LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00-01458R000100130001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE WHITE HQUSE ~ 2928 -.-J
WASHINGTON
President's
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Enclosed is a Dopy of the Board's report on
recruitment. Paul Seabury, I believe, has
done a fine job.
Sincerely,
Anne Armstrong
Chairman
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
PFIAB review completed.
S~C12~~
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Introduction
(C) The President tasked PFIAB in July 1984 to inquire into methods for
recruitment and training of intelligence personnel. In his charge to the
Board, the President took special note of the importance of counterinte]ligence
and his concern that special talents and abilities are needed by officers to
perform that function. Our report on counterintelligence recruitment practices
will be completed later this year. The present report primarily addresses
CIA's recruitment of case officers.
Observations
(S) This study comes at a time when a significant rebuilding process is underway
at the CIA after a substantial decline in personnel in the 1970's. This decline
ended in FY 1979 when the number of prospective intelligence professionals
recruited increased to 10$ from the previous year's 48. This rebuilding process
has progressed even more dramatically in the 19$0's, with 1$4 career trainees
acquired in FY 19$4.
(C) Still, there are serious shortfalls in meeting the present and forecasted
needs for talented personnel for the Directorate of Operations. The problem is not
merely one of numbers. Many different kinds of people, with varied talents
and backgrounds, will be needed to meet our nation's diverse and expanding
intelligence requirements.
Method
In conducting this study, PFIAB obtained CIA's assessment of its personnel
needs (numbers, target areas and functional skills, such as languages), for the
l9$5-90 period. We also examined CIA's current recruitment practices, inc]uding
spotting, screening and processing, and security vetting. For comparison,
we looked at the practices and policies of three other U.S. intelligence agencies
(FBI, DIA, NSA) and a]sa those of our closest intelligence ally, the~British
SIS and MI5. Headquarters and staff briefings were supplemented with site
visits in order to understand better the problems faced by CIA recruiting
officers in the field. Our review also included extensive interviews with:
(a) Regional CIA recruiters (in Dallas, Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles,
New York, and Boston).
(b) Office of Personnel chiefs and staff {CIA, DIA, FBI, NSA).
(c) Medical and psychological evaluation staff of CIA and non-government
experts.
(d) D0, DI, CI Directorate staffs.
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(e) Office of Security chiefs (CIA, NSA).
(f) Office of Training chiefs and staffs. (CIA, FBI, NSA).
Current Recruiting System
(C) Fundamentally, the CIA today focuses almost exclusively on recruiting
"generalists"' for case officer positions, believing that subsequent career
training and on-the-job experience will generate an adequate supply of
skilled case officers.
(C) The system seeks volunteers, and depends primarily on area recruiters to
stimulate interest through placing advertisements in major newspapers and
canvassing college campuses. These practices produce thousands of inquiries
each year, from which the serious candidates must be culled. Screening begins
with interviews by area recruiters and directorate representatives. It continues
with administering a testing battery, which is intended to determine an applicant's
intellectual and psychological suitability. Further interviews and a medical
examination follow, and eventually polygraphing. The complete recruitment
process, including the lengthy and detailed security check, takes nearly one
year--longer, in some cases. As the above description makes clear, a large
part of the effort that goes into the present recruitment process is spent on
ex eluding less promising candidates.
(U) As interviews with current career trainees made clear, the recruitment
process does generate a pool of bright and highly motivated people whose morale
is boosted by the system's apparently stringent selectivity.
(C) CIA's data on current recruits show that:
- Career Trainees (CTs) come from all parts of the country and have matriculated
at a wide variety of colleges and universities, with no discernible concentration
of recruits coming from any particular institution or geographic area;
- the proportion of women in the operations directorate is increasing signi-
ficantly;
- the average age is 26.5 years;
- over SOX of the recruits have some post-academic work experience; and
- about 18X have prior military experience.
In effect, because attrition rates through the training phase average only
about 5X (substantially lower than an industry norm of 20%), these will be the
characteristics of the next class of CIA officers.
Problem Areas in Current System
(C) We found that CIA has been seriously concerned with improving the present
system and with increasing the productivity of recruitment efforts. In our view,
however, there are continuing problems that require both changes in current
recruitment practices and also a supplemental recruitment program.
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>) A critics] problem is the consistent failure of the present recruitment.
system to fill validated personnel requirements. With the DDO's projected
requirements and its attrition rate of 4.4X/year, the recruitment system needs
to produce approximately 1.20 GTs annually. For PY 1983 only 79 were acquired;
in FY ]984, 8]. Thus far in FY 1985 only 23 prospective case officers have
entered training, with classes yet to convene in July and October.
(C) It is possible that extensive reliance an the Professional Aptitude Testing
Battery (PATB) in the selection process ie artificially restricting the pool of
potential CT candidates. Currently, the CIA uses the PATB to reduce -its pool of
applicants by approx imately 75X. Tests of this sort are a customary and accepted
way in government and industry to cull out people who are clearly unsuitable.
Our interviews, however, left us with the impression that the PATB is also being
used as a guide to select candidates for recruitment. How the PATB is used
might be quite important, because a mechanism designed to filter out "poor bets"
might not be particularly goad at identifying "good bets." In the present case,
it might be inappropriately restricting the pool of potentially suitable trainees.
We note, for example, that (while differences in mission objectives need to be
considered) the FBI does not employ a test as extensive as the PATB. Yet in
1983 the Bureau received 15,000 applications, appointed 666 Special Agents and
met their recruitment objectives.
(C) It is also possible that the duration of the screening process (often 12 or
more months) is costing the CIA some recruits. CIA has no data that directly
address this matter. But we know that over 25X of those who apply far appointment
drop out somewhere along the line, and we also know that a high proportion of
CIA applicants either are transitioning from one job to another or are making
decisions about their future careers; for them, a year may be, relatively speaking,
too long to wait. To the extent that this protracted "application time" is a
factor, the problem will grow worse in the years ahead, as the number of persons
found in the age group from which CIA traditionally recruits will be shrinking.
In this respect, at least, the current recruitment system seems ill-prepared to
compete with other government agencies and the private sector for tomorrow's
best and brightest.
(C) In addition to the above, PFIAB is particularly concerned that the
recruitment process is acquiring CTs who are racially, ethnically, and culturally
homogeneous. Consistent with this pattern is the significant absence of CTs who
are proficient ar even competent in a second language. In our view, such homogeneity
results directly from the passivity of the current system. The system is simply
not designed to aggressively seek out and interest potential recruits with the
diverge backgrounds, languages, experiences, and skills needed now and in the
future. Career training of generalists should not be abandoned, of course; but
it is expensive, time consuming, and often less satisfactory than the burnishing
of talents, perspectives and habits which have, for some, become second nature.
Recommendations
(U) We note that the CIA is attempting to improve its recruitment system. To
help stimulate and reinf orce its efforts, we urge serious consideration of the
following problem areas and recommendations:
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a (U) Shorten the time required to process applicants. While thorough
screening, particularly for security, is essential. we believe that increasingly
scarce, qualified talent is being lost because of the length of the processing
period. In addition, potential CTs receive little or no feedback while the
process is underway. Together, these factors virtually invite persona who are
making career decisions to apt for othex opportunities. We recommend:
- Establishment of a firm target of six months for completing the
recruitment process.
- Installation of an adequate data management system to ensure more timely
and accurate feedback between the headquarters and the field office
and between the field office and the recruit.
o (C) Develop a systematic program for recruiters. We consider the quality
of the recruiter to be critical to any improvements in the recruitment system.
Uur review of the regional recruitment offices found recruiters who were generally
enthusiastic and knowledgeable. Piowever, we believe that some regions are larger
or more densely populated than can be properly cultivated by the present number
of assigned officers, even when augmented by annuitants. Further, we also noted
that assignment to such positions is often driven by reasons totally unrelated
to the specific needs of the recruitment system. In too many cases, potential
CTs are being recruited by officers who are either retired, officers on their
last tour of duty or officers assigned for "humanitarian" reasons. These are
not the optimum categories from which to draw recruiters. It was also noted
that recruiters received no specific training. Each received some indoctrination
but was generally left on his own to devise ar inherit a predecessor's recruitment
program. We recommend:
- Increasing the number of full-time recruiters to enable more thorough
canvassing of the talent pool in a community.
- Selection of recruiters whose age, career levels and experience are
mare credible [o the audience that is being recruited.
- Creation of career incentives to attract a high calibre of CIA officers
to recruiting and to reward those who succeed in its service.
- Establish a training program for recruiters.
o (C) Re-examine the application of the PATB.. PATB is a critical element
in CIA's recruitment system. As we noted earlier, however, our concern is that
it is possibly being relied on too extensively and is used in a manner not
consistent with the PATB's designed purpose. While such a battery may be useful
and accurate in screening out undesired applicants, its utility as a predictor
of future performance among the remaining applicants may be quite limited.
There is no necessary correlation between the two functions. 0n the other hand,
we have been told that statistical data have been collected which indicate that
the PATB might in fact help predict future performance. In light of the PATB's
critical importance, we recommend:
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- Creation of an independent panel of experts, properly cleared, to
evaluate the PATE; such an evaluation should include findings not only
on how it might be improved, but shou]d also address the usefulness
and limitations of the examinatior. for recruitment purposes.
o (C) Develop supplemental recruitment programs. While Pf`IAB believes the
CIA should retain its present recruitment system, with some modification, we are
not convinced that even this modified system can produce in sufficient numbers
the broad diversity of talent, perspectives and personalities required by the
GIA. Growing and diversified intelligence requirements levied against the Agency
appear to dictate that a more active and eclectic approach be taken to recruiting
future intelligence professionals. We recommend:
Establishment of a supplemental recruitment system that would
actively and- systematically target (a) potential recruits with special
ta]ents and diverse backgrounds and (b) sources of potential recruits that
have not been tapped by newspaper advertisements and campus activities.
(a) Special. Skills - We believe that the Agency will continue to
need case officers who possess considerable language skills and
a deep knowledge of major foreign cultures. Even the most
rigozous training is no substitute far practically acquired or
native skills. Just as the CIA actively recruits specialists for the
various disciplines within covert action, we are of the opinion
that similar active recruitment of case officers would enrich
the Agency's talent pool.
(b) Activist Recruitment - We believe that recruiters shau]d appreciably
expand their areas of search and seek to recruit from pools of
talent that are not now being cul tiva,:ed or are unlikely to
respond to CIA's newspaper advertisements. ~ amples of possible
pools of talent with linguistic, cultural and special skills
that readily come to mind are:
-- District Attorney's offices and police departments in cities
with large ethnic and racial divisions.
-- Offspring of employees of either the U.S. government or
multinational corporations who have grown up in regions of
particular interest to the U.S..
Conclusion
(C) We believe the present system, with the modifications we have proposed,
is capable of generating the number of CTs required. However, we are less optimistic
that the depth and diversity needed by the CIA can be satisfied by s continued
dependence on passive recruiting strategies. Our concern is that this qualitative
shortcoming will affect our intelligence capabilities in the years ahead.
PFIAB is, therefore, convinced that it would be prudent to supp]ement the current
-recruitment program with an activist approach to fill its ranks.
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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
25 July 1985
TO: (Name, oARce srrr-Dc~l, room number, ~
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PLS PROVIDE CON~fENTS FOR DDA'S SIGNATURE TO
THE DCI/DDCI AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FOR DCI
SIGNATURE (ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ACTIONS TAKEN
SUBSEQUENT TO EPORT).
SUSPENSE: COB 31 JULY 1985
DU NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals. concurrences, disposals.
clearances. and similar actions
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gPTIQNfiI FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING S4IP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDO
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D/OlL
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VC/NIC
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1 Aug 85
To 6: Please provide comments to DCI/DDCI and
appropriate response for DCI signature (especially
in light of actions taken subsequent to
report).
Jul 85
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