NID: USSR: LITHUANIAN PARTY DECLARES INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826835
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: December 21, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826835
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USSR: Litht.anian Party Declares Independence
The 1.ithuanian party's declaration of independence from the
Communist Party of the Soriet Union yesterday will accelerate
centrIugal tendencies in the national party and reduce the authority of
part � leaders but Moscow's response probably will be more bark than
bite
The decision, by an 855 to 160 vote, flouts the CPSU Central
Comz-nittee's insistence on a unified national party and the intense
pressure from the Politburo, including a personal appeal by President
Gorbachev. In the debate before the vote, several ethnic Russian
delegates opposed complete independence, arguing instead for greater
autonomy within the Soviet party
Comment: Gorbachev and other national party leaders undoubtedly
are concerned about the blow to their authority and the failure of �
Lithuanian party boss Brazauskas to get a compromise. Gorbachev
may come under pressure from his right to reply harshly, perhaps by
increasing the presence and visibility of troops in the republic.
The leadership probably will be restrained, however, wanting to
retain some influence ovet Lithuanian politics. It could strip the
maverick party of such benefits as having a voice in national party
decis onmaking and the use of national party buildings. property, and
prinLng facilities.
A restrained response probably will encourage republic parties in
Estor ia, Latvia. Georgia, and perhaps Armenia to follow the
Lithuanian example before republic elections next spring. This may
breat le life into some republic parties but will further reduce
Moscow's control in the non-Russian republics. It is also likely to
increase the confidence of other nationalists that they can achieve
substantial gains through persistent and peaceful action
as many as 20 percent of
Lithuanian party members, mainly ethnic Russians and Poles, will
chow e to stay in the CPSU, adding to ethnic tensions in the republic.
A similar split may occur in other republic parties that opt for
inderendenee.
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1---SrSer) ref-
TCS 2995/89
21 December 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826835