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SECRET 73 /GS /GP Honduras August 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced !:a'sctively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion or the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory l of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WAR \I \G This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, us amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or rceipt by an unauthor ?zed person is prohibited by law, CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASJIFI- CA'iON SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3i. DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 0 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by March 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 0 Honduras CONTENTS 1 This chapter supersedes the political cover- age in. the General Survey dated August 1969. A. Introduction 1 B. Structure and functiuuing of the government 2 1. Constitutional history 2 2. Executive branch 3 3. Legislative branch 4 4. Judicial branch 4 5. Civil service 5 6 Loc government 5 C. Political dynamics 6 1. Military 6 SECRET No FoRmcN DIssEm APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 2. Political parties a. National Party b. Liberal Party c. Progressive Popular Party d. Orthodox Republican Party e. National Innovation and Unity Party. f. Communist parties and front groups 3. Interest groups 4. Electoral law and practices a. Electoral law b. Electoral practices Pare 6 7 8 9 9 9 9 10 12 1.2 13 Page c. Policy toward agrarian reform 14 d. Policy on public administration 14 e. Policy toward other major needs 15 2. Foreign 15 E. Threats to government stability 16 1. Discontent and dissidence 16 2. Subversion 16 F. Maintenance of internal security 17 1. Police 17 2. Countersubversive and counterin- surgency measures and capabilities 17 D. National policies 13 1. Domestic 13 a. Historical perspective 13 b. Policy toward development planning 14 Chronology 18 Glossary :',0 FIGURES Page Page Fig. 1 General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, Fig. 3 Administrative divisions (map) 5 head of state (phc`o) 1 Fig. 4 Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus, national Fig. 2 Constitutional structure of the party leader photo) 7 government chart) 3 rig. 5 Election results table) 8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 Government and Politics A. Introduction (S) 011 -1 DCLTlllber 1972, General Oswald() Lopez Arellano. Chief of the f lon(Ictran Armed I orces (Figure 1), ousted President Manion Erncsto Cniz and resumed the presi(Icnc�y of Ilou(luras after only 15 months out of office. Although the coal) N%as triggere(! bN a hunger march of several thousmid pe:esants protesting Cruz Lick of interest in the rtec(Is of the rural poor, press(irc for the coo,) had been bciil(lirig up for over it year. l.'n(ler Cruz. Ilondunis had experienced an un(isuallY high I(wcI of internal disorder and administratisr Chaos :end little�. if any, progress. 'I'll( nuiin cause of the iristabilih' N(as that Cruz had been placed in office I)\ a coalition of forces with di(rrgent interests udder the guise of "unit. I le lacked the political niciscle to control those forces, and liondunis la.c�kcd the political maturity to n)akc a unik' governinenl work. Ilondiinis biv, no Iradition of (lenu,c�raticAk elected governtnent or ordcrly transfer of poker. %fill)\ of the polilic;il con(�cpts and processes taken for granted in the l'nited States ar se- rec()gniz:chle in I Ionduras, though the language of detnoc�rac\ is \(idel used mid there is no lack of legal pro%isioiis setting forth the political and ec�onoinic rights of Ilonduran citizens. The two major political parties, each consisting inure of' personal followings than of persons (Icvolcd to (�oninu,n principles. have c�ortipeted hitterk for the spoils of offi(�(% unrestrained Im m(itual respect or Im strong inhibition:, against gaining or retaining political po\%er h\ force. The result has bceri a turbulent If istcrry, rei irded de�srloptnent, and (�ontinual plotting against the group in po\\er. It is this basic situation which prinmril\ explains the urned forces* fr(�clnent interference in the political processes. Thc� stability imposed by the arined forces un snc�h occasions has been artificial and leniporar\, but !hrough most of 1 ionduran histor% it has been th(� only stability mailable. The internal violence which characterized the early gars of f fondumn histor\ spas inhocrr(�e(1 signifi(�antl by the general instabilit\ of the Central Anwrican urea. Toward the end of the 19th c�cntun IIonduras ac�hiesrcl sonic degree of internal peace. The I'irst period of prolonged domestic trinyuillik, ho\\e\cr. e�anu� \\ith the dictatorship of ;en. Tihtircio Carias Andino (19 :32 --15). The Carias regime was suc�cec�d((I by the relatively mild regin)c of Juan \9anuef (.al\cz (19- 15 -1) and by the dictatorship of Julio Lozano (195 1 56). In 195;, followin9 Lozano's ouster. it inilitary junta condcictcd elections fur a Constituent Asscnrbl\. These elections were the niost orderly and deniocratic� in Ilonduran history. The resulting (:onstitr)cnt Assenibly elected as President Manion Villeda Morales of the Liberal I art\ of' Ilonduras (PI.I I the� less conservative of the coiintr)Is two major parties. Shortly before the end of Villeda's 6 year tern), Ow niilitary, anticipating the probable elcc�tion of another Liberal, N'lodesto Modas Alvarado. whom tlicy considered hostile u) militan interests, overthry the Villeda governmew in order to prevent Modas front becoming President. As if result of this coup, on ,i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 FIGURE 1. Gen. Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, head of state, and Chief of the Armed Forces (C) October 1963, it miiitar< government headed b% Gen. (then (ol.) Osvaldo Lopez Arellano was formed. with elements of the other major part%, the National Part% of Honduras WNW, providing the civilian support. 'rite United States refused to recognize the Lopez regime until it schedule for the return to constitutional h was annotmced: Lopez subsequently promised elections by 1965. 'rite 16 February 1965 eiections for deputies to it Constituent Assembly were care�fufly controlled by Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus. Lopez adviser, so as to obtain it majority for the Nationalist candidates, who were predominantly from Zi niga's faction of the part%. The assembly elected Lopez President for a 6-year term, drafted it constitution, and changed its rnyn status to that of the National Congress. With the inauguration of Lopez on 6 June 1965, the facade of constitutional government was restored. In 1970, with the end of his term approaching. Lopez appeared reluctant to step down, but he was constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. Son observers believe he devised the unity Pact in it sincere effort to reduce political antagonisms. Others believe it yeas dune with 'the expectation that the government would not hold together and that h#r would eventually find it "necessary" to resume direct control. In any case� a more unworkable government for Ilondrtras could hardly be contrived. The unite pact Was essentially an agreement for dividing up political offices and other government jobs between the National and Liberal parties. placing the hest qualified persons in government instead of staffing tile entire government from the party of the winning presidential candidate. The Presidency and Vice Presidency were the only national offices filled by election, and with the hacking of the better organized National Party, its candidate. Crum thougin having no political strength of his own. on the presidency at-d was inaugurated in June 1971. 'rite xperiment of sharing governmental responsibility foundered :�m the reefs of political bickering, however, and Cruz spent his first few months in office refereeing the restihing scramble for office. With his own part\ controlled by former Minister of Government Ricardo biniga. Cruz was allowed to select only two) of his cabinet members ;trtd spent considerable time and energy after his inauguration trying to keep one of the two-0 Minister of Education �from being forced out by Zuniga. The real power over the miiitary resided not in the president but in the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Lopez. The semi- independent status of the- Chief of the Armed Forces, who is elected by and responsible to the congress frustrated Cruz efforts to 2 maintain public order ou a nrnetober of ocea Ili own litnitations as it leader and the ambitions of yarimis self seeking groups "urking at cross- purpou�s not oriiy pn��.rnted a n% real accounplishments. but fostered internal disorder and stalled se�ttlernent of se�ye�ral foreign relations problems. The coup It'd b% Lop: z \vas predicted earl% in the Cnnz adtnittistratiou. he major political f -roes in the c�nnntr% c�ontittue to he the militar% and the two mutually -mtagonistic political parties. In addition, t strong; democratic labor novennernt is taking an int�reasit g1% active ard independent part in national affairs. The most important of these forces b\ far is the military. without eghose approval no government has re�nmiued in p(mvr %er% Lng. "There are three Conunurnist parties. all of %.Ilk-h are illegal, small, acid di%ided and cornstihnte no real threat to the go%ernment. 'The% uttennpt. ho\%ryer. to exploit the general turmoil. the and the underdeyelopnnent (If the c�cnmtr, anti t:un contribute significantly to the utrest generated by these factors. B. Structure and functioning of the government 1. Constitutional history (U j OU In 19175 Honduras enacted its 1 �_tit operati%e constitution. (On(. constitution. mitten in IS:31, g%as never put into effect. With the exception of the first (1825), which provided for confederation with other Central American states, I londenran constitutions have been similar. but the inclusion of Man% social and econonnic guarantees did not begin tnntil 1957. Honchirat c�otstitutions have bud an average life of 12.5 %ears. '1,11e l onges t lied, that of 1591. lasted 2S %ears including both its original period of operation (1119.1- 19(Ni) and it second period (1905 -24) following its restoration; the shortest lived constitution ryas written in 1904; it did not hec�onu� effec�tiye tnntil 1901; and \%-its replaced in 1905. '1'hc 1965 constitution is alnnost identical to its predecessor, written in 1957. and makes no significant e�hanges in the structure of the government. both documents accord tile artned forces it degree of autonomy that is highly unusual in constitutional governments. Tho three biggest differences in the 1965 constitution are that it gives it more precise definition of national territorial limits, provides for more congressional control over autonomous institutions, and prohibits reelection of the President. The 1965 constitution states that the Ilondurau Government is republican, democratic, and representative. and that it operates through three c�nmplementary, but f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL NATIONAL PRESIDENT SUPREME CONGRESS COURT 64 Deputies 7 Mogntrotes Attornry COUNCIL General OF Controller MINISTERS Public Mmhtr DEPARTMENTAL Gown Coons of Appeals Courts of font Irni �e MUNICIPAL Counuls Mayon Justices of rile Peace ELECTORATE Election Appointment Appeal FIGURE 2. Constitutional structure of the government (U /OU) independent, powers: legislative, executive, and julicial (Figure 2). The constitution provides for it unitary form o: government. Prior to the election in March 1971. ;ul amendment sponsored by the two ITlajo arties. lousiness and labor representatives, and the military provided for it "government of national unit. In essence, the anlendnlent deleted for ot;e 6 -year administration the constitutional provision for popular election of the legislature, dividing the 6 -1 scats bet%\rcn the two parties and subinitthig the slate to the voters for ratification. The ��unite pact" agreement also included a nulinurn plan of goyernnent." A supplementary agreernent called the "pactilo" (the little pact) divided cabinet posts, judicial positions, arnbas- sadorial appointments, and many other governinental jobs somewhat equ1111Y betwee_: the two parties. In practice, the pact and pactito diluted the power of the President by specifying the direction his government should take and removing a large number of official appointments from his exclusive domain. No change in the constitutional stnu:ture has been nade since the coup of 4 I)cc�wnber 1972. Theoretically the 1965 constitution and the 197 "unite" anendnient arc still in force, "insofar as they are not opposed to the dispositions of the present governnTe�nt. Sottle aspects of the constitutional structure apparently are "opposed" and are being ignored, at least for the moment. Congress. for instance, has been dissolved, and Lopez is governing by decree through the Council of Ministers. 'I'lle National 1 ?lec�tious Council has also peen dissolved. 2. Executive branch (U /OU) F 'xecutiye po\%er is vested in the President. %\h,, is elected for it 6 year term by it "simple majority" (plurality) of direct popular votes. The c�onstitutiou stipulates that the President must be llonduran by birth, in possession of his political rights, at (cast :30 sears of age, and not a number of the clergy. A person play not be elected President if he has previously held that office �by any title �for morc than half of a constitutional te�rin. Persons who have exercised any of the following functions during the 12 months prior to the election may not be elected to the Presidency: I President of the Republic. 2) the president of Congress. :3; secretary or subsecretary of state. -1) Chief of tile :)ruled Forces, 5) tnenber of the National Elections Council, and 6) official chosen by the Nationai Congress. Others ineligible for the Presidenc% are the spouse and relative; within the fourth degree of consanguinih or second degree of affinity of persons serving as President, Chief of the Armed Forces, or member of the National F,Icctions Council during the previous 12 months. Three Presdential Designates (frequently called 'ice Presidents) are elected at the same time and in the same manner as the President, and serve in the absence of the President. If the absence is to be temporary, the President may choose any of the three to replace hint, or he may entrust the executive functions to the Council of Ministers if the absence is to he less than 30 days. If the absence of the President is permanent. Congress chooses one of the designates Io replace hire. If the three designates are also pernanently absent, the executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers, which must call it presidential election within 1:5 days. The person thus elected takes office immediately, but his 6 -year presidential term is counted from the following 6 June. The President is in charge of the conduct of foreign affairs, national defense, and general administration of the nation, for which purposes the constitution grants him considerable unrestricted power. The main APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 consti t tit im w i t restrictions on presidential action are derived from the congressional power to override it veto by it two- thirds vote and fnm the recessit% for c�ongressitmal ratification of treaties. Fur this reason and because the President is usually it strong personalih- with considerable support ammig the iii,; interest groups �the chief executive is traditionally the dominant figure in tlte� government. Former President Hannon Ernesto Cruz had not hee�n typical of Honduras presidents. Although popularly elected, he wits in many respects moppet president. The constitution state:; that there shall be za !east 10 ministries headed by secretaries of stale freyuentIN called ministers, who jointly eonpose the Couuc�il of Ministers.' In 1973 they were: Co\enuucnt Mid Imsticc Foreign Affairs Public Health and Social Assistance Public Education Economi, I.- imutce National Defense and Public Security Communications, ':7auisport, and Public Work. Labc,r and Soc�ia! SCCarity Natural Resources In order to have legal I owe. all decrees, regulations, resolutions, orders, and executive acts of the President must be countersigned by the appropriate secretary of state. In addition, the G:mncil of Xlinislers naN make decisions by majority Note ou all matters submitted to it by the President. Under normal c�iremIlStances, however. the Council of Mini.;ters does not provide it check on actions of the President, since iu' appoints all secretaries of state without congressional approval and can remove� them from office at his pleasure. Furthermore, the council serves an important advisory function, and, in addition, individual secretaries nzty represent the executive brunch before Congress, either on their o\vn initiative to attend debate or on the initiative of Congress to answer questions concerning their departments of government. :3. Legislative branch (U /OU) The unicameral National Congress is conposed cif deputies representing the IS departments, CICCted by direct vote on the basis of one depuhv and onC alternate for each 30,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof over 1:5,000. Departments having fewer than 30,000 inhabitants are entitled to one deputy and one alternate. A system of proportional representation is employed to determine the winning candidates, but, 'For e current listing of k(-} go\ officials consult Chic fs of State and Cabinet :Members of Foreign Coternments, published monthh by the Directorate of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency as mentioned carlicr, the Iegislature elected ill 19 no\v dissolved� \y:ts, b\ prior agme� ncnt, divided equally b0\%ven the Naticnal and Liberal par!ies, \with the former Ia\ing an extra tie breaking Note. A deputy nust bC ?a \cars of awe or older, it Ilonduran citizen b\ birth, and ill possession of lei�, political right Deputies enjoy congressional inununity and tuay not be ccrupelled to perform militar service. I'he Nat onal (:(i ngress� \%hicfn normally nu�ets i regular sessiim from to 26 October Caclt year. exercises the usuLl la\ynnaking functions. Subject to approval by the Prridenl. and can m(erride it presidential yehe by 1m)-thirds Note. In addiiiou, the Congress elects magistrates of the Supreme Court. the Controller and :Assistant Controller, and the� :Attorney General and Assist:ott :attorneys General. It acts iointly \\ith the President in c�onferriNg militar\ ranks of major and above and selects the Chief of the :lrmcd Forces fron three Candidates SubnittCd h\ the President. Cemgress has the po\yea� to declare war and to make peace. and it exercises some control dyer the� nation's fin:utces through re\�ie\v and approval of the budget. Congress also has the p,:\yer to decide if grounds exist for the i�rpCachnu�nt of officialS. While Congress is not in session. its place is taken by it nine member housekeeping organ c�allcd the I'ernt.ueent Gminittee. This conuuittee has no la\makim, ftnaetion: its primary duty iS to prepare business for the uexl session. In theory Cor.,,ri�ss has Sufficient po\Ners to prc�y,�nt Complete control of the g by the executive. In prtc�tice, ho\yeyer. it has generally been controlled by the I'resident's party and has acted as a rubberstamp for the executive. Daring the (.:ruz adninistretion \e hen the President \vas not supported by it strong congressional majorit\. Congress \vas ineffective because of internal disumit\ and partisan antagonisms. 4. Judicial branch (C) The judicial po\yer of the nation is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice. by the courts of' appeals. and by other courts established by la\\. :1 magistrate of� the Supreme Court or of a court of appeals imisi bC londnran b\ birth, in possession of his political rights, a lawyer, at least 30 ye�:rrs of age. and noncleric�al. A magistrate of tL�e Supreme Court must have been a judge of it court of' first ;iistanc�e or magistrate of it court of appeals for at lew,t I year, or have prac'tic'ed la\w for 5 Nears. A magistrate of it court of appeals mast have held the position of judge of it court of first instance for at k I year or have practiced la\w for 5 \ears. Supreme Court magistrates are elected by the National Congress for a 6 -Near term. 1n 1971. the congress, in accord mc�c. with the terms of the pactilo, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 1 elected Four I,iln�ra! and three \ationalists to the Suprenu� (:ourt. After the Dt- (ember 1972 c�out), I.opez, in cousuf tilt ititI \\ili the� (:uuncil d \IiIIisters, appointed it ne\\ seven- nlenlher Suprviiv� (:ourl. \lugistrates of the� courh of appeals, judges cuf courts of first instance, labor judges. registrars of propertN, and officials of the Public \iii istr\ (.inlilar in ftulctton to the Office the Attonav\' General in the United States) are appointed b the Supreme (:ourl. Jrlslices ill' the peace are appointed b\ the judges of courts of first instance. \lagistrates, jrulges, amt officials of the Public \linislry nla\ not he compellt-d to perform nilitar\ service. The Supreme Court has Loth original and appellate jurisdiction. Anumg the %lses in \\hi(.k it Ilia origin ;I jurisdiction ore I inlpeachnu�ut proceedings. 2) eases of protection against abuse of itithorik, and :it (Ilicstious of constittltionalIiIN of la\\ The Supreme Court na\ dec�lar;� it la\\ to be nnc�onstitclliunal after its enac�tnu nt by hearing it specific case. It nut\ also he called 111 ill b Congress to gi\ e its opinion un the constitutionalih of it proposed la\\ hick huts been vetoed by the I'res:dent on grounds of nn- constit lit ionalit\. lit general, lit wever. the ju(liciar\ has not exercised its c )list it tit iortal status as ;In independent branch of go% ern nu�nt. The court I%stenl is often characterized as \\rak and hesitant to hand down it verdict of guilty in controversial cases. especially those in\ (6-hog public order and sub\ vrsion. The Ilondtiran legal s\stenl is bused on Bom;trl a lld Spanish Ci\it la\\ \%ith some influences of Fliglish e orllnlorl law. 0 U FIGURE 3. Administrative divisions (U /OU) 5. *ivil service (C) i ci\ if sera ice la\\ \\rt p ;used ill Septerrlber 1961 anel bc�e�;lllw effective it; J ;imiar\ 1969. Although ;r board lots been established to sct salaries nl \ctr'ious sins e�rnmelit joln. no re,Il nn�ril s\ stmt has et e\ ol\ eel fur hiring ;111(1 prcunoting go\cnimenl enlplo\ees. (Mv of the ;link of the unit go i\ rnnle�nl it to place the I est el lit lifieel perso11s a\ailahle in go\ernnu�nl: \\ilh fe\\ e\ceplions, ho\\ the� public ad lit iit ist rat itm contiuuecl in the same lour stall as in the past. The unite Imct ;llld the ppanto diet not ;rbolish the� slwils .\stem: the\ nlerck di\ided the spoils more� e\enl\ bet\\eerl lie 1\\o ne,Ijor parties. (;orc�rnna�nl je)bs. ;n has liven the tradition. ;Irc still being used to pad ,ullilic;rf debts and re\\it rd 1()\ it[ purl\ ,\orkers. although Lopez hits slated Ills inten!iou to repl ;lc�e c,nclualified civil ser\ants. 'I'll(- warc�it\ of trntined, c�omi) dent iwitip)\\vr, ho\\c\er. is nu\\ here� Inure visible that, in gc:\crnmciit a rice. kvii the \cr\ hest of intentions un the part of an a clnlinistntlion. it \\ould probably be difficult to find several thousand IImidtirans It() ;tre d eflicienl. ;jild \\(.11 cm)[11411 ecluc ;tlecl to sLlff tie \;rrious ;rg,mcies. 6. Local government (U/01 '!'It( cuunlr\ is di\icle(I into Is, (lepartnn�111s. about 2T5 iniwic�ipalities, and I c�entnil district, comprising the capit;Il cil\. Tegucigalp and ;r suburb. :()I i lit \:Iglll�la I l figure 1 TIwse (Ii\ isions are nu�relc `Fier di.irritic ,m pl,it- n.un,. Ivc th(� li (d u;iIne ,ui the ,ilmni f tli, `umnean \lal in thi e -;wtn Pr( liIc li.iI)h -r .ui,l t i,� ii,il, it.�Il r 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 for administrative purposes, since� the only local autonomy granted to rtnunicipalities is a slight dcgrce of ffmam ial responsibility regarding expenditures. "There are no legislative bodies on the departmental level, and governors are presidential appointees. Nlunic�ipaI councils and it arc elected by popular vote at i -year intervals and sear mostly ard- ministraliye and ccrcinonial frnnctfons. C. Political dynamics 'I'll(- most important political forces in I londuras are the military establishment and tit(- political parties. strong, democratically oriented labor nu,ycnu�nl, which includes the most powerful peasant organiza- tion, has emerged as it significant interest group since an unsuc�c�cssful general strike in :\rigid 1965, when it demonstrated an unaccustomed coftesiyeness. 1)riyate enterprise groups are f,ec�onting increasingly more active in the political arena as well. Student organizations, most of then under considerable Communist influence, have becl,me the most yuc� ;tl and disruptive forces in the society ;ofd hay(- f,cnt government police to student will on se\cral occasions. (C) t. Nfilitarp (S) The military is by !ar the most significant political force in the country The approval of the military establishment has traditionally hcen so important to the stability of any regime that it has frequently been called "the final political arbiter. This special status, which the military officers have generally shown themselves resolved to nutintain, is reflected (yen in the constitution. the provisions of which emphasize the power of the military in political ntatters.:krtic le 119 of the constitution, like c�onstitotions of several other Latin American countries, charges the armed forces with defending the constitution and assigns them the mission of guaranteeing free stnffrage and Icgal succession to the presidential office. Their partially autonommis position is derived from Articles 322 and 32 -1, which state that the President trust exercise his constitutional functions with mspec�t to the artned forces through the Chief of the Mined Forces. who is appointed by and is removable only by tit(- National Congress. The special position of the armed forces is further emphasized by the natum of the ��oath.' actually it promise, which ,Article 325 of the constitution prescribes for the Chief of the Awned Forces; the oath states that the armed forces will not respect any orders which violate the letter or the spirit 6 of the constitution "(-yen if tlu cunt(- front our sup writ rs. 'this in theory makes the armed forces prrc�tically iudependen of tit(- 1'residenl. In it country that is not ;tbly lucking in Ibe stabilizing factors supplied in other societies by political restraint and the sons(- of common interest the military regards itself as justified in providing stability by extrapolitical nnva ns and I., fund of referring to itself as the guardian uI "c�oostitutional order." Iloculttran military leaders are b\ no means intnume, however, to the� varied influences motivating the po'i':c4uts and have get wraII\ lacked the maturity and s;�1) vstraint found in the military of some other Latin \nu�ric�an countries. In sonic cast's the actions of the military have coincided \\ith the� wishes of' the public. such as the overthrow of the n�pressiye Lozano dictatorship in 19511 and the inept Cruz administra- tion in 192. In others, the military has acted in its own self- interest, becoming au unsettling factor al a time licit orderly change Wright otherwise have occurred. :kit exampic of the latter took place during the presidential campaign of 19113. \%hen the Liberal ('arty candidate. Modesto Rodus varado. severely criticized the militim. stated his intention to restrict their influence inn Ifondurau affairs, and caused the military lea dersl to fear that he meant to disband the ;trtned forces, keeping onl) the Civil Guard, which \ Horde tip mainly of Liberal fart\ mendwrs. The military W(_*"rdittgI\ seized the goyentna�nl ant :i October to present his election. Political parties (S) The two Icgally registered political parties are the National 1 arty of I londuyas I'N 1 I and the Liberal I'arty of Ilonduras (1)1.II). 'Three other parties have been funned but are still uninsc�ribed. They are the 1)rogressiye 1)opular Party (1'1 1'). the Orthodox Bepublic�an Party (I'HO). and the National Innovation and l'nity Part (I'INI 'There are. in addition, three illegal Communist parties, one Soyict oriented ana two Chinese oriented. :1 growing number of persons espousing it Social Christian philosophy are active ill civic activities, and are organizing under the name of the Christian 1)(1110cratic Nloyement (XIDC). So far, however, leaders are few. and legal and bureutncratio harriers make it almost impossible to register new parties. The 1 1.11 is the older of the two legal parties. haying come into existence inn 1890; the 1'N I I s\ o formed about 190:3. Membership in these two p n'aes has bec�onu� largely it matter of family tradition rather than ideology. The intense partisan rivalry between them has retarded rather than encouraged deraoc�relic� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 J development. Tile chief aim of each is to achieve and retain control of the government, mostly for personal gain. Neither party feels it necessity for accommoda- tion with the other when it is in office, nor does it regard itself as it I091 opposition when out of power. Roth parties are weakened by internal dissension. As one of its fiat acts follomying the coup of December 1972, the goy(,nunent banned all political activities "contrary to the present order." TII,- govc:nurtent also relieved civil servants of the obligation to contribute Vc of their salaries to their chosen party. This had been the largest single source of political financing. As it result, the two major parties, W bile legally still ill existence, are confronted with the problem of maintaining themselves as functioning bodies. they have no role, no paid func�tionamics, no regular income, and there is it virtual hall on formal meetings. The two parties have displayed great persistence historically as a result of family loyalties, but the present dilemma is acute. Indeed, several ministers in the new govern have claimed that tile ban aims at causing the traditional parties to wither away... a. National Party The PNII, the more conservative of the two legally registered parties, has technically been the govern- ment part' since the coup of 1963. It has earned it reputation as it party of dictators� ha% ing supported the regimes of Gen. 'I'iburcio Carias Andimo 1932-45) and Julio Lozano (1954 -56). In an effort to divest itself of this label, the party since 1963 has offered it progressive program of public health, welfare, and aid to housing and education similar to that of the Liberals ill the elections. The PNII has claimed experience and ability to execute such it program, althoug': its record of accomplishment while ill office does mot substantiate this claim. With the exception of the Cntzadministration, most 'f ,NI1 governments have been reasonably -uc�cessful in maintaining internal stability with var degrees of re but have not utilized that stability to develop the country either sc.;�ially or economically to ally great degree. The Cruz government could barely maintain public order. Tile National Pa -ty has suffered it number of splits, all of which have 1wen the result of personality clashes rather than ideological c:iffcrences. Present divisions arc for the most part, between the majority faction, which supports party boss Ricardo "Luniga (Figure 4), and several smaller factions, which oppose him. Composed of the younger members of' the PNII, the %uniga faction has demonstrated by its methods of gaining and maintaining control of the part and- -for it while �the country that it intends to stay ill control despite opposition, from within the party. Following the c�oul in October 19113. "Limiga, from his position as chief advker to Loper began to gain control of the party machinery. Ry February 19115 he controlled both the party and the national election machine�ry suffivientl\ to insure the election of it majority of pro- Zimig Nationalists to tlx: Cunstitu;�nt Assellbly. In October of that year several changes in the PNII party statutes specifically one forbidding officers of f +re part\ to hold elective or appointive� posts in the government�brought the central committee under his control by requiring the resignation of several anti %uniga members Ito were also goycrnmcnt officials. T1 I(- PNII central c�omtmtittees elected since October 1967 have been composed entirely of friends of '!.uniga. The anti %uniga portion of tlt^ party is not \yell organized and is unable to oifcr any effective opposition to him and his group within the part. "f he only faction within the PNII which has attempted to organize behind an alternate leader is it small segment called the National Velasyuista Movement (NINA'). The \,/1N\' supports :of. Armando Velascluez Cerrato, the Honduran ambassador tc Peru, and claims to have the hacking of SWi of the PNI1 rank and file� although most observers believe this faction is much smaller. Velasyucz and his principal hackers have attempted to gain some representation oil the PNII central committee by writing to all deputies to the party convention, but to no avail. m APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 FIGURE 4. Ricardo Zuniga Augu- stinus, leader of the National Party (C) The� governing bod% of the National fart% is flit� parex convention, which inve�ts ever% 2 years :tit(] elects a I.'. roan c'e�utraI c�oinnittee and an IS member c�onsulta'ive council. The central c'onunittee govems the part% between conventions. and part% officers are selected from anong its +nentbership. The president of the part% is Stiprenu� Court Justice Alejandro Loper Cantarero. Tht� consultative c'ounc'il is an advisor% body with no real power. In addi ton to the 3 civil service clonatims, the I'N I i was io financed b\- funds syphoned from cariots goveni.ient projects until the 1972 coup eliminated both sources of income. \lost of the National I'art\ support comes from conservative businessinvii and professionals and inentbers of the military. I'hc Constituent Assembly election in 1965 and the nunicipal elections in 1965 (I it;ure 5). in which the National Party polled 55`(' and 6Y(' of the total votes respectively, are poor indicators of the parh's actual strength, since fraud and intimidation were used extensively bs 'Lttniga and his collaborators. The municipal elections ill 1962 (.iii wlic'h the part\ \yon -11(f of the total vote), the Constituent \ssembly election in 195 (35.5 "1 of tit( total vote won) and the presidential election of 1971 (52.51 of the total vote are believed to have been conducted fairly and are 11JUL -11 better indicators of the strength of the National and Liberal parties ut the time the elections took place. The voting strength of the National fart\ ill the 195 cicction includes. for purposes of comparison, those votes cast for the National Reformist Movement. it faction \yhich had separated from the National Party in 195 -1 but rejoined it in Febnmim 1962. i.. Liberal Party The Pf,11 is the rs liberal and progressive of the two major p arties. It is also hclicyed to he the larger. although reliable statistic's are lacking, and its FIGURE 5. Election results (U/OU) inviiibership encompasses it \\41v range of political opinion. TIic purl\ clr :tws sonic� support from conservatives and some from the� extreme le'll, but in general is considered to be sonic�\% hat left of center: the part) position \%as officially described be the 1'1.11 central executive council in 1967 its "democratic left." The I'I.II normally has had the support, though not the overt assistance, of north coast organized labor. Since 19')2 the part\ has controlled the governna�nt only during the Bannon \'illecla Monles ad- ni [list rat ion (195, -fit). L'nder the leadership of Villeda, the IIondciran Government embarked on it program of land reform and improved public health ant! housing. Since the cotip of October 196", the Liberal 1'arty has vacillated between cooperation with the [)Nil and :ill -out opposition. On several occasions the Liberals have accepted a token assortna�ut of' government jobs. thus giving the gos it bipartisan facade ill exchange for assurances of free elections. In 1965 and 1965, when extensive electoral fraud trade it obvious that these promises had not been trade ill good faith. Liberals sought to embarrass the government by ordering [)[,If nu�nbers to resign their posts. Lack of unity %ithin the part\ and inability to enforce part discipline rendered these efforts (futile. In 19T I cinder the terms of the unity pact. Liberals were given half the seats in Congress, half the cabinet posts. nany ambassadorships, and four of the seven seats on the Supreme Court. With all this representation the 11.11 still had no will influence on goyerimicnt police\. In late 1972. the President's dismissal of two 11.11 ministers replacing then with Nationalists caused the� 11.11 to again consider \yithdrawing from the government. The moderate faction Icd b\ Carlos Roberto licina Idiacluer and Jorge Bueso Arias tightened its control over the Party in April 19.3 when it \yon control of the 14.11 convention. Other incnlbers of the Bueso Ficina 8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 \teNIC!PA I. Co NsTrrel:N'I' ASSEN1I11.5' I'ettslUF :NT LC I. 1962 19118 1957 191iri 1971 i'vr- Per- l Per cent cent cunt cent of Mtinici- of� Ninnie�i- Dep of I)v of PA11TF Votes N'ote's paIitle�s V0t es voi es pall ties dotes Votes litlees Vote Votes Ill ies Vol Ps Cotes t.iberal.... 25S,78S 59 203 160, 7.55 a:i 35 2(1!1,1(19 Nil :i 311 272,071 y:i 29 2111,771 ,7. National.. 18.1,791 71 297,822 (ii. 2.11 1:30,7113 :3S.5 22 :33:1,:3711 S5 :35 306, 028 52. *Presidents leer% vivcted by c'onstittient assemblies in 1957 and 1913:5. 8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 faction are Max \'clasqucz Diaz and fornu�r foreign \linistcr \ndres M arado I'rtcrlcr. I�orna�r presi(Icntial candidate 196'i) Modesto Rodas Mv.irado Icads a small(�r faction. The highest gocrning body of the I'I.II is the parr coIIVVIIlion, \\Mich I,.w0s at a scar iIIter\aIs. It elects the part president and the othe six members of the c�ctttral cxceutivv council Which gm erns the parr bct\cccn coMrntions. No information is available on ITII finances. It is believed that the main source of funds is contributions froth mendwrs. c�. Progressive Popular Party The 1 is composed of folhmers (.)f the late Gen. "1'iburc�io (:arias \ndino, \\ho broke a\cay irons the National )arty ill 196: Mien the national parr cljo Ramon F'. :ruz as its presidential candidate. (:anas and his faction felt that :arias' sort. :onzah :arias Castillo, should have rcceiVVd the rlontimation. "I'he I')) has not yet bccu granted legal status (nor is legality likcl\ to be granted ill the future. and the National fart\ has beat unable to persuade the I'I'I' to return to the fold. In 1969 the I'I'I' claimed to represent 50,000 to 100,0110 \oters �a claim \\hic�h is believed exaggerated but \%hic�h as partiall\ substantiated Its the relm (ance of the \ation:tl I ark to admit loss of this fa+ tion. 'I'll(- political orientalinu of ))I' st(pporters covers a s\ idc range anti induct( s consetvativvs as \\cll as persons suspected of pro Conumrtnist s\ mpathie, d. Orthodox Republican Parl y "I'hc I.ibenII fart\ lost a ,haul portion of its right\cing in 196 when Roque Jacinto Ili\cra and his followers split off and formv(I the PRO. It has repcatedly applied for legal status since the coop of 101 but inscription has never been granted. c. National Lnnoration and Unity Parly The latest group to request inscription as a legal party is the NNU led b\ \ligucl \ndonic f�ernandez. According to ;\ndonic, the party has some 2- 1.(11)0 members and supports progress in social and ccmnontic� development and all end to the pctt\ s(Itntbblings that have retarded the countrv's development. "I'hc I'INl is represented in the mc�w Lopez c�abincl. f. Communist parties and front groups 'I'll(- presciwe of the three Comunumisl parties in Honduras illustrates the fragmentation of the IIIoventcnl rather than its strength. Onc party, the Communist Part\ of Honduras, Soviet (I'CII'S), is \losc(m- oriented, while the other tm), the (:mt!- tnunisl I'urt\ ol' Ilondur�ts�(:hina l'(:11 :utd a 1'(:II C splinter group. the \\'orkcrs I'arl\ of Ilon(lnras ;)"1'111 adhere to the Chiat�se line. \II :Ur illegal. ;tnd none is a \cell indoctrinawd or disciplined group. The bickering cchich had caused the I'CII to split into t%%o \\arring factions in I965 resulted iu a complete ideological dkorc�c in 197 ('nlil carl\ in 197: cac�h of the tm) parties had appro\imtalel\ 200 to 100 nu�ntbers and Iron( 00 to 1.000 s\ mpathizers. 'I'll(- split in 197 of the NCI I; C mid the subse(luent formation of the I" I'II Icft the I)CII C %%ith slightly more than half of its original strength. "I'he c aimbiiities and imfbu�nce of the three groups art uo\ I-- than at am time since the formation of the original parent part\ in 1951. The Comimmists haw� been ac�tkc in Ilomduras since Hit 1920's and hate been responsible for some of the uphcav;d and unrest am omg the %corkers. Fyr so. the Conumnmist parr, as such. \v mot (minded until the north coast gener�(I strikes ill the smmner of 1951: the founding group received considerable assistance bons Cuatentalart Communists. 'I'll(- I.ozamp regime. cchich took poker in October 195.1. suppressed the Conte um along \cith all other opposition to the gosrrm :tent.: \t the end of the I.oz:mo regime its I956 the )CI I \\as estimated to ha\c mo more than 600 mcntb(�rs. \cith an equal number of s\ ntpathizers. During the gars in scltic�h Bamon ill( \h)mIcs seas )resident i 195 6: opposition groups, inc�Indink rite (:on immists. \ccr� permitted consideral)k more freedom of action. The I'CI I trade significant g :tins. not onk in e\p:utding its influent e ;among student and labor groups. but also in infiltrating the gmvntntcnt. espcciall\ tie \linistr\ of )rtblic F(Imcation. \'illvda. \chile aclnlitting his concert ow�r the po,sible clanger of comma mism to Ilonclnras. coronae( to display hat ratan\ obscr\crs consi(lered :r oh" attitude to\\ard the N :I I. IIc utaiIIt.1 ine(I that c� )II Ill unisnt collIII not be destro%ecl b\ srlppressiort but rather b\ constrn(�ti\e grnrrnnu�ntal action \chic)( +ould rob it of its appeal. Furthermore. he sought the support of as much of the leftist clement as possildc. apparvntl\ in the belief th :.(l he could control and use the I'Cll for his it purposes. He reportedl\ tnct with )CI I leaders oc�c�asionaII to inform then( of the degree of opposition his govemnu�mt \c ould tolerate. \(ter the coop cvhic�h brought the Lopez. government to power in 196: there :is more rest ric�livc� policy toward Cotnutmmist activil\. \last of the Communist leadership, as well :is rout\ leaders of the non- Contntumist opposition. went into c\ile� ittostl\ in \Icxico and F Sulv,rclor� \\hcre the E APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 Communist. \\ere able to estabIisII inter til j al Communist contacts more easily than in Ilondrtnts. Within the country government harassment caused the part to become so disorganized that by late 196 -1 only two of the 10 municipal committees :uu1 it ft.%% c:�Ils were functioning. In November 1964 ;,n anurtesty decree permitted the return of all exiles except Itt of the Co nntunisi leaders ho were considered Inc the lymernment to be dangerous. Most of the Itl have since returned c�landestinek to th:� country. Efforts to rebuild the party structure� vr(�re defeated by deepening dissension within the p:,rt I'vvu factions emerged, each mic identified by the name of its Icadc Tomas F.ratzo Mena beaded the larger faction, while Dionisio Hangs Hejarano led the smaller. Wlicn the split first became (1v ident, both factions claimed to be the legitimate hcirs:af Marxism Leninisnt and the true disciples of the Soviet li the intrapart\ fight developed. however. what be 4an as it power struggle becaun(1 all id (1ological split. The old guard �or Hanuas faction remained loyal to Soviet leadership and a(kocated it cautious tactical approac). 'I'll(- dissident �or Frazo faction advo- cated a more aggressive police and eventually aligned itself id the Chinese Communists. Eraz,r, ho wits educated ire Communist doctrine at the Marxist Leninist Cadr(1 School in Moscow, reportedl\ turned his faction toward the Clikiese line in retaliation for having been excluded from the iiuclapest Consultative :onfemIce in March 196). "Pile weakened condition of the Connuptist parties is reflected in the curtailed propaganda effort. There arc three Ili 1tIIIIist fart\ pnblic�ations in Ilon- duras �one published by the 1 :11 S :uul two by the PCII C. Voz P'opida (Voice of the People) is published by the I'CII S. The PCII C publishes Unidad J'nity for genernl distribuution and :Ibril :`,prih for circulation within the part\. :III of these publications are poorly printed and appear irregntlarl\ because of the limited financial resources of the parties. Favorite themes in Cornimmist publications f w1m!c criticism of the t'nitcd Fruit Company, bru, tv of the IIondnuran police, ;tail l'. S. respor i Ili lity for acts of the INmdunua Government cartsco by diplomatic pressure. "Pile disorganized and weakened condition of the parties is further (lcnonstrated by the fact that there is onto one actively functioning front grout; �the l.`niyrrsitc lieforn Front (FHA'), which is controlled by the I'( :II!( 'Pile 1) 11 S has trie(I \\itII little success to offset its rivals strength at the university by forming its ()\%n front group. the Socialist Student Front (FES). Although its stre has been eroded to sonic r\te�nt, the Flit'. \\Inich gain(1d control of. the student lederation in 1969, has n lit int it i u�d its donination of student politics, has se\cral sympa- thizers anout; the faculty members. is \\ell :tuned. and has become )it( of the most trouhles�,mu� groups i, Hondum,s. :Although tic gmernnteut is capable of controlling student (listurbanc�es. the willingness appears to he lacking, and students. gcrtcraII\ vvitII Flit' pro%iding the rirgicaders, ha %c b(1ert able to keep public disord(1r at an all -time high since earl\ 19 TI Tilt. Communist murvv-nuenl has had onto limited success ire maintaining control of am\ portion of orgamized labor and has failed notably in organizing \\0111(111 and cantpesinos. While tic Ccntral Federation of Unions of free Workers of Honduras (FFJ :FSI T- I .I I I i it )Ili nrr Ili ist- controlled until Late 1965, hell nou leaders gained eon.rol of a majorit\ of the member unions. n,t major labor federation is no\\ controlled by :o nununists. 'I'l l(. unions \\hic�h remain undcr (:olnimmist Ica dership have littic influence in the labor movenr(1nt. :3. Interest groups (C) The main factors prompting the formation of interest groups awl encouraging organizations formed for other purposes to act as interest groups have been the inactivity on ti part of the gmenrnn�mt in c!e ve loping tie eourr ".n cc�amomically and socially, mitt the corruption and inefficiency which have pervaded most :administrations. T\\ o organizations t in(1 Honduran Council 0f Private Enterprise (COIIFI'i. .and the National :\Iliance of Social Organizations of londuras (.\\OSII1� include influrncing grnrnn- nu�nl polic�v among their stated objectives. Several labor orgraninations. business ausoc�iations ,and other groups have also acted a,s inter (1sl groups or h.avv� demonstrated the potential to do so. .Among them. tilt most active aar(1 the Notional Workers Trade Vnion Federation of I 1midturats I' ESI I I i, the Cha ndwr of Commerce and Indnslrics of Cortcs (CCICI, the National Federation of Farmers and Cattlemen of Honduras (FI�N.M;111, and th(1 \:rtionai :Vssoc�iation of llonduran t.' tntpesinos Students and teachers have also !r�conw more \0c�al in the past fc\\ years. and their activities, while largely disruptive. have inflct�nccd gmcniment polic�v on occasion. The most active interest grouups are organized labor. especially FF.SITH:k\ I I and the Confederation of Ilondnran Yorkers :TI l of which it is the strongest component. and the va,rionus business organizations represented by C011f ?P. FFSI NII and (:011l� :I' \\ere supporters of the mlity govvnumenl and suet several times following the inauguration of Cruz to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 r( i(�%% tit( gmurum ent's accomplishments �or the lack thereof �and intake recommendations. Vntil earl% 1968 FESITIIAN11 stayed out of the� political arena for the most part, belies ing that the federation could do more for the maker b it Itm political profile and therebN ;voiding potential harassment. In that xear FESI THAN:} joined %%ith the CCIC, an organization of businessmen in San 1'edro Sula %ho had also staxed out of' politics, in presenting the government %%ith if series of requests for increased attention to economic development, personnel changes in the cabinet :end judiciar%, and c�foscr supervision of the frequent1% irresponsible !oc'al police. Both 1 1?SI I'! ?:N 11 and :I(: v ievv economic stagnation as injurious to both labor and m anilge- nient, and as if result of their joint petition, fourof the seven Supreme Court Nlagistrat(�s were replaced by persons gener,(Ily considered neon qualified, :u;d the Director of the National :kgrtrian Institute (IN:k) %%as relieved of if second joi) so that ht- could conccutrate his efforts oil agrarian re;orn. Ilealizimg that these were only token concessions. FESIT11:1\ I I and CCIC again %%rote to the President in late :\ugust I96S, expressing thanks for the eh;utges he had ntacle but indicating that the% also expected action on tie other items. In September their efforts vver(� set back by an illegal strike� belie\cd by some labor and business leaders to have been instigated b\ the government to weaken labors mtoraI position �hut in 19 FESI'I'RAN I I and busi.a�ss grumps resumed their efforts to influence government polic�\ and became backer:, of the unit\ governnu�mt. The group through yvhidl b1ltillletistln'll have generally worked begun I)\ *lelgar. Whilc significant improyena�nt has beet: matte. th(. (:I ?S still has dcfic�ien(�ics, mostly in numbers of personnel. in arms. and in transportation e(luipmu�mt. �I'lle :leis is equipped with an assortment of small arms such as pistols, carbines. M I rifles. amd, in smile utttl\ing districts, olcl Mausers. The nnmtber of ycltid(l s nyailablc to the CES is insuffic�icnl fur the performance of its mission. and the (:F.S laloratory and tnetlimls of imyesti,-alion are thus far inadequate. The CES c�unttnttnication system, howeycr. is the most modern in I lon(I(tr is. The corps re(�eiyed considerable ('.S. :III) assistan(�c in establishing the network, and the network repair facility. inacic(luatc thus far. i nuproying under :111) guidance. 1. :ountersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities In coping with widespread outbreaks of terrorism. riotim4. or other disorders, the police would need the direct inyolycmu�nt of the military forces. The military forces and police combined are probably capable of containing and eventually controlling such internal disorders. The puttee alone arc probably capable of containing strictly localized disorders, but tic wiIIimgtless of General Lopez (even (haring his (mii previous administration) to commit the police to such activity has been notably lacking, especially w1wil students are involved. On it number of occasions stu(lemts hays been allowed to inflict considerable property damage on L'.S. offi(�ial installations. IIond(tran govenu let t offices. and schools with mo response �or if late response at best �front the police. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 Given t e� fae�t that this attitude it', especial Ix apparent after Cruz took office in jtine 19 I. I opez' willingness to c�onthat threats to the (;rtez ad- ministration was defiuitt Iv suspect. Although not it najor activity of the sec�trity forces. there is it small civic action progr: in in operation. The Chronology (u /ou) 1502 Columbus reaches coast of Honduras during fourth voyage 1539 Honduras and four other provinces of Central America are incorporated into captaincy general of Guatemala, adminis- trative division of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, in the Spanish Indies. 1821 September Independence from Spain is g:t :.aed amt Honduras bee nnes part of Mexican Empire. 1923 Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, ;rid Costa Rica form United Provinces of Central America. Francisco Morazan of londuras serves as President from 1~30 to collapse of federation in late 15:35. 1838 November Honduras declares independence from federation. 1932 -48 Dictatorship of Gen. Tiburc�io ('arias Andino provides first period of prolonged domestic peace. 1918 October .'uan Manuel Galrez (handpicked successor of (;(-it. (arias) is elected President on National Party ticket, 19.19 January President Galvez and Vice President .lulio Lozano are inaugurated for 6 -rear term. 1954 May General strike paralyzes entire north coast area. November President (.alvez leaves country for "medical treatment" following indecisive elections; Vice President Lozano becomes Acting President. 15 drawl forces ha\e engaged in road eonstntctic;n and provision of potable� \\att�r facilities. The air force has o,casionally transported niedieal assistance to inaccessible areas. TI it scope of this I) rot! rant. however, is not sufficient to make any real impact as it counlerinsurgencv measure. December Newl elected ('ongrer:s with mandate for settling presidential election faik to convene: Lozano declares himself do aclu Chief of St:tle. 1956 August Revolt against Lozano's authoritarian tactics is quickly suppressed: Liberal Party leaders are exiled. October Fraudulent election of Lozano's handpicked Constituent Assembly results in bloodless military coup; interim militar.% junta assumes power. 1957 July Defense Minister Col. Oswaldo Lopez Arollano emerges as strong military leader with ouster of Gen. Roque ,I. Rodriguez from interim junta. September Constituent :ksseutblY is elected; Liberals win control by wide margin. November Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, Liberal leader, is named con- stitutional President -elect by Constituent Asselnbly; ('ol. Oswaldo Lopez Arellano bec�onu�s member of junta. December Villeda Morales is inaugurated President for ti -year term. Constituent Assentbh� becomes National Congress; new con- stitution is promulgated: Lopez is appointed Chief of the Armed Forces. 1960 November Longstanding border dispute with Nicaragua is settled by the International Court of Justice; disputed territory awarded to Honduras. 1963 October Militar; coup by Lopez overthrows Villeda, thus preventing elections scheduled for 1:3 October. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 r. 1965 February Constituent Assembly elections are held; Nationalist: "�ia" :35 seats to Liberals' 211. March Constituent Assembly elects Lopez President of Honduras. Constituent Assembly changes status to National Congress. June Lopez is inaugurated for 6-year term. 1967 May Honduran and Salvadoran troops clash in undemareated border area. 1968 March Government party "wins" 'gal of the 276 muricipalities through extensive fraud and coercion. July Honduras and El Salvador exchange prisoners captured during the border clash in 1967. 1969 June Honduras auml El Salvador break relations ov, r mistreatment of one another's nationals. July Hostilities erupt between El Salvador and Ilonduras. The Organization of American States Obtains cruse -fire %%ith great difficult% 1971 January Major interest groups sign unit} pact govrrnimg Nl rch election and government that will fellow. June Raumon Ernesto Cruz, elected on 26 Jlarch, is inaugurated for 6 -Year term. 197'2' December Lopez ousts Cruz in bloodless military coup: dissolves congress and governs by decree. E APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070017 -0 Glossary A It It It EVIAT It l.% E N m, Is II S I A NAC I I National Association of Honduran Asociticioll Vacilimll oil Campt"ino.. II(All- �allipesillos 11111.0 no., ANOSII National Allianev of So�ial Orgalli- Aliflll:ll Xti�liplill/ (It Onplill-m-itillf., zations of Holldlil�as Ile Holobiras ('('I(' Challibvi. of Collim�rve and Indus- Camara (it Coinfl-rio 1 1111111striti� 1/( tries of ('ones ('orb 's� ('1? Special set�Ilrity Corps.......... Cucrpo Espcvial (I( So atiridud CM I E P 11ol)(IIII Cokill�il of Private Collse ill 11(induro no do Ili Empnmi 1'rhada Enterprise COLP R 0SU M A I I.. Professional College for Illlpro�v- ('14cf1io Profc�iomd (It Subinittrilf) Magi- IlIvIlt of Teaching ill Honduras �brio flonduro-no CT I I Confederation of Honduran Confethracion ill Truhapubirts Him- Workers durf nos FECESITIA 11 ('vile al Fvdpration of Onions Of F(Weravion Ci Oral tit Silidif-ahis do Fre� Workers of Honduras T�id)(ijadorf� Lilons do Hondum.� FENACOTHAL. Nalional Federation Of 1�tild Ftdiravion A�(wional I( ('nup(rulirus de Transport Cooperatives Transport( Limituda FENAGII N:Lti0IMI I�(41eratioll of Farmers Pedt Xarional (if Ag�icullons :111d Of IIOIIdlII',I.1 Garimbrols tit Hondni-ax FE'SITRAN 11 National Workers' Trade Union Fithrucion Sindical tit Tr(d)(Ijildon S Federation of Honduras Naciollut (it Honduras Socialist Student Front.......... Fronh Extudiantil So�ialista F H I. I'lli�vi-sit� Reform From........ Frcide do Btforinti Univirsitilria 1N:\ National Agrarian Institute...... Institulto A'acitimil Agrario .\I DC Christian Denlocrati� Movelilent .11ol-cmitnto Dimo�raticei Chrisireina \I N\ National VvIasquista Movemellf .11til'o-lilitilto Xaviololl I'llamplista 1 1 11 C olllllllllli.-;t Parts of Honduras I'lil Com linisla do Illolldpllwx hilm Ili na 1 S Communist 1 of Honduras l (lido Conlunisho do Ilmolu'lls Soviet Soviet PIN(' National Innovation and VnitY I'crtitill Inoreicion Xitrion(d Uniduel Part.% 1)1.11 IJI)VI-:11 hLI-t� of flondunts.. I'(11-lido I'd)(1-al (if Hombir(is PNII National Part.%� Of Honduras� MI 1.1 ido Naritillul do Ilondill-fis 13131) 1 Popular Part.% hi rt ido Popular Prot .17*4 sistil PRO Orthodox Republican Part.y. Poirlida lecimlifirano Orloiduro PTI I Workers' Part.%� of Honduras..... I'm�lids) tit Trahnjadort.. (if Holobly�u., 4 20 NO FOREIGN I)ISSI-I'M APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070017-0