EXECUTIVE BRIEF: IRAQ, SYRIA, ISRAEL: PROSPECTS FOR CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00T02041R000100380001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC 00727/1 /89
30 June 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: (see distribution)
National Intelligence urrncer tut 11e' L.GLQ 1.
and South Asia
SUBJECT: Executive Brief: Iraq, Syria, Israel: Prospects for
Confrontation in Lebanon.
1. Attached for your information is the above-captioned Executive Brief
developed by the NI0/NESA from the special intelligence community meeting
held on 28 June. If you have any comments, please contact me at
Attachment
As stated
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P5- /i/-4-'
SUBJECT: Executive Brief: Iraq, Syria, Israel: Prospects for
Confrontation in Lebanon
NIO/NESA~
Internal Distribution:
DCI
DDCI
ADDI
ADDO
CNE/D0
DCNE/ISRAEL
'D/MESA
C/NESA/PG
CMM- MI
C/NESA/AI/I
C/NESA/AI/L
C/NESA/PG/I
C/NIC
NIC/PO
C/AG
NIO/W
NI0/USSR
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S T
The hector of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C 20505
National Intelligence Council
EXECUTIVE BRIEF
NIC#00727/89
30 June 1989
IRAQ, SYRIA, ISRAEL: PROSPECTS FOR CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON
-- The acquisition of Iraqi FROG rockets by Lebanese Christian forces will
increase the danger of an Syrian-Iraqi confrontation--which could also
involve Israel--and the threat to US interests in the region.
-- Iraq and Syria do not want to go to war. Baghdad might mass troops or
launch limited attacks on Syria's eastern border if Syria invades the
Christian enclave in Lebanon.
-- Syria will react carefully to the presence of rockets in Lebanon, fearing
an Israeli response and international condemnation. If the rockets are
launched, however, Damascus will use force to try to eliminate them.
-- Israel would welcome increased Syrian-Iraqi tension. Tel Aviv will
selectively interdict Syrian air or naval forces involved in operations
against the Christian enclave in Lebanon. Israel probably would use its
air force to stall a massive Syrian ground on the Christians.
-- Tel Aviv would not send its ground forces to fight Syria in Lebanon.
Israel probably will not use a Syrian attack in Lebanon as an opportunity
for Israel to destroy chemical warfare and missile facilities in Syria.
-- The Soviets reportedly plan to tell the Iraqis that sending arms
destabilizes Lebanon and that Moscow would reduce its supply of
weapons to Iraq if Baghdad continues to send arms to Lebanon.
This memorandum is the result of a special Intelligence Community
meeting held on 28 June 1989 to assess the situation around Lebanon. The
memorandum reflects the general consensus of the attending organizations as
interpreted by the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South
Asia.
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IRAQ, SYRIA, ISRAEL: PROSPECTS FOR CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON
Since its ceasefire with Iran, Iraq has supplied increasing
amounts of military equipment to the Christian groups opposing
Muslim and Syrian forces in Lebanon.
reports that Iraq had sent FROG-7 rockets
to Aaaba (Jordan) probably enroute to the forces of Lebanese
Prime Minister Prime Minister Michel Awn., we nave no
confirmation so far that FROG rockets are in Lebano
Syrian President Assad has warned that he would not allow the
Christians to have such weapons which could hit the Damascus area
from the- Christian enclave. Israel has said it would not
interfere with the delivery of rockets to the Christians but has
been vague about its response to Syrian military operations
against the enclave.
Iraqi Goals
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's immediate goal with the arms
aid is to force Syria out of Lebanon. He probably hopes that a
success in Lebanon will help him gain his ultimate goal of
ousting Assad from Syria. The lack of Iraqi efforts to hide the
FROG shipments suggest that Saddam is trying to goad Syria into a
hasty response. If Saddam's current efforts fail to achieve
results, we believe he will increase his activities in Lebanon--
perhaps sending more arms--to tighten the pressure on Assad even
more. The Soviets reportedly plan to tell Saddam that Moscow
believes sending weapons destabilizes Lebanon. They warn that
further Iraqi shipments of Soviet-made weapons could cause Moscow
to reduce the flow of Soviet arms to Iraq.
Despite Saddam's provocatory activities in Lebanon and his
desire to humiliate Assad, we believe Iraq does not want a major
military confrontation with Syria. For its part, Syria does not
want war with Iraq. We believe we would detect a significant
Iraqi or Syrian military build-up along their common border. So
far we have not detected such activity. Baghdad probably would
engage in public posturing and threats before launching any
operations into Syria.
*Some analysts believe a few or all of the rockets say go to Awn's Christian
warload rival, Shamir Ja Ja. Ja Ja probably is such less likely to flaunt
the rockets and would fire them only as a last resort.
the rockets may go to North Yemen.
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If Syria launches a massive ground attack against the
Christian enclave, however, Baghdad might begin limited air
attacks or ground skirmishes along the common border to divert
Syrian attention. Iraqi forces might even take a small amount of
Syrian territory and offer to exchange it for a Syrian withdrawal
from Christian areas of Lebanon. Syrian defenses are weak along
its western border with Iraq and its nearby oil fields are highly
vulnerable.
Syria's Response
Syria's possible response to the presence of FROG rockets in
Lebanon has become less predictable recently. Assad may
deliberately be trying to obscure Syria's response to gain new
options and time to.maneuver diplomatically.
-- suggest that Damascus might try to intercept
the rocket shipment at sea.
-- Assad's earlier statements indicate Syria would try to
eliminate the rockets as soon as their presence in Lebanon
is confirmed.
(suggests that Damascus might
act only if the missiles are launched.
Assad probably will act carefully in response to the mere
presence of the rockets because he fears the response from Israel
and other Arab states. We believe he probably feels he does not
need to react to the arrival of the rockets immediately. If
Assad tries to eliminate the rockets, Syria might use airstrikes,
artillery, or commando raids in such operations. The Syrians
probably believe that Awn and the Iraqis will judge the lack of
any response as Syrian weakness which could lead to even more
pressure on Damascus to act.
We believe Syria would not hesitate to respond with force
against Awn and the Christian enclave if the rockets are
launched--even if the target is not Damascus. The Syrians would
try to destroy the rockets quickly with little collateral damage.
They would be inclined to increase their use of force to the
level necessary to neutralize the threat and avoid humiliation in
Lebanon.
In addition to the risk of Israeli intervention, the Syrians
also probably recognize the other costs and problems of using
force in Lebanon. Syrian airstrikes might miss some of the
rockets and launchers and a ground attack might become bogged
down into a long and costly operation. In both cases Awn would
have time to fire more rockets at Syrian targets and appeal for
outside support. Assassinating Awn might temporarily disrupt the
Christian forces, but they would still have the rockets.
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Israel's Response
Israel welcomes increased Iraqi/Syrian tensions which
distract attention from the Palestinian issue. Tel Aviv does not
want to become involved deeply in the Lebanese morass again.
Israel probably would respond selectively to Syrian operations
aimed at eliminating the FROGs. The Israelis would look for the
opportunity to attack Syrian air or naval units involved in
Lebanon to send a strong signal to Assad to back off and to
humiliate him. If the Syrians launched a ground attack against
the Christian enclave, Israeli aircraft might attack Syrian
targets in Lebanon. We believe that Syrian ground operations
against the Christians would stall under pressure from Israeli
air attacks.
Israel would not.send its own ground forces into Lebanon to
fight Syria. A small possibility exists that Israel might
eventually launch air attacks into Syria. Indeed some Israeli
hardliners might see the Syrian attack on the Christian enclave
as an opportunity for Israel to destroy chemical warfare and
missile facilities in Syria. We believe, however, that such an
Israeli attack is unlikely.
Awn's Moves
Christian Prime Minister and military leader Awn is highly
unpredictable, making any judgment difficult on his use of the
rockets. We believe he probably would publicly flaunt his
acquisition of the rockets to embarrass Assad. Such activity
would increase the pressure on Syria to react forcefully against
Awn. He may also embark on a dangerous gamble; fire rockets at
Syria in the hope of setting off a chain of events that will draw
Iraq or Israel into a conflict with Syria and eventually force
Syria out of Lebanon.
The Iraqis probably have some influence over Awn but not
enough to stop him from launching the rockets. We have no
evidence that Awn's forces know how to fire FROG rockets. Some
of his soldiers could have been trained in Iraq or a small number
of Iraqi rocket technicians could be sent to Lebanon. FROG
rockets are relatively simple to operate and Christian forces may
be able to teach themselves how to fire them. The accuracy and
effectivness of the system, however, would be reduced.
Implications for the United States.
We believe there is a significant chance that Iraq, Syria,
Israel, or especially the Lebanese Christians will miscalculate
the effects of their actions in the FROG rocket situation. The
greatest danger to US interests is the possibility that clashes
between Israel and Syria, and Iraq and Syria, might escalate to
war. Israeli involvement also could side-track efforts to make
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progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. A
confrontation in Lebanon would derail current mediation efforts
of the Arab League. More conflict in Lebanon also probably would
increase the danger to the US hostages held there and US embassy
personnel.
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