CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06788696
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 2, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
� -TOP-SECRET�
-
-TOP-SECRET-
////i
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
2 February 1961
Copy No. C g.af
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
�
TOP-SECRET
�
a
TOP-SECRET-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
\ �
-SECRET--
�
2 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Khrushchev's intended visit to Africa reflects Mos-
cow's view of Africa's importance. (Page i)
2. USSR plans to detonate 7,000 tons of high explosives
simultaneously in Alma Ata flood-control projects (Page i)
3. Communist China extends additional $157,000,000
credit to North Vietnam. (Page it)
4. 'South Vietnai� NeW- Harioi-sponsored 'front move:
ment to work for overthrow of Diem. (Page it)
5. Congo: Katanga President Tshombe reportedly forms
military alliance with South Kasai Mining State. (Page iii)
6. Indonesia: Subandrio says US failure to support Djakar-
ta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea has forced accept-
ance of increased bloc aid. (Page iii)
7. Iran: Anti-regime demonstrations likely to accompany
elections in Tehran today. (Page iv)
8. Cuba: The regime's drive to "wipe out illiteracy" may
presage state control of all educational institutions.
(Page iv)
9. Laos: Soviet airlift continues; Communist China and
USSR desire expanded conference prior to reactivation
of ICC. (Page v)
10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Ft29e
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Ii
�
� TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Communist Bloc - Africa: Khrushchev is expected to
make his long-delayed visit to Africa this year and has ac-
cepted invitations from Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia,
Togo, and Ethiopia. He appears to be angling for bids from
_Libya and Sudan._. The rapid _expansion _over _the_past_two
years of bloc activities in the newly independent countries
south of the Sahara reflects the Communist leaders' convic-
tion that Africa has become one of the most important are-
nas in the East-West contest. Exclusive of the UAR, the
number of bloc diplomatic missions accredited to African
countries rose from only two in 1954 to 45 at the present
time in line with the increase in independent countries. Since
1959, the bloc has extended economic credits to Ethiopia, Tunisia,
Guinea, and Ghana totaling approximately $275,000,000. Bloc
governments have also extended or offered gifts of aircraft,
arms, hospitals, schools,and food supplies to Guinea, Ghana,
Sudan, Morocco, 'Ethiopia, Libya, and the Congo. In addition,
bloc countries now have operative trade agreements with seven
African nations and they carry on trade with seven other coun-
tries without formal agreements. There are at least 500 bloc
r
technicians
serving in Africa on a contract basis..
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
USSR: Approximately 7,000 tons (7 KT) of high explosives
will be detonated simultaneously in the slopes of a gorge of the 0
Malaya Almaatinka. River this year to build a dike to protect
the city of Alma Ata from flooding, according to a report in
Izvestia by Mikhail A. Lavrentyev, a vice president of the So-
Triii-X-cidemy of Sciences. The plan to use a massive explosion
A TOP SECRET
�
\W X\\
LN.
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696.mwaimmimiminwa
Air
.c.-
�
' New Guinea is the
. P +.-.; US-Inctonesian relations
2'..;reed Indonea to accept increased assistance
� -somL. Soviet bloc, 'le stated that the New Guineals-
..,Ac largely determi. Ojakarta's foreign policy, that
Inenesia is determiot,-.i to "regain" the area, and will
. -a for help to any source available. Subandrio noted
Enrasheliev's promise, during the recent visit of an Indo-
nesian arms mission to Moscow, to support President
Sukarno in every possible way. (Backup,
`2e 9).
Iran: The parilmentary elections which are sched-
uled to begin today in Tehran are likely to be accompanied
by extensive demonstrations and possibly by violence. Na-
tionalist agitators demanding free elections have attracted
large crowds in Tehran,and some Communist instigation is
also reported. The most extensive demonstrations so far
have involved university students, some of whom have been
arrested. The regime is attempting through censorship to
prevent the dissemination within the cities of reports of dem-
onstrations against electoral rigging in the provinces, where
elections have been taking place since mid-January. The
government appears alert to the inherent dangers, and
American advisers hPlieva fha chould be able to con-
:aim disturbances. (Backup, Page 10)
Cuba: Cuban Education Minister Armando Hart is form-
"International Literacy Brigades" composed of teachers
from other Latin American countries to participate in Cuba's
effort to "wipe out illiteracy" in this "year of education!' The
teaching manuals used in this program, one of which was ob-
tained by Guantanamo naval base authorities, are clearly�
Communist authored. The regime's drive to orient the illit-
eracy campaign and education generally to "the policy of the
state and the realities of the revolution" may presage state
control of all educational Institutions.
2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF
iv
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
`.'1� A. �
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
\�,V
\ � AN�. \,L\
to dam the Almaatinka has received considerable pub-
licity in Soviet news media over the past year and was
discussed by the Soviets attlie nuclear test ban confer-
ence in Geneva in May 1960. The explosion will un-
doubtedly be ,studied extensively from a seismological
standpoint. Such a study will increase Soviet knowledge
of industrial explosions and of seismic detection of ex-
plosions in a particular geological medium. Theoretically,
It should also increase Soviet ability to conduct clandes-
tine nuclear tests in that medium.
(Backup, Page 3) (Map)
� Communist China - North Vietnam: Despite its grow-
ing economic difficulties, Communist China continues to
extend large-scale economic aid to neighboring bloc coun-
tries and to a .few underdeveloped nations in the free world.
On 31 January Peiping signed its latest aid agreement pro-
viding for an additional credit equivalent to $157,000,000
to North Vietnam as China's initial contribution to the sup-
port of Hanoi's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65). During
the past year, China has committed itself to well over
$500,000,000 in grants and credits to other countries. Re-
cent agreements include loans to Cuba and Burma of $60,-
000,000 and $84,000,000 respectively�the largest credits
the Chinese have granted outside the bloc. In addition,
smaller, credits have recently been offered to Nepal, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, and.Guinea. More than $400,000,000 has
been extended to the three Far Eastern satellites in 1960
and 1961. (Backup, Page 4)
South Vietnam: A "National Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam" has been established, according to Radio
Hanoi, with a manifesto .calling on all South Vietnamese to
work for the overthrow of President Diem. The front is in-
tended by the North Vietnamese to give organizational sub-
stance to their efforts to unite all anti-Diem elements in
2 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
11
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
"k*,,N\N's.%.,\;,�"%n".*:�%%\:. -\\1\sk�\ � k*.\\;�\1 ...\\ "1\\< \\\
L�.\
�
� -T�P---sEeRE-T_
�
South Vietnam. Hanoi is
attempting to preserve the fiction that this front is a
spontaneous movement and not an instrument of the
Communists.
(Backup,
Page 5)
Congo: Katanga President Tshombe reportedly
signec-1700 January a military alliance with Albert
ICalonji, chief of the South Kasai Mining State, based
on mutual recognition as autonomous states. Tshombe
apparently hopes that this move, in addition to strength-
ening his own military position, will induce the Leopold-
ville government to join the two dissident states against
Gizenga and thus indirectly recognize their claims to
autonomy. It is unlikely, however, that Kasavubu will
accept Katanga and South Kasai as anything but provinces
of the central government. Vench Colonel Trinquier
has reportedly been offered the post of commander of
Katanga's military forces and is now on his way to Brus-
sels to discuss the appointment:1
There is no confirmation TA -press reports that the
Moroccan contingent in the Congo has received orders to
stop preparation for withdrawal. Such a reversal appears
improbable.
akrtunah on 31 January showed Ambassador
Russell a telegram he had sent to Hammarskjold which said
that Ghana's troops would remain in the Congo until the UN
Conciliation Committee makes its report--which is not ex-
nected until late February.
(Backup, age 7)
Indonesia: Foreign Minister Subandrio has reiterated
to the American ambassador that lack of American support
2 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
VA4 \ :\� ,,, *.�
r\"�,".
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
\s
\\� \\\kN\
10-TOP-SECRE-T-
�
N,
\\\ Laos : The two Soviet AN-12's which flew to Haiphong several \N
days ago returned to Peiping on 1 February and are expected to
continue on to the USSR on 2 February. These heavy transport
aircraft presumably flew supplies into Haiphong in support of the , \\
%Ns
airlift into Lans. Airlift nnerations-into. Laos continued through
1 February. \\\
*Communist China has made it quite apparent that it does not
favor any immediate return of the International Control Commission
(ICC) to Laos. Speaking at a 31 January banquet for a North
Vietnamese trade and economic delegation visiting Peiping, Com-etc,6_,t,,
\,-
\ \\) munist China's Premier Chou En-lai said "even to reactivate the
ICC, it will be necessary immediately to convene an international P, /
conference of all countries concerned." Chou did not specify an \
, .,.
international conference limited to the nations participating in , �\.,'
\ the 1954 Geneva conference. Instead, he still seemed to favor an
ks expanded conference of "all countries concerned" similar to the .,
one proposed by Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk. Chou made it quite
clear, however, that Peiping would insist that any group convened
to seek a solution to the Laotian crisis deal only with Laos' ex-
,
N Premier Souvanna Phouma. The USSR has also indicated its re-
luctance to accept an immediate reactivatnn of the MC in T.70S
\
WATCH commaTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. L Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against
the United States or its possessions in the immediate futur_e3
B.
atio Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct.
military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas
peripheral to the bloc in the immediate futur_9
C. Communist forces in Laos generally retain the initiative and are
increasing their capability to extend offensive operations; the
continuing bloc airlift has provided a stockpile of supplies believed
in excess of immediate requirements. These forces are apparently
prepared for prolonged military operations but it is uncertain
whether major attacks will be made in the near futur_e3
D. 1-The bloc, the UAR, and African nationalists are continuing their
efforts to increase the scale of their material aid to the pro-
Lumumba pro-Communist regime in Stanleyville. The success
of these efforts appears to hinge in large measure on obtainin
2 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
\-,\I...\\\\,,s\
\
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
�TOP SEC
�
\
Ltransit rights from the Sudan. The withdrawals of several
UN contingents, the continuing momentum of the political
and military activity of the Stanleyville regime, and the
continued failure of anti-Lumumba leaders to settle their
own differences and their efforts to seek foreign assistance
outside the UN framework are combining to contribute to
continuing fracrmpntatinn nf thp rnncrn-1
2 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
vi
\ � \
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
0
�
SFANISI
SAHAR
MAURITANIA
PORTUO
=NIA
LZons
OMR
ALGERIA
Al. AFRICA
REPL:BLIC
CA ERO N
CA BIND
2 FEBRUARY 1961
DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR
TIES WITH BLOC COUNTRIES
FORMAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
WITH BLOC COUNTRIES
BLOC ARMS ACCEPTED OR COMM
BLOC GUNS MENDED OR OFFERED
MILES
10201 7
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
ANGOLA
IJTH-W
1AFRICA
FEDERATION 0
RHODESIA A
NYASALAND
71ECI.11.,ANALAN
NION
OF
SOUTH AFRIC
SIVA
�
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY
REPUBLIC
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
� SECRET
Bloc Gains in Africa
Bloc efforts in Africa have concentrated on increas-
ing diplomatic and cultural contacts, extending credits
and aid offers, and promoting trade. Since 1959, bloc
governments have extended economic credits of $110,000,-
000 to Ethiopia, $105,000,000 to Guinea, $8,000,000 to
Tunisia, and $50,000,000 to Ghana. In addition they are
known to have offered credits to Sudan, Central African
Republic, Morocco, and Libya, and are reported to have
at least indicated a readiness to do the same for Togo
and Mali. Bloc countries have operative trade agreements
with Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Mali and carry on trade without formal agreement with
the Somali Republic, the Malagasy Republic, the Union of
South Africa, Libya, Cameroun, Nigeria, and Liberia.
Mali presents an illustration of the way the bloc moves
in the newly independent countries. Since last August, when
Senegal withdrew from the Mali Federation two months after
it had gained independence, Mali has established or is in the
process of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR,
Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Bulgaria, and
North Vietnam. Prague has signed preliminary trade and
technical assistance agreements with Mali, and a Soviet eco-
nomic mission has recently been in the country studying pos-
sible aid projects. No commitments have yet been announced,
but the Czechs reportedly have offered a long-term, low-in-
terest credit and four transport aircraft, and have agreed to
construct certain industrial enterprises and conduct mineral
surveys.
Sib-Soviet radiobroadcasts to non-Arab Africa total 76
hours weekly. An additional 62 hours beamed to other areas
are also intended for African audiences.
Scholarships and technical study grants are an impor-
tant part of the bloc's African program. Many of these are
extended through the World Federation of Democratic Youth
SECRET
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
SE-ERE?
(WP'DY), which has affiliations with about 45 local African
groups. Approximately 1, 000 Black Africans are studying
at bloc universities.
Mali, Algeria, Guinea, and Morocco have received bloc
arms, and arms offers have been made to Ethiopia, Ghana, and
Sudan. The USSR and Czechoslovakia provide all of Guinea's
arms and military assistance, including training for at least
60 Guinean youths in these two bloc countries.
-SEERET
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
�
�
Approximate site of planned
7000 ton HE detonation
2 FEBRUARY 1961
fA
0145 10201 8
Probable area of 700 ton HE
detonation in early 1960.
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
CONFIDENTIAL
USSR Plans Detonation of 7,000 Tons of High Explosives
The Almaatinka explosion, as presently planned, would
be the largest detonation of high explosives known to have
been undertaken to date in the USSR. As such, it gives'in-
dication of Soviet proficiency in the use of directed explosives
techniques and the USSR's continued reliance on these tech-
niques, rather than conventional mechanical earth-moving
methods, for industrial operations in difficult terrain.
At the Geneva Conference in May 1960, the Soviets stated
they expected to use two explosions to do the job--one of 600
tons to be set off in the fall of 1960, and one of 3,500 tons to
be, set off sometime in 1961. M. A. Sadovskiy, head of the
Soviet Scientific Group, stated that these explosions were "be-
ing carried out at such depths as to preclude venting.' Later,
however, he explained to one of the US scientists that he had
meant they would not form craters rather than that they would
not vent into the atmosphere. The recent announcement of the
planned 7,000-ton blast appears to reflect further study of the
Almaatinka project by Soviet experts, perhaps as a result of
data acquired from a 700-ton contained experimental detona-
tion conducted probably near Osh early in 1960. Technical de-
tails for the new Almaatinka explosion are not known.
The proposed explosion is also of widespread interest be-
cause of its applicability to research aimed at improving the
seismic detection of underground nuclear tests. At the Geneva
scientific meetings in May 1960, the Soviets include&the Alma-
atinka explosions as part of their contribution to a coordinated
US-UK-USSR seismic research improvement program. Later
the Soviets withdrew from the -program. However, Soviet seis-
mologists are known to have used data from at least two other
kiloton-equivalent explosions--one industrial and one experi-
mental�iii their studies of seismic detection and identification
problems. They have compared their own seismic data from
explosions and earthquakes with those provided them by the US
on its underground nuclear tests. The so-called Osh explosion
seems, to have been undertakeii, at least in part, for similar
reasons.
-eONFIBET-1241,-
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
O TOP SECRET
Peiping Expanding Foreign Aid Program
The new economic aid agreement with Hanoi was signed
in Peiping by a North Vietnamese economic mission which
has been touring the bloc for more than two months in search
of aid for its ambitious First Five-Year Plan, which began
this year. Last December in Moscow, this mission also con-
cluded a new aid pact with the USSR which will provide a
$112,000,000 credit to finance equipment and technical assist-
ance for North Vietnam. Total Sino-Soviet bloc aid to North
Vietnam since 1953 stands at about $900,000,000�$365,000-
000 from the Soviets arid $457,000,000 from the Chinese.
This aid has amounted since 1955 to about one third of
Hanoi's annual budget. The new credit will most likely be in-
vested in further development of North Vietnam's light indus-
try.
In addition to its extensive aid program for Asian Commu-
nist countries, Peiping has committed over $200,000,000 in
loans outside the bloc. More than $40,000,000 has been made
available to Cambodia and Nepal, and an offer- -originally made
in 1959--of $30,000,000 to Indonesia has been revived.
China has also given assistance�largely financial--to
the Algerian rebel movement and the pro- Lumumba. forces
in the Congo.
-TOP-SECRET-
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
� TOP SECRET
Hanoi Publicizes Launching of United Front
In South Vietnam
�
North Vietnam has become increasingly open in its
efforts against the Diem government in the South through
a combination of intensified guerrilla warfare and political
agitation. Last September Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant,
Le Duan, publicly called for the formation of a broadly
based united front in South Vietnam to combine all seg-
ments of the population. Hanoi's leaders apparently hope
the front will become a focal point for the growing but as
yet unorganized opposition in the South. They probably also
hope the front will lead to the formation of a coalition gov-
ernment in the South as an interim measure designed to
bring about reunification of Vietnam on Communist terms.
Instructions to clandestine Communist elements in
South Vietnam l called for proc-
lamation on 20 December of the front and instructed agents
to stage demonstrations and disseminate propaganda. At
that time the Communists appeared sufficiently confident
of their control in some areas to permit public announce-
ment of local front committees. They warned, however,
that the situation was "fraught with difficulties" and cau-
tioned against identifying the front with the name of the
party. This may explain Hanoi's delay of more than a month
in publicizing the front and why Hanoi radio quotes a Reuters
dispatch from Saigon and the Cambodian press as the sources
of its information.
Strong emphasis in the front's manifesto, as reported
from Hanoi, on a program of land reform, expanded agri-
culture, and the removal of rural grievances over the Diem
government's forced labor and rural resettlement projects
suggests that a major objective of the front is to consolidate
political support in areas now controlled or actively pene-
trated by the Communist guerrillas. [ports of civilian
demonstrations against the Diem government in many rural
areas since mid-December are indicative of some success
in this endeavor, as well as in provoking reprisals from
government military force2j
instructed Communist
agents to establish contacts with non-Communist opposition
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
leaders sympathetic to the abortive coup against Diem
in November. aome remnant factions of the once influ-
ential Dai Viet party reportedly have agreed to cooperate
and may become identified with the new united froz29 De-
spite Hanoi's efforts to disguise. the front as a spontanep
ous local movement, however, most prominent non-Com-
munist opposition leaders in the South are likely to spot
the manifesto's close parroting of Communist objectives
and to remain aloof. Moreover, Hanoi radio's claim that
the manifesto has been widely disseminated throughout the
South has nc4 been verified by other,sources�and is-open
to some question.
TOP SECRET
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
� SECRET
�
Situation in the Congo
LN.egotiations between Leopoioviiie, ksakwanga (south
Kasai), and Elisabethville for a military alliance have been
going on for some time, but Kasavubu has been unwilling to
give in to Tshombe's conditions, which include a recognition
of Katanga's sovereignty. Tshombe has now reportedly agreed
that Leopoldville may have jurisdiction over foreign affairs,
defense, and finance once a military alliance is signed, and a
group representing the Belgian minister of African affairs be-
lieves such an alliance can be formed, setting aside the ques-
tion of sovereignty until latex)
a appears unlikely, however, that Tshombe and Kasavubu
will reach agreement on this subject. Katanga was the first
province to secede from the Congo, Tshombe having made it
plain even before Congo independence on 30 June 1960 that he
would take Katanga out of any Congo republic with a central
government. Although he has been bitterly disappointed by the
lack of international recognition of his regime, even from Bel-
gium, whose economic interests have given him strong support,
he has remained firm in his intention not to join any government
other than a loose federation. On the other hand, reports in-
dicate that Kasavubu is so opposed to Tshombe as an independent
leader that he would continue to oppose the Katanga government's
pretensions even if Tshombes forces should attack Gizenga3
The appointment by the Katanga Council of Ministers of
French Colonel Trinquier to replace a Belgian colonel as com-
mander of the Katangan Army could reduce the army's effective-
ness. Trinquier reportedly accepted on the condition that the
Belgian cadre officers remain. Although most of the junior Bel-
gian officers and NCOs may stay, the high-ranking ones almost
certainly will leave. Trinquier is reported planning to import
15 to 20 French officers to hold key positions in the army, and
one to be attached to each ministry of the Katangan government.
The native soldiers, who disliked but respected the Belgians,
may not respond easily to French officers. In view of Trinquier's
appointment, the French may now provide Tshombe with nine
jet trainers which they have reportedly been withholding since 26
January. Tshombe opposed Trinquier's appointment. This evi-
dence of his weakness, or any marked deterioration of the army)
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
SECRET
�5._t this time, when the Katangan regime is increasingly
'threatened by Baluba tribeSinen and pro-Lumumba forces in
northern Katanga, could result in Tshombets replacement
by his rival, Deputy Premier Jean luby...T.)
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Indonesian Foreign Minister Reports on Moscow Visit
Foreign Minister Subandrio in his talk with Ambassador
Jones admitted that there were risks in Djakarta's accommo-
dation with the bloc but denied any basic change in Indonesia's
"independent" foreign policy. He said any military man in
Indonesia would prefer American arms to Soviet arms, but
"we had no alternative."
Subandrio quoted Khrushchev as stating, "We will sup-
port your President Sukarno politically, militarily, econom-
ically, and psychologically. We will give him anything he
wants. All he has to do is ask for it. We will support him
all down the line." Subandrio claimed the Russians did not
argue about terms during the January arms negotiations and
told the Indonesians not "to bother" if they found it difficult to
meet payments.
Subandrio admired the skill of Soviet officials in appar-
ently convincing Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, leader
of the arms mission, that they were genuinely interested in
assisting him with the New Guinea problem. At the same time,
however, he praised the behavior of Nasution, who, on being
chided by Khrushchev on being "pro-American," had replied
that he was not pro-American but pro-Indonesian and also anti-
Communist.
1.ibandr1o's statement that arms purchases negotiated in
January totaled between $200,000,000 and $250,000,000 tends
to confirm reports from other sources which have set the fig-
ure at $244,000,0j
SECRET-
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
�
-Polling in Tehran May Lead to Violence
ffranian nationalists are making one of their strongest
bids in recent years to re-establish themselves as a polit-
ical force. Tehran University students led by agitators
from the National Front, a coalition of nationalist groups,
have been d ng emonstratinfr duri thP nasit urPPlr for frppr
elections.
four Tudeh groups, which
were formerly operating independently, are now coordinat-
ing their activities to aid the National Front. Tudeh leaders
are said to be receiving orders from the Soviet Embassy,
and some direction through Soviet radiobroadcasts. Exten-
sive demonstrations are expected when voting begins in
Tehran on 2 February and may provide the Iranian security
forces with one of their severest tests in recent years. Se-
curity officials in Tehran, who until recently have been com-
placent regarding the elections,are showing signs of nervous-
ness as the voting deadline approaches. Student demonstra-
tions have been.. increasing, and over 30 of their leaders
have been arrestecS
&tional Front leaders probably do not desire violence.
Twelve front leaders have taken asylum in the Senate build-
ing to dramatize their protest over police closure of their
club, the arrest of students, censorship, and lack of free
elections. Mozafar Baqai, a nationalist leader arrested dur-
ing the abortive election campaign last August for making street
speeches demanding free elections, is again making provoca-
tive speeches and attracting audiences as large as 5,000 per-
sons. In contrast, meetings of progovernment groups have
failed to draw sizable crowd_ED
ahe government is censoring news of incidents in the prov-
inces protesting the use of its influence to elect favored can-
didates for fear that such news would aggravate the situation
in Tehran. Voting has been taking place in the provinces since
mid-January and about 112 of the 200 deputies have been e-
lectl47
2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696
� CONFIDENTIAL�
THE PRESEDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
-CONFIDENTIAL-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696