WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SE ET
Th irector of central intelligence
Wuhin`ton. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 05421-86
2 December 1986
VIA: Nat
FROM:
z
onal Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
JuDutu is Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
The November NESA Warning Meeting addressed two topics: the possibility
of hostilities between the two Yemens, and internal dynamics in Iran.
1. YAR-PDRY: Imminent Hostilities? Tensions have risen noticeably
between Nort and out emen in t e past month or so, culminating in the
North Yemeni shootdown of at least one PDRY aircraft.
in part North Yemeni President Salih's frustration withTPDRYeinflexibilityt
over reconciliation and the exile issue.
-- North Yemen is the uncomfortable host to several thousand South
Yemeni exiles who fled the country after last year's coup. Many of
the exiles are supporters of ousted PDRY President Ali Nasir and
form an armed exile insurgent force that is growing restless in
North Yemen. Salih wants the new government in South Yemen to
promise safe repatriation of the exiles and give former government
officials some role in the new government.
The tension in North Yemen is heightened by growing economic problems,
and complaints in the military, particularly over North Yemeni casualties in
the Iran-Iraq war.
The risk of a border clash is high. The regime in Aden is very nervous
about what Salih is up to in his "games" with the US, the USSR, and the
exiles.
-- Salih is clearly trying to play superpower competition to his
advantage, using increased US i
l to
Moscow. There is little chancenin
utheenearcterm thattthefUSocanfrom
replace the substantial assistance provided by Moscow. Moreover
Salih perceives a Saudi veto over US, but not Soviet, actions ins
I
t
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North Yemen and is, therefore, unlikely to jeopardize his Soviet
tie. Tensions between North and South Yemen, however, have
certainly complicated Moscow's relationships with the two countries.
-- South Yemen would probably respond to provocation from the exiles or
the YAR itself by sponsoring an increase in National Democratic
Front (NDF) activities in North Yemen. North Yemen seems most
concerned in the near term about a SCUD missile attack from the
south.
-- Some Community analysts believe that possible instability in North
Yemen is potentially as dangerous over the near term as YAR-PDRY
border problems.
2. Iran: Internal Dynamics. The current bout of factional infighting
in Iran revolves around two issues: managment of the war and the arrests of
relatives of Ayatollah Montazeri--Khomeini's designated successor. On the
war, Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani is arguing for launching the "final
offensive" and President Khamenei--Rafsanjani's chief rival--is leading the
argument for shifting resources to the economy. Advocates of the offensive
have Khomeini's support, but a variety of problems have hindered lauching
the offensive. Rafsanjani plays a key role in directing the conflict and he
could suffer a setback if the offensive is not launched or is launched and
fails. The circumstances surrounding the arrests of Montazeri's relatives
are especially murky. DDI/NESA offers three possible interpretations:
-- Rafsanjani pushed for the arrests in order to discredit the
increasingly independent Montazeri.
-- Montazeri pushed opposition to Rafsanjani beyond acceptable limits.
-- Mehdi-Hashemi, the arrested son-in-law of Montazeri, had simply
become a rogue operator whose activities--the abduction of a Syrian
diplomat, the attempted smuggling of explosives into Saudi Arabia,
and perhaps the leak of the McFarlane trip to Iran to a Beirut
magazine--were widely deemed as harmful to the clerical regime.
This interpretation is favored by NESA and downplays a
Rafsanjani-Montazeri split and political setback to the Montazeri
crowd.
Some tentative conclusiQns can be drawn from the Mehdi-Hashemi episode:
2
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-- The arrests indicate that Khomeini was incapable, almost certainly
due to a real decline in his health, to play the supervisory role he
has played in past disputes. Previously, he has intervened to
settle such disputes before they reached the stage of open factional
conflict.
-- While the Community still believes there probably will be a
relatively smooth transition after Khomeini's death, serious
factional differences will exist and there is a real danger that the
power struggle could degenerate to open fighting.
-- Montazeri was originally considered a compromise candidate for the
succession because he was the least offensive to all the parties and
would presumably be a figurehead leader with others wielding the
power. He has, however, since his selection grown to fill the role
and become more decisive and independent, causing considerable
friction. Nonetheless, his removal would be very destabilizing and
increase the risk of a contentious power struggle.
For the general public, economic hardships and war weariness are
creating severe discontent and disaffection. While there have as yet been
few open manifestations such as demonstrations and riots, the Community
believes these problems should be watched with particular concern.
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The following components attended the NIO/NESA November Warning Meeting:
External
Air Force/AIAIT
NSA/G6
NSA/G64
NSA/G642
NSA/G6095
NSA/G9313
DIA/DE-4
DIA/OA-6
OSD/ISA
NWS
INR/NESA
Internal
NPIC/IEG/NESAD/PGB
OIA/TWFD/NEB
SOVA/TWAD
LDA/PPD
NESA/PG
NESA/PG/P
OIR/DB
FBIS/DRD
CRES
FBIS/NEAD/SAP
FBIS/NEAD/SA
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