NID: POLAND: ELECTION IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826743
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: June 3, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826743
Special Analysis
POLAND: Election Implications
The election In Poland tomorrow will produce a sweeping victory for
Solidarity and a deeply divided government. The opposition will fully
control the new senate, which must approve legislation initiated by the
lower house; the party and its allies will retain most of Me lower house
seats and get the powerful new presidency. Even If pragmatists on froth
sides seek compromise to address Poland's deepening economic
problems, bitter political conflict ppeaniinevkable as the opposition
tries to chip away at parry power.
The party's negligible appeal and legitimacy ensure an opposition
landslide in races for the new 100-member senate. The opposition
probably will also win most of the 161 contested seats in the
460-member lower house
the opposition has ov
lingering skepticism
participate in a mas eren
rcomeiiitial voter apathy; despite
voters are likely to
um against party rule.
Postelection Dilemmas
The opposition coalition has survived internal dissension, wildcat
strikes, and a boycott by radicals who claimed Solidarit le
Walesa sold out to the regime at the roundtable talks.
top Solidarity adviser Bronislaw Geremkwill become
the opposition whip, tasked with developing coherent political action
in the face of opposition divisions on such fundamental issues as the
pace of economic reform, the need for austerity measures, and the
relative merits of free market capitalism and West European social
democracy.
The party's resounding defeat will deepen polarization of hardliners
and moderates in the regime.\ I Walesa
and his top advisers fear their landslide will destroy party discipline
and discredit the pragmatists responsible for the regime's grudging
concessions at the roundtable. Regime moderates would then lack the
power to fulfill agreements with the opposition. Party traditionalists
are sure to accuse reformers of underestimating opponents like
Walesa and to resist further concessions,
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New Polish Parliament
Nionber of seats
Upper House Rules for New Government
Lowe House
Guaranteed to
Communist Party
Gutuanteed to
pro-Communist
alliance parties
453%
P Each house can initiate legislation that must be
approved by both.
P Lower house can override upper house
disapproval by two-thirds majority.
� Regime would have to gain some support
from contested seats in lower house to
guarantee two-thirds majority.
P Both houses will convene within one month of
election and elect president for six-year term;
Jaruzelski is likely to be only candidate.
6 President has power to veto legislation and to
dissolve Parliament if prolonged deadlock
occurs or if national emergency
declared.
P Dissolution would require new election.
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In the postelection period, an uneasy and protracted tug of war
between the regime and the opposition is likely. Party officials will
be counting on General Jaruzelski to use the presidency to protect
Communist privileges and break the opposition's momentum. The
regime will try to maneuver the opposition into sharing responsibility
for any painful economic policies and to lay the groundwork for
blaming economic stagnation on opposition "obstructionism."
The opposition will try to use the novelty of Poland's new political
structure to build working relationships with pragmatists in the lower
house, regardless of ideology, on issues that cut across party lines, like
housing, environmental cleanup, and agricultural prices. In this way
the opposition hopes to make inroads into the party's domination of
the new structure and to exploit fissures between party hardliners and
reformers. Opposition leaders will also be tempted to rally their
forces around popular antiregime planks such as drastic funding cuts
for the security services and abolishing the party's right to name
economic managers, but pushing such issues too strongly will reduce
the chances for political deals with party pragmatists on other
significant issues
Outlook
The election almost certainly will be another milestone in the slow
decline of the party's power, but the opposition must implement
constructive political and economic reforms to fully grasp its new
opportunity. If it fails, it could end up in a stalemate with party
hardliners determined to protect their control of the economy and the
corrupt nomenklatura. Such an outcome would risk further divisions
in the opposition that would leave the Communists in broad control
and the ace more disillusioned and angrier than ever
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Poland: Solidarity Outcampaigas Party
After a slow start, Solidarity found its feet and mounted a
Western-style election campaign complete with brass bands, bumper
stickers, and stump speeches. As the campaign took hold, popular
apathy gave way to cautious but growing optimism and enthusiasm.
Buses in major cities were festooned with opposition placards.
Solidarity lapel pins were widely visible, and thousands of citizens
bought Solidarity coupons or "bricks" that helped finance races and
that will become souvenirs.
In contrast, the party never shed its stilted, rigid public style, and its
campaign fizzled Clumsy rallies often drew only a few wore faithful
while opposition events drew thousands. By midcarnpaign, it was
clear that the party label doomed candidates to defeat;
an official list of Communist candidates was not
public information.
Despite the mismatch, most opposition observers expect a relatively
fair election. The regime, aware of the consequences of cheating both
at home and abroad, is honoring its promise to permit opposition poll
judges and ballot-counting observers and appears to have no plans to
steal the election.
TCS 2828/89
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Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826743