THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

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• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 19, 1983
• Content Type: NIE

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The Soviet Space Program
National Intelligence Estimate
WARNING: The material in this document
is sensitive. Distribution of this NIE should
be strictly limited to those officials who re-
quire access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties. For this reason
the publication as a whole is classified Top
Secret because compromise of its contents
would pose a grave threat to national
security.
NIE 11-1-83 S
TS-833351
19 July 1983
Copy 3 0
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NIE 11-1-83
THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
Information mailable as of 19 ink 1983 was
used in the preparation o! this Estimate.
WARNING: The material in this document
is sensitive. Distribution of this NIE should
be strictly limited to those officials who
require access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties. For this reason
the publication as a whole is classified Top
Secret because compromise of its contents
would pose a grave threat to national
security .
I.' 5,'3,'3 3551 ecret
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ........................................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS ................................................................................................... 3
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 9
Soviet Use of Space ............................................................................................ 9
Priority and Growth of Space Program ............................................................ 9
Military Use of Space ....................................................................................... 11
Economic Competition ...................................................................................... 19
Prestige ............................................................................................................... 19
Other Possible Developments in the 1990s ....................................................... 19
Gaps and Uncertainties ...................................................................................... 22
iii
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate describes current Soviet space capabilities, identifies
elements of the space program in various stages of development, and es-
timates how these will affect future Soviet capabilities in space through
the 1980s and into the 1990s in the absence of space-related arms
control agreement
For purposes of this Estimate, we have judged the likelihood of
various Soviet space developments as ranging from very low to very
high. These judgments, stated in terms of probability of occurrence,
would be:
Very low less than 10 percent
Low 10 to 40 percent
Moderate 40 to 60 percent
High == 60 to 90 percent
Very high ::= more than 90 percent
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe the principal goals of the Soviet space program are to:
- Provide global support to Soviet military forces.
- Enhance the worldwide influence and prestige of the Soviet
Union.
- Deny enemies the use of space in wartime.
- Contribute to the Soviet economy.
Military activities account for more than 70 percent of the current
Soviet space program in terms of annual launches and the estimated
total cost of the program. Moreover, from the Soviet military perspec-
tive, space is viewed as an extension of theaters of operations rather
than as a separate arena of conflict.
The current Soviet space program includes about 110 active
satellites that provide communications, intelligence, targeting, warning,
navigation, mapping, weather, research, and other functions. In addi-
tion, research and reconnaissance are conducted from a manned space
complex. Current Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities are limited and
fall short of meeting the apparent requirement to be able to deny
enemy use of space in time of war. The USSR has an operational ASAT
orbital interceptor, ground-based test lasers with probable ASAT capa-
bilities, and the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare
(EW) against space system
Although their current space program lacks some of the capabilities
found in the technologically sophisticated US space program, the
Soviets' space systems adequately satisfy most of their current require-
ments. The space program, moreover, has several unique features,
including ocean reconnaissance satellites for naval targeting, orbital
interceptors for the destruction of satellites in low orbit, and long-
duration manned space missions that have increasingly emphasized
military research and applications.
The Soviet space program is expensive-the dollar cost equivalent
is more than $20 billion. Currently this amounts to more than 1.5
percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP). Part of this high cost
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is due to the high launch rates-about 100 per year-necessary for the
Soviets to maintain their systems in orbit. Average lifetimes of Soviet
satellites are quite short, and many have experienced reliability prob-
lems. Moreover, Soviet satellites are concentrated primarily in low-
altitude orbits that generally require more frequent replenishment
Soviet space expenditures will continue at high levels during the
next 10 years, and the rate of growth in military space investment will
continue to outpace the rate of growth of the Soviet economy and
overall military spending:
- Seventeen new Soviet space systems that have been identified in
various stages of development are likely to undergo testing in
the next 10 years. (See figure 1.) Most of them are expected to be
deployed by the early 1990s. This will result mainly in improve-
ments to current capabilities.
- Major new capabilities in the next 10 years will result from the
successful introduction of a reusable space transportation sys-
tem, a space tug, a military space plane, and a heavy-lift launch
vehicle. Any delay in development of the heavy-lift launch
vehicle will seriously affect several other Soviet space systems.
- The reliability of Soviet space systems also will improve, but
some reliability problems will remain because of poor product
engineering, limitations in technology, and inadequate quality
control. Newer satellites should achieve an average lifetime of
three years, nearly doubling the average lifetime of older
system
The most significant result of the increased effort in space will be
the extension of the Soviet military reach by providing global support to
military operations:
- Command and control communications will be available on a
global basis, providing an expanding number of military users
with continuous, secure, and reliable communications.
- Intelligence collection, targeting, global navigation, and weather
data will be more accurate and timely.
- As satellite data relay systems become available, intelligence
and target information will be increasingly available to tactical
commanders
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Figure - /
Major Vcww So%iel Space SNstems in I)lecelopmenl
I .III ~~rhlt.iI I Im I::1 II u.ll
I,rntnl~hc IC.tInC , I,~I 110 H,I .,Ih,I Iii
H:PH.I iI,. I'. LII~ ,nnl. Il,
VI. .Il I ,,,I .I,IInn,
~I.IIII, (,I 0v v
110-'! .,,d
i It
For the rest of this century. Soviet space-related v~caia i h.w
vv ill prohahly he limited to A,SAT roles:
We do not expect significant improvements ill the
of the nonnuclear orbital ASAT interceptors. \V e du I10 1101i
pate the development of a high-altitude cons cutioll,.ll I1ri>It.u
ASA"I' capahility.
- Potentially, the most serious threat tot S space sy stein, I~ :r i;v
h;AV', especially against high-altitude satellites. An
viexv holds that, if a Soviet active k\\' caplbilit, 1~.I;IIt
satellites does exist, brute force jamming would Iw ihr 1u'
likely L\V technique. On the basis of availahle ev idr'III r II
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difficult to judge with any confidence that a Soviet technologi-
cal capability would include more complex forms of jamming.'
- Although potentially capable, we believe that Soviet interconti-
nental ballistic missiles and direct-ascent antiballistic missiles
(ABMs) are unlikely to be used in ASAT roles. Nevertheless,
unprotected satellites will remain vulnerable to the long-range
and persistent effects of nuclear detonations in space.
- We believe there is a high probability that a prototype high-
energy laser ASAT weapon will be tested in low orbit by the
early 1990s. A high-altitude version may be tested by the end of
the century. A space-based laser of the 1-megawatt class could
be tested in the late 1980s at the earliest, but prototype testing is
more likely to occur in the early 1990s. If testing proves
successful, an initial operational low-altitude system consisting
of a few satellite weapons, having an ASAT range of hundreds
of kilometers, could be available by the mid-1990s. The psycho-
logical impact of the first test of a space-based laser in a
weapon-related mode would be greater than the actual military
significance of such a weapon in its initial applications.
Space-based weapons for ballistic missile defense (BMD) will require
greater technological advances than those needed for an ASAT mission.
Thus, the Soviets are unlikely to have a prototype space-based laser
BMD system until at least the mid-1990s or an operational system until
after the year 2000.
In a transition to war, we believe the Soviets would expand the de-
ployment of naval targeting and photoreconnaissance systems to reach
full operational potential. Short of direct US-Soviet conflict, it seems
unlikely that the Soviet leadership would risk physical destruction of US
satellites, whereas it could perceive nondestructive interference as a
somewhat less risky option. Should war occur, the use of active
electronic warfare against space systems would probably be the initial
ASAT activity. We do not believe that any ASAT activity would be un-
dertaken merely for warning or demonstration purposes. The likelihood
of their launching orbital ASAT interceptors against selected US
satellites probably would be high during a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict. In such a conflict, the Soviets may perceive an operational
advantage if both sides experience significant satellite losses. In addi-
tion, the USSR's quick-launch capabilities provide an advantage over
the United States in restoring satellite capabilities, assuming its launch-
pads remain intact
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In a nuclear war, Soviet space systems would have key vulnerabili-
ties. Their launch and control sites are not hardened, and their satellites
probably have limited protection. In the future, key satellite systems
could be replaced either by using reserves stored in orbit or by
launching satellites from mobile facilities. However, the development of
smaller communications and photoreconnaissance satellites would be
required for use with a mobile launch capability
Manned space activities are receiving increased emphasis in the
Soviet space program:
- By 1986 manned space activities, which are predominantly
military in nature, will account for more than one-fourth of
Soviet space expenditures.
- The Soviet leadership has announced the national objective of
establishing a continuously manned space station, which we
believe will be achieved by about 1986.
- Beyond research and development, the military purposes of
manned space stations remain unclear, but reconnaissance, to
include ocean surveillance, is likely to be the main military
mission. In addition, a military space plane is under develop-
ment. The space p1a Also is unclear, but is likely to in-
clude reconnaissanc
Increased Soviet space activities will offer potential economic
benef its:
- The USSR will be able to offer a variety of space services at
competitive prices. These services, particularly telecommunica-
tions and space launches, could provide sources of hard curren-
cy earnings.
Manufacturing and materials processing in space is another area
of potential economic benefit to the USSR. Soviet experiments
are sufficiently advanced to begin production in space within
the next few years. The Soviet space shuttle will enable regular
harvesting of products manufactured in space
Increased Soviet space activities will also enhance Soviet prestige:
- A visible, highly publicized, continuously manned Soviet space
station will receive frequent worldwide attention.
- A manned Mars mission or the establishment of a manned lunar
base could be undertaken in the mid-to-late 1990s. If actually
undertaken and successful, such activities would demonstrate
Soviet scientific and technical prowess.
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- Unmanned lunar and planetary exploration, such as the coming
Venus-Halley's Comet mission, will enhance the USSR's desired
image as a peaceful and technologically advanced nation
Our ability to anticipate developments in the Soviet space program
Therefore, unanticipated developments will be increasing-
ly possible. Our perception of the Soviet space threat would increase sig-
nificantly if breakthroughs occur in:
- Space-related weapons.
- Submarine detection
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SUMMARY
Soviet Use of Space
1. The Soviet space program meets a variety of
requirements, but the broad objective is to increase
worldwide political influence by enhancing military
capabilities, prestige, and economic development. The
Soviets gauge this objective mainly in the context of
East-West competition, and they focus this competi-
tion in the military arena. Military activities account
for more than 70 percent of the current Soviet space
program in terms of annual launches and the estimat-
ed total cost of the program. (See figure
2. From the Soviet military perspective, space is
viewed as an extension of theaters of operations rather
than as a separate arena of conflict. In time of war,
satellites would be subject to military action as would
the forces they support. Therefore, according to Soviet
military writers, space systems are to be maintained at
the same stage of combat readiness as the forces they
support. In addition, there are provisions for sustaining
military operations by having capabilities to replace
key space systems either from reserves stored near
ground launch facilities or from inactive satellites
stored in orbit. However, should general war occur,
ground-support elements of Soviet space systems are
vulnerable. Neither launch nor control facilities are
hardened against nuclear attack, and there are no
indications of mobile launch facilities. Although there
is no evidence, a mobile emergency launch capability
for small communications satellites could be available,
possibly as early as the late 1980s, using solid-propel-
lant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will
be deployed beginning in the mid-1980s. A similar
capability with near-real-time photoreconnaissance
satellites could be achieved by the early 1990s. We
also believe that within the next few years the Soviets
will deploy a mobile command capability for un-
manned military space systems using ships or ground-
based mobile terminal
3. Current Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities
are limited and fall short of meeting the apparent
requirement to be able to deny enemy use of space in
time of war. The ASAT orbital interceptor is capable
of destroying satellites in low orbit. We believe the
USSR currently has the technological capability to
attempt to interfere with foreign satellite systems,
using active electronic warfare (EW) techniques.' In
addition, direct-ascent antiballistic missile (ABM) in-
terceptors and ground-based test lasers have potential
ASAT capabilities. Also, Soviet space boosters or
ICBMs with nuclear warheads could be modified for
ASAT purposes; however, we believe the likelihood of
such modifications to be love
4. Short of direct US-Soviet conflict, it seems un-
likely the Soviet leadership would risk physical de-
struction of US satellites, whereas they could perceive
nondestructive interference as a somewhat less risky
option. We do not believe that any ASAT activities
would be undertaken merely for warning or demon-
stration purposes. We believe there is a high likelihood
that, during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional con-
flict, the Soviets would attempt to interfere with
selected US space systems that provide important
support, using both nondestructive and destructive
means. In such a conflict Soviet leaders may perceive
an operational advantage if both sides experience
significant satellite losses because of greater US
dependence on space systems. In addition, Soviet
satellites can be more quickly replaced if space launch
facilities remain intact. The decision to launch ASAT
interceptors against satellites during the early part of a
conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would he
affected by Soviet uncertainties with regard to US
responses, including the likelihood of attacks against
existing Soviet space launch sites. If a general war
were under way in which the massive use of nuclear
weapons appeared imminent, the likelihood of at-
tempted interference with all US space systems is very
high, using all available mea
Priority and Growth of Space Program
5. Soviet space expenditures will continue at high
levels during the next 10 years, and the rate of growth
Director, National .Security Agency
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Figure - 2
Soviet Spacecraft Categories
Weapon Orbital interceptor
Intelligence
Collect1
Target vehicle
Radar support satellites
Naval support satellites (two generations)
Radar ocean reconnaissance satellites
Launch detection satellites J
Photographic reconnaissance satellites
taissance satellites
mitt space station
load communications satellites
c satellites
Molniya 3 communications satellites
Raduga communications satellite
Gorizont communications satellite
Ekran communications satellite
Meteor weather satellites
Scientific Salyut space station
Photographic-geophysical satellites
Earth resources satellite
Naval support satellites (third generation)
Astron scientific satellite
Amateur radio satellites
Prognoz scientific satellites
Biological satellites
Other scientific satellites
Lunar and planetary spacecraft
in niilitar~ space investment will continue to outpace
the rate of growth of the Soviet economy and Soviet
iiilitarv spending. (See figure 3.) The dollar cost
ciluivalent of the Soviet space program in 1983 is
about $20 billion, as compared with about $13 billion
for i S (.o~ernnuot space expenditures plus several
billion dollars in additional 1'S commercial invest-
incnts in space. (See figure 4 on page 12.) The
I'utopi an Space Agency (ESA), France, and Japan
I av e developed modest space programs, but they are
not competitive on a scale with the USSR; each
pro rung amounts to less than $1 billion annually.
l:Ainutted total Soviet space costs have doubled from
$It) billion in 198 to the projected $20 billion in 1983
Military
Support
for an average annual increase of 15 percent, a result
of the large number of programs in development. (See
table 1.) Much of the large jump in Soviet space
expenditures noted between 1980 and 1983 reflects
costly manned space activities, including the shuttle
orbiter, heavy-lift launch vehicle, and space stations.
By 1986 manned space activities, which are predomi-
nantly military, will account for one-fourth of Soviet
investments in space. After 1983, growth in space
expenditures is expected to be less rapid, perhaps
averaging about 6 percent a year through 1986
6. The expanding Soviet space program has been
supported by steady growth in design bureaus, produc-
tion facilities, launch complexes, control sites, cosmo-
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Figure ?3
Relative Rates of Growth: Soviet GNP, Military
Spending, and Military Space Hardware
Index 1965 = 100 (based on 1970 rubles)
SOO
Military
spacea
GNPb
Defensch
It this citegors only includes ruble costs for space that we identify
esclusisels as military hardware. If civilian space procurement was
included, the relative growth rate for space hardware would be lower
than shown here
1, Sosiet GNP was approximately 300 billion rubles (1970 prices) in 1965.
About 13 to 14 percent of that was devoted to defense, in turn, I to 2
percent of defense was allocated to military space hardware in 1965 By 1981
the share going to military space hardware had risen to 3 to 4 percent of
defense spending.
Table I
Major New Soviet Space
Systems Likely To Be
Tested in the 1980s
Military and Civil
Antisatellite
Estimated Degree of
Date of Confidence a
Prototype
Testing
(megawatt class, low orbit)
Intelligence collection
Electro-optical reconnais-
1983-85
High
sance/surveillance
High-altitude SIGINT
1986-89
Low
Photographic-geophysical,
1981-83
High
second generation
Communications
Potok data transmission
1983-85
High
Satellite data relay system
1984-86
High
Hybrid military comsats
1985-87
High
(Statsionar, Gals, Luch-P,
Volna)
Volna, Statsionar)
Military support
cal satellite (GOMS)
Global navigation 1983-85 High
system (GLONASS)
naut training facilities, and the fleet of space support
ships. This impressive infrastructure supports about
100 launches per year and controls about 110 active
satellites in orbit at any time. By contrast, the United
States maintains about the same number of active
satellites while conducting only about 20 launches per
year. The difference lies in the much shorter average
operational life of Soviet satellites and in Soviet de-
pendence primarily on networks of low-altitude satel-
lites, resulting in the need to maintain these networks
with a high launch rate. Product engineering appears
to be a basic problem with Soviet spacecraft. Better
quality control in production and improved reliability
in electronic components should extend the operation-
al life of most Soviet satellites. By the late 1980s,
newer satellites should have lifetimes averaging 36
months, about double the current average. Even with
missions of longer duration, we expect the launch rate
Geosynchronous launch 1984-86 Moderate
detection system
Geodetic, second generation 1981-83 High
Manned systems
Modular space station 1984-86 High
Military space plane 1983-85 Moderate- -
Space transportation system 1986-88 High
Space tug 1988-91 Moderate
New resupply vehicle 1983-86 High
Lunar and Planetary b
Lunar polar orbiter 1990-92 High
Lunar far side soil sample 1991-93 High
Mars soil sample return
Jupiter probe
Venus radar mapping
Venus-Halley's Comet flyby
(V EGA)
1986-90 High
1989-92 Moderate
1983 High
Our information on specific systems varies considerably. This
estimate of confidence indicates the relative levels of our under-
standing of the various developments, not the likelihood of testing, as
in table 3.
b For these developments, date is that of mission, not a prototype test.
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Figure S y
Dollar Costs of the Soviet Space Program"'
Billion I'S s
rldmintstnttion
& construction
Research &
development
It Ihese dollar estimates represent what it would cost to replicate Soviet
development and procurement of space systems in the United States and
then launch and operate the system as the Soviets would. We have more
confidence in our estimates of hardware cost than our estimates for
research, development, administation, and other support costs. Data are in
constant 1981 US dollars. Because our cost estimates cover only those
existing or planned programs or which we have evidence, they may
underestimate oserall program costs,
to be sustained at nearly the same level for the next
several years as new space systems are introduced, A
series of new space launch vehicles will account for an
increasing number of these launches
7. If Soviet investment in space continues as expect-
ed, 17 new military and civil space systems which
have been identified in various stages of development
are likely to undergo testing in the next 10 years. Most
of these are expected to be deployed by the early
1990s. (See table 1.) This nearly doubles the rate at
which new systems were introduced in the 1970s. In
addition to these new space systems, six lunar and
planetary projects have been identified and probably
will be pursued. The 1980s will be more like the 1960s,
when several new systems were introduced. In con-
trast, the 1970s were characterized by the introduction
of improvements and the establishment of fully opera-
tional networks of satellitesF___1
8. By US standards, the Soviet space program is
relatively unsophisticated and expensive-costing the
equivalent of 1 percent of the Soviet gross national
product (GNP) during the past 10 years and more than
1.5 percent today. However, we believe that the space
program adequately satisfies most current Soviet re-
quirements. The introduction of new Soviet space
systems in the next 10 years will make more timely
and more accurate information available to Soviet
political leaders and military commanders. Also, irn-
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proved communications will be available to Soviet
leaders, and a space-based laser will probably be
tested. Ambitious manned space activities will en-
hance Soviet prestige. Table 2 describes what capabili-
ties currently are derived from the Soviet space pro-
ccram and how they will change if all of the
anticipated systems in development (table 1) progress
according to our estimates. Major new capabilities in
the next 10 years will result from the successful
introduction of a reusable space transportation system,
a space tug, and especially the heavy-lift launch
vehicle which is a critical component of other space
systems, including the shuttle and the large space
station. Moreover, any delay in developing the heavy-
lift launch vehicle also will seriously affect Soviet plans
for placing large payloads in geosynchronous orbit.
Military Use of Space
9. Since the early 1960s, space systems have become
an integral part of Soviet military capabilities, provid-
ing intelligence collection, command and control, tar-
geting of strategic and conventional weapons, naviga-
tion, and warning of ICBM launch. Subsequently, an
orbital ASAT interceptor was introduced. Also, we
believe methods were developed to afford some pro-
tection for Soviet satellites. The main consequence of
the introduction of new space systems during the next
10 years will be the extension of the USSR's military
reach by providing global support to its military
forces:
- Command and control communications will be
available on a global basis, providing an expand-
ing number of military users with continuous,
secure, and reliable communications.
- Intelligence collection, targeting, global naviga-
tion, and weather data will be more accurate and
timely.
- As satellite data relay systems become available,
intelligence and target information will be in-
creasingly available to tactical commanders. (s)
10. We believe that, despite their large and com-
prehensive space program, Soviet leaders perceive that
overall US leadership in space could continue. There-
fore, Soviet diplomatic initiatives and propaganda
related to space have the objective of slowing down
the I'S space program. They also are intended to
isolate the United States in international political
forums. Soviet leaders have consistently shown a pre-
occupation with potential US space threats. They
argue that the United States is preparing for space
war. They point to substantial increases in US spend-
ing for military space programs, a Presidential Direc-
tive on national space policy that they claim directs
the Pentagon to be prepared to conduct military
operations in space, the establishment of a new US Air
Force Space Command, the military potential of the
US shuttle, and the development of the air-launched
miniature vehicle (ALMV) ASAT weapon. They have
mounted a major arms control campaign to ban all
weapons from space and to attempt to resume talks
with the United States on limiting ASAT weapons.
Recently, General Secretary Andropov reiterated the
1981 Soviet proposal for a United Nations treaty
banning all weapons in space. The treaty would
prohibit acts that destroy, damage, disturb, or change
the trajectory of any satellite belonging to a treaty
member who was in compliance with the treaty's ban
on weapons. Monitoring such a ban would be difficult,
especially if the USSR uses space stations for weapons
development. Soviet initiatives have been somewhat
successful in stimulating worldwide concern about an
arms race in space
11. Intelligence collection was the first military
application of the Soviet space program and currently
accounts for the largest share of space launches. About
30 military photoreconnaissance satellites are launched
annually. First-generation photoreconnaissance satel-
lites averaged about 13 days in orbit, and second-
generation photosatellites with solar panels have con-
ducted missions of up to 49 days. A major
improvement will be a new electro-optical reconnais-
sance and surveillance system. The system probably
will be deployed in a network of imaging satellites
supported by a series of data relay satellites to provide
photography to the Soviet General Staff in near-real
a high-altitude signals intelligence (SIGINT) system by
the late 1980s, but we are uncertain whether it would
be for communications intelligence (COMINT) or for
electronic intelligence (ELINT). To date, the USSR has
not deployed a space-based COMINT collection sys-
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Main Capabilities of Soviet Space Systems
Existing Capabilities and Expected Improvements
Navigation. Location data (within 180 me-
ters) are provided to Soviet naval and
commercial shipping. A new system,
GLONASS, will aid ships and other mo-
bile users in determining their positions,
possibly within 30 meters.
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Data are
generated for accurately locating points on
the Earth's surface and for producing
accurate models of the Earth's gravitation-
al field for intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) targeting and other uses. New
generations of geodetic and geophysical
satellites will provide more accurate data
for targeting by ballistic and cruise
missiles.
Weather. Data are provided for global
weather forecasting and may be used to
improve effectiveness of space-based imag-
ery collection. The new geosynchronous
system (GOMS) will provide better cover-
age and more timely data.
Command and Control. Secure and redun-
dant communications and data relay are
made available to major Soviet military
units as well as military advisory groups.
New systems will provide higher capacity,
more secure, global communications.
Civil Communications. Newer geosynchro-
nous satellites will make domestic tele-
phone and television services available to
about 90 percent of the Soviet population.
Space Transportation System. This system,
similar to the US space shuttle, will be able
to transport bulk cargo to and from space
stations. It also will enable delivery, recov-
ery, refueling, and repair of satellites. It
also may be a test bed for laser weapons. A
space tug, if perfected, would assist the
space station and shuttle and transfer
satellites between high and low orbits for
servicing.
Military Intelligence. The deployment and
exercises of most major NATO and Chi-
nese ground, naval, and air units are
monitored by space systems providing cur-
rent order-of-battle information, warning
of possible attack, and monitoring of treaty
compliance and crisis situations. Improved
SIGINT and new electro-optical satellites
will provide improved coverage and more
timely indications and warning informa-
tion as well as tactical data. A new satellite
data relay system will pass reconnaissance
data from low-altitude satellites directly to
Moscow in near-real time.
Naval Targeting. Satellites locate US naval
battle groups and other naval formations
and transmit the derived target informa-
tion on a real-time basis to selected Soviet
naval combatants. These satellites Iiave7
Warning. A nine-satellite system provides
on a continuous basis 30 min
warning of US ICBM launch
based ballistic missile early warning radar
systems. A new network of geosynchronous
satellite
is expected to begin initial testing
in 1 W54 and reach full operational capabili-
ty by 1990.
Resupply Vehicle. Existing "Progress" ve-
hicles deliver about 2,300 kilograms of
cargo. Newer resupply vehicles have great-
er capacity and will be able to recover
materials produced in space, return cosmo-
nauts in emergencies, and return
equipment.
A Military Space Plane. A spacecraft is
being developed for a mission we cannot yet
determine, but is likely to include recon-
naissance and satellite inspection roles.
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Earth Resources. Data on domestic and foreign
natural resources and crop surveys are collect-
ed using a recoverable film system. A develop-
mental electro-optical system with capabilities
similar to US Landsat will provide more timely
information and attain longer mission
duration.
ASAT. Orbital interceptors can attack satel-
lites in low Earth orbit one at a time, and up to
eight within a 24-hour period. The operational
system has destroyed a target in nine of the 15
tests to date. Future ASAT improvements are
expected to include a space-based laser, which
we believe will be tested by the early 1990s.
We do not expect a high-altitude conventional
orbital interceptor to be developed.
Lunar and Planetary Exploration. Unmanned
exploration of the lunar far side and a Mars
soil sample return mission are likely within the
next decade. Venus probes will continue to be
frequent in the near term.
Space Station. Soviet space stations have been
manned about 40 percent of the time. Cosmo-
nauts have conducted military experiments,
reconnaissance, materials processing, and oth-
er research. By about 1986, modular space
stations, with crews of six to 12 persons, will
provide permanently manned platforms for
similar activities and weapons component
testing.
Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV). Current
Soviet space launch vehicles are limited to
placing about 20,000 kg in low orbit. The new
Saturn V-class HLLV booster will be capable
of lifting at least 100,000 kg into low orbit.
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tern, but we believe such a system is within Soviet
technical capabilities. According to one view, there is a
low probability that a space-based COMINT system
will be deployed because the information can be
collected by other means; therefore, the SIGINT sys-
tem expected to be tested in the late 1980s would
probably be for ELINT.2 Another view holds that
there is a moderate likelihood the Soviets will test a
prototype span rn ;OMINT collection system by
the late 1980s.3
being developed probably will involve military users.
These new systems probably will use wide bandwidths
and spread-spectrum signals. Many mobile ground
terminals also have been introduced to support de-
ployed forces. (See figure 5.) Such developments and
other improvements will result in greater capacity,
higher speed, and more secure communications for
Soviet military commands to operate virtually any-
where in the world. As satellite data relay systems
become available, intelligence and target information
should become increasingly available to tactical com-
12. Certain space systems directly support Soviet
weapon systems by providing more accurate target
information. The EORSAT (ELINT ocean reconnais-
sance satellite) and RORSAT (radar ocean reconnais-
sance satellite) systems provide naval targeting data
directly to selected Soviet surface combatants and
submarines. However, these systems have serious limi-
tations.
RORSATs are adversely affected by
poor wea er. in peacetime neither of these systems is
deployed with what we believe would be a full
wartime complement of satellites, but the SL-11
launch vehicle could place additional satellites in orbit
quickly.
13. Some other space systems, such as ELINT 3,
have been developed to identify and locate land- and
sea-based radars, but do not report such detections in
real time. New-generation ELINT systems are expect-
ed to improve frequency coverage. Also, a new
ELINT system, if developed, could use a higher orbit
to provide greater geographic coverage. Other space
systems have been used to provide accurate geodetic
and gravitational models for targeting Soviet ICBMs
and SLBMs. The accuracy of this information will be
improved by the introduction of new geodetic (GEO-
SAT 2) and photographic-geophysical (PHOTOGEO 2)
satellites.)
14. Several Soviet military command and control
networks use satellites to provide high-speed, secure
communications between widely separated elements.
All of the new communications and data relay systems
Central Intelligence Agency
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Age en and the senior intelligence officers of the military serv-
iccs.
manders.
15. Navigation information is provided by two in-
dependent satellite systems to Soviet naval and mer-
chant ships and fishing vessels. The new navigational
system GLONASS probably will be operational by
1986 with about nine satellites providing location data
to both ships and aircraft, accurate to possibly 30
meters, worldwide. However, unlike the US Global
Positioning System (GPS), GLONASS is not believed to
have the capability to provide altitude data to aircraft.
Expansion to an 18-satellite system would enable
GLONASS to provide this information. Even when
GLONASS becomes fully operational, Soviet ships and
aircraft are likely to continue to carry receivers that
will enable them to use US space-based navigation
systems
16. About 30 minutes' warning of US ICBM attack
is provided by the Soviet launch detection satellite
(LDS) network. Eight satellites of the projected nine-
satellite network have been placed in orbit and pro-
vide coverage of US ICBM fields and the space launch
facilities at Cape Canaveral. SLBM patrol areas are
not covered, but a new geosynchronous s
e
expected to overcome this limitation by 199
17. Research in space-based submarine detection
has been conducted from Soviet space stations
We cannot judge whether the Soviets will achieve
a technological breakthrough in remote sensing of
submarine-generated effects during the next 10 years.
Even if' such a breakthrough occurs, we do not believe,
in view of the operational considerations and the
length of time needed for full-system deployment, that
there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets, during
the next 10 years, will have a system that could
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Figure M .t
Soviet Mobile Communications Satellite Terminals
simultaneously track a substantial fraction of the US
force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). We are more uncertain, and hence more
concerned, about the capabilities that could potential-
ly be realized and deployed in the mid-to-late 1990s.
An alternative view is tha
techniques.
18. Protection of Soviet space systems could involve
a wide range of measures, but we are uncertain which
methods are being adopted. The launch facilities and
the ground control sites are the most vulnerable links
in Soviet space systems, and there is no evidence of
hardening for any of these. A mobile command capa-
bility for unmanned military systems could be
achieved within the next few years. Satellites in orbit
could be afforded some protection by maneuvering,
Department of the Navy
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hardening against laser or electronic radiation, and the
use of decoys. In the 1990s the USSR probably will be
able to reconstitute essential space systems by reacti-
vating and repositioning satellites stored in orbit and
by quickly launching satellites from mobile launchers.
19. Current Soviet capabilities for destroying or
otherwise interfering with US satellites include an
operational nonnuclear orbital ASAT interceptor,
which has demonstrated satellite intercepts at altitudes
up to 1,600 kilometers. Many US satellites operate
below- this altitude. Nine out of 15 tests since 1968
have been successful, the last success having occurred
in March 1981. The most recent test, in June 1982, was
the first failure of the operational interceptor since
19771. During the period 1976-81, the Soviets conduct-
ed five tests of a developmental version incorporating
a probable passive electro-optical sensor; all five were
failures. We do not expect significant improvements in
the reliability of either the operational or deN elopmen-
tal ASAT orbital interceptors. Furthermore, we do not
anticipate the development of a high-altitude conven-
tional ASAT orbital interceptor because:
Evidence of such a program is lacking.
Appropriate quick-reaction launch vehicles are
lacking and have not been identified in
development.
The long flight time to intercept reduces poten-
tial effectiveness.
Compared with other ASAT techniques, an active
ASAT EW program would have relatively low cost
and low risk of escalation. Further, such a role is
consistent with ambitious EW programs existing
throughout the Soviet military forces. Potential Soviet
active EW platforms include many fixed, transport-
able, and mobile transmitters. However, we have no
evidence of Soviet equipment or organizations with an
ASAT EW mission.
21. An alternative view- contends that there is insuf-
ficient evidence at this time to support the judgment
of Soviet intent to use active EW against satellites.
Moreover, the
holder of this view concludes that, if a Soviet active
EW capability against satellites does exist, brute force
jamming would be the most likely EW technique. On
the basis of available evidence, it is difficult to judge
with any confidence that a Soviet technological capa-
bility would include more complex forms of jamming.'
22. Direct-ascent ABM interceptors, armed with
nuclear or nonnuclear warheads, also have the poten-
tial to attack low-orbit satellites; however, we do not
believe that ABM interceptors would be used in an
ASAT role. Space launch vehicles, such as the SL-6
and SL-12, could be modified with nuclear warheads
for ASAT purposes, but relatively low launch rates
make them unlikely candidates.
cncrgy, offer more promising prospects
Soviets intend to use active EW against both satellites
and ground-based users of space systems. Further-
more, we consider EW to be the most likely type of
initial Soviet ASAT activity. Such a capability poten-
tially poses the most serious threat to US space systems.
Against high-altitude satellites, this currently may be
the only ASAT capability. We believe the USSR
currently has the technological capability using active
E\1' to attempt to interfere with foreign space systems.
23. We believe ICBMs are unlikely to be used in an
ASAT role, although ICBMs are available in larger
numbers and can reach higher altitudes than ABMs.
Also, ICBMs are protected by hardened silos and
control facilities. We believe the Soviets are unlikely to
risk collateral damage to their own satellites by using
ICBMs with nuclear warheads, and they would be
wary of the risks and uncertainties about US responses
if a conflict were otherwise still at the conventional
force level. We do note, however, the Soviets' potential
advantage in reconstituting their space systems if their
launchpads remain intact. Current ICBMs probably
would require some modifications and a short period
" The holder of this view is the Director, National Security
Agencv-_1
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of testing to be ASAT capable. If high-altitude targets
are to be attacked, modifications to existing guidance
systems would be required, and new upper stages
would be needed. We would expect to observe testing
of the new upper stages. In any event, unprotected
satellites will remain vulnerable to the long-range and
persistent effects of nuclear detonations in space
24. Soviet research related to directed-energy
weapons, including lasers, particle beams (both
charged and neutral), and radiofrequency (RF) energy,
has been under way for many years. These weapons
have potential application in antisatellite, air defense,
and ballistic missile defense roles. Among the possible
directed-energy weapons, our evidence is strongest
concerning Soviet laser weapons developments. Two
facilities at Saryshagan are assessed to have high-
energy lasers and associated optical equipment with
the potential
25. We believe there is a high probability that a
prototype high-energy laser ASAT weapon will be
tested in low orbit by the early 1990s. Such a system
would have advantages, such as a multishot capability,
over a conventional orbital ASAT interceptor. Howev-
er, development of a space-based laser is technologi-
cally difficult and could proceed in several directions.
One approach involves a laser of the 1-megawatt class
which could attack satellites at ranges of hundreds of
kilometers. A prototype of such a weapon probably
could be tested in the late 1980s at the earliest, but
more likely in the early 1990s. If testing proves
successful, an initial operational system in low orbit
consisting of a few satellite weapons could be available
by the early 1990s (if tested in the late 1980s), but such
an operational system is more likely to appear in the
mid-1990s. Another possibility is a laser of lower
power (hundreds of kilowatts) in an unmanned, low-
orbit satellite with an ASAT range in the tens of
kilometers. If such a system were pursued, a prototype
could be tested earlier than a megawatt-class laser and,
if early tests proved successful, possibly reach an
operational capability by the early 1990s. But such a
system with its short-range capabilities would have
severe operational limitations. In any event, the psy-
chological effect of the first test of a space-based laser
in a weapon-related mode would be greater than the
actual military significance of such a weapon in its
initial applications=
26. Research to date has indicated that a space-
based particle beam weapon (PBW) will be more
difficult to achieve than a laser system. We believe
that prototype testing of an ASAT PBW is unlikely to
occur before 1995. An alternative view holds that a
space-based PBW system intended to disrupt satellite
electronic systems and requiring significantly less pow-
er than a destructive PBW could be developed and
deployed several years earlier
27. Another threat involves the use of high-power
RF signals to damage satellites. The effectiveness of
this threat is dependent on detailed technical knowl-
edge of the target. No facilities designed for RF attack
against satellites have been identified in the USSR. We
believe it is highly unlikely that a Soviet space-based
RF-damage ASAT weapon will be tested before the
year 2000. By 1990, there is a moderate likelihood the
USSR will test a ground-based RF ASAT weapon
capable of physically damaging satellites.
28. The USSR is clearly committed to manned
space stations, but the military purposes of these
stations remain unclear. Experiments by military cos-
monauts suggest reconnaissance as the primary mis-
sion. We expect to see laser weapon components tested
on manned spacecraft. However, unmanned satellites
seem better suited as platforms for operational direct-
ed-energy weapons
Economic Competition
29. During the 1980s the USSR could become a
competitor in providing a wide range of space services.
Telecommunications and space launch services offer
potential sources of hard currency earnings for the
USSR and, maybe more important, world prestige.
The Soviet-sponsored INTERSPUTNIK organization,
for example, has offered to lease communications
satellite voice circuits at prices as much as 40 percent
below those charged by INTELSAT. Soviet space
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launch services also may be offered at prices well
below those of the US shuttle and ESA's Ariane. We
believe, on the basis of the expected launch rates, that
the demand for commercial space launchers may
exceed the projected capacity of the shuttle and
Ariane launch vehicles. The SL 12/13 Proton would
be the vehicle most likely to be launched for Soviet-
offered commercial services. The Proton is the world's
largest expendable space booster and has proved to be
90-percent reliable during the past 10 years. We
believe about five Protons per year could be available
for commercial purposes by the late 1980s. The USSR
also may provide Earth resources data to other coun-
tries in competition with the US Landsat and French
SPOT systems. In addition to gaining hard currency,
the USSR could provide navigational and meteorologi-
cal services to other gestures of good will
for political purposes
30. Manufacturing and processing of materials in
space is another area of potential economic benefit to
the USSR. For example, on Salyut 6 (1976-81) experi-
ments involved the manufacture of semiconductors,
superconductors, and special alloys that were suffi-
ciently advanced to permit production of materials to
begin in the near future. The most likely next step
would be to create a special materials processing
module as part of a space station. In addition, the
availability of an operational space shuttle within 10
years will enable regular harvesting of products manu-
factured in space
Prestige
31. Since opening the space frontier with Sputnik in
1957, the USSR has accumulated a long list of space
"firsts." In the 1980s continuously manned Soviet
space stations will provide the opportunity to gain
international recognition as a leader in space Recent-
ly, for example, Soviet cosmonauts established a new
endurance record of 211 days in space. By 1986 the
USSR hopes to establish a permanently manned modu-
lar space station with a crew of six to 12 persons. These
and other manned space activities demonstrate the
high value Soviet leaders continue to place on man in
spaceF__1
32. The USSR has offered other countries the op-
portunity to participate in its space activities. In 1967
it established the INTERCOSMOS program to provide
satellites, launch vehicles, and launch facilities for
other member countries to conduct scientific experi-
ments. To date, 10 Soviet Bloc countries have joined
the INTERCOSMOS program, and there are coopera-
tive agreements with countries such as France and
Sweden. In addition, nine foreign cosmonauts have
participated in Soviet space activities. These efforts
have strengthened scientific and technical ties and
provided opportunities for technology transfer. (s)
33. Interplanetary exploration in the next several
years also will enhance the USSR's desired image as a
peaceful and technologically advanced nation. In De-
cember 1.984, Project VEGA spacecraft are scheduled
to be launched and fly by Venus and Halley's Comet
as part of a Soviet-led international scientific space
exploration effort. The resumption of Soviet un-
manned lunar exploration is expected in the early
1990s. This would involve a lunar polar orbiter and a
lunar lander that could return soil samples from the
far side of the moon. The manned lunar exploration
project was canceled in 1974, but, if it were reinstitut-
ed, which we believe is unlikely, it probably would be
for the purpose of establishing a Soviet lunar base and
could occur in the late 1990s. More likely is a manned
mission to Mars by the late 1990s, discussed in Soviet
open literature
34. The USSR also has gained recognition from the
use of Soviet satellites to help locate ships and aircraft
in distress. A NAVSAT 3 satellite equipped with two
special radio transponders for relaying distress signals
from ships and aircraft was orbited in 1982 as part of a
US, Soviet, Canadian, and French system (COSPAS-
SARSAT) to provide emergency assistance. These and
similar activities will continue to keep the Soviet space
program before the international public~~
Other Possible Developments in the 1990s
35. In addition to the developments thus far antici-
pated in this Estimate, there are several other possibili-
ties in the Soviet space program that could occur in the
next 10 to 20 years, but the evidence is insufficient to
make firm judgments. In some cases, on the basis of
limited information on the general nature of Soviet
research, we are inferring possible significant future
developments. In other cases we are assuming logical
Soviet choices based on the expected availability of
key technologies. On these limited bases, this section
describes possibly significant Soviet space develop-
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ments during the next 10 to 20 years. (See table 3.) We
do not expect these systems to be operational before
the 1990s because the typical Soviet space system takes
12 to 15 years to develop. Because of the high cost of
these projects, formidable technological challenges,
and limitations on research, design, and production
facilities, we do not expect all of them to be pursued to
the system testing phase. We do, however, consider
them important targets for US intelligence collection
and analysis.
36. Radar Imaging. Development of a space-based
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) could provide imagery
in all types of weather and lighting conditions. Devel-
opment of specialized signal- and data-processing
techniques would be necessary before conducting or-
bital flight tests. Such tests may be possible by the
mid-1990s. If a SAR is tested on the current Soviet
Venus radar mapping mission, it could significantly
further the development of a radar-imaging reconnais-
sance satellite
Table 3
Possible New Soviet Space-Related
Developments in the 1990s
Radar imaging Moderate-high
Large aircraft detection Moderate
Submarine detection Uncertain
Submarine laser communications Moderate
Space power station
Geosynchronous space station
Large space station
Manned lunar base
Manned orbital Mars mission
37. Large Aircraft Detection. A Soviet space sys-
tem for detecting large aircraft would employ either a
real aperture radar or infrared (IR) sensors Soviet
experience with space-based real aperture radars ex-
tends back to the first RORSAT in 1971. Development
of a radar system for aircraft detection would require
a large deployable antenna as well as high-data-rate
signal-processing capabilities. We believe there is a
low-to-moderate chance the Soviets will conduct orbit-
al flight tests of a space-based radar system in the
early-to-middle 1990s, and a moderate chance by the
year 2000. We believe an III aircraft detection system
is less likely to be developed than a radar system and is
unlikely to be tested before the mid-1990s. Such a
system would require the development of suitable IR
sensors and associated data-processing system
38. Submarine Detection. Extensive research in
nonacoustic sensing of submarines has been conducted
by the USSR during the past two decades, and for the
last five years this research has involved space plat-
forms. This research could have utility in protecting
Soviet submarines as well as detecting US submarines.
Radar, photographic, infrared, and microwave sensors
could potentially detect small changes in temperatures
or subtle variations in the patterns of waves generated
by submarines. One possibility is a space-based radar,
probably a SAR. However, we cannot assess with
Likelihood
of Testing
by the Year 2000 a
Very low b
Low-moderate b
High b
Low
Moderate
Moderate-high d
Low-moderate
Ground-based radiofrequency ASAT Moderate
weapon
Space-based radiofrequency ASAT Very low
weapon
High-altitude conventional orbital Very low
interceptor
Offensive space-to-space missiles Low
Defensive space-to-space missiles Moderate
on manned platforms
Space mines Very low
Space-based particle beam ASAT weapon Low
Space-based ground-impact weapon Low
a We have considerable uncertainty in many of these judgments.
Among the criteria considered in making these judgments were:
(1) the availability of necessary technologies elsewhere that could
be acquired by the USSR; (2) demonstration of similar technol-
ogies by the USSR; (3) concepts observed in Soviet research
publications; (4) a project identified or associated with a design
bureau; (5) component testing reported; and (6) perceived require-
ments. These estimates do not prejudge the effectiveness of the
systems should they complete the developmental process and be
deployed.
b Likelihood of full-scale system.
Likelihood of mission.
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T I
confi submarine detection potential of such a
rac{ar
39. Submarine Laser Communications. One ac-
tive Soviet program involves development of a satellite
with a blue-green laser to communicate with sub-
merged submarines space tests of such components
could take place in the mid-to-late 1980s. However,
we do not expect to see an operational network for
laser satellite-to-submarine communications before the
In id- 1990S
40. Advanced Communications Satellite. We be-
lieve an advanced Soviet communications satellite
system will be orbited in the early-to-middle 1990s.
These satellites will operate at high frequencies, up to
30 Ghlz, and will have increased capacities over
current systems
41. Space Power Station. A Soviet concept to
provide solar power to Earth involves a large solar
power station, about 1 kilometer in diameter. This
idea may have been based on a US concept discussed
in the 1970s. Such a station would require 10 to 20
payloads using the heavy-lift launch vehicle now
under development. A demonstration of the power-
station technology could be conducted in space by the
nrid-1990s, but the chances are very low that a fit]]-
scale system could be operating before the next cen-
tury
42. Geosynchronous Space Station. The ambi-
tious Soviet manned space station program could
include placing a space station in geosynchronous
orbit. Such a station could provide continuous observa-
tion of certain geographic areas and could be less
vulnerable to attack than low-orbiting space stations.
The new heavy-lift launch vehicle could place a
Salyut-class space station or module in geosynchronous
orbit. Similarly, an upgraded Proton (SL-12) space
launch vehicle could place a transport vehicle of the
Soyuz T class in geosynchronous orbit. Space stations
in these high orbits could serve as research platforms,
intelligence collection stations, satellite repair bases,
weapons test beds, or staging areas for further explora-
tion of the Moon or for planetary expedition
43. Large Space Station. The modular Soviet
space station, designed for crews of six to 12 persons,
will probably be followed by a large space station
I)irrctor of Aaoal Intelligence, Department of the Nat'y
capable of accommodating 12 to 20. Some Soviet
scientists have discussed the development of a ver'
large space base in the 1990s with provisions for as
many as 100 persons.
44. Manned Lunar and Planetary Exploration.
Soviet statements frequently discuss manned explora-
tion of Mars and occasionally mention lunar expedi-
tions. Also, Soviet studies in the mid-1970s addressed
the establishment of a lunar base, but the concept
seems to have been dropped in the late 1970s , Recent
comments by Soviet scientists and officials suggest that
a manned mission to Mars is planned for the mid-to-
late 1990s. A manned Mars mission svould require
fewer resources than a lunar base and would bring
greater prestige to the Soviets. Such a mission would be
limited to an orbital reconnaissance of Mars and
return. It may he technically feasible by that time
First, however, we xvould expect to see Soviet simula-
tion of such a mission in Earth orbit for about 12
months, verifying that both people and equipment
could sustain such long flights.
-15. Space Weapons. There is a moderate-to-High
likelihood that the des eloprent of low-orbit space-
based lasers, coupled with a heave-lift lauuclt capabili-
ty, will result in testing of laser ASAP weapons in
geosynchronous orbit by the late I990s. altloii hi sve
ascribe a low probability to operational deploy rnent by
the year 2000. An alternative view holds that. while
deployment of a geosynchronous space-based loser
would probably take place after deployment of a low-
altitude system, there is a moderate chance of deploy
rnent of a geosynchronous spaced-teased laser by the
mid-1990s.5 Although space-based lasers will probably
he restricted to the AS.-\]' mission for the remainder of
this century. technological breakthroughs conceivably
could lead to capabilities to destroy ballistic missiles,
aircraft, cruise missiles, and ground targets from space
in the late 1990s or beyond. Among the wide range of
possible weapon systems. we believe the following
space-based possibilities deserve continued ('lose atten-
tion by the Intelligence (:ommm1lity:
Laser 13M1) satellite.
Space-based iammcrv
Space-based R F ASA'I' weapon
The holders of thi.v lieu' (m ' the I)irc'etoi' Defct,n 1uielligrnrc'
Agency, and the? Assistant ('hied of Staff. Inh'lIzgrnrr. Drpartment
of flit, Air ForccF---1
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- High-altitude conventional orbital interceptor.
- Space-to-space missiles.
- Space mines.
- Particle beam ASAT weapon.
Satellite for delivering ground-impact weapon
Gaps and Uncertainties
16. There are several aspects of the Soviet space program
Our perception of the Soviet space threat would increase
significantly if breakthroughs occurred in:
- Space-related weapons.
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