NID: USSR: THE OPTION OF FORCE IN THE BALTICS

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826769
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: September 7, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826769
Special Analysis
USSR: The Option of Force in the Rallies
The central party leadership is likely to persist in granting the Baltic
republics greater autonomy while warning strongly against secession.
President Gorbachev is gambling that a flexible and constructive
approach to demands for autonomy eventually will erode secessionist
sentiment, enabling him to or a show offorce that would cripple
his reform program and cost him international good will. Moscow
ultimately would use force to prevent the secession of a Baltic republic
but has a variety of options short of a major military crackdown to
deter Baltic nationalists from moves toward secession. Widespread
intercommunal violence, not Baltic political posturing, is the most
likely trigger for a use of force.
Moscow is unlikely to abandon its support for far-reaching political
and economic reforms in the Baltics that remain within the bounds
of perestroika and disavow secession. Gorbachev has endorsed the
concept of more independent republic party organizations and
reportedly has considered a number of innovations, including a
scheme for quasi-convertible currencies for foreign transactions.
Even the strongly cautionary Central Committee statement of
26 August affirmed plans the Supreme Soviet approved in July to
allow the Baits to implement republic !elf-financing in January
1990�a year earlier than anywhere else�and to craft more radical
plans for republic economic independence. The Central Committee
statement criticizing the Baltic independence movement was
nonetheless less conciliatory than many of Ciorbachev's past
comments and indicates there is a Politburo consensus that Baltic
demands for independence are extreme
No Good Options
The Baltic nationalists responded initially to the Central Committee's
statement by postponing action on several controversial proposals
but, over the long term, will not yield on their plan to use republic
sovereignty within the USSR as a prelude to an eventual push for
complete statehood
The Moscow leadership almost certainly views the use of force as
a last resort. Gorbachev last December reportedly ruled out using
violent measures against Estonian nationalists and has emphasized
his desire to do everything possible to avoid using the military. Some
leadership elements, such as party Secretaries Chebrikov and
Ligachev, probably would turn more quickly than would Gorbachev
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Moscow's Military-Security Options
If Moscow chose to oust Baltic party leaders, it probably would rely on airborne and Interior
Ministry (MVD) troops to cordon off government and party buildings and secure airports
and other key logistic points. One airborne division�some 5,000 troops�is based in the
Baltic Military District, but the Soviets might fly in additional irbo
elements of the MVD's crack Derzhinsky Division
Moscow would probably also augment the approximately 4,500 MVD troops already
stationed in the Baltic area. As many as 5,000 additional special police�trained and
equipped to control rioting�are less than a day from the Baltics by road or rail. These would
probably be used to round up separatist leaders and handle violent demonstrations.
Moscow probably believes that airborne and MVD units�which have infantry fighting
vehicles or armored personnel carriers�could deal with all except a full-scale rebellion. In
that unlikely event, a dozen or so ground forces battalions from the Baltic MD could also be
deployed without mobilizing reservists. A reservist callup in the Baltics would risk further
antagonizing the local population, although it could also serve to intimidate nationalist
leaders subject to callup.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Defense Ministry is showing concern about rising hostility toward the
armed forces in the Baltics. Krasnaya zrezda says the Ministry's chid political officer is
meeting with personnel from the Baltic MD to discuss the local situation and the Central
Committee's statement.
To et
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Gains Made for Baltic Autonomy in 1989
Pre�WW II national anthems, flags reasserted in all three republics.
Popular-front candidates dominate March elections to the Congress of People's Deputies.
National language laws passed in all three republics.
Citizenship laws proposed in Estonia, Lithuania.
USSR Supreme Soviet approves Baltic economic autonomy bill.
Lithuanian party youth organization (Komsomol) severs tics to Moscow.
Lithuanian party announces fall conference to consider cutting ties to CPSU.
Congress of People's Deputies reportedly finds annexation of Baltic republics illegal.
Potential Flashpoints
Outside agitation by reactionary Russian nationalist groups.
Extremists gain control of Popular Fronts.
Baltic parties split along ethnic lines.
Moscow leadership in open conflict over nationality policy.
Pronationalist Baltic party leaders fired.
Nationalist, "parallel" government formed, declares secession.
Widespread intercommunal violence crupts; MVD cannot control.
Soviet troops deployed; martial law declared.
Thrgter4400.
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from political means to the use of force, but i..1 the end the entire
leadership would agree or. the necessity of military action if all other
means failed to prevent secession.
The leadership would first exhaust less drastic means. For example,
Gorbachev could deprive activists of important advocates in Moscow
by removing nationalist-minded officials. such as Lithutmian party
chief Brazauskas or Estonian premier Toome. Or, central ministries
could be directed to exert economic pressure by delaying the delivery
of fuel or blocking foreign financial ventures. Alternatively. Moscow
mignt emphasize its disapproval by increasing the presence and
visibility of security (MVD and KGB) personnel or military units in
the Baltics, hoping to cow dissenters and forestall a major
bloodletting. In April the appearance of a few armored personnel
carriers in Riga during a routine military command staff exercise
reportedly discomfited Latvian nationalists.
Moscow recognizes that these options carry the risk of provoking
demonstrations and escalating into a situation ultimately trapping the
central leadership into sending troops. The risk is less, however, than
that associated with a general crackdown in the Baltic republics,
which would be held in reserve as a last resort. A crackdown could
force Gorbachev to retreat on the decentralizing aspects of his
domestic reform program and sharpen nationality problems
elsewhere in the country. It would also cost him much of the
international good will derived from his diplomatic initiatives.
Outlook
The political atmosphere between the Baltic capitals and Moscow will
remain tense over the next few months as local parties try to maintain
their credibility in the face of continued work by the popular fronts to
press their action programs for independence. Critical points could
occur this fall with republic-level elections in Estonia and Latvia or
next spring when the fronts in both these republics plan to hold
popular congresses that will consider declaring independence. Sajudis
candidates in Lithuania are likely to win control of the republic
legislature then
As long as Moscow continues its present course, republic party
organizations have a chance of persuading nationalists not to provoke
Moscow with calls for secession. The greatest threat to Moscow's
policy of accommodation comes from the Russian minorities, who
are much more likely than the Halts to attempt to provoke a violent
confrontation. If widespread intercommunal violence then resulted,
Moscow would declare martial law and use troops to restore order.
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