1. WHATEVER STRATEGY IS FOLLOWED BY THE ENEMY OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IT WILL DERIVE NEITHER FROM A POSITION OF DESPERATION, NOR FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786681
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 28, 1969

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GEN ER AL
1. WHATEVER STRATEGY IS FOLLOWED BY THE ENEMY OVER THE
NEXT FEW MONTHS, IT WILL DERIVE NEITHER FROM A POSITION OF
DESPERATION, NOR FROM A POSITION OF STRENGHT. HE STILL HAS
MOST OF HIS MILITARY FORCES INTACT. TENUOUS INDICATIONS ARE
THAT HE SUBSTANTIALLY BUILT UP HIS FORCES IN THE MONTH PRIOR
TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AND IS NOW BUSILY RECRUITING IN THE
FORMER. GVN- CONTROLLED AREAS WHERE MANPOWER 'WAS' NOT PREVIOUSLY
AVAILABLE TO HIM. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE TOTAL OF MAIN,
LOCAL AND GURERRILLA FORCES AVAILABLE TO HIM TODAY IS NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THAT AVAILABLE TO HIM ON. 1 JANUARY,
DESPITE THE CONSIDER ABLE ..LOSSES INFLICTED ON.. HIM SINCE THAT
DATE. MOREOVER, HE RETAINS THE OPTION OF SENDING IN ADDITIONAL
FORCES FROM THE NORTH EITHER AS NEW UNITS OR TO SERVE AS
REPLACEMENTS, IF HE SO CHOOSES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LOSS
SEC Elf.
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PAGE 2 SECTION 1 OF 5 SAIGON 9276
OF IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, THE
IMPRESSMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF UNTRAINED PERSONNEL INTO
THE LOCAL FORCES, THE LOSS OF MANY TRAINED ELEMENTS
SUCH AS SAPPER 1SONNEL AND MIDDLE-LEVEL UNIT COMMANDERS,
TOGETHER WITH HEAVY EXPENDITURES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION,
SUGGEST THAT THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENEMY FORCES
HAS SUFFERED AT LEAST A TEMPORARY DECLINE. MOREOVER, THERE
ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS CONCERNED OVER THE MORALE
OF HIS FORCES IN THE LIGHT OF HIS PROMISES OF AN EARLY FINAL
VICTORY. IN ANY EVENT, IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THE SCOPE AND
INTENSITY OF THE REMAINDER OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WILL
DECLINE SOMEWHAT IN THE MILITARY SPHERE, AND INCREASE
CONSIDERABLY IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE,
SHORT RUN CONSIDERATIONS
� 2. THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAI G51 WHICH APPARENTLY WAS
FORMULATED SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER OR FALL FO 1967, WAS TO
CONSIST OF THREE PHASES: OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1957; JANUARY
TO MARCH 1968:- AND APRIL TO JUNE 1968.- CAPTURED VIET CONG
(VC) DOCUMENTS AND PRISONER STATEMENTS AMPLY DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE COMMUNIST VIEW THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN AS THE
:
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PAGE 3 SAIGON 9276-SECRET
"DECISIVE" PHASE PHASE OF THE WAR, CRUCIAL TO ITS ULTIMATE OUTCOME.
INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT THE COMMUNISTS IN ASSESSING THE
SITUATION BELIEVED THAT THE MOMENT FOR AN ALL-OUT PUSH HAD
COME, AND THAT THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR A VICTORY VIA
THE "GENERAL UPRISING" WHICH WOULD PUT THEM IN A VERY STRONG
POSITION FORM WHICH TO "NEGOTIATE" A UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL
FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.
3. �THE FACTORS THAT LED THE COMMUNISTS TO THIS
ASSESSMENT ARE MANY AND VARIED. THREE, HOWEVER, STAND OUT
AND APPEAR TO BE ENDEMIC TO THE COMMUNISTS, FIRST, THE
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE VICTIMS OF THEIR OWN DOCTRINE. IT
IS DIFFICULT TO SORT OUT COMMUNIST INTENTIONS FROM THE RHETORIC
OF THEIR DOCTRINE, BUT IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNISTS
ACTUALLY SUBSCRIBED TO THE OFT-REPEATED SHIBBOLETHS THAT
"THE LONGER WE FIGHT, THE STRONGER WE BECOME;" "THE MORE
VICIOUSLY THE ENEMY FIGHTS, THE CLOSER HE IS TO COLLAPSE;,"
AND "THE P- OiLE SUPPORT US AND WHEN THE URBAN PEOPLE HAVE THE
CHANCE TO RISE UP OUR VICTORY WILL BE ASSURED." THIS
DOCTRINAL BLINDNESS IS FED BY THE GROSS MIS-REPORTING
EMANATING FROM LOWER-LEVEL ECHELONS TELLING THE COMMUNIST
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PAGE 4 SAIGON 9276 -
SUPERIORS WHAT THEY WANTED TO HEAR, NAMELY THAT THE WAR
WAS GOING WELL. FINALLY, AND PERHAPS WITH MORE BASIS IN
FACT, THE COMMUNISTS BELIEVE FERVENTLY THAT THE EVER-
INCREASING UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR AND,
PERFORCE, IN VIETNAMESE SOCIETY WAS CREATING WIDESPREAD
"CONTRADICTIONS" BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)
AND BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHICH WOULD
LEAD INEVITABLY TO A NEW GOVERNMENT, TO SENDING THE
AMERICANS HOME, AND TO ENDING THE WAR.
4. GIVEN THIS BACKGROUND, THE COMMUNISTS APPARENTLY
BELIEVED THAT A CONCERTED ATTACK AGAINST THE CITIES WOULD
LEAD TO THE LONG-AWAITED AND MUCH HERALDED "GENERAL
UPRISING" IN WHICH: THE PEOPLE WOULD RALLY TO THE VIET CONG
OR THE PAPER FRONTS WHICH THEY PLANNED TO CREATE; THE
MILITARY FORCES OF THE GOVEPNMENT WOULD DEFECT OR FOLD UP
AGAINST THE VC ONSLAUGHT; AND THE GVN WOULD DISINTEGRATE.
THE END RESULT OF ALL THIS WOULD BE THE FORMATION OF A
"COALITION GOVERNMENT" WHICH WOULD ORDER THE UNITED STATES
TO LEAVE. THUS THE TET OFFENSIVE. IN TERMS OF ITS MAXIMUM
GOALS, THE OFFENSIVE OBVIOUSLY WAS A FAILURE: THE PEOPLE
141 IVrs
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PAGE 5 SAIGON ;276 SECRET
DID NOT RISE UP, ARVN AND THE GVN DID NOT COLLAPSE, AND NO
GOAL ITION GOVERNMENT WAS CREATED. WE DO NOT KNOW HOWEVER
WHAT MINIMUM GOALS THE COMMUNISTS HAD IN MIND FOR THIS
PART OF THE WINTER�SPRING CAMPAIGN, BUT, DESPITE THEIR
CONVICTION THAT THEY WOULD SUCCEED, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THEY
ALSO HAD LESSER GOALS. GIVEN THE ENORMITY OF WHAT THEY
COMMITTED IN THEIR ATTEMPT, THEY MAY HAVE ACHIEVED SOME OF THESE.
. .1! _e1e.
THEY CERTAINLY DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILITY FOR COORDINATED
ACTION AND. FOR SUSTAINING SUCH ACTION WHICH WENT BEYOND WHAT
WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEY HAVE UNDERMINED THE CON�
FIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GVN' S ABILITY TO PROTECT
THEM. THEY HAVE INFLICTED RECORD LOSSES ON THE FREE WORLD
FORCES, THEY SCORED A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY IN THE WORLD�
WIDE, AND TO SOME EXTENT, THE UNITED STATES PRESS. MORE
IMPORTANT, THEY MADE AT LEAST IN. THE, SHORT RUN TREMENDOUS
-
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FAR
TOWARD 'ALLEVIATING THE FOOD UTD MANPOWER SHORTAGES THAT WERE
PLAGUING THE VC.
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PAGE .6, SAIGON
5. WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THE FUTURE STRATEGY OF THE
COMMUNISTS WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE GAINS ALREADY MADE, WHILE
AVOIDING THE HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED IN THE PAST. � T HEY ARE
OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE TET OFFENSIVE DID NOT SUCCEED 9
BUT THEY ARE EQUALLY LIKELY TO VIEW IT AS A STEP TOWARD
FUTURE SUCCESS IN THAT IT BR OUGHA T HE AR -HOME TO THE CIT IES,
FLIRT HER 13 URI) EN ED AN ALREADY OVER-BURDENED AND SOMEWHAT
INEFFECT IVE GVN 9 AND IN VC EYES, SPEEDED. UP THE PROCESS OF
CREAT ING CONTRAD ICT IONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE �AND THE
AMERICANS, FURTHERMORE, THERE IS THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE COMMUNISTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WHERE THEY HAVE THE
iA
CAPABILITY TO MOVE INTO THE VAC UN LEFT BY THE WITHDRAWAL
OF SECURITY FORCES. IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE
COMM UN ISTS WILL LOOK AT THE. TET OFFENSIVE AND � REASON
THAT IF IT WAS NOT THE FINAL BLOW, IT STILL GREATLY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FINAL BLOW, AND ALL THAT IS �NEEDED IS
FOR THE coMMUN IST FOR CES '1.0 PRESS FORWARD EVEN HARDER T
BRING IT ABOUT. IN SHORT, THE "LOG IC" AND REASONS BEHIND THE
WINTER -SPR ING CAMPAIGN ST ILL HOLD, AND THE CAMPA IFirj HAS YET
TO RUN ITS ALLOTTED COURSE.
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PAGE 7 SAIGON 9276--e--E�C-11�
SHORT -TERM STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CA PABIL IT IES
6. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND INTERROGAT ION
REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY FOR THE SHORT
-TERM IS TO KEEP HIS MILITARY FORCES POISED AGAINST THE
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WHILE CONSOL ID AT ING HIS HOLD ON RURAL
/-1
AREAS. HE PLANS TO KEEP FR 1- Y FORCES OFF-BALANCE BY
ATTACKING BY FIRE KEY MIL IT AR'? BASES, URBAN AREAS, LINES
OF COMMUNICATION, AIRFIELDS, �AND PORTS. HE APPARENTLY
PLANS TO AVOID LARGE SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES
FORCES BUTiaf TO TRY TO ISOLATE THEM. BY FOLLOWING SUCH A
COURSE OF ACT ION, HE EXPECTS TO KEEP POPULAR TENS ION HIGH,
TO DISRUPT THE URBAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, TO EXACERBATE DIF-
FERENCES BETWEEN ARVN AND ALL IED FORCES, TO DETER FRIENDLY
UNITS FR OM COUNTERATTACKING, AND TO EXPLOIT
MIL IT AR IL Y ANY OPPORTUNITY THAT MIGHT ARISE. AT THIS TIME,
THE ENEMY REPORTEDLY EXPECTS TO BE IN POSITION, MILITARILY
AND POLITICALLY, TO CONCLUDE THE WAR BY WINNING A BIG VICTORY-
OVER i KEY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, SUCH AS SAIGON, KHE SANH,
)
OR IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS. 1-1' 9 �FVER MOST SOURCES DO NOT
-
INDICATE THAT HIS SPECIFIC TARGET IS PREDETERMINED BUT THAT
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PAGE 8 SAIGON 9276 5t
OPPORTUNITY, EMBODYING THE KEY FACTORS OF PREPARATION AND.
SURPRISE, WILL DETERMINE WHICH TARGET WILL BE CHOSEN.
7. GIVEN THE ENEMY'S RELATIVELY EXPOSED POSIT IONS
AND EXTENDED SUPPLY LINES, HE IS NOW MORE VULNERABLE TO ALLIED
ATTACKS THAN PREVIOUSLY. AGGRESSIVE ALL IED COUNTERATTACKS -
WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PRESSURE THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM. A M ISCALCUL AT ION BY THE
ENEMY AT THAT TIME AS TO HIS RELATIVE STRENGTH COULD LEAD
TO LARGE SCALE ASSAULT S ON A NUMBER OF URBAN AREAS WHICH
WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT IN HEAVY LOSSES. IN SUCH A. CASE A
REVISION TO THE PRE-TET PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IS POSSIBLE.
THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE PLACEMENT OF ENEMY 4A IN FORGES NEAR
BORDER SANCTUARIES TO PROVIDE SAFEHAVENS, SHORTEN HIS SUPPLY
LINES, PROVIDE MORE FAVORABLE COMBAT COND IT IONS, AND -ALLOW
HIM TO PREPARE TO EXPLOIT ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR OFFENSIVE
ACT ION . Al THE SAME TINE, EMPHASIS WOULD BE PLACED ON
GUERRILLA TACT ICS AND SMALL UNIT ACT IONS TO CONTEST CONTROL
OF THE RURAL POPULATION .
8. IN RESPECT TO THE ENEMY' S MILITARY CAPABIL IT IES,
THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF
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PAGE 9 SAIGON 92 7 6-77�C-11�E�T---
MANY UNITS HAS BEEN REDUCED BECAUSE OF LOSSES DURING THE
WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGNS THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE, HOWEVER,
THAT THE ENEM /SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED .HIS FORCES PRIOR.- TO
4
THE TEl OFFENSIVE BOTH THROUGH EXPANDED- INFILTRATION AND
IN-COUNTRY RECRUITMENT. SINCE TET THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS
INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS EXTENSIVELY RECRUITING AND
IMPRESSING ADDITIONAL MANPOWER FROM THE AREAS PREVIOUSLY. DENIED
TO HIM. THUS IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE ENEMY'S TOTAL STRENGTH
MA Y NOT HAVE BEEN REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY THOUGH HE IS QUALI-
TATIVELY WEAKER THAN WHEN HE INITIATED HIS WIDESPREAD T ET ATTACKS.
THIS REDUCTION IN EFFECTIVENESS MAY BE OFFSET TO SOME DEGREE
BY HIS RECENTLY GAINED ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE WHICH WILL
GO FAR TOWARD ALLEVIATING THE FOOD AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES
THAT HAVE PLAGUES HIM OVER THE PAST YEAR.
9. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS OF A "SECOND PHASE"
OF EXTENSIVE ATTACKS, BUT LACKING THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE
AND THE COVER OF 64IET, WE BELIEVE THE ENEMY LACKS THE
CAPABILITY FOR ANOTHER MASSIVE EFFORT AGAINST THE CIT IES
SUCH AS AT TET. THE CONTROL AUTHORITY WHICH DIRECTED
THE RECENT COORD INATED ATTACKS REMA INS BASICALLY INTACT
C
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PAGE 10 SAIGON 927 C fl rT�
AND HAS ORDERED MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESSURE
ON THE CITIES, THE ENEMY ALSO HAS HIS FORCES DEPLOYED IN A
THREATENING POSTURE NEAR NUMEROUS URBAN AREAS. .
WE. THINK IT LIKELY THAT IN THE SHORT RUN HE PLANS TO EXERT
PRESSURE ON THE URBAN AREAS THROUGH HIS PRESENCE AROUND THE
r:
CIT IES AND BY EXTENSIVE 'ATTACKS BY FIR, MOUNTING GROUND
ASSAULTS ON SLECTED 'TARGETS ONLY.WHE.RE THE. BALANCsE OF FORCES
IS FAVORABLE, ALT HOUGH HE IS NOW IN � A :MORE VULNERABLE POSITION,
THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING LOOSE ENCIRCLEMENT
OR MANY URBAN AREAS, INTERD ICT ING LINES OF. COMMUNICAT ION, -
AND MOUNTING ATTACKS BY FIRE ON CIT IES AND MILITARY INSTAL-
LAT IONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY NOW REALIZES THAT. HE
DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER MAJOR
URBAN AREAS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF..T IME. � HE AL SO REALIZES
THAT HE MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON ALL IED FORCES. � TO KEEP
THEM TIRED DOWN, KEEP THEM FROM REORGANIZING, AND MOST
IMPORTANT, KEEP THEM FROM LAUNCHING COUNTERATTACKS.
10. REGARDLESS OF WHAT SHORT�RANGE MILITARY STRATEGY
THE COMMUNISTS EMPLOY, IT .ALMOST CERTAINLY- WILL BE
ACCOMPANIED- BY AN INTENSIFICATION OF POL IT ICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL
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PAGE 1 1 SAIGON 92 765E CR E T
AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES AIMED. AT UND�ERM IN ING THE AUTHORITY.
OF THE GVN , SUBVERTING THE GVN FORCES,- STIMULATING DISCONTENT
AND FEAR AMONG THE POPULATION, � AND BUILDING -UP TILE NEW-FRONT
STRUCTURE . A STEPPED-OP CAMPA IGN OF TERRORISM, ESPECIALLY
IN THE CITIES, CAN BE ANTICIPATED. WHERE POSSIBLE THE
COMMUNISTS SEEM LIKELY TO TRY TO INTERDICT LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS TO INTERFERE WITH FOOD SUPPLY AND OTHER
ECONOMIC ACT IV IT Y.
1 1. IN THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD, HANOI IS LIKELY TO PR OBE
THE UNITED STATES POSITION, IF FOR NO � OTHER REASON
THAN TO FUEL THE ENGINES OF WORLD OPINION PRESSING THE
UNITED STATES FOR A CESSATION OF BOMBING AGAINST NORTH
VIETNAM (NVN ) IT IS POSSIBLE, MOREOVER THAT AT SOME
POINT DURING THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN THE COMMUNISTS WILL
VIEW THEIR POSIT ION AS BEING CONDUCTIVE TO SERIOUSLY UNDER -
TAKING TALKS. THISMOVE -NIGHT -OCCUR. IF THE.CONMUNIST.S BELIEVED
THEY HAD SIGN IFICANTLY LTERED THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF
FORCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO TALK FROM A POSIT ION OF
STRENGT H--A LONG HELD TENET IN THE IR STRATEGY CONCERNING
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THE WAR. THE CAPTURE OF ONE OR MORE PROVINCE CAPITALS OR
A MAJOR MILITARY VICTORY MIGHT BE VIEWED BY THE COMMUNISTS AS
BRINGING ABOUT THIS SIT UAT ION.
LONGER TERM CONSIDERATIONS
12. IF AT THE END OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN THE
COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUSTAIN THE GA INS THEY HAVE
MADE TO DATE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO FIND THEMSELVES IN AN
UNFAVORABLE POSIT ION. MANY OF THE ADVANTAGES T.HE COMMUNISTS
HAVE GAINED BY THEIR ALL-OUT EFFORT DURING TEl WILL BEGIN
TO DISSIPATE. GIVEN TINE, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE ALLIED
FORCES WILL GET BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE GVN. WILL
FOLLOW-IF SO, THE GVN AND UNITED STATES WILL PROBABLY MANAGE
TO ACCOMODATE THE WORST AFTER-EFFECT:S OF THE DISRUPTION
CAUSED BY THE TET ATTACKS. MOREOVER, DESPITE THE INCREASED
ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, ATTRITION WILL TAKE ITS TOOL
FROM THE COMMUNIST FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE COMMUNIST CADRES
AND TROOPS HAVE BEEN PROMISED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT
1968 WOULD SEE THE WAR BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
DESPITE THE ABILITY OF THE COMMUNISTS TO VERBALIZE DEFEAT
INTO VICTORY, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THERE *ILL. BE INCREASING
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DISAFFECT ION WITHIN COMMUNISTS RANKS IF THE COMMUNIST POSIT ION
AGA IN BEGINS TO DECLINE. THE VC DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO
WIN, BUT THEY DO NEED TO SHOW MOMENTUM IN THAT DIRECTION IF
THEY ARE TO AVOID SUCH DISAFFECTION.
13. WE VIEW THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN AS. BEING A CRUCIAL
PERIOD FOR THE COMMUNISTS IN FORMULATING THEIR 'STRATEGY FOR
THE FUTURE 0 THEY WILL PROBABLY MAKE 'A -'MAJOR ASSESSMENT OF
THEIR POSIT ION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN IF THEY
HAVE NOT CONT INUED TO REAP ADVANTAGES IN THE WAR, AND SEE NO
WEAKENING IN UNITED STATES AND GVN DETERMINATION, THEY MIGHT
CONCLUDE THAT " VICTORY" AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPHS 2-5 ABOVE
IS NOT LIKELY, THUS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT . RESULTS. OF
THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN COULD BE TO BRING THE COMMUNISTS
CLOSER TOT HAT MOMENT OF TRUTH WHEN. THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE
BASIC DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE WAR,
14. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS ST AGE TO .SAT WHAT HANOI
MIGHT DEC IDE AT THE CONCLUSION OF . THE W INTER - SPR ING . CAM PA IGN
THERE'S, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY. THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE
ALONG THE SAME COURSE AS. PRESENT PER-HAPS ONLY BECAUSE IT
WOULD BE UNABLE TO COME TO A DECISION ON WHAT COURSE TO TAKE .
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PAGE 14 SAIGON 92 76
THE SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ALL GOOD OR ALL BAD, AND
IT MIGHT CALCULATE THAT ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS FOR ONE MORE
HARD PUSH, PARTICULARLY IF COMMUNIST FORCES ST ILL HAD ACCESS
TO MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND HAD A STRONG BASE FOR WHICH
TO LAUNCH THE PUSH. IF' THEY SENSE A WEAKENING OF THE HOME
FRONT IN THE UNITED STATES, THEY MIGHT CALCULATE THAT NO
RAD ICAL CHANGE FOR THE PRE-JET STRATEGY IS NEEDED THAT
PROTRACTED STRUGGLE AIMED AT FRUSTRATING GVN /UN ITED STATES
PACIFICATION GOALS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A FAVOR ABLE
SETTLEMENT .
15, BEYOND MERELY CONTINUING WHAT THEY ARE DOING, THE
COMMUNISTS WOULD HAVE THREE BASIC OPT IONS IF THEY, DECIDED TO
ADOPT A NEW STRATEGY, THEY COULD DRAMATICALLY ESCALATE THE
WAR, PERHAPS BY MOUNTING AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH
VIETNAM AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM AND EVEN CALLING OF CHINESE
COMMUNIST COMBAT TROOPS TO PROTECT NVN WE DO NOT BELIEVE
THAT HANOI WOLD OPT FOR THIS STRATEGY; IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT
CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS/ 01 SaCCESS AS PR7tING ; THE
LIKELIHOOD OF MASSIVE UNITED STATES COUNTER-ACT ION WOULD BE
VIEWED IN HANOI AS BEING HIGH; AND HA_N.Q.L. AL09,pT_ CERTAINLY
4 J
(
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DESIRES TO REMAIN MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY, A POSITION
IT WOULD ENDANGER, IF NOT SACRIFICE, BY INVITING LARGE -SCALE
CHINESE INTERVENT ION IN THE NORTH. NEVERTHELESS, IT SHOULD
BE POINTED OUT THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES
IN THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN AND THE TET OFFENSIVE CAPABLE
OF TAKING RATHER MOMENTOUS TURNS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
16. RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY EXCALATE THE WAR,
WE THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
WOULD RENEW THE IR EFFORTS TO MANEUVER FOR SOME TYPE OF TAAKS
NEGOTIATIONS.OR THERE ARE ALREADY SOME IND IV IONS THAT
THEY ARE GINGERLY UNDERTAKING THIS TASK. ALTHOUGH THEY
COULD VIEW SUCH TALKS SOLELY AS A RUSE WHICH WOULD ALLOW
THEM A RESPITE IN WHICH TO RECOUP, WE BELIEVE IT MORE LIKELY
THAT AT THIS STAGE THEY WOULD BE-WILLING TO GIVE SERIOUS
CONSIDERAT ION TO THE POSSIBILITY OFA SETTLEMENT. PRESUMABLY,
HANOI, IF IT CHOSE THIS APPROACH COULD COUNT ON THE ACTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION. INDEED, THERE IS THE
POSSIBILITY THAT MOSCOW VIEWING THE SITUATION AFTER THE
WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, WOULD- BE MORE WILLING TO TAKE A MORE
ACTIVE ROLE IN COUNSELING HANOI TO BE FORTHCOMING CONCERNING
SECRET
.71 1.7.0i
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PAGE 16 SAIGON 9276
NEGOTIATIONS, PEKING WOULD REMAIN OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF
TALKS, BUT WOULD BE VERY UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY POSITIVE ACT ION
AGAINST HANOI IF RIJ DECIDED TO TAKE THIS OPTION.
17, THE THIRD OPT ION OPEN TO HANOI WOULD BE TO RESORT
TO GUERRILLA WARFARE AND GIRD FOR A LONG-TERM STRUGGLE.
THIS OPTION, OF COURSE, IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH NEGOTIATIONS
SINCE IN NO EVENT WILL NORTH VIETNAM ABANDON ITS ULTIMATE
GOAL OF DOMINATION AND REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM UNDER COMMUNIST
CONTROL. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME D IFFICULTY
IN SELLING THIS APPROACH TO ALL OF THEIR ADHERENTS IN THE
SOUTH, BUT BY ITS VERY NATURE, PROTRACTED WAR DOES NOT REQUIRE
A SUPER-ABUNDANCE OF PERSONNEL. IT DOES REQUIRE HOWEVER, A
HARD CORE OF DEDICATED CADRES WHO ARE WILLING TO FOLLOW
COMMUNIST DIRECTIVES NO MATTER WHAT, COME WHAT MAY. THE
COMMUNISTS HAVE 9 AND UNDER ANY FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES,
WILL CONTINUE TO .HAVE ENOUGH SUCH CADRE FOR THIS PURPOSE.
FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY OF GVN TO WITHSTAND NVA /VC PRESSURES
18. THE QUALITY AND COHESIVENESS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY
LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE GVN 'S
ABILITY TO WITHSTAND VC POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES.
--TSTELGA44_L
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THE GVN COULD STIMULATE AND GUIDE THE. CONSIDER ABLE ENERGIES
AND TALENTS OF ITS PEOPLE IN A BROAD EFFORT AGAINST THE
VIET CONG IF IT ENJOYED INSPIRATIONAL AND EFFICIENT DIRECTION
AT THE TOP. THE PRE JT LEADERSHIP IS ABLE ENOUGH AND
PROBABLY DEDICATED ENOUGH BUT IT IS NOT WORKING TOGETHER.
MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT LACKS THE INSPIRATIONAL QUALITIES
SO NEEDED IN A COUNTRY AT WAR AND WEARY OF WAR AT THAT.
HE LACKS A SENCE OF URGENCY AND SEEMS UNABLE OR UNWILLING
TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY. ON MANY ISSUES HE IS INDECISIVE AND
CAUTIOUS. HIS DIFFERENCES WITH VICE PRESIDENT KY, WHILE NOT
INSURMOUNTABLE, ARE COMPLICATED BY SHARP DIVERGENCES OF
PERSONALITY AND METHOD; THEY ARE AGGRAVATED BY AMBITIOUS AND
SCHEMING COTERIES OF A SSOC ITES . KY COULD PROVIDE. BYNAMIC
LEADERSHIP, BUT WHEN HE DOES ASSUME THAT ROLE HE IS SUSPECTED
OF FURTHERING HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL POSITION. THE RECENT
--r
CR ISIS TEMPORARILY BROUGH4 AN APPEARANCE OF UNITY AT THE 'TOP,
BUT THE SPL IT BETWEEN THE TWO SEEMS NOW TO HAVE BEEN
AGGRAVATED DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. THE PRIME MINISTER
IS INTELLIGENT BUT, LACKING GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION, IS
INCAPABLE OF RUNNING A GOVERNMENT.
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F. I
19. THE PROSPEAS ORM-IMPROVEMENT OVER THE COMING
WEEKS AND)1ONT HS ARE NOT GOOD IT IS POSSIBLE THAT �LOC
COULD BE REPLACED TO SOME ADVANTAGE BUT POL IT ICALLY VIABLE
AND CAPABLE SUCCESSORS ARE NOT IDENTIFIABLE AT THE MOMENT.
THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ENCOURAGE KY TO TAKE ADDITIONAL RESPONSI-
BIL IT IES BUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF LIBERATING KY'S FULL ENERGIES
ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THIEU IS SMALL. THE PRESIDENT
CONTINUES TO DEMONSTRATE A GOOD INTELLECT UAL GR ASP OF
THE PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT BUT WILL PROBABLY FAIL
TO TAKE ACT IONS FOgEFUL ENOUGH OR EARLY ENOUGH TO TRANSLATE
THA t UNDERSTAND IN73 INTO TRULY MEANINGFUL PROGRAMS.p
"2JO A SECOND FACTOR IS THE ABILITY OF THE GVN 10 ZEAL
WITH THE DESTRUCT ION AND DISLOCATIONS CA D BY THE T.ET
OFFENSIVE� DESPITE POLITICAL WEAKNESSES AND MANAGER IAL PROBLEMS,
THE GVN AS PRESENTLY CONST IT4D , FULLY BACKED BY THE UNITED
STATES WITH PERSONNEL AND FUNDS, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PR OV IDE
AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RELIEF AND RECONSTRCUT ION. THE
IMMENSE TASK OF CARING FOR 500,000 EVACUEES AND RESUMING
SOMETHING RESEMBL ING NORMAL ECONOMIC INTERCOURSE IN THE
CIT IES HAS BEEN APPROACHED WITH REASONABLE EFFICIENCY AND
���-�:����" �
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DRIVE. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE MECHANISM WORKED RATHER WELL.
WHILE IT BENEFITTED FROM THE AMERICAN INPUT IT WAS IN MANY
WAYS A VIETNAMESE SHOW. SLOW TO BEGIN OPERATIONS IN THE
PROVINCES, THE COMMITTEE IS BEGINNING TO MOVE RESOURCES
AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE THERE WILL
BE PERSISTING COMPLAINTS AND DISCONTENT, THE LEVEL
PROBABLY WILL NOT BUILD TO A BREAKING POINT UNLESS A SECOND, OR
THIRD, WAVE OF DEVASTATION HITS. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THE
GVN ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM WOULD BE SEVERELY TAXED. IF
THE VC WERE, AT THAT TIME, BEATEN OFF AND A LENGTHY RESPITE
EARNED, THE GVN COULD PROBABLY ST ILL MANAGE AN ACCEPTABLE
EFFORT AT REHABILITATION.
21. THERE ARE MANY AMBIVALENCES IN ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS
THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MASSES AND ELITE
TO SUPPORT THE GVN. ALTHOUGH THE VC GAINED NEW RESPECT FROM
THE PEOPLE FOLLOWING THE TET OFFENSIVE, IT ALSO CREATED A
STRONG FEELING OF ANTAGONISM TOWARD THEM, AND WE DOUBT THAT
ATTACKS HAVE GAINED THEM MANY NEW FRIENDS. DURING THE PAST
MONTH CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN HAS WEAKENED AND DISENCHANTMENT
WITH THE AMERICAN PRESENCE HAS INCREASED, BUT THERE REMAINS
60
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SOME APPRECIATION FOR THE FACT- THAT GVN /UNITED STATES FORCES
DID, AFTER ALL, REPULSE THE ATTACK ON THE CIT IES AFTER REELING
UNDER ITS INITIAL IMPACT, THOSE DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY THE GVN/UNITED STATES COUNTERATTACK, ,SUCH AS
DESTRUCT ION OF HOMES AND LOOTING, CONSTITUTE ONLY A 'SMALL
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION. THE PEOPLE AT 'LARGE REMAIN
FEARFUL, INCREASINGLY WEARY, ANXIOUS FOR BREAK IN THE LONG
TENSION. OUTWARDLY, THEIR DOMINANT REACT ION HAS BEEN, AND
WILL PROBABLY REMAIN RESIGNATION AND PASSIVITY-STEMMING
IN PART FROM THE ORIENTAL BELIEF IN AN INEXORABLE FATE, AND
IN PART FROM A FEAR OF . BECOMING OPENLY INVOLVED WITH THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF THE UNKNOWN VC
SYMPATHIZER . POPULAR � REPONSE 'TO FURTHER VC SUCCESSES, EVEN
IF TEMPORARY, WILL PROBABLY BE FURTHER WITHDRAWAL. ALTHOUGH:
THE PEOPLE ARE NOW MORE VULNERABLE TO ENEMY PSYCHOLOGICAL
ATTACK, WE, DOUBT' THAT THE VC WILL BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE ANY
ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT, VOLUNTARY SUPPORT. IN. THE NEAR FUTURE.
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE URBAN MASSES DO NOT :WANT TO BE
ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOSER, AND AT THIS POINT THE ALLIES'
ABILITY TO RESTORE CONTROL IN THE CITIES PROBABLY IS THE
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PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN THEIR ATTITUDE.
22. AMONG THE ELITE POLITICAL GROUPS THE PREDOMINANT
TREND HAS BEEN TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AND CONDEMN THE VC,
ALTHOUGH THE THIEU-KY SCHISM AND LACK OF 'DYNAMISM IN THE
GVN WILL PROBABLY PREVENT THE DELELOPMENT OF AN ANTI-
COMM UN IST FRONT FR ON REACHING IT S FULL POTENT IAL . WIT H IN
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, A REFLECT ION OF BOTH EL ITE AND POPULAR
OPINION, THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE WITH
BOTH HOUSES CALLING FOR A CLOSING OF RANKS. AT THE SAME
TIME, THERE IS AN UNDERCURRENT OF CRITICISM-CURRENTLY
SUPPRESSED IN THE INTEREST OF UNITY-AGAINST THE ARMY FOR
ITS LACK OF PREPAREDNESS AND THE INCOMPETENCE OF SOME ARMY
COMMANDERS, AND AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INT I IAL
INEFFECTUAL RESPONSE TO THE VC ASSAULT. HOWEVER THERE
ARS NO DEEP CLEAVAGES BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE
AND FOR THE SHORT TEEM, THE OUTLOOK FOR CONT INUED COOPERATION
APPEARS GOOD.
23. THE MOST CRITICAL ELEMENT AMONG THE ELITE IS THE
YOUNG OFFICERS GROUP, WHO ARE CHAFING OVER THE POOR QUALITY
OF LEADERSHIP, THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMANS STRUCTURE
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CONTINUED AND RAMPANT CORRUPTION, AND THE LACK OF AN AGGRESSIVE
POSTURE ON THE PART OF AR VN . THESE OFFICERS APPEAR AWARE
OF THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP, PARTICULARLY THE
IMPACT IN THE UNITED ST ATES,AND DO NOT SEEM INCLINED TO MOVE
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS MANNER . THEY ARE CONCERNED
HOWEVER, THAT THE CONTINUED FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE TOP
POLITICAL LEADERS TO SHOW GREATER PROGRESS WILL INCREASE
SENTIMENT FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
WHICH THEY REGARD AS A EUPHEMISM FOR DEFEAT. THEY APPEAR
TO BE SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO BR ING PRESSURE TO BEAR FOR
CHANGE WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM.
24. WHILE DIFFICULT TO EXPRESS IT IN TERMS SUITABLE FOR
A NATIONAL ESTIMATE, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE GVN'S
CAPABILITY TO FACE UP TO THE FUTURE VC CHALLENGE IS DIRECTLY
RELEATED TO THE ABILITY AND W ILLINGNE SS OF TH# UNITED STATES
TO APPLY "LEVERAGE" ON THE GVN LEADERSHIP TO MOVE FORWARD
MORE RAPIDLY. THIS WOULD BE RESISTED BY THE VIETNAMESE,
WHOSE SENSIBILITIES IN RESPECT TO AMERICAN INFLUENCE APPEAR
TO HAVE INCREASED MARKEDLY DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE
SPECIAL AGGRAVATIONS CAUSED BY RUM-Q_RS OF- ALLEGED AMERICAN
1
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Pt. CA THE
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT COMSIPPODTED 41;itiazg"
AMER ICAN ROLE UP TO THE EVE OF THE T ET OFFENSIVE . HOWEVER 9
THE PROVIDING OF COUNSEL, RATHER. THAN D IRECT IVES TO THE
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PRODUCED ACT ION AND PROGRESS
BROADLY OR RAPIDLY ENOUGH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONLY A
GREATER APPL ICAT ION OF LEVERAGE, TO WIT,AN IMPL IED IF NOT
EXPLICIT INDICTION THAT FUTURE UNITED STATES SUPPORT IS
CONTINGENT UPON THE ACCOMPL ISHEMENT OF ESSENTIAL AND STATED
GOALS. IVEN VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN
THAT SUCiltA MOVE WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE DESIRED RESULT-
THE VIETNAMESE PR INC IPLCS, CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES
COULD NOT SIMPLY PULL OUT MIGHT WELL FEEL THAT THEIR HONOR
AND SELF-RESPECT DEMANDED A REJECT ION OF SUCH BLATENT
AMERICAN PRESSURE. ANY INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE
WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY INCREASED SUPPORT, IF NOTHING
ELSE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR INTENT IONS TO REMAIN BY THEIR SIDE.
25 FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT, THERE ARE NUMEROUS,
WEAKNESSES IN THE GVN ' S ARMED FORCES WHICH WILL AFFECT ITS
ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FUTURE VC PRESSURES. AR VN IS NOT
EXPLOITING ITS OPPORTUNITIES TO PURSUE THE ENEMY AGGRESSIVELY
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AT A TIME WHEN HE IS IN AN EXPOSED POSITION, OPERATING FAR FROM
HIS BASES, AND AT A LOW LEVEL OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, INSTEAD
THE GVN FORCES HAVE PULLED BACK INTO THE CITIES INTO A GENERALLY
PASSIVE, DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THIS IS A REFLECT IONX POOR
AND UNAGGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP WHICH RANGES FROM THE HIGH
COMMAND ON DOWNWARD, ALTHOUGH THIS IS BY NO MEANS UNIVERSAL.
THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARVN FORCES IS ALSO REPORTED TO BE
BADLf SHAKEN IN THE FACE OF SUPERIOR FIREPOWER DEMONSTRATED
BY EVEN THE LOCAL VC FORCES, AND THE INCREASING APPEARANCE
OF HEAVY ARMAMENT AMONG THE ENEMY FORCES. THE STEPPED-UP
MOBILIZATION DECREE AND THE CHANGE IN TWO CORPS COMMANDERS
AND APPARENTLY SEVERAL PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE STEPS IN THE
RIGHT IRECT ION BUT AN ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN TO REMOVE
INEFFECTUAL UNIT COMMANDERS AND PROVINCE CHIIS, AN
IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE, BETTER COORDINATION
BETWEEN UNITED STATES ANDiARVN AT THE CORPS AND DIVISION
LEVEL, AND IMPROVED WEAPONRY FOR THE GVN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY
AND POLICE FORCES AR ESSENT IAL IF THE INITIATIVE AGAINST
THE VC IS TO BE REGAINED.
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