BRAZIL: THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR DECISIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06827145
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: March 28, 1979

Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
28 March 1979
--11310-Secrt4
"F Int VIS e r- e t
CO NID 79-073JX
TCS 2773179
28 March 1979
Copy 392
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
 Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
(b)(3)
Contents
Brief and Comments
USSR: Views on Egyptian-Israeli Treaty
1
(b)(1)
Palestinians: Terrorist Plans
3
Iran: Chief of Staff's Resignation
4
OPEC: New Oil Prices
5
Tanzania-Uganda: Military Situation
6
South Africa: Political Scandal
7
USSR-France: Brezhnev's Health
8
Canada: Pre-election Scene
8
China-Vietnam: Delay in Talks
9
UK: No-Confidence Vote
9
Special Analyses
West Bank - Gaza Strip: The Autonomy Issue. � � 12
Brazil: The Politics of Nuclear Decisions . 15
Overnight Reports 19
The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the
final section of the Daily, will often contain materials
that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and
Comments.
_lapSeerer
TCS 2773/79
(b
)(1
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
(b)(3)
BRAZIL: The Politics of Nuclear Decisions
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
President Figueiredo has quietly called for a re-
evaluation of Brazil's nuclear energy program. Brazil-
ians are critical of the heavily increased costs, delays
in implementation, and management problems of the program
that was planned in 1975 when the accord with Germany was
concluded. In addition, Brazil's scientific community
has become divided over the uranium enrichment process
to be transferred to Brazil, and the dispute has grown
into a frequently vicious fight between different nuclear
agencies. It appears that Brazil will eventually reduce
the scope of its ambitious nuclear program and probably
decrease the number of Brazilian - West German reactors
from eight to four. Brazil, however, will not abandon
either its drive for nuclear independence or the accord
with West Germany, which it has vigorously defended.
(b)(3)
Brazil's nuclear program has increased dramatically
under the ambitious 1975 accord with West Germany, which
Brasilia has since categorized as essential to independ-
ence in the nuclear field. Indeed, national prestige
has been profoundly linked to the West German technologi-
cal package, which calls for joint development of eight
power reactors and, more important, buildina uranium en-
richment and fuel reprocessing plants. (b)(3)
The fact that spent-uranium reprocessing equipment
can be used to extract plutonium--a weapon ingredient--
has raised international concern about the Brazilian -
West German accord. Brazil's reaction to US and other
Western inquiries about the reprocessing arrangement has
been indignant and harsh. In feelings created by what
Brazil sees as US interference in its affairs have con-
tributed to cooling relations and the abrogation of sev-
eral longstanding joint military agreements. Any per-
ceived interference or criticism of the accord with West
Germany will continue to elicit a strong Brazilian re-
sponse. (b)(3)
15
--continued
ltp-S4KEPA
TCS 2773/79
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
'TIrmfickerpt
A number of factors, however, suggest Brazil is
considering a curtailment of its program with West Ger-
many and the subordination of nuclear energy to hydro-
electric power. The first is Brazil's disappointment
with a series of delays in implementing the accord.
Training and initial reactor construction may be as much
as two years behind schedule. Brazil blames West German
arrogance and incomplete training for delays in trans-
ferring the technology. The West Germans complain that
Brazil's inexperience and relatively low technological
base have retarded the exchange.
Rising costs for construction, training, and hard-
ware are also having a heavy impact on Brazilian leaders.
Delays in the program and spiraling inflation affecting
both countries have led to a number of serious cost over-
runs for the minimal construction completed to date. The
original $5 billion figure for the reactors and associ-
ated plants may double or triple. Some domestic critics
have charged that Brazilian and West German corruption
and mismanagement have added to the sharp cost increases.
Site security and safety procedures have proven
faulty. A number of accidents and other costly incidents
have come to the attention of the press and provided
ample fuel for critics. These factors, in combination
with some personal enmities, have split the Brazilian
scientific community, which is now engaged in a sometimes
sharp dispute over the accord and its possible curtail-
ment. The most recent example was the resignation of a
top nuclear official who disagreed with policies of the
director of Brazil's nuclear energy.
Figueiredo officially supports the nuclear program,
but he may be giving only lip service to a program that
was highly touted by his predecessor. The new President
has indicated he will gradually reevaluate the scope of
the accord with West Germany. He has already asked for
a cost analysis of the last four of the eight reactors
called for in the agreement and has shown interest in
Brazil's hydroelectric potential. Figueiredo has also
--continued
16
Topjecret
TCS 2773/79
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
mApproved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
ntreveepiat._
selected an energy adviser who has criticized portions
of the agreement with West Germany in favor of conven-
tional power development. Finally, the new Minister of
Mines and Energy, Cesar Cals, has publicly hinted that
Brazil will slow its push into reactor construction.
Cals said that nuclear-related progress will depend on
Brazil's need for energy, an implication that later re-
actors may be delayed indefinitely.
There is no evidence that Brazil is planning to
produce nuclear weapons any time soon, although such
speculation has surfaced since 1975. Feeding interna-
tional concern is Brazil's failure to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty or fully to ratify the Tlate-
lolco Treaty, which would establish Latin America as a
nuclear-free zone. Added to this is previous emphasis
by the Brazilian military on heavy water production and
occasional published remarks by military officers indi-
cating that Brazil must have a nuclear weapons capabil-
ity to be truly independent.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
While West German technology will allow Brazil to
produce fissionable materials that could be used in explo-
sive devices, a number of years--perhaps eight to 10--
would be required to complete the development of weapons.
The Brazilians would have to break international safe-
guards to begin such a program at this time. Brazilian
leaders have repeatedly asserted that their country will
use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes.
Brazil is clearly the most powerful nation in South Amer-
ica and has no immediate need for atomic weapons.
Brazilian leaders would feel otherwise, however, should
Argentina's nuclear program continue to lead Brazil's
or if Argentina begins a weapons program. (b)(3)
17
--continued
TCS 2773/79
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145
 ,..,.....,Approved for Release. 2020/09/11 C06827145
1 OD 'etTet---
Outlook
Brazil is likely to curtail its nuclear program and
focus more on the country's substantial and more readily
available hydroelectric power. Figueiredo may take addi-
tional action later and possibly eliminate the last four
reactors under the accord. Continued delays and price
increases because of management and contractual problems
may force a reduction in the West German agreement
through the sheer cost. In addition, the dispute between
nuclear officials may force the President to shuffle
Brazil's top nuclear managers.
The timing of significant changes is uncertain be-
cause of the political impact of the nuclear issue and
Figueiredo's reluctance to repudiate former President
Geisel's policies. Whatever the changes, Brazil will
not abandon its effort to exploit the West German tech-
nology transfer toward achieving its goal of nuclear in-
dependence. There is no pressure now from any important
sector in Brazil to develop explosive devices with the
plutonium from the reprocessing technology. Brazilian
expectations regarding a full-fuel cycle nuclear program
and the controversy both inside and out of the country
over the accord with West Germany will heighten Brasilia's
sensitivity to criticism. The nuclear issue will remain
an important factor in Brazil's international relations
for the foreseeable future.
18 -Tep-Sesfet--
TCS 2773/79
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827145