USE OF NVA FORCES IN THE TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06787092
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 18, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787092
18 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Use of NVA Forces in the Tet Offensive
1. Based on information currently available, it can be stated that
the enemy generally relied on VC main and local forces to carry out the
initial phase of the Tet offensive against urban centers. NVA units were
used, however, to augment VC forces in areas where VC units were either
not available or were understrength.
Z. The use of NVA forces was extensive in the attacks against cities
in I and II Corps. The attack against Quang Tri city was apparently an
exclusive NVA action. Elsewhere in I Corps, NVA units were employed
with VC forces in the attacks against Hue, Danang, Hoi An and Tam Ky.
In II Corps, NVA and VC units have been identified in the attacks against
Kontum, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. No
NVA units have yet been identified in the attacks against provincial capitals
in IM,Corps. The attacks in IV Corps were conducted by VC units as no NVA
forces are known to exist in the corps area.
3. It is apparent that the enemy planned to use NVA units in some
areas as a blocking force in support of VC units which attacked the cities.
These NVA units had the mission of attacking Allied base camps away from
the provincial capitals and interdicting lines of communications to prevent
Allied reinforcements from reaching the cities. It is difficult, however, to
assess the extent to which the enemy employed this tactic. The only firm
evidence is in III Corps. Elements of the 7th NVA Division, which recently
moved into Binh Duong Province, were instructed to attack the U.S. base
� at Lai Khe while VC forces attacked the provincial capital of Phu Cuong.
Other elements of the 7th Division were undoubtedly responsible for the
attacks on 14.S. base camps in Binh Long and Hau Nghia Provinces and for
interdicting roads into Saigon. Several U.S. base camps in I and II Corps
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were also subjected to attacks by fire, but the enemy units involved in these
attacks have not been identified.
4. The role and mission of the NVA Divisions operating in VC
Military Region (.MR) V remains unclear. Some of these Divisions were
committed in the attacks against cities while others were apparently held
in reserve to renew the attacks against selected targets at a later date.
Elements of the two regiments of the 5th Division (95th and 18B) were
committed in the attacks against cities and towns in Khanh Hoa and Puy Yen
Provinces. Only one regiment (the 18th) of the 3rd NVA Division has been
identified in the attacks against provincial capitals and district towns. The
18th Regiment was reportedly responsible for the attack on Phu Cat district
town in Binh Dinh Province. It is possible that the other regiments (22nd
and 2nd) of the 3rd Division had the mission of moving into the pacified areas
of Birth Dinh Province and destroying the RD program in this area. The
entire 1st NVA Division, which operates in the Central Highlands under the
control of the B-3 Front, was not committed in the initial phase of the Tet
offensive and was apparently held in reserve. Elements of the 1st Division
have recently been engaged around Dak To and are apparently preparing for
attacks against Allied bases in this area. Two regiments (1st and 3rd) of the
2nd NVA Division, which operates in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces,
were also apparently held in reserve by MR V. The third regiment (21st)
of the 2nd Division was reportedly involved in the attacks on Tam Ky, but
subsequently withdrew northward to join the remainder of the division in
positions threatening Danang and Hoi An. The role of the 2nd as a reserve
force to renew the attacks on Danang is inferred in the document captured
This 3.3(h)(2)
document, a critique of the Tet offensive by MR V, refers to units of "Mr
Truc" which have "returned to area K for counter-operations." The units
are believed to be regiments under the 2nd Division and "K2" is presumably
a cover for the Danang area. 3.3(h)(2)
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787092