WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 1, 2011
Sequence Number: 
10
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 2, 1986
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1.pdf152.43 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01 CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 SE ET Th irector of central intelligence Wuhin`ton. D.C. 20505 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence NIC 05421-86 2 December 1986 VIA: Nat FROM: z onal Intelligence Officer for Warning Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA JuDutu is Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia The November NESA Warning Meeting addressed two topics: the possibility of hostilities between the two Yemens, and internal dynamics in Iran. 1. YAR-PDRY: Imminent Hostilities? Tensions have risen noticeably between Nort and out emen in t e past month or so, culminating in the North Yemeni shootdown of at least one PDRY aircraft. in part North Yemeni President Salih's frustration withTPDRYeinflexibilityt over reconciliation and the exile issue. -- North Yemen is the uncomfortable host to several thousand South Yemeni exiles who fled the country after last year's coup. Many of the exiles are supporters of ousted PDRY President Ali Nasir and form an armed exile insurgent force that is growing restless in North Yemen. Salih wants the new government in South Yemen to promise safe repatriation of the exiles and give former government officials some role in the new government. The tension in North Yemen is heightened by growing economic problems, and complaints in the military, particularly over North Yemeni casualties in the Iran-Iraq war. The risk of a border clash is high. The regime in Aden is very nervous about what Salih is up to in his "games" with the US, the USSR, and the exiles. -- Salih is clearly trying to play superpower competition to his advantage, using increased US i l to Moscow. There is little chancenin utheenearcterm thattthefUSocanfrom replace the substantial assistance provided by Moscow. Moreover Salih perceives a Saudi veto over US, but not Soviet, actions ins I t 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 North Yemen and is, therefore, unlikely to jeopardize his Soviet tie. Tensions between North and South Yemen, however, have certainly complicated Moscow's relationships with the two countries. -- South Yemen would probably respond to provocation from the exiles or the YAR itself by sponsoring an increase in National Democratic Front (NDF) activities in North Yemen. North Yemen seems most concerned in the near term about a SCUD missile attack from the south. -- Some Community analysts believe that possible instability in North Yemen is potentially as dangerous over the near term as YAR-PDRY border problems. 2. Iran: Internal Dynamics. The current bout of factional infighting in Iran revolves around two issues: managment of the war and the arrests of relatives of Ayatollah Montazeri--Khomeini's designated successor. On the war, Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani is arguing for launching the "final offensive" and President Khamenei--Rafsanjani's chief rival--is leading the argument for shifting resources to the economy. Advocates of the offensive have Khomeini's support, but a variety of problems have hindered lauching the offensive. Rafsanjani plays a key role in directing the conflict and he could suffer a setback if the offensive is not launched or is launched and fails. The circumstances surrounding the arrests of Montazeri's relatives are especially murky. DDI/NESA offers three possible interpretations: -- Rafsanjani pushed for the arrests in order to discredit the increasingly independent Montazeri. -- Montazeri pushed opposition to Rafsanjani beyond acceptable limits. -- Mehdi-Hashemi, the arrested son-in-law of Montazeri, had simply become a rogue operator whose activities--the abduction of a Syrian diplomat, the attempted smuggling of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and perhaps the leak of the McFarlane trip to Iran to a Beirut magazine--were widely deemed as harmful to the clerical regime. This interpretation is favored by NESA and downplays a Rafsanjani-Montazeri split and political setback to the Montazeri crowd. Some tentative conclusiQns can be drawn from the Mehdi-Hashemi episode: 2 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 SECRET -- The arrests indicate that Khomeini was incapable, almost certainly due to a real decline in his health, to play the supervisory role he has played in past disputes. Previously, he has intervened to settle such disputes before they reached the stage of open factional conflict. -- While the Community still believes there probably will be a relatively smooth transition after Khomeini's death, serious factional differences will exist and there is a real danger that the power struggle could degenerate to open fighting. -- Montazeri was originally considered a compromise candidate for the succession because he was the least offensive to all the parties and would presumably be a figurehead leader with others wielding the power. He has, however, since his selection grown to fill the role and become more decisive and independent, causing considerable friction. Nonetheless, his removal would be very destabilizing and increase the risk of a contentious power struggle. For the general public, economic hardships and war weariness are creating severe discontent and disaffection. While there have as yet been few open manifestations such as demonstrations and riots, the Community believes these problems should be watched with particular concern. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 ...................... . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1 SECRET I 25X1 The following components attended the NIO/NESA November Warning Meeting: External Air Force/AIAIT NSA/G6 NSA/G64 NSA/G642 NSA/G6095 NSA/G9313 DIA/DE-4 DIA/OA-6 OSD/ISA NWS INR/NESA Internal NPIC/IEG/NESAD/PGB OIA/TWFD/NEB SOVA/TWAD LDA/PPD NESA/PG NESA/PG/P OIR/DB FBIS/DRD CRES FBIS/NEAD/SAP FBIS/NEAD/SA SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1