REPORTING ON NATIONAL POLICE ACTIVITIES DURING THE VC TET OFFENSVIE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786550
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 14, 1968

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MEMORANDUM
14 February 1968
SUBJECT: Reporting on National Police Activities During
the VC Tet Offensive
1. The information in this report was compiled from Vietnam
situation reports available as of 1700 hours EST 13 February 1968.
Following the Summary and Conclusions is selected data by corps and
province. The map at the end of this memorandum reflects very tentative
judgment of police(performance for selected provinces.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2. Reporting on National Police activities and performance during
the 'VC Tet offensive is still very incomplete. Outside the province capitals
and independent cities /reporting is almost non-existent. Over 70 district
towns have been attacked and it is assumed that the police have played some
role in the defense of these towns. There is sufficient information on the
police in 19 province capitals plus the cities of Saigon, Danang, and Cam
Ranh to make a very tentative judgment as to police performance. In 17
of the 19 provincial capitals and the three independent cities (the exceptions
being Hue and Phan Thiet), National Police forces appear to have responded
in a satisfactory marther to the emergency. There is not sufficient infor-
mation on the remair,ling 25 province capitals and the independent city of
Vung Tau to make any judgment. The VC opened the jails in Hue, Quang
Ngai, and Go Cong releasing approximately 3,000 prisoners. There are
no reports of other province jails being opened by the VC. Total National
Police casualties are unknown. The limited reporting available lists more
than 200 police killed. Our tentative conclusion, drawn from the limited
material available, is that the police have generally performed well (with
the exceptions noted above) and in some province capitals have shown con-
siderable initiative and energy; this includes the Special Police Branch,
the Police Field Forces, and the Combat-Police. In several provinces it
appears that the Special]. Police are taking advantage of intelligence gained
through interrogations, .doeuments, and agent reports to strike. hard and
rapidly at the VC infrastructure but there is insufficient information to
judge intelligence collection and action by the police country wide.
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SAIGON
3. The National Police and the subordinate Combat Police and
Special Police Branch have been heavily engaged with the Viet Cong since
the VC attack on 31 January. At least 6 of the 9 precincts and 14 sub-
precinct police stations have been attacked (including one sub-station which
has repulsed 9 attacks), some have been overrun and others damaged or
destroyed. Though the police have generally performed well, popular
feelings towards them have been mixed. The police have frequently ex-
posed themselves to considerable danger to save and assist private
citizens but have also been criticized for exhibiting occasional foolishness
and reckless behavior. People were informing the police of the location
of VC and the Special Police Branch stated that it has been receiving
gratifying cooperation from the population in combatting VC attacks.
There are indications that some students in Saigon have assisted the VC.
President Thieu and Vice President Ky described the performance of
Director General of National Police Loan as outstanding. Total police
casualties as of 12 February were over 100 killed in Saigon.
4. There are some reports that the police have executed a few
prisoners but it appears that the police have confined most prisoners and
are conducting detailed interrogations. Check points have been increased
and house-to-house search operations launched. The Special Police in-
formant and agent networks appear to be functioning well and information
reporting is in quantity. There is conflict in the information received on
VC intentions caused in part by the limited knowledge of the sources and
intentional rumors started by the VC. Viet Gong infiltration of the refugee
centers around Saigon is causing the National Police concern.
I CORPS .
5. The National Police in Hue are reported to be performing
unsatisfactorily. There is not sufficient information to judge police
performance in Quang Ngai. In the remaining three provinces and Danang,
reports reflect satisfactory to very good performance. There is no infor-
mation on the police in the districts of I Corps. The Viet Cong released
between 2,600 and 3,100 prisoners from the Hue and Quang Ngai jails.
There is no estimate of police losses but in Hue the casualties will probably
be high.
6. DANANG: It does not appear that the Danang Police were caught
off guard by the .Viet Cong attack. Prior to the attack information from in-
telligence sources provided the general VC attack plan. The police began
uncovering small VC sabotage units that had infiltrated Danang two weeks
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prior to the attack. Interrogation of the captured VC and exploitable intelli-
gence led to the capture of additional VC and alerted local security forces to
the probability that the VC general attack plan was being implemented.
Security in and around Danang was increased prior to the attack. After the
attack, the police concentrated its efforts toward elimination of the VC in-
frastructure. Interrogations were being conducted at the Provincial
Interrogation Center. House-to-house searches were initiated with the
assistance of Police Field Forces and ARVN� In the first phase of the
search operations, approximately 750 of the original 1,000 houses ear-
marked for search had been completed by 3 February., More than 400
persons had been detained which caused an acute problem in finding sufficient
interrogatorsoconsequently many prisoners were being held with a minimum
of screening. Apparently some persons had been picked up with no firm
reason for considering them VC. Every house in Danang was to be searched
in the second phase. Individuals without proper identification papers were
being detained at a local school. The police reported that the people were
generally cooperative, although it was evident that many feared reprisals
by the VC should they cooperate with the police. Local residents were
providing information on where VC were hiding. The police reacted
quickly on information received from the population or intelligence sources,
resulting in the capture of nearly 50 VC. By 10 February, it appeared that
the search operation was less systematic and thorough than would be de-
sired but it was still being conducted and was keeping the VC on the move.
The police believed that another attack on Danang was imminent due to
documents taken from a VC courier.
7. QUANG NAM: The police were encountering considerable
difficulty in screening and performing other security functions in Hoi An
City because of the masses of refugees. They were hearding the refugees
about the city but it was difficult, if not impossible, to control them. The
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police continued to pick up suspects at established check points. On
11 and 12 February the police had detained 50 VC suspects in Hoi An.
The Provincial Interrogation Center was operating again, located at police
headquarters. The police had jailed more than 100 Buddhists to forestall
any political problems or demonstrations.
8. QUANG NGAI: Onthe night of 30 January, the VC captured the
Quang Ngai provincial jail and it was not retaken by ARVN until the morning
of 1 February. About 150 prisoners were not inside the jail at the time of
the VC ground assault, but ARVN officers claimed they were accounted for.
Approximately 70 to 75 POW's in the jail had been removed before the VC
gained the area and these POW's remain under detention. As of 4 February,
603 prisoners were 'unaccounted for.
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9. QUANG TIN: On the night of 31 January, the Provincial Inter-
rogation Center in Tam Ky was used by ARVN as a defensive position during
the Viet Cong attack. After the attack ARVN and police elements made con-
tinuous sweeps of Tam Ky and surrounding areas, broke up sporadic attempts
of segments of the population to form demonstrations and apprehended demon-
stration leaders.
10. QUANG TRI: As of 12 February, the police had been divided
into two groups for night operations. One group was in charge of the police
station which had been fortified with sandbag bunkers and interlocking trenches,
while the other group was on constant patrol throughout Quang Tri City. By
8 February, the police had arrested 50 suspects and daily screening opera-
tions were continuing. From 31 January to 8 February, about 6 Special
Police were killed and 4 wounded. The Provincial Interrogation Center
(PIC) was still closed, as of 12 February, with the prisoners moved to
sector or the National Police jail. The PIC probably will return to normal
operations in the near future since it did not suffer any damage during the
attack.
11. THUA THIEN: The VC captured the Hue jail and released
2,000 to 2,500 prisoners of which 200 to 300 were hardcore VC. The jail
was recaptured by Marines on 3 February. The VC were also reported to
have massacred 100 GVN officials and police by 11 February.
3.3(h)(2)
The police were confusing the distribution of rice,
failing to assist in the refugee problem, and contributing to the looting,
which was becoming a problem throughout the city. With proper leader-
ship, the police probably have the capability of doing 3.3(h)(2)
their job. . The Regional Police Headquarters in Danang moved a newly
organized Police Field Force Company to Hue� This Company is com-
prised of graduates from the police academy, many of whom are from
Hue and had had their families killed, wounded, or detained by the VC.
The company volunteered to go to Hue.
II CORPS
12. Except for Binh Thuan Province, where the National Police
apparently fell to pieces, limited reports indicate that the police continue
to perform satisfactorily in II Corps. The police actions in Khanh Hoa
have brought praise by advisors. Information on half the provinces in
II Corps regarding the police is too limited or non-existent for any judg-
ment to be made. N.o jails are reported to have been opened by the VC in
II Corps. Police casualties have not been reported.
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13. BINH DINH: According to information received by the Special
Police Branch in Qui Nhon and through the interrogation of captured VC, the
attack plan on Qui Nhon called for the capture of the police chief and the
province chief. The VC were unsuccessful during their attack in accom-
plishing these two objectives.
14. BINH THUAN: By 5 February, effective police operations
in Phan Thiet had not been initiated. The situation between the province
chief and the police chief was very poor -- each was criticizing the other
for lack of ability to cope effectively with the situation during the attack.
The province chief was probably correct for the local police had not been
doing their job. They had dispersed and most of them were looking after
their families and personal effects. During the height of the battle, many
of the police threw away or hid their weapons and mingled with the populace
so they would not be connected with the police. On 4 February, out of
approximately 800 policemen in Phan Thiet there were probably only 100
on duty. The Special Police Branch Chief was completely ineffective. On
3 February when a VC squad was at the police station he left the scene of
action saying that he had sustained a serious injury. Observers said the
wound amounted to a slight scrape on his knee. As of 5 February he had
not been seen. On 1 February, the Police Chief of Phan Thiet City, with
two platoons consisting of administrative type personnel, was in contact
with the VC at the Phan Thiet soccer field. This is the only action in which
the police were reported engaged outside the police station.
15,, CAM' RANH: On 6 February the Cam Ranh police had
captured 5 members of the local VC infrastructure.
16. DARLAC: The local population was reported, on 4 February,
to be telling GVN officials where VC infiltrators were hiding in Banmethuot.
17� KHANH HOA: The VC infrastructure supported the VC attack
on Nha Trang, and in so doing made themselves vulnerable to identifica-
tion and arrest,, As of 9 February, the Khanh Hoa Special Police Branch
was doing an excellent job of exploiting this opportunity, working rapidly
and professionally. During the initial part of the VC attack, the Special
Police fanned out through Nha Trang contacting informants and attempting
to locate VC/NVA soldiers and sympathizers assisting attackers. They
�were very successful in both tasks. They passed this information to the
Police Field Force and ARVN units for action. A five-man Special Police
interrogation team worked almost continuously at the Provincial Interro-
gation Center which. had been turned into a joint POW interrogation center.
Information obtained from these interrogations resulted in the arrest of
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16 VC cadre and 50 suspects. The police also arrested 4 VC cadre of
which 2 were members of the Nha Trang VC Committee. Their interroga-
tion led to the arrest of 2 more VC cadre. The military captured 14 members
of the VC infrastructure and many additional suspects. On 3 February, the
VC Commander of the Nha Trang municipal unit was captured by the police.
Indications are that the VC have suffered a crippling loss of leading political
and local cadre.
18. NINH THUAN: The RDC advisor in Ninh Thuan reports that
the National Police in Phan Rang have operated in an outstanding manner
throughout the current emergency. They have been fully responsive to the
emergency military situation as well as the needs of the people.
19. PLEIKU: One of the primary targets during the VC attack
on Pleiku City, 30 January, was the house of the Regional Police Director.
By 4 February, the police and ARVN had completed their search of most
homes, had apprehended many VC suspects, and had located several arms
caches. The Special Police were providing information of VC troop loca-
tions.
20. QUANG DUC: As of 1 February, extra police patrols were
watching for VC infiltration in Gia Nghia, the capital of Quang Duc.
21. TUYEN DUC: The Dalat City Special Police had regained
control of the area around their headquarters by 4 February which had
been surrounded for three days. The Provincial Interrogation Center was
secure and contained 12 prisoners. The police had captured and detained
55 suspects by 5 February,, GVN officials were displaying remarkable
initiative in meeting enemy attacks.
III CORPS
22. Casualties suffered by the National Police in III Corps, between
31 January and 6 February, were 22 KIA and 40 WIA. Morale remained
high among the police. There were indications that the Special Police Branch
reporting has not kept pace with developments throughout III Corps and the
National Police Director was not being kept adequately informed. There
were no reported casualties among the Special Police. Losses were dis-
tributed fairly evenly throughout III Corps with no particular province taking
the lions share of casualties. Reports indicate police performance has been
satisfactory in 4 of the 11 provinces. Information on the remaining 7
provinces is insufficient to make a preliminary judgment. No jails were
reported opened by the VC.
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23. BIEN HOA: As of 3 February, there had been several
examples of local people turning in VC pockets of resistance and leading
allied troops to enemy locations. The Provincial Interrogation Center
Chief was on duty during Tet, the National Police Chief returned to duty
on 4 February, and the Special Police Branch Chief returned on 5 February.
24. BINH DUONG: Vietnamese intelligence and security services
were reported, as of 3 February, to be going all out on the security of Phu
Cuong City. On 1 February the VC had unsuccessfully attacked the police
station. By 5 February, the National Police had suffered 5 KIA and 5 WIA
in Phu Cuong.
25. BINH LONG: Police activities on 2 February were directed
toward security and they were not collecting information about VC move-
ments.
26. GIA DINH: As of 1 February, the Hoc Mon Police Sub-Station
was in VC hands and the Hang Xanh Police Sub-Station had been overrun.
As of 3 February, a few pockets of enemy resistance still existed, but
these were being cleared out by the local police force, who were reported
to be doing a good job.
27. LONG AN: The VC attacks of 10 and 11 February on Tan An
City caused 20 percent of the police station to be damaged, 10 police killed
and 30 wounded, including the police chief,,
28. LONG KHANH: On 2 February, a National Police check point at
the west end of Xuan Loc was probed by the VC resulting in 5 VC KIA and no
friendly casualties. On the night of 2 - 3 February, the National Police
Station in Xuan Loc was set on fire by a friendly flare. The police evacuated
the station, but damage to the station itself was not known. As of 3February,
a VC squad remained in Xuan Loc but they were surrounded by the police
who were attempting to mop them up. The Provincial Interrogation Center
was only slightly damaged during the VC attack.
29. TAY NINH: Friendly forces had been forewarned of the
6 February attack on Tay Ninh City by a Vietnamese security service
source who has been considered usually reliable. His warning resulted
in ambush and defensive sites being increased.
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IV CORPS
4o. There is only limited information on police performance in
IV Corps. It appears that police casualties will run high in the Delta.
Very incomplete reporting lists 32 police killed, 25 wounded, and one
missing.. The VC released 134 prisoners from the Go Gong city jail. No
other prisons were reported captured and opened. There is no reporting
which indicates the police have performed unsatisfactorily. Information
indicates the police performed satisfactorily to very well in the five
provinces of Ba Xuyen, Chau Doc, Din Tuong, Kien Giang, and Vinh Long.
31. AN XUYEN: The National Police were holding two senior
VC cadre captured by the PRU on 31 January.
32. BA XUYEN: During 2 - 3 February, the National Police
and the Police Field Force were very effective in Soc Trang. They main-
tained the best contact with events through their 16 outposts in the city.
33. BAC LIEU: As of 3 February 5 National Policemen had
been killed.
34. CHAU DOC: By 3 February, the chief of police and 15 police-
men in Tri Ton district town had been killed and 3 policemen killed and
the chief of police missing in Chau Doc town. The Special Police were
working well and had captured 8 VC and were detaining 40 - 50 VC suspects
in Chau Doc town. By 8 February, the police were beginning to attempt
to run house-to-house searches. The Provincial Interrogation Center was
functioning.
35. DINH TUONG: The Special Police were cited as having done
an excellent job during the fighting in My Tho, especially considering the
superiority of the VC weaponry over that used by the police. They also
came to the defense of the RDC compound. As of 11 February, 8 National
Police had been killed in My Tho and 25 wounded.
36. GO CONG: The VC released 134 prisoners from the city
jail on 5 February.
37. KIEN GIANG: The National Police, including the Police Field
Force, were part of the defending force for Rach Gia City on 31 January.
By 3 February, the police chief had run house-to-house searches with the
result that there had been no reoccurrence of terrorism. The National
Police, along with other units, were reported to have done an excellent job
of defending the city and taking offensive action.
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38. KIEN PHONG: The National Police in Cao Lanh City, along with
the PRU, had assumed defensive positions on 4 February.
39. PHONG DINH: The National Police and Special Police in Can
Tho, as of 1 February, were collecting information on VC tactics in the
province.
40. VINH LONG: Between 31 January and 7 February, the National
Police were reported to be the beet organized and coordinated defense force
in the city. They seemed to move with efficiency and speed. The Police
Field Force had uncovered a large ammunition cache, acting on informa-
tion provided by the Special Police. The police were attempting to curb
looting in the secure areas of the city. The police station was 60 percent
destroyed, but repairs were underway and the police had the city under
good control. The Provincial Interrogation Center was open and functioning.
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
Attachment
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