NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 73; HONDURAS; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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SECRET
73 /GS /GP
Honduras
August 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Honduras
CONTENTS
1
This chapter supersedes the political cover-
age in. the General Survey dated August 1969.
A. Introduction 1
B. Structure and functiuuing of the government 2
1. Constitutional history 2
2. Executive branch 3
3. Legislative branch 4
4. Judicial branch 4
5. Civil service 5
6 Loc government 5
C. Political dynamics 6
1. Military 6
SECRET No FoRmcN DIssEm
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2. Political parties
a. National Party
b. Liberal Party
c. Progressive Popular Party
d. Orthodox Republican Party
e. National Innovation and Unity Party.
f. Communist parties and front groups
3. Interest groups
4. Electoral law and practices
a. Electoral law
b. Electoral practices
Pare
6
7
8
9
9
9
9
10
12
1.2
13
Page
c. Policy toward agrarian reform 14
d. Policy on public administration 14
e. Policy toward other major needs 15
2. Foreign 15
E. Threats to government stability 16
1. Discontent and dissidence 16
2. Subversion 16
F. Maintenance of internal security 17
1. Police 17
2. Countersubversive and counterin-
surgency measures and capabilities 17
D. National policies 13
1. Domestic 13
a. Historical perspective 13
b. Policy toward development planning 14
Chronology 18
Glossary :',0
FIGURES
Page Page
Fig. 1 General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, Fig. 3 Administrative divisions (map) 5
head of state (phc`o) 1 Fig. 4 Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus, national
Fig. 2 Constitutional structure of the party leader photo) 7
government chart) 3 rig. 5 Election results table) 8
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
011 -1 DCLTlllber 1972, General Oswald() Lopez
Arellano. Chief of the f lon(Ictran Armed I orces
(Figure 1), ousted President Manion Erncsto Cniz and
resumed the presi(Icnc�y of Ilou(luras after only 15
months out of office. Although the coal) N%as triggere(!
bN a hunger march of several thousmid pe:esants
protesting Cruz Lick of interest in the rtec(Is of the
rural poor, press(irc for the coo,) had been bciil(lirig up
for over it year. l.'n(ler Cruz. Ilondunis had
experienced an un(isuallY high I(wcI of internal
disorder and administratisr Chaos :end little�. if any,
progress. 'I'll( nuiin cause of the iristabilih' N(as that
Cruz had been placed in office I)\ a coalition of forces
with di(rrgent interests udder the guise of "unit. I le
lacked the political niciscle to control those forces, and
liondunis la.c�kcd the political maturity to n)akc a
unik' governinenl work.
Ilondiinis biv, no Iradition of (lenu,c�raticAk elected
governtnent or ordcrly transfer of poker. %fill)\ of the
polilic;il con(�cpts and processes taken for granted in
the l'nited States ar se- rec()gniz:chle in
I Ionduras, though the language of detnoc�rac\ is
\(idel used mid there is no lack of legal pro%isioiis
setting forth the political and ec�onoinic rights of
Ilonduran citizens. The two major political parties,
each consisting inure of' personal followings than of
persons (Icvolcd to (�oninu,n principles. have c�ortipeted
hitterk for the spoils of offi(�(% unrestrained Im m(itual
respect or Im strong inhibition:, against gaining or
retaining political po\%er h\ force. The result has bceri
a turbulent If istcrry, rei irded de�srloptnent, and
(�ontinual plotting against the group in po\\er. It is this
basic situation which prinmril\ explains the urned
forces* fr(�clnent interference in the political processes.
Thc� stability imposed by the arined forces un snc�h
occasions has been artificial and leniporar\, but
!hrough most of 1 ionduran histor% it has been th(� only
stability mailable.
The internal violence which characterized the early
gars of f fondumn histor\ spas inhocrr(�e(1 signifi(�antl
by the general instabilit\ of the Central Anwrican
urea. Toward the end of the 19th c�cntun IIonduras
ac�hiesrcl sonic degree of internal peace. The I'irst
period of prolonged domestic trinyuillik, ho\\e\cr.
e�anu� \\ith the dictatorship of ;en. Tihtircio Carias
Andino (19 :32 --15). The Carias regime was suc�cec�d((I
by the relatively mild regin)c of Juan \9anuef (.al\cz
(19- 15 -1) and by the dictatorship of Julio Lozano
(195 1 56). In 195;, followin9 Lozano's ouster. it
inilitary junta condcictcd elections fur a Constituent
Asscnrbl\. These elections were the niost orderly and
deniocratic� in Ilonduran history. The resulting
(:onstitr)cnt Assenibly elected as President Manion
Villeda Morales of the Liberal I art\ of' Ilonduras
(PI.I I the� less conservative of the coiintr)Is two major
parties. Shortly before the end of Villeda's 6 year tern),
Ow niilitary, anticipating the probable elcc�tion of
another Liberal, N'lodesto Modas Alvarado. whom tlicy
considered hostile u) militan interests, overthry the
Villeda governmew in order to prevent Modas front
becoming President. As if result of this coup, on ,i
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FIGURE 1. Gen. Oswaldo Lopez
Arellano, head of state, and Chief
of the Armed Forces (C)

October 1963, it miiitar< government headed b% Gen.
(then (ol.) Osvaldo Lopez Arellano was formed. with
elements of the other major part%, the National Part%
of Honduras WNW, providing the civilian support.
'rite United States refused to recognize the Lopez
regime until it schedule for the return to constitutional
h was annotmced: Lopez subsequently promised
elections by 1965. 'rite 16 February 1965 eiections for
deputies to it Constituent Assembly were care�fufly
controlled by Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus. Lopez
adviser, so as to obtain it majority for the Nationalist
candidates, who were predominantly from Zi niga's
faction of the part%. The assembly elected Lopez
President for a 6-year term, drafted it constitution, and
changed its rnyn status to that of the National
Congress. With the inauguration of Lopez on 6 June
1965, the facade of constitutional government was
restored.
In 1970, with the end of his term approaching.
Lopez appeared reluctant to step down, but he was
constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. Son
observers believe he devised the unity Pact in it sincere
effort to reduce political antagonisms. Others believe
it yeas dune with 'the expectation that the government
would not hold together and that h#r would eventually
find it "necessary" to resume direct control. In any
case� a more unworkable government for Ilondrtras
could hardly be contrived. The unite pact Was
essentially an agreement for dividing up political
offices and other government jobs between the
National and Liberal parties. placing the hest
qualified persons in government instead of staffing tile
entire government from the party of the winning
presidential candidate. The Presidency and Vice
Presidency were the only national offices filled by
election, and with the hacking of the better organized
National Party, its candidate. Crum thougin having no
political strength of his own. on the presidency at-d
was inaugurated in June 1971. 'rite xperiment of
sharing governmental responsibility foundered :�m the
reefs of political bickering, however, and Cruz spent
his first few months in office refereeing the restihing
scramble for office. With his own part\ controlled by
former Minister of Government Ricardo biniga. Cruz
was allowed to select only two) of his cabinet members
;trtd spent considerable time and energy after his
inauguration trying to keep one of the two-0
Minister of Education �from being forced out by
Zuniga. The real power over the miiitary resided not in
the president but in the Chief of the Armed Forces,
General Lopez. The semi- independent status of the-
Chief of the Armed Forces, who is elected by and
responsible to the congress frustrated Cruz efforts to
2
maintain public order ou a nrnetober of ocea Ili
own litnitations as it leader and the ambitions of
yarimis self seeking groups "urking at cross- purpou�s
not oriiy pn��.rnted a n% real accounplishments. but
fostered internal disorder and stalled se�ttlernent of
se�ye�ral foreign relations problems. The coup It'd b%
Lop: z \vas predicted earl% in the Cnnz adtnittistratiou.
he major political f -roes in the c�nnntr% c�ontittue to
he the militar% and the two mutually -mtagonistic
political parties. In addition, t strong; democratic
labor novennernt is taking an int�reasit g1% active ard
independent part in national affairs. The most
important of these forces b\ far is the military. without
eghose approval no government has re�nmiued in p(mvr
%er% Lng. "There are three Conunurnist parties. all of
%.Ilk-h are illegal, small, acid di%ided and cornstihnte no
real threat to the go%ernment. 'The% uttennpt. ho\%ryer.
to exploit the general turmoil. the and the
underdeyelopnnent (If the c�cnmtr, anti t:un contribute
significantly to the utrest generated by these factors.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government
1. Constitutional history (U j OU
In 19175 Honduras enacted its 1 �_tit operati%e
constitution. (On(. constitution. mitten in IS:31, g%as
never put into effect. With the exception of the first
(1825), which provided for confederation with other
Central American states, I londenran constitutions have
been similar. but the inclusion of Man% social and
econonnic guarantees did not begin tnntil 1957.
Honchirat c�otstitutions have bud an average life of
12.5 %ears. '1,11e l onges t lied, that of 1591. lasted 2S
%ears including both its original period of operation
(1119.1- 19(Ni) and it second period (1905 -24) following
its restoration; the shortest lived constitution ryas
written in 1904; it did not hec�onu� effec�tiye tnntil 1901;
and \%-its replaced in 1905.
'1'hc 1965 constitution is alnnost identical to its
predecessor, written in 1957. and makes no significant
e�hanges in the structure of the government. both
documents accord tile artned forces it degree of
autonomy that is highly unusual in constitutional
governments. Tho three biggest differences in the 1965
constitution are that it gives it more precise definition
of national territorial limits, provides for more
congressional control over autonomous institutions,
and prohibits reelection of the President. The 1965
constitution states that the Ilondurau Government is
republican, democratic, and representative. and that
it operates through three c�nmplementary, but
f
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LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
NATIONAL
PRESIDENT
SUPREME
CONGRESS
COURT
64 Deputies
7 Mogntrotes
Attornry
COUNCIL
General
OF
Controller
MINISTERS
Public
Mmhtr
DEPARTMENTAL
Gown
Coons of
Appeals
Courts
of font
Irni �e
MUNICIPAL
Counuls
Mayon
Justices of
rile Peace
ELECTORATE Election
Appointment
Appeal
FIGURE 2. Constitutional structure of the government (U /OU)
independent, powers: legislative, executive, and
julicial (Figure 2). The constitution provides for it
unitary form o: government.
Prior to the election in March 1971. ;ul amendment
sponsored by the two ITlajo arties. lousiness and labor
representatives, and the military provided for it
"government of national unit. In essence, the
anlendnlent deleted for ot;e 6 -year administration the
constitutional provision for popular election of the
legislature, dividing the 6 -1 scats bet%\rcn the
two parties and subinitthig the slate to the voters for
ratification.
The ��unite pact" agreement also included a
nulinurn plan of goyernnent." A supplementary
agreernent called the "pactilo" (the little pact)
divided cabinet posts, judicial positions, arnbas-
sadorial appointments, and many other governinental
jobs somewhat equ1111Y betwee_: the two parties. In
practice, the pact and pactito diluted the power of the
President by specifying the direction his government
should take and removing a large number of official
appointments from his exclusive domain.
No change in the constitutional stnu:ture has been
nade since the coup of 4 I)cc�wnber 1972.
Theoretically the 1965 constitution and the 197
"unite" anendnient arc still in force, "insofar as they
are not opposed to the dispositions of the present
governnTe�nt. Sottle aspects of the constitutional
structure apparently are "opposed" and are being
ignored, at least for the moment. Congress. for
instance, has been dissolved, and Lopez is governing
by decree through the Council of Ministers. 'I'lle
National 1 ?lec�tious Council has also peen dissolved.
2. Executive branch (U /OU)
F 'xecutiye po\%er is vested in the President. %\h,, is
elected for it 6 year term by it "simple majority"
(plurality) of direct popular votes. The c�onstitutiou
stipulates that the President must be llonduran by
birth, in possession of his political rights, at (cast :30
sears of age, and not a number of the clergy. A person
play not be elected President if he has previously held
that office �by any title �for morc than half of a
constitutional te�rin. Persons who have exercised any of
the following functions during the 12 months prior to
the election may not be elected to the Presidency: I
President of the Republic. 2) the president of Congress.
:3; secretary or subsecretary of state. -1) Chief of tile
:)ruled Forces, 5) tnenber of the National Elections
Council, and 6) official chosen by the Nationai
Congress. Others ineligible for the Presidenc% are the
spouse and relative; within the fourth degree of
consanguinih or second degree of affinity of persons
serving as President, Chief of the Armed Forces, or
member of the National F,Icctions Council during the
previous 12 months.
Three Presdential Designates (frequently called
'ice Presidents) are elected at the same time and in
the same manner as the President, and serve in the
absence of the President. If the absence is to be
temporary, the President may choose any of the three
to replace hint, or he may entrust the executive
functions to the Council of Ministers if the absence is
to he less than 30 days. If the absence of the President
is permanent. Congress chooses one of the designates
Io replace hire. If the three designates are also
pernanently absent, the executive power is exercised
by the Council of Ministers, which must call it
presidential election within 1:5 days. The person thus
elected takes office immediately, but his 6 -year
presidential term is counted from the following 6 June.
The President is in charge of the conduct of foreign
affairs, national defense, and general administration
of the nation, for which purposes the constitution
grants him considerable unrestricted power. The main
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consti t tit im w i t restrictions on presidential action are
derived from the congressional power to override it
veto by it two- thirds vote and fnm the recessit% for
c�ongressitmal ratification of treaties. Fur this reason
and because the President is usually it strong
personalih- with considerable support ammig the
iii,; interest groups �the chief executive is
traditionally the dominant figure in tlte� government.
Former President Hannon Ernesto Cruz had not hee�n
typical of Honduras presidents. Although popularly
elected, he wits in many respects moppet president.
The constitution state:; that there shall be za !east 10
ministries headed by secretaries of stale freyuentIN
called ministers, who jointly eonpose the Couuc�il of
Ministers.' In 1973 they were:
Co\enuucnt Mid Imsticc
Foreign Affairs
Public Health and Social Assistance
Public Education
Economi,
I.- imutce
National Defense and Public Security
Communications, ':7auisport, and Public Work.
Labc,r and Soc�ia! SCCarity
Natural Resources
In order to have legal I owe. all decrees, regulations,
resolutions, orders, and executive acts of the President
must be countersigned by the appropriate secretary of
state. In addition, the G:mncil of Xlinislers naN make
decisions by majority Note ou all matters submitted to
it by the President. Under normal c�iremIlStances,
however. the Council of Mini.;ters does not provide it
check on actions of the President, since iu' appoints all
secretaries of state without congressional approval and
can remove� them from office at his pleasure.
Furthermore, the council serves an important advisory
function, and, in addition, individual secretaries nzty
represent the executive brunch before Congress, either
on their o\vn initiative to attend debate or on the
initiative of Congress to answer questions concerning
their departments of government.
:3. Legislative branch (U /OU)
The unicameral National Congress is conposed cif
deputies representing the IS departments, CICCted by
direct vote on the basis of one depuhv and onC
alternate for each 30,000 inhabitants or fraction
thereof over 1:5,000. Departments having fewer than
30,000 inhabitants are entitled to one deputy and one
alternate. A system of proportional representation is
employed to determine the winning candidates, but,
'For e current listing of k(-} go\ officials consult Chic fs of
State and Cabinet :Members of Foreign Coternments, published
monthh by the Directorate of Intelligence. Central Intelligence
Agency
as mentioned carlicr, the Iegislature elected ill 19
no\v dissolved� \y:ts, b\ prior agme� ncnt, divided
equally b0\%ven the Naticnal and Liberal par!ies,
\with the former Ia\ing an extra tie breaking Note.
A deputy nust bC ?a \cars of awe or older, it
Ilonduran citizen b\ birth, and ill possession of lei�,
political right Deputies enjoy congressional
inununity and tuay not be ccrupelled to perform
militar service. I'he Nat onal (:(i ngress� \%hicfn
normally nu�ets i regular sessiim from to 26
October Caclt year. exercises the usuLl la\ynnaking
functions. Subject to approval by the Prridenl. and
can m(erride it presidential yehe by 1m)-thirds Note.
In addiiiou, the Congress elects magistrates of the
Supreme Court. the Controller and :Assistant
Controller, and the� :Attorney General and Assist:ott
:attorneys General. It acts iointly \\ith the President in
c�onferriNg militar\ ranks of major and above and
selects the Chief of the :lrmcd Forces fron three
Candidates SubnittCd h\ the President. Cemgress has
the po\yea� to declare war and to make peace. and it
exercises some control dyer the� nation's fin:utces
through re\�ie\v and approval of the budget. Congress
also has the p,:\yer to decide if grounds exist for the
i�rpCachnu�nt of officialS. While Congress is not in
session. its place is taken by it nine member
housekeeping organ c�allcd the I'ernt.ueent Gminittee.
This conuuittee has no la\makim, ftnaetion: its
primary duty iS to prepare business for the uexl session.
In theory Cor.,,ri�ss has Sufficient po\Ners to prc�y,�nt
Complete control of the g by the executive.
In prtc�tice, ho\yeyer. it has generally been controlled
by the I'resident's party and has acted as a
rubberstamp for the executive. Daring the (.:ruz
adninistretion \e hen the President \vas not supported
by it strong congressional majorit\. Congress \vas
ineffective because of internal disumit\ and partisan
antagonisms.
4. Judicial branch (C)
The judicial po\yer of the nation is exercised by the
Supreme Court of Justice. by the courts of' appeals.
and by other courts established by la\\. :1 magistrate of�
the Supreme Court or of a court of appeals imisi bC
londnran b\ birth, in possession of his political rights,
a lawyer, at least 30 ye�:rrs of age. and noncleric�al. A
magistrate of tL�e Supreme Court must have been a
judge of it court of' first ;iistanc�e or magistrate of it
court of appeals for at lew,t I year, or have prac'tic'ed
la\w for 5 Nears. A magistrate of it court of appeals mast
have held the position of judge of it court of first
instance for at k I year or have practiced la\w for 5
\ears. Supreme Court magistrates are elected by the
National Congress for a 6 -Near term. 1n 1971. the
congress, in accord mc�c. with the terms of the pactilo,
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elected Four I,iln�ra! and three \ationalists to the
Suprenu� (:ourt. After the Dt- (ember 1972 c�out),
I.opez, in cousuf tilt ititI \\ili the� (:uuncil d \IiIIisters,
appointed it ne\\ seven- nlenlher Suprviiv� (:ourl.
\lugistrates of the� courh of appeals, judges cuf courts of
first instance, labor judges. registrars of propertN, and
officials of the Public \iii istr\ (.inlilar in ftulctton to
the Office the Attonav\' General in the United
States) are appointed b the Supreme (:ourl. Jrlslices
ill' the peace are appointed b\ the judges of courts of
first instance. \lagistrates, jrulges, amt officials of the
Public \linislry nla\ not he compellt-d to perform
nilitar\ service.
The Supreme Court has Loth original and appellate
jurisdiction. Anumg the %lses in \\hi(.k it Ilia origin ;I
jurisdiction ore I inlpeachnu�ut proceedings. 2) eases
of protection against abuse of itithorik, and :it
(Ilicstious of constittltionalIiIN of la\\ The Supreme
Court na\ dec�lar;� it la\\ to be nnc�onstitclliunal after
its enac�tnu nt by hearing it specific case. It nut\ also he
called 111 ill b Congress to gi\ e its opinion un the
constitutionalih of it proposed la\\ hick huts been
vetoed by the I'res:dent on grounds of nn-
constit lit ionalit\. lit general, lit wever. the ju(liciar\
has not exercised its c )list it tit iortal status as ;In
independent branch of go% ern nu�nt. The court I%stenl
is often characterized as \\rak and hesitant to hand
down it verdict of guilty in controversial cases.
especially those in\ (6-hog public order and sub\ vrsion.
The Ilondtiran legal s\stenl is bused on Bom;trl a lld
Spanish Ci\it la\\ \%ith some influences of Fliglish
e orllnlorl law.
0
U
FIGURE 3. Administrative divisions (U /OU)
5. *ivil service (C)
i ci\ if sera ice la\\ \\rt p ;used ill Septerrlber 1961
anel bc�e�;lllw effective it; J ;imiar\ 1969. Although ;r
board lots been established to sct salaries nl \ctr'ious
sins e�rnmelit joln. no re,Il nn�ril s\ stmt has et e\ ol\ eel
fur hiring ;111(1 prcunoting go\cnimenl enlplo\ees. (Mv
of the ;link of the unit go i\ rnnle�nl it to place the
I est el lit lifieel perso11s a\ailahle in go\ernnu�nl: \\ilh
fe\\ e\ceplions, ho\\t.tr. the� public ad lit iit ist rat itm
contiuuecl in the same lour stall as in the past. The
unite Imct ;llld the ppanto diet not ;rbolish the� slwils
.\stem: the\ nlerck di\ided the spoils more� e\enl\
bet\\eerl lie 1\\o ne,Ijor parties. (;orc�rnna�nl je)bs. ;n
has liven the tradition. ;Irc still being used to pad
,ullilic;rf debts and re\\it rd 1()\ it[ purl\ ,\orkers.
although Lopez hits slated Ills inten!iou to repl ;lc�e
c,nclualified civil ser\ants. 'I'll(- warc�it\ of trntined,
c�omi) dent iwitip)\\vr, ho\\c\er. is nu\\ here� Inure
visible that, in gc:\crnmciit a rice. kvii the \cr\ hest
of intentions un the part of an a clnlinistntlion. it \\ould
probably be difficult to find several thousand
IImidtirans It() ;tre d eflicienl. ;jild \\(.11
cm)[11411 ecluc ;tlecl to sLlff tie \;rrious ;rg,mcies.
6. Local government (U/01
'!'It( cuunlr\ is di\icle(I into Is, (lepartnn�111s. about
2T5 iniwic�ipalities, and I c�entnil district, comprising
the capit;Il cil\. Tegucigalp and ;r suburb.
:()I i lit \:Iglll�la I l figure 1 TIwse (Ii\ isions are nu�relc
`Fier di.irritic ,m pl,it- n.un,. Ivc th(� li (d u;iIne ,ui the ,ilmni
f tli, `umnean \lal in thi e -;wtn Pr( liIc li.iI)h -r .ui,l t i,� ii,il,
it.�Il
r
19
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for administrative purposes, since� the only local
autonomy granted to rtnunicipalities is a slight dcgrce
of ffmam ial responsibility regarding expenditures.
"There are no legislative bodies on the departmental
level, and governors are presidential appointees.
Nlunic�ipaI councils and it arc elected by popular
vote at i -year intervals and sear mostly ard-
ministraliye and ccrcinonial frnnctfons.
C. Political dynamics
'I'll(- most important political forces in I londuras are
the military establishment and tit(- political parties.
strong, democratically oriented labor nu,ycnu�nl,
which includes the most powerful peasant organiza-
tion, has emerged as it significant interest group since
an unsuc�c�cssful general strike in :\rigid 1965, when it
demonstrated an unaccustomed coftesiyeness. 1)riyate
enterprise groups are f,ec�onting increasingly more
active in the political arena as well. Student
organizations, most of then under considerable
Communist influence, have becl,me the most yuc� ;tl
and disruptive forces in the society ;ofd hay(- f,cnt
government police to student will on se\cral occasions.
(C)
t. Nfilitarp (S)
The military is by !ar the most significant political
force in the country The approval of the military
establishment has traditionally hcen so important to
the stability of any regime that it has frequently been
called "the final political arbiter. This special status,
which the military officers have generally shown
themselves resolved to nutintain, is reflected (yen in
the constitution. the provisions of which emphasize
the power of the military in political ntatters.:krtic le
119 of the constitution, like c�onstitotions of several
other Latin American countries, charges the armed
forces with defending the constitution and assigns
them the mission of guaranteeing free stnffrage and
Icgal succession to the presidential office. Their
partially autonommis position is derived from Articles
322 and 32 -1, which state that the President trust
exercise his constitutional functions with mspec�t to the
artned forces through the Chief of the Mined Forces.
who is appointed by and is removable only by tit(-
National Congress. The special position of the armed
forces is further emphasized by the natum of the
��oath.' actually it promise, which ,Article 325 of the
constitution prescribes for the Chief of the Awned
Forces; the oath states that the armed forces will not
respect any orders which violate the letter or the spirit
6
of the constitution "(-yen if tlu cunt(- front our
sup writ rs. 'this in theory makes the armed forces
prrc�tically iudependen of tit(- 1'residenl.
In it country that is not ;tbly lucking in Ibe
stabilizing factors supplied in other societies by
political restraint and the sons(- of common interest
the military regards itself as justified in providing
stability by extrapolitical nnva ns and I., fund of
referring to itself as the guardian uI "c�oostitutional
order." Iloculttran military leaders are b\ no means
intnume, however, to the� varied influences motivating
the po'i':c4uts and have get wraII\ lacked the maturity
and s;�1) vstraint found in the military of some other
Latin \nu�ric�an countries. In sonic cast's the actions of
the military have coincided \\ith the� wishes of' the
public. such as the overthrow of the n�pressiye Lozano
dictatorship in 19511 and the inept Cruz administra-
tion in 192. In others, the military has acted in its
own self- interest, becoming au unsettling factor al a
time licit orderly change Wright otherwise have
occurred. :kit exampic of the latter took place during
the presidential campaign of 19113. \%hen the Liberal
('arty candidate. Modesto Rodus varado. severely
criticized the militim. stated his intention to restrict
their influence inn Ifondurau affairs, and caused the
military lea dersl to fear that he meant to disband
the ;trtned forces, keeping onl) the Civil Guard, which
\y.is Horde tip mainly of Liberal fart\ mendwrs. The
military W(_*"rdittgI\ seized the goyentna�nl ant :i
October to present his election.
Political parties (S)
The two Icgally registered political parties are the
National 1 arty of I londuyas I'N 1 I and the Liberal
I'arty of Ilonduras (1)1.II). 'Three other parties have
been funned but are still uninsc�ribed. They are the
1)rogressiye 1)opular Party (1'1 1'). the Orthodox
Bepublic�an Party (I'HO). and the National Innovation
and l'nity Part (I'INI 'There are. in addition, three
illegal Communist parties, one Soyict oriented ana two
Chinese oriented. :1 growing number of persons
espousing it Social Christian philosophy are active ill
civic activities, and are organizing under the name of
the Christian 1)(1110cratic Nloyement (XIDC). So far,
however, leaders are few. and legal and bureutncratio
harriers make it almost impossible to register new
parties.
The 1 1.11 is the older of the two legal parties. haying
come into existence inn 1890; the 1'N I I s\ o formed
about 190:3. Membership in these two p n'aes has
bec�onu� largely it matter of family tradition rather
than ideology. The intense partisan rivalry between
them has retarded rather than encouraged deraoc�relic�
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J
development. Tile chief aim of each is to achieve and
retain control of the government, mostly for personal
gain. Neither party feels it necessity for accommoda-
tion with the other when it is in office, nor does it
regard itself as it I091 opposition when out of power.
Roth parties are weakened by internal dissension.
As one of its fiat acts follomying the coup of
December 1972, the goy(,nunent banned all political
activities "contrary to the present order." TII,-
govc:nurtent also relieved civil servants of the
obligation to contribute Vc of their salaries to their
chosen party. This had been the largest single source of
political financing. As it result, the two major parties,
W bile legally still ill existence, are confronted with the
problem of maintaining themselves as functioning
bodies. they have no role, no paid func�tionamics, no
regular income, and there is it virtual hall on formal
meetings. The two parties have displayed great
persistence historically as a result of family loyalties,
but the present dilemma is acute. Indeed, several
ministers in the new govern have claimed that
tile ban aims at causing the traditional parties to
wither away...
a. National Party
The PNII, the more conservative of the two legally
registered parties, has technically been the govern-
ment part' since the coup of 1963. It has earned it
reputation as it party of dictators� ha% ing supported
the regimes of Gen. 'I'iburcio Carias Andimo 1932-45)
and Julio Lozano (1954 -56). In an effort to divest itself
of this label, the party since 1963 has offered it
progressive program of public health, welfare, and aid
to housing and education similar to that of the
Liberals ill the elections. The PNII has claimed
experience and ability to execute such it program,
althoug': its record of accomplishment while ill office
does mot substantiate this claim. With the exception of
the Cntzadministration, most 'f ,NI1 governments have
been reasonably -uc�cessful in maintaining internal
stability with var degrees of re but have
not utilized that stability to develop the country either
sc.;�ially or economically to ally great degree. The Cruz
government could barely maintain public order.
Tile National Pa -ty has suffered it number of splits,
all of which have 1wen the result of personality clashes
rather than ideological c:iffcrences. Present divisions
arc for the most part, between the majority faction,
which supports party boss Ricardo "Luniga (Figure 4),
and several smaller factions, which oppose him.
Composed of the younger members of' the PNII, the
%uniga faction has demonstrated by its methods of
gaining and maintaining control of the part and- -for
it while �the country that it intends to stay ill control
despite opposition, from within the party.
Following the c�oul in October 19113. "Limiga, from
his position as chief advker to Loper began to gain
control of the party machinery. Ry February 19115 he
controlled both the party and the national election
machine�ry suffivientl\ to insure the election of it
majority of pro- Zimig Nationalists to tlx: Cunstitu;�nt
Assellbly. In October of that year several changes in
the PNII party statutes specifically one forbidding
officers of f +re part\ to hold elective or appointive� posts
in the government�brought the central committee
under his control by requiring the resignation of
several anti %uniga members Ito were also
goycrnmcnt officials. T1 I(- PNII central c�omtmtittees
elected since October 1967 have been composed
entirely of friends of '!.uniga.
The anti %uniga portion of tlt^ party is not \yell
organized and is unable to oifcr any effective
opposition to him and his group within the part. "f he
only faction within the PNII which has attempted to
organize behind an alternate leader is it small segment
called the National Velasyuista Movement (NINA').
The \,/1N\' supports :of. Armando Velascluez Cerrato,
the Honduran ambassador tc Peru, and claims to have
the hacking of SWi of the PNI1 rank and file�
although most observers believe this faction is much
smaller. Velasyucz and his principal hackers have
attempted to gain some representation oil the PNII
central committee by writing to all deputies to the
party convention, but to no avail.
m
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FIGURE 4. Ricardo Zuniga Augu-
stinus, leader of the National
Party (C)

The� governing bod% of the National fart% is flit�
parex convention, which inve�ts ever% 2 years :tit(] elects
a I.'. roan c'e�utraI c�oinnittee and an IS member
c�onsulta'ive council. The central c'onunittee govems
the part% between conventions. and part% officers are
selected from anong its +nentbership. The president of
the part% is Stiprenu� Court Justice Alejandro Loper
Cantarero. Tht� consultative c'ounc'il is an advisor%
body with no real power. In addi ton to the 3 civil
service clonatims, the I'N I i was io financed b\- funds
syphoned from cariots goveni.ient projects until the
1972 coup eliminated both sources of income. \lost of
the National I'art\ support comes from conservative
businessinvii and professionals and inentbers of the
military.
I'hc Constituent Assembly election in 1965 and the
nunicipal elections in 1965 (I it;ure 5). in which the
National Party polled 55`(' and 6Y(' of the total votes
respectively, are poor indicators of the parh's actual
strength, since fraud and intimidation were used
extensively bs 'Lttniga and his collaborators. The
municipal elections ill 1962 (.iii wlic'h the part\ \yon
-11(f of the total vote), the Constituent \ssembly
election in 195 (35.5 "1 of tit( total vote won) and the
presidential election of 1971 (52.51 of the total vote
are believed to have been conducted fairly and
are 11JUL -11 better indicators of the strength of the
National and Liberal parties ut the time the elections
took place. The voting strength of the National fart\
ill the 195 cicction includes. for purposes of
comparison, those votes cast for the National
Reformist Movement. it faction \yhich had separated
from the National Party in 195 -1 but rejoined it in
Febnmim 1962.
i.. Liberal Party
The Pf,11 is the rs liberal and progressive of the
two major p arties. It is also hclicyed to he the larger.
although reliable statistic's are lacking, and its
FIGURE 5. Election results (U/OU)
inviiibership encompasses it \\41v range of political
opinion. TIic purl\ clr :tws sonic� support from
conservatives and some from the� extreme le'll, but in
general is considered to be sonic�\% hat left of center: the
part) position \%as officially described be the 1'1.11
central executive council in 1967 its "democratic left."
The I'I.II normally has had the support, though not
the overt assistance, of north coast organized labor.
Since 19')2 the part\ has controlled the governna�nt
only during the Bannon \'illecla Monles ad-
ni [list rat ion (195, -fit). L'nder the leadership of
Villeda, the IIondciran Government embarked on it
program of land reform and improved public health
ant! housing.
Since the cotip of October 196", the Liberal 1'arty
has vacillated between cooperation with the [)Nil and
:ill -out opposition. On several occasions the Liberals
have accepted a token assortna�ut of' government jobs.
thus giving the gos it bipartisan facade ill
exchange for assurances of free elections. In 1965 and
1965, when extensive electoral fraud trade it obvious
that these promises had not been trade ill good faith.
Liberals sought to embarrass the government by
ordering [)[,If nu�nbers to resign their posts. Lack of
unity %ithin the part\ and inability to enforce part
discipline rendered these efforts (futile. In 19T I cinder
the terms of the unity pact. Liberals were given half
the seats in Congress, half the cabinet posts. nany
ambassadorships, and four of the seven seats on the
Supreme Court. With all this representation the 11.11
still had no will influence on goyerimicnt police\. In
late 1972. the President's dismissal of two 11.11
ministers replacing then with Nationalists caused
the� 11.11 to again consider \yithdrawing from the
government.
The moderate faction Icd b\ Carlos Roberto licina
Idiacluer and Jorge Bueso Arias tightened its control
over the Party in April 19.3 when it \yon control of the
14.11 convention. Other incnlbers of the Bueso Ficina
8
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\teNIC!PA I.
Co NsTrrel:N'I'
ASSEN1I11.5'
I'ettslUF :NT LC I.
1962
19118
1957
191iri
1971
i'vr-
Per-
l
Per
cent
cent
cunt
cent
of
Mtinici-
of�
Ninnie�i-
Dep
of
I)v
of
PA11TF Votes N'ote's
paIitle�s V0t es
voi es
pall ties dotes
Votes
litlees
Vote
Votes
Ill ies
Vol Ps
Cotes
t.iberal.... 25S,78S 59
203 160, 7.55
a:i
35 2(1!1,1(19
Nil :i
311
272,071
y:i
29
2111,771
,7.
National.. 18.1,791
71 297,822
(ii.
2.11 1:30,7113
:3S.5
22
:33:1,:3711
S5
:35
306, 028
52.
*Presidents leer% vivcted by
c'onstittient assemblies
in
1957 and 1913:5.
8
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faction are Max \'clasqucz Diaz and fornu�r foreign
\linistcr \ndres M arado I'rtcrlcr. I�orna�r presi(Icntial
candidate 196'i) Modesto Rodas Mv.irado Icads a
small(�r faction.
The highest gocrning body of the I'I.II is the parr
coIIVVIIlion, \\Mich I,.w0s at a scar iIIter\aIs. It elects
the part president and the othe six members of the
c�ctttral cxceutivv council Which gm erns the parr
bct\cccn coMrntions. No information is available on
ITII finances. It is believed that the main source of
funds is contributions froth mendwrs.
c�. Progressive Popular Party
The 1 is composed of folhmers (.)f the late Gen.
"1'iburc�io (:arias \ndino, \\ho broke a\cay irons the
National )arty ill 196: Mien the national parr cljo
Ramon F'. :ruz as its presidential candidate. (:anas
and his faction felt that :arias' sort. :onzah :arias
Castillo, should have rcceiVVd the rlontimation. "I'he
I')) has not yet bccu granted legal status (nor is
legality likcl\ to be granted ill the future. and the
National fart\ has beat unable to persuade the I'I'I' to
return to the fold. In 1969 the I'I'I' claimed to
represent 50,000 to 100,0110 \oters �a claim \\hic�h is
believed exaggerated but \%hic�h as partiall\
substantiated Its the relm (ance of the \ation:tl I ark
to admit loss of this fa+ tion. 'I'll(- political orientalinu
of ))I' st(pporters covers a s\ idc range anti induct( s
consetvativvs as \\cll as persons suspected of pro
Conumrtnist s\ mpathie,
d. Orthodox Republican Parl y
"I'hc I.ibenII fart\ lost a ,haul portion of its
right\cing in 196 when Roque Jacinto Ili\cra and his
followers split off and formv(I the PRO. It has
repcatedly applied for legal status since the coop of
101 but inscription has never been granted.
c. National Lnnoration and Unity Parly
The latest group to request inscription as a legal
party is the NNU led b\ \ligucl \ndonic f�ernandez.
According to ;\ndonic, the party has some 2- 1.(11)0
members and supports progress in social and ccmnontic�
development and all end to the pctt\ s(Itntbblings that
have retarded the countrv's development. "I'hc I'INl
is represented in the mc�w Lopez c�abincl.
f. Communist parties and front groups
'I'll(- presciwe of the three Comunumisl parties in
Honduras illustrates the fragmentation of the
IIIoventcnl rather than its strength. Onc party, the
Communist Part\ of Honduras, Soviet (I'CII'S), is
\losc(m- oriented, while the other tm), the (:mt!-
tnunisl I'urt\ ol' Ilondur�ts�(:hina l'(:11 :utd a
1'(:II C splinter group. the \\'orkcrs I'arl\ of
Ilon(lnras ;)"1'111 adhere to the Chiat�se line. \II :Ur
illegal. ;tnd none is a \cell indoctrinawd or disciplined
group. The bickering cchich had caused the I'CII to
split into t%%o \\arring factions in I965 resulted iu a
complete ideological dkorc�c in 197 ('nlil carl\ in
197: cac�h of the tm) parties had appro\imtalel\ 200 to
100 nu�ntbers and Iron( 00 to 1.000 s\ mpathizers. 'I'll(-
split in 197 of the NCI I; C mid the subse(luent
formation of the I" I'II Icft the I)CII C %%ith slightly
more than half of its original strength. "I'he c aimbiiities
and imfbu�nce of the three groups art uo\ I-- than at
am time since the formation of the original parent
part\ in 1951.
The Comimmists haw� been ac�tkc in Ilomduras
since Hit 1920's and hate been responsible for some of
the uphcav;d and unrest am omg the %corkers. Fyr so.
the Conumnmist parr, as such. \v mot (minded until
the north coast gener�(I strikes ill the smmner of 1951:
the founding group received considerable assistance
bons Cuatentalart Communists. 'I'll(- I.ozamp regime.
cchich took poker in October 195.1. suppressed the
Conte um along \cith all other opposition to the
gosrrm :tent.: \t the end of the I.oz:mo regime its I956
the )CI I \\as estimated to ha\c mo more than 600
mcntb(�rs. \cith an equal number of s\ ntpathizers.
During the gars in scltic�h Bamon ill( \h)mIcs
seas )resident i 195 6: opposition groups, inc�Indink
rite (:on immists. \ccr� permitted consideral)k more
freedom of action. The I'CI I trade significant g :tins.
not onk in e\p:utding its influent e ;among student and
labor groups. but also in infiltrating the gmvntntcnt.
espcciall\ tie \linistr\ of )rtblic F(Imcation. \'illvda.
\chile aclnlitting his concert ow�r the po,sible clanger
of comma mism to Ilonclnras. coronae( to display
hat ratan\ obscr\crs consi(lered :r oh" attitude
to\\ard the N :I I. IIc utaiIIt.1 ine(I that c� )II Ill unisnt
collIII not be destro%ecl b\ srlppressiort but rather b\
constrn(�ti\e grnrrnnu�ntal action \chic)( +ould rob it
of its appeal. Furthermore. he sought the support of as
much of the leftist clement as possildc. apparvntl\ in
the belief th :.(l he could control and use the I'Cll for
his it purposes. He reportedl\ tnct with )CI I leaders
oc�c�asionaII to inform then( of the degree of
opposition his govemnu�mt \c ould tolerate.
\(ter the coop cvhic�h brought the Lopez.
government to power in 196: there :is more
rest ric�livc� policy toward Cotnutmmist activil\. \last of
the Communist leadership, as well :is rout\ leaders of
the non- Contntumist opposition. went into c\ile�
ittostl\ in \Icxico and F Sulv,rclor� \\hcre the
E
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Communist. \\ere able to estabIisII inter til j al
Communist contacts more easily than in Ilondrtnts.
Within the country government harassment caused
the part to become so disorganized that by late 196 -1
only two of the 10 municipal committees :uu1 it ft.%%
c:�Ils were functioning. In November 1964 ;,n anurtesty
decree permitted the return of all exiles except Itt of
the Co nntunisi leaders ho were considered Inc the
lymernment to be dangerous. Most of the Itl have
since returned c�landestinek to th:� country.
Efforts to rebuild the party structure� vr(�re defeated
by deepening
dissension within the p:,rt I'vvu
factions emerged, each mic identified by the name of
its Icadc Tomas F.ratzo Mena beaded the larger
faction, while Dionisio Hangs Hejarano led the
smaller. Wlicn the split first became (1v ident, both
factions claimed to be the legitimate hcirs:af Marxism
Leninisnt and the true disciples of the Soviet li
the intrapart\ fight developed. however. what be 4an
as it power struggle becaun(1 all id (1ological split. The
old guard �or Hanuas faction remained loyal to
Soviet leadership and a(kocated it cautious tactical
approac). 'I'll(- dissident �or Frazo faction advo-
cated a more aggressive police and eventually aligned
itself id the Chinese Communists. Eraz,r, ho wits
educated ire Communist doctrine at the Marxist
Leninist Cadr(1 School in Moscow, reportedl\ turned
his faction toward the Clikiese line in retaliation for
having been excluded from the iiuclapest Consultative
:onfemIce in March 196).
"Pile weakened condition of the Connuptist parties
is reflected in the curtailed propaganda effort. There
arc three Ili 1tIIIIist fart\ pnblic�ations in Ilon-
duras �one published by the 1 :11 S :uul two by the
PCII C. Voz P'opida (Voice of the People) is
published by the I'CII S. The PCII C publishes
Unidad J'nity for genernl distribuution and :Ibril
:`,prih for circulation within the part\. :III of these
publications are poorly printed and appear irregntlarl\
because of the limited financial resources of the
parties. Favorite themes in Cornimmist publications
f w1m!c criticism of the t'nitcd Fruit Company,
bru, tv of the IIondnuran police, ;tail l'. S.
respor i Ili lity for acts of the INmdunua Government
cartsco by diplomatic pressure.
"Pile disorganized and weakened condition of the
parties is further (lcnonstrated by the fact that there is
onto one actively functioning front grout; �the
l.`niyrrsitc lieforn Front (FHA'), which is controlled
by the I'( :II!( 'Pile 1) 11 S has trie(I \\itII little
success to offset its rivals strength at the university by
forming its ()\%n front group. the Socialist Student
Front (FES). Although its stre has been eroded to
sonic r\te�nt, the Flit'. \\Inich gain(1d control of. the
student lederation in 1969, has n lit int it i u�d its
donination of student politics, has se\cral sympa-
thizers anout; the faculty members. is \\ell :tuned. and
has become )it( of the most trouhles�,mu� groups i,
Hondum,s. :Although tic gmernnteut is capable of
controlling student (listurbanc�es. the willingness
appears to he lacking, and students. gcrtcraII\ vvitII
Flit' pro%iding the rirgicaders, ha %c b(1ert able to keep
public disord(1r at an all -time high since earl\ 19 TI
Tilt. Communist murvv-nuenl has had onto limited
success ire maintaining control of am\ portion of
orgamized labor and has failed notably in organizing
\\0111(111 and cantpesinos. While tic Ccntral Federation
of Unions of free Workers of Honduras (FFJ :FSI T-
I .I I I i it )Ili nrr Ili ist- controlled until Late 1965,
hell nou leaders gained eon.rol of a
majorit\ of the member unions. n,t major labor
federation is no\\ controlled by :o nununists. 'I'l l(.
unions \\hic�h remain undcr (:olnimmist Ica dership
have littic influence in the labor movenr(1nt.
:3. Interest groups (C)
The main factors prompting the formation of
interest groups awl encouraging organizations formed
for other purposes to act as interest groups have been
the inactivity on ti part of the gmenrnn�mt in
c!e ve loping tie eourr ".n cc�amomically and socially, mitt
the corruption and inefficiency which have pervaded
most :administrations. T\\ o organizations t in(1
Honduran Council 0f Private Enterprise (COIIFI'i.
.and the National :\Iliance of Social Organizations of
londuras (.\\OSII1� include influrncing grnrnn-
nu�nl polic�v among their stated objectives. Several
labor orgraninations. business ausoc�iations ,and other
groups have also acted a,s inter (1sl groups or h.avv�
demonstrated the potential to do so. .Among them. tilt
most active aar(1 the Notional Workers Trade Vnion
Federation of I 1midturats I' ESI I I i, the Cha ndwr
of Commerce and Indnslrics of Cortcs (CCICI, the
National Federation of Farmers and Cattlemen of
Honduras (FI�N.M;111, and th(1 \:rtionai :Vssoc�iation
of llonduran t.' tntpesinos Students and
teachers have also !r�conw more \0c�al in the past fc\\
years. and their activities, while largely disruptive.
have inflct�nccd gmcniment polic�v on occasion.
The most active interest grouups are organized labor.
especially FF.SITH:k\ I I and the Confederation of
Ilondnran Yorkers :TI l of which it is the strongest
component. and the va,rionus business organizations
represented by C011f ?P. FFSI NII and (:011l� :I'
\\ere supporters of the mlity govvnumenl and suet
several times following the inauguration of Cruz to
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r( i(�%% tit( gmurum ent's accomplishments �or the
lack thereof �and intake recommendations. Vntil earl%
1968 FESITIIAN11 stayed out of the� political arena
for the most part, belies ing that the federation could
do more for the maker b it Itm political
profile and therebN ;voiding potential harassment. In
that xear FESI THAN:} joined %%ith the CCIC, an
organization of businessmen in San 1'edro Sula %ho
had also staxed out of' politics, in presenting the
government %%ith if series of requests for increased
attention to economic development, personnel
changes in the cabinet :end judiciar%, and c�foscr
supervision of the frequent1% irresponsible !oc'al police.
Both 1 1?SI I'! ?:N 11 and :I(: v ievv economic
stagnation as injurious to both labor and m anilge-
nient, and as if result of their joint petition, fourof the
seven Supreme Court Nlagistrat(�s were replaced by
persons gener,(Ily considered neon qualified, :u;d the
Director of the National :kgrtrian Institute (IN:k) %%as
relieved of if second joi) so that ht- could conccutrate
his efforts oil agrarian re;orn. Ilealizimg that these
were only token concessions. FESIT11:1\ I I and CCIC
again %%rote to the President in late :\ugust I96S,
expressing thanks for the eh;utges he had ntacle but
indicating that the% also expected action on tie other
items. In September their efforts vver(� set back by an
illegal strike� belie\cd by some labor and business
leaders to have been instigated b\ the government to
weaken labors mtoraI position �hut in 19
FESI'I'RAN I I and busi.a�ss grumps resumed their
efforts to influence government polic�\ and became
backer:, of the unit\ governnu�mt.
The group through yvhidl b1ltillletistln'll have
generally worked begun I)\ *lelgar.
Whilc significant improyena�nt has beet: matte. th(.
(:I ?S still has dcfic�ien(�ics, mostly in numbers of
personnel. in arms. and in transportation e(luipmu�mt.
�I'lle :leis is equipped with an assortment of small arms
such as pistols, carbines. M I rifles. amd, in smile
utttl\ing districts, olcl Mausers. The nnmtber of
ycltid(l s nyailablc to the CES is insuffic�icnl fur the
performance of its mission. and the (:F.S laloratory
and tnetlimls of imyesti,-alion are thus far inadequate.
The CES c�unttnttnication system, howeycr. is the
most modern in I lon(I(tr is. The corps re(�eiyed
considerable ('.S. :III) assistan(�c in establishing the
network, and the network repair facility. inacic(luatc
thus far. i nuproying under :111) guidance.
1. :ountersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities
In coping with widespread outbreaks of terrorism.
riotim4. or other disorders, the police would need the
direct inyolycmu�nt of the military forces. The military
forces and police combined are probably capable of
containing and eventually controlling such internal
disorders. The puttee alone arc probably capable of
containing strictly localized disorders, but tic
wiIIimgtless of General Lopez (even (haring his (mii
previous administration) to commit the police to such
activity has been notably lacking, especially w1wil
students are involved. On it number of occasions
stu(lemts hays been allowed to inflict considerable
property damage on L'.S. offi(�ial installations.
IIond(tran govenu let t offices. and schools with mo
response �or if late response at best �front the police.
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Given t e� fae�t that this attitude it', especial Ix
apparent after Cruz took office in jtine 19 I. I opez'
willingness to c�onthat threats to the (;rtez ad-
ministration was defiuitt Iv suspect.
Although not it najor activity of the sec�trity forces.
there is it small civic action progr: in in operation. The
Chronology (u /ou)
1502
Columbus reaches coast of Honduras during fourth voyage
1539
Honduras and four other provinces of Central America are
incorporated into captaincy general of Guatemala, adminis-
trative division of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, in the
Spanish Indies.
1821
September
Independence from Spain is g:t :.aed amt Honduras bee nnes
part of Mexican Empire.
1923
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, ;rid Costa
Rica form United Provinces of Central America. Francisco
Morazan of londuras serves as President from 1~30 to
collapse of federation in late 15:35.
1838
November
Honduras declares independence from federation.
1932 -48
Dictatorship of Gen. Tiburc�io ('arias Andino provides first
period of prolonged domestic peace.
1918
October
.'uan Manuel Galrez (handpicked successor of (;(-it. (arias)
is elected President on National Party ticket,
19.19
January
President Galvez and Vice President .lulio Lozano are
inaugurated for 6 -rear term.
1954
May
General strike paralyzes entire north coast area.
November
President (.alvez leaves country for "medical treatment"
following indecisive elections; Vice President Lozano becomes
Acting President.
15
drawl forces ha\e engaged in road eonstntctic;n and
provision of potable� \\att�r facilities. The air force has
o,casionally transported niedieal assistance to
inaccessible areas. TI it scope of this I) rot! rant.
however, is not sufficient to make any real impact as it
counlerinsurgencv measure.
December
Newl elected ('ongrer:s with mandate for settling presidential
election faik to convene: Lozano declares himself do aclu
Chief of St:tle.
1956
August
Revolt against Lozano's authoritarian tactics is quickly
suppressed: Liberal Party leaders are exiled.
October
Fraudulent election of Lozano's handpicked Constituent
Assembly results in bloodless military coup; interim militar.%
junta assumes power.
1957
July
Defense Minister Col. Oswaldo Lopez Arollano emerges as
strong military leader with ouster of Gen. Roque ,I. Rodriguez
from interim junta.
September
Constituent :ksseutblY is elected; Liberals win control by
wide margin.
November
Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, Liberal leader, is named con-
stitutional President -elect by Constituent Asselnbly; ('ol.
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano bec�onu�s member of junta.
December
Villeda Morales is inaugurated President for ti -year term.
Constituent Assentbh� becomes National Congress; new con-
stitution is promulgated: Lopez is appointed Chief of the
Armed Forces.
1960
November
Longstanding border dispute with Nicaragua is settled by the
International Court of Justice; disputed territory awarded to
Honduras.
1963
October
Militar; coup by Lopez overthrows Villeda, thus preventing
elections scheduled for 1:3 October.
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r.
1965
February
Constituent Assembly elections are held; Nationalist: "�ia"
:35 seats to Liberals' 211.
March
Constituent Assembly elects Lopez President of Honduras.
Constituent Assembly changes status to National Congress.
June
Lopez is inaugurated for 6-year term.
1967
May
Honduran and Salvadoran troops clash in undemareated
border area.
1968
March
Government party "wins" 'gal of the 276 muricipalities
through extensive fraud and coercion.
July
Honduras and El Salvador exchange prisoners captured
during the border clash in 1967.
1969
June
Honduras auml El Salvador break relations ov, r mistreatment
of one another's nationals.
July
Hostilities erupt between El Salvador and Ilonduras. The
Organization of American States Obtains cruse -fire %%ith great
difficult%
1971
January
Major interest groups sign unit} pact govrrnimg Nl rch
election and government that will fellow.
June
Raumon Ernesto Cruz, elected on 26 Jlarch, is inaugurated
for 6 -Year term.
197'2'
December
Lopez ousts Cruz in bloodless military coup: dissolves
congress and governs by decree.
E
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Glossary
A It It It EVIAT It l.%
E N m, Is II
S I
A NAC I I
National Association of Honduran
Asociticioll Vacilimll oil Campt"ino.. II(All-
�allipesillos
11111.0 no.,
ANOSII
National Allianev of So�ial Orgalli-
Aliflll:ll Xti�liplill/ (It Onplill-m-itillf.,
zations of Holldlil�as
Ile Holobiras
('('I('
Challibvi. of Collim�rve and Indus-
Camara (it Coinfl-rio 1 1111111striti� 1/(
tries of ('ones
('orb 's�
('1?
Special set�Ilrity Corps..........
Cucrpo Espcvial (I( So atiridud
CM I E P
11ol)(IIII Cokill�il of Private
Collse ill 11(induro no do Ili Empnmi 1'rhada
Enterprise
COLP R 0SU M A I I..
Professional College for Illlpro�v-
('14cf1io Profc�iomd (It Subinittrilf) Magi-
IlIvIlt of Teaching ill Honduras
�brio flonduro-no
CT I I
Confederation of Honduran
Confethracion ill Truhapubirts Him-
Workers
durf nos
FECESITIA 11
('vile al Fvdpration of Onions Of
F(Weravion Ci Oral tit Silidif-ahis do
Fre� Workers of Honduras
T�id)(ijadorf� Lilons do Hondum.�
FENACOTHAL.
Nalional Federation Of 1�tild
Ftdiravion A�(wional I( ('nup(rulirus de
Transport Cooperatives
Transport( Limituda
FENAGII
N:Lti0IMI I�(41eratioll of Farmers
Pedt Xarional (if Ag�icullons
:111d Of IIOIIdlII',I.1
Garimbrols tit Hondni-ax
FE'SITRAN 11
National Workers' Trade Union
Fithrucion Sindical tit Tr(d)(Ijildon S
Federation of Honduras
Naciollut (it Honduras
Socialist Student Front..........
Fronh Extudiantil So�ialista
F H I.
I'lli�vi-sit� Reform From........
Frcide do Btforinti Univirsitilria
1N:\
National Agrarian Institute......
Institulto A'acitimil Agrario
.\I DC
Christian Denlocrati� Movelilent
.11ol-cmitnto Dimo�raticei Chrisireina
\I N\
National VvIasquista Movemellf
.11til'o-lilitilto Xaviololl I'llamplista
1 1 11 C
olllllllllli.-;t Parts of Honduras
I'lil Com linisla do Illolldpllwx hilm
Ili na
1 S
Communist 1 of Honduras
l (lido Conlunisho do Ilmolu'lls Soviet
Soviet
PIN('
National Innovation and VnitY
I'crtitill Inoreicion Xitrion(d Uniduel
Part.%
1)1.11
IJI)VI-:11 hLI-t� of flondunts..
I'(11-lido I'd)(1-al (if Hombir(is
PNII
National Part.%� Of Honduras�
MI 1.1 ido Naritillul do Ilondill-fis
13131)
1 Popular Part.%
hi rt ido Popular Prot
.17*4 sistil
PRO
Orthodox Republican Part.y.
Poirlida lecimlifirano Orloiduro
PTI I
Workers' Part.%� of Honduras.....
I'm�lids) tit Trahnjadort.. (if Holobly�u.,
4
20
NO FOREIGN I)ISSI-I'M
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