or believed that;
A. There had -been an agent leaking Soviet military,
political and intelligence information to the U.S....
B. When CIA officer Russell Langelle was assigned
to MoScow, he was going there to 'handle "a Special
agent or mission , ."
� C. Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow then led
the KGB to Popov..
Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing,. but
added that the KGB had been led to Langelle through their sur-
veillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, George Winters.
Unfortunately, to Bagley, no statement meant 1N/hat it purported
to mean. Under GolitSyn's influence, Bagley's doubts con-
cerning Nosenko's bona fides led to the use of an analytical
technique which he described as trying "to read the case
I I
through a mirror to find its implications if it is bad:. . �
By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written', Bagley
(b)(3)
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'had decided that the story of the Popov compromise given by
Nosenko was the primary area to determine whether CIA
itself had been penetrated by the KGB.
Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov was compromised,
identified by name through KGB surveillance of Langelle
in Moscow in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the
name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn report was .
actually completely omitted from Bagley's.17 April 1963
memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not ex-
plained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn
gave a completely different story of the compromise in June
1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this
story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this
day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's
1964 version shortly, but first some additional background
is needed..
Since Nosenko had said that Popov was compromised through
KGB surveillance of Winters, the "mirror" technique indicated -
that this was not the case. The mental leap from this postu-
late was that if surveillance of Winters was not �the cause.
of the compromise, then recruitment of Winters by the KGB.
was the logical possibility to be explored.
� George Winters as a CIA officer was a maverick in anyone's
terms; that he was sent to Moscow, of all posts, was a poor
personnel selection. Both his personal and his professional
conduct in Moscow were a sorry picture. He was indiscreet
and insubordinate, especially in maintaining social contacts
with a Soviet he himself labeled (correctly) probably a KGB
officer. The Soviet was known to him as-Vladimir Komarov,:
whe had spent nearly a year assigned to the.Soviet Embassy
in Washington, D.C. After Winters reported meeting this
Soviet, he was specifically instructed to break off the
relationship. He did not; he first argued a case that he
would learn what Komarov was up to by keeping in touch.
When this was overridden,-he-just continuedto see him anyway
The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn and to
Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief Directorate
case officer who was Chief of the.Section working against the
AMerican Embassy, Moscow.
Winters' documented association with.Komarov/Kovshuk
tame to light immediately when name trace's were Tun on the
Soviet. The same reporting documented his one-time meeting
with a friend of. Komarov/Kayshuk's a TASS correspondent.
just returned from Washington, named Aleksandr Kislov.
Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his friend in
the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko
'had gotten drunk On several occasions. Asked if Kislov was
also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically �denied that he �was.
A review of FBI reporting on. Komarov/Kovshuk'S TDY in
Washington brought to light a close regular association with
Kislov, in company with a number of identified KGB Officers;
leading to a strong circumstantial case that, contrary to
Nosenko's.denial, Kislov probably was a KGB officer. His
f--.`��
�
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Contact with George Winters in Moscow, introduced by
Komarov/Kovshuk, was therefore held, to be not a coinci-
dence but:
We cannot find a convenient explanation
for Kislov's role in this theory', but
it appears significant , .
A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and Nosenko's
reporting on:Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to Washington. Both
sources agreed that it was related to recruitment of an
American who had earlier served in the MoScOw Embassy
(speculation by Golitsyn) or reactivation .of an Aterican
already recruited in Moscow (also Golitsyn speculation;
but statement of fact by Nosenko, supplemented with.
specific details which would eventually lead to identi-
fication of the agent).
Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to reactivate a
code machine mechanic, KGB code name "ANDREY," who had been
recruited and;had worked in Moscow in the early fifties. In
the first Geneva cable of 9 June 1962, in Bagleyis memoranda,.
and throughout the "Kisevalter transcripts" of 1962, this .
agent was consistently misdescribed as a garage mechanic,
althoUgh. Nosenko in fact always- called him a code machine
mechanic. Thanks to this major error in notes and tran-
scription, the FBI was hindered in its:inVestigation of this
lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in January
1964. The FBI already had located the..one possible candidate
for this lead, but could not actively .pursue the investigation
until this confusion was cleared up, By December 1965, they
.finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession from
Dayle Wallace Smith, a code machine mechanic at the American
Embassy, Moscow, from 1952 to 1954, which confirmed the
essentials of Nosenko's reporting of 1962.
George Winters was in training in preparation for his
CIA Moscow assignment during the time Komarov/Kovshuk was -TDY
.in Washington. (He had been previously assigned to the
American Embassy, Moscow, .from 1947 to 1949 as an Assistant
Attache prior to entering CIA service in .1950.) Komarov/..
-Kovshuk returned to. the USSR in February 1958;. Winters left..
for Moscow in June 1958.
The case built by, Bagley, postulating George Winters as z.
a KGB agent recruited, or re-recruited in Washington in 1951 �
or 1958,was built froth the above-summarized material as
follows:
A. Nosenko was sent to CIA by the KGB.
B. His mission .(or a major part of it) was to
mislead CIA aboUt the true cause of Popov's com-
:promise.
C. George Winters, a KGB agent within CIA,
revealed Popov's identity to the KGB deliberately',
not through KGB surveillance.
D. Nosenko lied about the Popov Case, about
KisloV's KGB status, and about Komarov/Kovshuk's
real, agent in Washington (ANDREY, later identified
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-as Dayle Wallace Smith)...
� E. Thus, there were good and substantial
grounds to doubt Nosenko's bona fides.
3: Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on tPopov Compromise Theory"
Without going into details on the Penkovskiy case, it is
important to know that in October 1962, only four months
after the first Nosenko meetings, the KGB had dramatically
announced the arrest of another penetration of the GRU --
Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA,
even more serious than the Popov arrest., and �a great deal
of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's
exposure.
Although not reflected in the Bagley memorandum of 1963,
Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the Suspicions within CIA--
especially Soviet Russia Division -- that there must be a
KGB penetration of CIA for two such calamities to have
occurred within three years.
When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working within the
KGB as a Western agent, reported that Penkovskiy (like Popov)
had been exposed to the KGB through its omnipresent surveil-:
lance in Moscow, Bagley, Murphy et al., interpreted this -
report as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal. KGB
penetration of CIA. Winters remained a principal suspect.
4: George Winters Cleared of Suspicion, 1964
Until April 1964, the above "case" against George Winters
stood as the cornerstone of the case against Nosenka's.bona
fides. At that time, however, Bruce Solie, of the CIA Office
of Security, conducted an extensive series of interrogations
of Winters, concluding his investigation with a thorough and
professional polygraph examination: Solie. established that
Winters as a case officer and as a human being was every bit
as poor a specimen as the records had shown�-but-unequivocally
cleared him of any suspicion of collaboration with the KGB
at anytime in his life
B: Golitsyn's 1964 Story
With Winters out of the picture, did the case against
Nosenko as a KGB instrument tO conceal the true cause of popovs
compromise collapse? No, merely the case against Winters_
Why? Because by this time Golitsyn had come up: with a new
story about Popov.
In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko.'s version of
the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated that the KGB report he.
had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider
running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted.
He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov .
compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information.
Golitsyn stated then that a.certain Kotov _(first name 'not
given), who' had been in the KGB in Vienna. during the period
Popov was there, suspected Popov of being a Western agent,.
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and made known his suspicions. At the time, no action was
taken by Iotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, however, when
the KGB received similar information from another source,
Kotov was sent to Germany because he knew Popov and was
familiar with his background. (Contrary to his 1962 report,
Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was
identified by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or
1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the
framework of the facts which follow.
On 21'November 1963; the then-Chief., SR Division, David
Murphy, recorded the passage to_GolitSyn, through the CI
Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including
:English language transcripts of all operational meetings
held with Popov in Vienna iii. 1953--1955, and all operational
meetings held with him in Berlin 1957-.,1958. Thus, :by the
time Golitsyli waS commenting on Nosenko's version of the
Poppy compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of every-.
thing Popov had told CIA,. specifically what was going on in
Berlin in 1957 and 1958.. This included Popov's mention of
a KGB officer named Kotov, who arrived a week or two before
Popov was recalled to Moscow, and another KGB officer named.
Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav target at the
same time that Popov worked.on this target for the ORU in
Vienna. In view of the fact that Goiitsyn's story in June
.1964 varied drastically from that he had told in March 1962,
it is legitimate to suspect that he had �recreated a story of
Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after
reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 version must
be thrown .out of court.
6: The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated
Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case,
it was Golitsyn's:.1962 version which was ignored in favor of
his "facts" of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as
strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. The reason
for this is obvious.- The Popov compromise hypothesis had
been feeding on itself for so long that it had -come to be
treated as fact, With the result that the subject of Popov's
compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet
-source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed.
with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent --
a penetration of CIA -- had compromised Popov, then that Soviet
source was held to be a part of an ever-growing massive KGB
conspiracy to protect penetration(s) of CIA By further
extension, �Nosenko's :failure to produce evidence that Popov
and .Penkovskiy had been compromised by a KGB penetration of
CIA was interpreted as proof. that indeed such a penetration
must exist.
Instead of.Winters,-the CIA staff officer who "gave away
Popov to the KGB" became Mr. "X,". and suspect after suspect
came under consideration within the Soviet Division or �CI �Staff
over the next several years. Suspicion oven extended to
Bagley, David Murphy and, finally, even to James Angleton
himself.
� The Popov compromise continued to be a burning issue for
years after Winters was cleared Of suspicion. This was the
�
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case because, inasmuch as Golitsyn's 1964 vetsiOn best fitted
Bagley's hypothesis, it came to. be accepted as the only
reliable "evidence" concerning the Winters case. The
acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only
that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also
that all Other Soviet sources must be considered suspect
if.they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result
was �to distort seriously for a number of years the ability
of the Soviet.Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona
fides of any defector or agent.
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pay_
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case because, inasmuch as Golitsyni,s 1964 version best .fitted
Bagley's hypothesis, it came to be as the only
reliable "evidence" concerning the Winters case. The. '
acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only
that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but, also
:that all other Soviet sources must be considered suspect
if they supported Nosenko'S story. The overall result
was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability
of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona
fides of any defector or agent.
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CHAPTER Arr.-
DISINFORMATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT AND
APPLICATION IN THE NOSENKO CASE
There can be little -doubt that the handling which
Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not
have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for
the Soviet intelligence practice known as dezinformatsiya'
(usually translated into English as disinformation).
Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, Some months
after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided .
information on some of the same or similar persons or leads
as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko
had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit�
him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation -- all
these factors combined to preclude "normal" professional
treatment of Nosenko. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides
should have been established, or not established, on the
basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the
information which he provided under standard interrogation.
procedures.. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a �
KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a
defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this .
prejudgment.
Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long
standing which has been defined or described by numerous
sources through the years. Two representative definitions
are as follows:-
Petr Deryabin: DezinfOrmatsiya is the deliberate
and purposeful dissemination of false information
regarding accomplished facts and/or .intentions, plans
of action, etc., for the purpose of misleading the
enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by
means of the press, radio .and television, agent reports
and communications, operations, etc. The term also
refers to the information itself.
Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term
dezinformatsiya is used to denote false incomplete;
misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to
opposition services for the purpose of causing these
services (and their governments) to reach erroneous
conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to
undertake action beneficial to.the USSR.
By means of dezinfOrmatsiya, again acCording to Golitsyn,
the Soviet Government hopes to ensure that the,policy
decisions of a given country will be based on a false
impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. .
Specifit measures taken to achieve this end might be designed
to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless.
research projects, to create a misconception about or ad-'
versely affect the stature of another country in the eyes
of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly-
discrediting, individuals who are considered, a threat to the
national interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve,
create or strengthen certain political parties.
With regard to the definitions quoted :above, Deryabin,.
cs.7 7
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Golitsyn and others have spoken from: knowledge gained as
Soviet state security officers However, implicit in all
definitions is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an
activity which is the .exclusive prerogative of the security
organs. It has always been carried out as a matter of
government policy; as �an activity which at times may involve
the security organs.
Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya
department within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations),
although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from
time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign
intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya
work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was
carried out with the approval of higher authorities within
the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with
the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU..
It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya
insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign
intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized
within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of
dezinformatsiya played any. significant role in the thinking
of CIA counterintelligence officers.
The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for
CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who
initially provided information by anonymous Correspondence
starting in 1958, and later While under interrogation following
his defection in January 1961..The information he provided
was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on
the subject of dezinTormatsiya from as early as 1953, and was
in fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but
also a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source
to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to
CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our
analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim
that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence services.
played a major role in the implementation of such polities.
Specifically, Goleniewski provided information which was
to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would'
do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer.
Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB
dezinformatsiya was the protection ,of Soviet agents by means
of action designed to Mislead Western security services. He
listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya
operations those designed to confirm important true infor-
mation, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the
reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes mis-
leading information to anti-Soviet governments.
Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation
might be designed to discredit accurate information of signi-
-ficance received by the opposition through sources not under
Soviet control, e:g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the
veracity of the source or sources of this true information
Goleniewski stated further that the information passed
through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis
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of what was already known about any Sensitive items, i.e.,
could stem from defector damage .assessments. One means
obviously might be the channeling of information at variance.
with that provided by the defector; 'Another means might be
the provision of "give away!' material, which neither added
to information already in the hands Of the opposition nor,
by the same token., did any particular damage to the KGB.
In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some
of their own important agent assets in the interest of
enhancing the reputation of an agent penetration Of one of .
the anti-Communist intelligence services. (That.this-latter
technique was used to advantage by the KGB in building
Heinz Felfe as a penetration agent within the German Intel-
ligence Service has been. assumed in most analyses of that
case. Felfe was a KGB agent fox all of the ten years he
worked for the German Intelligence Service, from 1951 until
his arrest in 1961. During this period -Felfe was able to
work his way up to the position of Chief of the Soviet Section
of the German counterintelligence staff. It has been postu-
lated that Felfe's rise in the German intelligence ranks
was assisted by the KGB, which was willing to sacrifice less
important agent assets to enhance Felfe's reputation and
position as their long-term penetration agent. Forfull
details on the Felfe case, see the study.entitled KGB
Exploitation of Heinz Felfe, dated March 1969.)
. In all its essentials; the information provided by.
GOleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn,
who defected in December 1961 and who was the first. significant
Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after:
Goleniewski. In addition, to the general definition of
dezinformatSiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or
GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya
unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit the
situation,- after review of the probable areas of information
revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated in
this connection that the Disinformation Department of the KGB
maintains extensive files organized .on a topical basis,
containing all information on a given topic which is known
(from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double �
agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi-
tion intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer'
assigned to Beirut to work against the American Embassy-mho
defected to CIA would be assumed by, the KGB Department of
Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about'
KGB .operations against:the Embassy and Embassy-personnel. By
reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Department
of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent to
Mhich KGB operations in that area had, been compromised to CIA.
On the basis of the foregoing information, it might. be
assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections Mould have
received similar handling-by the KGB Department of Disinfor-
mation and .by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the -
West. However, the two Men were not similarly received by
CIA when they presented themselves as. defectors; they received
.completely different handling, based on quite different assess-
ment of the information they provided and their motives for
defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as .a bona fide defector in
relatively short ordeX, while Nosenko was speedily rejected
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..as a bona fide defector, as explained below..
Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of
the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961.
Information which he provided relating to the organization
and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true,
at least in part because there was relatively little-record
information against which it could be compared, but also
because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable..
In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable infor-
mation on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings:
were limit0d, but the information provided by Golitsyn
proved to be .accurate to the extent it could be checked
against-these holdings. Finally,. he provided a theory of
KGB operations which was not only accepted at face value,
but received with outright enthusiasm. Given the value of
his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting,
which included an obseSsion with the evil inherent in the
KGB and an emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the
KGB.," his bond fides was accepted in March 1962.
The. reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected. in
J964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did
not receive standard treatment .as a defector whose bona fides
would be determined on the basis of the information he pro-
vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves
reference to Golitsyn. i As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn
himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the .
trust placed in his judgment:, he .was actually encouraged to
label Nosenko as a disinformation agent.
. This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts
with CIA in 1962,'Nosenko,provided information on Personalities
which were similar to those provided a few months earlier by
Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been
warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by
false information fed-to them through no matter what channels,
the "duplication" or "Overlapping" information given by Nosenko
was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led
to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn
soon after the former!s defection. The paranoid Golitsyn
_immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or
even assassinate him.
Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence officers
ndt to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an analytical
technique which has been referred to variously as "double.
think" or "mirror reading." This "analysis" led to the con-
clusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us
what the KGB wanted. us to believe. Thus,- everything Nosenko
said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had
.been unable.to recruit any Americans serving at the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow during a given period,, this meant that the KGB had
been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information
on a given topic which we had already received from another
Source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that
particular piece of information, hence the other source un-
doubtedly was a KGB agent 'a well. And so on. Facts or
material Were discarded or ignored when they did not fit the
hypothesis that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other
sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm or dealt
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with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded
as "contaminated" -.--that is to say, they were considered
part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko
figured.
Golitsyn played a .major role in this "analytical pro-
cess-". As soon as Nosenko's defection became public,
Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's
interrogation.. AS of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed
that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and
given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning
at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's
function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation
was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn-'s
assistance was required to pursue it properly. 24 Accordingly,
over the next several months Golitsyn was provided With
material-from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at
his request was supplied with all available biographic data
on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation:
On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by James
Angleton, Chief,, CI Staff; Raymond Rocca, Deputy Chief, CI
�Staff and David Murphy, Chief, SR. Division.. The following is
quoted from the transcripts of this meeting:
Golitsyn: I have made a study of the documents.
and information which was provided to me about
Nosenko and his interrogations: T would like.
now to make known my conclusions . . , my con-
clusion.is that he is not a bona fide defector..
He is a provocateur, who is on a Mission for
� the KGB.. . . to mislead, chief in the field of
investigations . .�. on Soviet penetrations made
mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate in
� Moscow . . . Why did they choose Nosenko for
that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was rec-
commended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk* for the
Nosenko could have been named or
recommended by them and the KGB gave these
people a chance. � They are very energetic -- all
of them. And, of course, they discuss things
among themselves. Many of them had mada.mis-
takes -- they had told too much. They .were;
therefore, in the damage report (on my defection)
and for them the only way to act was to Suggest
an operation against me in order to save their
face, to save the situation.. 41
It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to
discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre-
eminence as advisor to CIA '(and other Western intelligence
Vladimir AleksandroVith Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich
.Kovshuk and Yuriy,IvanoVich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were
colleagues and good friends of Nosenko in the Second Chief
Directorate, Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a
one-time officer of the' .Second Chief Directorate; he trans-
ferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the
Soviet Missioh to the European Office of the United Nations
in Geneva-at the tite of Nosenko'S temporary duty there
in 1962.
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services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to pro-
mote his contentions as to how the West was being deceived'
by the Soviet Union in political and strategicAmatters, and
thus enhance his position as advisor to governments on.
overall Soviet politital matters.
Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When
he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified documents
from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, which he made clear he
wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of
Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was
going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his
willingness, to cooperate With CIA and other U.S. Government
agencies underwent changes from time. to time., depending Upon -
whether his demands for access to and interviews with speci-
fied ranking Officials of those organizations were granted.
Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy
and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of
Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all
of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with
an "interpretation" of thel.atter's role. In any event, the:
idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's. hammering
away. at this theme that we were being "had." by the Soviets,:
particularly by being penetrated as a result:of clever KGB
counterintelligence' operations and that Nosenko had to be
"broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to
us the details and dimensions of. the Soviet machinations.
Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed
with efforts to "break" Nosenko but also to study past oper-
ations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what could
be learned from these cases about how the Soviet intelligence
services had carried out their activities against the West
through the years. This study of historic Soviet cases,
designed not to explore an hypothesis but to prove an -already-
accepted thesis, produced information about an awesome "enemy,'
cunning and complex, lavishing money and manpower on oper-
ations which were almost invariably successful: The fact
.that many of these cases were primarily of historic interest,
undertaken at a particular. time to take advantage of or
exploit a particular situation which no longer obtained or
�had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection,'appeats
to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases
included in the study were considered:to have been hugely
successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence.
services and governments, it was concluded that we were con-
tinuing to.be deluded and duped. It was reasoned that as
CIA and other Western intelligence services became increas-
ingly aware of and informed on the So-Viet operational tech-
niques being used against them and changed their operational
tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new
situation and continued to outwit us. With Shelepin and .
succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central-Com-
mittee, it Was assumed that those KGB Operation's which could
be (or were) classed as dezinformatsiya Were not only
important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as the
KGB, through its chief, was involved in the policy-making �
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body of the Soviet Union. -Consequently, any operation as
important as the one which involved sending a senior KGB.
officer, NOsenko, to the West on a dezinformatSiya mission
must have been an exceedingly important one, involving, high-
level staff coordination. Any other agents who provided
confirmatory information or whose information could in any
way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be, part
of the overall operation. .Given the importance of 'the oper-
ation, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the
whole thing himself.
No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the'
assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn,.there-was no known
case of a KGB officer ever having been sent to discredit a
previous defector in the eyes Of a Western, intelligence
service.. _After brief consideration of the notion that
Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was
decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.
Conclusions
In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to- point out that
(a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent
defection, no information has ever been developed to sub- . �
stantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn'
or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with
respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally 'consistent;
and (c) Golltsyn himself 'as the architect and sponsor of :
theories presented has not been able to support his. claims,
despite the wealth of information made available to him for
'analysis- The following is quoted from anAinsigned-paper,
dated 19 September 1968, -in summation of Golitsyn's claims:
Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet
leadership in. 1959. developed a."New Policy"
(peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics,
united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable
�as a statement of the "Right" strategy
developed during the mid- and late-fifties
and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow
Manifesto. - Golitsyn's depiction of this
policy as, in toto, a "misinformation"
operation rests upon his extremely broad
use of that term: "special deliberate
efforts .of the communist governments to
mislead Western studies and to direct them
in wrong directions" by means of official
Soviet speeches and Party documents,. ,
official press and propaganda outlets,
travel controls-, diplomatic activities,
leaks, etc.- His vbcabulary and general
handling of this new Bloc policy gives the
strategy a conspiratorial quality not justi-
fied by its essentially open and public
character.
The role of the -KGB in the execution and
coordination of this :policy is constantly
alluded to, but no evidence is provided to.
define the precise nature of its role and,
no actual "covert". disinformation operations
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are cited for the years from 1959 to the
.present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence
for "politicalization" of the KGB in 195,
but. its new role may also be interpreted to
cover routine operations of covert propa-
ganda, political action, recruitment of
agents of influence and specific "disinfor-
mation" operations without involving the
KGB .(or the Bloc intelligente services) in �
any broader role.
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CHAPTER VII
GOLITSYN VS NOSENKO: A 'COMPARISON
OF THEIR HANDLING BY CIA
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differences
in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn
and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study,
since it was.Golitsyn's ".confirmation" of certain theories
regarding, Nosenko as a dispatched agent which helped to
establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he
walked In some months after Golitsyn. It is also. material
since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko.
Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows..
Interrogation
The defections.of.Golitsyn and Nosenko cannot be con-
sidered directly.comparable, since some. five meetings were
held with Nosenko about eighteen months. before his actual -
defection. � There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn
before his defection. However; the following statements can
be made.
� Golitsyn was brought to this .country within days of his
.defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interrogatIon
procedures were initiated, which included his systematic .
debriefing regarding his own biographic .data, family background
and career, and his knowledge of the structure,organization,
personalities and operations Of the KGB. What he said was
checked against. CIA files and formed the basis for his accep-
tance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona:
fide defector:
The "non-routine" aspects of Golitsyn's interrogation were
that he was fully cooperative with his handlers only during .
the first months after arrival in this country. Moreover, he
attempted call the shots", from the very beginning, refusing.
to answer some questions, making -replieS, to others conditional
on compliance with some demand or other. For -full details on.
the manner in which Golitsyn managed to run his own interro-
gation to a large extent, readers, are referred to.Study No. 3,
a review of the case of Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn, pre-
pared in 1976 by the Counterintelligence Staff of the. DDO.
In Nosenkd'S case, he cannot ,be said to have been inter-
rogated. at all, In the strict, sense. Of the word, dUring .
initial contacts with him in Geneva :in June 1-96.2. For
thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply
offered certain pieces of information which he thought would
be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of
money which he claimed-to need. . Also, time with him was
'limited.
When Nosenko:actually.defetted.in February 1904, he was.
Interrogated in a manner which contrasted sharply 'with that
in Golitsyn's case In. the. interim between initial;
contacts. in .1962 and 'his defection in.1964,..as,.previously
�explained,. it had been concluded that he was .a -dispatched agent.
1ToluMinous.papers�had been written, during this period "proving".
that such was the case, .and. because :of, the. accumulated
"evidence," it was decided to attempt � to. "break" -him_ as soon
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CHAPTER VII
GOLJTSYN VS NOSENKO: A 'COMPARISON-
OF THEIR HANDLING BY CIA
.The purpose of this chapter is tb describe the. differences'
in handlinvby CIA of the two KGB defectors', Anatoliy Golitsyn
and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study,.
since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain theories
regarding. Nosenko as a dispatched agent which helped to
establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he
walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material
since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko.
Brief discussibn of the treatment given the two men follows.
Interrogation
�
Tho defections of Golitsyn and Nosenko �cannot be con-
sidered directly.comparable, since some. five meetings were
held with Nosenko. about eighteen months before.his actual
defection. There had been no similar contact with 'Golitsyn -
before his defection. However, the following Statements can
be made.
Golitsyn was brought to this.country within days of his
defection in Helsinki in December 1961: .Standard interrogation
procedures were initiated, which included his systematic
debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family background
and career, and his knowledge of the structure,:organization,
personalities and operations of the KGB. What'he said was
checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his acceP7
tance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona
fide defector.
. The "non-routine" aspects of Golitsyn's interrogation were
that he was fully cooperative with his handlers only during .
the first months after .arrival in this country. :Moreover, he:.:
attempted "to call the shots" from the very beginning,. refusing
to answer some questions, making replies to others conditional
on compliance with some demand or other. For full details on
the manner in which Golitsyn. managed to run his own interro-
gation to a large extent, readers are referred to Study No. 3,
a review of the case of Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn, pre-
pared in 1976 by the Counterintelligence Staff of the DDO.
In Nosenko' s case, he �cannot be said to have been inter.:.�
rogated at all, :in the strict, sense of the word, during .
initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one
thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that -Lite but simply
offered certain pieces of information which he thought would
be of interest to CIA, in exchange fora specified sum of
Money which he claimed to need.:. Also, time with him was:
limited,.
When Nosenko actually defected. in February 1964, he was
interrogated in a manner which .contrasted sharply with that -
applied in Golitsyn's case. In, the interims between initial_
contacts in 1-962 and 'his .defection in 1964,. as previously.
explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched agent.
Voluminous papers had been written during this period "Proving"
that such was the case, :and because :f the. accumUlated
'"evidetice," -it was decided to attempt tO "break" him as sobh
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11.62 (%41�,�-� kt>r
A:Ja can, '444
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as possible. Accordingly, and because it was also believed
imperative to act quickly, Nosenkois interrogation took
place in various pre-planned stages or phases, 'ranging from
ostensibly friendly to hostile.
In Nosenko s case, then, the entire effort was to force
him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain infor-
-mation from him in any logical or Systematic fashion. -
Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him.off balance,"
by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that
his only option was to "confess" that he had been sent by
ji the KGB, etc. His denials of charges or refusals to "confess"
U only resulted in increasingly, hostile treatment. While his
statements did contain inconsistencies and there were questions
for which he gave no adequate or consistent and logical
answers, the manner in which he was questioned was in no way
that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the pressures
which were put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of
a climate not conducive to proper interrogatiOn. : It was not
until October 1967, in fact, that he received 4 proper inter-
rogation--__
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bember 1961)...made certain '
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ent Kennedy. 'Golitsyn
! a close working relation-
if the U.S. Government,
Because Golitsynis initial expectations were so grandiose
they could not readily be satisfied, he "kept up a steady
barrage of demands and complaints" aimed at wringing coil-
cessions from CIA. Nevertheless, by 12 February 1962, a
"Statement-of Agreement with the U.S. Government" had been
worked out which apparently was acceptable to both sides;
it was therefore signed on that date. It called for Golitsyn's
(a) continued cooperation in providing information freely
to all U.S. Government agencies, (b) protective custody by .
the U.S. 'Government until no longer necessary, (c) continuous
consultation in the field Of political actiOn against overt
and covert Soviet foreign policy, (d) coordination with him
of arrangements for his surfacing, (e.) general agreement on
a work plan.and reference materials to be provided him-, (f)
eventual freedom to launch journalistic efforts, and (g)
-freedom-to use his lump sum payment as he desired, with advice
from the U.S.. Government. later, Golitsyn insisted that the
original 'agreement be amended by means of a codicil which
reflected more completely his claimed, motivation for defecting
("to fight the Soviet regime") and spelled out the freedom.
from control he desired. ..Even thiscodicil he refused to
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sign until he had discussed his grievances with Attorney
General Robert Kennedy, and had received assurances from
Kennedy that the terms .of the agreement would be carried
out.
Nosenko (defection date: 4 February 1964) held discus-
sions with SR officer Tennent Bagley on 17 February in
which Nosenko requested official assurance that he was
actually working for CIA, as he had been promised he would
be. While trusting his contacts-, he still felt the need
for "some tangible evidence that he had a status With CIA."
He complained of being in a state of suspended animation,
which prevented him. from relaxing and throwing himself into
his work as he Should. He ,did not appear to be satisfied
with the reply that CIA wanted to allow him a suitable.
period in his new country before binding him to a contract.
He stated that intelligence work was his only profession,
that he was not going to learn, a new profession at his age,
and that his long-considered decision to defect. was based
on his determination to combat the present regime in the
Soviet Union. 22
The folldWing statements are, quoted from the memorandum
for the record prepared by Bagley on his discussions of
17 February with Nosenko:
Speaking unofficially, I [Bagley] said that there
could be no doubt what we in CIA want since both
.Mr. Murphy and myself are .enthusiastically opti-
mistic about. future cooperation with him [Nosenko]
in operations 'against the USSR. However, I pointed,.
out our stand in this matter of contract was the.
official and bureaucratically correct one. I '
noted that [Nosenko] could not in the, long run
always lean on official 'pieces of paper. but would
sooner or later haVe-to.depend to some degree on
his confidence in us as individuals. He replied
that he did not need paper but, in fact, needed
only to be told officially that he is working
with us as of a certain date and that his salary
has. begun . . . I then asked whether he con- '
sidered me as empowered to speak in this regard
for CIA and he said he did. I then said offi-
cially that he 'is working with us as Of
- 5 February 1964 and 'his salary begins., from that
date . . We stressed:that 4 written contract
:would follow and that it would include such
administrative details as leave, provisions, etc. 22
In point of fat, the SR Division officers concerned
appear to have been "enthusiastically optimistic"'only about
"breaking" Nosenko. On the day the above discussions took
place, a memorandum was sent to the DDP by the Chief of SR .
Division, David Murphy; in, which he made the following' state-
ments and recommendations:
We can also opt for a debriefing period during
which Subject [,Nosenko] believes we trust him
while at the same time we take necessary steps
,to get ready for the final confrontation To
maintain the minimum :atmosphere of trust (and
conviction on Subject's part that he is moving
ahead in his initial goal..Which is acceptance ,by
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CIA as a CI consultant on operations), we
believe we-should adhere generally to the
statements made to Subiect during our meetings
in Geneva recognizing that we
can shape this program to our own timetable. 21
It was not until 1 March 1969 that Nosenko and the U.S.
Government entered into a written contractual relationship.
This contract defined Nosenko's -status as that of an inde-
pendent contractor or consultant to CIA. Its terms specified
that Nosenko would hold himself available at all times to
fulfill requests made by .CIA or to respond to tasks requested
by CIA, and spelled out matters pertaining to communication
with CIA representatives, cover and security arrangements,
place of residence, compensation travel and other expenses,
hospitalization and medical care, and secrecy obligations.
Nosenko acknowledged that' in View of the arrangements being
Made by CIA with respect to his future employment and welfare,.
that he had no outstanding claims against CIA and that there
were no commitments made to him by CIA, arising out of his
prior associations with CIA, which retained Unsatisfied.
Polygraph Examination
As with other phases of their respective handling, the.
.account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked con�
trast with that of Golitsyn.
Golitsyn was given two polygraph examinations,.on
27 and 28 March 1962, by polygraph operator Nicholas Stoiaken
of the Office of. Security. The:tests-were administered under
special ground rules which were established initially during
discussions held on 16 March 1962 between, Howard Osborn,:
Deputy Chief; SR Division, and Robert Bannerman, Deputy
Director, Office of Security. It Was agreed at that time
that Golitsyn was to be regarded as a "special case"; his
"flap potential" was regarded as high inasmuch as his case
had become known to General Maxwell Taylor', Chief of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to Attorney
General Robert Kennedy; and to the DCI, John McCone. There
obviously could be repercussions in the event Golitsyn was
improperly handled during polygraph sessions in view, of the,
fact that Taylor, Kennedy and McCone were aware of Golitsyn'S
allegations that the U.S. Government and CIA were penetrated
at a high 'level, and that these allegations had been accepted
to that point by CIA without reservations. Also, Golitsyn
himself had reacted adversely to the idea of taking 4 poly-
graph examination and had consented only after it had been .
brought ,home to him that the test was 'an absolute requirement
for receipt of resident alien status in the United States.
The unusual manner in which the tests were. conducted is
illustrated in the following quotations from the report later
submitted by Stoiaken:
The undersigned [Stoiaken] had a series of prey-
polygraph conferences with Ed Knowles, C/SR/C1;
Birch O'Neal, CI Staff officer, and Bruce Sone
of the Office of Seturity. :The general consensus
.of the interested parties regarding what areas
should.' and should not be covered during poly-
graph testing all reflected the fact that Subject
.{.Golitsyn] should be disturbed as little as
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possible by the questions aSked during the
polygraph test so that he would not feel per-
sonally offended and as a result become "sour,"
unmanageable or uncooperative. Furthermore,
that no indication be given to [Golitsyn]
during testing that there were any doubts as
to his reliability or defection motivation.
. . [Polygraph] coverage was to deal with
questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn] was
.a dispatched KGB agent, if [Golitsyn] had a
mission in connection with his defection, if
[Golitsyn] was intentionally misinforming his
[American intelligence] interviewer, whether.
he had any secret prearranged means of contact
with Soviet officials, if he had a concrete
plan to return to the ussR, as well as questions
dealing with his motivation l(the latter to be
asked as discreetly as possible. so as not to
disturb).
. . . It was also pointed out to [Stoiaken]..
during the pre-polygraph conferences . . that
regardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifi-
cally, even if there were consistent specific
indicationsof.deceptien to the questions, under
no circumstances should [Golitsyn] be made -
aware of the fact that [Stoiaken] had conclu-
sive polygraph evidence which reflected that.
[Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the
pertinent questions. 140
Although Stoiaken was fluent in Russian, .the test was.
given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian was
used by Stoiaken only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend the
full and accurate meaning of a question. Golitsyn raised no
objections to any questions asked, bUt Stoiaken did not con- .
sider the day's testing conclusive, because of the difficulties
which had arisen due to Golitsyn's poor comprehension of
English plus a malfunctioning polygraph.
second test was therefore given the following day,
28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of'which
Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previous day._
Before the �test could be initiated, howeVer, Golitsyn again .
had to be convinced of the necessity for taking it... He stated
that he had thought over the questions he had been asked the
previous day, and considered them "insulting.", He resented
having been asked whether he had been sen by the KGB, whether.
he had a mission connected with his defection having to do
with misinformation, his motivation for defecting, etc. In
Stoiaken's words, he resented "all in all,, any and every question
which may have reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent
on the basis of only his own explanations and 'assurances,"
Nevertheless, the test was finally conducted. Upon its comple-
tion., Stoiaken informed Golitsyn that he (Stoiaken) had con-
'cluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful �in his answers
and that, as far as:Stoiaken was concerned, the results mere
.favorable.
Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed th.e
polygraph charts, as well as the questions Which had been posed,.
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the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final report.
prepared by Stoiaken. On 19 September 19.62,. a memorandum .
was prepared for the Chief of the Interrogation and Research
Division of the Office of Security by reviewer Robert Taylor.
Taylor's report contained the following initial statements:
. .
15/21/5fill-l\
f
A review of [Stoiaken's report on the testing
of Golitsyn] reflects everything except a: �
.clear-cut statement of whether or not Golitsyn
lied or did not lie to any or-all of the :
questions. The report states that the first
day's testing was inconclusive. The results .
of the second day's testing is not set forth:
The report is :rather remarkable for this
reason. 141
� Taylor's report indicates that the first day's charts
showed that Golitsyn was very nervous during testing on that
day, considerably less so on the second. No particular inter- �
pretation was placed on this lessened apprehension, other .
than to note that GOlitsyn knew what to expect in the way Of
questions and procedures on 'the second day, and also that.,
on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than English.
Of more interest .ds the reviewer's conclusion that, while the
charts for 28 March Show no noticeable reactions to relevant
questions, they also show no noticeable reactions to any
other questions: the reviewer was unable-to-determine.which,
if any, of the questions were designed to be "hot" �or control
questions which could provoke a response indicative of. :
deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions
were not well conceived. - In addition; Taylor noted that
Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal'
biography which might have indicated whether be was with-
holding information. Taylor's ultimate conclusion was that
the charts, with the, limitations noted above; did not show
reactions indicating that Golitsyn was ,a dispatched Soviet'
agent. However-, his report also 'contained the following con-
clusion:
This should not be considered any definitive
[polygraph examination]. The conditions and
limitations placeolon.the [polygraph] officer
as reflected in the body of the report imposed
a set of conditions that preclude and make im-
possible any unequivocal statement that.a
conclusive [Polygraph examination] was con-
-ducted. .141
* * * * * ' * *
The use of the polygraph in Nosenkols'case contrasts
sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn. We shall not .
\\ft go into detail here,. because.Nosenko's polygraph examinations
\
_ '
are covered at length in Chapter VIII.: It is relevant here,
however, to make the point that those polygraph examinations
of both Golitsyn and Nosenko performed prior to 1968 were all
invalid'. Since the CI Staff had possession of, or access to,
all documents relating to Golitsyn, they were 'in a position
to know that Golitsyn had:not'been properly polygrapled. To
-whose attention this fact came, and whether any attention was
paid-to it, is not the province of this study. In the case '
� " ,
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of Nosenko, we know that the leadership of the SR/SB Division,
including Murphy.and Bagley, were personally involved in
employing the polygraph not for assistance in seeking the
truth, but to extract an admission of guilt ;from a person
who has since given every evidence of being innocent of the
allegations against him.
Access to Classified Information
With respect to their relative access to classified infor-
mation, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not stand in
greater contrast.
Practically from the.moment,of his arrival in this
country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files. He
largely achieved his ends and was soon being given transcripts
of his own debriefing sessions as well as what has been des-
cribed as a "valuable library," including reference publi-
cations classified upto Secret. Starting in November 1963,
voluminous information was made available to him by. the CI
Staff and by SR Division, via the CI Staff. The documents
and materials have been:identified by reference to (1) letters
of transmittal from the CI Staff to Golitsyn addressed to
"Dear Anatole," and (2) to meMoranda of transmittal from SR
Division to the CI Staff attaching material "for Golitsyn."
They included:
A. Thirty-two documents concerning the
Penkovskiy case.
B. Biographical sketch on, and all (83) .reports
obtained from, Nikolay Artamonov, a Soviet naval
officer who defected in 1959.
C. Voluminous documents pertaining to the
Popov case, including SW messages-, meeting tran-
scripts and contact reports.
D. Copies of the first four sub.stantive cables
from Geneva relating to the circumstances of
Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The
cables included details of the first meeting with
David Mark, a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.
E. Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko
in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the
cables described above.
F. Transcriptions of meetings 1 through 13
with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.
G. Material requested by Golitsyn in connection,
with his "-work on the Nosenko case": lbiographic
information provided by Nosenko before he underwent
hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and
handwritten.notes which Nosenko brought out with
him; a resume of the first week's hostile interro-
gation of Nosenko;-Nosenkos comments on YuriyI(rotkovs
manuscript entitled Fear (Krotkov was a writer and
KGB agent who defected in London in 1963.); and a
nearly complete collection of photo identifications
made by Nosenko as of that date.
7'71 1-i
(4
1
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140 --
/'
' H. A sanitized copy of.a.-,cable summary of
Nosenko's reactions to Yuriy Krotkov.
I. Biographic sketch of Russell Langelle,. a
:U.S. citizen and CIA staff Officer at one time
stationed in Moscow, With -a list of operations
in which he was involved.
J. Biographic sketch of George Winters, a
U.S. citizen and former CIA staff officer at one
time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations
in which he had been involved-.
K. Biographic Sketch of Edward Ellis Smith, a
U.S. citizen and former CIA.staff employee who had
. served as Security Officer of the American Embassy
in Moscow. �
L. Biographic sketch of David Mark, a U.S.
citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated
with:CIA during the period of.his assignment to
the American Embassy in Moscow, plus a list of
operational actions carried out by him for CIA.
M. ' Biographic sketch of Steve Washenko, a U.Si.
Citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated
with CIA during the period of his assignment to the
American Embassy in Moscow; with a list �of oper-
ational actions carried out by him for CIA.
N. Biographic sketch of Lewis Wesley Bowden,
jr., a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer
assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow at one
� time. Bowden had no CIA affiliation.
0. .Biographic sketch of James A. Ramsey, a
U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned
to the American Embassy in Moscow at one time.
Ramsey had no-CIA affiliation. Golitsyn was pro-
vided with a copy of an interview of Ramsey con-
ducted by U.S Government security officers (not
identified as to agency affiliation)
P. Biographic sketch of Vladimir Toumanoff, a
U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned
to the American Embassy in Moscow at one time.
Toumanoff had no CIA affiliation.'
Q. Biographic'sketCh of jean Lieberman, �a
U.S.. citizen and CIA staff officer at one time
assigned to MOS.COW.
R. Information oniLeonid Gran, Russian-born
American citizen employed as an interpreter by the
United Nations in Geneva. Gran Was the object of
a KGB recruitment attempt while Gran was on loan
to UNESCO for conference work in Tbilisi in 1968.
S. Biographic 'information on CIA-connected
personnel mentioned in the Cherepanov papers. '
This information was additional to sketches on the
same persons given toGolitsyn with the transcript
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for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva in
1964;
T. A nine-page summary of the status of
the Nosenko case., including information on the
results of Nosenko's 1964 polygraph examination,
on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation
on his life ilistory, on CIA conclusions ("daily
support for our conviction that Nosenko: was sent
on a KGB mission"), on CIA plans for future
handling of Nosenko (continued interrogation),
and on Nosenko's circumstances (confinement under
observation, without cigarettes or reading
material).
U. Copies of two reports on the subject of
KGB audio-technical operations, one prepared on.
the basis of information prOvided by Golitsyn
himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of
information.brought out by Nosenko in 1964, with
notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping.oper-
ations in the American Embassy in Moscow_had
located all the microphones identified by Nosenko
and a number not mentioned by.:NosenkO.
V. 'A repeat of -Nosenko's commentary on
Krotkov (identified above), expanded to include
identifications Nosenko made of the KGB people.:
involved with Krotkov.
- W. A list of questions which Krotkov had
suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify.
information given by Krotkov,'
X. Biographic sketches on Vladimir M. Kovshuk,
Yuriy I. Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomili, and
Igor I. IvanoV. Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers
known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir
Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having
recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be Sent to
the West to discredit Gblitsyn in the �eyes of CJA
and other Western intelligence services Feklisov �
was a KGB officer who visited the United States as�
part of Khrushchev's party in J959, and later.
(1960--1964) served as Counselor of-the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, D.C. IvanoV was arrested
by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of
John W. Butenko, U.S. Air-Force officer who was
arrested as.a KGB agent; These reports were given
to Golitsyn at his request
Y. . A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy,
a KGB-controlled CIA source; Golitsyn had asked to
"re--read" the file on Belitskiy, whose statzis-vis-a-
vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by.Nosenko.
Golitsyn was also given a background sketch of.
Belitskiy and transcripts of "all four contact
periods."
Z. File summary of the case of. GRU Colonel
Fedorov.alias Rasin, a CRU Colonel who served-as an
illegal in Fiance in 1958--1959.
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AA.. Case descriptions of two operations which
were serviced by-ciA personnel in Mbscow. Both
were KGB couriers dispatched on emigre operations
into West Germany where they were apprehended,
�agreed to work for American intelligence and later
returned to the USSR: Irina Jung and-Taisya
Konstantinovna PrytkOva.
BB. 'Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted
by Golitsyn on: .recruitable Soviets (by name and .
background); American double agents;:the Popov case;
recruitment of U.S. intelligence personnel; KGB �
operations against U.S. Embassy (Moscow) personnel;
-
surveys or Studies done by the KGB Second Chief
Directorate about arrested American spies (including
Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards (including those
given to persons who participated in the investi-
gation of Penkovskiy, Popov, StaShinskiy); the
Penkovskiy'Case; Golitsyn.
CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported
on KGB operational interest in specific persons
(i.e, operational ."leads"), and what CIA had been.
able to develop on them through investigation,- with
CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of infor-
mation provided by Nosenko on the structure and
� personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them;
"a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying versions."
DD. .Information on the operations of Igor Orlov,
CIA contractual employee in West Germany from 1951--
1961. Orlov Was identified by the Office,, of''
Security as the individual described by Golitsyn as
� a KGB penetration agent who worked for an_American
intelligence unit in Berlin and' whose, KGB cryptonym
was SASHA. Orlov had been sent to Germany during
World War. II to assist with organizing partisan
forces behind the German lines, He was captured in
1943, later served as a counterespionage officer in
the Wehrmacht; still later transferred to the
Vlasov Army; and finally worked briefly for the
embryonic German -Intelligence Service. In 1950 he
joined a Soviet emigre organization Which was
attempting to launch information cbllection, propa-
ganda and defector-inducement programs. In 1951 he
left this organitation to work for CIA. 7
By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation
of informatiOn to Nosenko is indicated by the following state-
Ment taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by David
Murphy as. Chief SR Division, dated 30 March 1964:
. . . I think we should make absolutely sure
that Subject [Nosenko] does- n6t learn a single
thing from us that we do not want him (and
eventually the KGB) to know. I think CIA has
to take a very firm position on this issue,
otherwise�the FBI might urge a delay in.cOnfron-
tatibn while they present case after ,case to
[Nosenko] in an effort to learn more from him. 30
For information .on Nosenko sHdepriyation of reading matter of'
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� la
r- 143 --
any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence
files of the sort given to GoIitsyn, see Chapter III.
Physical Confinement
'Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined
at any time. The following description of the protective
custody afforded him arld his reaction to: any type of control
is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study (No. 3)
on Golitsyn:
Golitsyn always felt the need for protection
against possible KGB retaliation, but quite
obviously believed he alone'was the best
judge of what this entailed. He wanted guards
around, but not underfoot. The record is
replete with his complaints against the guards
and his attempts to isolate them. This became
-a key issue in.the adoption of the codicil to
the Statement of Agreement in July 1962, when
Golitsyn moved into his own house 'and was
given complete personal control.of the guards
their hours of duty and their respOnSibilities.
From that point on, Golitsyn was essentially.
unguarded. His wife also railed against her companions" in the early days. She made fre-
quent:trips into Washington to shop or attend
movies, theater or ballet. At these times, she,
would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy periods
On two occasions she took the bus alone to
New York for the day, and Golitsyn also visited
New York in November 1962,. at which time he .
roamed the city unescorted. 124
'Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a'similar
pattern.. He suddenly left the United States for the United
Kingdom in December 1962,. and while in England'he lived where
he wished and had no security protection. The British intel-
ligence unit responsible for him (MI-5) asked Golitsyn to
keep his whereabouts to himself, not to. stay in one hotel
for any length of time, and to call MI-5 when he wanted to
meet. According to the study quoted above; this loose method
of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped 'in maintaining- a
cooperative attitude on his part; it also apparently set a
precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which he :
would live upon his return, to the United States in July 1963.
Upon his return here, he was given complete freedom' to set
his own-pattern of living and working, following the British
example. He obtained his own residence in New York; the
location of which.was unknown to CIA for some time. He moved
several times, developed the concept that he was the test
judge of his own security,and at times lived "almost under
the eaves.of the Soviet Mission' in NeW York-while simul-
taneously refusing to talk to CIA offieers because CIA Was
penetrated.
Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even
minor amenities fTaill the time of his defection in, early
until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treat-
ment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so :
:fully ih.Chapter III that it'requires'little further comment.
It is ofjntexest to note, however, that the Memorandum of
JJnderStanding-signed.by Howard Osborn and Thomas Karamessines
,
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in February 1969 contained.the-following provision:
Although the orientation [i.e., rehabili-
tation] process will involve an apparent
relaxation of restraint, actual control
over Nosenko will continue to deny him any
opportunity to make contact with the*Soviets.114
Given the fact that Murphy and Bagley were by now
stationed abroad, it is not wildly suppositious to 'conclude
that this provision was drafted under Angleton's aegis.
The provision also underlines once again the differential
treatment accorded Golitsyn and Nosenko as a result of .
Angleton's influence with Helms.
Conclusions
If summatiOn is needed, the following can be stated with
respect to the five areas dealt with above:
�' A: :Golitsyn controlled-his own interrogation,
withholding information if he chose, refusing to
answer questions according to his own whim, and
on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers..
Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked
to for long stretches of time), much less properly
interrogated, for several years-after,the.date of.
his defection.
� B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement
covering the conditions of his cooperation with
the U.S. Government, which met all of his demands.
Nosenko was specifically denied a written contract,.
on the grounds that an oral agreement was the
"bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his
relationship with the U.S. Government, until five
years after his defection (1969):
C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was.admin-
istered�under ground rules imposed by SR Division.
These rules produced inconclusive test results,
but full assurances were given'Golitsyn that he
had passed his. examination. No further attempt was
ever made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides during
Angleton's tenure as Chief, CI Staff. Nosenko, on
the other hand, underwent three separate series of
polygraph tests Two of the three were conducted
in such a manner as to Prejudice the result's
against Nosenko; under the ground rules imposed by
the SR Division officers on the polygraph operator,
the latter was under instructions to "find" evi-
dences of deception in the polygraph charts whether
they were theresor not. �
. D. With respect to access to information,
Golitsyn was provided with literally safes-full of
classified-documents, including files on cases
which were regarded as highly. sensitive within CIA
and to 'which 'only a very: small number of CIA staff
officers had access. Nosenko not only did not see
any intelligence material but was denied access to
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newspapers, books, radio, or even personal'contact
with other human beings.
E. As to physical confinment, Golitsyn was
simply never confined; the thought of confining
him did not even arise. Nosenko-spent virtually
all of his first five years in this country as
a prisoner, given fewer amenities .than he would
have received in Most jails or prisons within
the United States,, or in some form of protective
custody.
It seems self-evident that these two defectors should
have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect
as the other until completion of all appropriate processing
aimed at determining bona fides. Clearly, however, such
was not the view of CIA's leadership at the time.
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face of inescapable contradictions, with
the statements "I don't know" or "I don't
remember." Another technique which we had
applied could by now be seen not to work.:
months and even years of the boredom of
detention had failed to break him. It had
also been decided that no special technical
interrogation techniques would be approved
for this case.
For four years We have been analyzing and .
investigating Nosenko's story and gaining
considerable appreciation of how the KGB
developed and mounted this operation. We
felt this "knowledge" could be used to in-
crease Nosenko's feeling of hopelessness and
as such was a weapon which we had not yet
used. At this pOint, despite some risk of
error, there was little to lose by-intro-
ducing it. .
The polygraph had been used earlier only for
general questions on 4 April 1964. We thus
decided to use it as an interrogation tool
for whatever added .pressure it offered.
This interrogation was therefore .a last
.ditch effort. Its aims were as follows:
a. To gain further information and to
strengthen. our basic paper.on the Nosenko
case, now in preparation.
b. To add to the evidence in that paper
any valid results the polygraph testing
might produce on points of detail.
c. To influence Nosenko toward eventual
confession by putting our hypotheses to work:
putting to him questions so as to (1) make
him aware:of.the extent of our Ostensible
knowledge and of the hopelessness of his
position; and (2) break down the barriers
which have seemed to us to prevent his con-
fession: hope of legal release, confusion
about our aims, expectations of vindication
� or support, perhaps fear of penetrations of
AIS, OT even more loyalty to his, superiors
or fellow agents-provocateurs.
d. To gain more insight into points of.
detail which we could use in fabricating an
ostensible Nosenko .confession. Insofar as
we could make one consistent and believable
(even to the Soviets); a "confession" could
be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko. 89
er...r7171" cr
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Nosenkd's final polygraph examination conducted under
the direction of Howard Osborn and Bruce Solie, was quite
at variance with the first two. Initiated on 2 August 1968,
it concluded on 6 August 1968. The tests took place after
approximately 7,000 pages of transcripts and related
materials had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's
new interrogation undertaken in late October 1967. About
60 questions of a pertinent nature Were covered in the
interview. Nosenko wa completely cooperative, no problems
were encountered, and the conclusion of the polygraph
operator was that Nosenko had been sOstantially truthful
in answering all relevant questions put to him.
In the course of the present investigation, the Office
Of Security Was requested to make a further reevaluation of
the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October. 1966,
and August 1968, The resultant report, dated 30 September
1976 and signed by Director of Security Robert .W.. Gambino,
states:
This memorandum is in response to your
request for a review of the polygraph
charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained
during polygraph interrogations in April
1964 and October 1966, conducted by
Mr. Nicholas Stoiaken and in August 1968,.
conducted by Mr. Stephen Andros.
After a thorough review of the charts
obtained in April. 1964, it is our opinion
that the polygraph charts obtained do not
contain sufficient technical data on which
to base a conclusion of deception or to
support that Mr. .Nosenko was a dispatched
agent of the KGB . . .
Finally, the polygraph patterns produced to
pertinent questions during the August 1968
polygraph examination substantiate that
Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had
not given false information to his CIA
debriefing officers. It is our opinion.
that the examiner in that testing was
correct in his chart analysis. 1L6 �
re', 731.3
I �
j
2 it
701
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CHAPTER IX
'PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL FINDINGS
A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two
Agency Specialists, respectively a psychologist and .a
psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenko. Like so much else
which occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying mainly
in the negative sense cif demonstrating how the Services of
such professionals ought not to be exploited.,
In sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally
involved in this case were given enough misinformation about
Nosenko's bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an
accurate personality assessment. In addition, the psychol-
ogist was threatened with reprisal if he did not tome up
with a conclusion acceptable to Murphy and Bagley. . (For
details on this matter, see Chapter III,)
We now examine in, some detail the roles played by John
Gittinger, the psychologist, and Charles Bohrer, the psychi-
atrist. In doing so, we -have very much in mind the fact that
both these gentlemen are members of organized professions,
both of which impose explicit standards of conduct upon
their members. We must therefore look for possible conflict
between demands which the Agency made of these professionals
On one hand, and their professional standards on the other.
1: The Role of Mr. John Gittinger
Gittinger's role will be dealt with first because, to
judge by the written record; he was the first to assess Nosenko
from the psychological point of view, by means of a.brief -
interview and test administered 'on 23 June 1964. His initial
report is dated .9 July 1964. In addition, he interviewed
Nosenko at length in 14 sessions, dUring the period 3--21 May
1965. He then wrote both 'a chronicle of Nosenko's life and .
an overall psychological evalUation based on these interviews.
By way of background, it should be said that Gittinger -
is an extremely insightful psychologist, with clinical
experience :acquired both before joining the Agency as well
as during his CIA service. .He has developed his own system
of interpreting the Wechsler intelligence tests (Wechsler-
Bellevue and Wechsler Adult' Intelligence Scale), which he
calls the Personality Assessment System (PAS). It is PAS
which, for over two decades, has been the main resource used
by the Clandestine Service in the assessment of personality
for operational purposes.
Like any other scientific practitioner, however, a
psychologist can only function properly on the.basis of valid
data. If you put a cube of ice in a patient's mouth before
inserting the thermometer, you do not get an accurate tem-
perature reading. If you. provide an examining psychologist
or psychiatrist with erroneous data regarding a defector,
the findings Of his examination will inevitably be in part
erroneous.
Persdnality assessment instruments, or "tests," also
have their limitations They:yield:results which should be. -
read 'only' as statements of the statistical probability of the
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presence of a given personality predisposition or character-
istic. In other words, the results give the psychologist a
suggestion as to what to look for in �a person, as he
collects further data. In the case here under consideration,
the personality formula which Gittinger derived from his
administration of the PAS test to Nosenko suggested that
Nosenko might have the characteristics of a sociopath.
Gittinger's task was then to evaluate this datum within a
framework which included the following elements:
A. His judgment of the validity of his own .
test results. Note that he depended-on.a single,
English-language measurement instrument when he
examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964.
� B. Personal interviews. He had time for only
�a limited interview at the time of testing, and it
was conducted withOut benefit of an interpreter in
English, a language which Nosenko spoke with far
from idiomatic fluency. Lengthy interviews were
conducted later, in May 1965, long after the:
� original diagnosis had been made. They also were
conducted in English.
C. Collateral data, obtained from Murphy and
� Bagley, which 'were uniformly prejudicial to Nosenko.
' The latter was described as one who lied and changed
his story constantly,. and.who ..had been sent to the '
United States on a mission for the KGB. Doubt was
even expressed as to whether Nosenko was the person
he professed to be.
Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's false.-
hoods were in fact minor Ones. But Gittinger did not know
all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly and knowing that
manipulative lying is part of the psychopathic syndrome, he
diagnosed Nosenko.as a psychopath. '
. The term "psychopath" (another : term Used interchangeably
is "sociopath") itself -deserves a word of explanation;
because its connotation is misleading: �Like se many psycho-
logical terms, it evolved out of the fact that psychologists
tend to be involved primarily with people in trouble, very.
often with those who end up in prisons and mental insti-
tutions. A survey of psychological literature reveals, not
surprisingly, that the one quintessential Criterion of. a
psychopath is that he is habitually given to criminal or
delinquent behavior.- The criteria which psychologists use
in distinguishing between psychopaths and non-psychopaths
have been developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile
delinquents, criminals and mental patients; and thus the
term is really only applicable with any certainty to indi-
viduals belonging to one or another of those groups. Despite.
this fact, testing of many people who are not delinquent or
criminal may yield a score or profile of 'scores suggesting
psychopathy. . To illustrate the point, let: us take an example.
On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of
the.most widely used clinical �testing instruments in this
country), the.prefile-which suggests psychopathy has:also
been generated in testing persons who turned Out to be good
WACs in World War II, and others.who have been predicted as
likely to succeed in the life insurance .business. Yet, good
r T571
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WACs and life insurance agents are Obviously not groups to
whom we would ordinarily apply the term "psychopath."
. Thus, the fact that one has a predisposition to psycho-
pathy does not mean that you necessarily become one; the
psychopathic profile on either the MMPI Or the PAS test is
merely a warning signal of what you might do under certain
adverse circumstances_
In recalling the events surrounding the 23 June 1964
test, Gittinger is vague. In particular, he was unable to
recall exactly what information he had been, given about
Nosenko. However, that whatever information he did receive
from SR Division was tendentious in the.extreme.iS borne :
out by the following'quotation from Page .4 of his initial
evaluation:
. . . When trapped, he can be sly as a fox
and is capable of using any trick, to. get his
own way,. in his own manner. He is the -stuff
of which collaborators and informers are made:
He has been so busy playing both ends against.
the middle in order to serve his own ends -
that it is almost impossible to deteTmine his
true loyalties and his true beliefs.43
Even the personality formula (couched in alphabetical
symbols) yielded by Gittinger's test was unlikely in this
case to have been accurate. As one authority says, "It is
not very difficult to get a patient. to do poorly on 4 psycho-
logical examination . . .."*; in general,- it may be said
that to .get a valid behavioral assessment, you must elicit
your subject's maximum performances.** .Yet under circum-
stances which arouse anxiety, there is a disruption in per-
formance.
When he tested Nosenko, Gittinger was not fully aware
Of all the pressures under which this defector was functioning.
He-was unaware of the. manner of his sudden Confinement after .
glowing promises had been made of rewards .for defection; of
the falsified polygraph results, and the fact that Nosenko
had been informed that the examination showed him guilty of
deception; or of the fact that Bagley had told Nosenko that
the latter's information (later to prove of great value) was
all "crap." Given these factors, we would have to conclude .
a priori that the. resultant PAS personality profile was likely
to be partly spurious.
The exact extent. to which Gittinger's test results were
inexact cannot be determined, but one example is illustrative
of the possibilities. One part of the profile suggested that
Nosenko was endowed with a well-below average memory. That
his memory was functioning at less than average level at the
time he took: the test cannot be doubted; but it has already
been made clear that he* was functioning under extremely
Lezak, M.D., NeUropsychological Assessment.
Oxford University Press, 1.976. Page 106.
**
Ibid., page 107.
New York:
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adverse conditions, and since the Wechsler subtest which
measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be
vulnerable to so-Called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,
this aspect of the personality profile must be considered.
spurious. From Nosenko's performance during extensive
debriefings since he was, released from confinement and
began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that
his memory is in fact exceptionally good. We can only con-
clude that if it functioned badly at the. time of testing',
this Was largely due to anxiety induced by treatment
received at the hands of CIA.
As to Gittinger's characterization of Nosenko as a
psychopath, the, limitations of such a diagnosis have already.
been made clear. Since his release from incarceration,
although he. has certainly shown himself to be an empathic.
person,. winning and charming when he wants to be, he has not
shown any Of the undesirable traits associated with psycho-
pathy. Quite to the Contrary, as of this time at least, he
has since 1909 comported himself with both dignity and dis-
cretion.
As prejudiced as Gittinger's original evaluation seems
to have been by the erroneous information received from * .
SR Division, it did not satisfy Bagley. The latter went to
Gittinger's office to question his judgments (Gittinger no
longer remembers in exactly what respect) ,'and the'result
was a supplementary evaluation more to Bagley's liking.
It contained a section entitled "Vulnerabilities' which
was, once again, clearly based on the premise that Nosenkp.
was dissembling when he denied being under continued KGB
control. .Gittinger wrote
Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost
anything to get relief: Another-vulnerability
� is that he will "break" in order to get relief.
Care should be taken to continue pressure for
some time after an initial break is .secured
to allow for vacillation and modification.
Long periods of isolation after these breaks -
may be useful in evaluating the reliability
.of his information.. In general, it is better
to give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes,
� baths; etc.).for no apparent reason than to� .
tie them to periods of cooperation, etc.43
Gittinger's last major involvement in the case appears
�to have been:the series of debriefings having to do with
Nosenko's personal history, conducted during the period
3--21 May 1965. These led Gittinger to the follOwing con-
clusions and recommendations:
A. Nosenko's story was consistent with' the
previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath" (i.e.;
psychopath). �
Matarazzo, J.D., Measurement and Appraisal of Adult
Intelligence. Baltimore': Williams and Wilkins, 1972.
Page 444.
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B. Gittinger was "totally at a loss to even
attempt to rationalize why a story with this much
pathology would be used as a legend. .Nothing could
be served other than to discredit the Man to whom
it was assigned." 62
C. New approaches were neceSsary, as deScribed
in the following paragraph:
I have few specific recommendations. . The
first is to consider *a pentothal sodium [sic]
interview. Dr. Bohrer is capable of doing
this but I have no firm basis to assume that
he would 'do it . . . Second., he:tan be hit
with a hostile, or a better term would be a
needling, interrogation on his psychological
weaknesses.. His reaction to my mild needle
on him running away from a bad situation
suggests he may be highly Vulnerable* in this.
area. Third, some consideration could be
given to turning him back to. the Soviets.
The publication of his life story-:with.the
proper editorial changes .--;emphasizing
.the class distinctions and-privileges in a
classless society could be most humiliating
to the Soviets. In addition, we. could take -
the gamble of demonstrating that defection
is an honorable act of mbtivated men. .The
U.S. has no room for the.misfits and failures
of the Soviet system. 62
:The above findings were still insufficient for some -
of the personnel of SR/CI, who then. drafted a series of very
specific questions to be put to Gittinger. Of these the
first three will be quoted, together with Gittinger's
answers:
1; This man's story is full of demonstrable
lies. Often. these lies seem pointless -- no
matter from what point of view they are studied.
When challenged, he will sometimes retreat fromy
one of his stories;; in other instances, he will
cling adamantly to one even when it is clear to
all that he is lying and even When he has an
easy way out. In other words, his lies,.distor-
tions and .rationalizations are harder to under-
stand than those of most "normal" people. In
your opinion, when he lies, does he do so:
. a.. because he is a compulsive liar;�
.(Answer: :No.)
'b.. -because he seeks to. bolster his..
stature and ego for his own reasons;
(Answer: Essentially yes.)
c.. because the KGB told him to.,.
(Answer: Perhaps.)
2. Do �the incidence and nature of his.
�inaccuracies and distortions add. up to a. behavior
pattern that might �reasonablY:be-called -"normal"?'
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If not, how can it be described in layman's-.
terms? (Answer: Not a "normal" personality
but legally normal and not hbspitalizeable.)
3. If his behavior pattern is not "normal,"
Could it be counterfeit, either for personal
reasons or because he was briefed to comport
himself this way?. Could he play such a. role.
over a considerable.. period of time?'
(Answer: Absolutely not.) 69
When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division con-
cluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case, the
findings of the psychologist were included in the following
abbreviated form: '
Nosenko is d- rationalizer, a distorter, and
an evasive person clearly capable. of dis-
sembling for personal reasons.- He is not.
a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate
what he thinks he is expected to say:rather .
than to tell the truth as he knows it. He .
lies by design as well as for effect, however,'
and he does not always embroider just to '
bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor
psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions."
Nosenko's rationaliznions are not the .pro-
duct of derangement."
:The most notable quality of this summary is its.selec-
tivity. For example:
A. The summary nowhere.mentioned the diagnosis
of Nosenko as a.psychopath/sociopath. .The fact that
psychopaths generally try to evade the penalties
of their misbehavior by adaptive tole-playing (e.g.;
sudden religious "conversions" to win sympathy and -
"prove" they are changing their ways) could have-i
served dangerously to undercut the thesis that
Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist in
carrying.. out a long-term KGB plot in face of the
Sort of treatment he had received since 4 April 1964�H
B. By the.abovecited omission,- it tends to
establish a dichotomy between the 'insane" or
"psychotic," who suffer "delusions," and "normal"
people who tell the truth. It .carefully skirted
the existence of a middle ground between normalitY
and psychOticism, in which people do.not behave
"normally" but are not insane, yet this distinc-
tion-.had been drawn specifically in answer to one
of the SR Division questions quoted 'above.
Enough has been said to make clear that John Gittinger
was .put in an impossible position; On the basis of the ."facts"
provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how Nosenko could
have been selected for a KGB mission involving extended
dissimulation. Yet, Murphy had threatened reprisal against
lhim if he cast doubton the Murphy-BagleytheSis.'1-25
Oittinger was not Sure enough of his..ground-to stick to
his guns. Given his background as apsychologist Who had
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dealt previously with a number of Soviet defectors;
Gittinger had a greater degree of insight into the
absurdity of the Murphy-Bagley claims than anyone else in
personal contact with Nosenko. On the other hand, he knew
that he did not have all the facts, because Murphy had
specifically told him so. Insight is of very little use
when not -based on adequate data. '
Helms tried to help. When told, by Gittinger that the
latter did not have all the facts necessary to make a'
judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Murphy and instructed
him that Gittinger should be fully informed. . This instruction
appears to have been disregarded.
We can only conclude that Gittinger did what could legit-
imately be expected, of him, within the constraints of the
Agency's command structure..' The weaknesses which in retro-
spect we can perceive in Gittinger's diagnosis and recommenda-
tions can. be ascribed directly to.his being asked to make
professional judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The
propriety of the Agency's employing a professional in this
manner should be carefully reviewed.
2: The Role of Charles A. Bohrer, M.D.
Dr. Bohrer's role in the Nosenko operation was more
extensive and of longer duration than Gittinger's. In addi-
tion to physical examinations, it included giving advice on
how Nosenko should be treated while in confinement, advice
on special interrogation techniques such as the use of sodium
pentothal, and an assessment of Nosenko's personality. -
Dr. Bohrer has stated (in discussions with the senior
author of this report) that he had been.told when he was
first assigned to the case. that Nosenkb was concealing infor-
mation of great importance to the U.S. Government. That he
worked throughout the case under 'this assumption is evident
from the total context of his reporting. On the other hand,
there is no evidence that either the SR Division or CI Staff
shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a suffi-
cient extent for him to have.evaluated their claim; even had
Bohrer been qualified by professional background to make such
4n evaluation. -Bohrer knew and accepted his limitations in
the latter regard; for example; in a report dated 23 February
1965, after he had Spent an hour observing an interrogation
by Thomas-RYan, Bohrer remarked:
He comes off [in] his responses to questions
.(at least when I saw him) in ,the same
fashion as always though am not competent
to judge the content Of what he says, [Under-
lining added.] 60
Yet, even though Bohrer was not an "operations officer"
according to normal Agency criteria; during his long associ-
ation with this case (which included 34 examinations of
Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he acted in more than a purely
medical capacity. Not only did he check on Nosenko's health
and endeavor to safeguard it, he also advised the oper-
ational component-of the Agency on certain aspects of.their
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own specialized activities, to which his medical and psychiatric
knowledge appeared relevant. In this latter capacity,
Bohrer's name was invoked frequently in operational corres-
pondence,' generally without his knowledge; for example, in
a 27 November 1964 memorandum to the DDP, concerning arrange-
ments for forthcoming interrogations, Murphy stated:
Given . . . the assessment by both Bohrer
and Gittingetthat Subject is a compulsive
talker, we are hopeful that we will make
some progress. 52
By implication; this and other .similar references evoked
the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psychological
professionals to bolster claims of impending success so
frequently but incorrectly reiterated by Murphy and Bagley
:that they saw their own credit runninvout.
It should be made clear that throughout the Nosenko
affair, Bohrer was entitled to feel that he was acting pro-
perly in line of duty. His component, the-Office of Medical
Services/Operational Services Division, was specifically
charged with providing assistance to the oPerational'com-
ponents of the Agency. It had long been Agency practice,
both at Headquarters and in the field, for medical doctors
to function in .a partly operational capacity, even though
they were not necessarily cognizant of all aspects of the
operations in Which they became. involved. The assumption was
that senior Operations officers' knew what they were about and
that, within rather vaguely defined limits, a doctor of
medicine could accept their authority as guaranty of the
rightness of what he did to assist them.
Thus, it was only natural that Bohrer, having been told
by senior Agency officials that Nosenko was consistently lying. .
about his true mission, should accept their views. Unlike -
Eittinger, he did not even have the advantage of having sys-
tematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history; had he done
so, he might have shared Gittinger's suspicions that the SR
.Division opinion of Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge.
. Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which Bohrer
was Placed had two unfortunate Consequences: -
A.' Because he was led.to assume that Nosenko
Was systematically lying, his:diagnosis was some-
� what distorted.
B. The same assumption led him to play a quasi-
operational role in the handling of Nosenko which,
in the perspective of 1976, may seem questionable..
Let us now look in greater depth at the first .consequence.
In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a qualified
psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to ascertain whether
this particular professional, well known to his colleagues
for his devotion to duty,7was.in fact given a fair opportunity
to make an honest evaluation.
Bohrer's diagnosis of Nosenko,. which he labeled
";:"
'11,�/..
I
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"Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20 December 1964. It
read in part:
Psychiatric impression is that of an individual
who shows an above average intelligence Capacity,
is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to
have desired to cooperate and work with U.S. :
officials, his antisocial behavior was destruc-
tive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed
to pursue. His own needs and desires are of
paramount importance to him and he manipulates
those around him without regard to consequence
in order to satisfy his needs. :As such he tends
to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and
exhibitionistic. In satisfying his own desires
there is no concern for the feelings or interests
of others. There has been no evidence of a
sense of honor or of shame. He has seen.
nothing wrong with his own behavior, being-unable::
to view this from another's viewpoint. For most
of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect.
that he has operated in this manner --.without
,conscience, without guilt and has directed his
efforts at satisfying, his own needs. .He may
at.times give the impression of being a reliable.:
and steadfast person, but after gaining security
for himself and the confidence of 'others, can
shrug off major obligations easily. As with
many individuals of this personality makeup,
his disregard for the truth is remarkable'.
Whether there is. a good chance that he will get
away with a lie or whether detection is almost
certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and
can coolly maintain his position. While com-
mitting the most serious of perjuries, it is
easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.
Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to
uninviting or destructive behavior. It also
has an effect on his sexual life which was
most certainly'prOmiscuouS and marked by indul-
gence in sexual aberrations which may include
homosexual experiences.. Emotional attachment
is shallow. Although he may give at times the
impression of being cordial and affectionate,
beneath this is an astonishing callousness.
As a youngSter, this man might well have been
looked upon as a juvenile delinquent With con-
stant brushes with authority. As he grew older
this behavior most likely continued in the same
pattern with occasional brushes with the law
and perhaps some punishment. But the effective--
ness of his ability to manipUlate and protect
himself by personable appeals may have kept him
in circulation in society on the fringe, 'so to
speak: His reaction to his restricted environ-
ment is .not unusual, as some such individuals
come to accommodate to some limits imposed by
.authority while at.the saMe time not accepting
the seriousness of their situation and believing
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161
that, as in the past, they can talk their
way out. This man is capable of playing a_
role, and playing it effectively:
With this view of his personality, it seems .
unlikely that he could have achieved much
stature as a staff intelligence officer. He .
however, have been effective in various
types 'of intelligence operations. 61
On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was distussed
with Bohrer in the light of facts previously unknown to him.
Inter alia, he was given (in writing) background on the
following aspects of the Nosenko case:
A. Bagleys promises' of substantial. monetary-
'reWatds and an opportunity for Nosenko to work with
.CIA on a salaried basis.
B. Allegations of homosexuality which appear,
from the record, to stem primarily from:-"a prejudiced:
source. � .
C. The conclusion of the Director of Security,
as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr.' NoseAko Was truth-
ful and that he had not given false information to:
his CIA debriefing officers."
D. Acceptance of Nosenko's bona. fides. by both
FBI.and CIA. 127
The memorandum of conversation dictated by the senior
author following the above discussion reads in part:
Dr. Bohrer agreed.that his 20 DeceMber,1964
memorandum, as well as Subsequent. psychiatric
judgments which he had made,- were all heavily
dependent on "collateral information", which he'
obtained from representatives of the SB.Division
He agreed that, had he known the, .facts as stated
in my memorandum, his psychiatric judgments
might lave differed from those he actually made.
In connection with some of the specific points
raised in my memorandum, Bohrer made the
following observations:
a. He.was not aware of the financial or other
promises made to Nosenko,' and perhaps assumed
that Nosenko, like most defectors, was angling
for large rewards. Bohrer mentioned Golitsyn
as among theprecedents which he probably had
in mind..
b, Dr. Bohrer's reference to homosexual advances
was based on a' statement made by John McMahon.
(I did not tell Dr. Bohrer that McMahon was'in
Jact-the.."prejudiced source" to whom I had
referred in my memorandum.)
c. �regard to-Nosenko's-alleged lying- and
deception, he was totally dependent upon'the.
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judgments of SB Division personnel as well
as that of Nicholas Stoiaken... �
Dr. Bohrer stated that, until he read my .
1 October 1976 memorandum, he had 'never -known
that Nosenko had contributed valuable infor-
mation. He had also never received any infor
mation concerning NOsenko's behavior sine
his being released from incarceration at
LOBLOLLY. He expressed puzzlement at the
fact that Nosenko had net created more .
trouble for the Agency and made heavy demands
on the U.S. Government for compensation, in
light Of the facts which,' had made available
to him. 1-27
We are thus justified in concluding that, in Bohrer's
case as in that of Gittinger, a professional was not given
the proper "collateral information" on the basis of. which to
�
render a sound professional judgment.. More explicitly, because
neither Bohrer Inor Gittinger was accurately informed even
about such basic aspects. of the case as the promises made to
Nosenko (which could not possibly he considered to have had
sensitive security implications), neither man had an accurate
criterion for judging the appropriateness'of Nosenkos .�
behavior in seeking better treatment..
Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's leader-
ship that there Were good and sufficient reasons for incar-
cerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is not surprising
in hindsight that Bohrer Offered judgments and..advice:ex-
tending well beyond the bounds of conventional medicine and
psychiatry. Since his quasi-operational participation in
this 'case has been covered to some degree in Chapter III, we
need only reevoke'a few examples here:
-- His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things
are bound to Change as far as Nosenko is ,con-
cerned -- he is.either going to stop faking. or
things will get worse."' 72
His judgment, reported by Murphy on 26 April �
1966, that reestablishing contact between
Nosenko and the interrogators would be a.
serious mistake because it would constitute a.
"relief," 76
-- His opinion, offeted after monitoring the
6 July 1966 meeting between. Bagley and Nosenko,
that "the way in which the interview Was con-
ducted would very effectively slam shut another
psychological door," 81
Admittedly, the above comments come to us second-hand,
via memoranda Written by others. Nonetheless, they are con-
sistent with everything in Bohrer's handwritten reports of
his visits to Nosenko in confinement, which are appended as
Annex B. Since they are available.to the reader in toto,
it will ..suffice here to illustrate our point with one
example, quoted from Bohrer's 14 July 1964'report of a
visit to Nosenko,'by then incarcerated in ..Clinton, Maryland:
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Subject was seen for [the] first time in
over two weeks. His general physical condi-
tion is satisfactory and his weight is now -
170 lbs. There is evidence however that he
is reacting psychologically to his detention
and is showing increased tension, anxiety and
is misinterpreting various stimuli in his
environment. -More significant is his con-
viction that he is being constantly photo-
graphed in his rooln� and in the "privacy, of
his bath.". The Iattet is most disturbing
to him especially being photographed totally
nude. 'He describes hearing the sound of .
mdvie cameras especially in the bath and was
quite disturbed over having pictures made
without his "panties." .(This is the exact
word he used.) I asked how pictures were
being taken in his TOOM and he got off the .
bed, walked over to the door to his room and
pointed to pin holes on each side of the door
through which he was being clandestinely
photographed. He said he had taken photo.-
graphs of people in compromising positions
for operational use in [the] KGB and he
understood the 'reason for this. .:But he did
not understandwhy the guards continued to.
take pictures.of.him -- especially in the
bath. In the guard log is a notation 'last
week about a request from him that picture
taking be stopped. This sequence, I am con-
vinced, was not play acting. The nebulous
situation he finds himself in is beginning .to
take its toll. From the psychiatric stand-
point this is Viewed as first sign of dis-
integration of personality and loss of con-
tact with reality. It may progress or 'it may
remain at this level. It is interesting that .
,this first indicator Centers around his
"privacy," being in the nude and is concerned -
with sexual identification and his under-
lying concern over this. area.. At this
juncture I do not recommend any changes in
his management [underlining-is ours] other .
than those previously suggested, -i.e., reading
material; writing Material,, chair and table
in his room. He has been given reading
material and writing material and I understand
from Pete Bagley, who is aware of the above
Visit., that chair, table, and cigarettes in.:.
the toom are.forthComing.in the next day
Or SO. 44
10:
Although Bohrex later changed his mind, and expressed
the conviction that Nosenko had been faking his signs .of
psychological deterioration, .the reasons behind his assurance
are not evident, at least to the lay mind. There have been
ample studies of the effects of isolation and sensory depri-
vation on human beings, triggered in large Measure by the
demands of the space program. :They are only partially rele-
vant to Nosenko's situation, because no experimenter in the
non.-Communist world .has ever attempted to impose social
isolation or other forms of deprivationon eXperimental
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subjects for More �than a few days at a�time. (The Soviets,
.who are bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed
-durations of up to 60 days.) Nevertheless, while various
researchers have obtained diverse results, there is ample
evidence that certain psychological, physiblogical, and
behavioral impairments do indeed result from severe restric-
tions being placed on physical activity, sensory stimulation,
and social interaction; and this generalization seems to
apply to Soviets in much the same way as it does.to.AMericans
Bohrer's judgments were no doubt based in good faith on his
clinical judgment, but the question remains as to Whether �
the latter was not distorted by his apparent commitment to
the cause of "breaking" Nosenko. ..Thus we are-Jed inevitably
to the problem of whether such a. commitment is appropriate
in the case of a doctor of medicine. �
� Once again the question of propriety has arisen. We
recommend that the Agency pay more attention to the issue-of
,how medical personnel-may be properly utilized than it has
heretofore.
3: Conclusions
The senior author of:this study spent i72 making a
'study of Soviet agents-in-place. �Two of the conclusions of
that study are worth requoting in part four years later:
. We have not always used out Agency
psychiatrists and psychologists to best
advantage. When we deal with computers,
we know that we have to call...on specialists.
to help us, but we have a false self-
confidence in dealing with people. This
self-confidence is allowable when we are
dealing with people Who are normal, but
unfortunately many Soviet defectors and
Just about any Soviet who is willing to
serve as an agent-in-place are not psycho-.
logically normal. . They therefou require
very specialized handling'. . ,
. . . An operational death wish seemed to over-
whelm us, as we insisted on ascribing every
aberration of the agent(s) to Some sinister
design of the enemy. Granted that we must
always keep in-mind the possibility of an
agent's being under opposition Control, as
long as there is. a chance that he is genuine
we should never let him become aware of. our
suspicions. 'We have missed some Major oper- **.
ational.opportunities by violating this rule. 7'
For more details, see Zubek, J.P� Behavioral and
Physiological Effects .of Prolonged Sensory and .
Perceptual Deprivation, in Rasmussen, J.E.�-Man in
Isolation and Confinement. Chicago: 'Aldine, 1973.
**
Memorandum to Director Richard Helms, dated 29 December.
1972 (ER.72-6579). -
.***
The' Hollow Men: A Theory Regarding.Soviet Agents-in-
Place, Section IV-E.. This StUdy-was transmitted to
Helms under�cOver of. the memorandum cited above.
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165 --
. In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our failure
to:Make-use of the psychologists/psychiatrists, but in our
gross. misuse of them. CIA officials in charge of the Nosenko
'case until 1967 sought assistance of professionals from this
.field, as they did from similar people in other fields, only
to help shore up certain stubbornly-held misconceptions.
What they should have done, on the contrary, was to bring
them in at the inception of the case to assess as accurately
as possibleNosenko's psychodynamics and, *on the basis of
this assessment, to evaluate his bona fides and his possible
operational usefulness. Instead,. the_Agency proceeded in
:the reverse order..
For their.part, the psychological/psychiatric profes-
sionals were not of as much help as they could have been.
They had become accustomed over the years to playing a sub-
ordinate-support role to the operators, and had developed a
"you tall-we haul" attitude. which is inconsistent with the
independent-mindedness legitimately to be expected of a �true
professional.
In addition., because of the doctrine of compartmentation,
the knowledge which the Agency's psYthologiCal/psychiatric.
professionals have had to contribute has, at any given time,
been much less than it could and should have been. The
persons exercising command authority in the Agency have not.
even had enough understanding of the differing techniques
employed by the Agency's own psychological and psychiatric
staffs to know when to call upon one rather than the other.
Nor have most of the senior executives within�the Agency
had the faintest glimmering of the fact that an accurate
understanding of. the symptomatology of Soviet agents and
defectors 'could only be achieved by a long-term program of
data collection regarding them. On the initiative of the
:psychologists or psychiatrists themselves, some efforts at
data collection have been undertaken, and some useful research
has been carried out. But, overall, the effort has been
sadly. insufficient.
Thus, as was certainly true in the Nosenko case, the
Agency seldom receives the .best advice that could be expected
from the psychological/psychiatric professionals-, even when
it does call on them. We are including a. recommendation on
this subject in our.final chapter.
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CHAPTER X
IMPACT OF THE "MONSTER PLOT" ON CIA'S
POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MISSIONS
The effect of "mirror reading" analysis, as practiced
by many officers of SB Division during the 1960's, was to
impede the development of new sources of information. This
technique also cast doubt on the bona fides of existing
agents and sources, and caused confirmable information.to -
be treated with skepticism if it had been received from a
supposedly "tainted" source.
It has-not been possible, in the course of this study,
to examine in depth the negative effect which the Angleton-
Murphy-Bagley thesis (often referred to within the Agency as
the "Monster Plot") had on the development of new positive
intelligence operations, because the search of numerous
developmental case files, in which the impact of the .thesis
is known to The reflected, would have been too time-Consuming.
Had time permitted, however, there is no doubt that we could
have amply demonstrated the thesis' baneful effect.
Because time has not permitted us to document the problem
across-the-board,-we have chosen instead to concentrate on
two Cases b way of
(b)(1)
The second concerns two Sovie-ODOblo-
mats, Vladimir P. Suslov and Vasiliy V. Vakhrushev.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
'LI I
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(b)(1
(b)(3
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
r.:47
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
77,
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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176
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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-- 178 --
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
2:. Effect on Other Potential Operations
As previously mentioned, limitations of time have pre-
vented an in-depth study of the effect of the Nosetko case
on positive, human-source intelligence operations against
the Soviet Union. There are differing views among persons
we have talked to on this subject, each probably reflective
of some aspect of a.complicated situation.
The cases of Suslov and Vakhrushev provide a good �
example. .loth men were long-time friends of Nosenko:- Con-
cerning both, we had reliable, independent confirmation of
possible vulnerability to recruitment. At the time Nosenko
proposed that we mount operations against them. with that aim
in mind, neither would have qualified as a top priority
target, yet they were sufficiently high-ranking in the
Soviet hierarchy to be of interest .and both were very well-
connected with other, more important Soviet officials.
Suslov was Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the
United Nations Secretariat � in New York at the time of Nosenkb's
proposal. Vakhrushev, who inter a_lia had once served as an
escort-interpreter for-Vice President Nixon during the latter's
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visit in 1959 to the USSR, was Counselor of the Soviet dele-
gation to UNESCO in Paris. Both men drank excessively, had
had marital problems, and manifestly enjoyed the amenities
of life outside the Soviet Union.
As of mid-1964, Bagley felt :that SR Division should not
take advantage of the opportunities which their ready
accessibility in New York and Paris presented. As usual,
it was precisely the fact that we possessed confirmatory
information regarding their vulnerability that weighed most
heavily against them. In a 7 July 1964 memorandum,- SR
Division stated:.
Nosenko is offering us two prime targets
for recruitment, both old personal friends
of his, neither of the KGB and both now
serving abroad.. One is V.V. Vakrushev [sic]
in Paris, the other is VladiMir P._Suslov in
New York. Neither has been recalled as a
result �of NOsenko's defection, and Nosenko
himself claims the KGB is not aware of his
special relationship with them. Suslov has
come to our .attention through other sources
and through his own indiscretions, supporting
our suspicion that he is being offered to us;
.Vakrushev [sic] has been recently mentioned
by [a medium-level Soviet official who was also
a CIA agent], possibly to feel out our inter-
est. Nosenko, in strongly urging us to
recruit aggressively among Soviets, and parti�
cularly these two, has commented, we think,
'significantly, "Some won't work, some will;
we mustn't be daunted by failure but must -
push on." It thus appears that. the KGB might
be offering us new "agents" among UN person-
nel whose later _"discovery" by the KGB could
involve us in a major political flap. 42 .
Had the question of pursuing these operational leads
been left to Bagley alone, it is fairly certain that no attempt
would have been made to exploit them. His view was summed up
as follows:
We are fighting in the bull's terrain --
strongest there Of all available Sovs;
Suslov would give us the closest-in xeaction,.
but he best briefed, has tricks we don't kno;61-a
'Murphy's attitude, on the other hand,' was less one-sided...
He was an activist; as he said when debriefed on 16 July 1976,
" . . . The most difficult thing that I hacias a personal
problem during all that time was , . to insist on the
development of the Division as a whole and try to push new
cases." On the- other hand, he was troubled by the
supposed inconsistencies in Nosenko's Story:. "All this time,
I had this other thing and my attitudes toward it were in
part based on some of my own experiences. . . I certainly
didn't believe that Nosenko was entirely bona fide . �,, 131
'Within the S.B.Division itself; the conflict was apparently
never satisfactorily resolved as' long as both Murphy and
Bagley remained in positions of authority within it. We have
already seen Leonard McCoy's April 1966 letter, in which he '
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180 -
� spoke of "the morbid effect which the Nosenko. case has,
� and will continue to have, on intelligence collection
against the USSR . . ." (See Page 81 of this study.)"
A report by the CIA Inspector General, published in October
1968,. was highly critical of SB performance
between 1964 and 1967, and attributed the Division's problems
to �preoccupation with the Nosenko case. The report states
that the Division "gained'a reputation for -excessive .
pessimism'. . . for being one-sided in-its approach to
counterintelligence, security, and operational matters..
. . , Facts and implications are repeatedly marshalled to
show the RIS at work continuously,. on-a massive scale, aiming
their work at us, and practically-never Missing a trick," 11D
The fact that even Bagley was somewhat torn between the
demands of his CI role and the necessity for collecting intel-
ligence is implied in an interview which he and another
senior SR Division officer had with Helms on.19 November 1964:
Mr. Helms wanted to know what we expected
to gain from our operation against Vakhrushev
in view of the fact that we believe him to
be offered to us by the KGB.. We pointed out
that Vakhrushev's family -connections and
official position in Paris should give him
access to.positive and counterintelligence
information of value, and that we could take
what the KGB was willing to sacrifice and
sort the good from the bad. Mr. Helms
remarked that this had been taking us months
with Nosenko.and doubted that we want.to'get
into a similar situation again.50
Although time has not permitted us to examine the record.
of the Vakhrushev and Suslov cases in detail, it 'is evident
that before and after the above conversation, periodic'
'efforts were made, as the occasion arose, to capitalize on
the Vakhrushev and Suslov-leads. Hoy efficient or resource-
ful these efforts were, given the suspicions which surrounded
the two targets, we have not been able to deterMine..
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3: How CIA Worked t Defeat Itself.
The lessons to be drawn from the
Vakhrushev cases are clear'.
(b)(1)
Suslov, and
(b)(3)
The case in particular demonstrates that
Nosenko was not an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary,
he was the victim of a system of illogic for which it'iS
difficult to find a parallel in Agency history. Secondly,
it brings into sharp :relief a pattern of self-defeating
behavior within the Agency in its conduct of intelligence
operations against the United States' single-most threatening
adversary.
The collection of intelligence has been less systemat-
ically reduced to a coherent doctrine than most other
Governmental activities, because secrecy and compartmentation
have often combined to keep even-its more senior practi-
tioners from comprehending the process as a whole. -Yet
there has been one basic principle upon whiCh. neophytes and
old hands alike have long depended; this-has been the
evaluation of information from one source according to the
degree of confirmation by other independent sources. ::The
usefulness of this relatively simple principle has been,
accepted in the past as applicable in the field of both posi-
tive and counterintelligence.
The Monster Plot shattered the whole basis for confir-
mation. As long as any defector or potentially recruitable
agent was to be viewed as. possibly in some way responsive -
to a Soviet supra-authority fostering and directing a "grand.
design" directed at deceiving the United States, there were
by definition no longer any Valid independent sources. Quite
to the contrary, everything any source-said could be part of
the same integral, though infinitely .complex,.pattern of'
deception. .
Difficulties produced by the above:assumption were
aggravated by a pattern of dichotomous thinking. . The SOviet
defectors and agents-in-place who came under analysis were
either 'good or bad, normal or psychotic, trustworthy to;the
nth degree (e.g., -Golitsyn, Deryabin) orYchreats to U.S.
national security. A middle ground was seldom given serious
consideration.- This predilection for dichotomies was made
to order for Golitsyn, because paranoids do.tend to divide
all humankind into two categories:. their own persecuted
selves on one'hand; and the persecutors on-.the other. Even'
Where persecutors and persecutees can be shown to exist,
rational men tend to see a preponderant middle component in
the population, whereas in paranoid thought the fallacy
which logicians call the "law of the excluded middle" is.
prevalent:.
It is troubling that so many Otherwise able CIA officers
fell prey to this fallacy; but why they did so is beyond the
competence of this study. Whatever the reason, the result.
was to reduce SB-Division.to a house chaotically divided.
It is the view of a number of 'senior 'CIA intelligence officers
who lived through the difficult period of the 60's and to
whom we have talked during this investigation, that, the
Monster Plot thesis set CIA positive and counterintelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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programs back by a number of. years. And though we maybe
tempted to look back and say that this is now water over
the dam, there can be no assurance that such is the case.
For if One poses the question of how many additional Soviet
� agents and defectors we might have gained had our handling
of those who did approach us been better calculated to en--
courage, rather than discourage, them, the only answer is:
Nobody knows.
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- 183 --
CHAPTER XI
METHODOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP:
Our Letter of Instruction-requested �that we address
ourselves to "the nature and validityof.methodology of
previous Nosenko bona fides studies." We have interpreted
this instruction as referring to those studies made under
the auspices of David Murphy and Tennent.Bagley, with input
from the CI Staff,. between 1962 and 1968. Our attention
� has been principally devoted to the so-called "thousand-
page. paper," of February 1967, and the briefer, revised
version published in February 1968.. We also have reviewed
a very large number of formal and informal writings, many
. of which have been quoted in previous chapters; all will
be found included, in their full versions,- in the annexes-
1: Lack of CI Methodology
Webster's New jnterhational Dictionary- (1954) gives,
as one of its definitions of Methodology, the following:
-A branch of logic dealing with principles
of procedure, whether of theoretic or
practical science.'
While the Word "methodology" can perhaps be stretched to
include many things, it is doubtfulthat'it could be so
defined as to encompass the technique's which Bagley described -
as "mirror reading" without being distorted beyond recog-.
nition. Certainly, no possible definition could cover mis-
translation, selective omission of data, and deliberate misuse
of technical data-gathering equipment (i.e., the polygraph).
The disturbing fact is that the analytical and investi-.
gative procedures and techniques employed in the Nosenko case
were all in varying degrees viewed by the major protagonists.
-- Messrs. Angleton., Murphy,'and Bagley as legitimate
exercises of the counterintelligence process.: We.dp not
believe that they were.
We accept without question the necessity for counter-
intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process
concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert and
clandestine activities against the United States and our
allies.� But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its
purposes, must employ.an orderly and systematic methodology.
Unhappily, in .the Nosenko case it did no such thing..
We are forced to conclude that, in:the 1960's, when
Golitsyn, Nosenko, and contacted CIA, the Plans (WO)
Directorate and its Clandestine Service were intellectuaTly,(b)(3)
technically, and procedurally Unprepared to handle them.
A useful study entitled KUBARK Counterintelligence Interro �
-
gation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the handling
of Nosenko gives no indication that .any Of the Agency per-
sonnel directly involved had profited from it, if 'indeed
they had read it at all. Insofar as we can ascertain, in
respect to Soviet nationals, the Directorate lacked:
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A. Explicit written criteria to be applied
in evaluating bona fides of a defector or pro-
spective agent.
B. Explicit written procedures for the col-
lection, analysis, and evaluation of the counter-
intelligence product of a defector or prospective
agent.
. C. Explicit written procedures for psycho-
logical evaluation of a defector or prospective
agent.
D. Any broadly-based systematic data base
(or systematic written procedures for employing
it, had it existed) regarding the relevant psycho-
logical characteristics of Soviet agents. There
did exist some psychological data regarding
defectors, but they had not been collated and
analyzed, nor were they objectively applied to
the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn. The latter
was himself never even tested.
2: Influence of Angleton on Methodology
The predominant influence in the_CI.field within the
Agency until 1975 was James Angleton, a man of loose and
disjointed thinking whose theories, when applied to matters.
of public record, were patently unworthy of serious con-
sideration. His contention:that-the Sinb-'Soviet schism was
a disinformation project carried out under the direction of
the KGB was subject to ridicule., even by some of his friends.
and supporters.
Angleton's reputation for expertise rested, therefore,
on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide
covert political role. .In truth, no one could compete with
Angleton as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based
on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more
imaginative than systematic, and therefore neither easily
comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike
the Emperor and his :imaginary clothes, Angleton's fantasies
were never vulnerable to objective examination, simply
because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of .
secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a
minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the
intelligence community, both American and foreign, he .doled
them out selectively -- seldom in written form to prove
whatever point he was trying to make at the time.
Angleton's preference for oral over written communication
is worth emphasizing. During his incumbency as its Chief,
the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its possession
information concerning a horrendous hazard to both the
United States and its allies, never committed to paper any
complete,, written, �documented report on the subject. There-
-fore, the threat could never be systematically analyzed and
evaluated. Only when Angleton finally departed did dispas-
sionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings finally become
possible, and it has consistently failed to support his
central claims regarding the KGB's massive influence in world
affairs.
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B. During the same period,rihe Agency was �by
contrast successful in developing a number of
in-
place human sources who reported strategic intelligence
on the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.
C. Almost without exception, the human sources
� mentioned in sub-paragraph B volunteered their -
services in the first instance; the Agency did not
� develop them from. scratch. After they had of their
own initiative indicated some degree of willingness
to cooperate with U.S. intelligence, the Clandestine
Service attempted to assert Sufficient Control over
them to enable us to guide their collection acti-
vities. In some cases., there was also a question
of whether a Volunteer would defect Outright,
meaning that he would leave his native tertitory.
to seek asylum in the nail-Communist world, or
alternatively remain in place in order ta provide
a continuing flow of intelligence; the Agency.
,normally attempted to persuade the volunteer to
take the latter course. It was in such ways, then,
that the Agency can be said to have "developed" its
best agents.
The above definition of "agent development" may seem,
to some well-informed readers, so self-evident as to be
superfluous. It is not, however; for Agency claims of
success in the human-source collection field have often been
so phrased, whether intentionally or not, as to give the...
impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the
process which, in Clandestine Service parlance, is called
"development and recruitment." The impression that we
"recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources, in the
1949--1970 period, following a period of orderly development
must be dispelled before there can be meaningful' discussion
of previously described lacunae. In most major Soviet cases
prior to 1970, it might be more nearly cortect.to- say that
the foreign nationals involved "developed" the Americans.
In the case of Penkovskiy, to cite an extreme example, �U.S.
officials Made even the latter process so outrageously diffi-
cult for him that he had to write a letter to both the Queen
of England and President Eisenhower in Order finally.to
achieve a clandestine working relationship, with the 'British
and American intelligence serVices.
Points A, B, and C above are also validas applied to
the field of counterintelligence information; with one
im-
portant exception. In the CI field, much information has
been obtained from spies of hostile powers arrested in areas
under the control of the United States or nations friendly
to us. Thus, in this latter field, we are not as dependent
on agents OT defectors- as we are in the case of the positive
intelligence collection effort.
Within the framework of what has just been said, we can
now judge the seriousness of the lacunae listed on page 184.
If our most signifitant positive intelligence and much
of' OUT most significant -counterinteilligence from human
sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals
who volunteered their services, why did we fail'more fully
to systematize their handling? Even more to the point within
the. framework of the present study, why would we not give such
persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt: rather than
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--� 191 --
CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1: The Letter of Instruction
General guidance for the preparation of this report was
contained in a Letter of Instruction, signed by the Deputy
Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It assigned the
following tasks:
You are tasked to write an analysis of the
Nosenko case which will address the following .
matters:
a. The bona fides of Nosenko.
b. The value of Nosenko to the United
States and allied governments.
c. The relationship and significance of
Nosenko to other agents and operations.
d. The identification of unexploited
Nosenko penetration leads and information.
e. The nature and validity of methodology
of previous Nosenko bona fides studies.
We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather
liberally, because the ramifications and implications of the
Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and .
probably the framers of the above Letter, anticipated. None-
theless,. we Shall commence this concluding chapter with
responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a through .
e above.
1-a: Bona Fides
Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own
making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person,
as well as of gathering and evalUating the intelligence he
had to offer, been handled properly he could have been
declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other
Soviet intelligence officers.
This is not to say that we can be certain bf the genuine-
ness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically
possible that the Soviet Government-, acting through the KGB
or some other instrumentality; will attempt to plant an .
intended "disinformation agent" or prospective penetration
of our Government on our doorstep. But the Usefulness of the
Soviets' doing so, in the manner ascribed to them in the
Nosenko case, is probably as slight as is the feasibility.
Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other
countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable.
,By 'contrast, there is no record of the USSR successfully
infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power
by'use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen',- least of all one
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-- 194 --
recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem
necessary.
3-a: Examinattion of the Role of Professionals
. We recommend that the role which can properly be
played within the Agency by members of the organized pro-
fessions -- medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and
others 7- be given careful study, -within the context of
(1) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best
possible use; while (2) refraining from involving them in
matters not properly within their professional purview.
3-b: Improvement of Intellectual Standards
We recommend that the Operations Directorate, � and its
Clandestine Service', take whatever steps are possible to
ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is.
equal to the exigencies of the future.
We.realize that the present personnel selectibn system
sets high standards for those entering on duty at the.pro-
fessional level, particularly as regards IQ.and education.
But the standards presently in force do not by themselves -
guarantee that' future selectees will possess independence Of
.mind, analytical ability, and objectivity.
In the case of personnel already on board, it" should be
kept in mind that we 'live in a rapidly-evolving, technologi-
cally-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual
skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years
from now. For an intelligence organization-, we define
"inadequate" as anything which is less than the best.
We suggest that a board of expert consultants be estab-
lished, drawn primarily from research institutions, high- �
technology enterprises, and.the academic world to recommend
a program Of screening new entrants, and improving the
analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of
achieving and maintaining a high level of intellectual
excellence throughout the Operation's Directorate.
3-c: Detection of Deception
We recommend that high prior it be accorded a program
to develop new methods 'of detecting deception.
Some steps are already, underway in this regard, but
they should be extended and given greater emphasis. Present
methods, based mainly, on the use of the polygraph, are clearly
obsolete.
� ,
Specific criteria-.Of�bona fides will follow naturally
'from improved methods,' of detecting deception,
3-d: Collection, Analysis and Evaluation of CI Product
We are hot'making a recommendation in this regard -
betause, although well aware of the inadequacies of the
Nosenko period, we do not 'know how the matter is now being
handled.
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3-e: .Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent
Handling and Personnel Selection
We recommend a multi-track program of psychological
.research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's
needs, to'develop.a new generation -of personality assessment
techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and
.selection of DDO personnel. This program should be under
direct DDO control.
A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists
within the Agency; and some valuable research is underway,
but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it
could be. Instead; it is being handled by DDSU/ORD/Life
Sciences.Division, which currently accords it a low
priority and may eliminate it altogether.
It is theoretically possible to establish, within the
reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological
correlates :of a number of personality types.
It is also theoretically quite possible, .though not yet
demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological
correlates we could take Much of the guesswork out of
personality evaluation. We would.thus substantially reduce
the threat which the employment of unstable or anti-social
personalities (e.g., Philip Agee) poses fox -the Agency, and
particularly for the Operations Directorate.
3-f: Further Research on Past CI and SE Division Cases
We recommend that the psychological research program �
(sub-paragraph 3-e) be supplemented by continuing research
on past CI and SE Division cases involving Soviet or Soviet
Bloc nationals. The purpose would be to extract possibly
objectifiable indicators of the personality of the defectors,
agents, or suspects involved, in order thata personality
typology be built up to cover persons in those three cate-
gories. Such.a typology should enhance Our ability in the
future to predict the behavior of such persons, as well as
to improve our handling of them.
.3-gl Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors
We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation,
by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement .
.techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors
from the denied areas.. We recommend against dependence on -
psychiatric examinations, unless the psychiatrists are
willing to use the same standardized instruments as the
psychologists would.
Although few., if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Blot
agents to whom we have.had direct andcontinuing access have
ever been tested as long, as they remained in agent status,
we do not accept as valid the reasons usually given for not
testing them.
. Implementation of this recommendation would, if the,
other programs above--recommended are also carried out, con-
tribute substantially toward .authentication of agent sources
and information.
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4: Review by Higher Echelons
In addition to review at the appropriate echelons of
command, we recommend that this report be thoroughly reviewed
by the Inspector General and General Counsel.
Although the statute of limitations presumably renders
impossible criminal actions as a result of this case, there
Will remain virtually indefinitely the threat of an action
for damages on the part of Nosenko. In the view of the,
senior author, this danger is minimized by keeping Nosenko
actively and productively engaged in work on behalf of the.
CIA and FBI. Nonetheless, the possibility of Nosenko's
eventually deciding to press publicly for further compen-
sation cannot be totally discounted. The Agency should -
thetefbre be fully prepared in advance for such a contingency.
5: .Moral .Responsibility
We recommend consideration be giVen. to establishing a
written. code.of moral responsibility for Agency employees.
Even the conduct of a declared war is to some extent.
restricted by certain morally-based limitations, such as the
Geneva Convention. While the nature of clandestine and covert
activities demands exemption from many legally-imposed limi-
tations, this fact should not be taken tojmply a total'dis-,.
pensation from all moral imperatives. We believe, for
example, that the long incarceration of Nosenko and.the
were morall(W)
indetensible. (b)(3)
- We suggest that there should be enough consensus within
the Agency regarding categories of impermissible actions for
an explicit .code of moral or ethical standards -- call them
what you will --.to be established and enforced..
Enforcement is as important as establ: f such a
-code. In the aftermath of the Nosenko and cases, (W(1)
manifestations of outrageously poor judgment on t e part of (b)(3Y
'key Agency officers seem regularly to have been:followed by
assignment to desirable European posts. This sequence may
have been adventitious; but whether it was or not, it pro-
jected an image of amorality on the part of the Agency's
leadership which does not bode well for CIA's future in a
democratic society. One of the Clandestine Service's most.
.positive features.has.always been theA.edication Of. its
personnel; yet amorality and dedication are self-evidently
inconsistent in our society. It is essential that the Agency's
leadership keep this fact in mind.
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1962
CHRONOLOGY OF
APPENDIX:
NOSENKO CASE
THE YURIY IVANOVICH
in
UN Disarmament Conference opens in
Geneva
5 June.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
9-June
Nosenko offers,
to sell(b)(1)
information to
.(b)(3)
American intellig
identifies self as KGB office-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)1)
11 June
12 June
13 June
14 June
15 June
16 June
ca 20--26 June
26 June
27 June
14 August
1963
13 September
4 November
1964
19 January
23 January
(b)(3)
Bagley and Kisevalter meet Nosenko.
:They advise Headquarters Nosenko has
conclusively proven bona fides,:
Bagley and Kisevalter Meet Nosenko and.
report him cooperative.
Meeting No. 4.
Meeting No. 5.
Nosenko returns to Moscow after' agreeing
to re-establish contactwith CIA when
next in West.
Nosenko case discussed at CIA Headquarters
by Angleton, Maury, Bagley and Kisevalter.
Bagley studies Golitsyn's reporting on'
alleged KGB disinformation mission.
Bagley discusses Nosenko inaterial..(in �
disguised form) with Golitsyn.H Golitsyn
agrees Nosenko's information may reflect
disinformation.
Bagley suggests Nosenko under KGB control
and commences to build case against Nosenko.
Kisevalter completes "summary transcripts"
. of CIA's five meetings with Nosenko in
Geneva.
YuTiy Krotkov,.KGB SCD agent, defects to
.The Cherepanov incident in Moscow.
Nosenko informs CIA of his return to Geneva.
Meeting No. 1. Nosenko says he wants to
defect.
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24 January
25 January
:26 January
27 January
28 January
29 January
30 January
31 January
1 February
2 February
3 February
�
. 4 February
�
-- 198 --
Meeting No. 2.� Bagley cables Headquarters
that suspicions regarding Nosenko's bona
fides are justified. Requests TDY to
Headquarters.
Meeting No. '3. Karpovich meets Nosenko
vice Bagley.
Meeting No. 4..
Murphy tells Helms SR goal is to "break"
Nosenko.
Meeting No. 5.
Meeting No. 6
Meeting No. 7. Bagley; now back in.
Geneva, requests Nosenko remain in place.
Meeting No. -8.
Meeting No. 97
Meetings N 10 and 11.
Meeting No. 12.
Meeting No.. 13.. Nosenko insists on .
immediate
to
defection
.and is
exfiltrated
(W(1)
(ID)(3
5
February
Nosenko arrives
)
(b)(3)
6
February
Nosenko cooperates
with debriefing in
FBI
judges Nosenko's inf0ODX1)
mation "valid
and valuable.''.
. .(b)(3).
7
February
Murphy visits
to assess Nose]')
00)
8 February
9 February.
Murphy confirms Bagley and Karpovich. judg-
ment that Nosenko not bona fide.
Murphy assures Nosenko-we consider him
bona fide; and makes detailed financial
commitments to him.
10
February
Murphy, back at Headquarters, .tells-
Karamessines Nosenko is KGB agent On mission.
11
February
McCone.dii-eots Nosenko be brought to
Washington soonest because Soviets are
publicizing the case McCone- also notifies c
�President of CIA's suspicion that Nosenko
is on KGB mission.
12
February
Nosenko arrives in United States...
14
February
Nosenko is confronted by Soviets and
confirms desire to remain in United States.
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17 February
18--21 February
. Helms approves Murphy's plan for
handling case on basis Nosenko not
bona fide. Concurrently, Bagley assures
Nosenko of future collaborative relation-
ship with CIA and sets schedule of
emoluments.
Nosenko is debriefed.
20
February
Helms agrees to bring Golitsyn into the
case. -Golitsyn will receive Virtually
full access to Nosenko material.
24
February
� FBI begins debriefing of Nosenko..
Nosenko
comnlaing of hiq tv7tment
by
FBI
(b)(6)
25
Feb--6 March
FBI
debriefing continues despite
Nosenko
reluctance.
9 March
12--28 March
12 March
20 March
23 March
1 April
2 April
4 April
-Murphy tells Helms little of Nosenko's
information is new. Nevertheless, FBI
believes Nbsenko to be genuine KGB defector.
:(b)(6)
Deryabin reports extensive errors in
"transcripts" of '1962 meetings with
Nosenko.
Helms, Angleton and Murphy meet with McCone
.to discuss plans for confinement and
hostile interrogation of Nosenko. Goal
is to ."break" him.
CIA disseminates to State Department
Nosenko's information on microphones in
U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
CIA clears its proposed handling of
Nosenko with FBI, which interposes no
objection.. Helms advises State Department
that Nosenko is not genuine defector and
raises possibility of turning Nosenko
back to Soviets.
Helms�Murphy, and Houston meet with,�
Deputy Attorney GeneralKatzenbach to
discuss CIA's freedom of-actioh:under
provisions for "parole" to Agency.
Murphy briefs McCone on reasons why
Nosenko is Considered KGB plant.
Following "polygraph," Nosenko is confined
in safehouse at Clinton, Maryland. Bagley
confronts Nesenko, .saying hi S KGB mission
has been .known', to CIA for two years.
6 April �Hostile interrogations begin.
�
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end-April
- 14 May
23 June
29 June
20--21 July'
Interrogations-cease,,since Nosenko
has not confessed.
-Microphones found in U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
Interrogations resume and continue until
late July.
Gittinger administers psychological test
to Nosenko.
Golitsyn presents his conclusions on.
Nosenko.
CIA tells MI-5 and MI-6 that Nosenko is
KGB plant and links Krotkov with wide-
spread "diversionary
10 November Interrogation of Nosenko stops.
lg. November Helms orders rapid windup of Nosenko case.
1965
57-8 January CIA and FBI attempt to reach common
position on Nosenko.
18 January . FBI tells McCone they are in no position
.to reach firm conclusion regarding.Nosenko.
,25 January Murphy initiates planning for Nosenko'
:confinement at LOBLOLLY.
26 Jan--5 March Hostile interrogations resume
3--21 May Gittinger interviews Nosenko.
-26 July--13 Aug Deryabin interrogates Nosenko in Russian.
27 July Angleton; Murphy, and Osborn inspect
LOBLOLLY. �
13 August
Bagley tells Nosenko his position is
hopeless and breaks off direct SR Division
contact with him. �
10 December McCoy forwards his dissenting paper to
Murphy.
1966
12 January �
Murphy tells Helms no .one from SR Division
has seen.Nosenko since August 1965, and
they discuss use of "special techniques"
on Nosenko.
lg April � Murphy again discusses use O "special-
techniques" with Helms.
21 June � Murphy discusses sodium amytal interview
and other "special techniques" with Helms.
-rP7IPPI
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6 July
23 August
30 August
1 September.
2 September
18--28 October
1967
February
10 March
16 March
29 March
10 May
26 May
Bagley makes first case officer visit
to Nosenko in a year.
Helms instructs FitzGeraid and Murphy
to terminate Nosenko case within 60 days.
Murphy organizes SR Division task force
to meet Helms' deadline.
Murphy tells Helms chance of Nosenko
confessing is not great.
Helms forbids use of sodium amytal and
other "special techniques" on Nosenko.
Helms considers turning Nosenko over
to Soviets.
Murphy obtains from Helms extension of
60-day deadline until end of year.
Nosenko is interrogated extensively with
assistance of polygraph.
SB Division produces long-awaited -report
on Nosenko case.
Murphy, forwards portions of SB Division's
report on Nosenko to Angleton.
Admiral Taylor questions Murphy on
Nosenko case.
Angleton objects to manner in which SB
Division report treats Golitsyn material
about Nosenko.
Admiral Taylor finds SB report on Nosenko
.unconvincing and overly-lengthy.
Taylor requests Office of Security comments
on SB report. Director of Security recom--
mends Bruce Solie to take over interro-
gation of Nosenko.
19 June Solie comments on SB Division study and
recommends alternative lines of inquiry.
11 August
27 October
30 October
1968
February.
Solie is assigned to interrogate Nosenko:
Office of Security moves Nosenko from
LOBLOLLY unbeknownst to SB Division or.
CI Staff."
Solie's first interview with Nosenko.
SB Division produces revised report on
Nosenko representing compromise with
CI Staff.
SECREJSEcTEVE
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SURETNYTiVr
202 --
2---6 August
September--October
Office of Security administers first-
ever, valid polygraph to Nosenko.
There are no signs of deception.
FBI and CIA Office of Security reports
conclude Nosenko bona fide defector
and not dispatched by 'KGB.
gErWitSr"Sfritir
Approved for Release: 2019/06/25 C06775695