NEAR-TERM COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06787048
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 20, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787048
3.5(c)
20 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Near-Term Communist Intentions in Vietnam
1. the Commu-
nists are in the process of evaluating the gains
and losses, mistakes and successes of the first
phase of their "general offensive." Evidence on the
nature of this reassessment is fairly consistent and
provides some basis for judging the second round
which apparently began on 18 February.
2. The general tenor of the critique is that
the failures in the first wave of attacks Were the
result of inadequate support and poor timing in the
use of larger military units "outside" the cities,
as well as weak political preparations inside the
cities. The second round of attacks indicates that
the Communists are devising more flexible tactics to
take account of these weaknesses. Instead of a
massive "second wave," they are carefully selecting
areas for different modes of attack.
3. We think the Communists will attempt to
keep up some of the military pressure against urban
centers throughout the country to the extent that
they are able to do so, which probably means selected,
limited ground probes combined with occasional, co-
ordinated attacks by fire.
4. There are many indications that the enemy--
outside the far northern provinces--is now engaged
in resupply and consolidation. In the countryside,
however, there is considerable evidence that the
Communists are stepping up their activities, and are
propagandizing the people and trying to recoup their
manpower losses from the first-round offensive. In
a large part of the country, the way they play out
their hand from now on will depend greatly on the
pace of allied recovery and stabilization,both in
the cities and in rural areas.
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787048
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787048
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
5. If, over the near term, the enemy's rural
operations and continuing harassment of the cities
begin to unravel the government and its military
forces, Hanoi might decide to try to exploit the
situation with another massed ground punch at allied
strongpoints. If, on the other hand, the allies
can go over to the offensive and exert some strong
military pressure on the Communists, the enemy may
find it too costly to maintain his forces around
the urban areas.
6.
which indicate that the enemy is now trying
to get set for a new wave of urban attacks. The
same materials, however, reveal that the Communists
believe they have considerable spadework and prepara-
tion ahead of them, and that their ultimate tactical
moves depend to a large extent on allied activities.
7. The situation in the two northern provinces
appears much more ominous. The enemy is clearly
trying to position his resources there so as to
make a strong and sustained effort to break allied
control over the bulk of the populace in Quang Tri
and Thua Thien. We believe there is a good chance
that he is going to make a major effort to keep his
foothold in Hue, hoping to use it as a base for an
attempt to set up an actual framework of political
administration in the two northern provinces. The
tone of Communist propaganda in the past few days is
strongly indicative of this, as is the move of ma-
jor NVA forces from the DMZ down into the coastal
plain in Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
8. The battle for Khe Sanh is the big question
mark. There are some indications that the Communists
do not necessarily plan a massive effort to overrun
it immediately. Some troops have shifted eastward
from the Khe Sanh area in recent days, which could
presage a heavy seige campaign to hold down allied
forces at the base and in reserve. On the other
hand, there are indications of some further infiltra-
tion, resupply and replacements for Communist forces
in the area. It is possible that tactics in Khe
Sanh will depend to some' extent on the success of
Communist attacks in the remainder of I Corps.
-2-
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787048
3.3(h)(2)