ADDRESSING THE TOR FOR THE GRECO-TURKISH BALANCE NIE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00837R000400080009-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER
BUILDING 203 - STOP 314
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374
AIAIT-AN ( 381a) 4 Nov 87
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO-GPF (CAPT Bblme)
SUBJEC11 (C/NF) Addressing the TOP. for the Greco-Turkish Balance NIB
(C/NF) The following Roman Numerals correspond to questions asked in the
Terms of Reference portion of WE on Greek-Turkish Military Balance.
I. (C/NF) The paper examines the balance between Greece and Turkey and.
explains the capabilities and limitations of both potential antagonists. It
examines the forces relevant to an Aegean balance and how they may potentially
be employed.
II. (C/NF) The paper examines how and why the balance has changed since 1974
and shows how both sides are prepared --or not prepared-- to confront each
other in the Aegean and on Cyprus.
a. (C/NF) The paper will show anticipated improvements in the defense
structures of both nations through 1992. The paper will make an estimate of
how much modernization will occur in the next five years and examine a number
of constraints on the ability of both Greece and Turkey to achieve
modernization goals.
b. (C/NF) The paper will address the domestic political requirements in
each nation and how they affect defense spending. Basically, the populations
of both nations are supportive of the military. The Greco-Turkish disputes
transcend politics in Greece and there is a national agreement that there is a
Turkish threat. In Turkey, the general population is extremely supportive of
the armed forces. Only a general political upheaval in Turkey --like that
which occurred in the late seventies-- could upset current long-term
modernization goals.
c. (S/NF) Outside military assistance is the major influence on the
military balance between Greece and Turkey. U.S. EMS assistance, and the 7 -
IC) ratio has been primarily responsible for the military balance as it exists
today. The FRG, to a lesser extent also contributes to maintaining the
balance between Greece and Turkey.
d. (S/NF) Greece, through its militarization of the eastern islands and
its improved defenses in Thrace has established a balance between itself and
Turkey that is generally believed to be capable of protecting Greek territory
against a Turkish attempt to seize any large portion of it. Greece probably
has a better air force than Turkey and can probably deploy --on short notice--
more naval units in the Aegean than Turkey. Greece cannot do much more to
upset the balance as it exists today. Turkey also is limited in What it can
do to upset the current balance between itself and Greece. Over a period of
time --a decade or so-- Turkey will become militarily stronger than it is
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AIAIT-AN (381a)
SUBJECT% Addressing the TOR for the Greco--Turkish Balance NIE (C/NF)
now. This will be the result of the overall modernization of its military
forces. Otherwise, Turkey's approach to Greece has been relatively low-keyand
this analyst has not determined any evidence of a specific Turkish intention
to seriously prepare for a Greco-Turkish war that has as its ultimate aim the
seizure and retention of Greek sovereign territory.
a. (S/NF) It appears that the Greek and Turkish ability to clearly
understand the capabilities of each other is rather limited. They are
restrained by their intelligence collection capabilities vis-a-vis each
other. This conclusion is somewhat apparent as a result of DAD reporting of
Greco-Turkish perceptions vis-a-vis each other and this analyst's limited
contact with Greek and Turkish military officers. It appears --and this is an
educated guess-- that both Greece and Turkey, have a, tendency to overestimate
each other's military capabilities. This is good: It acts as a moderating
factor against going to war with each other. Overall, it appears that Greek
intelligence of Turkish force dispositions is better than Turkish intelligence
of Greek force dispositions.
b. (C/NF) Greco-Turkish psychology is a crucial and very difficult
factor to analyze. The Turks have along historical experience in dealing with
the Greeks and don't trust Greek intentions. Ankara feels that Greece has
been after Turkey since the early 1800s in the sense of first establishing an
independent state at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and then pursuing
irredentist goals against that empire in order to incorporate additional
Greek-populated territories into the new Greek state. Greek irredentist
aspirations were basically put to rest as a result of Greek defeat at the
hands of Ataturk in Anatolia in 1922. The Cyprus problem is --or can be
viewed as-- the last chapter of the "Eastern Question." Cyprus is not a
closed issue. The Turks cannot really afford to reduce their military
strength on Cyprus because they feel that once the Turkish tanks are gone the
Greeks and Greek Cypriots will eventually move against the north. The Turks
may very well be right: The chance of moving against the northern portion of
Cyprus would be very high --especially if Greece feels that it can
simultaneously protect itself in Thrace and the Aegean. Turkish strength in
northern Cyprus is a key factor in a great Aegean balancing act. A
Greco-Turkish war initiated by Greece in the Aegean could result in a Turkish
occupation of all of Cyprus. The Greeks are aware of that and it is a major
moderating influence that Should tend to preclude them from being anxious to
start hostilities in the Aegean. Although Turkish military activities have
been relatively low-key in the Aegean, there is evidence that the Turks are
becoming increasingly concerned about the Greek threat. The Turkish armed
forces cannot afford to be embarrassed by Greece in a Greco---Turkish conflict.
The Turkish people would not understand that: In a war with Greece, the
Turkish military runs the risk of suffering a blow to its prestige that it
cannot afford. Therefore, in recent years Turkey appears to be placing a
greater emphasis on being able to defend its interests in the Aegean.
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SUBJECT: Addressing the TOR for the Greco-Turkish Balance NIE (C/NF)
Basically, Greece and Turkey are wary of each other. The Turks are in a poor
position because they cannot afford the political repercussions of being
perceived of initiating a war with Greece. They feel --perhaps correctly so--
that Greece, a Christian country with strong ties to the west in terms of
history and culture, will have a great advantage in terms of generating
propaganda and world-wide support in a Greco-Turkish conflict.
IV. (S/NF) The continuation of a military balance between Greece and Turkey
will tend to deter war in the Aegean. Hbwever, this analyst believes that
Turkey, even if it was more powerful by a large margin than Greece in the
Aegean and in Thrace, would have no logical reason to initiate a war with
. Greece. The limited gains vis-a-vis the major risks are simply too great
The Greeks, for their part, will never be able to do much more than protect
their interests in Thrace and the Aegean against Turkey. Today, the Greeks
are probably more capable than they have ever been to defend their interests
against Turkey. The Greeks perceive a definite threat from Ankara and their
current military capabilities makes them feel better about their security.
Today, the Greeks may be less hesitant to engage Turkey in a war because of
their improved capabilities. Hbwever, the Greeks understand that they cannot
prevail against Turkey in a lengthy war and further understand that any
Greco-Turkish war may ultimately involve Cyprus and the potential occupation
of all of that island by Turkish forces. The Greeks, although they won't
admit it, are already guilty enough about Cyprus. They have no desire to be
responsible for creating a situation Whereby the Greek Cypriot population in
southern Cyprus is subjected to another Turkish invasion. A Turkish invasion
of southern Cyprus today would far-and-away cause much more loss of life and
destruction of property than occurred in 1974. Basically in 1974, the Greeks
could not really resist the Turkish invasion and therefore loss of life and
property was limited- Today, with a mobilized GCNG of 50,000+, in addition to
the 160 armored 90mm gun Cascavels of the GCNG and other improved capabilities
in anti-tank and artillery weapons, war on Cyprus would insure a vicious
conflict in Which the Turks would nevertheless ultimately prevail.
a. (S/NF) In a sense, it is difficult to determine if the pursuit of a
military balance has made the region more or less stable. Greece could not go
to war against Turkey in 1974 over the Cyprus crisis. The Turks at least
suspected as much and this was likely a factor favoring invasion of Cyprus. A
crisis in Cyprus today that led to a Turkish invasion of the Greek Cypriot
south would almost surely result in a Greco-Turkish war in the Aegean.
However, today there is no reason for the Turks to contemplate an invasion of
southern Cyprus --;-unless they were involved in a war with Greece in the
Aegean. The potential for an Aegean conflict is higher today than in 1974
because of the relative balance which exists between Greece and Turkey and
Greece's declared determination to insure that its perceived rights in the
Aegean are not compromised by Greek-perceived Turkish expansionist designs.
Both sides, due to the balance Which currently exists, recognize the need to
exercise care in the Aegean. Due to the balance Whidh exists today, it is
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AIAIT-AN (381a)
SUBJECT: Addressing the TOR for the Greco-Turkish Balance NIE (C/NF)
likely that neither side will be able to prevail against the other in an
Aegean war. The Turkish perception of Greek capabilities are such that Turkey
probably feels that there is nothing of any particular worth to gain and
probably much to loose in a war with Greece. Greece, in a short war with
Turkey stands to regain an element of self-esteem by standing up to the
Turkish giant. Greece probably hopes that the western powers would not permit
Turkey to retain any Greek sovereign territory that Turkey managed to occupy
in a Greco-Turkish war. In any case, Greece feels that NATO and the U.S.
would likely be forced to immediately intervene in a Greco-Turkish war and
that such a war would therefore be of short duration. If Greece can claim a
higher number of successes in the air and at sea than Turkey can, then the
Greeks will see a short Greco-Turkish war as a victory for them. If, on the
other hand, Turkey inflicts greater damage upon Greece than it receives in
turn, the Greeks will fall back on the fact that Turkey is a nation with a
much larger population and military and that it is nevertheless to Greece's
credit that it stood up to Turkey. Due to the U.S. maintenance of a 7 - 10
ratio over the last decade in aid to Greece and Turkey, a balance has been
created whereby Turkey cannot arbitrarily attack Greece with the possibility
of realizing rapid gains in either Thrace or the Aegean. Greco-Turkish
hostilities, if they ever occur, will likely be inconclusive in military terms
and only serve to heighten animosities on both sides of the Aegean.
b. (C/NF) International fora, including NATO, have tried to distance
themselves from the Greco-Turkish disputes in the Aegean. They will likely
continue to do so. On Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots enjoy the moral edge in
their position vis-a-vis the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Nicosia is
recognized in the U.N. as the legitimate government of Cyprus. Numerous U.N.
resolutions call for the withdrawal of Turkish Mainland Army forces from
northern Cyprus. No state, other than Turkey, has yet recognized the
government of the TRNC. Although the USSR would like to become more involved
in the Cyprus problem, the Turks want nothing to do with them and therefore
the USSR is not likely to become a key player in any potential settlement.
International fora will not become more involved in Greco-Turkish differences
than they are today. The only chance for greater involvement would be as a
result of a Greco-Turkish war.
c. (S/NF) In Greece, the government of Andreas Papandreou has increased
the domestic perception of the Turkish threat since coming to power in 1981.
In Turkey, President Evren, and to a lesser extent, Prime Minister Ozal, have
been relatively low-key in their approach to the issues that separate Athens
and Ankara. The GCT, while supportive of President Denktask and the TRNC, has
sought not to heighten tensions between the two Cypriot communities and at
times has intervened to preclude President Denktagh from taking actions --such
as the repopulation of Varodha-- that would increase tensions. The GOT is
supportive of reaching a solution on Cyprus in accordance with the draft
framework developed by the U.N. Secretary General and rejected by the Greek
Cypriot government of President Spiros Kyprianou. The Turks feel that they
and. the TRNC hold the upper-hand in Cyprus and are prepared to wait the
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AIAIT-AN (381a)
SUBJECT: Addressing the TOR for the Greco-Turkish RPlance N1E (C/NF)
situation out until the political atmosphere in southern Cyprus changes as a
result of the election of a new government that will be more amenable to
entering negotiations with the TRNC for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.
In the Aegean, the GOT has consistently called for bi-lateral negotiations
between Ankara and Athens concerning their differences. Greece, since 1981
and until after the March 1987 crisis, had rejected all such overtures on the
part of Turkey claiming that there was nothing to discuss. Since March 1987,
Prime Minister Papandreou and Prime Minister Ozal have been exchanging letters
concerning the continental Shelf issue. Prime Minister Ozal has not as yet
ruled out eventually taking the problem to the International Court in
accordance with Greece's wished. This is a small beginning brought about by
the March 1927 crisis. Military planners in Greece take the possibility of a
potential Greco-Turkish war very seriously. Over the last decade, the Greek
military has been task-structured to defend Greece against a potential Turkish
attack. In the last several years, Turkish military planners have begun to
take the possibility of war with Greece more seriously. However, Turkish
force dispositions have not radically changed and modernization efforts,
although perceived by Greece as an expanding threat, generally conform to
Turkish requirements within the context of Turkey's NATO mission. Although
there can be no doubt that Turkey now has plans for a potential war with
Greece, there is scant evidence to suggest any massive preparations on the
part of the TGS to be instantly prepared to implement an invasion of a major
Greek island or even an invasion of Thrace. Greece, for its part, appears to
be virtually instantly prepared to implement its war plans for the defense of
Greece in the event of a Greco-Turkish war. This was readily apparent in
March 1987. The Greeks took the crisis much more seriously than the Turks did
and, according to the reporting received during and after the crisis, made
much greater preparations for conflict than did Turkey.
d. (C/NF) The issue dividing Greece and Turkey that appears to have the
greatest change of setting off a Greco-Turkish conflict is each nation's
perception of its rights on the continental Shelf issue. Any attempt on the
part of Greece to implement research or drilling operations beyond the
territorial waters of its islands will be met by similar Turkish operations in
the disputed waters of the Aegean. If the Greeks, as it appeared they were
prepared to do in March 1987, took action against Turkish research vessels;
the result would be a Greco-Turkish war.
e. (S/NF) U.S. and NATO nation political intervention in the midst of a
crisis that has the potential for war, could have a beneficial effect on
soothing tensions between Greece and Turkey. The Greeks, during the March
1987 crisis, made a determined attempt to inform U.S. representatives in
Greece of the seriousness of the situation and the possible ramifications of
events as they were progressing. It appears that the Greeks did not want a
war in March 1987 any more than Turkey did. However, the Greeks realized that
they could become victims of their own propaganda and rhetoric and find
themselves embroiled in a war with Turkey. Turkey, regardless of the correct
relations that it maintains with Moscow, is extremely wary of Soviet
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AIA1T-AN (381a)
SUBJECT: Addressing the TOR for the Greco-Turkish Balance NIE (C/NF)
intentions. Turkey is and will remain concerned about the potential
opportunities that a Greco-Turkish war could create for Moscow. Turkey,
likewise is distrustful of Bulgaria, Turko-Bulgarian relations are at an
all-time low as a result of "Bulgarization" of the ethnic Turkish population
in Bulgaria. The apparent excellent current state of Greco-Bulgarian
relations, coupled with the visit of Foreign Minister Papoulias to Sofia
during the March 1987 crisis subsequent high-level visits of Greek officials
to Bulgaria are the cause of extreme concern for Turkey. Turkey fears the
power of the so-called Greek lobby in America and probably suspects that
American support of Turkey in a Greco-Turkish war, especially if the U.S.
perceives that Turkey instigated the war, or that more appropriate actions on
the part of Turkey could have avoided it, will tend to be supportive of Athens
vice Ankara. With regards to the potential Soviet threat, Turkey, although
confident of the U.S. commitment to its security under normal circumstances,
is not as confident of that commitment as it used to be prior to the Cuban
Missile crisis. A, Greco-Turkish war could potentially open a Pandora's Box of
troubles that Turkey has no desire to investigate, or even take a peek at.
Both Greece and Turkey would probably welcome the political intervention of
the U.S. and key NATO allies such as the FRG in smoothing over a confrontation
situation that had the potential for rapid escalation into a shooting war.
V. (C/NF) 'Greco-Turkish differences have adversely affected the security of
the southeast flank and therefore NATO. Although the majority of the recent
weapons improvements in the Turkish armed forces have been generally deployed
to conform to NATO defensive strategy. This is not the case for the Greeks.
The Greeks have deployed the majority of their active duty forces to deal with
the Turkish threat in Thrace and in the Aegean. Although a substantial
portion of the Greek forces deployed in Thrace and Macedonia can be
repositioned to resist a Pact attack within a few weeks time, the ability of
Greece to rapidly respond to such a threat has diminished.
a. (C/gF) There are not going to be any radically "different conditions
of balance" between Greece and Turkey over the next five years. Even if the 7
- 10 ratio is maintained over the foreseeable future, Turkey, due to its size,
and its own internal efforts at improving its armaments industries, will begin
to become increasingly more powerful than Greece in terms of its overall
capabilities and the forces that could be potentially committed to an Aegean
war. Greece, already under a terrific economic strain vis-a-vis the national
funds already committed to defense, and suffering in terms of decreasing
military age, cannot realistically hope to maintain the relative balance that
it now enjoys against Turkey indefinitely into the next century. Under these
changing circumstances Greece Should become increasingly less anxious to
confront Turkey military in the Aegean or in Thrace. If Greco-Turkish
differences continue to persist into the next century, then Greece could be
comforted by U.S. and NATO military assistance aimed at improving its
defensive capabilities against tanks and aircraft. As Greece becomes weaker
vis-a-vis Turkey, the liklihood of war should decrease and the willingness of
Greece to enter into negotiations aimed at settling its disputes with Turkey
should increase.
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AIAIT-AN (381a)
SUBJECT: Addressing the TOR for the Greco-Turkish Balance NIE (C/NF)
b. (S/NF) Without the Greco-Turkish disputes in the Aegean and over
Cyprus, it is likely that Greece would have never been galvanized into
expanding the capabilities of its armed forces to the point that they
been expanded today. The improvements in the Greek Air Force and Navy have
benefitted NATO in that a great deal of flexibility exists regarding the
employment of these assets. Even though they may be currently oriented
against the Turkish threat, these forces can quickly and easily be redeployed
to meet a Pact threat to Greece. Although a large portion of the Greek Army
is indeed permanently stationed on the six major Aegean islands, their
equipment is generally of the older obsolete type that the Greek Army in
Thrace and Macedonia used to have. The majority of modern armaments in the
Greek Army, especially in terms of tanks, and artillery, can be found in Greek
units in Thrace and Macedonia. Although Greece has lost the benefit of
training with its NATO allies in recent years, it nevertheless is better
equipped and trained than it has even been in the past. With the exception of
the Turkish XIth Corps in Cyprus, the majority of equipment Turkey has
received or modernized in the last several years has been deployed with the
Turkish forces most likely to encounter the Pact threat. This is especially
so in the case of the powerful Turkish 1st Army in Thrace. The potential
ability of Greece and Turkey, either separately or collectively, to resist a
Pact attack has increased markedly in the last decade. The Greeks are adamant
in the maintenance of the 7 - 10 ratio currently in force. Turkey, for its
part, cannot understand Why the U.S. maintains the 7 - 10 ratio considering
Turkey's willingness to actively participate as a faithful alliance partner
Which fields the largest standing army in European NATO. Turkey, although
concerned with the significant percentage of U.S. aid to Greece vis-a-vis
Turkey, is even more concerned in What it perceives to be the failure of the
U.S. to provide an adequate amount of military assistance to Turkey for its
massive modernization requirements. Turkey would like to see U.S. aid at the
900 million to one billion dollar level annually --even if this meant 700
million dollars in EMS credits for Greece. Although unhappy with U.S. levels
of aid to Greece, Turkey is more concerned with modernizing her armed forces
to be better equipped to face the ultimate danger to Turkish security --the
Warsaw Pact. Although Turkey grumbles from time-to-time about potentially
restricting U.S. access to base facilities, there has been no evidence in
recent years that Turkey would take serious action to do so except on a
limited and temporary basis in order to satisfy domestic political
requirements.
c. (S/NF) Greece and Turkey, although appreciative of U.S. goals in the
southeast flank, usually feel that the United States is not evenhanded in its
relations between Ankara and Athens. They feel that the U.S., depending upon
What side of the Aegean you are on, sides with the other side more often than
not. This has been a delicate balancing act for the U.S. to follow. Greece
has accussed the United States of favoring Turkey with concessional interest
rates and military assistance programs that Greece has not been granted.
Also, in terms of the Southern Region Amendment (SRA), Greece feels
particularly slighted that the U.S. has transferred 40 F-4E Phantom IIs to
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Turkey while offering Greece F-4ds and Cs. In terms of the SRA, Turkey is
concerned about the 300 M48A5s that Greece is in the process of acquiring.
d. (S/NF) The prospects for the U.S. of achieving continued basing
rights in Greece and Turkey are good. Greece cannot hope to maintain even a
semblance of a military balance against Turkey without substantial continuous
U.S. aid. Greece, as a result of its decision to acquire 40 US F-16s --and
with the probability of buying an additional 20 F-16s-- cannot afford to
distance itself from the U.S. thereby jeopardizing ENS financing and future
support for these crucial air defense assets and other programs as well.
Also, Greece is aware that the maintenance of U.S. bases on its soil
contributes indirectly to its security vis-a-vis Turkey. A decision to close
the U.S. bases would likely result in a number of them being transferred to
Turkey with a corresponding percentage of U.S. aid that otherwise would have
gone to Greece. Turkey, like Greece, is tied to the U.S. for its maintenance
and modernization needs. So long as the U.S. attempts to be evenhanded in its
policies regarding Greece and Turkey --despite the fact that the U.S. will be
accussed of favoring Athens at Ankara's expense and vice-versa--- the bases
will continue in both nations. Both Greece and Turkey closely monitor and
have input into U.S. use of facilities in their respective nations.
Generally, U.S. peacetime operations in Greece and Turkey are not inhibited.
The use of U.S. bases in fulfilling out-of-area commitments or "non-NATO"
commitments will be restricted by both Greece and Turkey.
k),NxiAek
HARRY D. DINELLA
MAJ, QMC
NATO Branch
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