COMMENTS ON MAJOR BROWN'S MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL DE PUY ON THE SUBJECT OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO VC/NVA FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786723
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 13, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723 3.5(c)
13 March 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT Comments on Major Brown's Memorandum for Major General
De Puy on the Subject of Current Intelligence Estimates
of Logistic Support to VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam
1. The burden of Major Brown's memorandum is that current
intelligence estimates of logistic support for VC/NVA forces in South
Vietnam are inaccurate, mainly because these estimates have been
established on what he terms as questionable assumptions, as well as
a lack of hard information, and a lack of timeliness in the data base.
To reach these conclusions, Major Brown has taken certain liberties with
recent OER studies; taking much of the information out of its original
context and presenting misleading comparisons of data in support of his
argument.
2. On page 2 of his memorandum Major Brown speaks of "estimates
which may present a deceptive picture of W/NVA operational capabilities
due to a persuasive tendency to equate capabilities with requirements."
OM; to my recollection, has never equated requirements and capabilities;
it has: however consistently acknowledged the capability of Communist
forces to transport supplies in excess of prevailing combat requirements
in South Vietnam. Major Brown contends the estimate lacks hard information
but concedes that much of the data base consists of detainee/rallier in-
terrogation reports: captured documents, technical intelligence examination
of captured material, and review of US/17414F operational after-action reports
and admits further that from this data valid TOE: basic load, and day of
combat expenditures rates were developed.
3. Major Brown alludes to questionable assumptions but he does
not elaborate on these assumptions. He suggests that the data lacks
timeliness and supports his point of view by comparing the 11 ton daily
1967 Communist ammo requirement with recent Communist ammunition expenditures
of about 7.5 tons a day along Marine outposts in I Corps during a recent
10 day period in February. OER has never claimed that the 11 ton daily
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723
�
L...
proved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723 3.5(0
WP61
requirement in 1967 applied during the Tet Offensive. In fact, pre-
liminary findings of a recent OER study on Tet ammunition expenditures
shows consumption to be considerably higher than the 11 ton require-
ment, and expenditures in I Corps to be fairly consistent with the
7.5 ton daily expenditure rate cited in the Brown Memorandum. On the
other hand, prior to Tet, there was no conspicuous increase in ammunition
expenditures; an increase which would invalidate the NIB 14.3-67 estimate.
This brings up the question of the timeliness of the data used in
our estimate. The methodology, used in the NIB was agreed upon at
the Saigon Logistics conference in May 1967. Much of the data used
in the estimate, however, was based on research undertaken after
the conclusion of the conference. Heavy weapons ammunition expenditures,
for example, were reviewed by Corps area, by month for the period
January thru September 1967 and the findings were incorporated into the
estimate. Likewise much of the data on Class II, and IV supply items,
enemy material losses, and combat operations, dating from the conclusion
of the conference, were used in the estimate.
Major Brown exaggerates the problem relating to the lack of in-
formation on VC/NVA stockpiling practices. Stockpiling is an integral
part of any study on logistics, but available information on this subject
showed no rigid VC doctrine on stockpiling. Ekploitation of captured
document and interrogation reports show varying stockpile levels main-
tained by Communist forces ranging from 7 to 90 days supply levels.
Sufficient data was available to determine the percent of some out
of country Class II and IV supply requirements. This estimate was really
a synthesis of data based on analysis of captured enemy war material and
factors derived from FM 101-10. Allowance was made in the estimate for
weapons replacement and reequipping. Given the combat levels during the
Tet Offensive, both weapons replacement and reequipping factors should be
reexamined. However, again, intensified Communist during the Tet Offensive
should not be used as to invalidate an estimate which applied to an
entirely different level of combat in 1967.
OER is continuing its efforts to refine the data used in estimates of
logistical requirements. Whereas we can find little agreeement with Major
Brown A findings, we can at least support his call for a more intensive
collection and analysis effort. Major Brown concedes that the logistic
effort is enormously complex. As a minimum it requires continuing and
extensive exploitation of documents and reports for data on order of
battle, combat operations, food supplies and losses, the quantities, origin,
2
3.5(c) �
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723
pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723
3.5(c)
and types of weapons and other technical supply items used, replace-
ment factors, variations in ammunition basic load, and expenditures
by unit and by geographic area, material losses inflicted in ground
and air attacks, and stockpiling practices, not only for South Vietnam
but for Laos and North Vietnam as well. Given the immense resources
of the intelligence community,a more systematic and comprehensive re-
view and analysis of Communist logistical operations would seem en-
tirely feasible and desirable at this time.
3.5(c)
Chief, Logistics Branch
3
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786723