PLATOON LEADER OF A PHU YEN PROVINCIAL MOBILE BATTALION ON OBJECTIVES OF THE TET ATTACKS AND POSSIBLE CLAIMS AND FUTURE PLAYS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND HANOI.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786548
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 15, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786548
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information CableIN
� PRIORITY
.51.410
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA Nmcc/mc (srcper JCS A.MY NAVY CIAMMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
DN ESO
OCR FOIS DCS IRS AID USIA
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.
Seca. 793 and 704. the traztemisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
hia-FGREfet
GROUP,
Itsdodod from couromalk
doernorodlne ond
L___Coderirnothr
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
COUNTRY
DOI
SUBJECT
ACQ
SOURCE
151134Z
SOUTH VIETNAm
CITE
DIST 15 FEBRUARY 1968
3.5(c)�
?LATOON LEADER OF A
PROVINCIAL MNILE BATTALION ON 09JECTIVES
OF THE TET AT-:,-iCKB AND POSSIBLE CLAIMS AND
FUTURE PLE
AND HANOI.
(-)1:
3.3(h)(2)
THE NATIONAL LIBERATITJ FRONT
C-O-N-F-I-D-F-N-T-IA�L NO FOREIGN Distrii
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3.5(c)
1. ASKED WHAT HE WA :i TOLD WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE
COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM,
THAT 'r ET CONE LIC) ITArY 0-3,1CTIVS WERE TO FIGHT HARD,
INFILTRATE DEEP TM�) CITIES. DISTRICTS,AND PROVINCES
AND SIMULT A NE ail. Y MOT IVA TE THE . PEOPLE POLITICALLY SO THAT
THE REVOLUTION COULD CREATE AN UPRISING AND ORGANIZE A
COALITION GOVERNMENT.
2. ASKED WHAT HIS FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES
REPLIED
WERE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS,
REPLIED THAT
HE '..!AS GIVEN THE MISSION OF ATTACKING THE POWER HOUSE AND
THE RAD IO STATION
ONL Y AND THAT HE HAD
NO FUTURE RE SPONSI B IL IT IE S. HE ADDED THAT HE IS GIVEN
INSTRUCT IONS JINT BEFORE AN OPERATION.
3. ASKED IF "E WAS TOLD, AND IF HE BELIEVED, THAT THE
POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND THE AMERICAN FORCES, HE
REPLIED THAT HE WAS TOLD THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM
1 -wAtILE) PARTICIPATE IN THE GENERALAPRISING, AND HE BELIEVED
IT AT THAT TIME.
4I �
NO FOREIGN DISStM
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3.5(c)
4. ASKED WHAT ACUT AL SUPPORT HE RECEIVED FROM THE
POPULACE, HE SAID HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SUPPORT FR OM THE
PEOPLE. INSTEAD, THE PEOPLE SHOWED GVN SOLDIERS WHERE HE
AND HIcl TROOPS WERE HID INC.
ASKED IF HE WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT MILITARY
ACTION :WRING TEl WOULD RE SUPPLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE
IN THE '1ORTH AT K HE SAN H OR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE
SAID 7� "T IN P0',TTICAL IFfv),:"H NNTIONS HE AND HIS COMPANY
BECAUSE
WERE 1',2s.D TO FIGHT HARD AND ATTACK AND OCCUPY
FORCES FROM KHE SANH AND THE DMZ WOULD SUPPORT VC
FORCES IN THE SOUTH. HE DID NOT BELIEVE SUCH FORCES WOULD
SUPPORT THE VC NOW, BECAUSE THE VC HAD FAILED IN
6.
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PROVINCE.
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KNEW NOTHING A30UT EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE AN 3.30-0(2)
"ALL I A NrE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A. COALITION MOVEMENT
TO NEG. OT IATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV).
7. IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION CONCERNING FOLLOW�UP STEPS
IN CUPRENT VC STRATEGY, SAID THAT THE VC WERE
DETERMINED TO OPERATE STRONGLY IN EVERY WAY�MILITARILY,
CONFIDENTIAL 1'10 FOREIGN DIY..CM
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POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY-- IN THE WINTER/SPRING INSURRECTION
CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THE VC FAILED
IN ITS TWO ATTACKS nN , IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
VC WILL STRIVE TO rUMMON MOPE FORCES IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK
AGAIN, HARASS, AND WEAR DOWN GVN AND ALLIED FORCES.
� 3.5(c)
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S. ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT THE NFLSV OR HANOI WOULD EXPLAIN
AN INDECISIVE MILITARY CONCLUSION TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AS
OPPOSED TO POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS, HE SAID THAT HE
THOUGHT THAT THE NFLSVN OR HANOI WILL SAY THAT THEIR FORCES
HAVE WON OVER THE GVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN EVERY WAY. IT
WOULD NOT BE.4STRANGE IF THEY DID. EVEN IF THE VC FAILED TO
ATTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES, THEY SUCCEEDED POLITICALLY, AND
"POLITICAL SUCCESS WILL SOUND AN .ECHO IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS
IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES."
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