FORECASTING AND WARNING MEETING REPORT, 19 JANUARY

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CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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39
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December 23, 2016
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January 22, 2013
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12
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Publication Date: 
January 20, 1984
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MEMO
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-.1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE NeflMai lnf .tone Counc l enr". NIC 00484-84 20 January 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director DDiref ctortofl Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning Assistant National Intelligence urricer- rvr nL-N% SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 January 1. Tunisia: Prospects for Further Unrest. The community representatives agree that e government probably has sufficient time to meet the kinds of economic grievances that sparked the recent riots. There was general agreement, however, that the government -- hampered by poor leadership and leery of imposing austerity measures on the middle class -- may not move quickly enough in the near term and that we may see further unrest in Tunisia, perhaps as early as the spring. Two key determinants in the government's ability to deal with future unrest are the army's attitudes and the status of President Bourguiba. The army performed well in an internal security role and army morale is high. We are not, however, sure the army would enjoy prolonged police-type duties. Moreover, it is likely that senior officers will begin to demand a larger political say if they are called on to continue a major internal security role. Bourguiba played a key role in defusing the recent unrest. If he dies or is incapacitated when unrest breaks out again, we believe his absence would hinder efforts to bring it under control. 2. Iran-Ira : Developments. There are a number of new developments a. Reports of SS-12 Scaleboard in Ira : We are inclined to Analysts felt that the Soviets were orts t these re . p W unlikely to provide them to Iraq for fear of alienating Syria 25X1 since our as warning meeting: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 ST QET j;25X1 and possibly harming Soviet arms relationship with Iran. Moreover, none of these have been previously reported outside of the Warsaw Pact. b. Iranian Suicide Attacks on US Naval Targets: The community et atte for such direct attacks were not sufficiently substantiated to be' 25X1 Analysts saw little reason for Iran to want to dibl cre e. directly attack the US now -- although all agreed that attacks through surrogates will continue -- or to take action that _ would certainly lead to the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Analysts felt that the Iranians are more likely to continue with incremental responses and some analysts felt that the reports might indicate Iranian preparations for responding to a. US attack on Iran, which Tehran sees as increasingly likely. c. Iranian Exocets: Analysts agreed this report must be taken seriously. Ine search for likely sellers to Iran is now centered on Peru and Pakistan, although most analysts felt that Peru was the most likely donor. There are some indications that the whole episode may be an elaborately arranged "sting" designed to swindle Tehran. AUB President Kerr's in Terrorism d T . ren s banon: New 3. Le assassination confirms the trend towards individual terrorist attacks on nationals and diplomats from MNF contributing countries. MNF precautions against suicide car bomb attacks may well have convinced the terrorist groups -- and we believe that radical Shia backed by Iran are responsible for the attacks -- to switch targets. Terrorists will now focus on small, be targets. and hit individual targets, useM~asoldiers willsilencer-equipped and run type attacks. One analysts suggested that the contrast between the kidnapping last year of AUB President Dodge -- who was"subsequently released -- and the assassination of Kerr might indicate growing differences between the radical Shia and Syria. Some evidence suggests the radical Shia who kidnapped Dodge had wanted to try and execute him but were apparently prevented from doing so by Syria, which arranged his release. The radicals, fearing Syria might do the same thing again, decided to kill Kerr directly. Analysts agreed that there might be differences between Syria we did not have enough convincing evidence to say tthat and the radicals b s u su with certainty 2 SECRET ?, ,; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 '7"% Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, 0. C 20305 NIC 02057-84 30 March 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: Graham E. Fuller National Intelligence Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 22 March 1984 1. Iran-Iraq: Update. We still anticipate a large-scale Iranian offensive--probably centered in the Basra region--in the near term. Some analysts raised the possibility that the reason we have not yet seen a large scale Iranian offensive is that Tehran has shifted to a strategy based on attrition on a grand scale. Most analysts, however, continue to believe that the Iranian offensive is still likely and that delays can be attributed to logistical problems. DIA offered some comments on the state of morale among Iranian forces, noting that there is very little reliable reporting from either side on this crucial factor. Based on our limited reports, however, we believe that there are clearly some problems among Iranian troops. -- There is an increasing tendency of the irregular Bash and Revolutionary Guard forces to surrender. There have been some reports of Revolutionary Guard commanders being relieved. -- Tensions between the army and the Revolutionary Guard remain high, and there have been reports about charges of misappropriation of army supplies by the Revolutionary Guards and vice versa. Warning Notes Although most analysts continue to believe that the Iraqis can contain the Iranian offensive, there is concern that not enough attention is being paid to the consequences of an Iranian success and a resulting SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 ------- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 Iraqi collapse. Such a development could have a major impact on US policy in the region and could spark an Iranian effort to move against the Gulf states and possibly Saudi Arabia. 2. PLO-Jordan-Israel: Increased Terrorism. The Israelis believe both pro- and anti-Arafat PLO factions are trying to reestablish infiltration infrastructure in Jordan and may be responsible for recent large-scale terrorist attacks in Israel such as bus bombings in Ashdod and Jerusalem. Israeli concern is growing--some Israeli officials believe that Arafat's need to adopt a more militant posture to firm up his position in the PLO could cause him to increase greatly efforts to infiltrate into the West Bank and Israel proper. However, we believe that the Israelis still see Jordan as doing all it can to stem these infiltration attempts and that Israeli retaliation against Jordan is not likely so long as Tel Aviv holds to this view. Most analysts believe that if the Israelis decide to retaliate for terrorist attacks they will continue to strike at PLO targets in Lebanon. They will retaliate against Jordan only if they become convinced that the Jordanian government is actively abetting PLO infiltration--something we now think highly unlikely. Warning Items Reports of PLO infiltration from Jordan through the Sinai to Gaza are certain to eventually reach the Israelis and could cause major irritants in Israeli-Egyptian relations. The Israelis have in the past complained about Egyptian laxity in stemming infiltration into Gaza and could raise this issue again. While most analysts do not believe that Israeli retaliation against Jordan is likely in the near term, some analysts believe there is possibility of such a move particularly if a terrorist attack inside Israel resulted in high casualties during the period leading up to the Israeli elections. 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 3. India: Growing Unrest in Pun -Jab. The two-year-old regional disturbances in Punjab have escalated to an unprecedented level of violence in the past two months, despite the imposition of direct rule from New Delhi last October. Hindu-Sikh conflict as well as anti-government activities by the dissident Sikhs have resulted in over a hundred deaths in five weeks. Other developments have included attempted assassinations of political leaders in Punjab and neighboring Haryana, the growing alienation of moderate Sikhs as a result of New Delhi 's crackdown, and warnings by Sikh leaders that they will fight to the death any effort by paramilitary troops to enter Sikh temples and curtail their use as terrorist sanctuaries. New Delhi has responded by banning a key Sikh students' organization, accusing the leader of the Sikh Akali Dal Party of sedition, and further increasing the number of paramilitary units in Punjab-- indicating its unwillingness to countenance continuing violence. Warning Items We would be particularly concerned by: Further spread of violence beyond the borders of Punjab State. Deployment by New Delhi of the Army to curb the unrest--a last resort for Gandhi 's government because the Army objects to involvement in internal problems and because Sikhs comprise about 12% of the Army. Use of the Army would signal New Delhi's failure to handle Punjab by more conventional means, an admission detrimental to the government in an election year. Evidence of governmental weakness could encourage other dissidents elsewhere to step up activities. Mobilization of Army troops could also raise tensions with Pakistan by causing Islamabad to believe New Delhi is mounting an attack from the border state of Punjab. Graham E. Fuller 3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 NIC 02057-84 30 March 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:3cn 30 Mar. 84 Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC 2 - NI0/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1-SRP 1 - NIC/AG - C/OCR/NEA - OGI/IIC/TI - OGI/IIC/TG - NESA/AI/D - NESA/PG/D - NESA/SO/D - DDI/CRES - CPAS/ILS - SIGINT, Chairman, 1 - G/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG 2 - ICS/OHC/DIR 1 - DDI Rep, OLL 1- SECRET 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1 - Bill Eckert. a of VP 1 - DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1 22 March 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 - DIA/DB-2 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 ONI Estimates Br. 1 AF/INER 1 - AF/INES 1 - HQ USMC CODE INTP 1 - MSC/ME 1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC W, ,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 :RET/ NIC 00484-84 20 January 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central-Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 January 1984 NIC/A/XIO/NESA: Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1-ER 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NICs 2 - NIO/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1 - SRP 1 - NIC A 1 1 1 - C/OCR/NEA. 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 1 - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - NESA/AI/D 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - NESA/SO/D 1 - DDI/CRES 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT, Chairman, 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- T 1 - DDI Rep. OLL 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG 2? - ICS/OHC/DIR 1 20 Jan. 84 1 - State/INR/RNA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 DIA/DB-2 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 - ONI Estimates Br. 1 - AF/INER 1 - AF/INES 1 - HQ USMC CODE INTP 1 - NSC/ME 1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1- of VP 1 - IA ATTN: DC4A SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 I 25X1 _1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET) The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 National Intelligence Council NIC 02496-84 24 April 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence _ Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: Graham E. Fuller National Intelligence Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 April 1984 1. Sri Lanka. CIA provided a brief overview of the current situation on the island and gave an estimate of how we see Indian policy towards Sri Lanka unfolding. DIA gave an overview of likely military warning indicators on impending Indian military action and the DIA analyst offered his views on the outcome of an Indian-Sri Lankan clash. Analysts believe that there is little likelihood of an immediate Indian military move, despite recent amphibious exercises and some thinly veiled threats contained in Mrs. Ghandi's letters to President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher. Instead, we believe India will employ a combination of diplomatic pressure, sabre-rattling and semi-public support for Tamil dissidents in Indian training camps in an effort to get President Jayewardene to concede some form of autonomy for Sri Lankan Tamils. Some analysts felt that this combination of Indian pressures might well prove counterproductive--particularly the training of Tamil dissidents--leading Jayewardene to toughen his stand instead of compromising, thus raising the possibility that India would have to move militarily. INR noted that India has for some time felt that the US is following a policy of regional encirclement vis-a-vis India--that the Indians in particular see the Presidential visit to China and closer ties to Pakistan in this light--and might try to break out of this perceived encirclement by moving against Sri Lanka. In any event, efforts by the US to demonstrate support for Sri Lanka--particularly ship visits--would SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRETI almost certainly raise Indian fears and could contribute to an Indian decison to move against Sri Lanka. Warning Indicators DIA presented their view of how the Indians might approach an invasion--which would probably be aimed at protecting Tamil areas in north Sri Lanka and Indian interests around Colombo--and what we might expect to see as preliminary signs. The DIA analyst felt that the Indian military would "worst-case" the invasion and would seek to have overwhelming force available. Preparations to assemble such a force might well take 2-3 weeks and thus the number of indicators available to -us should be large. These indicators might include: military take over of railway, large-scale amphibious preparations and large military movements. A DIA analyst also offered his view that even a limited Indian invasion of Sri Lanka might not be the walk-over that is universally foreseen. We would certainly expect India to win, but the cost of the victory and the subsequent occupation might well be larger than the Indians expect. Analysts also noted that we can expect an appeal from Sri Lanka for US aid in the event of an Indian move and that policymakers ought to be planning now what the US response will be. 2. S ria--Succession Struggle. CIA gave a presentation on the current status of e succession struggle and some possible consequences. There was general agreement that whatever the outcome we cannot expect to see fundamental changes in Syrian policy. Specifically, we would not expect any successor regime to cut ties with the Soviets, abandon Syrian interests in Lebanon or enter the peace process under conditions other than those stated by Assad. Moreover, a successor regime might well prove to be more erratic and less adroit than Assad and could well undertake regional adventures. Analysts agreed that there were several ways in which the current stalemate could be broken: -- an accidental clash between Rifaat's supporters and their army opponents. -- a decision by one side to preempt and launch a surprise attack on the other side. -- assassination attempts by one side against the leadership of the other. Rifaat is the most likely target of such moves. The group also agreed that in the short term Rifaat's forces probably have the upper hand--his forces are better positioned near and SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET in Damascus, for example--but that a prolonged struggle would probably favor his opponents in the army who could bring greater force to bear over the long run. Warning Indicators CIA and DIA analysts cautioned that the beginnings of the power struggle are likely to take place at levels where we have little information. Analysts agreed that the Baath Party conference scheduled for later this summer might well prove to be a significant event and could serve to galvanize the struggle. 3. Iran--Iraq: Iranian Offensive and Leadership Problems, o e is vn 2`25X1 25X1 25X1 is now more or less permanently on hold and that we can expect little in the way of major military moves by Iran until at least later this year. In the meantime, we can probably expect Iran to continue to follow more or less a strategy of attrition. DIA stressed that this analysis was still tentative and that we needed to know more about the disposition of some Iranian forces before we can conclusively state that the offensive has been delayed. Most analysts agreed, however, that there is mounting evidence that the major Iranian offensive may not take place. INR spoke to Iranian leadership attitudes on the war, noting that there is some evidence of discontent among the senior clerics with the "military option" and that this may well be a factor in Tehran's failure to launch its offensive. INR noted, for example, that the usually hawkish Rafsanjani has been relatively quiet thus far and also cited several diplomatic reports from Tehran reporting dissension within the upper levels of the government. However, INR and others stressed that Khomeini still speaks of the "final offensive" against Iraq and we have no evidence to suggest that he has dropped his desire for the offensive. The option of turning the war over to the Majlis for a final decision on how to proceed was also discussed. Analysts agreed that this was increasingly likely but that Khomeini and the senior clerics still 3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET had to lay out the options for the Mauls to follow in resolving the war--as they did in turning the hostage case over to the parliament--and could not simply pass the problem to the Maulis. Graham E. Fuller Warning Indicators All analysts agreed that whatever the evidence that Iran has abandoned plans for a major offensive, the Iranian forces in the central and southern sectors have not been reduced and in fact may have been reinforced. The possibility that an Iranian offensive could be launched with little or no notice thus must still be considered. In any event, even if the Iranian offensive is postponed, we must remain alert to the -continuing possibility of Iraqi actions designed to raise tensions in the Gulf through attacks on shipping or Iranian oil exporting facilities. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 NIC 02496-84 24 April 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 April NICTNIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 24 Apr. 84 Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC NIO/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1 - SRP 1 - C/OCR/NEA 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 1 - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - NESA/AI/D 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - NESA/SO/D 1 - DDI/CRES 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT_ Chairman CTDtIS 1 1 1 - OSWR/PPC 1 - SOVA CSO C 1 - NPIC/PEG 2 - ICS/OHC/DIR 1 - DDI Reo, OLL 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 - DIA/DB-2 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 - ONI Estimates Br. 1 - AF/INER 1 - AF/INES 1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP 1 - NSC/ME 1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1 - Bill Eckert- Office of VP 1 IA ATTN: DC4A 25X1 M. ,~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 The Director of central intenigem Washi.gto., D.C. 20303 National Intelligence Council NIC 03664-84 25 June 1984 - MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 21 June 1984 1. India-Pakistan. CIA commented on the unrest in the Punjab, noting that the army can probably contain the violence there and that we expect the government to speed up efforts to reduce the percentage of Sikhs in the armed forces. We do expect Sikh terrorism to continue, however, and community analysts anticipate an outbreak of terrorist acts aimed at Indian targets by Sikhs abroad. A more disturbing question--addressed by CIA and DIA--is the Indian military movements associated with efforts to put down the unrest in Punjab. While a number of the military moves are in line with what we would expect given armed forces concern over the unrest, there are some elements which appear to go beyond what would be required for stifling domestic disturbances. Particularly noteworthy is activity in the Indian Air Force which does not seem to be directly related to the Punjab, but could be indicative of planning for an Indian preemptive strike against the Pakistani nuclear program. There is concern that the Indians may be using the unrest in Punjab to mask broader military moves in preparation for a strike against the Pakistani program. Analysts were quick to note, however, that there are other signs--particularly the impending visit of the Indian army COS to the US--that would argue against any imminent strike. Overall, the community sense is that the probability of a preemptive Indian strike or of any broader eruption of Pakistani-Indian hostilities remains low. , 25X1 2 A11 25X1 A X1 1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 LOA I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 I- L_ _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET failure will depend on Iraq's tactics, but we believe the Iranians will seek to undermine Saddam Husayn through terrorism and subversion rather than seek a negotiated end of the war. 3 SECRET 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 NIC 03662-84 25 June 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central I Deputy Director of Ce SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warni ntelligence ntral Intelligence ng Meeting Report, 21 June 1984 25X1 NIC/A/NIO/NESA 25 June 1984 25X1 Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DDCI 1 - DIO/NE 1 - ER 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - ADDI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 - SA/IA 1 - DIA/DB-2 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - C/NIC 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - VC/NIC 1 - DIA/JSI-56 -2 NIO/NESA 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 5 - NIO/W 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - Each NIO 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - Each Office Director 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - SRP 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 - NIC/AG 1 - ONI Estimates Br 1 - . 1 - AF/INER 1 - 1 - AF/INES 1 - C/OCR/NEA 1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 1 - NSC/ME 1 - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC 1 - NESA/AI/D 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - Bill Eckert, Office of VP 1 - NESA/SO/D 25X1 1 - DDI/CRES 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT. Chairman- SIRVES 2 - ICS/OHC/DIR 1 - DDI. Rep. 0 1- 1 - OSWR/PPC 1 - SOVA/CSD/C 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET The Director of NIC 04183-84 20 July 1984 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence -VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: Graham E. Fuller National Intelligence Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 July 1984 1. Iran-Iraq. Although Iran continues to maintain a state of preparedness for another assault against Iraq, there are continuing indications of delay based on political decisions from Tehran. Iran's military preparations include a readiness to cross the Shatt Al-Arab. Given the nature of Iraqi defenses, however, and the extensive flooding in the area, any Iranian attack would be likely to incur very high casualties. Discussions in Tehran probably hinge more on how and when to launch an attack rather than whether an attack should be made. The air war in the Gulf continues with Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping and Iranian measured responses. Despite numerous reports of forthcoming diplomatic activity to end the war, no significant steps have been taken and we doubt that mediation will bring results. Iran may wish to use mediation offers as a means to entice the Gulf states into pressuring Iraq to stop the air war. Iran has at least three options: -- Maintain the war in a twilight zone of no peace, no war. -- Seek a negotiated settlement in which the fall of Saddam Husayn would be the key goal. 1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET -- Launch an attack against Iraq and escalate the conflict in the Gulf. Iran has been sobered by numerous recent events such as the Saudi shootdown of an Iranian plane, the lack of success in Iran's land war, Iran's failure to generate meaningful terrorism inside Iraq, and Iraq's near conclusion of a new pipeline agreement. It is important to remember that Iran has many long-range goals in its struggle for dominance in the Gulf that will continue to exist even should the war wind down. The Community recognized that the situation is quite fluid at the moment and we have little clear indication of Iran's probable course of action. 2. Tunisia. The bread riots in Tunisia in January vented a considerable amount of public dissatisfaction but the underlying causes of dissatisfaction remain. Unemployment is high, worker remittances from abroad are diminishing, tourism is dropping, the budget is distributing largesse unequally through the country, and corruption remains high. Bourguiba's ruling party, once the symbol of nationalism and independence, is now a symbol of corruption, cronyism, and stagnation. The rifts between the haves and the have-nots is growing. Bourguiba himself, so long part of the solution of Tunisia's problems, is now more the source of such problems. He is increasingly senile, out of touch with the present situation and is blocking efforts at major reform. He is still in charge for better or for worse and because of his stature, is unlikely to be removed. There is no one of sufficient standing in Tunisia to fill his shoes. The government is devoting more time to finding scapegoats for Tunisia's problems than to finding solutions. A recent pact between the labor unions and the government may help to contain labor strikes in the near term. The situation still remains potentially explosive, and student demonstrations this fall--especially if badly handled by security forces--could unleash further major unrest. At the moment there is no specific immediate issue which could serve to spark trouble in the months ahead. The major actor in any disorders would be Islamic fundamentalists. Libya's influence on domestic politics is decidedly limited. The military--once a reliable instrument in quelling disorder--cannot be counted on to serve the regime in this capacity indefinitely. 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET 3. PLO. The recent Aden agreement signed between the PFLP, DFLP, and Arafat marks a significant step in tightening the PLO's hold on Arafat's activities. The emphasis is now on collective leadership, lack of communication with Egypt, and discouragement of peace talks with -Jordan. Despite these strictures, Arafat is still likely to exercise some personal independence of action. He has survived recent struggles and still maintains leadership. All indications are that Arafat still wishes to avoid a major split in the PLO at all costs. Arafat's differences with Syria are harder to bridge. President Assail has recently met with senior Arafat lieutenants but will not be willing to meet Arafat until they are certain he will restrict his activities in accord with recent agreements. Syria likewise has had limited success in winning acceptance of the Syrian controlled rebels among Arab states. In any case the prospects for Arafat providing King Hussein with any meaningful mandate for negotiation with Israel is extremely unlikely. The PLO continues to infiltrate into Beirut. Current figures suggest some 2,000 Palestinian fighters in the Beirut area. This time, however, there is far greater suspicion and concern for PLO activities among most Lebanese factions than ever before. Syria likewise does not wish to see the PLO run uncontrolled. If the PLO refuses to enter negotiations with Israel, with or without Hussein, it will need some other viable policy. Since the military option is increasingly unrealistic, a return to terrorism is a distinct possibility. PLO politics are likely to remain loose, however, and each of the various factions will probably continue to pursue their own goals while avoiding a formal break in the organization. Graham E. Fuller 3 SECRET "I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET NIC 04183-84 24 July 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 July 1984 NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 24 July 84 Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC .2~ NIO/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1 - SRP 1 - NIC AG 1- 1- 1 -1 ;0/wRi11LR 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 1 - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - NESA/AI/D 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - NESA/SO/D 1 - DDI/CRES 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT, Chairman, SIRVES 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1 - OSWR/PPC 1 - SOVA/CSD/C 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG 1- 2 - ICS/OHC/DIR 1- 1 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 i 0.44 A" 00~ 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 - ONI Estimates Br. 1 - AF/INER 1 - AF/INES 1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP 1 - NSC/ME 1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1 - Bill Eckert Office of VP 1 - DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1 1- 1 ,OM / C' f f; ?Ei~J Ti -&4 A/ '""I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 l 1 ~. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET) The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 NIC #04865-84 27 August 1984 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 23 August 1984 1. India-Pakistan-Sri Lanka. DIA presented a discussion of developments in Indo-Pak relations designed to update the recently completed SNIE, Prospects for Hostilities. There are few if any new military indicators of impending hostilities. Indeed, we have noted some Indian troop withdrawals from the Punjab and we have seen no new activities in the Glacier. On the Pakistani side, there is also little sense of urgency: unit commanders have been advised to be extremely careful in the border area. Politically, Mrs. Ghandi has toned down her rhetoric--she also publically claimed to be unworried about the Pakistani nuclear program--and appears to be focusing on the Sri Lanka issue and her domestic difficulties for the near term. CIA noted that, while there are few military indicators of impending hostilities, there were clashes in northern Kashmir recently and that tensions remain high. DIA also provided an overview of tensions on the Pak-Afghan border. There have been an unusually high number of cross-border incidents--shelling and air strikes--in August and most community analysts believe this represents a more aggressive Soviet strategy. Some analysts believe there is a likelihood of a small-scale Soviet ground incursion into Pakistan in the near future. 1 SECRET 25X1 25X1 ,, ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 l .1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET/ There is, however, some disagreement over the intent of the more aggressive Soviet stance. Some analysts believe the cross-border operations are intended to send a strong message to Pakistan to end its support for the insurgency. Others are less inclined to see a direct political message and maintain that the raids represent a more aggressive military stance growing out of Soviet frustration over their inability to end the insurgency. Whatever the intent of the cross-border attacks, most analysts believe the Pakistani government sees them as conveying a direct threat from the Soviets and want the US to be more active in backing Pakistan. Warning Notes Analysts agreed that a key indicator of Soviet intentions would be a cross-border attack of any sort in an area in which there is no ongoing major military operation. To date, all the cross-border attacks have taken place in areas where large-scale anti-insurgent operations are in progress. Analysts also agreed that the cross-border raids could at some point cause Zia internal problems, particularly if casualties mount and if large numbers of Pakistanis are killed during such operations. Finally, analysts noted that Zia--given his firm belief that Soviet pressure is mounting--is likely to see the US reaction to his requests for support as a test of the strength of the US-Pakistani relationship. Sri Lanka We had a brief review of the situation led by analysts from DIA and CIA. Analysts agreed that the likelihood of Indian involvement is low, although there appears to be some pressure on Mrs. Ghandi from Tamil Nadu officials. Moreover, analysts agreed that despite the recent excesses by the army, prospects for a negotiated settlement between the government and the Tamils remain relatively good. The government's security forces and information control have improved greatly. Analysts agreed that the insurgents have been badly hurt by the recent government offensive and that there is a strong possibility that they could initiate terrorist attacks in the Sinhalese south. Analysts agreed that there is also a possibility that US facilities and personnel could be targeted by Tamil terrorists. 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 2. Libya. CIA led off with a brief discusson of Qadhafi's foreign and domestic policy since the May 8 barracks attack in Tripoli. Qadhaf1, disturbed at the apparent strength of his domestic opposition, has sought to improve ties with regional powers, alleviate some of domestic discontent by"backing off from some of his more onerous measures while at the same time continuing his covert attempts to undermine Arab moderates. Qadhafi's goals in this two-track policy appear to be: -- getting his regional relations in order so as to focus on the domestic dissent; and -- projecting a moderate image that he hopes will split off Western Europeans from the US. His recent talks with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti are part of this strategy. Nonetheless, Qadhafi's efforts to subvert Egypt and Sudan do not appear to have lessened. There is mounting evidence that Libya was responsible for the Red Sea mining and we expect subversion attempts against the Sudan to continue, although we have no reporting of actual planning at this time. Qadhafi's tactics show his usual concern for carrying out acts which give him plausible denial. Warning Note We expect Libyan operations against dissidents in Europe and elsewhere to intensify. There is some evidence that the recent Libyan attempt to smuggle arms in to Hajj pilgrims in Saudi Arabia was part of a plan to strike at Libyan dissidents in Saudi Arabia. Community analysts also noted that Qadhafi has for some time warned that he would take--unspecified--action if the Arabs did not pull together on anti-Israel and anti-US activities by 1 September. While we have no indication of any Libyan planning for this date, we believe the threat is real. 3. Iran-Iraq. In a brief overview of the Iran-Iraq military situation and the Iranian domestic scene, community analysts concluded that there is little to add to past warning reports and community analysis. There are no significant new military indicators, and we remain convinced that Iranian forces could launch an offensive at any time. Similarly, despite numerous signs of dissent among the Iranian leadership over how to prosecute the war, we see no sign that the Iranian leadership has abandoned its goal of overthrowing Saddam Husayn or that Tehran is prepared to explore seriously a negotiating option. 3 SECRET "M, -i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET Community analysts were informed that we plan to begin a SNIE on succession to Khomeini shortly. INR will draft. ,,, ,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 NIC 04865-84 24 August 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting REport, 23 August 1984 NIC/A/NIO/NESA 24 Aug. 84 Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC 2 - NIO/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1 - SRP 1 - NIC/AG 1- 1- 1 - C/OCR/NEA 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 1 - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - NESA/AI/D 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - NESA/SO/D 1 - DDI/CRES 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT, Chairman, SIRVES 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1 -'USWK/PPL 1 - SOVA/CSD/C 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG 1- 2 - ICS/OHC/DIR 1 - DDI Ren/OLL 1- 1- 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C 1 - OJCS MEAF Div. 1 - NSA/G-609 1 - ACSI DAMI FII 1 - ONI Estimates Br. 1 - AF/INER 1 - AF/INE1&i- 1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP 1 - NSC/ME 1 - Cmdr. P- hi-1--Dur, NSC 1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command 1 - Bill Eckert, Office of VP 1 DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1 1 - NWS, Room 1C925, Pentagon N, , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET The Director of Central Intelligence Wuhington, D.C. 20505 NIC 05473-84 24 September 1984 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: ss s an National Intelligence Officer for NESA SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 20 September 1984 1. Morocco-Libya: Impact of the Union. CIA opened the discussion by briefly describing the current state of the union and assessing Hassan's motives for engineering the deal. -- The implementation of various aspects of the union is proceeding smoothly; the first group of Libyan students will arrive in Morocco shortly. -- Hassan was probably motivated by a desire to end Libyan support for the Polisario, gain a political counterweight to Algeria, and hopes of achieving Libyan financial support. Analysts then discussed the Libyan agreement to withdraw from Chad. There was agreement that both the Chad and Moroccan agreements plus signs we have seen of efforts to improve relations with other Arab and African moderates represent a Libyan effort to drive a wedge between these moderates and the US. Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki's--a sophisticated and skilled diplomat--consolidation of control over Libyan foreign affairs may also be a factor. The Libyan decision to pursue better relations with neighbors may, in the view of some analysts, reflect Qadhafi's concern that his domestic situation is so serious that he needs to have good external relations in order to devote his complete attention to internal affairs. Other analysts disagreed, however, maintaining that Qadhafi is firmly in control and that his foreign policy moves are simply tactical adjustments in pursuit of longstanding goals. 1 SECRET 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET Analysts were uncertain as to whether the union will end up primarily having served Moroccan, or Libyan interests. Warning Notes -- Algeria is increasingly concerned by its regional isolation. ? At the same time Hassan is clearly buoyed by the merger and may feel that he has a free hand in the Western Sahara. This combination of Algerian concern and Moroccan aggressiveness could lead Hassan to overplay his hand and bring about a Moroccan-Algerian clash, particularly if Morocco decides to extend the Berm. -- Hassan has put his prestige on the line and has focused a good deal of attention on the alleged financial benefits the merger will bring to Morocco. If the Libyans fail to deliver, there could be a domestic backlash. 2. PLO: The PNC and After. The discussion of the PLO centered on the apparent decision to postpone the PNC and the fortunes of the various factions in the organization. Analysts agreed that even if the PNC were to be held at some time in the near future, there is little likelihood that any major policy moves or significant internal changes would result. However, Arafat clearly wanted to hold the PNC--he and other members of his mainstream faction had publicly committed themselves to holding the meeting. Arafat's apparent inability to arrange a venue is bound to be an embarrassment and serves as further indication of the erosion of his authority. Analysts agreed that there is little chance for Arafat to arrest this erosion despite the apparent disarray in the ranks of the dissidents. Warning Note There was general agreement that we are likely to see more drift and indecision in both the mainstream and dissident ranks and that there is not likely to be any major policy shift for the near term. Community analysts agreed that there is little chance of the mainstream or the dissidents resuming international terrorism, although the possibility of 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET 25X1 such attacks by fringe groups like Abu Nidal and 15 May remains high. Attacks on Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper will probably increase, however. 3. Iran-Iraq. DIA provided a brief overview of the military situation in the last month's review of this subject. a slight shift in Iraqi tactics with an increase in the scope and frequency of air attacks on tankers and other targets in the Gulf. This is - partially due to Baghdad's recent acquisition of new aircraft. Warning Note Analysts agreed that, given the Iraqi's traditional caution, there is not likely to be a major increase in such Iraqi attacks. Similarly, there are indications that the Iranian offensive in the Basra area remains on hold. Analysts agreed that the general stalemate of the last few months will continue for the near term. 3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/22 : CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9 SECRET NIC-05473-84 24 September 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 20 September 1984 NIC/A/NIO/NESA Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - SRP 1 - NIC A 1 - Exec. Dir. 1 - ADDI 1 - SA/IA 1 - C/IPC Staff 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC _2 -NIO/NESA 5 - NIO/W 1 - Each NIO 1 - Each Office Director 1 - C/OCR/NEA 1 - OGI/IIC/TI 2-Itob/OWDIR 1 - DDI Rep/OLL 1- - OGI/IIC/TG 1 - DDI/Registry 1 - CPAS/ILS 1 - SIGINT, Chairman, 1 - NESA/PG/D 1 - NESA/SO/D 1 - DDI/CRES - NESA/AI/D 1 - OSWR/PPC 1 - SOVA/CSD/C 1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD 1 - NPIC/PEG SIms 24 Sept. 84 1 - State/INR/NESA 1 - DIO/NE 1 - DIA/DB-3C 1 - DIA/JSI 1 - DIA/DE-4 1 - DIA/DB-2C2 1 - DIA/JSI-5A 1 - DIA/JSI-5B 1 - DIA/JSI-3B 1 - DIA/JSI-2C ell' Cy6e7b I- D.,9-/j) e--