THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786604
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 13, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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-1)pet
127
13 February 1968
17.
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Information as of 1200
13. February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
The sitnafinn is generally quiet.
extensive preparations for
� North Vietnamese offensive operations all across
� the Demilitarized Zone and southward to Quang Tri
� city. New attacks in the western highlands are
likely, and rumors of renewed Communist assaults
against Saigon continue to circulate.
Tho qiflintion in South Vietnam:
reflects preparations
for new enemy offensive operations in northern I
Corps (Paras. 1-7). Morale in Quang Tri city is
declining because of the enemy threat (Para. 8).
Strong Communist resistance in Hue continues(Paras. 9-10).
Other urban centers in I Corps are quiet, but re-
ports of impending Communist attacks continue to be
received (Para. 11). A general lull in enemy ac-
tivity prevails in II Corps, but there are signs
of preparations for new enemy offensives in several
areas (Paras. 12-18). Saigon has been generally
quiet but rumors forecast renewed fighting (Pares.
1923). Government forces fought Communist troops
near My Tho on 12 February, but the night of 12-13
February was generally quiet in IV Corps (Paras. 24-25).
South Vietnamese police have doubts whether Commu-
nist General Tran Do has been killed (Pa.ra. 26).
II. Political Develo merits in South Vietnam:
Vietnamese
officials cnarge tnat some participants in the 1966
Buddhist "struggle" assisted the Viet Cong during
their attack on Hue (Pares. 5-6). A montagnard
Lower House deputy from Darlac Province has been cap-
tured by the Viet Cong (Para. 7).
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I. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. No major new enemy initiatives have been
reported during the past 24 hours in northern I
Corps. Signal intelligence, however, continues to
reflect extensive reconnaissance, maneuvering, and
battlefield preparations by North Vietnamese forces
against allied positions from Khe Sanh, east across
the Demilitarized Zone, and south toward Quang Tri
city.
2. Khe Sanh came under light and sporadic
mortar attacks and small-scale ground probes against
its perimeter defenses the night of 12-13 February.
The headquarters elements and as many as eight sub-
ordinate regiments of the North Vietnamese Army's 304th
and 325 "C" divisions remain in the general area.
3. Elements of the 325 "C" Division's 101 "D"
Regiment southwest of Khe Sahli have sharply inten-
sified their reconnaissance reporting on allied heli-
copter movements and artillery firing in support of
the base. In other developments, there are indica-
tions of resupply activity from Laos in support of
the 325 "C" Division's 95th Regiment northwest of
Khe Sanh.
4. North Vietnamese artillery and infantry
units operating in the central and eastern portions
of the Zone are also being heavily resupplied.
Since 2 February, the communications of North Viet-
namese rear service elements have reflected the move-
ment of large quantities and varying types of am-
munition to the 164th, 204th, and 184th artillery
regiments and to the 270th Regiment.
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5. The 90th Regiment 324"B" Division has
joined the division's 803rd Regiment in a move
south from the Demilitarized Zone,
Elements of both
regiments are now believed to be located south
of the Cua Viet - Cam Lo River in northeastern
Quang Tri Province. The presence of these forces
in this area poses an immediate threat to the US
3rd Marine Division forward operating base at Dong
Ha, and also to Quang Tri city.
6. There is limited evidence
that elements of the 90th Regiment
may continue their deployment farther south through
the Ba Long Valley to link up with the 324 "B"
Division's remaining subordinate, the 812th Regiment,
in Base Area 101 southwest of Quang Tri city. This
move, if confirmed, would significantly increase
the enemy threat to Quang Tri city from the south
and would also pose serious problems for allied
positions astride Route 1 from Quang Tri city to Hue.
7. Elements of the 812th Regiment attacked
Quang Tri city during the opening phase of the Com-
munist Tet offensive in I Corps.
the entire regiment has been
resubordinated to the Communist's Military Region
Tri-Thien-Hue command. This command authority is
responsible for enemy operations in lower Quang
Tri Province and in all of Thua Thien Province,
�The 812th Regiment is still carried in MACV's order-
of-battle holdings as subordinate to the 324 "B"
Division and to the DMZ Front, but its move south-
ward in early January, coupled with the current
southward movement of the 90th and 803rd Regi-
ments, suggest that a resubordination of 324 "B"
Division forces may be taking place.
13 February 1968
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II Corps
12. A general lull continued in II Corps. South
Vietnamese Rangers have apparently cleared enemy
forces from Da Lat, the last city in II Corps par-
tially controlled by the Communists.
13. In weste n Pleiku Province,
indicate that an enemy force, prob-
ably an element of the 1st North Vietnamese Division,
is to launch a mortar attack on the Le Thanh district
town. Messages passed between this unit and a prob-
able B-3 Front authority on 12 February indicate prep-
arations for the shelling are to be accelerated.
14. The Communists apparently hope this attack
will draw an allied reaction. The attacking force
was told to "carry out the mission...in order to
force the enemy to deal with you,",
The Communists may be planning
to ambush a friendly reaction force, or they may
intend to try to divert allied attention from other
areas of the western highlands.
15. There are indications that the Communists
may be preparing for offensive activity in the Dak
To area. 1
17. The enemy may be planning to attack in the
Dak To area, but the disposition of enemy forces at
present suggests that the preparations have not
reached an advanced stage.
13 February 1968
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18. Major elements of the. 95BNorth- Vietnamese
Regiment apparently have withdrawn from the Pleiku -
city area, easing the threat there. The regimental
headquarters. and two battalions were fixed by di-
rection finding within the last few days between 16
and 35 miles south of the city--representing with-
drawals of at least ten miles.
Saigon and III Corps
19. Saigon was quiet at noon. on 13 February. No
significant fighting had taken place within the city
during the preceding 24-hour period. Groups of Viet
Cong continue to be sighted, in the southwestern dis-
tricts, and several sharp fights broke out on the out-
skirts on 12 and 13 February. In one action 113 Viet
Cong were reported killed.
� 20. During the past few days there have been a
number of low-level reports that the Communists plan
additional attacks in the Saigon area. 04 12 February
a South Vietnamese police station located !north. of Sai-
gon reported that an estimated 3,000 Viet Cong had been
sighted moving. south. .The next;day-a-South Vietnamese
Army outpost in the same general�area_also. reported
sighting a large enemy force moving south. These re-
ports parallel statetents by: civilian,traVelers on 11
February that two enemy. "divisions!! were moving on.
Saigon from the north. and west.- Communist � troops in
Binh Duong reportedly spread this information among the
local population in the � province.
21. In addition to these reports � there are a num-
ber of. indications that Communist troops who took part
in the. initial attacks. on Saigon: expected other. forces.
to conduct f011ow-up attacks.: For. example, Civilians
in a number of villages outside .of-Saigon say. that
the Viet Cong have ordered their: troops to mix in' with
the local population. and wait for �reinforcements. In
at least one suburb of Saigon the rumor is that15,000,
North Vietnamese reinforcements will arrive next �
week.
13 Februp.ry 1968
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22. Although the above reports are from low-
level sources--and some were undoubtedly circulated
by the Communists primarily to keep the civilian
population tense--they cannot be entirely discounted.
The enemy has sizable forces within striking range
of Saigon. These have not yet been committed, and
the possibility of renewed large-scale fighting in
the capital area is real.
23. Action elsewhere in the III Corps provinces
was light. Viet Cong activity was highlighted by
a 12-round 122-mm. rocket attack on the Bien Hoa
Air Base. Damage was minor.
IV Corps
24. South Vietnamese Army forces and govern-
ment irregulars had several sharp clashes with Viet
Cong troops on the outskirts of My Tho on 12 Febru-
ary. Over 70 Communists were reported killed. Al-
lied losses were 4 killed and 20 wounded.
25. On the night of 12-13 February, about 15
minor. Viet Cong - initiated incidents were reported.
The majority of the incidents took place in Dinh
Tuong and Phong Dinh provinces.
Communist Major General Tran Do
26. The press is reporting that Major General
Tran Do, deputy commander of the Viet Cong Libera-
tion Army, has been killed by allied forces in Saigon.
This has not been confirmed, and the US Embassy re-
ports that South Vietnamese police sources now have
some doubts.
13 February 1968
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
13 February 1968
Dav-getirET
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Possible Involvement of Ex-Strugglers with Viet Cong
5. Vietnamese provincial and police officials
in Thua Thien Province have charged that participants
in the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement in Hue assisted
the Viet Cong during their Tet attack on the city.
The Thua Thien Province chief asserted in a press
interview that the Communists used a pagoda near Hue
as their command post for the attack and, once in-
side the city, operated from another pagoda. Both
were centers of antigovernment agitation during the
"struggle" movement. The Viet Cong "alloted large
roles to the Buddhist militants and sympathetic
students of Hue University," the province chief
charged. He emphasized, however, that only a small
number actively assisted the Communists.
13 February 1968
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There were no reports of significant air activity
in North Vietnam on. 13.February. A.North Vietnamese MIG-
21 was shot down northeast. of Hanoi.near the Chinese bor-
der on 12 February.
that the pilot was a Nor prean. e owne p ane
probably wasone of several fighters providing cover
for the IL-28 bombers which had flown to this area when
US .strike aircraft approached. Hanoi.
2. There is evidence
that the three IL-14s which were reported to have flown
as far south as Vinh on 12 February, may have continued
on to the A Shau Valley. If so, it is probable that
they were involved in a resupply mission similar to
the one carried out by IL-14s on 7 February.
/during the past week indicate that
at least some of the IL-14s involved in the various
flights to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone have
been modified to carry out tactical as well as logistic
missions.
4. There have been previous reports of Communist
gunners firing on IL-14 and AN-2 transports in the
southern section of North Vietnam, despite warnings on
the air defense nets. On 7 February one of the IL-14s
which attempted to fly to the A Shau Valley had a fire
started in its left engine by Communist gunners. On
13 February a North Vietnamese battalion north of Vinh
notified its subordinates that they were not to fire
__cin any propeller driven aircraft unless fired upon.
13 February 1968
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New North Vietnamese Divisions Possible
5. head-
quarters garrison elements from both North Vietnam's
304th and 320th divisions remained in North Vietnam
when these divisions shifted to the Demilitarized
Zone area.
6. This is consistent with the deployment
pattern of most North Vietnamese regimental- and
division-level units now in South Vietnam. After
the units departed for the South, stay-behind ele-
ments were fleshed out with recruits and transfers
to form new units. In some cases, these second,
third and even fourth generation units themselves
deployed to the South. With headquarters elements
now apparently in place, the North Vietnamese could
follow precedent and re-establish the 304th and 320th
divisions.
7. This could be accomplished by drawing upon
recruits and personnel from other units or by sub-
ordinating existing regiments to the headquarters
structure. /
\an infantry regiment which remained
in North Vietnam, although it had been subordinate
to the 320th prior to the division's deployment.
13 February 1968
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
']F_O-P-ffECIrET
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
13 February 1968
1
TOP SECRET
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Construction of new communications facilities
into Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces from Laos is
another sign that the Communists are preparing for a
period of sustained offensive operations in the area.
2.
the enemy is running landline along the
Laos - South Vietnam border between the Demilitarized
Zone and the A Shau Valley. It is not known when
this activity began, but concurrent work in widely
separated areas suggests that the new communications
links are a priority project. The work appears to
be progressing at a good pace. There is one 70-mile
long trace between Tchepone and Ban Bac. There is
no indication that the lines are in service.
3. Landlines into the I Corps area could pro-
vide a capability for several simultaneous two-way
voice conversations over each line as well as a
capability for telegraphic traffic and improved com-
munications security. There is some evidence that
one new line near the Demilitarized Zone is in an
advanced stage of construction. It may tie in with
existing facilities in North Vietnam. If such a
connection is made, Hanoi will have direct, secure
communications with at least some of the major Com-
munist units opposing allied forces in northern
South Vietnam, as well as with logistics units
stationed in and around the Laos panhandle.
VI-1
CRET
13 February 1968
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3.3(h)(2)
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ANNEX
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Background of the Tet Offensive in Pleiku
1. Recently available Communist documents dat-
ing from mid-December through early January, together
with reports of interrogations of five relatively
high-level cadres captured in the recent fighting,
give a partial picture of the immense effort behind
the enemy's Tet offensive in Pleiku Province. The
documents suggest that Viet Cong plans included not
only an effort to destroy government effectiveness
in the provincial capital, but also to regain in-
fluence over the hamlets and the rural populace. It
is not certain whether Communist objectives and ex-
pectations were the same in all areas,\in the Tet of-
fensive, but similarities of technique and of goals
are emerging as information from other areas becomes
available.
2. The Pleiku documents indicate that prepara-
tions for the attack on Pleiku city began in earnest
as long ago as November, and possibly in September,
when a new provincial sapper battalion, numbered
408, was formed from other existing units. Accord-
ing to directives dating from 4 November 1967 and
4 January 1968, local force units taking part in the
attack were put directly under the B-3 Front, the
Communist command for the highlands provinces. Be-
fore the Tet offensive these units were harassing
key transportation routes, training, and preparing
a thorough plan of attack to be approved by the B-3
Front command.
3. Despite the latitude apparently given pro-
vincial units in planning details of the attack on
Pleiku, higher authorities laid down specific guide-
lines. One declared that, with a Superior force in
a surprise attack, it should be easy to take Pleiku
because it was lightly defended by South Vietnamese
paramilitary forces. Roads leading to Pleiku were
to be blocked and reacting US units from outside
the city were to be intercepted.
13 February 1968
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4, Primary targets in the city were paramili-
tary and police posts, government administrative
offices, the radio station, and public utilities.
While these points were under attack by military
units, the Viet Cong "city unit" was to "hunt out
and destroy" government officials and to "motivate"
the population to stage demonstrations in support
of the Communists. There is no reference in the
documents to a role for North Vietnamese units sub-
ordinate to the B-3 Front, and these units appear
to have been only marginally committed.
5, A group of five high- to medium-level pro-
vincial and district level officials, who were cap-
tured in the attack on Pleiku city (one was the
commander of the 11-15 Battalion), have indicated
under interrogation that their orders and objectives
were similar to those outlined in the documents.
Neither the captives nor the documents specified a
time limit for holding the town if their attacks
were successful. The prisoners alleged that their
purpose was to destroy the local South Vietnamese
government and to "liberate" the province, and that,
whether successful or not, they were contributing
to a nationwide effort to "liberate" �the country.
None admitted to having any specific orders cover-
ing failure, but nearly all appeared to believe that
the Viet Cong would go on fighting as before.
6. According to the prisoners, they believed
that their mission in Pleiku would succeed, partly,
as one declared, because two thirds of their forces
in the province were still in reserve. All allegedly
expected most of the population to support their
efforts, both out of sympathy and because of their
expected superior strength in the town. Some had
specific missions to bring the town population into
the streets and to march demonstrators in from the
outside. All acknowledged their failure to gain
popular support, but attributed this to the failure
of the attack itself. Most were fuzzy about the future
political goals of the Communists, but some believed
that a people's coalition would be organized to
negotiate a settlement with the Liberation Front. '
13 February 1968
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7. One of the documents, dated mid-December,
suggests that plans for Pleiku included the "libera-
tion" of rural areas in addition to, or concurrent
with, the attack on the provincial capital-, The
captives have shed no light on this effort to date.
The document directs "areas" of the province--dis-
tricts or villages, perhaps--to muster a major part
of their remaining "concentrated forces," and up to
two thirds of their guerrilla units, to "liberate"
or "break the enemy's grip" on specific hamlets ap-
parently astride major lines of communication. In
the process, these guerrillas are directed to
organize and arm new guerrillas, with a goal of
22,500 from the province and possibly adjacent areas.
8. There is some evidence that attacks on
urban areas throughout South Vietnam followed pat-
terns similar to those specified for Pleiku city.
If so, the Communists clearly failed to achieve many
of their stated goals. These goals may have been
only maximum Communist hopes, however, and there
is nothing in the documents which indicates that
failure to hold the city or to muster widespread
popular support would preclude continued efforts
to achieve the larger objectives of the campaign. The
Communist leadership may have taken the same view
as some of the prisoners--that while specific ac-
tions might prove unsuccessful, they would be con-
tributing to a nationwide effort which ultimately
would succeed. In this view, the attacks against
the cities would be part of an attempt to create
conditions where continued military pressures, ac-
companied by increased political agitation and
organization, would eventually pay off for the Com-
munists.
9. Moreover, the information about a major
effort to extend Communist influence over the coun-
tryside in Pleiku Province suggests the attacks
against urban centers were only one aspect of the
country-wide offensive, and, perhaps, not the most
important one. There is still little information
on Communist activities in the countryside during
the offensive. Scattered reports from other provinces,
however, indicate there has been considerable Viet
Cong activity, possibly including arming of conscripts,
in unprotected rural areas.
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