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October 1, 1971
Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 EO 13526 3.3(h)(2) EO 13526 6.2(d) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE LEADERS OF COMM UNIff CHINA VI. MAO Tse-tung Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 WARNING This document co ains information affecting the national defense of the Unite States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and , of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or reve lion of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized erson is prohibited by law. GROUP I Excluded hem cute ' do.ngreding end declastiketiew Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET PREFACE This report is the sixth in a series of in- depth biographic studies of Communist China's top leaders. The series fills a gap in our biographic coverage of China's senior leadership. This report was prepared by the Central Reference Service and was coordinated within CIA as appro- priate. Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 BIOGRAPHIC BRIEF Mao Tse-tung joined the Chinese Communist Party (CC?) in 1921. After many years of agitation within the Party, and in the face of considerable opposition from Li Li-san, he became CC? Chairman in 1935. Mao solidified his position in the hills of Yenan and until 1949, when he marched victori- ously into Peking, operated in China's countryside guiding his band of followers through the anti- Japanese and civil war years. In Peking, the Central People's Government was founded, and Mao became Chief of State. Mao then negotiated a treaty with Moscow and began a series of suppressive movements designed to ensure his supremacy at home. The "cult" of Mao spread, but following the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958, Mao resigned his top government post, while retaining the CC? Chairmanship. To rejuvenate the CCP with a revolutionary spirit, and to defeat the rising threat from "revisionists" and "capitalist-roaders," Mao launched the chaotic Cultural Revolution in 1965. Four years later he remained leader of the CCP backed by a Politburo entourage of loyal Maoists. Mao, now 77, has been in uncertain health for many of his adult years but currently appears to be in good physical and mental condition. His life has been a combination of the ruthlessness of a totalitarian leader, the cunning of a clever Ming Court official, and the sensitivities of a poet. He is married to Chiang Ch'ing, his fourth wife. SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 GROUP 1 Excluded horn automatic downgrading and declassification Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 MAO WITH NI COLAE CEAUSESCU OF ROMANIA, JUNE 1971 SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO Tse-tung (3029/3419/2639) Chairman, Chinese Communist Party; Chairman, Politburo; Chairman, Military Commission Mao Tse-tung has been Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1935. He also holds the following major positions: Chairman of the CCP Politburo, member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and de jure chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee (CCP-CC). In addition, the existing draft constitution, which will be discussed at the impending Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), specifically names him commander in chief of the whole army and whole nation. This is a new title and appears to be deliberately vague but more all-embracing than the post of head of state, formerly held by the now deposed Liu Shao-chli. Mao has been a Deputy representing Peking municipality in the previous NPC's. Mao's rise to power was gradual achieved in the face of considerable opposition from rival leaders and, indirectly until 1935, from the Com- munist International (Comintern) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Mao consoli- dated his leadership in Yenan, Shensi, where he developed an interpretation of China's situation within the framework of Marxist philosophy. In this period at Yenan, Mao solidified his position as an ideological as well as political leader of the Chinese Communist movement. Since the Yenan era and the 1949 CCP takeover, Mao has decided the fate of numerous party cadres and has demonstrated a ruthless vindictiveness toward anyone he believed disloyal to him. His continued domination is the result of leadership abilities, tremendous charismatic appeal, and the often unrewarded loyalty proffered by lifelong associates. The invaluable aid he has received from Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chien Po-ta and K'ang Sheng, his fellow members of the Politburo Standing Committee, has been instrumental in maintaining SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and deciamirwation Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 his preeminence in China. There have been others, of course, such as military elder Chu Te, as well as the now purged Liu Shao-chli, Teng Hsiao-pling and P'eng Te-huai, upon whom Mao has relied for assistance and who stand out in the annals of CC? history. Particularly noticeable is the respect all of these men have had for Mao, even during many years of internal troubles and discontent. At times, the personality cult surrounding Mao has prevailed to such a degree that his stature could best be described as that of a semideity. Whether Mao's personal traits are a result or a cause of this stature is difficult to determine. In any case, he exudes an air of extreme self- confidence, is skillful in manipulating protago- nists during infighting and intrigue, and demon- strates great patience, a sense of timing, and a readiness to retreat when necessary. Early Life Mao Tse-tung was born on 26 December 1893 to Mao Shun-sheng, a moderately wealthy peasant farmer and Wen Ch'i-mei, a kind, generous and sympathetic woman and a devout Buddhist who gave her children religious instruction. Mao was the eldest of four children--three sons and a daughter. The family lived in Shaoshan village, Hsiangt'an hsien, a rural county some 20 miles south of the Hunan pro- vincial capital of Changsha. Early in life, Mao learned a lesson from his relationship with his quick-tempered father who frequently beat his sons. The elder Mao often accused young Tse-tung of laziness and unfilial conduct, but when the latter asserted his rights by open rebellion, his father relented; when Tse- tung remained weak and submissive, his father only cursed and beat him more. Mao Tse-tung later told American journalist Edgar Snow, "I learned to hate my father but it probably bene- fited me. It made me most diligent in my work." From the age of 8, young Mao received a traditional Chinese education at the local pr school while continuing to work on the family 2 ary arm. Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 His teacher was harsh and severe and did not hesi- tate to beat his students. At 13 Mao left school to work longer hours on the farm. He managed to continue reading, and stories of Western technol- ogy and the mistreatment of Chinese at the hands of foreigners stimulated his desire to resume his education. He ran away from home, studied classi- cal literature with an unemployed law student, and at age 16 enrolled in Tungshan Academy. The fol- lowing year he studied at a Changsha middle school. With the outbreak of the Wuhan uprising on 10 October 1911, Mao joined an anti-Manchu Hunan army unit, but thinking the revolution had ended he resigned in 6 months to return to school. He soon left school again, returned to spend about 6 months at the Hunan Provincial First Middle School in Changsha, then quit once more to begin a period of self-education, reading poetry and romances and serious works on Russia, England, America and France. In 1913 Mao reentered the Hunan Provin- cial First Middle School. This time he remained until 1918, having been influenced by liberal instructors such as Yang Ch'ang-ch'i, whose daugh- ter Mao would soon marry. During this period Mao became an enthusiastic supporter of the magazine Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth), founded by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1915 after Japan's announcement of the degrading Twenty-One Demands. Ch'en, who later became dean of the Faculty of Letters at Peking University and the first secretary general of the CCP, wanted to awaken China's youth ideologically and to show the need for destroying stagnant traditions. Inspired by Hsin Ch'ing-nien, Mao gradually built up a small nucleus of serious-minded colleagues and on 18 April 1918 founded the Hsin-min fisiieh- hui (New People's Study Society) in Changsha. (Among its activities, the society helped to organize students to go to France under the work- and-study program. In 1920 Mao went to Peking with 20 such prospective students; at the last however, he stayed in China.) SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET Financially unable to enter a university, Mao was given a minor position in the National Peking University library by Li Ta-chao, head librarian and soon to be another of the founders of the CCP. Mao joined Li's Marxist Study Society and read Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto and various other works on socialism and class struggle. He returned to Changsha in early 1919, took part in the Hunan phase of the May Fourth (1919) Movement (a student- led political crusade opposing the degradation of China at the Paris Peace Talks), and then went to Shanghai. There he met Chien Tu-hsiu and worked out the plans for a Hunan Reconstruction Associa- tion. Mao then returned to his native province, where he continued the work of the New People's Study Society, corresponded with Ch'en and took up a teaching position. That winter he helped to organize workers politically and instigate strikes. Mao has declared that by 1920 he had become in theory, and to some extent in action, a Marxist. The Beginnings of the CCP _ The founding date of the CCP is usually given as July 1921, the occasion of the First CCP Con- gress, in Shanghai. Of the 12 persons who partic- ipated in the congress, only Mao, who was one of two Hunan representatives, and Tung Pi-wu, who represented Hupeh, are still active in the CCP. After the congress, Mao returned to Changsha to set up the party organization in Hunan, aided by Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao missed the Second Congress, held in 1922. At the Third CCP Congress, in Canton in 1923, he was elected to the CCP-CC for the first time. He was also appointed director of the Organization Department of the party and until late 1924 worked out of CCP head- quarters in Shanghai. In 1923, at the outset of the period of CCP- Kuomintang ( ) cooperation in the first united front, Mao joined the KMT. In January 1924 he became an alternate member of the KMT's First Central Executive Committee. Mao threw himself into his task of organizing cooperation with the -4 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 KMT so enthusiastically that he was soon looked upon with suspicion in his own party. By the end of 1924, according to his autobiography, Mao became ill and returned to Hunan for a rest. There is little doubt that his illness was at least partly political. He was under heavy attack from those in the CCP who were opposed to an excessive emphasis on KMT-CCP cooperation at the pos- sible expense of their own party's independence. (In fact, Mao was not elected to the Fourth CCP-CC in January 1925.) MAO IN 19 23 Upon returning to his native province Mao noticed a growing awareness and concern of the peasantry for political matters. He began try- ing to organize peasant associations, but his work in the Hunan countryside was brought to a halt by the provincial governor, and he was forced to flee to Canton in the fall of 1925. By this time the peasant movement in Kwangtung Province had reached considerable proportions, as had the tensions between the KMT and CCP over the united front policy. Much of the available evidence suggests Mao still favored cooperation, and during the next year and a half he played a rather significant role within the KMT apparatus. In November 1925 he and two Communist colleagues gained the domi- nant voice on the credentials committee for the forthcoming Second KMT Congress. At about the same time Mao became de facto head of the KMT Propaganda Department, although his title was only deputy chief. In this capac- ity, at the Second KMT Congress in January 1926, _ 5 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET he delivered a report on propaganda, in which he stressed the need for the KMT to center its work on the peasantry. Mao was again elected an alter- nate meMber of the KMT's Central Executive Commit- tee, and he continued to serve as acting head of the Propaganda Department. In February he also became a member of the Peasant Movement Committee, more than half of which was made up of Communists, and which apparently was intended as a device by which the CCP hoped to gain control of KMT organi- zations that dealt with peasant questions. After March 1926 Chiang Kai-shek moved to curtail Communist power. He was able to accomplish much in this direction at the Second Plenum of the KMT Central Executive Committee in May 1926. Mao was removed from his Propaganda Department post, and most of his fellow Communists were stripped of their positions. Surprisingly, Mao continued to occupy the important post of principal of the Peas- ant Movement Training Institute during the period from May to October 1926. The institute, though under KMT jurisdiction, had been a stronghold of the CCP since the school was established 2 years earlier. While head of the institute, Mao arranged for a number of top Commu- nist leaders to teach or give lectures while he himself lectured on the peasant question in China and on methods of teaching in the countryside. After his class graduated, Mao spent a brief me in Shanghai as secretary of the newly estab- lished CCP Central Peasants' Committee and then made an inspection tour of rural areas in Kiangsu and Chekiang. In December he was in Changsha, where he gave the keynote speech to the First Hunan Peasants' Association Congress, stressing the critical importance of the peasantry to the revolution. The result of Mao's tour of Hunan was A Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. In this paper, Mao anticipated massive rural uprisings in which the peasantry would over- throw the landed classes. His plea that the party -6 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 exploit the revolutionary potential of the peasants went unheeded, however, because it conflicted with official CCP policy. The CCP-CC published Mao's report without comment, and Chien Tu-hsiu then tabled it at the Fifth National CCP Congress in Wuhan in May 1927. At this congress, which took place 1 month after Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Commu- nist coup in Shanghai, Mao was reelected to the CCP-CC but only as an alternate member who was not permitted to vote on policy decisions. Fellow party members still held him in suspicion because of his work with the KMT, and he had gained the reputation of a "hot-head" who was not easily disciplined. Not only did Mao oppose the party's policy, or lack of policy, toward the peasants, he also led the All-China Peasants' Union (whose chairman he became in May 1927) in a series of rebellions throughout Hunan early in the summer of 1927. This was at a time when the Comintern was issuing directives to stop inciting peasant uprisings. On 1 August 1927 a band of Communist forces under Yeh T'ing captured KMT-held Nanchang, Kiangsi. Within a few days they were driven out, and on 7 August an emergency CCP meeting was convened in Hankow at which Chien Tu-hsiu was deposed as CCP leader. A Provisional Politburo under Chili Ch'iu- pai was established, and Mao became an alternate member of that body. Under revised instructions from the Comintern, the Politburo planned a series of rural uprisings (later known as the Autumn Harvest Uprisings) with the ultimate goal of surrounding and capturing the major Yangtze Valley urban centers. Mao was sent to his native Hunan, and by September his 1st Divi- sion of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army began to experience minor successes. Soon, however, after many battles and troop losses, the uprisings failed. The KMT drove Mao's forces to Chingkang- shan, a mountain retreat on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. Repudiated and dismissed from the Central Com- mittee and Politburo, Mao remained at Chingkangshan through the winter of 927-28, completely cut off 7 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 from the party center and short on food and arms. In April or May 1928 Chu Te arrived with his ragged troops and joined forces with Mao in the beginning of an important, strategic alliance. Officially, Mao was the political commissar and Chu the com- mander of the 4th Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In the summer of 1928, Mao was reelected in absentia to the CCP-CC by the Sixth National CCP Congress, held in Moscow. Kiangsi Period During 1929 and early 1930 the Chu-Mao forces marched about in southeastern Kiangsi near the Fukien border while Mao was strengthening his per- sonal position. In December 1929 he convened the Ninth Conference of 1st Red Army delegates at Kutien in Fukien. It was an obscure event, but it signified his growing control over the Red Army and was his initial attempt at independent policy formulation. Mao called for the subordination of military to political affairs; he opposed the policy of city- based revolution as advocated by Li Li-san, strong man of the party in Shanghai; and he expounded his own views on agrarian revolution and the means of building up the Red Army for a revolutionary role. The Kutien Conference marked the end of Mao's passive resistance to the Soviet-oriented Li L -san leadership and the beginning of his attacks on the Moscow-educated "returned students" group known as the "28 Bolsheviks." Mao's proposal to concentrate his efforts on Kiangsi and his claim that his policy was the only correct one were clear indications that he intended to function autonomously. He had perceptibly strengthened his position, and the Comintern began to accord him public support. In December 1930 Mao suppressed a local rebel- lion against his authority at nearby Futien in Kiangsi. This incident resulted in the first and one of the most extensive and bloody purges car- ried out by Mao prior to 1949. Mao was secure in his position in the Kiangsi Soviet by 1931, having been elected Chairman of the SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) in 1930 and of the Provisional Chinese Soviet Republic (PCSR) in 1931. Mao's position in the CCP, however, was less imposing, and over the next year and a half his policies--especially regarding military strategy--came under constant attack from the returned student faction and Chou En-lai. Power in the CCP had shifted from Li Li-san to the "28 Bolsheviks" who, by 1932, were head- quartered in Juichin, Kiangsi. This development signalled a temporary waning of Mao's power. He was replaced by Chou En-lai as RMC Chairman, but as disillusionment with Soviet guidance grew, Mao gradually regained political strength. In late 1932 he was elected a full Politburo member for the first time, and he has continuously served on that body since then. The Long March and the Yenan Era In October 1934 the Kiangsi Soviet succumbed to the KMT extermination campaigns, and the Red Army set out on its historic Long March to Shensi. En route, in January 1935, the Politburo held the Tsuni (Kweichow) Conference at which Mao became Chairman of the CCP. He also took back from Chou En-lai the post of Chairman of the RMC. During the next 2 years Mao reestablished the PCSR in north Shensi, first in Paoan and then in Yenan after December 1936. He remained in Yenan for the next 10 years, devoting most of his time to the consolidation and organization of the CCP. From early 1935 Mao successfully withstood a series of challenges to his position within the party, and with each challenge his power increased. His main opponents were Chang Kuo-t'ao, another CCP founder, and Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), a Comintern- sponsored advocate of strong Soviet ties. Mao was aided by the services of Ch'en Po-ta, the late Ai Ssu-ch'i, and other members of a "brain trust" he had formed to counter the charges of the Moscow- trained men that Mao did not understand Marxism- Leninism. SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET MAO ( 3RD FRN LEFT) IN YENAN, 1937 Several articles written around this time-- which form part of the basis of Chinese Communist thinking--are attributed to Mao: "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party During the Anti- Japanese War" (1937); "On Practice" (1937); "On Contradiction" (1937); "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" (1938); "On Protracted War" (1938); "On New Democracy" (1940). The Cheng-feng Movement Mao's attacks on his opponents culminated in the Cheng-feng (rectification) movement of 1942, which dispelled any doubts about Mao's primacy in the CCP. Generally designed to raise party efficiency and ideology, the campaign also effec- tively eliminated Mao's opposition in the party. The specific target for Cheng-feng was Ch'en Shao-ya, one of the leading "28 Bolsheviks," and the greatest significance of the campaign was Mao's insistence that Marxism be made Chinese. - 10 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET The message of the reform was that the Chinese party was determined to direct its own revolutionary activities. Mao called for the eradication of dog- matism, subjectivism in thought, sectarianism in party relations, and formalism in literature and art. Party members were ordered to check on each other's attitudes and ideology; incorrigible com- rades were to be dismissed from the party, but a second and third chance were to be given to those who confessed and showed a willingness to reform. Excesses in the early stages of the movement worried the Central Committee. In July 1942 Liu Shao-ch'i wrote one of his best known works, On Intra-Party Struggle, which was a set of procedural rules for the Cheng-feng movement. This proved to be a turning point for Liu who at the time was in central China as political commissar for Ch'en I, the acting commander of the New 4th Army. Mao summoned Liu the next year to aid him in general party administration and in carrying out the rectification campaign. Their goal was the type of intensive indoctrination and training that would allow party cadres to operate with unanimity in guerrilla-controlled "Liberated Areas" where close administrative control and inspection were impossible. This indoctrination was to include emphasis on the Sinicization process of Marxism and the application of Marxist-Leninist theories to China. The outcome of the movement was three- fold: A group of high leaders fell from power; the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" cult was inaugurated; and Mao's position as leader of the party was con- solidated as he affirmed the independence of his own leadership from Moscow. The 1944-49 Period In 1944 Mao accepted an offer in principle from Chiang Kai-shek legalizing all political parties in China. As he prepared for the next phase of his political career, Mao strengthened and consolidated his hold on the organization and thinking of the CCP. At that time he also headed the five-man Secretariat of the Central Committee, then the party's top policymaking body. Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET MAO WITH AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN YENAN, 1944 The Seventh Party Congress, held during April- June 1945, reviewed wartime developments and elected a new Central Committee and Politburo, both of which were composed overwhelmingly of men who had proved their ability and their loyalty to Mao during the difficult war years. A revised party constitution was also adopted, and it offi- cially enshrined the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" as necessary to guide the entire work of the party. Mao himself was reelected Chairman of the Politburo and Secretariat. A highlight of the meeting was an address by Mao, "On Coalition Government," a statement that summarized Mao's political thought as it had evolved during the Yenan years and gave the con- ditions under which the CCP might cooperate with the Kuomintang. Mao proposed a "united front or democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people under the leadership of the working class" to take the place of KMT politi- cal tutelage after the defeat of Japan. He called for two steps: In the first stage, to form a provisional coalition government by common agreement of the representatives of all parties and - 12 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET people without party affiliation; in the second stage, through free and unrestricted elections, to convene a national assembly which will form a proper coalition govern- ment. Mao challenged the KMT's ability to solve the economic and political problems of China in terms of Confucian tradition as suggested by Chiang Kai- shek in his China's Destiny. Mao wanted a new authority, namely the coalition government, which would be responsible for tackling such questions in the postwar period. The civil war between Mao and Chiang continued after the defeat of Japan. The Nationalists occupied Yenan in March 1947, and Mao was then reported in various rural areas of north China. He finally entered Peking on 25 March 1949, 2 months after its occupation by Communist forces. The Early Years of the People's Republic of China From 21 to 30 September 1949 the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) an "organization of the democratic united front of the entire Chinese people," was convened. It adopted the Common Program and the Organic Law, which set up the Central People's Government (CPG) of the People's Republic of China. Mao was named Chairman (Chief of State) of the CPG and--in order of rank--Chu Te, Liu Shao-ch'i, Sung Ch'ing-ling (Sun Yat-sen's widow), Li Chi-sen, Chang Lan and Kao Kang became Vice Chairmen. The highest civil- ian policymaking body was the CPO Council, and subordinate to that was the 20-man Government Administration Council (GAC) headed by Chou En-lai. The GAC had jurisdiction over ministries, commis- sions and committees. Mao faced two problems when he took over China: the consolidation of authority and, as he wrote in "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" (July 1949), "the education of the peasantry." In Mao's view, the traditional hunger for land and the indi- vidualism of the peasants needed to be overcome, as did the backwardness of rural areas with refer- ence to modern agricultural methods. - 13 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET On 28 June 1950 the Land Reform Law was prom- ulgated, but it produced disappointing results. Land reform teams then urged the peasants to wage "fierce class struggle" against local landlords and to arouse class hatred. Mass trials and accusation meetings became the order of the day, and by November 1952 over 116 million acres of land were confiscated and divided among 300 mil- lion poor peasants. This campaign was carried out at considerable human cost. By Mao's own admission, some 800,000 people lost their lives in the opening years of the People's Republic. Mao also inaugurated three other suppressive movements: the "three anti movement" against cor- ruption, waste and bureaucracy in government bodies and public enterprises; the "five anti movement" aimed at merchants and businessmen as a class; and the "study campaign for ideological reform" designed to gain the support of China's intellectuals (it resulted, however, only in alienating them). Mao Goes to Moscow In December 1949 Mao made his first trip outside China, traveling to Moscow to discuss political, security and economic arrangements with Stalin. Nine weeks of negotiation led to the signing of the Sib-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950. IN MOSCOW, I4 FEBRUARY 19 50 � 14 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET In addition to defense and aid provisions, the alliance called for Chinese recognition of the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. Upon leaving Moscow, Mao declared that Sino- Soviet friendship was "eternal and indestruc- tible." The alliance also provided China with war materiel during the Korean conflict in which China was involved from November 1950 to July 1953. The performance of the Chinese Communists in that war-- in which the Chinese People's Volunteers fought the Western world's strongest power without being defeated--further enhanced the prestige of the Chinese and of Mao, their leader. With the death of Stalin in 1953Moscow, aware of the importance of retaining China's friendship, paid increased attention to Mao's ideological stature. Soviet reviews of Mao's literary works began to describe them as enriching Marxist theory. The CCP went further, claiming for Mao the title of the leading Marxist-Leninist theoretician. Admitting his stature as a natural leader, many non-Communist Western observers nevertheless consider Mao's principal contribution to Marxism- Leninism to be his concept of rural tactics. This concept is known today as guerrilla warfare. 1954-57: Government Reorganization The CPG was reorganized in 1954, and the National People's Congress (NPC) became the high- est organ of state authority. Mao was elected chairman of the People's Republic of China and the Council of National Defense, and under the new constitution he had other wide-ranging and undefined powers. Liu Shao-ch'i became head of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and Chou En- lai head of the State Council--the highest administrative organ. The military-dominated regional administrative system was abolished, thus removing a source of potential personal chal- lenge to Mao's leadership. In its place, a sys- tem of provinces municipalities, and minority autonomous districts was established. - 15 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET The first major internal attempt to jar the party and government structure occurred in the famous Kao-Jao case publicized in April 1955. Kao Kang was the powerful head of the Northeast Administrative Area (Manchuria) and also headed the State Planning Commission. Jao Shu-shih was a member of the same body and director of the then important Organization Department of the CCP-CC. In early 1954 both men mysteriously dropped from public view, and in February of that year Liu Shao-chsi made a call for party unity. He made a scathing reference to those who "regarded the department under their leadership as their indi- vidual inheritance or independent kingdom." This reference was not given full explanation until 4 April 1955, when Peking issued a report on the so-called Kao-Jao antiparty alliance. The two men, and a number of their subordinates, were expelled from the party for "engaging in conspiratorial activities" with the aim of deposing Mao and Chou En-lai and stepping into their places. Kao com- mitted suicide, and nothing has since been heard of Jao. In 1955 Mao decided it was time to advance from socialism directly to "higher" forms of col- lectivism, a theory based on what Peking called "uninterrupted revolution." Mao's call for rapid collectivization and a speedup in industry, science, education and public health work was supposed to be voluntarily implemented. It worked better in the rural areas than in the cities, but by June 1956 it was clear that the program was out of balance. The campaign had met with considerable opposition, and it was later officially admitted that during the first 7 months of 1957 there were 100 cases of agricultural sabotage in one small county alone. Cooperativization was nevertheless decreed complete by 1957; Mao declared that there was a "high tide" of enthusiastic support for a "Next Great Step" toward socialism. This was clearly tantamount to a decree that such a step was impending, but the nature of the move Was not divulged until the summer of 1958. - 16 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET Meanwhile in September 1956 the CCP convened the Eighth, Party Congress. Under the terms of the revised constitution Mao retained the party chairmanship. He was also elected to the newly established Standing Committee of the Politburo, which in effect replaced the former Secretariat as the "inner Politburo." The Standing Committee then consisted of Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai Chu Te, Ch'en Yiin and Teng Hsiao-pling. A year and a half later, Lin Piao was added to the group. "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" At the time of the Hungarian revolt in October 1956, Mao stated that a similar revolt could never happen in China because the Chinese people under- stood their freedom and the extent of its limits. In May 1957 he launched the "Hundred Flowers" cam- paign, based on the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, and a hundred schools of thought contend." It was ostensibly designed to mobilize support for the government among China's intellectuals by permitting open criticism of political conditions, including criticism of the CCP. This, Mao thought would help prevent the type of situation that had occurred in Hungary. The resulting rash of criti- cism, however, was more than Peking expected, and the CCP soon reimposed strict controls. "Rightists" were denounced and intellectual dissidence was quickly suppressed before it could spread to the peasants and working class. The Great Leap Forward: 1958-59 Mao next went from political to socioeconomic experimentation as he launched the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes in 1958. He wanted the people to accomplish in 4 years what would normally take a decade. Mao required that the utmost speed be used in incorporating enormous numbers of workers into new productive enterprises under a decentralized economic administration. In 1958 he proposed the commune as a new organiza- tional form for agriculture. Again, debate on his new idea within and outside the party was intense. In a move to ensure that his view on the commune - 17 - Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 SECRET (and other topics) would be heard, Mao created a new party journal, Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), and appointed Chien Po-ta as its editor. Hung Ch'i replaced Hsieh Hsi as the major theoretical peri- odical of the CCP. There are many disputes about the campaign's short- and long-range significance, but there is little debate regarding the economic dislocation that followed in the 1959-61 period. Discontent became rampant, and the situation demanded a retreat. One of the first signs that Mao might be in trouble was an announcement in December 1958 that he was resigning as Chief of State, osten- sibly to give him more time to devote to reading and theoretical writing. This was the first major setback Mao had experienced since the People's Republic of China was formed. Most of his actions since the failure of the early communes and his Great Leap Forward policies have been designed to restore his authority and get the country moving again in the revolutionary direction he wants. During November-December 1958 the Sixth Plenum of the CCP-CC called for a retreat from the extremes of the Great Leap Forward. At the Seventh Plenum, held in April 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i became Chief of State and Chairman of the National Defense Council. Chou En-lai replaced Mao as Chairman of the CPPCC, the predecessor of the NPC as the high- est governmental representative body. Mao became Honorary Chairman. The Lushan Plenum--August 1959 Mao attended the Eighth Plenum of the party, held in Lushan, Kiangsi, in August 1959, to sup- press the opposition raised against his policies and preeminence. Gen. P'eng Te-huai, Minister of National Defense, came to Lushan to challenge Mao's recent policies, especially the Great Leap Forward. P'eng did not seek to overthrow Mao-- only to moderate his excesses and open a construc- tive debate on policy. He implied, however, that China's leaders had ignored reality in the frenzy of the Great Leap. - 18 - SECRET A roved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 P'eng's criticism of Mao and his policies was no longer discreet as he said, "Putting politics in command is no substitute for basic economic principles, still less for the concrete measures needed to run successful economic enterprises." Mao openly acknowledged that some errors had been committed but noted that if P'eng's destructive criticism continued, it would bring the collapse of the nation within a year. The Central Committee voted on 16 August 1959 that P'eng Te-huai and his "antiparty clique" had aimed at splitting the party. The Maoists' triumph appeared total. On 9 September P'eng wrote a letter to Mao that, in effect, seemed to be an explanation and an apology for his actions. It was in vain, however, for on 17 September Liu Shao-ch'i delivered his "Order of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China": is hereby ordered to appoint Lin Piao Minister of Defense; Lo Jui-ch'ing Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army [PLA], and Hsieh Fu-chih Minister of Public Security; and to relieve P'eng Te- huai of his duties as Minister of Defense and Lo Jui-ch'ing as Minister of Public Security. On 30 September Nikita Khrushchev visited Peking on his way back from a meeting with Pres- ident Eisenhower. He brought gifts for P'eng Te-huai, praising him as "the most righteous, most courageous, most outspoken man in the CCP." Khrushchev asked to meet with P'eng but was denied the opportunity. Domestic Affairs--1960-65 From 1960 to 1965 China gradually rose from the economic and psychological morass into which the Great Leap had precipitated the country. In November 1961 P'eng Chen, first secretary of the Peking Party Committee, chose 20 of his closest associates to search the records of the two disas- trous years of the Great Leap to find a rational road to the future through a full understanding of the errors of the past. - 19 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 By 1960 CCP morale was low and disillusionment over the results of the Great Leap was high. The organizational structure of the party was in dis- repair, and younger party members lacked a revolu- tionary spirit. A "socialist education" campaign was begun in 1962 to reinvigorate the party with such a spirit, but it failed and Mao held senior party officials responsible. During 1961 and 1962 numerous intellectuals, economists and party cadres began to ignore Mao's policies in five major areas: culture, education, ideology, agriculture and industry. Therefore, in what seemed to be an attempt to bolster his apparently slipping image, Mao added three loyal supporters to the party Secretariat: K'ang Sheng, who was an alternate member of the Central Com- mittee and a political security specialist; Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the PLA; and Lu Ting-i, a propagandist and Vice Premier of the State Council. It was apparent that Mao continued to leave the day-to-day conduct of party affairs to Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. According to Cultural Revolution documents, one result of Mao's neglect of economic planning and development was that Liu and the party apparatus continued to slight Mao's "mass line," substituting central- ized control for decentralization and local self- sufficiency, stressing material over ideological incentives, and relying on expertise and organi- zation rather than mass campaigns. Mao was out of public view for long periods of time from 1962 to 1965, often in seclusion at his retreat outside Peking. His visible activities in domestic matters continued to be relatively low key during this period, but there was nevertheless a steady increase in Peking's efforts to spread the cult of Mao. - 20 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET CHATTING WITH YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS, JUNE 19611 The forthcoming Cultural Revolution was fore- shadowed in a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of 3 August 1964 entitled "Cultivate and Train Millions of Successors Who Will Carry on the Cause of Proletar- ian Revolution." This editorial was probably the first time that party rectification (termed the "reeducation of functionaries and readjustment in the revolutionary ranks") and revitalization (described as the selection and cultivation of younger talent within the nucleus of leadership at all levels) were authoritatively discussed as closely interrelated subjects. The logic of the new combination, coupled with the intensified urgency of the regime's concern over training Mao- ist successors, led some observers to see that gradual but widespread personnel changes were being contemplated at every level of the party and government structure. Faced with pressure from below, threatened by "degenerate" ideas from within and without, aware that younger men would inevitably take over some day--regardless of their ideological - 21 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET qualifications--Mao and his aging supporters seem to have decided that younger men must be readied for positions of responsibility. In January 1965, under Mao's supervision, the Politburo drafted the "23 Articles," which shifted the focus of the campaign to a general "clean-up," and basic construction in politics, economics, ideology and organization. The "Articles" also attacked high-level party officials as class ene- mies for "taking the capitalist road." The DismisBal of Hai Jul By mid-1965 Mao had set up a group of five party officials, led by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking and first secretary of the Peking Party Committee, to conduct a "cultural revolution" among intellec- tuals. In September of that year, at an enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao issued a new series of directives demanding a more vigorous attack on "bourgeois ideology." On 10 November Yao Wen-yjian, a literary critic and then an obscure member of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee, launched an attack on a play written by Wu Han--one of P'eng Chen's deputies--entitled The Dismissal of Hai Jul. The play was staged in 1960-61 and was the story of a legendary Ming Dynasty official who brought exploiters of the people to justice only to be dismissed through court intrigue. The political significance of the play lay in the analogy to the P'eng Te-huai case and the issue of Mao's responsibility for the suf- fering of 1960-61. P'eng Chen tried to subtly evade those factors in a memorandum and instead concentrated merely on the historical accuracy of Hai Jul. He also authorized a counterattack on Yao Wen-yuan (who is now a member of the Polit- buro). cri fal tha In May 1966 a Central Committee circular icized P'eng's memorandum and signaled his from power. The cultural revolution team he headed was dissolved. Peng's purge Was - 22 - Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 quickly followed by the fall of Lu Ting-1, head of the CCP Propaganda Department, and T'ao Chu, Lu's replacement. Chou Yang, a literary theorist and member of the CCP-CC, was also an early vic- tim of the purge. The Calm Before the Storm Mao revealed at an expanded Politburo session in May 1966 that his "revisionist" opposition program was centered at the very highest level of party leadership. Addressing a number of these top leaders in July, Mao disclosed that revolu- tionary students and teachers (the precursors of the Red Guards) were "going to impose revolution on you people because you did not carry out the revolution yourselves." The Cultural Revolution Group was also set up by Mao in July. It consisted of 17 members, headed by Ch'en Po-ta and Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing and advised by K'ang Sheng. The year 1966 was marked by the near deifica- tion of Mao and his thoughts and the appearance of numerous big-character posters calling for the overthrow of all "bourgeois reactionaries." Mao himself wrote a poster--"Bombard the Headquarters"-- that openly attacked all those at the party center guilty of "revisionism" and of "taking the capital- ist road." In August 1966 the 11th plenary session of the Eighth CCP-CC adopted the 16-point "Decision Con- cerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which was drawn up under Mao's personal direction. At the plenum, the party gave formal sanction to the Cultural Revolution and to the censure of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-pling, head of the Party Secretariat. Mao stated that he only expected a small minority of party cadres to resist and that therefore, the prospects for the success of the Cultural Revolution were good. - 23 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 C ET REVIEWING RED GUARDS WITH LIN PIAO, AUGUST 1966 On the whole, however, provincial party leaders withstood the first assault of the Red Guards much more successfully than did their colleagues in Peking. The extension of the Cultural Revolution to agriculture and industry in mid-December 1966 and the formation among workers of revolutionary rebel groups led to the collapse of most party and administrative organs. 1967: The Year of the Storm The first big blow against the existing order came in January 1967, when revolutionary rebel orga- nizations in Shanghai banded together and seized power from the city's party and municipal authori- ties. This act--the "January Revolution"--was applauded by Mao and the CRG, and by 22 January the Jen-min Jih-pao had made it clear that events in Shanghai should be emulated throughout the country. For the next 20 months--January 1967 to Septem- ber 1968--revolutionary committees were established - 24 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET in all 21 provinces, three municipalities (under direct control of the central authorities) and five autonomous regions of China to take over the powers of former party and government organiza- tions. Mao paid a price for this Cultural Revo- lution, however. It was carried on amid violence and bloodshed, the purge of numerous high-level party and government officials, the disruption of the economy and party apparatus, and the bringing of China to the brink of civil war. What often astonished the outside world the most was Mao's concurrence in or at least tolerance of this anarchy to achieve his various ends, such as the cleansing and rebuilding of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1967 Mao made a number of public appearances, received several foreign delegations, and made two tours into the Yangtze valley. The official praise and "deification" of Mao during the year reached unprecedented heights. A major segment of the paper and metal industry was devoted to the produc- tion and distribution of materials contributing to the perpetuation of the Cult of Mao Tse-tung. In 1967 alone more than 76,000,000 sets of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung were published, along with some 47,000,000 copies of Mao's Selected Readings and 57,000,000 copies of his poems. In addition, there were the Mao badges, his portraits, and the famous Little Red Beck, which permeated Chinese society. By the end of 1967, 13 of the original CRG members had been purged for "rightist sympathies" or "ultraleftist tendencies." Efforts to form revolutionary committees and rebuild the adminis- trative apparatus proceeded slowly. March 1968 witnessed a new purge of the military, which was torn between its dual tasks of maintaining order and implementing power seizures. The result was a new surge of radical ferment that required Mao's calling in the army to suppress militancy and restore order. Finally, in September 1968, Chou En-lai proclaimed that as a result of the "tremen- dous victory" in the 20-month struggle "to seize power from the capitalist-roaders," China was "now all Red." - 25 - ,ECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET Power Consolidated The Ninth CCP Congress met in April 1969. Because the campaign to rebuild the party (which reportedly was originally directed by K'ang Sheng and later by Chou En-lai) had had little success, most of the delegates to the congress were selected either by the central authorities or by ad hoc meetings. At least 40 percent of the delegates were PLA members, while many of the others were labor heroes or Mao-study activists. The new Central Committee reflected a similar balance, with a preponderance of senior provincial military figures, most of whom held concurrent posts in revolutionary committees, replacing the leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution. Mao was again chosen Chairman of the CCP, and Lin Piao was elected Vice Chairman. The composi- tion of the Politburo and its Standing Committee reflected the fact that loyalty to Mao and Lin was a strong consideration in selection for those elite bodies. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Conflict The Sino-Soviet dispute, which might partially be called the Mao-Soviet rift, took root in the early days of the CCP and began to blossom in the decade of the fifties. It was in 1956 that Mao reacted against Nikita Khrushchev's famous de- Stalinization address to the 20th CPSU Congress in February. Mao is reported to have told Anastas Mikoyan in April that Stalin's merits outweighed his faults. Mao's public reaction to "de-Stalinization" was expressed in "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which appeared as an editorial in the Jen-min Jih-pao of 5 April 1956. A second editorial, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," was published on 29 December 1956. The editorials disapproved of the lack of Soviet self-criticism and censured Khrushchev's failure to consult with other Communist parties in advance and to make an - 26 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 overall analysis of Stalin. In Mao's logic, to affiim that Stalin's whole policy during the last two decades of his life was basically a series of crimes and errors was to cast discredit on the entire world Communist movement and on the Chinese Communists who had come to power with the support of this movement. Khrushchev's attempt to estab- lish a complete separation between Stalin and the system he had dominated for a generation appeared to Mao logically absurd and politically explosive. KHRUSHCHEV (2ND FROM LEFT), LIU SHAO-CHII, MAO, PIENG CHEN, 2 OCT i959 The year 1959 saw Sino-Soviet relations deterio- rate at a markedly fast pace due to such factors as Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" line and dis- sensions over China's border conflict with India. Moscow's refusal to provide Peking with specifica- tions on an atomic bomb and Khrushchev's suggestion that year that Mao consider accepting a two-China - 27 - Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 C-, Li policy served to widen the gap between the two powers. The U-2 incident of I May 1960 provided Mao with more ammunition in his war of words as he implicitly taunted Khrushchev for having displayed "illusions" about imperialism and peaceful coexis- tence. Heightened polemics at the Romanian Workers' Party Congress of June 1960 and at the 81-party meeting in Moscow in November, coupled with the recall of all Soviet experts in China the same year, added new strains to Sino-Soviet tension. Many letters, statements and communiques began to pass between Peking and Moscow as the former attacked "revisionist" Yugoslavia (meaning the Soviet Union) while the latter counterattacked "doctrinaire" Albania (meaning China). In 1962 Mao openly challenged Soviet authority in the world Communist movement. At the 10th CCP- CC plenum, in September, Mao struck out at Khrush- chev, publicly naming him as a wrecker of the socialist camp and the "betrayer" of Castro. The situation continued, and in mid-1963 Teng Hsiao- p'ing held fruitless talks with the Soviets in Moscow. Mao was pointedly present at the airport to see Teng off and to welcome him back from his trip. The Chinese continued to issue a series of letters to Moscow. The language and style were so similar to Mao's that their authorship was widely attributed to him. In any case, it is clear from their importance that Mao at least authorized them. The letters contained endless charges against the Soviet Union and presented arguments, often char- acterized by pungent wit and keen logic, that China's sponsorship of continuing revolutionary activity in the "Third World" was the only hope for sustaining the international Communist move- ment. Soviet responses indicated their sensi- tivity on a number of issues, but Mao's goal of turning Soviet policies around were, in large part, a failure as of the mid-1960's. The replacement of Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin in 1964 failed to - 28 - Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET alleviate Sino-Soviet tensions. Kosygin tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a reconciliation with the Chinese. PLA Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing advocated a rapprochement with the Soviets, but Lo soon became one of the purge victims (November 1965) of the Cultural Revolution. At the 11th CCP plenum, in August 1966, Mao obtained sufficient voting strength to carry his policies in the Polit- buro and to keep China on an independent course of action. Mao's Family Mao has had four wives. The first, whom he married at 14, was a girl 6 years his senior with whom he never lived. It was a marriage arranged by his parents following traditional Chinese cus- toms. No other information is available on his first wife. In 1920 Mao married Yang Klai-hui daughter of his former teacher, Yang Ch'ang-ch'i. They had two sons: An-ying was born in 1922, educated in the Soviet Union, and killed in Korea in 1950; An-ching, also educated in the Soviet Union, became a translator of Russian political works. Yang K'ai-hui was executed by the KMT in 1930. Mao's third wife was Ho Tzu-chen, reportedly a normal school graduate and a party member from 1927. Mao married Ho around 1930, and she bore him five children, four of whom were left with var- ious friends during the Long March. Ho was one of about 30 women who survived the March despite her having been injured or wounded several times. About 1937 Mao married an actress in Yenan named Lan P'ing. This is his present wife, Chiang Ch'ing, by whom he has two daughters. Li Na (Hsiao Li) was born in 1943, and Mao Ming was born in 1951. Both were still living at home as of 1957, and one was reported to be a history student at Peking University in 1959. Li Na is supposedly married to Politburo member Yao Wen-yaan. � 29 � Approved for Release 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 SECRET Mao had two brothers: Mao Tse-min was director of the Financial Department of the Sinkiang Provin- cial Government before his execution--probably by the KMT--in 1943; and Mao Tse-tan, once a command- er of a Red division, died in battle in 1935. The KMT executed a younger sister. Mao Tse-tung--the Man In the past, Mao has been said to have the naturalness and simplicity of a peasant. He has long been noted as a man of simple tastes, plain speech and plain living, but he occasionally appears coarse and abrupt. He smokes, drinks little in the line of alcoholic beverages, and consumes large quantities of tea. Up to 1957 Mao had been known - 30 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 as a good orator, speaking in a high-pitched voice with a noticeable Hunanese accent. He has been overweight for some time but apparently has reduced slightly in recent years. Mao is taller than most Chinese and has prominent cheekbones, long slender hands and a receding hairline. - 31 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 006928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928171