THE PALESTINIANS AND THE FEDAYEEN AS FACTORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00T02041R000100220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1971
• Content Type: NIE

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The Palestinians and the Fedayeen as Factors.
In the Middle East Situation
(Supersedes PJIE 30-1-69)
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THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being
outside of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Ezcloded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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N I E 30-71
The Palestinians and the Fedayeen as Factors
In the Middle East Situation
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CONTENTS
Page
NOTE .............................................................. 1
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ...................................... ................. 3
I. THE PALESTINIANS ............................................ 3
A. Who They Are ................................................ 3
B. Where They Stand ............................................. 4
II. THE NEW FEDAYEEN .......................................... 5
A. Who They Are ................................................ 5
B. How Others View Them ........................................ 6
C. Their Performance Against Israel ................................ 7
D. The Fedayeen versus Jordan and Lebanon ....................... $
III. THE PALESTINIANS AND THE FEDAYEEN AS FACTORS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST .................................................. 9
A. As Factors Affecting Arab-Israeli Negotiations .................... 9
B. Factors Affecting Short-Term Tactics and Prospects ............... 10
C. The Contingency of an Upset in Jordan .......................... 10
D. Palestinians Over the Longer Term ............................. 11
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THE PALESTINIANS AND THE
FEDAYEEN AS FACTORS I N
THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
NOTE
This Estimate assesses the attitudes, composition, capabilities, and
likely roles in the Middle Eastern situation of both the fedayeen-the
Palestinian commandos-and the Palestinian community as a whole.
Most judgments made are necessarily short term.
CONCLUSIONS
A. In 1968 and 1969, the fedayeen won international renown and
wide popularity in the Arab world. Triumphs of publicity obscured,
but never remedied, their major weaknesses: poor military performance
against Israel and continuing dependence on Arab governments. These
defects will remain serious.
B. The fedayeen appear likely to play a much diminished role in
mid-eastern developments. The September 1970 civil war and sub-
sequent events in Jordan left them defeated and demoralized. Their
various organizations are rent by internal quarrels, and their relations
with Arab governments are deteriorating. A severe heating up of the
Arab-Israeli confrontation would create a psychological climate ui
the Arab world favorable to fedayeen militancy and bring some re-
surgence in the prestige of and support for the commandos-though
not necessarily any improvement in their fighting effectiveness. The
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present Jordanian regime will almost certainly be able to keep them
under control. However, the civil war has narrowed Hussein's power
base and increased the polarization between Palestinians and the East
Bank establishment.
C. The Palestinian people, though without leadership or agreed
goals, do have a sense of identity arising from common experiences
and misfortunes. No lasting mid-east settlement is possible unless it
addresses Palestinian interests, particularly the problem of the refugees.
One which did so, and which was endorsed and enforced by the Jor-
danian and Egyptian Governments, would probably receive the acqui-
escence of most Palestinian Arabs. The fedayeen probably could not
prevent the implementation of such a settlement.
D. With or without a settlement, the Palestinians are likely to
be a disturbing factor in the Middle East situation, and some form
of fedayeen movement is likely to continue. In periods of tension and
conflict, the fedayeen will win more support from individuals and
from governments and will be more active.
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DISCUSSION
I. THE PALESTINIANS
A. Who They Are
1. There has never been a separate inde-
pendent Palestinian nation. Palestine was a
part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of
World War I and then under British mandate
until 1948. Today its territory is occupied by
the state of Israel and the Israeli-held West
Bank of Jordan, and the Gaza strip. The Pales-
tinians are those Arabs who lived there prior
to the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, and their
descendants. There were nearly 1.3 million of
them in 1948; as a result of the 1948-1949 con-
flict over 600,000 fled their homes in that part
of Palestine which became Israel. One hundred
fifty thousand stayed behind, while the others
remained in those parts of Palestine which
stayed under Arab rule. Many of those who
fled wound up in Syria, Lebanon, and the East
Bank of Jordan. Others became residents of
refugee camps or found other housing in Gaza
and the West Bank. Following the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, over 100,000 non-refugee Palestin-
ians, along with some 200,000 "old refugees"
fled the West Bank and later Gaza for the
eastern part of Jordan. Since 1948 the number
of Palestinians has doubled; there are now
roughly the same number of Palestinian Arabs
as there are Israeli Jews.'
2. About 1.4 million Palestinians are regis-
tered as refugees with the United Nations Re-
lief and Works Agency (UNRWA ), but this
statistic must be used with caution.2 Of the
registered refugees, some 600,000 live in refu-
gee camps. Most of them are poor and em-
1 See Annex for data on the Palestinians and the
principal fedayeen organizations.
UNRWA was set up after the first Arab-Israeli
war. Its budget, which now runs about $40 million
a year, is met principally by the Western Powers,
chiefly the US. It runs refugee camps, sponsors
educational programs, and issues basic rations
( worth about seven cents a day) to some 840,000
persons. Nearly all Palestinians who fled their homes
registered with UNRWA, but this is no indication
of economic need. Many registered refugees are com-
paratively well off (as are some refugee camp
dwellers) but do not wish to jeopardize their legal
claims for possible compensation. In addition the
UNRWA rolls are inflated in size; many deaths of
Palestinians are unreported so that survivors may
continue to draw the rations of the deceased.
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bittered. Now, thanks to some 20 years of
concentrated UN efforts, many are relatively
well educated. Among the camp-dwelling refu-
gees are the most volatile elements amongst
the Palestinians. Palestinians-refugees and
non-refiigees alike-experience wide varia-
tions in social acceptance and economic status.
They are to be found principally in Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Kuwait, and Israel. (See
Annex. )
B. Where They Stand
3. Present day Palestinians remain a heter-
ogeneous lot, cut off from one another and
living in very different environments. Even so,
most share a sense of a common Palestinian
identity, due in large part to the experiences
of their struggles with the Zionists until 1948,
of the ensuing diaspora, and then of the 1967
war. They resent the injustices suffered at Is-
raeli hands, and are hostile in varying degrees
towards Israel and its backers. This sense of
common misfortune has been accentuated by
the ambivalent posture of other Arabs towards
the Palestinians. Although they have always
supported the Palestine cause in the abstract,
many Arabs have discriminated socially, eco-
nomically, and politically against Palestinians
in their countries. Among the Arab states, only
Jordan gave automatic citizenship to Palestin-
ians living there (about half the total Pales-
tinian population) .
4. Palestinians have never agreed among
themselves on specific goals. When stirred by
emotion, it was usual for Palestinian leaders
and their supporters in the Arab states to de-
mand an end to Israel. It is doubtful, however,
that the Palestinian community as a whole,
or even a majority of its members, find this
a realistic goal. Over the years since 1949,
some Palestinians have privately shown a
grudging willingness to accommodate to the
fact of Israel's existence. Others, who have
carved out a new life in Jordan, Syria, or Leba-
non have become reconciled to the loss of their
former homes. They recognize, in effect, that
Israel will outlast their own life span and
so they entertain only a residual interest in an
Irredentist Palestinian cause.
5. The numbers and strengths of militants
and non-militants, extremists and moderates
among the Palestinians still are not known, and
probably fluctuate a great deal. The young
revolutionary intellectuals hold the most ex-
treme views and the comparatively prosperous
Palestinians the mast moderate ones. Many
Palestinians appear to wish an end to vio-
lence, but they have no spokesmen and have
been generally unassertive. There are no area-
wide organizations or political parties which
enjoy the support of the majority of the Pales-
tinians. These circumstances make it relatively
easy for a few individuals or groups with polit-
ical, financial, and propaganda support from
. one or more Arab states to assert themselves
as Palestinian spokesmen without fear of chal-
lenge.
6. In the period from 1949 to 1967, the
leaders of the principal Arab governments
were the spokesmen for the Palestinian cause.
They helped keep the issue alive-but usually
for parochial reasons. The cause of the Pales-
tinians has long aroused strong emotions
throughout the Arab world; it was and re-
mains susceptible to demagogic exploitation.
Thus, many government leaders sought to use
the Palestinian issue to assert their own un-
compromising ideological purity on Palestine
while imputing softness to their opponents.
T'haugh quite a few Palestinians (particularly
those from leading families in the community
prior to 1948) held high posts in various Arab
governments, or prospered in business ventures,
no effective Palestinian political leadership
developed between 1949 and 1967. In 1964, an
Arab Summit Conference agreed to establish
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO )
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with an official status as the voice for the
Palestinians. But its leader, the demagogic, ex-
tremist Ahmed Shugairi, epitomized the PLO
then. He was notoriously self-seeking, subser-
vient to 1Vasser, and could not be considered
representative of Palestinian opinion.
7. Activities against Israel by Palestinian
guerrillas (fedayeen) go back to the early
1950s, but the level of their activities varied
widely in the pre-1967 era. The Egyptians
sponsored raids on Israel until the 1956 Israeli-
Egyptian war; the Syrians promoted guerrilla
raids, mostly through Jordan, in the 1960s. The
Jordanians for their part sought to suppress
all raids from their territory, but were unsuc-
cessful. The fedayeen never became a signifi-
cant force in their own right in this period.
Most were closely controlled by an Arab gov-
ernment-usually Egypt or Syria-which used
them for its own purposes. In general, most
pre-1967 fedayeen had little standing in the
Arab world and no claims to political leader-
ship of the Palestinian people.
A. Who They Are
8. The war of June 1967 drastically changed
the situation of the fedayeen. The defeat dis-
credited Arab chiefs of state as leaders of the
fight against Israel and as spokesmen for the
Palestinian cause. In the vacuum that ensued,
a new group of Palestinian militants emerged
claiming to represent the Palestinian people.
Asserting their independence of Arab gov-
ernments, they began mounting guerrilla
attacks against the Israelis in the occupied
territories and in Israel itself.
9. The fedayeen quickly acquired strong
emotional support throughout the Arab world;
they also began to get considerable material
and financial backing. They have since greatly
increased in number, fame, and influence.
They have taken over the PLO. From the
beginning, several different fedayeen groups
were in the field competing for honors and
support, and new organizations have continued
to appear. Recruits flocked to the fedayeen
organizations in 1968-1969. Many were highly
motivated and well educated in sharp con-
trast to most of the guerrillas of pre-1967 days.
By mid-1970, the fedayeen groups may have
had 10,000 or more commandos and a much
larger number of members, including support
personnel and hangers-on.
10. The fedayeen organzations break down
into roughly three types: (a) The instruments
of outside parties-usually of Arab states.
These include Saiga, founded and directed
by the Syrian Baath Party, the Iraqi-controlled
Arab Liberation Front, and Al Ansar, the in-
strument of established Arab Communist
parties. None has been particularly active
against the Israelis; Saiqa, the only organiza-
tion of this type of any size and consequence,
has concentrated on harassment of the gov-
ernments of Lebanon and Jordan. (b) Ideo-
logically-oriented groups such as the Popular
Front for the Liberation o f Palestine (PEEP )
and its various offshoots. Political extremists
and revolutionaries, they claim that the over-
throw of conservative Arab regimes such as
Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a prerequisite for
the liberation of Palestine. They are also in-
tensely hostile to the US and most Western
countries. While mounting some operations
into Israeli territory, these organizations have
concentrated on headline grabbing activities
such as attacks on airliners. (c) Fatah and
others like it, which claim to be without politi-
cal bias, to desire the friendship and coopera-
tion of all Arab governments, and to seek only
to fight a Palestinian nationalist struggle
against Israel. Fatah is larger than all the
other fedayeen groups combined.
11. Fatah, headed by Yasir Arafat, also con-
trols the PLO. Its leaders take care to stay on
good terms with most Arab governments.
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Arafat has claimed, for example, that he re-
spects the sovereign rights of Arab govern-
ments and that Fatah has no wish to take
control of Jordan. By virtue of his status as
head of the PLO, Arafat regularly attends
Arab chiefs of state meetings and summit con-
ferences, where he is accorded official status
as leader and spokesman of the Palestinian
people. Fatah is the best financed of the fe-
dayeen groups; it receives large sums from
well-to-do Palestinians throughout the world
and from the Arab states-conservative and
radical alike. The exact amount of funding
is unknown but has easily run into the tens of
millions of dollars since 1967; from a financial
point of view, Fatah has had fewer problems
than other groups. But Fatah is a relatively
loose, undisciplined confederation; its com-
ponent units throughout Jordan and Lebanon
often act without much concern for its central
leadership.
12. Fedayeen leaders now claim to be the
spokesmen for the people of Palestine. Nearly
all leaders of the commando groups, though
divided on many other issues, maintain that
no compromise with the Israelis can be ac-
ceptable. They reject the November 1967 UN
Resolution and the Rogers Plan. They state
that the present Zionist state must be de-
stroyed. Most publicly assert that they favor
establishing a new secular democratic Pales-
tinian Republic embracing Muslims, Chris-
tians, and Jews. That these goals are regarded
as realistic by a significant portion of the total
Palestinian community is unlikely.
B. How Others View Them
13. The fedayeen have won much publicity
in the Arab states and around the world. The
Palestinian cause has become far better known,
and in many cases more favorably regarded
than ever before. The fedayeen have also at-
tracted the praise, interest, and verbal sup-
port of various revolutionary-minded and radi-
cal groups in Western Europe and the US.
They have succeeded in making the New Left
in these countries generally anti-Zionist. Such
activities as airplane bombings and hijackings
and attacks on Israeli-owned offices in various
parts of the world, however, have made ma-
terial for sensational and generally unfavorable
press stories.
14. Contacts between the fedayeen and
Western governments have been few. Fe-
dayeen suspicions of the interests and motives
of these states-particularly those of the US-
have held them back. Western governments,
for their part, have been influenced both by
the fedayeen goal of eliminating Israel and
by their preference for maintaining govern-
ment-to-government relationships in the area.
They have also been uncertain as to whether
any fedayeen leader could realistically claim
t~ speak for the Palestinians.
15. But the fedayeen have actively sought
Soviet support. Moscow's attitude towards
them has, since 1967, changed from one of
great caution to a kind of circumspect interest,
reflecting growing awareness of the impor-
tance of the fedayeen. Soviet material and
political support has been limited, however.
They permitted Arafat to come to the USSR,
but kept him at arms length and accorded him
no official status. Arms have been provided
(most fedayeen weapons are of Soviet origin),
but apparently through established Arab gov-
ernments. Moscow has clearly been concerned
to avoid damage to its relations with Arab
states whose interests often clash with those
of the fedayeen. The Soviets refuse to support
the fedayeen objective of the elimination of
Israel as a Zionist state, undertake only occa-
sional consultations with the commando
leaders, and avoid according them anything
which might suggest recognition of an official
status. Moscow usually refrains from direct
attacks on the fedayeen. It openly espouses
policies contrary to theirs and occasionally
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condemns such fedayeen activity as airline
hijackings. In part, Russia's present posture
has probably been brought about by the
Soviets' concern over the strong open support
given the commandos by China. Peking has
indeed been extremely vigorous in its public
statements backing the fedayeen. However,
the Chinese have not become heavily involved;
their material assistance to the fedayeen
movement has amounted to training several
hundred commandos and providing some
arms.
16. Arab governments feel bound to sup-
port the movement in principle, but they are
sensitive to the potential the fedayeen have
to challenge their authority. Some are par-
ticularly concerned by the prospect of an
effective fedayeen veto of an Arab-Israeli
settlement. None feels it can openly oppose
the fedayeen movement as a whole and the
PLO is still accorded official status. Militant
Libya and Algeria, though far from Pales-
tine, are generous with funds and propaganda
support. Algeria has been a major arms sup-
plier. But they and others, including Egypt
and the Baathi regimes in Syria and Iraq, have
not hesitated to criticize or suppress specific
fedayeen activity of which they disapproved,
while continuing the politically necessary
praise of the movement in general. The con-
servative states are more wary of the com-
mandos but give them lip service and finan-
cial support, some of it through such devices
as government-collected deductions from the
salaries of Palestinians. Relations between the
fedayeen and the Governments of Jordan and
Lebanon are special cases and are discussed
below.
C. Their Performance Against Israel
17. One must be careful to distinguish the
fedayeen myth from the reality. Their leaders
have become world famous. Their image of
dedicated, self-sacrificing fighters avenging
past humiliations and liberating their home-
land has had enormous appeal to Arabs and
non-Arabs alike. This reputation was substan-
tially made in 1968 and 1969 when the feda-
yeen often seemed to be carrying on the Arab
struggle against Israel alone. They scored
some initial terrorist successes within Israeli-
held territory, and their prestige soared after
a widely publicized battle against an Israeli
raiding column at Karama, in Jordan, in March
1968. Propaganda accounts multiplied suc-
cesses many times and downplayed losses.
The resulting atmosphere helped to increase
demonstrations of anti-Israeli militancy by
Arab governments. Egypt's decision to begin
the "war of attrition" in March 1969 was in-
fluenced by the fedayeen's headline grabbing
and by their growing prestige.
18. Fedayeen actions against Israel have
touched Israeli sensitivities. But even at the
height of their activity, fedayeen achievements
were limited. The fedayeen have never, to
our knowledge, managed to carry out an op-
eration of military significance in Israel or
Israeli-occupied territory. Although their har-
assment has forced Israel to commit financial
and military resources, countermeasures along
the Jordanian cease-fire line including fences,
patrols, and air strikes, have steadily reduced
guerrilla capabilities to cross into Israeli-held
territory. By late 1969, the fedayeen were
reduced to such actions as firing rockets at a
handful of exposed Israeli settlements. Since
June 1967, nearly 2,000 guerrillas have been
killed on Israeli-held territory alone and some
2,500 more captured. In hirn, some 300 Israelis
have died at fedayeen hands since 1967.3
As the Jordanian cease-fire line tightened up,
the fedayeen began to shift attention to the
3 These are Israeli figures; Israel's statistics on its
own losses are generally accurate. Statistics on
fedayeen losses appear realistic.
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Lebanese-Israeli border, again with some ini-
tial success, speedily erpded by Israeli counter-
measures. .
D. The Fedayeen versus Jordan and
Lebanon
19. In 1970, the commandos' relations
with the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon
worsened. The fedayeen have insisted on their
right to attack Israel from bases in adjoining
Arab states, but Syria has allowed very few
fedayeen operations from its territory, and
Egypt has forbidden them entirely. The re-
gimes in Amman and Beirut have allowed
fedayeen operations from their territory, but
they have not relished Israeli reprisals which
have forced up to a hundred thousand of
their citizens to flee the border areas. Both
governments have, in the past year or so,
moved in the face of intense opposition to
limit fedayeen activity in their respective
countries.
20. The confrontation between the fedayeen
and the Jordanian Government has been par-
ticularly severe. Jordan has the largest share
of displaced Palestinians within its borders
and has allowed the fedayeen more freedom
of movement than any other country. As
Israeli defensive measures made guerrilla ac-
tivity more hazardous, the fedayeen turned
their energies toward establishing a privileged
position for themselves within Jordan. Rela-
tions with the Jordanian Army worsened, as
commandos sought to assert their independ-
ence of any controls and even to assume a
status superior to the regular forces. The latter
remained strongly loyal to King Hussein,
whom many fedayeen wished to topple. In
these circumstances, relations between the
Amman government and the commandos
steadily deteriorated during 1970.
21. After serious confrontations in February
and June, a dramatic showdown eventually
came in September 1970. It vas basically the
culmination of deep-seated mistrust between
Hussein's regime and the fedayeen, although
other area events were also causative factors.
These included Hussein's and Nasser's ac-
ceptance of the Rogers peace initiative-a
move bitterly opposed by the fedayeen lead-
ers-and the challenge to the authority of the
Jordanian regime posed by the PFLP's daring
quadruple skyjacking. This 10-day conflict may
prove to have been critical for the future
of the fedayeen. The war proved that the cpm-
mandos-even when :they fought bravely and
well as they did in Amman-were no match
for the regular armored units of the Jordanian
Army, made up mostly of Bedouin troops.
22. Jordanian infantry units, which have a
large percentage of Palestinians, were not used
in the fight, but neither did they come to the
aid of the commandos. The 740,000 civilian
Palestinians, who comprise over 40 percent
of the East Bank population, remained on the
sidelines. The fedayeen lost several hundred
men and much of their equipment and were
forced to back down. The aftermath of the
war has seen a further erosion of fedayeen
strength in Jordan. Some commando groups,
mostly small, have disappeared, fedayeen
morale has declined, and individuals who pre-
viously supported the fedayeen now find it
better to appear neutral or even pro-govern-
ment. Guerrilla activities against Israel have
virtually ceased. There is a strong faction in
the army that seems to be disposed to push
its advantage and to eliminate the fedayeen,
once and for all, as a military force and as a
political threat.
23. Fedayeen setbacks in Jordan have
strengthened the Lebanese Government's dis-
position to limit the actions of the Palestinian
guerrillas in their country. Lebanon's polit-
ical system is dependent on a balance between
religious communities-principally between
Christians and Muslims. Most of the former
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are hostile to the fedayeen; many Muslims
strongly support them. The conservative rul-
ing establishment itself, drawn from both
communities, is fearful of Israeli reprisals and
wary of the fedayeen. However, it is also
greatly concerned about the possibility of
domestic civil strife ensuing from any open
clash between Lebanese forces and the Pales-
tinian guerrillas. Whereas previously such do-
mestic concerns, along with fedayeen prestige
and pressure from other Arab governments
(principally Syria ), had impelled Lebanon
to permit extensive freedom of operation to
the guerrillas, the latter have now cut back
on most activities outside a small area near
the Israeli frontier. Some fedayeen operations
continue from this region and remain an
irritant to the Israelis although they are not
a serious security problem.
24. The setback in Jordan sowed confusion
throughout the fedayeen movement. The
Fatah leadership including Arafat is under
attack from within the organization. The
PFLP is beset by internal bickering; its leader,
George Habbash, is in hiding and apparently
commands few followers. The new Govern-
ment of Syria, which ousted the Baath faction
responsible for sending Syrian forces to the aid
of guerrillas in the Jordanian civil war, has
disarmed and muzzled Saiqa. All these devel-
opments leave the fedayeen movement in dis-
tinctly poor condition, and its military capa-
bilities are likely to remain low for some time.
III. THE PALESTINIANS AND THE
FEDAYEEN AS FACTORS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
A. As Factors Affecting Arab-Israeli
Negotiations
25. The Palestinian question will remain one
of the central issues in the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute. No settlement is likely to be lasting
which does not in some way respond to Pal-
estinian interests, including Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank and Gaza, the status of
Jerusalem, and the refugee problem. The
refugee issue, which is of particular impor-
tance, would have to be addressed, probably
through a plan involving resettlement and
compensation, and with token repatriation to
Israel. On the basis of present evidence and
past experience, a settlement which appeared
to be responsive to Palestinian aspirations
and which was strongly endorsed and en-
forced by the Egyptian and Jordanian Gov-
ernments would probably receive the acquies-
cence of most Palestinian Arabs.
26. By contrast, the fedayeen leaders would
continue to refuse to associate themselves with
a settlement which permits Israel to continue
as a separate Zionist state. Some would
strongly denounce any moves toward a nego-
tiated agreement, as they have the Rogers
Plan. But their ability to force the Arab gov-
ernments to reject all such moves or to pre-
vent the implementation of an agreed settle-
ment, at least in the next year or two, appears
limited. Egypt, for example, has been sensi-
tive to opinion in other Arab states, but it
would probably not be greatly swayed in its
policy decisions on the Arab-Israeli question
by fedayeen opinion. The regular forces of
Israel and Jordan have demonstrated their
ability to contain the commandos in open con-
frontation and would probably be able to do
so again. Indeed, some fedayeen leaders have
privately indicated their awareness of their
inability to play a de ~isive role in the Arab-
Israeli situation.
27. The creation of some kind of autono-
mous or independent Palestinian Arab state
as part of an Arab-Is~~ aeli settlement has been
frequently discussed of late. Some Arab lead-
ers on the West Bank have pronounced favor-
ably on the idea of aquasi-independent West
Bank entity. Most Palestinians and Arab gov-
ernments, however, have little enthusiasm for
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it on the grounds that either Israel or Jordan
would inevitably dominate the fledgling state.
Moreover, the economic liabilities of an entity
comprising only the West Bank and Gaza are
great. Both districts are poor and they already
have more refugees than they can absorb.
28. Some Palestinians, including fedayeen
leaders, have privately indicated interest in a
larger Palestinian entity, including the entire
East Bank. If such an entity did emerge it
would probably have the support of large
elements of the settled Palestinian population.
Such a state would have much better eco-
nomic chances of survival than the West Bank
and Gaza alone-but this would mean a new
Palestinian Government in place of the Jor-
danian monarchy. The East Bank establish-
ment including the King and most of the Jor-
danian Army, would oppose such a develop-
ment and could probably prevent it.
B. Factors Affecting Short-Term Tactics
and Prospects
29. The principal preoccupation of .the feda-
yeen groups for some time will be survival.
They will try to reorganize, to maintain some
freedom of action in Jordan, and to the extent
possible will try to mount attacks on Israel.
Unless present trends are reversed, they are
likely to be generally ineffective.
30. This is not to say that despite their
recent setbacks, the fedayeen will probably
wither away. They are likely to remain popu-
lar with the Arab masses, to attract recruits,
and to win the backing of some Arab govern-
ments. Asevere heating up of the Arab-Israeli
confrontation would create a psychological
climate in the Arab world favorable to feda-
yeen militancy and bring some resurgence in
the prestige of and support for the com-
mandos-though not necessarily any improve-
ment in their fighting effectiveness. If they
remain disorganized and ineffective for an ex-
tended period, however, support of all kinds
is likely to taper off.
31. Some of the fedayeen may again seek
public recognition through such tactics as air-
planehijackings, political kidnappings, and the
like. Such efforts would have to take place
principally in host countries like Lebanon and
Jordan, or as in the past, outside of the Middle
East altogether. Launching attacks against Jor-
danian or Lebanese forces or officials is likely
to lead to even harsher repressive measures
in those countries. These could probably not
crush the fedayeen entirely, but would prob-
ably force a substantial number of commandos
to conform to government dictates while driv-
ing asmaller number underground in active
opposition. A number of leaders, including
Arafat, will probably continue to act so as
to maintain their prestige and connections
with important Arab leaders, even at the sac-
rifice of at least some political independence.
C. The Contingency of an Upset in
Jordan
32. 1n the recent Jordanian civil war the
army did indeed win all the battles. The army
is now in control; there are no immediate
signs of its losing its grip. The ability of the
Amman regime to maintain its cohesion, and
effectively run the country despite the pres-
ence of a large, embittered Palestinian minor-
ity seems reasonably good in the short term,
unless King Hussein were assassinated. In such
an event, Crown Prince Hassan, with the sup-
port of the army, could probably maintain the
Hashemite regime.
33. But the ~var also triggered off develop-
ments which may sooner or later lead to ma-
jor changes in that country. King Hussein,
working in concert with East Bankers of vari-
ous political views and with some Palestinians,
had managed to rule Jordan for many years,
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although erosion of the system had been going
on since the rise of the fedayeen after June
1967. The civil war drastically reduced Hus-
sein's ability to play a conciliatory role, nar-
rowed his power base, put hard line elements
in the army leadership in a stronger position,
and increased the polarization in Jordanian
society between East Bankers and Palestinians.
34. If the present Jordanian regime fell, for
whatever reason, the nature of its successor
would depend on many factors. The military
would almost certainly play an important role.
It would be virtually impossible for the feda-
yeen in their present disorganized state to fill
the vacuum created by a government collapse
and take over rule of Jordan in the name of all
Palestinians. At a later date, however, a mili-
tant Palestinian government could emerge
from such a collapse. It has been argued that
this might be desirable, that such a govern-
ment of Jordan would be forced to act respon-
sibly, would ultimately adapt the East Bank
as the true Palestinian home, and forget about
Israel. Though this might come to pass over
the very long term, a Palestinian government
in Amman would almost certainly-for the
next several years at least-be dominated by
the sort of extremists who now claim to speak
for the Palestinians. Under them, there would
be no hope of a negotiated Arab-Israeli settle-
ment.
D. Palestinians Over the Longer Term
35. In any event, Palestinian irredentism will
continue as a factor in the Middle East. An
overall Arab-Israeli settlement would satisfy
many Palestinians, but it would not be ac-
cepted by all of them. The present fedayeen
organizations would be very badly weakened,
but would probably not disappear entirely.
Some Palestinians would reject the compro-
mises a settlement necessarily entailed and
would seek to continue some form of resist-
ance, particularly terrorist activity.
36. In the event that no Arab-Israeli accord
is reached, the prospects for the Palestinian
Arabs would not be bright. Over a million of
them would continue to live unhappily in
Israel or Israeli-occupied territory. Many of
the rest would continue the life of refugees,
and Palestinian irredentism would probably
increase. Some fedayeen would probably be-
come more extremist in outlook and action.
Some Palestinian Arabs are likely to be sources
of Near Eastern tension almost indefinitely,
and to constitute a reservoir of bitterness,
frustration, and hatred.
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ANNEX
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PRINCIPAL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS PRIOR TO
THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR OF SEPTEMBER 1970
NOTE: Accurate, detailed information on
the fedayeen movement is not easy to come
by. Their financing-particularly of Fatah, the
most affluent-remains covert. Such available
data as those on total membership and specific
operations are often incomplete or unreliable.
Even so, a fairly accurate but general picture
of the fedayeen movement can be drawn. At
the height of their activity, say mid-1970, there
were some 30,000 people involved in the feda-
yeen movement. Of these about one-third were
commandos trained and equipped to mount
operations against the Israelis. The remainder
were various categories of support personnel
including a substantial number of armed Pales-
tinians, sometimes called the "militia", in per-
manent residence in Lebanon, Syria, and Jor-
dan. Commando leaders give considerable lip
service to the principle of fedayeen unity; most
are members of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) and participate in its de-
liberations. But fedayeen-and Palestinian-
unity remains unachieved; the PLO and other
organizations designed to coordinate fedayeen
and Palestinian efforts are generally ineffec-
tive. The following data covers the fedayeen
and particularly the commandos as they ex-
isted prior to the September 1970 Jordanian
civil war. They were badly hurt in that con-
flict and in ensuing bafitles with the Jordanian
Army. Several hundred fedayeen have been
killed and many more injured; some entire
group, have probably disappeared and the
remainder are in disarray. From one-third to
one-half of the commandos appear, at least
temporarily, to have abandoned fedayeen ac-
tivity altogether.
1. Al Fatah: Largest of the Palestinian or-
ganizations. Its membership comprises at least
one-half of total fedayeen organization mem-
bership, and it is responsible for about two-
thirds of all activity directed against Israel.
Its declared policy is to carry out operations
only in Israel and the occupied territories. It
denies intent to overthrow any Arab govern-
ment, and has stayed on good terms with such
disparate regimes as those of Libya and Saudi
Arabia. In February 1969, Fatah gained con-
trol over the PLO. It is well financed, and of
all fedayeen groups the most likely to endure.
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2. Popular Liberation Forces (PLF) : The
commando arm of the Palestine Liberation
Army (PLA) . The PLA is organized and
trained along conventional military lines, and
its units are attached to regular Arab armies.
It now may have some 8,000-9,000 men, most
of whom are based in Syria. Offically con-
trolled by the PLO, the PLA has retained
considerable autonomy. Most of its fedayeen
activities are carried out in Gaza.
3. Popular Front for the Liberation o f Pal-
estine (PFLP) : Leader George Habbash.
This organization is extremely radical, perhaps
Maoist. It believes that the toppling of con-
servative Arab regimes and the fight against
Israel to be of equal priority. It has been re-
sponsible for most terrorist activity outside the
Near East, particularly airplane hijackings,
though it has also mounted operations in
Israeli-held territory, especially Gaza. It has
been a serious rival of Al Fatah as the most
prestigious fedayeen group. It has received
Iraqi support in the past. Badly crippled in
the September 1970 civil war, its future is
uncertain.
4. Popular Front for the Liberation o f Pal-
estine-General Command: Leader Ahmed
Jibril. A small splinter group of the Popular
Front.
5. Arab Palestine Organization: Headed by
Ahmed Za'rur. Tiny dissident faction of Jibril's
organization. Has had Egyptian backing.
6. Popular Democratic Front for the Lib-
eration o f Palestine (PDFLP) : Leader Naif
Hawatma. The main faction which broke
away from the PFLP in February 1969. Also
extreme leftist views, but much less active in
operations of any kind. Has received Syrian
support.
7. Al Saiga: Sponsored and controlled by
the Syrian Government. Active against Israel
mainly from Jordan and Lebanon rather than
from Syria. Often used in the past to harass
the Lebanese and Jordanian Governments.
The new Syrian leaders are alleged to have
promised to turn control of Saiqa over to a
united Palestinian military command, though
they have not as yet done so.
8. Arab Liberation Front: Sponsored by the
Iraqi Government. Very small and ineffective
to date. Relies on Iraqi troops in Jordan for
funding and equipment; many members are
alleged to be Iraqi nationals.
9. Popular Struggle Front: A small organi-
zation which was formerly a part of Fatah.
10. Active Organization for the Liberation
o f Palestine: Leader Dr. Isam Sartawi, who
broke away from Al Fatah in early 1969. Pro-
Egyptian. Of marginal size and significance.
11. Al Ansar: Set up in March 1970. Size
and leaders unknown. Of interest principally
because it was founded by Arab Communist
parties as their fedayeen group. Has remained
isolated from the other commando groups,
thanks to its support of the Rogers peace ini-
tiative. As far as is known, has mounted no
operations against anyone.
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PROBABLE COMMANDO STRENGTH PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER 1970
TOTAL NUMBER
ORGANIZATIONS OF COMMANDOS
Al Fatah ................................... 7,000
Popular Liberation Forces ..................... 1,000
Al Saiga ................................... 2,000
PFLP ...................................... 1,000
PDFLP .................................... 500-700
All Others ............. .................... No more than
1,000
LOCATION OF PALESTINIAN ARABS
(LATE 1970 )
TOTAL
AREA ~APPROXIMATE~
REGISTERED
REFUGEES
RESIDENTS OF
REFUGEE CAMPS
West Bank ....................
680,000
273,000
72,000
East Bank .....................
740,000
505,000
211,000
Gaza ..... ...................
360,000
312,000
199,000
Syria .........................
170,000
158,000
43,000
Lebanon ......................
230,000
176,000
92,000
Israel .........................
360,000
...
...
Kuwait .......................
85,000
...
Saudi Arabia ... ............ ..
20,000
..
Other Arab States ..............
28,000
...
Non-Arab States ...............
37,000
..
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