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SECRET 50E /GS /GP Guinea. May 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater per Ishobility can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Proffle, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the G Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the cone.. rent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central ln;elligerce Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNINC This docamenr contains in formation affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of tale l8. sections M and 704 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to of receipt by an anouthori=ed person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED by 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 30 (1;, (2), i3'. DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEILIGENCc. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provis;ons of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 This chapter was written for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by March 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 S 11h n f4 r f Y3" 4 R U d h h t� v i `r y ,at 1 Guinea CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1969, copies of which should be destroyed. A. Summary and background B. Structure and functioning of the government 1. Constitution 2. Central government a. President b. Legislature c. judiciary 3. Regional and local government 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4. Civil service 5 SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 FIGURES Page Page Page C. Political drisunles 8 E. Threats to government stAft 21 1. Sekou 'foure 8 1. Discontent and dissidence 21 a. Biographic sketch 8 Visit of U.N. Special Committee on b. Philosophy 7 1 Subversion 23 2. Democratic Party of Cuinea 7 a. Permanent "imperialist" plot 23 a. Origin 7 b. Communist- inspired subversion 24 b. Organization 7 c. Affiliates 9 F. Maintenance of internal security 25 3. Electoral system 11 1. Police 13. National policies 11 1 Intelligence and sceurity services 27 1. Themes and goals 11 3. Coun'.ersubversive measures and 2. Aftermath of 1970 invasion 12 capabilities 28 3. Domestic policies 13 G. Seketed bib bibliography 28 4. Foreign policies 15 a. Relations with African states 15 Chronology Q,g b. Relations with Communist states 18 c. Relations with Western states 19 Glossary 30 FIGURES Page Page Fig. 1 Structure of ruvernment Fig. 4 PDG youth photos) 10 chart) faces 1 Fig. 5 PDG women photo) 10 Fig. 2 President Sekou Toure in milita.-y Fig. 8 Visit of U.N. Special Committee on uniform photo) 8 Decolonization photos) 17 Fig. 3 PDG electoral system chart) 8 Fig. 7 Display of captured weapons photo) 23 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 Sekou Tour* President, Secretory*~' d of the POG, "Supr leads, of the Re. .cation" PARTY EXECUTME LEGISLATra JUDICIAL National I 7�Man wftfw l Nmlaial Pon! ilureau 7- Domain Mk *W$ Assembly 3 Miglw Cows ss�M.b.r Central Comminee 4 Ministers Delegate a sion 1 30 Federation 29 Regional 29 Regional SswNOrMs Governors AssembNes I 209 Section 209 30 lower Courts C mmandonts Arrondissement etea ds Local 1 About 8.000 lose Committees (Perform all party, governmental, and judicial functions at the local level) FIGURE 1. Structure of government. The parallel systems of party and government converge at both ends of the structure. At the top, authority centers on Sekou Toure; at the bottoti, the local party cells constitute the local government. (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 Government and Politics A. -Summary and background (S) The anoa of west Africa which now comprises the Republic of Guinea was the object of French military penetration and colonialization in the middle of the 19th century, but it was not until almost the 20th century that French colonial rule was consolidated. An event predating French rule, however, and one .which has had an important long -term influence on Guinea s political development, was the Fulani conquest of the area in the 18th century. From their stronghold in the Fouta Djallon mountains in Movenne- Guinee (Middle Guinea), the Fulani exercised feudal dominion over most other tribal groups, bringing Islam it their wake. Although internal rivalries progressively weakened their control, the Fulani aristocracy continued to furnish the countrv's elite during all but the final years of French rule, .which lasted from 1891 to 1958. In Guinea, the Fulani remain the stronghold of Islam, through which they continue to exercise considerable, if subtle, influence on the predominantly Muslim population. Between 1945 and 1956 political strength among Guinea's African population shifted dramatically from the Fulani aristocrats �who cooperated with and in tarn were supported by the French �to i t ne%w party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PD(;). After securing control of the territory in 1937 under the autonomy provisions of the French Loi Cadre Framework Laic of 1956, which put France's African colonies irrevocably on the path to independence, the PDG led Guinea to independence in 1958, as the population voted overwhelmingly against membership in De Gattlle's French Community in a constitutional referendum held on 28 September 19,58. France responded by immediately pulling out its administra- tive -nd technical personnel, supplies, and records, withdrawing all financial support, and cutting off trade. Although the French departure left economic chaos, a well -knit political party organization under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou '1'oure was already in place and assumed control of the country. Since independence, Sekou Toure and the PDG have sought to achieve an extensive social and politieJ revolution aimed at transforming Guinea from a traditional, tribalired African society into a unified modern state led by a socialist government. The regime's successes have been uneven and concentrated in the political and social sph �res. The cost has been increasing restrictions on individual freedoms, creation of a heavily bureaucratic system, and economic stagnation. As the only political party, the PDG has absorbed almost the entire adult population and is the key organization in Guinea. Its leaders hold all the positions of power in the government, and state police is made by party and government bodies almost interchangeably. Although the PDG has successfully supplanted the traditional elite as the primary force in Guinean society and has made some progress in inculcating a sense of nationhood among the country *s diverse ethnic groups, over 13 years of part indoctrination and unkept promises have also produced considerable apathy and disillusionment among the populace, even on issues which the public tends to favor, such as the Presidents attempts to deal with corruption. All this makes it increasingly difficult for the regime to marshal popular enthusiasm for its policies and tends to make the Guinean revolution more a matter of words than of substance for the mass Of subsistence farmers and it growing numbc�rof better educated citizens. A major contributing factor to popular disillusion- ment is the government's inabilith. to deal with economic problems. The country continues to suffer from administrative deficiencies fostered in part by an ideological commitment to socialist policies which are not responsive to its problems. In their rhetoric, Toure and other leaders of the regime hold to the goal of establishing it socialist and egalitarian state. The pressure of events, however, is forcing the leadership increasingly to choose between adopting more rational economic policies or continuing on the road to an ever harsher authoritarianism in order to prevent the rise of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 dissent at home and the exploitation of popular discontent by regime opponents within Guinea and abroad. The events of November 1970 �when Portuguese forces and Guinean dissidents launched un armed attack on Conakry �were a traumatic experience for Toure and have strengths -ned measurably the trend toward authoritarianism. Portugal. angered by Toure's support of insurgents fighting in Portuguese Guinea, aided dissident Guineans in organizing the attack for the purposes of freeing Portuguese prisoners held in Guinean jails, of striking at the rebel headquarters, and, hopefully, of toppling Toure. Tours survived, countered with an extensive political purge, and merged more solidly in control than ever. During the next fey years Tourc faces the increasingly difficult problem of reconciling the conflicting demands of ideological commitment and harsh economic reality. He must try to strike a balance between his unique brand of socialism with its siege mentality and the pressing need to proceed with rational economic development in order to give some substance to the promises he has made t., the people. Reliance on foreign aid and private foreign investment in the mineral extraction industry has so far been the answer. Foreign aid has helped Toure maintain the system of tight control over the highly bureaucratic and inefficient domestic economy, as well as to postpone needed economic reforms. But pressures for reform are almost certain to continue to grow, and it remains to be seen whether the nationalistic Toure will wish to remain dependent on so unreliable a base as the aid and investment of foreign governments. B. Structure and functioning of the government I. Constitution (C) A constitution providing for a strongly centralized presidential system, guaranteeing an extensive list of civil rights, -ind providing for a possible future delegation of sovereignty to a supranational African organization was au.pted at independence in 19:38 and has never been abrogated. From the outset, however, the constitution has been more honored in _hc breach than the observance and has not restrained President Sekou Toure from ruling exactly as he pleases. He promulgates laws as he sees fit, and he changes the structure or composition of the government at will. Toure's use o' an extensive political purge and organizational changes during 1971 and 1972 ostensibly to protect his regime from 0 1 subversion amply demonstrated this point. 'I'll(- most dramatic change, announces) at the extraordinary National Congress of the PDG in April 1972. was Toure's naming his chief lieutenant to tits newly eceated post of Prime Minister. None of the changes over the past 2 years has altered the concentration of political power in the hands of President 'Toure or greatly affected the way the government is run. Under Guinean law the constitution can be amended by a two thirds vote of the National Assembly or by referendum, initiated either by the President or by the National Assembly. In pr.etice, however, this is an empty provision, since all political power is in the hands of 'Toure, who determines the role of the assembly in the political process and manipulates public opinion to suit his own purposes. 2. Central government a. President (U /OU) The President of the Republic stands at the apex of the structure of government (Figure I He is elected fora 7 -year term by universal adult suffrage and can be reelected. The minimum age is :33. There is no specific provision for succession, but in case the presidency becomes vacant the Cabinet continues to conduct state business until a new election is held. Ahmed Sekou Toure has been President since 1938, when Guinea became independent. Constitutional provisions plus evolution of the Guinean system have concentrated broad power in the hands of the President. He is Chief of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; he exercises the administrative powers of governrnc.t. assisted by a Cabinet which he appoints; he makes all major appointments to the armed forces and the public administration; and he conducts foreign policy. The President appoints the governors o,' the 29 administrative regions and, through them, is responsible for local law enforcement and public security. Although any draft laws submitted by the President are assured of passage by as compliant assembly, the bulk of ;:uinca's lawmaking is done by executive decree or administrative fiat. President Toure is able to govern in this manner because of his Great prestige as the leader of Guinca's independence movement and his dual position as President and head of the only political party. '['his convergence of powers gives him control over all major instruments of authority. In the lower echelons the juxtaposition of government administrators and party officials is such that 'Toure can use the party and the burc: to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 watch each other and can bolster the p(me�r of either b snit his current polio-,. Membership in the top level of the l-xc ;utive hrtnch �the (:ahinet �has since the late I9(i( t's paralleled membership in the party's top hods, the seven -man National Political Bureau. Cabinet ministries ct rrenlly form seven domains' O f responsibility: the Presidential I)omain; the Prime Minister's Domain, and domains for Finance and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Interior a and Sl-c�urity. Conurierc and Culture and Education. In addition, there are four ministers delegate, each responsible for l-conontic� clevelopntent in one of the four geographic regions of Guinea. A nunther of other officials echo were elevated from "Secretary of State to minister� plus the governor of the Central Bank, were listed as Cabinet members following it Jun(- 1972 Cabinet shuffle.' Despite their titles, th occupy I lower level within the hierarchy and do not have (-elual status -with till- heads of domains. These second- echeiOn officials administer policies in specific fields related to their respective domains. For instance, within the Office of the Prime Minister are four subordinate ministers� one responsible for financial control, another for the people's army, a third for plans, and a fourth for foreign affairs. Theorcticalk, head of domains supervise� government operations and make policy decisions. In practice, however. all important d ecisions art- made within the framework of tit(- party organizatiol, specifically the National Political Bureau� and executed through the Cabinet's administrative system. Ministers are not responsible to till- National Assemble, they must not be assembly deputies, and the election of it n l-w assCIIIIAy has little if any relationship to the composition of the Capin Ministers are appointed by the President and serve at 4iis pleasure. b. Legislature (U /OU) The legislature consists of a single house, the National Assemble, whose membership is elected at one time for a 5-year term. Since 196..3 its membership has heen set at 73. The part controls the assembly, which is viewed as the collective emanation of the will of the people rather than as an assembly of tepresentatives from different regions. The National Assemble is supposed to meet in two short regular sessions each year, in March at,(] Octoher. Special 'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. sessions nta\ be hl-ld ;t ;its% time at the meluest of the President of t1w I{-public Or after a No-thirds vote of the dctmties. Actually, the assembly has not stet n�gul:u i) A Permanent Commission :111(1 a It)- member bureau are elected at the beginning Of each legislative teen to deliberate on goverw.��nt actions which take place heiween regular sessions of the assentb;.. although such deliberations in fact have no effect on police decisions. Fach commission se for the full 5- year term of that assentfly. In practice. the assenibly acts as an appendapt. Of the part\ and is ratifying body for PDG polic�ie iy meaningful discussion of proposed legislation takes place within the party organization, following which tile proposal is submitted to tit(- National Assembly for perfunctory approval. The PDG also determines till- composition of the assembly by drawing up ie list of 3 candidates which it presents to the ,cation for election. The President retains the right to veto the "()Initiation of any cmididate. Of the deputies elected to the assembly in 1965, 32 were members of the (ventral Committee of the PDG, while six and seven were members of the bureau~ c hc� parh�- affiliated labor ai,.r youth organizations, respectiy. ly. Twenty deputies were women c. Judiciary (U /OU) PD(: theory recognizes no separation of powers. and judicial poarr ultimately rests with tit(- party. Along with the rest of the grn (-rnnu tit, the judiciary is expectl-d to uphold till- will Of the people as expressed by lilt- party and he subject to party disc�ipli Ohl- of Toure's early accomplishments was the abolition of c�ustonwry tribal courts and their replacement by PD(:- operated Popular Tribunals. which decide minor disputes at the village level. All legal costs are borne by till- state. All judges, magistrates, and lawyers (including defense attorneys) are civil servants, and as salaried officials they are not expected to accept fees. There is it serious shortage of Gohicans with legal training. lu its formal aspects, Guinea's judicial system has been carried over from the French. 'I'll(- court syste�m has ;I simple structure. At the lowest level, 25 of tiiv 29 administrative regions have a Justice of tit(- Peace court. Of the other four regions� three have one Court of First Instance, while Conakry has two. The Courts of First Instance have a presiding judge, plus official pr osecution and defense attorneys, and their jurisdiction runs the gamut of civil and criminal cas There are three higher courts, one of which is the Court of General Sessions in Conakry. This court has 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 uHKin:d critosial juriwliviic,n in vaw�% onoskitig nlitjf)r oo(frtiw�.. 11% 11"idittg 111411tt- 1% dt�44ig1t:tt-41 li% the per44ich�tt fi( the (:taut oil Aplso -iok aiml it ha44 1%ov 111tcliti111kt1 jiftlit 44111141 ff)ut la% it�w�.w 1144 4�114nt�11 [nine a lI%I prrililrrrl Its Iltr r(mt�rnttn�nl. ;lippoietletnml. ter Iht- (:eurl 411 Griletill SM44111% ion� fist I ltl�ar Aentlier hither a old. Iles� C411111 fif 1111111-ilk in Citnakn. Inw '.'11net al� fnlm lln� lowt-r 4.111d% in bf)ih 44lt11 Went rrimitkd co %m. II has if pn��idt-nl and it noml/rr of jenletr.. all apllotimetl b% pre%itlemial dm-e�. lit we eve iwlattc�e�.. apprid nu% Ise nksde !nine 1144 dr449i111% 14, the tiultrrntr t antrt u! .1ign�ak Tin� thin) Nether 4'4141rt. tilt- Stipn�mr 0stur1 411 Alliteul�. ha� fill- mrmloe�r% aemi is hrade4l I/% a ptr.idrut. %tat i% A%%W �d 11% four 4rn.nw�14/n !"till the a141r1 tf Aplr�1d� "Pile funeti4gt o! Ihi% c�etsri is Inch 1% 141 clllrif% life tau ilnd in�ur4� 44rn�cnr.. 4j interpn4111h111: it it" 1111 ndr 41n the L14�h in is raw�. It hewn apprah front all lower court.. A w�ilurulr stitch 0 .�f jimi a lien itiawdr Ili,- n�etulur jmli4ial %Weed .still hit juriwtiction f)nh filter miners again.! the �tale: Ihrn� i. list a /twill front clrclsiott44. I1� memlwAip croteprSm till- prr.itte�nt sot III� Nalhmul A44w�mi:h. w I,.t w�n4�. a� pn�.idenl fit list- ctrttrl. flinv Calliw'. m;iti4em w-.1 there nn�tnlx�r� fif the Nalifi4...! .wrenbl% "f i,t- stitch (stied st(ju.ticr ha. Ioeen ttw�d total% tuicr. lie April Mal) it tried if getup fit prewm aettiw�d tf phillinet at successfully combined a popular awareness of the goal of liberation from French rule with a highly effective organization to achieve political independence. The next step, says Toure, is it "qualitative" jump forward toward realization of a tnly indigenous social organization based on African, not foreign, values. It was to make this "qualitative" adva -tee that the Guinean cultural revolution was proclaimed. Its methods are ideological education and increased domestic militancy. These methods are often harshly applied, however, and offer few material induce- ments. Other social policies are aimed at achieving educational reforms, gaining literacy in an indigenous language, eliminating the deprecattry attitude toward manual labor, and bridging the gulf between urban and less sophisticated aural inhabitants. Programs to effect these changes have frequently aroused popular discontent because of the emphasis on social control. Educational reforms have entailed the i reposition of government control over all schools and students, revision of the curriculum to deemphasize classical French training, awl rapid expansion of dcational 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 facilities and enrollment. The ultimate goal is establishment of Centers of Revolutionary Education as self- sustaining in which agricult -+ral production theoretically is combines with political indoctrina- tion. Toure's preoccupation with ideological indoctrination may, in the long run, make the schools as unresponsive to Guinea's actual needs as they were under the French system during the colonial era. PDG policies aimed at eliminating tribal allegiances include participation in governt,tent by individuals from all major tribes and rotation of government personnel outside their own tribal areas. The political security of the leadership is another objective of the rotations. The scheduling of important party meetings in all parts of the country and frequent tours of interior areas by national leaders are part of the effort to break down tribal and regional parochialism and wipe out attitudes associated with former hereditary tribal aristocracies. To further social equality the PUG encourages members of those groups who have little status in the traditional tribal system (youth, %women, unmarried men, and those traditionallt associated with servant classes) to participate in party affairs and rise through the party structure by loyal performance. The goal is to replace traditional groupings with party organizations, thereby making the PDG the final arbiter and sole sanctioning body for all important .ac tivities. The PDG's substantial success in achieving this goal confirms its claim to be a revoluti.nary leader among African political parties. The party has demonstrated its commitment to equal treatment of all elements of the society by providing better opportunities for women, ordering students and city workers to the countryside to work on farms, and compelling the military to participate in civic action projects. Toure's determination to prevent the emergence of special interest groups with loyalties outside the party is evident in his harsh treatment of the surviving remnants of the merchant class and in the barrage of propaganda warning against the emergenct of a bourgeoisie. Guinea's economic goals include the creation of a viable modern economy, improvement of living standards, and control of all economic life by Guineans. These goals are to be achieved via a planned economy, but Guinea has never had n effective national plan. In a kind of reverse Marxism, Toure has declared that Guinea's economy must he based on its politics, and he appears confident that economic goals can be reached by taking correct political decisions. Guinea has had two multiyear economic plans, but these have been more 14 compendiums of hopes than effective instruments for national planning. The development of a rtew 5 -year plan is to be the sole item on the agenda at the 10th PDG Congress, scheduled for late spring 1973. Although Toure rants against capitalism and foreign investment, Guinea's substantial mineral resources arc being exploited in cooperation with large foreign companies. Despite his revolutionary rhetoric, Toure has largely fulfilled his promises to the private investors. The government needs outside aid in exploiting these resources because Guinea lacks the required capital, market outlets, and expertise. The earnings derived from the sale of the ores and metals will continue to he the govemment's major soarce of foreign exchange for some time to come. Toure is counting heavily on returns from the extraction of minerals to allow continuation of many of his domestic experiments, such as his decision in 1960 to create an independent Guinea currency, �tow called the syli. The government has repeatedly asserted that earnings from bauxite deposits at Boke will provide the required foreign exchange beginning in 1973; that Soviet rights to bauxite deposits at hindia will satisfy demands for payment of back debts by the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies; and that development of untapped iron ore deposits in southeastern Guinea, when exploited, will insure economic momentum through the 19$0'x. if the benefit to the government of these mining enterprises falls short of Toure's expectations, however, his followers are likely to be even more disillusioned. particularly if consumer shortages and demands for economic sacrifices continue. The government insists on strict concession agreements with foreign developers allowed to operate in Guinea. Most agreements provide for progressive Guineanization of the work for r and for tight controls on foreign exchange and on the repatriation of profits. Although the structure of the economy is changing, Guinea is still predominantly an agricultural country. The regime has not been successful in its attempts to collectivize agriculture, and subsistence farming continues to provide the largest portion of the total national output produced by the private sector. Purchase of agricultural products is by state monopolies. while distribution of consumer goods is controlled by regional committees directly subordinate to party federation officials. These controls, combined with the chaotic management of the distribution system and drastic restrictions against private traders, contribute to the continuing shortage of consumer goods. Furthermore, policies which make the Guinean currency nonc�onvertible at the legal rate, plus serious APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 domestic inflation, have led to extensive blacknrarket- ing and smuggling. Although the citizenry has borne such hardships stoically, the potential for an explosion against the regime exists. Despite the economic problems created for Guiuca by its withdrawal front the French controlled African franc zone in 1960, the regime defends the national currcncv as a symbol of independence. It regards as not fully independent those African countries which are unwilling lo pursue independent monetary policies and whose currencies are part of a larger currency area, such as the franc �none. 4. Foreign policies (S) Toure's ideological views place his government alongside Communist nations on most international issues. Nevertheless, the regime has reiterated and frequently demonstrated by its actions its determina- tion to avoid becoming dependent on any power. Communist or otherwise, and to pursue its own interests. These interests mainly are the security of Cuinea and the long -range goals of national development and African unity. Pursuit of these goals, entwined as they are with sensitivities arising front it recent colonial past, the search for an authentic African identity, and the need for foreign economic aid, has frequently resulted in tensions .which strain Guinea's relations with its neighbors and other nations. Toure is careful, however, to balance off worsening relations with one major power by making friendly moves toward a rival power. Shrewd application of this technique since independence has preserved considerable freedom of movement for Toure and gained for Guinea substantial amounts of foreign aid. a. Relations with African states Guinea's close ties with Communist states and hostility toward Paris have caused some problems with its moderate neighbors Senegal and Ivory Coast and contributed to its political isolation. Conakry favors it unified African military command and has traditionally supported a much tougher position on the question of the Portuguese territories than have most other African governments. Another complicat- ing factor has been Toure's practice of harboring dissidents or exiles from other African countries. Most notable among these was Ghana's late President Kwame Nkrumah, who was granted asylum following his ouster in 1966 and resided in Guinea until his death in 1972. Withdrawal from the franc zone and establishment of a national currency not backed by gold have cut off mist legitimate regional trade. Guinea took its first tentative step toward African unity in 1958 when it joined Ghana in a "union" of the two countries, which was expanded in 1960 to include Mali. Few steps were ever taken to implement the agreements, however, and it few years later the union was declared defunct by Guinea. In January 1961, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali joined Morocco, tits United Arab Republic, and the Provisional Governnnent of Algeria in forming the Casablanca Group. '['his organization took a militant stand oil African questions and set up an African Iligh Command. The Casablanca Croup never functioned effectively, however, and was finally dissolved in the summer of 1963 on the grounds that it had been overtaken by the formation of the Africa -wide Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tours strongly supported the establishnuCnt of the OAU, but since its creation he has frequently expressed disappointment over its lack of militancy and leadership in African affairs. The overthrow of two radical west African leaders who generally shared Guinea's pan African, anti colonial views� Kwarne Nkrumah in Ghana in February 1966 and Modibo Keita in Mali in November 1968 �also thwarted Guinea's African policies. In recognition of their past association as revolutionary brothers, Toure promptly gave sanctuary to Nkrtunah and declared him a co- President of Cuinea, but the title was strictly honorific. Nkruntah's presence in Conakry ruled out it reconciliation behveen 'Toure and the military junta that ousted Nkrumah or %with the junta's civilian successors, the Busia government. Busia's overthrow in January 1972 and Nkrurnah's death the following April opened the way for an improvement in relations. Tourr's welers met with a positive response in Accra, suggesting that both countries desired an end to the %ears of hostility and recrimination. Toure's move was part of a general diplomatic offensive designed to improve Guinea's relations with African states and to refurbish his government's image in the wake of the unfavorable publicity generated by the intensive domestic political purges of 197 I. Relations with Ghana were reestablished in February 1973. Relations with neighboring Mali have had their ups and clowns, reflecting for the most part Toure's attitude toward its rulers. One immediate result of Nkrumah's overthrow and Guinea's growing isolation was Toure's decision in 1968 to establish even closer ties with Modiho Keita in Mali. This trend was short lived, however, because of an army coup in November 1968 which toppled Keita's leftist government. Despite Toure's distrust of Mali*s new military rulers 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 and his suspicions of French involvement in the coup. he did not break diplomatic r.�lations and cautiously avoided antagonizing the new regime. Relations gradually wartned after an initial 1wriod of coolness, and they were cordial in late 1972. Tonre particularly uppreciated the Mali regime's immediate suplxrt after the 194 invasion. Relations with Lilwria and Sierra Leone are genendly gourd, hilt there are occasional disputes over trading concessions, tribal matters. lit(] illicit liorder crossings. Lilm�rian President Tolbert has followed the example of his predecessor, the late President Tubman, in sparing no effort to maintain cordial relations with Guinea and Toure. Tolbert visited Conakry soon after succeeding to the presidency in July 1971, and he took an active part in OAU efforts in 197.2 to mediate the Guinea- Senegal dispute. Tour� reciprocated. and his only two journeys outside Gnine, since I(fi(i wen� to Monrovia in mid -1972. Guinea's relations with Sierra Leone have been very close since Siaka Stevens became President in `lay 1968. Toure had provided a haven from which Stevens plotted against the military regime in Freetown. Then in March 1971. Toure dispatched Guinean troops to help Stevens regain control. following an ineptly staged comp by the Sierra Leone army commander. A secret defense agreement was hastily signed, about 2W Guinean troops were sent to Freetown. and (;uinean MiG -17's buzzed the city in a show of suplxrt Toure), help proved crucial, and a grateful Stevens energed more� in control than before. A contingent of about :)1) Cninean troops was conhmnng to act as Stevens' lxo yguard in early 1973. Guin(.a's relations with Portuguese Guinea are anigae because- of the anticolonial rebellion that has been going oil there for almost a decade. Conakry is the headquarters of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Cuine�a and the Calm- Verde Islands (PAICC), and is the lmrt of entry fur most of the supplies being provided the insurgents by Communist nations. The organization controls its own transport for moving supplies from Conakry to bases along Cuineu'+ northwest Imrder, and it olx�rates its own hospital near Boke. Toure had 1wrmitted the PAIGC considerable autonomy in nntning its operation from Guinea, but following the assassina- tion of PAIGC leader Amile ar Cabral in Co,aakry on 20 )ant ary 1973. 'Tonre began to assert more control over the organization's activities in Gidnea. Tnure�'s moves strained relations Im-tween the two, and in early 1973 relief combat troops stationed in Conakry Im -gall relocating to the "Idwrated" territories. Only a small headquarters staff remained in Conakry to handle IR incoming supplies. There are cennpelling reasons on both sides to patc�l �i the quarrel, however, and no significant diminution of Guinean help is expected. The fact that Conakry w;as the location for a meeting in April 1972 of the U.N. Special Committee on Decohmization re%tdted in mocli favorable publicity for the PAWL (Figure 6). 'Toure pushed other African governments hard for more concrete demonstrations of support for the anti Portuguese struggle following the 1970 Portuguese -led attack on Conakry, and ill 1971 the African Liberation Committee cif the WU opened it subregional office in Conakry. 'Toure believes that other African governments are not doing enough to aid lbe liberation movements, and he advocates a coordinated African effort to oust Portugal front the continent. The Guinean Parh Central Committee proposed to Senegal in !ate 0et0bV, that both countries aid the PAIGC militarily. Toure's desire to bracleo the stntggle in Portuguese Guinea is motivated in part by his fear that Guinea alone would bear the brunt of future Portuguese retaliation, as it did in 1970. Toure, who sees himself as it leader of the antic�olonial struggle in Africa, also gives strong diplomatic and propaganda support to other liberation movements whose goal is the- ouster of the Portuguese from all of Africa. For some years Guinea's relations with Senegal and Ivory Court have been seriously strained. Although slm�cific incidents bave over the years produced acute tensions, the continued poor relations result more� from basic differences of philosophy and temperament between President 'Toure on the one hand and Presidents Senghor of Senegal and I louphouet- Boigny of Ivory Coast on the other. Senghor and 1louphouet- Boigm have advocated free enlerprise and close tics with France and the West. while Toure has emphasized socialism, close ties with Communist governments, and Afric�anization. 'There list) are basic difference in attihades toward South Africa. 'Toure regards dialog with South Africa, as proposed by Ilouphoucl- Boigny in 1971, as it betrayal of Africa's interests. Tensions among the three leaders also are increased !y the fact that among the hundrecls of thousands of Guineans who have fied to neighboring countries for economic or political reasons, some arc� actively working for 'I'nure's ovo�rthrow. In 1966 Cuincan exiles in Abidjan formed, with help from the Ivory Coast Covernmcnt, the Guinean National Liberation Front in an attempt to unify all anti- Toetre exiles. The refusal of authorities in 1)aakar and Abidjan to return anti -Toure exiles to Guinea and to end completely the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 k. F.- FIGURE 6. The U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization visits Guinea in April 1972. (top) Opening meeting of the committee at the People's Palace. (center) Members of the PAIGC in fatigues at the opening meeting. (bottom) Committee members at a PAIGC school. (C) activities of Liberation Front rnernbers on their soil has not helped snooth relations with Conakry. Relations between Guinea and Senegal wyere furehc�r embittered by their dispute following the Portuguese- led attack on Conakry in 1970. Senghor's unwilling- ness to extradite Guinean exiles charged with c�otnplicit' in the attack resulted in i t propaganda wy it mud various retaliatory neasures im the diplorrratic� and ec�ouotic fields, aucl it prornMed 'I'oure to c�ornplaiu to the OAV. Aft( r several nu�diation efforts by it sPeeial At' c�ounitlee of African leaders, it public rec�omci hill iolt wyas reached in \Ionrovia just before the 1972 OAL' summit in Rabat. The exile elueslion endoubtedly aas also discessecl at it ueetirg in Guinea in July 1972 between 'I'oure and Ivory (:oast President Ilouphouc't- Boigny. Althougl uco agree ments were announce(l, the fact that the� meeting �the� first fretwyeen the lwyo nu a in 9 gars took place at all indicates a desire on both sides to seek improved relations. \ny lasting reconciliation with either tieghor or IIouphoeel- Boignx. however, depends on their wyillingness to eliminate exile ac�tiyit w w�ithin their countries. Sekou 'I'oure's c�omcept of African unite allows for regional organinc. ions. but oly if such groupings are not vulnerable to pressure and nanipeI;etion by foreign powyers. An example of one organization that does not Ineet 'I'oure*s standards and is conscyuentIv cordenned as an expression of neoco!onialisme is the reach inspired :1fro \1ala, and Mauritian (:onunon Organization. 'I'oure would partic darly like to sec Africans exert more control over thei financial affairs A common African currency not based or the French friurc� or the 1�:nglish pound, for ex11111le. wyoulcl not only be ideologic�.dl\ sound, according to 'I'oure. but would offer him i t politically uc�ceptablc wyay to revamp Cuinea's financial structure. wyhic�h no\y depends on the urbacked and virtually worthless Guinean syli. 'forre favors it region;d grouping c�onbining both French- and I ?rglish- speaking \frican countries and he has supported noyes in that direction, notably at disc�nssions in Monrovia in \pril 196' Ile supports the idea for the sane reason that 1-'ranee opposes it: because cc�onomically powycrf it states such as Nigeria wyould overshadows France's main backers in Afri;�a and probably diminisl French liegen anumg its former colonies. \s wyitb all African groupings� the crucial test for'I'otre is wyhetheran organization is free from control, f or otherwise, by nom- Africans. (:ninea has not taken it position on tile newly funned Organization for the Developtrc'nt of the Senegal Iliver composed of Scnegul. Mali, and Vlaritania. For political reasons 'I'oure gave rhetorical support to its predecessor organization, the Organization of Senegal River States, which had the same purpose and included Guinea. ''oure's dispute with Senghor in 1971 forced the other three members to regroup wyilhout Guinea in order to make ary progress Io\yurd approving and implementing APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 development plans. Mali and Mauritania were careful not to exclude the possiLility of GtOnea's joining the new organization in the future if it so wishes, however. b. Relations with Communist states Guinea has diplomatic relations with all Com- munist countries, and most of them maintain diplomatic missions in Conakry. The U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and Cuba support significant military and economic assistance programs in Guinea. Trade with Communist countries continues to be fairly heavy. Several hundred Guineans are studying in Communist countries, and well over a thousand Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban technicians work in Guinea. The relatively close relations which Guinea maintains with most Communist countries were further strengthened in 1971 and 1972. Toure rhetorically placed Guinea in the forefront, along with the Comra(anist states, of the world socialist camp and claimed an important role for Guinea in the fight against world imperialism. Both the U.S.S.R. and China renewed their political support of the Toure regime during 1971, and Communist aid commit- ments, physical presence, and role in Guinea's security services were all expanded. Guinean delegations visited the U.S.S.R., China, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Albania during 1971. The Hungarian President visited Conakry in December 1971, a high -level delegation of the CPSU atl ^nded the 25th anniversary of the PDG in May 1972, and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro paid an official visit, also in May. The Communist -front World Peace Council awarded its 1971 peace prize to President "Toure. On the economic side the U.S.S.R. began implementing an agreement concluded in 1969 under which the Soviets agreed to provide $92 million in aid as their share of a joint project for exploiting the bauxite deposits near Kindia. The Communist states were the first nations to offer aid and recognition when Guinea became independ- ent in 1958. Since that time they have extended over $300 million in economic aid to Guinea and Have provided economic advisers as well. The raid on Conakry and Portugal's role in the invasion were cited 4 Toure as conclusive "proof' that Guinea was the target of a permanent imperialist plot. Toure bitterly condemned not only Portugal but gradually extended his condemnation to five major Western powers., including the United States. Expecting new attacks, Toure turned to the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist states for help, especially military aid. The Soviets seized the opportunity and were able to 18 enlarge their foothold in Guinea at minimum risk and cost. Sizable shipments of military supplies, including additional MiG's, tanks, and radar controlled guns, were sent to Toure, along with more Soviet technicians to advise on radio operations, gunnery, and construction of military fortifications. Moscow also gave political and propaganda support to the Guinean cause. The 1970 raid on Conakry has worked to tle benefit of th(, Communist nations particul Cuba and the Soviet Union because it heightened Toure's security fears and prompted him to establish closer relations with these nations. Nevertheless, "Toure continues to insist �and justifiably �that he is not a puppet. Conakrv's relations with Moscow have not always been entirely smooth, although Toure's ideological proclivities and his need for Soviet aid have usually prevented a scriou5 breach in relations. On two occasions, in 1961 and 1969, Toure ordered the Soviet ambassador to leave because of alleged involvement with Guinean dissidents. In addition, it Soviet vice consul was quietly expelled in January 1972, because of Guinean suspicions about his local contacts. The presenc of an almost permanent Soviet naval patrol off the coast of Guinea since mid- December 1970 adds a new, important dimension to U.S.S.R.- Guinea relations. 'The patrol, usially consisting of two or three warships and it support vessel, was provided by Moscow in answer to Toure's appeals for help after the Portuguese attack. The Soviet ships have free access to Conakry harbor and have broadened their mission to include visits to other west African capitals. China is the only major power which has had a consistently good reputation with Guineans, who admire the unobtrusive and hard working Chinese technicians numbering some 500 -600 in late 1972. The Chinese took advantage of it crisis in U.S. Guinean relations in late 1966 to strengthen their position. A climate of mutual trust has been created over the years with the extension of unfettered aid on generous terms. The Chinese have concentrated mainly on agricultural and hydroelectric projects, but thcv also built a cigarette and match factory and are reported to have established it small arms repair facility. Many Guineans, including President Toure, are impress( by China's revolutionary ideology, the apparent similarity of China's problems with those of Guinea, and the exemplary behavior of Chinese echnicianx. Moreover, China has thus far managed to avoid the charge of attempting to subvert the Guinean Governrn �a charge which Toure has leveled at one time or another against every other major aid donor. Peking responded to the 1970 invasion of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 Conakry with additional aid. An exchange of military delegations in mid -1971 was followcd Iv small Chinese shipments of military supplies to Guinea, but the U.S.S.R. remains by far the major providerof arms aid. Guinea also maintains good relations with other Communist countries. North Korea has given token aid, and it military delegation visited Conakry in X1141t eh 1971, although no aid agreement seems to have beets signed. Guinea signed it cultural agreement with North Vietnam in 1966, while proclaiming its support for Vietnam's fight against U.S. imperialism. Conakry's close contacts with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam constitute recognition in all but the formal sense. Guinea hits relations with all Eastern European nations, including East Germany, whose mission to Conakry was raised to ambassadorial level in September 1970. Almost all of the Communist stales of Europe provide Guinea with sonic form of aid. Cuba has good revolutionary credentials in the eyes of the Guinean leaders, who view Fidel Castro as if successful revolutionary. The visit of Fidel Castro to Conakry in May 1972 highlighted the steadily developing relations between the two countries. The number of Cubans working in Guinea and the extent of Havana's aid expanded in 1971 and 1972, probably as a result of the events of November 1970 and Toure's desire to keep the foreign aid program to Guinea as broadly based as possible. Cuba provides some military assistance and assigns advisers to train Guinea's militia and security services. In 1972 the Cubans constructed and began operating it special militia training center north of Conakry in 1972 and began work on improving Conakry airport. Militia members also are sent to Cuba for training. Cuba is believed to rank third, after the U.S.S.R. and China, in the number of advisers and technicians assigned to Guinea. In late 1972 there were an estimated 370 Cubans in Guinea, some of whom are connected with Havana's support of the Conakry -basal PAIGC. c. Relations with Western states Guinea's relations with the West in general have alternated between periods of cordiality and periods of dramatic tensions. Basically, Guinea's leaders view reliance on Western aid as a step backward toward colonialism. Relations are further confused by the fact that the regime's frequent public attacks on various Western governments often coincide with private assurances to those governments with which it still has diplomatic ties that Guinea desires good relations. These assurances are casually motivated b% purely economic considerations, while Toure's Marxist predilections account for his hostility to the capitalist world. A complete break with the West is unlikely because 'Toure still recognizes the need for Western capital and echnical help and sees the West as a useful counterbalance to the Communists. Shrewd manipulation of East -West rivalries has brought extensions of over $:4N) million in foreign aid to Guinea since independence. No period of tension has been more dramatic- than that which foliowed the 1970 attack on Conakry. The raid and its aftermath led to an erosion of the Western position. The staff of the I'.S. mission was reduced because of Guinean harassment, and tight restrictions were imposed by Guinea on the activities of remaining diplomats. As of early 197:3 the United States, Italy. Belgium, and Switzerland were the only Western governments operating embassies in Conakry. Government dealings with Western nationals. including representatives of Western nutting concessions, were often arbitrary and harsh. Dozens of foreigners, particularly German and French citizens. were abruptly arrested or expelled. The U. N. development program to Guinea was crippled by expulsion of most of its personnel. Radio and press denunciations of NATO, 1'.S. "imperialism." capitalism, and neocolonialism were made almost daily, beginning in July 1971, but by early 1972 overt manifestations of the hostility, particularly the radio denunciations, had subsided. West Germany, whose standing in Conakry had been deteriorating since earl\ 1970, was an early casualh' of the November 1970 attack. Toure charged Bonn's ambassador in Conakry with complicity in the raid and the West German Government with supplying arms and uniforms to the attackers. Toure also claimed that Bcut had assumed control of the anti "Toure exile movement following Conakry's diplomatic break with Paris in 1965. Relations were broken in January 1971, and all West German nationals were ordered out of the country. Economic self- interest has dictated the reestablish- ment of normal relations with the l?nited Stator, and this probably softened anti-L.T.S. actions taken during the postinvasion period. Since the mid- 1960's. U.S. aid, especially P. 1. 480 food, has been crucial to the Guinean economy, and private U.S. investment is a prime factor in developing Guinea's bauxite, on which the regime pins its hopes for economic advancement in the 1970's. Conakry's regular submission of its annual 1). L. .180 request in Decenber 1971 was ono of the 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 early signs that, despite public attacks, Guinea wanted economic cooperation with the United States to continue. U.S. Guinean relations had worsened steadily during 1971, as Guinean charges of U.S. subversion and meddling becante more explicit. U.S. membership in NATO, Washington's refusal to condemn Portugal in the United Nations, and Tome's conviction that the United States, as an ally of Portugal in NATO, at least had foreknowledge of the Portuguese plans �all contributed to the strains. Virtually all imporhut Guinean officials overly friendly to the United States auul the West were among those arrested during the- purge. The climate of suspicion made it impossible for the small Peace Corps program to continue. At one point the U.S. aid program was referred to as a cover for U.S. intelligence activities. U.S. protests of the allegations initially were met with private assurances that these were not official views but simply charges by individuals that required further investigation. By this approach Toure evidently_ hoped to keep his options open. This ambiguity, which has characterized U.S. Guinean relations almost since independence, results largely from ideological factors. Close ties with the United States do not easily harmonize with Guinea's Wore militant revolutionary posture, and Sekou Toure is careful that no one appears more militant than he. The public denunciations satisfied the ideological requirement that the United States he c�ondentned as part of the "imperialist conspiracy," while the private assurances were designed to salvage a basis for continued cooperation. Tours� has avoided staking his personal prestige on a pro- or anti -U.S. policy, and on those occasions when anti Americanism or suspicion of Westerners stimulated by events �as in 1970 -71 �the Guinean leadership has permitted and even encouraged the expression of popular emotions. A crisis in 1966 led to demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy and expulsion of the Peace Corps. U.S. aid was reduced at that time and now consists only of a small P.L. 480 program. 'rhe govc�rnit t s attitude toward France is ambivalent. Cultural and language ties remain, but emotions aroused in the preindependence political campaigns and by France's brusque withdrawal after the 1958 referendum aggravated anti French feelings. The break in 1953 caused hostility on the French side as well, and it was not until January 1959 that France extended diplomatic recognition. Relations hit it low point in the spring and summer of 1960, when Guinea created its own currency free from ties with the French franc. Guinean charges of French complicity in a plot 20 to overthrow the government further aggravated relations and delayed the exchange of ambassadors until April 1961. 'I'll(- Guinean Government made if concerted effort to strenglheu tics with France in the wake of charges by Totre in late 1961 that Soviet representatives were engaged in subversive activity. Guinea was interested in finding ne%y sources of foreign aid, both to make up for anticipated Soviet cutbacks and to assert its independence of Communist countries. Toure� has frequently employed this tactic whenever Cuinea's relations with one or another major aid clonor have soured. Basic suspicions between Prance and Guinea remained, however, and their fragile relations were again shattered in late 1965, when Toure accused France and Ivory Coast of engineering and financing a plot to overthrow his regime. Diplomatic ties were broken and have not been reeshblished. Guinea made overtures to France in late 1967, but the suspicion that Paris was involved in the Mali coop of 1968 revived old animosities. Frances pro- Biafra sentiments during the Nigerian civil war also were viewed as evidence of French neocolonialist deigns oil Africa. The familiar pattern of Guinean overtures and French caution, followed by a dramatic event precluding reconciliation. was repeated in 1970. Talks on longstanding financial differences were held early in the year, touching off speculation about eventual normalization of political ties. The Portuguese attack on Conakry in November and subsequent Guinean charges of French complicit dashed hopes for progress toward better relations. French nationals living in Guinea were a particular target of the 'I'oure reginne during the 1971 purges. Some French nationals were released from Guinean jails in December 1972. however, and the time may he ripe for cautious resumption of contacts with Paris. Guinea retains diplomatic relations with a number of other Western countries and is an active participant in various international organizations. In line with its anticolonial foreign policy and its solidarity with the other African states, Guinea broke relations with the United Kingdom in December 1965 over the Rhodesia question. Unlike France, the United Kingdom accepted 'roure's overtures in 1967 for better relations, and diplomatic relations were: reestablished if year later. As it member of the United Nations, Guinea is primarily interested in colonial issues, particularly Portuguese activities in Africa, and in the problems of underdeveloped countries. Guinea began a 2 -year term as one of the nonpermanent members of the Securitv Council in 1972. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 E. 'Threats to government stability (S) The hostility directed toward Guinea by France and its African client states �loth at the time Guinea ,pted for independence and since�has induced among Guinean leaders it profound sense of isolation and suspicion that is oftt it described as paranoid by outside observers. As far as Toure is concerned, foreign subversion, particularly by the "imperialists," is a fact of Guinean life. Portuguese involvement in the November 1970 raid is seen by him as dramatic proof of this view. The regime also has always had an appreciation of the propaganda value of the charges of alleged subversion and has employed them to explain away regime failures and to justify Toure's constant demands for more sacrifices and greater militancy. This tactic has never been fully successful, however, and there is considerable popular discontent with the regime. 1. Discontent and dissidence Popular dissatisfaction, focuses on the stagnant economy and the burdensome measures imposed by the government to promote its economic plans and maintain tight political control. Economic stagnation and economic difficulties are all the more glaring because of the nation's large mineral reserves and its agricultural land suitable for a variety of crops. The popular reaction to the government's poor per- formance has not been open hostility, the tight political controls imposed by the regime inhibit the development of an effective internal opposition. Some disaffected Guineans leave the con:try illegally. Others retreat to the interior or !o the family farm. where government mismanagement and restrictions on individual freedom have less impact. The disaffection of young people and students appears to have been a particular problern for Toure in the past few years, calling into question the effectiveness of the regimes pervasive indoctrination programs in the schools. Merchants in particular are dissatisfied with regitne policies. Prior to November 1964 many merchants, traders, and market women were active in party affairs and won local election. to top offices. As the regime's socialistic economic policies began to he implemented, however, their disruptive effects on the economy created popular dissatisfaction and growing demands for reform. On the defensive, the regime singled out the merchants as the scapegoats, and they became the principal targets of the November 1964 anticorruption drive and the first group against whom dismissal from party membership was used as it punishment. Among those merchants disciplined wire many of Lebanese extraction. The small (about 1,000) Lebanese community has newer been fully integrated into Guinean life, and the Lebanese are regarded by the regime as exemplifying the exploitative, boorgeois mentality, although Toure probably does not feel thev are a subversive. threat. One of the n. st difficult and persistent problems confronting Toure and the PDG is how to reconcile the differences between the political leaders who have risen through the party ranks and individuals, loosely defined as technocrats, who have reached positions of authority in the regime by virtue of their competence in a particular area. Both groups are part members, but the latter are generally less involved in party affairs, favor more pragmatism in economic policies, are more informed about the world outside Guinea, favor closer ties with non Communist countries, and are better educated than many PDG officials. The politicians cling to Marxist slogans and emphasize loyalty as the principal criterion for advancement. They are distrustful of the outside world, favor curbing foreign investment, and advocate a more militant line for the party. Toure tends to favor party regulars over the technocrats, because he sees the latter as a potentially antirevolutionary class of entrepreneurs whose interests often coincide with those of foreign capitalists. Frequent cases of corruption on the part of heads of enterprises or technocrats who deal with foreign firms have confirmed Toure's bias. In early 1969 a number of technically oriented middle -level officials were removed from office during it general purge. The finance and economic ministries were hardest hit. According to "Toure, these elements constituted a national bourgeoisie that syas helping foreigiii imperialists undermine the revolution. Appointments were henceforth to be made on the basis of political reliability. 'The even wider purge of 1971 finished what the purge of 1969 left undone and settled, at least for the time, the question of %which group would prevail. Despite Toure's success in maintaining tight political controls, the basic economic dilemma remains: how to revive Guinea's stagnant economy and promote: rational economic development without creating it favored group of technically skilled individuals who would not be responsive to party slogans and discipline. There have been many false starts in the past, but finally in mid -1972 Toure appeared to be sufficiently confident of his political position to give serious attention to the economy. lie announced that it was "time to build the material 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 base for socialism in Guinea" and ordered the drafting of a new 3 -year plan. In a speech to the diplomatic corps Toure invited foreign help in achieving Guinea's economic goals and did not appear embarrass --d by the fact that only a few months earlier he had described Western aid programs as vehicles for foreign espionage. His apparent readiness to seek greater foreign help in 1972 was tantamount to an admission that the demands for belt tightening of the last decade and a half had taxed the patience of the people and risked the security of his regime. Nevertheless, there are political dangers associated with a serious effort to deal with the nation's economic problems, since this would almost inevitably requir. increased foreign aid and provision of individual incentives to producers. This then would mean the position of the moderates and the technocrats would be strengthened and Toure would be vulnerable to charges from party militants that greater foreign involvement in the economy was a betraval of the revolution. That charge was previously leveled at Toure because of his decision to allow foreign investors to provide some $230 million for the development of Guinea's bauxite industry, one -half of which came from U.S. sources. Toure is an accomplished politician and manipulator of opinion, however, and he gives every appearance of being able to prevent his critics from coalescing into an organized opposition which would threaten his continued domination of national life. In terms of power, the military is the greatest potential threat to the security of the government. Over the years the army ranks and the officer corps have been demoralized by purges, by lack of material and moral support from the government, and by President Tovre's frequent insistence that professional military duties give way to civic action projects �such as roadbuilding �that are more befitting a "people's army." Toure has always been wary of the coup potential of the armed forces. Following the army coup in Mali in 1968 he seemed particularly concerned about the loyalty of his own forces and took additional steps to subject them to party discipline. In early 1969 Toure disclosed an alleged military plot and arrested the deputy chief of staff of the army, the commanders of the small air force and navy, and scores of lower ranking personnel. Nine plotters were eventually sentenced to death. These moves coincided with his decision to upgrade the militant and more politically reliable 8,000 -man militia, which was designated by Toure as the "defender of the revolution." Toure strengthened the militia further following the 22 November I970 raid, crediting that body with driving out the attackers. lie was critical of the army's poor showing and subsequently purged several ranking army officers, including its commander. Militia officers were even transferred into the regular army officer corps. Together the 1969 and postinvasion arrests represented a complete purge of the military cYmmand staff. Toure also has tried to insure that the other branches of the security service remain apart from army influence and control. Despite these provocations, the Guinean military shows no signs of willingness to challenge the government, although it still has the capability of being a threat to the regime. Toure's precautionary moves have had the predictable effect of creating jealousy among the services and morale problems within the army. Nevertheless, they also have prohibited the concentration of military power in the hands of a single establishment or the creation of an elitist minded officer corps similar to those that have intervened in the politics of mam� neighboring states. There are almost no professional military cadres. The principle of civilian control of the military is well established, and military personnel are considered civil servants. Conflicts among other elements of the society undoubtedly exist. Even revolutionary Guinea must contend with divisions between youth and their elders, wage earners and subsistence farmers, and recently graduated students and older park- members with less formal education. The conflicts are masked, however, because of the pervasive organization of the party, and Toure's tight control precludes popular expression of opposition to regime policies. Ethnic rivalries also are present, but the regime's policy of absorbing ethnic leaders into the PDG and of downplaying loyalties has reduced the subversive threat from this factor. The political parties which opposed the PDG in the 19:50's were constituted along ethnic lines; the PDG's principal competitors were two Fulani- backed parties. Because of the loss of their former commanding position, the Fulani are suspected by Toure of playing a prominent role in antiregime activities. Ethnic loyalties among the population are still strong, and PDG leaders closely monitor the activities of Fulani and other tribal groups for any sign of antigovernment activity. 'There is little likelihood that any ethnic -based group within Guinea could develop sufficient strength or popular support to overthrow Toure in the foreseeable future. The extent of popular discontent can be measured by the number of Guineans who .ye fled the counts since independence, most of them illegally. Estimates APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 run as high is otte- sixth of dw population. Ironically, emigration acts as it safety valve, removing the most seriously dissuffected from the scene. Although popular dissatisfaction is potentially dangerous, civil (I isturhanees sufficient to threaten the reginu�'s survival would probable occur only if there should emerge tiff opposition leader with some visible support within the anny, the police, or the militia. Ec�ononiic hardship by itself has not been sufficient to provoke a flash revolt, and the average Guinean prolmbly will not act against the regime miless he sees it realistic alternative to rule by Sekou Totire. 2. Subversion a. Permanent "imperialist" plot Sekou Totire equtites all those who question his views, no mutter how slightly. with subversives. Ile is continually off guard against all forms of plotting, but because of past experiences with colonialism and his general political outlook bis primary preoccupation is with subversion from the "imperialists," partic�tdtirly Portugal and France. Since independence five major subversive plots �only one of them with Communist links �have [)evil exposed. The four "imperialist�- inspired plots arc considered by Totire to be episodes in it continuous attempt to subvert his government. vie most recent episode, which took pluc�e in November 1970, was the most serious threat to date and the onb one in which foreign military elements participated directly. The shock waves were still being felt in Conakry in lute 1972. In the early morning hours of 22 November it commando force of about 700 to 400 men, consisting of Portuguese Arm\ and Nave regulars and it smaller group of Guinean exiles, wits ferried ashore it Conakry from unmarked Portuguese naval vey.,els clearly visible from the port urea. Although the Portuguese and the exiles acted together, each seemed to have different objectives. The Portuguese forces, Gluck African commandos most likely recruited origin illy to conbut PRIGC, struck the Conakry headquarters of that rebel movement. The attackers were unsuccessful in their attempt to kill the rebel leader, hilt they did manage to free several Portuguese prisoners hell in it Guinean military camp. 'I'll(- Guinean exiles, on the other hand, were out ti topple the regime, and they hoped that their presence would spark it popular uprising uguinst the President. Portugal supported the operation because, in addition to striking at PAID(:� it offered it chance to overthrow Totire, who allows PAI( to operate from bases inside ;uinea. 'I'll(- Portuguese contingent handled its tasks skillfully mid pnfessionally. The force and the resc�ned prisoners had wilhdruwti to the w tiling ships less than 2 -1 hours after the landing. The exile contingent, however, was rounded up To :re's sectirit Nr forces after waiting in vain for an uprising. For ;bnost i year the regime pressed a witch Inuit for subversives une) suspected supporters of the invaders. Figure 7 shows it display of urns captured from the invaders. The exile contingent was recruited under the banner of the Guinean Notional Liberation Front (I� I.N( It looser' organized dissident grotip whose main centers of activity are in Paris, DaUr, and Abidjan. 1' I N( the ortly known organized opposiliou to Sekou Totire. dr;tws its support from oolong the over half million Guineans living outside the country. Its leadership consists mostly of politicians who lost out to Totire in the preindependence power struggic and of defectors from the Totire government. FLNG insde its first ptiblic� appearance in Abidj;u in March 1966. At Ihat time it had the covert siipport of the French ;overnment and the open backing of the Ivory (:oast Government. which was sharply it odds with Totire. FLNG is it heterogeneous grouping beset by perennial financial problens and by chronic disputes over questions of tactics :aid leadership. 1'-ior to November 1970. FLNG tactics centered nn propaganda and occasional Infiltration efforts. ;oid the front showed little capacity to affect events within Cuine;t. Broke and ineffectual, FLNG turned for aid in early 1970 to the Portuguese, who wanted to get even with Sekou Totire for his mirestric�led aid to 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 FIGURE 7. African leaders at OAU meeting in Lagos inspecting arms captured from invaders in late WO (C) PAIGC, the successful insurgent organization that controlled it part of Portuguese Guinea. The November raid was the result. Since the attack, FLNG seems to have reverted to its previous ineffective state. Lisbon, which suffered politically from the raid, apparently has withdrawn it, backing, although it probably maintains scnne contacts with the exiles against the possibility of future cooperation. 'rhe likelihood of such cooperation would be increased if PAIGC scored significant military or Political successes in its skirmishes with the Portuguese. Continued lack of foreign backing probably will force FLNG to revert to previous tactics, including renewed efforts to assassinate Touere. FLNG's leadership appeared to be in it state of flux in mid -1972, as the various factions sought to shift the blame for the failure of the raid and to reorganize the movement. Moreover, 'rhe extensive arrests in Guinea following the 1970 attack almost certainly destroyed the bulk of FLNG's organizational assets wittin the country. Whatever support FLNG has in Guinea rests mainly on kinship solidarity. Bitterness on the part of relatives of those purged following the 1970 raid may have produced it number of silent symphathizers for FLNG's cause. The regime maintains that "imperialist" plotting predates the raid on Conakry, and as proof the government points to it series of incidents which occurred in the middle and late 1960*s. An assassination attempt in June 1969 while 'Toure was riding in an open car with Zambian President Kaunda was publicly attribnted to the "imperialists." President Toure also linked "imperialists" (par- ticularly France) with the military coup in Mali in 1968 and warned that their next target was Guinea. In March 1969 an alleged conspiracy by army officers to assassinate Toure resulted in it general purge of military and government officials. President Toure viewed the conspiracy as merely it continuation of the abortive 196.5 plot allegedly engineered and financed by Ivory Coast and France �to overthrow his government. The 1965 conspirators counted oil intervention by the army in support of it general uprising against the government, but they were arrested before the plans were put into action. Government accounts of the 1965 plot hit hard at the theme of ontside direction of counterrevolutionary elements within Guinea �a theme: that Toure seized upon in 1971 when he charged several Western countries with conducting espionage operations in Guinea, aided by opponents of the regime. The charge of foreign direction was also leveled at the participants in an anti Toure plot uncovered in April 1960, shc:iiy 2 -1 after Guineas creation of its own currency, a symbolic last step ill the break with France. Anus caches %were discovered in neighboring territories still under French control, and 'Toure charged that the ain was to foment a Fulani tribal uprising with cover French aid. In all these cases, the active plotters were few in number, and personal ambition rather than ideological issues played a large role. Most of the� plotters appeared to favor dramatic actions that tile\ hoped wwAl trigger it general uprising or militant intervention. In each case the regime exposed the plots before they could achieve an\ results and meted out harsh punishment. Although many Gnineans are dissatisfied with the regime in varying degrees, titer(- is little indication that the\ have any serions organization or capability for overthrowing it. However. an isolated, unpredictable event such as assassination of Toure remains possible and could spark it general nprising. b. Communist- inspired subversion Since independence Guinea has had extensive political, economic, cultural, and educational contacts with both European and Asian Communist countries, and these ties generally have boosted the prestige of those countries in Guinean eves. 'Toure has not given the Communist nations carte blanche, however, as was evident by his vigorous reaction to what he believed were subversive contacts between certain Guinean radicals and Soviet diplomats in the early 1960's. 'I'll(- representatives of the Communist states probably have little incentive to engage in activities which would risk jeopardizing their generally favorable situation in Guinea. "Toure keeps careful watch on Communist, particularly Soviet, activities, and has reacted strongly to any hint of unauthorized involvement in Guinea's internal affairs. 'Toure has leveled charges of subversion against the Soviets on at least three occasions, although he has succeeded in linking them directly with only one specific plot. In 1961, during it period of popular discontent over poor economic conditions, leftving leaders of the teachers union publicly criticized the Toure govenuneat for failing to improve conditions since coming to power. The government reacted by arresting two top union officials and five teachers. Secondary school students in Conakry and in some interior towns then staged a sympathy strike in support of their teachers. Fearing the protest might spread, the government called out tilt: militia, which was able to break the strike but only by resorting to brutal measures. Convinced that the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 Soviet Union had aided and encouraged the strikers. Toure expelled the Soviet Ambassador in Decentlier of that year and curtailed Gnumunist propaganda activity. "on-ever, full diplomatic tic's %Aen� s oxat restored. In 19ti9 relations with Moscow again entered a period of chill. Toure requested the withdrawal of the Soviet Ambassador after he learned of contacts between Soviet Embassy officials and individuals involved in an attempt to assassinate the President. In 1972 a Soviet Vice Consul was ex under circumstances which suggested he had been c'harge'd with espionage and subversion. The U.S.S.R. has provided credits and tec'hnic'al aid in many fields, including educatio medicine, and industry. Participation in the bauxite mining project near Kindia also adds to long -term Soviet leverage. In addition, the Soviet Union gives large amounts of military aid to Guinea. The Eastern European countries are active and influential in the fields of labxr, education, information, and youth activities. they also provide technical aid in various areas, including civil aviation, mining, medicine, and hydroelectric development. There are frequent exchanges of delegations in these fields, and many Guineans associated with them are trained in Communist countries. All these activities present the Communists with opportunities to cultivate it susceptible cadre within the regime. Several Communist -front and Third World solidarity organizations arc active in Guinea, and some have regional offices in Conakry. 'flee� regitne does not permit Guinean organizations to belong to the major Communist -front organizations such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the World Federation of Trade Unions, but it does send large delegations to international meetings sponsored by these groups. The main interest of the PDG is in African and Third World affairs, and the PIX; is a member of the Afro -Asian People's Solidarity Organization and of the Afro -Asian and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization. Guinea disseminates their propaganda in its press and radiobroadeasts. China was slower than the European Communist countries in offering aid to Guinea, but it has stepped up its aid program since 1964 and has been improving its political and propaganda position. Careful not to leave themselves open to charges of subversion, the Chinese have concentrated on technical aid programs, especially in agriculture, where they fecal they have a particular competence. The Chinese have sought to influence Guinea's political direction by paying special attention to the information media and the youth organization. A pcrtion of Guinean youth is particularly susceptible to the Maoist views on militancy and revolutionary purity, perhaps finding they have some relevancy in light of the malfeasance and favoritism practiced b% many PDG section and federation leaders. Be'c'ause the Chinese have scrupulously refrained from any actions Guinea might construe as interference in its internal affairs, the regime probably does not regard their activities as having a dangerous subversive pxtential. Nevertheless, the ever- suspicious gove'rnme'nt does monitor these activities. and should the Chinese move two openly to establish their influence particularly within the militia, which "Toure views as a primary bulwark of his strength they can expect the President to react as strongly as he did against the Soviets in late 1961. F. Maintenance of internal security (S) Guinea is a police state ruled by a strongman whose imsition depends largely on the effectiveness of his disciplined political organization, on an extensive network of private informers, and cn six separate securit services, all of them are controlled by the President. Two of the services, the police and the gendarmerie, are formally assigned the major responsibility for police duties, however, the rnilitarv, the Republican Guard, and the militia have police type dutie among the respomsibilities. In addition, a special security organisation was formed in mid -1972 to prote'c't the President and act as a riot police force. Most of the conditions traditionally associated with a police state arc present in Guinea to varying degrees. President Toure trusts no one and is read\ to believe rumors of betrayal by subordinates whose los-alty had previously been unquestioned. Consequently, the fear of denunciation and arbitrary arrest is ever present among the general populace and among those: nearest Toure. Individuals and organizations vie to prove their dedication to the revolution. Tight restrictions on information and travel have been imposed, and there is no truth but that which is expounded by tit(- President. Control of the population is facilitated by a mandatory system of identity cards issued by the National Police. Information contained on the cards which often are required at checkpoints established throughout the country, includes the individual's home region, arrondissement, and local PUG committee, his date and place of birth, his photograph and fingerprints, and his signature. To obtain a card the citizen must produce a birth certificate, it 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 certificate of residence issued by his local party committee, and a tax receipt. New national identity cards were issued in April 1972. Numerous changes in the lines of authority that accompanied the political upheavals during 1971, combined with the secretiveness of the Guinean system, have severely limited the amount of current information available on the organization of Guinea's police: and security service. Hollowing the 1970 attack on Conakry, responsibility for the direction of Guinea's defense was placed in the hands of a newly created High Command. A separate committee with overlapping membership was created to coordinate the orders of the High Command and the activities of the various federation headquarters. The Ministry of Interior arid Security was represented on the Coordinating Committee, but apparently not on the High Command. Subsequent reorganizations have cast doubt as to the continued functioning of these bodies. Most organizational changes since January 1969 have increased the directness of presidential control, brought the regular military more firmly under the umbrelia of the PDG, and augmented the power of the paramilitary organization at the expense of the regular army. 1. Police The two organizations whose primary duties are normally associated with a police force are the National Police Force and the gendarmerie. The police are responsible for maintaining law and order and are most active in urban areas, particularly Conakry. Their chain of command is not known precisely. Presumably the police general staff still exists, although it was not specifically mentioned in the flurry of decrees issued immediately following the 1970 attack. The police arc responsible to the Presi'ent through the Minister of the Domain of Interior and Security. Locally, each of Guinea's 29 administrative regions has its own police commis- sioner, who is under the jurisdiction of the respective regional governors. Police commissioners also exist at the arrondissement level. The 1,500 -roan National Police Force performs ordinary police functions investigation of crimes, traffic control, and law enforcement. It includes a numtwr of specialized police and security units, such as the Surete Nationale, the Economic Police Force, and immigration and customs inspectors. Many of these have overlapping functions. The Economic Police Force was created in 1963. (;barged with the suppression of economic crimes, fraud, and speculation leading to price fluctuations, it 26 has been accorded the right to search and seize. The Economic Police assume particularly active roles during the anticorruption campaigns announced periodically by the leadership. The Economic Police are not effective, however, because they are subverted, through bribes, by those they should control. Immigration and customs inspectors are present at all important border crossing points. They cooperate closely with the gendarmerie units patrolling the borders and with the Surete. Detachments are on duty in Conakry at the port and at the international airport. Entry and exit are tightly controlled, and border authorities are particularly alert to smuggling attempts and to border crossings by anti -Toure personnel. Guinean police appear to be reasonably effective in maintaining order; however, police recruits are not as well trained and equipped as those of the other uniformed services. Recruits are sent to the Police Training School at Kankan, which is estimated to have trained about 360 recruits between 1939 and 1966. Details on the availability of laboratory and technical aids to investigation, such as fingerprinting and ballistics, are not available, but such aids are believed to be minimal. President Toure relies heavily on the 1,000 -man National Gendarmerie to maintain order, particularly in rural areas. Its duties also include maintenance of internal security. It provides normal police services for much of the population and controls the country's bor- ders. (The army also has some responsibilities for border control, particularly along the border with Portuguese Guinea.) The gendarmerie is headed by a chief of staff, who coordinates its activities with other services in the Combined Staff. Coordination also is required with the governor of the region in which units are located. The gendarmerie is divided among five squadron areas, following the general pattern of the country's four major geographic regions plus Conakry. Squadron headquarters are located at Kindia, Labe, Kankan, Nzerekore, and Conakry. Within each squadron area the gendarmerie is organized into city brigades, frontier brigades, and mobile platoons. Because the gendarmerie is lightly armed, has limited transportation equipment, and is widely dispersed throughout the country, coordinated action is very difficult. It is a moderately well- trained force, however, and can perform its mission capably during normal times. The gendarmerie is treated by Toure as a separate, select group among the branches of the armed forces. Toure's favoritism was indicated in February 1970, when control of Guinea's Daly effective communications network, which serves the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 army, police, gendarmerie, and regional government officials, was transferred from army to gendarmerie control. The gendarmerie seems to have performed to the President's satisfaction since 1970 and has kept him well informed about events within the interior. Gendarmarie recruits are selected from the army and sent to the gendarmerie training school in Conakry. The exact function of the approxinrtely 1,200 Republican Guard is not known, but the Guard falls under the Minister of the Domain of Interior and Security and directly under the control of the Surete Nationale. The Guard's duties have previously included protection of the President. other govern- ment officials, and government installations. Important political prisoners were often placed ire the Guard's custody. Toure reorganized his personal bodyguard after 1970, increasing his reliance on Cuban and Soviet advisers and purging several Guineans from this elite group. It is not known precisely how these changes affected the duties of the Republican Guard. There are Guard troops in each admini,trative region. The force lost its job as guard of the Presidential Palace to the special security force organized in 1972. The 8,000 -man militia, a paramilitary organization attached to the PDC, has important police functions although it is not a regular police force. Administrative control of the militia rests with the Minister of the People's Army. Normally it is used on ceremonial occasions to help organize demonstrations and keep order. In some villages where there are no regular security forces, the militia appears to have a primary role in maintaining law and order. Militia tactics include the setting up of roadblocks and checkpoints to examine work and travel permits, and it has been empowered to make arrests. Many militiamen are armed during alerts. The militia is especially important to the regime as an instrument for reporting on the movement and activities of the population. Informal sources, such as members of the militia and party informants, provide the regime with much of its most important information. 2. Intelligence and security services The 1971 purges enhanced the role played by the intelligence and security services. By 1972 their status was quite high, and all other ministries paid deference to the Ministry of Interior and Security. The regular intelligence and security force is active and effective in monitoring the diplomatic community. judging from the quick exposure and suppression of even the slightest manifestation of anti -Toure activity, the security services are effective in protecting the regime against subversion. Cubans are the principal advisers to the intelligence and security services, as well as to the Presidential Security Force. An estimated 40 Cubans were serving as advisers as of August 1972. Included in both the PDG and the militia are irregular systems of informants who report directly to the President and to the police. 'These individuals often are not paid but provide information as a service to the party. President 'Toure has the largest network of informants, who operate outside the regular channels of the security services to help him keep tabs on his ministers and other important Guineans. This network, pr- &-ably organized along Tamil} lines, appears to be quite effective. The Surete Nationale is the principal body specifically organized to provide intelligence and to act as the investigative element against subversion. It monitors internal political activity and maintains surveillance over the activities of the foreign community. Because of Toure's suspicions and fears of possible threats to Guinea's independence and sovereignty, surveillance and investigation �both of foreigners and of Guineans �arc important functions of the Surete Nationale. Mail is censored, phones are tapped, travel to the interior and abroad is carefully controlled through visas and permits, it curfew for foreigners is enforced, and official contacts between foreign diplomats and Guineans must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Checkpoints are established on the outskirts of Conakry and throughout the country, and planned long absences from one's home area must be cleared in advance by local part and police officials. The police traffic section �a unit responsible for highway security outside the towns, especially in the Conakry area was renamed the Commissariat of Public Roads and placed tinder the control of the Surete in 1966. Military intelligence functions were the responsibil- ity of the Deuxieme Bureau of the army until early 1970, when that bureau was abolished. There is no evidence that the bureau was reestablished following the 1970 attack. Since its demise, President Toure has relied primarily on the Surete Nationale, border control units of the gendarmerie, and the reporting of various informers to provide him with most of the intelligence he considers important. Collection of intelligence on Guinean exiles anti on foreign countries has probably been assumed by the Surete, whose officials also advised Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens on security matters following Stevens' takeover in 1968. 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 3. Countersubversive measures and capabilities 'rhe Guinean security services have, on the whole, proved themselves loyal to the gover anent. Open dissidence has been effectively suppressed on those rare occasions when it has occurred. The allocation of security duties among several different organizations (and the care taken to sec that no one� individual or gronuP accumulates power sufficient to threaten the President) has given 'ronre alternative means of control si:�ild one organization prove wanting. For instance, Toure ordered a special army unit front Conakry to Faranah in 1972 when local officials and security forces proved either linable or ttnwilliug to suppress public disorders during and after an election dispute. When army units failed to respond effectively to orders during the 1970 raid on Conakry. Toure depended on local militia units and the gendarmerie to repulse the invaders. Roth units seemed to perform to Toure's satisfaction. The government possesses the abilit to move a fe�w hundred troops to strategic places within the country. Transport aircraft are available, and there are airfields at the important interior towns. About 200 Guinean troops were moved overland by truck to Freetown, Sierra Leone. during it government crisis in that country in 1971. The overall effectiveness of the security forces and their ability to protect the regime are attested to by the fact that no internally inspired conp plot h:s ever been implemented. Such plots, which included scone contrived by Toure for political reasons, have been exposed at an early stage. 28 G. Selected bibliography (U /01j) Political turmoil and government suspicious have prevented field research in Guinea during recent years. The few comprehensive treatments which exist are in the French language and often are dated. Arcin. La Guinee Francaise. Paris. 1907. Old, bill still the hasic work on Guinean ethnic groups. Attvood, Willi The Reds and the Blacks. New York: Ilarper and Row. 1967. Includes an inteesting account of Annhassador Attwood's tour in Cuing (1961.6 Garter. C"'endolen. African One -Party States. Ithaca: Cornell Ui iversity Pros. 1960. Guinea is one of several states treated. Useful in helping assess Tonre's one -party system. Department of the Army. Area Handbook for Guinea. Washington, D.C.: TIt(- American University. 1961. A comprehensive, detailed survey of Guinea but somewhat dated. Morrow, john II. The First American Ambassador to Guinea, New Brunswick. N. j.: Rutgers University Press. 1968. Interesting, modern history, bill conditions have changed considerably since it was ritten. Iliviere, Claude. i%lutations Sodales en Guinee. Paris: Editions Marcel Rnviere. 1971. Suret- Canale, )caul. La Republique de Guinee. Paris: Editors Sociales. 1970. The hest and most detailed available study of modern Guinea, despite the obvious leftist Political outlook of the author, a French sociologist with Gontnnunist sympathies who spent 5 years in Guinea 19.38 -63) as a teacher. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 Chruauloly WON) 1945 October France grants political rights to African colonies, and Guinea elects representatives to French parliament for first time. 1946 October African Democratic R�rlly (RDA) is founded by left -of- center African politicians from French colonies. 1952 Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), Guinean branch of the RDA, is reorganized and Sekou Toure becomes secretary general. 1957 March PDG wins 57 of 60 seats in Territorial Assembly and forms territorial cabinet. This assembly later becomes, first National Assembly of the Republic of Guinea. 1958 September In referendum (.:uinea rejects membership in French Com- munity. October Guinea proclaims independence. 1960 February FRIA (now FRIGUTA) alumina processing complex begins operations. July Three -Year Plan inaugurated. 1961 January Sekou Toure elected to 7 -year term as President of Guinea. November Leftwing "teachers plot" against government is exposed, followed by subsequent loosening of Guinea's close ties with Communist countries. 1964 November In response to continuing econonsic decline, Toure decrees Guinea's "fundamental law of the revolution." which calls for greater state control of economy. 1965 October Plot to overthrow the Toure regime is uncovered. Toure charges Ivory Coast and France with complicity and breaks relations with both. 1966 March President Toure offers Kwame 'Nkl umah haw�eee Mn Guinea after Nkrumah is overahrown 1)y �GMranaian Arm). October Guinea's Foreign Minister is detained it sierra by Ghanaian officials; as hostage for return of Nkruru Ghai". Toure. holds United States responsible because minister Mas taken from U.S. commercial airliner. Issue resolved through OAU mediation. 1968 January National elections lwld; bekcuu Toure reelected President of Guinea b.v near unanimous vote. September Guinea signs $64.5 million kan with IBRID to finaiwe ex- ploitstion of Boke bauxite deposits by Westeroo consortium. 1969 January Toure establishes political committees in Guinean Army, deemphasizes its military role, and increases its involvement in .civic action programs. March About 40 military and civilian officials arrested in connection with alleged coup plot. June Toure narrowly escapes assassination during state visit of Zambian President Kaunda. Assailant is killed by security forces. 1970 November Guinean exiles and Portuguese forces stage commando raid on Conakry, hitting the headquarters of the rebel movement opposed to Portuguese rule in Portuguese Guinea and freeing Portuguese prisoners captured by the rebels and held in Guinean Army camps. December Soviet naval vessels take up patrol off Guinea coast in response to Toure request. 1971 January Toure charges W,mt Germany with complicity in the 1970 attack on Conakry; all West German nationals are expelled from Guinea and relations are broken. National Assembly sentences 92 persons to death and 72 to life imprisonment for their alleged part in 1970 attack. 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7 SECRET March Guinea and Sierra Leone sign mutual defense agreement. Guinean troops immediately sent to Freetown to protect President Stevens front mutinous army troops. June Hundreds of Guinean and some foreigners arrested and interrogated. Radio Guinea airs extensive confessions which assert that U.S. and major W-stern powers were engaging in spying and subversion. 1972 April Ninth National Congress of PDG annou� ces government reorganization and points to economic development as principal concern for 1972. glus:ary (ul80) April -Moy Tw,r brief visits to Liberia by President Toure mark first time in several years he has ventured outside Guinea. May -41dy Unusually large number of foreign dignitaries visit Guinea, including Cuban Premier Castro and Ivory Coast President Houphouet Boigny. 1973 January PA1GC leader Amilear Cabral assassinated in Conakry. AnRRF %'IATION FonEIGN ENGLISH BPN.......... Bureau l'olilique National............ National Political Bureau CER.......... Corms l'l:a.wii1mtmtit 16oplatiannairo. Centers of Revolutionary Education CNR......... Conseil National de la Rcrolutiort...... National Congress of the Revolution C: NTG........ Con 'fedcration Nutionale des Trarailleurn National Confederation of Guinean de Guirlee Workers FLNG........ Front deLibera:ion Nationale deGuinee. Guinean National Iberation Front JRDA........ Jeunesse de la Rerolution Democratiquc Youth o: the African Democratie Revo- AJricaine lution PAiGC'....... Partido Ajricano do Independeucia do African Party for the Independence of Guine a Cabo Verde Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde Parti Democratique de Guinec........ Democratic Party of Guinea PRL.......... Pouroir Reeolutionnaire Local........ local Revolutionary Authority RDA......... Rassenlblemenl Democralique Africain. African Democratic Rally 30 NO FOREIGN DISSE 11 St:CRFT APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070001 -7