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February 2, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � -TOP-SECRET� - -TOP-SECRET- ////i 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 2 February 1961 Copy No. C g.af Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � TOP-SECRET � a TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 \ � -SECRET-- � 2 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Khrushchev's intended visit to Africa reflects Mos- cow's view of Africa's importance. (Page i) 2. USSR plans to detonate 7,000 tons of high explosives simultaneously in Alma Ata flood-control projects (Page i) 3. Communist China extends additional $157,000,000 credit to North Vietnam. (Page it) 4. 'South Vietnai� NeW- Harioi-sponsored 'front move: ment to work for overthrow of Diem. (Page it) 5. Congo: Katanga President Tshombe reportedly forms military alliance with South Kasai Mining State. (Page iii) 6. Indonesia: Subandrio says US failure to support Djakar- ta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea has forced accept- ance of increased bloc aid. (Page iii) 7. Iran: Anti-regime demonstrations likely to accompany elections in Tehran today. (Page iv) 8. Cuba: The regime's drive to "wipe out illiteracy" may presage state control of all educational institutions. (Page iv) 9. Laos: Soviet airlift continues; Communist China and USSR desire expanded conference prior to reactivation of ICC. (Page v) 10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Ft29e Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Ii � � TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 2 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF Communist Bloc - Africa: Khrushchev is expected to make his long-delayed visit to Africa this year and has ac- cepted invitations from Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Togo, and Ethiopia. He appears to be angling for bids from _Libya and Sudan._. The rapid _expansion _over _the_past_two years of bloc activities in the newly independent countries south of the Sahara reflects the Communist leaders' convic- tion that Africa has become one of the most important are- nas in the East-West contest. Exclusive of the UAR, the number of bloc diplomatic missions accredited to African countries rose from only two in 1954 to 45 at the present time in line with the increase in independent countries. Since 1959, the bloc has extended economic credits to Ethiopia, Tunisia, Guinea, and Ghana totaling approximately $275,000,000. Bloc governments have also extended or offered gifts of aircraft, arms, hospitals, schools,and food supplies to Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Morocco, 'Ethiopia, Libya, and the Congo. In addition, bloc countries now have operative trade agreements with seven African nations and they carry on trade with seven other coun- tries without formal agreements. There are at least 500 bloc r technicians serving in Africa on a contract basis.. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) USSR: Approximately 7,000 tons (7 KT) of high explosives will be detonated simultaneously in the slopes of a gorge of the 0 Malaya Almaatinka. River this year to build a dike to protect the city of Alma Ata from flooding, according to a report in Izvestia by Mikhail A. Lavrentyev, a vice president of the So- Triii-X-cidemy of Sciences. The plan to use a massive explosion A TOP SECRET � \W X\\ LN. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696.mwaimmimiminwa Air .c.- � ' New Guinea is the . P +.-.; US-Inctonesian relations 2'..;reed Indonea to accept increased assistance � -somL. Soviet bloc, 'le stated that the New Guineals- ..,Ac largely determi. Ojakarta's foreign policy, that Inenesia is determiot,-.i to "regain" the area, and will . -a for help to any source available. Subandrio noted Enrasheliev's promise, during the recent visit of an Indo- nesian arms mission to Moscow, to support President Sukarno in every possible way. (Backup, `2e 9). Iran: The parilmentary elections which are sched- uled to begin today in Tehran are likely to be accompanied by extensive demonstrations and possibly by violence. Na- tionalist agitators demanding free elections have attracted large crowds in Tehran,and some Communist instigation is also reported. The most extensive demonstrations so far have involved university students, some of whom have been arrested. The regime is attempting through censorship to prevent the dissemination within the cities of reports of dem- onstrations against electoral rigging in the provinces, where elections have been taking place since mid-January. The government appears alert to the inherent dangers, and American advisers hPlieva fha chould be able to con- :aim disturbances. (Backup, Page 10) Cuba: Cuban Education Minister Armando Hart is form- "International Literacy Brigades" composed of teachers from other Latin American countries to participate in Cuba's effort to "wipe out illiteracy" in this "year of education!' The teaching manuals used in this program, one of which was ob- tained by Guantanamo naval base authorities, are clearly� Communist authored. The regime's drive to orient the illit- eracy campaign and education generally to "the policy of the state and the realities of the revolution" may presage state control of all educational Institutions. 2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 `.'1� A. � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 \�,V \ � AN�. \,L\ to dam the Almaatinka has received considerable pub- licity in Soviet news media over the past year and was discussed by the Soviets attlie nuclear test ban confer- ence in Geneva in May 1960. The explosion will un- doubtedly be ,studied extensively from a seismological standpoint. Such a study will increase Soviet knowledge of industrial explosions and of seismic detection of ex- plosions in a particular geological medium. Theoretically, It should also increase Soviet ability to conduct clandes- tine nuclear tests in that medium. (Backup, Page 3) (Map) � Communist China - North Vietnam: Despite its grow- ing economic difficulties, Communist China continues to extend large-scale economic aid to neighboring bloc coun- tries and to a .few underdeveloped nations in the free world. On 31 January Peiping signed its latest aid agreement pro- viding for an additional credit equivalent to $157,000,000 to North Vietnam as China's initial contribution to the sup- port of Hanoi's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65). During the past year, China has committed itself to well over $500,000,000 in grants and credits to other countries. Re- cent agreements include loans to Cuba and Burma of $60,- 000,000 and $84,000,000 respectively�the largest credits the Chinese have granted outside the bloc. In addition, smaller, credits have recently been offered to Nepal, Cam- bodia, Indonesia, and.Guinea. More than $400,000,000 has been extended to the three Far Eastern satellites in 1960 and 1961. (Backup, Page 4) South Vietnam: A "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" has been established, according to Radio Hanoi, with a manifesto .calling on all South Vietnamese to work for the overthrow of President Diem. The front is in- tended by the North Vietnamese to give organizational sub- stance to their efforts to unite all anti-Diem elements in 2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 "k*,,N\N's.%.,\;,�"%n".*:�%%\:. -\\1\sk�\ � k*.\\;�\1 ...\\ "1\\< \\\ L�.\ � � -T�P---sEeRE-T_ � South Vietnam. Hanoi is attempting to preserve the fiction that this front is a spontaneous movement and not an instrument of the Communists. (Backup, Page 5) Congo: Katanga President Tshombe reportedly signec-1700 January a military alliance with Albert ICalonji, chief of the South Kasai Mining State, based on mutual recognition as autonomous states. Tshombe apparently hopes that this move, in addition to strength- ening his own military position, will induce the Leopold- ville government to join the two dissident states against Gizenga and thus indirectly recognize their claims to autonomy. It is unlikely, however, that Kasavubu will accept Katanga and South Kasai as anything but provinces of the central government. Vench Colonel Trinquier has reportedly been offered the post of commander of Katanga's military forces and is now on his way to Brus- sels to discuss the appointment:1 There is no confirmation TA -press reports that the Moroccan contingent in the Congo has received orders to stop preparation for withdrawal. Such a reversal appears improbable. akrtunah on 31 January showed Ambassador Russell a telegram he had sent to Hammarskjold which said that Ghana's troops would remain in the Congo until the UN Conciliation Committee makes its report--which is not ex- nected until late February. (Backup, age 7) Indonesia: Foreign Minister Subandrio has reiterated to the American ambassador that lack of American support 2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii VA4 \ :\� ,,, *.� r\"�,". Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 \s \\� \\\kN\ 10-TOP-SECRE-T- � N, \\\ Laos : The two Soviet AN-12's which flew to Haiphong several \N days ago returned to Peiping on 1 February and are expected to continue on to the USSR on 2 February. These heavy transport aircraft presumably flew supplies into Haiphong in support of the , \\ %Ns airlift into Lans. Airlift nnerations-into. Laos continued through 1 February. \\\ *Communist China has made it quite apparent that it does not favor any immediate return of the International Control Commission (ICC) to Laos. Speaking at a 31 January banquet for a North Vietnamese trade and economic delegation visiting Peiping, Com-etc,6_,t,, \,- \ \\) munist China's Premier Chou En-lai said "even to reactivate the ICC, it will be necessary immediately to convene an international P, / conference of all countries concerned." Chou did not specify an \ , .,. international conference limited to the nations participating in , �\.,' \ the 1954 Geneva conference. Instead, he still seemed to favor an ks expanded conference of "all countries concerned" similar to the ., one proposed by Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk. Chou made it quite clear, however, that Peiping would insist that any group convened to seek a solution to the Laotian crisis deal only with Laos' ex- , N Premier Souvanna Phouma. The USSR has also indicated its re- luctance to accept an immediate reactivatnn of the MC in T.70S \ WATCH commaTEE CONCLUSIONS A. L Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate futur_e3 B. atio Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct. military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate futur_9 C. Communist forces in Laos generally retain the initiative and are increasing their capability to extend offensive operations; the continuing bloc airlift has provided a stockpile of supplies believed in excess of immediate requirements. These forces are apparently prepared for prolonged military operations but it is uncertain whether major attacks will be made in the near futur_e3 D. 1-The bloc, the UAR, and African nationalists are continuing their efforts to increase the scale of their material aid to the pro- Lumumba pro-Communist regime in Stanleyville. The success of these efforts appears to hinge in large measure on obtainin 2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF \-,\I...\\\\,,s\ \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 �TOP SEC � \ Ltransit rights from the Sudan. The withdrawals of several UN contingents, the continuing momentum of the political and military activity of the Stanleyville regime, and the continued failure of anti-Lumumba leaders to settle their own differences and their efforts to seek foreign assistance outside the UN framework are combining to contribute to continuing fracrmpntatinn nf thp rnncrn-1 2 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF vi \ � \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 0 � SFANISI SAHAR MAURITANIA PORTUO =NIA LZons OMR ALGERIA Al. AFRICA REPL:BLIC CA ERO N CA BIND 2 FEBRUARY 1961 DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR TIES WITH BLOC COUNTRIES FORMAL TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH BLOC COUNTRIES BLOC ARMS ACCEPTED OR COMM BLOC GUNS MENDED OR OFFERED MILES 10201 7 REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ANGOLA IJTH-W 1AFRICA FEDERATION 0 RHODESIA A NYASALAND 71ECI.11.,ANALAN NION OF SOUTH AFRIC SIVA � MOZAMBIQUE MALAGASY REPUBLIC Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � SECRET Bloc Gains in Africa Bloc efforts in Africa have concentrated on increas- ing diplomatic and cultural contacts, extending credits and aid offers, and promoting trade. Since 1959, bloc governments have extended economic credits of $110,000,- 000 to Ethiopia, $105,000,000 to Guinea, $8,000,000 to Tunisia, and $50,000,000 to Ghana. In addition they are known to have offered credits to Sudan, Central African Republic, Morocco, and Libya, and are reported to have at least indicated a readiness to do the same for Togo and Mali. Bloc countries have operative trade agreements with Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mali and carry on trade without formal agreement with the Somali Republic, the Malagasy Republic, the Union of South Africa, Libya, Cameroun, Nigeria, and Liberia. Mali presents an illustration of the way the bloc moves in the newly independent countries. Since last August, when Senegal withdrew from the Mali Federation two months after it had gained independence, Mali has established or is in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Bulgaria, and North Vietnam. Prague has signed preliminary trade and technical assistance agreements with Mali, and a Soviet eco- nomic mission has recently been in the country studying pos- sible aid projects. No commitments have yet been announced, but the Czechs reportedly have offered a long-term, low-in- terest credit and four transport aircraft, and have agreed to construct certain industrial enterprises and conduct mineral surveys. Sib-Soviet radiobroadcasts to non-Arab Africa total 76 hours weekly. An additional 62 hours beamed to other areas are also intended for African audiences. Scholarships and technical study grants are an impor- tant part of the bloc's African program. Many of these are extended through the World Federation of Democratic Youth SECRET 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 SE-ERE? (WP'DY), which has affiliations with about 45 local African groups. Approximately 1, 000 Black Africans are studying at bloc universities. Mali, Algeria, Guinea, and Morocco have received bloc arms, and arms offers have been made to Ethiopia, Ghana, and Sudan. The USSR and Czechoslovakia provide all of Guinea's arms and military assistance, including training for at least 60 Guinean youths in these two bloc countries. -SEERET 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � � Approximate site of planned 7000 ton HE detonation 2 FEBRUARY 1961 fA 0145 10201 8 Probable area of 700 ton HE detonation in early 1960. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 CONFIDENTIAL USSR Plans Detonation of 7,000 Tons of High Explosives The Almaatinka explosion, as presently planned, would be the largest detonation of high explosives known to have been undertaken to date in the USSR. As such, it gives'in- dication of Soviet proficiency in the use of directed explosives techniques and the USSR's continued reliance on these tech- niques, rather than conventional mechanical earth-moving methods, for industrial operations in difficult terrain. At the Geneva Conference in May 1960, the Soviets stated they expected to use two explosions to do the job--one of 600 tons to be set off in the fall of 1960, and one of 3,500 tons to be, set off sometime in 1961. M. A. Sadovskiy, head of the Soviet Scientific Group, stated that these explosions were "be- ing carried out at such depths as to preclude venting.' Later, however, he explained to one of the US scientists that he had meant they would not form craters rather than that they would not vent into the atmosphere. The recent announcement of the planned 7,000-ton blast appears to reflect further study of the Almaatinka project by Soviet experts, perhaps as a result of data acquired from a 700-ton contained experimental detona- tion conducted probably near Osh early in 1960. Technical de- tails for the new Almaatinka explosion are not known. The proposed explosion is also of widespread interest be- cause of its applicability to research aimed at improving the seismic detection of underground nuclear tests. At the Geneva scientific meetings in May 1960, the Soviets include&the Alma- atinka explosions as part of their contribution to a coordinated US-UK-USSR seismic research improvement program. Later the Soviets withdrew from the -program. However, Soviet seis- mologists are known to have used data from at least two other kiloton-equivalent explosions--one industrial and one experi- mental�iii their studies of seismic detection and identification problems. They have compared their own seismic data from explosions and earthquakes with those provided them by the US on its underground nuclear tests. The so-called Osh explosion seems, to have been undertakeii, at least in part, for similar reasons. -eONFIBET-1241,- 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 O TOP SECRET Peiping Expanding Foreign Aid Program The new economic aid agreement with Hanoi was signed in Peiping by a North Vietnamese economic mission which has been touring the bloc for more than two months in search of aid for its ambitious First Five-Year Plan, which began this year. Last December in Moscow, this mission also con- cluded a new aid pact with the USSR which will provide a $112,000,000 credit to finance equipment and technical assist- ance for North Vietnam. Total Sino-Soviet bloc aid to North Vietnam since 1953 stands at about $900,000,000�$365,000- 000 from the Soviets arid $457,000,000 from the Chinese. This aid has amounted since 1955 to about one third of Hanoi's annual budget. The new credit will most likely be in- vested in further development of North Vietnam's light indus- try. In addition to its extensive aid program for Asian Commu- nist countries, Peiping has committed over $200,000,000 in loans outside the bloc. More than $40,000,000 has been made available to Cambodia and Nepal, and an offer- -originally made in 1959--of $30,000,000 to Indonesia has been revived. China has also given assistance�largely financial--to the Algerian rebel movement and the pro- Lumumba. forces in the Congo. -TOP-SECRET- 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � TOP SECRET Hanoi Publicizes Launching of United Front In South Vietnam � North Vietnam has become increasingly open in its efforts against the Diem government in the South through a combination of intensified guerrilla warfare and political agitation. Last September Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant, Le Duan, publicly called for the formation of a broadly based united front in South Vietnam to combine all seg- ments of the population. Hanoi's leaders apparently hope the front will become a focal point for the growing but as yet unorganized opposition in the South. They probably also hope the front will lead to the formation of a coalition gov- ernment in the South as an interim measure designed to bring about reunification of Vietnam on Communist terms. Instructions to clandestine Communist elements in South Vietnam l called for proc- lamation on 20 December of the front and instructed agents to stage demonstrations and disseminate propaganda. At that time the Communists appeared sufficiently confident of their control in some areas to permit public announce- ment of local front committees. They warned, however, that the situation was "fraught with difficulties" and cau- tioned against identifying the front with the name of the party. This may explain Hanoi's delay of more than a month in publicizing the front and why Hanoi radio quotes a Reuters dispatch from Saigon and the Cambodian press as the sources of its information. Strong emphasis in the front's manifesto, as reported from Hanoi, on a program of land reform, expanded agri- culture, and the removal of rural grievances over the Diem government's forced labor and rural resettlement projects suggests that a major objective of the front is to consolidate political support in areas now controlled or actively pene- trated by the Communist guerrillas. [ports of civilian demonstrations against the Diem government in many rural areas since mid-December are indicative of some success in this endeavor, as well as in provoking reprisals from government military force2j instructed Communist agents to establish contacts with non-Communist opposition 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 leaders sympathetic to the abortive coup against Diem in November. aome remnant factions of the once influ- ential Dai Viet party reportedly have agreed to cooperate and may become identified with the new united froz29 De- spite Hanoi's efforts to disguise. the front as a spontanep ous local movement, however, most prominent non-Com- munist opposition leaders in the South are likely to spot the manifesto's close parroting of Communist objectives and to remain aloof. Moreover, Hanoi radio's claim that the manifesto has been widely disseminated throughout the South has nc4 been verified by other,sources�and is-open to some question. TOP SECRET 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � SECRET � Situation in the Congo LN.egotiations between Leopoioviiie, ksakwanga (south Kasai), and Elisabethville for a military alliance have been going on for some time, but Kasavubu has been unwilling to give in to Tshombe's conditions, which include a recognition of Katanga's sovereignty. Tshombe has now reportedly agreed that Leopoldville may have jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, and finance once a military alliance is signed, and a group representing the Belgian minister of African affairs be- lieves such an alliance can be formed, setting aside the ques- tion of sovereignty until latex) a appears unlikely, however, that Tshombe and Kasavubu will reach agreement on this subject. Katanga was the first province to secede from the Congo, Tshombe having made it plain even before Congo independence on 30 June 1960 that he would take Katanga out of any Congo republic with a central government. Although he has been bitterly disappointed by the lack of international recognition of his regime, even from Bel- gium, whose economic interests have given him strong support, he has remained firm in his intention not to join any government other than a loose federation. On the other hand, reports in- dicate that Kasavubu is so opposed to Tshombe as an independent leader that he would continue to oppose the Katanga government's pretensions even if Tshombes forces should attack Gizenga3 The appointment by the Katanga Council of Ministers of French Colonel Trinquier to replace a Belgian colonel as com- mander of the Katangan Army could reduce the army's effective- ness. Trinquier reportedly accepted on the condition that the Belgian cadre officers remain. Although most of the junior Bel- gian officers and NCOs may stay, the high-ranking ones almost certainly will leave. Trinquier is reported planning to import 15 to 20 French officers to hold key positions in the army, and one to be attached to each ministry of the Katangan government. The native soldiers, who disliked but respected the Belgians, may not respond easily to French officers. In view of Trinquier's appointment, the French may now provide Tshombe with nine jet trainers which they have reportedly been withholding since 26 January. Tshombe opposed Trinquier's appointment. This evi- dence of his weakness, or any marked deterioration of the army) 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 SECRET �5._t this time, when the Katangan regime is increasingly 'threatened by Baluba tribeSinen and pro-Lumumba forces in northern Katanga, could result in Tshombets replacement by his rival, Deputy Premier Jean luby...T.) 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Indonesian Foreign Minister Reports on Moscow Visit Foreign Minister Subandrio in his talk with Ambassador Jones admitted that there were risks in Djakarta's accommo- dation with the bloc but denied any basic change in Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy. He said any military man in Indonesia would prefer American arms to Soviet arms, but "we had no alternative." Subandrio quoted Khrushchev as stating, "We will sup- port your President Sukarno politically, militarily, econom- ically, and psychologically. We will give him anything he wants. All he has to do is ask for it. We will support him all down the line." Subandrio claimed the Russians did not argue about terms during the January arms negotiations and told the Indonesians not "to bother" if they found it difficult to meet payments. Subandrio admired the skill of Soviet officials in appar- ently convincing Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, leader of the arms mission, that they were genuinely interested in assisting him with the New Guinea problem. At the same time, however, he praised the behavior of Nasution, who, on being chided by Khrushchev on being "pro-American," had replied that he was not pro-American but pro-Indonesian and also anti- Communist. 1.ibandr1o's statement that arms purchases negotiated in January totaled between $200,000,000 and $250,000,000 tends to confirm reports from other sources which have set the fig- ure at $244,000,0j SECRET- 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � -Polling in Tehran May Lead to Violence ffranian nationalists are making one of their strongest bids in recent years to re-establish themselves as a polit- ical force. Tehran University students led by agitators from the National Front, a coalition of nationalist groups, have been d ng emonstratinfr duri thP nasit urPPlr for frppr elections. four Tudeh groups, which were formerly operating independently, are now coordinat- ing their activities to aid the National Front. Tudeh leaders are said to be receiving orders from the Soviet Embassy, and some direction through Soviet radiobroadcasts. Exten- sive demonstrations are expected when voting begins in Tehran on 2 February and may provide the Iranian security forces with one of their severest tests in recent years. Se- curity officials in Tehran, who until recently have been com- placent regarding the elections,are showing signs of nervous- ness as the voting deadline approaches. Student demonstra- tions have been.. increasing, and over 30 of their leaders have been arrestecS &tional Front leaders probably do not desire violence. Twelve front leaders have taken asylum in the Senate build- ing to dramatize their protest over police closure of their club, the arrest of students, censorship, and lack of free elections. Mozafar Baqai, a nationalist leader arrested dur- ing the abortive election campaign last August for making street speeches demanding free elections, is again making provoca- tive speeches and attracting audiences as large as 5,000 per- sons. In contrast, meetings of progovernment groups have failed to draw sizable crowd_ED ahe government is censoring news of incidents in the prov- inces protesting the use of its influence to elect favored can- didates for fear that such news would aggravate the situation in Tehran. Voting has been taking place in the provinces since mid-January and about 112 of the 200 deputies have been e- lectl47 2 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696 � CONFIDENTIAL� THE PRESEDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director -CONFIDENTIAL- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C06788696