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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R0002000 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are p- oduced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the Generai Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent cicssified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defenss Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by low. CLASSIFIED BY 019611. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of Notional Security Council intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no ribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 I_1,,:16IT M (1161:110 :1 File N 11 111 ISIIIyLIy1:ilIlhY1lhI1HIIIY4F&I GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS COUNTRY PROFILE I rltcgwivi3 Ixn%lxv 1we r-r ltic a1111)w amllaq a ChnrrnAmy a ATr.l frid Suinmsry Mal) THE SOMM S Klal i.r:Kilrhr Fgw1allnn J.rbor l l rAdi Op imWitLum Smiwl lin IlrllX11M FdLL4NJG m QUllllr li TM- nr .aginia a Artitlic C1[Ntttion Cl1Vli;l;NMENT AND POLITICS Potltical ntis- IU401r of Ilr sWl! C�C+ctllwrntaf slnrttXl? arK1 ttablllly 5ti uctuic end r ur>11un is MilFral dy. ni i rules ,ti uI irmal puli6o Threats to slublllty A Tits FAil.V r1tIC111Rc -ti {r 91111 sMartl} (ruun- trnrllrs.'0rm awl counterimurgrney "imtrlll tics 311E ECO,` 0h1Y Appral "l crr I lk- rmlltt I is sl uuiu rr� s,rirulturr, 101 rnsr'nl q'. Pur UDJ jonwer. iisrul and mineral, matttfucl a nd c rnil rudlup a 1 }nnsrsllc I ride cajmmnlc pnilr}' anti dr Clhprllrnl a lulertullau l rrnrKrnlc rr tiurp TWN SPO RTATIGN AND TELECON"EUNICATIOtiS Apq w1wI tie s r- rrru 54ratcX3t nurl>iIJI} Ralliwds 111j;6x .&%s FAind A4lcrw qi Prlx'll iki Pori M er- cha nl mi rine Ovil air Allf trlilt L ow Irlc� crrrn stem MILITARY CEOGH"JIY TcrpXruplry and cll- P031C Millt -If Rt r. plAr 1rXlurr. SI otrxir a lolcrnal mules Appcq r fi rs: Wid. wa, air ARMED FOAC�S 'Elie drIvine *sS4l rllsllmcnl Irrlht actititlm G nrttf rd Gorr, Naval frowns Air fermi J'arxmll l to ry SCIIr+NIM lac %vl lit xlralific Awamwntrnt Ur� PatiaNuo. FI:, rinlnX, a nd rirranr.aX err rr5 iT01 ~Chilli t4lututirrrl, n1ar11xo% 9rd radlilin t1 ulor rrseauji Arid U TELI.ICENCY. AN SECURITY Slout ure al rrrgartizutiorts corwrewil. milli Interval wrurily aiul rurrtig Iu1r111Xnccr, thrk InIMtnilrilHlcs, pru rr56- 14nllal ta runic. Intl 1ntrrr1Plall43mfillft %J jW0jl. worsixatiurs, rundrupw c#rc 1Ji cve% 9nd nlrllWrd ar rviAl� tit "0i srrvirr Sli>R, .oil lit krF trfrlciah it. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 I_1�:t6IT MIl1a]:4 :W* 111: 1bI-5N W01] WIN 11 I1Z QIy Lfl:bIIYIIfDIY:; Poland The I rrtpcmtive of Nstional Revival I 11' ltI'IFnn a NIA"Intion, M -Swl I iilrition, and 71 1ec'emU16 Lz"r Qc4rW'sN,-w Drxl rhr Yr.J M Abend arOAolm 20 Aera Baer 25 5um=rY AIap JWOU-1 M Th is Cam"(1 Pmfilr was prenarrd fax ter NIS by the Crr lml W.Akmrr Agrr V. Resft ch Lot rub� stars f Sth r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 t f .Mr LA f t a 'j 'J !,x,Y f/ r y {7 i yet ll S i t wo hFtt` of r ti{ 'Y'. -t k T L Y �iaf, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 The Imperative of National Revival When Edward Gierek took over leadership of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) from Wladslaw Gomulka on 20 Decer.iber 1970, the violent workers' demonstrations which had erupted in several of Poland's coastal cities during the preceding week were threatening to spread to Warsaw itself. Although the immediate cause of the disorders had been Gomulka's ill -timed action in raising food (mainly meat) and fuel prices on the eve of Poland's traditional Christmas feast, the crisis had been brewing for years. The dramatic circumstances surrounding Gomulka's return to power in 1956 had generated exaggerated ex- pectations about his intentions with regard to liberal domestic reforms and the exercise of Polish sovereignty alike. By the early 1960's, his seeming retreat on both fronts had badly tarnished his popular image. Thereafter, a sort of sickness characterized by cynicism and apathy on the part of the general pop- ulation and by increased factionalism and oppor- tunism within the ruling Communist elite settled in on Polish society. (C) There had been plenty of danger signals: troubles with intellectuals and students, discipline and morale problems in the military establishment, more and more pilfering and malingering in the factories, and mount- ing evidence of tensior. between the younger and older members of PUWP. Only a combination of Soviet political support, fortuitom circumstances (including the sobering lessons of the Warsaw Pact in- vasion of Czechoslovakia), and a compromise with im- patient "young Turk" elements in the party enabled Gomulka to survive a challenge to his leadership mounted by factional rivals in th,a spring and summer months of 1968. Yet even this close call did not result in any great change in Gomulka's internal policies or priorities. Preoccupied with foreign affairs and in- sulated from the realities of the Polish scene by a small clique of like- minded associates, he continued to neglect his country's domestic problems. (C) By mid -1970, the period of respite that Gomulka had won less than 2 years earlier was simply running out. The economy, suffering from mismanagement and the zigzag course of halfhearted reforms, was in serious trouble. Worse yet, the regime was woefully out of touch with the mood of the population. Finally per- suaded of the need for more forceful and consistent ac- tion on the economic front, Gomulka pressed forward with a belt tightening program involving, among other things, a planned increase in unemployment, a complex and controversial revision of the exist- ing wage /bonus system, and a marked alteration of established domestic consumption patterns through selective price adjustments. These measures hit Poland's factory workers and their families the hardest. And in December, the unexpected explosion of the ac- cumulated economic and social grievances nourished by a relatively prosperous and skilled segment of the ideologically favored industrial proletariat finally and irreparably exposed the bankruptcy of Comulka's domestic policies. (C) Demoralized by incessant factional infighting and by 14 years of Gomulka's cramped and autocratic style of rule, the existing PUWP leadership was ill- prepared to deal with the new crisis. At Gomulka's direction, it attempted to put down the protest demonstrations by force. This only made matter worse, and it soon became evident to the members of Warsaw's inner councils that Gomulka's harsh response had cost him Moscow's confidence and support. But by the time that those PUWP leaders who favored greater restraint had managed to oust him and his principal lieuten- ants, impromptu strike committees had gained con- trol of a number of factories and shipyards, dozens of people had been killed in clashes between the workers and the security forces, and well over 1,000 more had been injured. In Gierek's own assessment, Poland stood at the brink of civil war. (S) With Soviet intervention as the possible price of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 failure, Gierek was confronted with a number of for- midable tasks. First of all, he had to defuse the ex- plosive situation on the coast and gain control over the cumbersome PUWP and government bureaucracies. Eq important, he had to inaugurate a new but ideologically acceptable style of rule which would restore popular confidence in the regime, appeal to patriotic sentiment, and engage the cooperation and support of the largest possible part of the population in efforts to revive Poland's sagging economy. He was faced, in effect, with the need to foster a genuine national revival without altering the basic fea'rrres of Poland's existing Communist system or releasing the spontaneous pressures for societal change which had doomed the Dubcek experiment in Czechoslovakia. Finally, although the Soviet Union and Poland's other Warsaw Pact allies had been quick to endorse his regime, he had to insure that they would go along with his domestic innovations and continue to provide him with both political and economic support. (C) Fortunately for Gierek, there were some aspects of tht situation in December 1970 which worked to his advantage� including the widespread reputation as a tough, competent, and fair administrator he had earned during his 13 -year tenure as PUWP chieftan in Katowice province (the core of the Silesian industrial area). For one thing, although the dissident workers laid most of their grievances at the party's door, 2 Poland's socialist system as such was not under direct attack. Nor had the demonstrations taken on an anti Soviet coloration. Moreover, open agitation was pretty well limited to the urban working class and, even more narrowly, to the skilled workers who felt they had the most to lose from Gomulka's heavy handed economic policies. Despite growing uncer- tainty about Gomulka's ultimate intentions with re- spect to collectivization, the peasants were quiet. Whether out of caution or out of pique over the failure of the workers to come to their support in protesting political and cultural repression in 1968, so were the students and intellectuals. Although clearly sympa- thetic to the workers, the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept its peace excapt to counsel nonviolence. On a more general plane, still fresh memories of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia operatd both to temper the behavior of the Polish population and to incline Warsaw's allies toward cooperation with Gomulka's successor in hopes of avoiding the need for a rapeat performance. (Cl Even so, popular skepticism and impatience, the critical state of the economy, and Moscow's ever present shadow all imposed severe restrictions on Gierek's freedom of maneuver. Hence his success in meeting most of his initial objectives before he had completed a full year in office attests to his considerable political and administrative skills. Indeed, things did not go too well at first, and Gierek was soon confronted with a second albeit nonviolent �round of strikes. But by mid February, he had persuaded Moscow to provide him with the financial assistance and added measure of political support he needed to stabilize Poland's domestic scene. Thus he able to roll back Gomulka's aggravating price increases and to initiate a carefully phased series of personnel changes designed to remove incompetents and potential -opponents from positions where ',hey could hinder his plans. (C) By mid -1971, Gierek had greatly strengthened his control over the principal mechanisms of political power, an his cautiously implemented program of domestic rc!newal �with its emphasis on constructive dialogue, patriotism, material well being,, and social reform �had won him a period of grace -n the eyes of most Poles. His improved position enabled Gierek to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 extend his housecleaning campaign to the lower echelons of the party and government and to advance the scheduled date for the 6th PUWP Congress a full year to December 1971. And when that carefully prepared meeting was convened, he used it both to effect further key personnel changes and to enshrine the basic features of his political and economic policies in the new PUWP program. (C) In many ways 1972 was an even more encouraging year for the Poles. Their country emerged from the 6th PUWP Congress and from the governmental elections a few months later with the youngest and best educated leadership of any Warsaw Pact nation. Com- prised largely of individuals who began their political or professional careers in the postwar period, Gierek's new team shared his pragmatism, his commitment to a new relationship between the rulers and the ruled, and his concern for popular welfare. Moreover, by year's end Gierek could cite an impressive array of actions and accomplishments to substantiate his claim that Poland was not "on the right road" and to show that his policies were indeed serving his declared objectives of promoting domestic prosperity and of making Poiand "count in the world." Among other things, in- reases in agricultural rr:oduction, real wages, and in- "ustrial productivity had exceeded initial forecasts. In the field of foreign affairs, Poland had not only clearly regained its leading position among Moscow's partners it Eastern Ewmpe, but had succeeded in forging promising new political and economic links to the West as well. (C) Despite the fact that Gierek has won most of his in- itial battles, however, final victory in his struggle to revive the Polish nation is still far away. As un- derscored by the rejection of his proposed new labor code by the trade union congress held in November 1972, he is still very much on probation as far as most of Poland's workers are concerned. Their continued support seems likely to depend on further tangible im- provements� social, political, and, particularly, material �in their way of life. Yet Gierek's ability to deliver may be limited by a number of factors, not the least of which is his seemingly rather conservative posi- tion on the need for major institutional reforms within Poland's existing economic system. (S) Indeed, the key to Cierek's ultimate success or failure probably lies in the economic field. The Polish people know that he is no liberal and that his prograins promise no miracles. At the same time, however, pan of the bargain he has offered them rests on the promise that hard work and dedication will be suitably re- warded. Hence, failure to maintain a steady and rela- tively substantial rate of economic progress would greatly complicate Gierek's efforts to achieve a deli- cate balance between seemingly contradictory objec- tives �for example, popular mobilization and dis- cipline versus a freer internal atmosphere; Pb Tty supremacy versus a democratized and decentralized governmental system; and strong, responsible one -man management versus increased worker participation in the deebionwaking process. (S) Thus, while Gierek has entered into his third year in office in a rather favorable position, the situation which he maces is still too complex �and his long range plans as yet too vag!ie.y defined �to permit any confi- dent judgment as to jest how smooth or rocky Poland's new path to socialism may turn out to be. But it is possible to review the internal and external fac- tors� including the influence of history and geography �which affect Gierek's options, to assess his specific moves and policies in the light of the problems he inherited from the Gomulka era, and to identify areas of possible future difficulty. (S) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 The Polish Nation (u /ou) Poland was born in A.D. 966 when Mieszko I, the first known ruler of the native Piast dynasty, united the Slavic tribes living in the Vistula and Oder river basins between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic Sea, adopted Christianity, and placed his principality under the protection of the Papacy. A purported later copy of the instrument by which Mieszko performed the latter act indicates that the boundaries of his do- main closely approximated those of present -day Poland. The validity of this document has been challenged, but it makes little difference. Piast control over the territory described therein was soon firmly es- tablished by Mieszko's son, Boleslaw I "the Brave 4 who succeeded his father in A.D. 992 and who had himself crowned as Poland's first king 33 years later. Poland's geographic location astride the flat plains of the north central European corridor has resulted in an almost uninterrupted struggle for national identity and territorial integrity in the face of real or threatened domination by neighboring powers. No other Euro- pean country has known such contrasts in its fortunes. There have been times of grandeur when Poland ras the largest and most populous state in Europe west of Russia. And there have been times �in the late 18th century and again in 1939 �when a strong Germany and a strong Russia have joined forces to erase Poland from the map (in the first instance, for 123 years). Their turbulent history, in turn, has been the main determinant of the characteristics and attitudes of the Polish people. Centuries of adversity and of externally encouraged rivalry between members of their native nobility have made ti Poles tough, individualistic, resistant to change, and disrespectful of authority. Above all, however, their long struggle for national survival has imbued the Poles with a fierce and unique form of patriotism, one in which Poland's Roman Catholic Church is seen as the essence of all that is Polish and as the principal guardian of the nation's interests. The roots of this identification between Roman Catholicism and the nation extend back to Mieszko's action in making Poland an eastern outpost of the church. Later, during the Middle Ages, Polish forces fighting under the sign of the cross stemmed the ad- vance of the Turks and Tartars into Europe on several occasions. But the bond was really sealed in 1655 when a Polish victory over superior Swedish forces at Czestochowa was attributed to the miraculous in- tervention of a holy painting, the so- called Black Madonna. The grateful Polish monarch proclaimed the Madonna as Queen of Poland (an appointment that has been renewed annually in colorful religious ceremonies ever since). In the years that followed, the aggressive actions of a Lutheran Prussia and an Orthodox Russia further tempered the link between Polish patriotism and the Roman Catholic Church. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Then, in 1795, when all that was left of Poland was divided up and occupied by the Germans, Russians, and Austrians, the Polish church survived intact and became the chief unifying force contributing to the rebirth of the nation in the wake of World War I. Although societal change generated by moderniza- tion and industrialization added a new dimension to the problems faced by the leaders of the Polish state which emerged in 1918, the traditional factors of geographic location and national character continued to play a key role in shaping the country's fortunes and course. The nationalism which was later to find such heroic expression during World War II contributed to the mounting of a successful military campaign against a strife -torn Russia in the early 1920's. However satisfying to the Poles, this action resulted in the inclusion of sizable new �and potentially dis- sident� minorities within their country's eastern fron- tiers and laid the basis for the collaboration between Moscow and an equally irredentist and expansionist Berlin which brought devastation and dismemberment to Poland in 1939. At the same time, the Polish pop- ulation proved to be, in the words of one Western observer, "charmingly impossible to govern." Interwar Polish politics were characterized by a succession of weak parliamentary coalitions which finally gave way �in 1926 �to semidictatorial government, first under Marshal Piisudski and later under a collection of military leaders called the "colonels regime." World War II greatly altered the face of Poland. Above and beyond its bitter IPgacy of material destruc- tion, it resulted in boundary shifts by which Poland lost nearly 69,000 square miles to the Soviet Union in the east and gained about 40,000 square miles from Germany in the west. The effective wartime exter- mination of Poland's sizable Jewish minority by the Germans and the massive transfers of people which ac- companied the postwar border adjustments produced an ethnically and religiously homogenous population about 98% Polish and 95% Roman Catholic. Full sovereignty remained a thing of the past as German oc- cupation gave way to Soviet domination.. The Marxist regime imposed upon the country by Moscow soon completed the destruction of old social patterns and of the prewar political and economic elite which had been begun under Nazi rule. But despite radical changes in class distinctions and relationships, the fundamental attitudes and character of the Polish people remained as before. Polish indiv- ualism and resistance to imposed authority proved impervious to efforts to imbue the population with a new and ideologically determined set of values. If anything, the cumulative effect of all the traumatic changes in Poland's internal and external cir- cumstances was to reinforce the linkage between Polish nationalism and the Roman Catholic faith. Hence Gierek, just as his predecessors, must cope with the fact that his countrymen are just about the most unnatural Communists in the world. In its present configuration, Poland is a rectangular country slightly larger than Ohio, Indiana, and Ken- tucky combined. Its population at the end of 1972 was estimated at a little over 33 million. With its southern boundary at approximately the same latitude as the U.S. Canadian border west of the Great 'Lakes, it lies in a transitional weather zone between the continental extremes of the U.S.S.R. and the milder marine climate of northwestern Europe. Thus despite the moderating influence of the Baltic Sea, bitter cold winters and long summer hot spells are not uncom- mon. The Baltic Sea forms the portion of Poland's northern frontier. The s.Andy and low -lying Polish coastline -305 miles Fong �is bereft of good natural harbors, but hooks of land enclosing shallow lagoons and bays have permitted the development of major ports at Szczecin (Stettin), Gdynia, and Gdansk. To the south and southwest, the Carpathian and Sudeten mountain ranges� separated by the strategically im- portant 20 -mile wide lowland area known as the Moravian Gate �form a natural boundary with Czechoslovakia and provide the Poles with a year round resort area. Most of Poland is flat or gently roll- ing, however, and its flanks remain as vulnerable as ever to overland attack. In the west, its border with the German Democratic Republic generally follows the course of the Oder and Neisse rivers. On the opposite side of the country, the Polish- Soviet frontier is anchored on segments of the Bug and San rivers, but much of it was drawn with little regard for natural terrain features. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 4 a Poland can be divided into three main geographic regions crossing the country in roughly parallel zones from east to west. Since geography has played a prominent �if indirect �role in shaping the attitudes and character of Poland's colorful and ofttimes hotheaded people, it is somewhat of a paradox that most of the country owes its surface features to the southward invasions of the Scandinavian ice sheet which began to creep across the North European Plain about i million years ago. At its point of greatest ad- vance, this ice sheet covered nearly three quarters of present -day Poland. With each retreat, the great glaciers left a thick blanket of clays, sands, ar-d gravels �known as drift� spread over the land, even- tually completely obliterating the preglacial land- scape. At the end of the Ice Age, huge rivers, swollen by melt water from the ice sheet, flowed westward across the middle of Poland creating wide, marshy valleys which are still traceable today and which have facilitated the construction of canals linking Poland's present river systems. The plains region which makes up the northern two- thirds of Poland bears the strongest traces of this 6 glacial period. It is an area of generally poor soils, of many lakes and marshes, and of a number of roughly parallel east -wept ridges of glacial drift called moraines �which in some cases reach more than 650 feet in height. Much of the land is employed for agriculture and forestry, but transport and com- munications are easy, and a number of cities (par- ticularly Warsaw, Poznan, and the major Baltic ports) have important industrial centers. This vast region, from which Poland ("land of fields derived its name, rises southward into a much narrower central belt consisting of low hills and tablelands of the type found in Upper Silesia. A part of the mir;eral -rich contact zone between the North European Plain and the European uplands, this area is the ecor,9mic backbone of modem Poland. Its well dra:. ed loamy soils (the product of fine, windblown deposiN from the face of the Scandinavian ice sheet) are the most ferti;n in Poland and each year produce substantial tonnages of sugar beets, rye, and potatoes. The region's mineral resources include bituminous coal (Silesia's coalfields are among the most important in Europe with reserves exceeded only by those of West APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Germany's Ruhr Basin), lignite, sulfur, capper, iron, lead, and zinc. Benefiting, from its natural wealth and central location, Katowice province (Silesia) has become the industrial heart of Poland as well as on.^ of the country's most densely populated areas. 'arther to the south, the rolling hills of Poland's cen- tral geographic zone give way to the Carpathian and Sudeten mountain ranges: peaks and ridges thrown up in ages past by the northward thrust of the Alpine -fold mountains against the unyielding rock of the Bohe- mian Massif and the deeply buried Polish Platform. Elevations here range from about 1,000 feet above sea level in the Moravian Gate area to 8,200 feet in the loftiest part of the Carpathian system. A small mining area �the Lower Silesian coalfield �is located in the Sudeten mountains, and minor deposits of oil and natural gas have been found in the Carpathians. Tourism, however, is ccrrently the most significant economic activity in the area, with its principal center in the attractive environs of Zakopane. As a whole, the region is relatively backward by Polish standards, but its forests and, particularly, its hydroelectric potential offer promise for the future. The Oder and the Vistula, which together with their many tributaries drain almost all of Poland, both rise in this mountainous border zone and course northward across the country's east -west geographic divisions to empty into the Baltic. Stalinization, De- Stalinization, and The Gomulka Legacy (s) Poland's postwar internal evolution� political and economic �has gone through a number of distinct phases roughly paralleling changes in the general character of Soviet -East European relations. Transi- tion from one to another of these periods has generally been marked by varying degrees of violence. In part, this has been due to the character and attitudes of the volatile Polish people. But the basic causes lie elsewhere, in the dismal history of the prewar Polish Communist party, in the stifling influence of the Soviet Union, and in the inability of Poland's leaders to shed their ideological blinders and to adopt a flexi- ble approach to the new problems and requirements generated by marked changes in the internal and ex- ternal environment. The foundations of Poland's postwar political order were laid in 1944 when the advancing Soviet Red Army set about the systematic dissolution of the political and military centers then controlled by the non Communist underground and the London -based Polish Government in exile. To take their place, the Soviets established a single Communist controlled body, the Committee of National Liberation, in Lublin, granting it recognition in January 1945 as the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Provisional Government of Poland. Six months later, following the Yalta agreements and the broadening of the Lublin group to include four non Communist Poles from abroad, Moscow's creation was recognized by the major Western powers as Poland's legitimate government. With the negotiation of this hurdle, Poland had moved well into the first phase of its postwar evolu- tion, that of the suppression of democratic forces and the consolidation of Communist (local and Soviet) power. These processes were hindered, however, by the fact that Poland's Communists were woefully ill prepared to assume control of their war -torn country. Among other things, they were few in numbers, weak in organization, and generally unpopular. During the interwar years, their small party had been paralyzed by factional struggles, police penetration, and repeated purges. In 1938 it had been dissolved altogether on Stalin's orders. Although the party had been resurrected in 1942, wartime conditions had delayed progress toward filling out its ranks and rebuilding its domestic organizational base. And neither its new name, the Polish Workers Party, nor the minor role it ultimately came to play in the anti -Nazi resistance movement had served to alter the decades -cld conviction of most Poles that their coun- try's Communist party was antinational and therefore an alien organization. Popular prejudices notwithstanding, however, the Polish party had never been entirely immune to the nationalist virus. Thus one effect of World War II was to create a basic division within its ranks between the so -caled native Communists �those individuals, typified by the Party's First Secretary, Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose roots were firmly in Poland and who had spent the war years in their homeland �and the emigrees (popularly known first as the Stalinists and then, as times changed, simply as the Moscovites who had returned home from varying periods of exile in the Soviet Union in the baggage of the Red Army. Both groups were agreed on the necessity of active collaboration with Soviet advisers, military units, and secret police during the consolidation period, but the emigrees were understandably far more prepared than the Gomulkaites to subordinate purely Polish interests to those of the Soviet Union. As time passed, Gomulka hecame increasingly un- easy about the Kremlin's hegemonic ambitions in Eastern Europe and its insistence on slavish adherence to the Soviet model. He was firmly in favor of main- taining the closest possible ties with the Soviet Union, but he wished to see the partnership develop on a more equal basis. By 1948, his outspoken objections to the supranational character of Stalin's newly established Cominform organization, his refusal to inaugurate a program of forced agricultural collectivization, and his criticism of the insufficiently national orientation of Poland's prewar Communist party had placed him on a collision course with the Stalinists. It was an unequal contest. Gomulka may have en- joyed the sympathy of the bulk of the party rank and file, but he did not have control of the party machinery, and, more important, he had incurred Stalin's wrath. Yet even after he was forced to resign his job as party chief in September 1948, he refused to renounce his basic views. In 1949 he was stripped of his remaining party and government posts. In 1951 he was placed under strict house arrest and disappeared from public view. However, memories of his stubborn defense of his position lingered on. The Polish people compared Gomulka to his Stalinist successors, and in time the legend grew that he had been a truely "liberal" and "nationalist" leader. Gomulka's fall from power and the "merger" of Poland's Communist (Workers) and Socialist parties which gave birth to the PU WP a few weeks later marked the end of the consolidation period. With Soviet help, Warsaw had broken the back of all organ- ized political and paramilitary opposition. Most of Po- land's prewar political parties had been disbanded and their leaders converted, jailed, or forced into exile. The two non Communist parties still in existence, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, were mere appendages of the PU WP. The voice of the Roman Catholic Church, while not stilled, had at least been somewhat muted. The ouster of Gomulka and his associates had cleansed the party of its own potential troublemakers. Its new leadership, headed by Boleslaw Bierut, was unquestioningly loyal to Moscow. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 The next phase in Poland's postwar evolution �its Stalinis era �was more or less coterminous with the 7- year period of Bierut's rule. It was a time of forced draft industrialization, of energetic but largely ineffec- tive efforts to collectivize Polish agriculture, of police terror, and of total subservience to the Soviet Union. The Warsaw regime's repressive policies and the de- gree of control which Moscow exercised over Poland's internal affairs deeply alienated the bulk of the Polish population. Passive resistance to the party's dictates became widespread. For their part, however, Poland's top leaders were wedded to the Stalinist system, and when this began to break down under the pressures for change released by the Soviet dictators death in early 1953, a factional struggle developed between conservative and reform minded forces in the PUWP which finally reached its climax 3 years later. 1956 was quite a year for the Poles. In February, Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet Com- munist Party Congress set the stage for the first round of de- Stalinization in Eastern Europc as well as in the Soviet Union. The convenient death of Boleslaw Bierut a few weeks later removed one potentially formidable obstacle to domestic reforms in Poland. In late June, just before the outbreak of rioting in Poznan convinced Bierut's successor, Edward Ochab, of the urgency of such reforms, President Tito of Yugoslavia secured the Soviet Party's first official endorsement of the concept of separate roads to socialism. For a moment it appeared that the Soviets had given a green light to their allies to emulate some of the more innovative features of the Yugoslav experiment. But Khrushchev hastened to dispell this illusion. Laying the blame for the Poznan riots on the old bogey of imperialist provocation, he held fast to the view that radical political and economic reforms were neither needed nor permissible within the Soviet empire. And he made it clear that the Kremlin still regarded Titoism as a particularly dangerous form of heresy. Under these circ�st -noes, Gomulka �who had been released from detention in 1954� became the man of the hour in Poland. Not only was he an ad- vocate of a uniquely Polish path to socialism who had stood up to the Soviets in the past, but F alone among Poland's more prominent Marxists enjoyed a public image favorable enough to bridge the gulf that had developed between the regime and the general popula- tion. Courted by the reformists (both liberal and moderate) as a seemingly ideal champion in their struggle with the still well entrenched Stalinist faction, Gomulka was quietly readmitted "alto the party in August. Thereafter, pressures for change mounted both within and outside the party as a steady decline of the effective power of the security apparatus opened the way for a virtual flood of liberal proposals and com- mentary in the Polish press. Poland's internal crisis reached its climax on 19 Oc- tober. Benefiting from Ochab's support and growing popular enthusiasm for their cause, the re'ormists had made steady gains, and it was no secret that they hoped to use the PUWP Central Committee Plenum which was convened on that date to elect Gomulka as Party First Secretary and to adopt his political lir.:;. An attempted coup by the beleaguered Stalinist faction was thwarted on the very eve of the plenum. Then, as 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Soviet forces such as these on maneuver were :xar at hand during Polands Internal crisis in 1956 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 the meeting opened, Moscow intervened. Soviet forces began to mass along Poland's borders and those Red Army units already on Polish soil moved out of their garrisons toward Warsaw. A star studded Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev himself flew to the Polish capital uninvited in order to assess the situation and, if need be, to bully the Poles ir_to submission. Ochab thereupon adjourned the PUWP plenum and, together with Gomulka (who had been hastily coopted into the Central Committee on the news of Khrushchev's arrival) and a number of other senior Polish leaders, entered into a stormy negotiating ses- sion with the Soviets which lasted into the early morning hours of 20 October. In the end, the Poles not only persuaded Khrushchev that Gomulka's accession to power would strengthen Polish socialism (and that, on the other hand, any attempt to block his election as First Secretary would have very bloody consequences) but also succeeded in hammering out the basis for a new and healthier relationship beh een Warsaw and Moscow. The Soviet delegation departed for home as hastily as it had arrived. The PUWP plenum resumed its work, and on 21 October Gomulka was confirmed in office as party chief. The events of the preceding week had made him a national hero. His countrymen were prepared to believe that such a man could do no wrong, and Poland entered the third phase of its postwar development on a great wave of popular enthusiasm. For a time it seemed that Gomulka might live up to popular expectations. He halted the forced collec- tivization of agriculture and allowed those peasants who wished to withdraw their land from established collectives to do so. Rejecting the rigidly hostile stance of the old Bierut regime, he negotiated a mut, Oly acceptable, if somewhat uneasy, accommodation Poland's powerful Roman Catholic Church. Despite the tense atmosphere which prevailed in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt, he successft,Ily defended and con- solidated his country's newly expanded autonomy in tIte conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs. These were no mean achievements, and they endured to become an important and positive part of the legacy 10 which Gomulka bequeathed to Gierek in 1970. But the process of accommodation with Moscow in- volved many compromises, and, in any event, Gomulka's views on the proper lines of Poland's future evolution were far different than those of most of his countrymen. The people hoped that he would democratize and rationalize Poland's political and economic institutions and that he would lead them into ever greater independence from Moscow. Gomulka, on the other hand, wished only to correct those Stalinist distortions which had derailed Poland's existing socialist system and which had reduced his country to the demeaning status of a Soviet satellite. Gomulka was, in fact, in a very uncomsortable posi- tion during his first few months in office. The chain of developments which culminated in his return to power had left the PUWP in total disarray and had released spontaneous forces for change which had pushed him much fiirther in the direction of radical reforms than he wanted to go. Though he had, of necessity, dealt with his Stalinist opponents forcefully and quickly, he was convinced that if Soviet hostility to the Polish ex- periment were to be overcome and the disaster of Hungary avoided, the more tenacious and more destabilizing liberal elements in Poland's post- October internal environment would have to be sup- pressed �and the control of the party over all aspects of national life reasserted �as soon as possible. He set about this task with characteristic determination and thus planted the seeds of popular distrust and dis- illusionment which were to bear such bitter fruit less than 14 years later. The consequences of Gomulka's retreat from liberalism might have been less serious had it not become a self feeding process or had Gomulka found it in himself to be more responsive to changing internal and external conditions once he had consolidated his domestic position. As it was, Gomulka became in- creasingly preoccupied with the task of maintaining a delicate factional balance within the PUWP and governmental hierarchies and therefore tended to neglect his country's other internal problems. When this resulted in outbreaks of popular dissatisfaction, he responded by incorporating increasing numbers of hardliners into his regime to control the population APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 rather than by trying to identify and remedy the un- derlying grievances. Hence the cycle would repeat itself, with the population becoming increasingly alienated and the top echelons of the regime in- creasingly hostile to criticism and resistant to change at each turn. Unlike his peers in Romania and Hungary, Gomulka made no attempt to exploit Khrushchev's second round of de- Stalinization or the bourgeoning Sino Soviet dispute to his country's domestic or inter- national advantage. By 1967, his unimaginative policies had resulted in a miasma of political repres- sion, economic stagnation, stifling bureaucratization, and moral corruption. In June of that ;year, Israel's vic- tory over Moscow's unpopular Arab clients and the subsequent campaign against "Zionist" element in the ruling parties of Eastern Europe opened the way for a virtual revolt of the frustrated younger generation of PUWP functionaries against the Gomulka leadership. Focusing their attack on Comulka's suddenly vulnerable Jewish supporters in the party and governmental bureaucracies, some of these tough, young, and relatively nationalistic officials rallied to the hardline PUWP faction headed by security chief Mieczyslaw I.4eczar. Others, equally tough but generally more sophisticated and more concerned with seeking practical remedies for Poland's mounting social and economic problems, clustered about Gierek. As indicated earlier, a number of factors eventually combined to enable Gomulka to turn back this challenge and to reimpose a semblance of stability un- der his leadership at the 5th PUWP Congress in Oc- tober 1968. But once this had been accomplished, he once again allowed his attention to be diverted from his country's domestic problems. This time, the object of his concern was Bonn. In 1967, Gomulka's dismay over Romania's action in establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and his abiding fear that Moscow �then still the sole guarantor of Poland's western frontier �might some- day reach an accommodation with Bonn at Warsaw's expense had prompted him to sign a number of new "solidarity" agreements with his East European allies that had effectively tied his own hands in dealing with the West Germans. He had quickly recognized his mis- take, but his initial efforts to jettison the burden of this multilateral approach had been interrupted by Po- land's party crisis. Now, Gomulka was determined to lose no more time. With Moscow's approval and the active encouragement of the newly coopted young Turk elements in his regime, he labored to secure a negotiated settlement of the issues particularly the emotion -laden question of the Oder Neisse fron- tier �which had long impeded the development of normal political and economic relations between Poland and the Federal Republ3:: of Germany and, to a lesser degree, between Poland and all of the NATO powers. These negotiations ware protracted, and Gomulka's continued neglect of problems closer to home ultimately resulted in his downfall. But the long awaited Polish -West German agreement was finally signed on 7 December 1970. It was the last �but by no means the least si =nificant� positive element to be included in the Gomulka legacy. 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Glerek's New Deal (s) Gierek's accession to power was not greeted with much popular acclaim. It was generally agreed that he had done a good job at Katowice, but the restless Polish nation �wiser and more skeptical than in 1956 �was unwilling to accept any new leader at face value. Moreover, the party machine he now com- manded was held in deep contempt. Thus Gierek had to prove himself anew. He began by reversing the Gomulka regime's condemnation of the December dis- orders, declaring them to have been �by and large �the expression of legitimate working -class grievances. Attributing the conditions which gave rise to these grievances to the erroneous practices of his predecessor, he promised to introduce a more democratic style of leadership to improve the party's contact and cooperation with all elements of the Pop- ulation, to insure a freer flow of information, to raise living standards, to correct existing distortions in economic policy, and to provide the average Pole with greater opportunity. for direct participation in the political and economic decisionmaking processes. 12 Suiting action to words, Gierek moved swiftly to allay the immediate grievances of Poland's angry workers. He granted a substantial increase in wages and allowances to low income families. He first shelved and then discarded Gomulka's controversial incentive pay plan. He rolled back the December price increases and froze food prices through 1972 (since extended through 1974). With the help of a $100 million loan from the U.S.S.R. he was able to substantially increase the supply of meat available to consumers. He traveied from factory to factory, talk- ing directly with the workers in order to hear their complaints, to tell them of what was being done to improve their lot, and to explain why lie couldn't do more. Although he resisted demands for the introduc- tion of Yugoslav -style workers selfmanagement, he gave the workers substantially increased representa- tion in high party and trade union organs. In addition, he undertook to draft a new and more equitable labor code, but this project has turned out to be a bit more sticky than he anticipated. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Poland's private peasants (whose 3 million farms occupy 83% of the country's arable land) were not forgotten in the press of efforts to satisfy their urban cousins. Recognizing that he could not assure ade- quate supplies of food in the future unless he won the confidence of the peasantry and induced it to produce more, Gierek promptly increased the procurement prices for slaughter livestock and directed the nation's well- equipped state farms to provid -C a wide variety of assistance to their small private competitors. He also abolished state control over sales of coal to farmers. Furthermore, the hated compubory deliveries of farm products to the state were abolished and replaced with a contract system that gives the peasants a fairer return for their labor and considerable leeway in determining just what to produce. Land taxes were altered in such a way as to facilitate the expansion of private holdings. Poland's health insurance program was extended to cover most of the previously ineligible private farmers and their families. Lest some fears and suspicions re- main about the future direction of his farm policies, Gierek publicly pledged that private ownership of most land would continue. And he backed up his words with legislation that granted many peasants clear title to land they had been tilling but which previously had been considered to be state property. Although important in themselves, these specific (and carefully limited) concessions to workers and peasants have reprr. ;sented only one side of Gierek's overall program for revitalizin the Polish nation. Like all his other moves to improve the internal political and economic climate and to bridge the gap between the party and the public, they have been keyed to his basic pledge to introduce a new style of leadership �a conveniently ambiguous commitment which un- derscores hL determination to eliminate the errors of the Gomulka era without raising undue hopes for radical change. In keeping with this approach, Gierek has tried ha to convince his countrymen that Poland's new leadership is more open and communicative, more responsive to well- direct criticism, and sincerely desirous of staying in touch with the needs and aspirations of all the citizenry. Thus the precedent es- tablished by Gierek's early factory visits has been maintained. Party and government leaders h;ive held innumerable meetings with workers and other groups throughout the country. High ranking officials have submitted to critical interviews on radio and television, in some instances responding to questions sub- mitted �both in advance and during the broad cast�by their listening audience. A new post of government spokesman has b:en created to publicize and explain the activities of the cabinet. The results of the meetings of the party Politburo and Central Com- mittee, now held more frequently than during the Gomulka era, are regularly publicized. The appearance of frank and mildly provocative articles is now tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, in the public press. A few previously banned journalists have been permitted to reappear in print. And far from silencing the more outspoken critics of Poland's social and economic ills, Gierek has coopted a number of them into the establishment. Underlying this emphasis on a more open �but still disciplined society is Gierek's acceptance of the basic concept, first articulated by Kadar in H..ngary, that "all those who are not against us are with us." Not only has he ostentatiously appointed nonparty people to a number of responsible positions previously held by party stalwarts, but he has repeatedly pledged to eliminate discriminatory distinctions based on an in- dividual's class background or religious beliefs. More important, Gierek has followed through on his early promise to try to normalize church -state relations relations which had never progressed beyond the stage of an uneasy truce during the Gomulka era and which still bore the scars of a period of renewed confrontation in the mid- 1960's. A meeting of Prime Minister Jaroszewicz and Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, in March 1971 �the first such church -state "summit conference" in 8 years� marked the beginning of an ongoing high -level dialogue between churc'- and government officials. The Jaroszewicz- Wyszynski encounter was followed by the opening of direct talks between the Gierek regime and the Vatican and by the enactment of legislation giving 'Life Polish church legal title to ecclesiastical property in the former Cerman territories. Another cause of friction was removed in early 1972 when War- saw abolished regulations requiring the church to keep a full inventory of its property for tax purposes. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Gierek has combined his conciliatory approach to "believers" and other nonparty elements with a broad but cautiously implemented campaign to engage Polish patriotism in support of his policies. This dis- tinctive aspect of his renewal strategy was highlighted by the decision to rebuild the ancient royal castle in Warsaw and by the substitution of the centuries -old ,rational seal �the Polish eagle �for the previously ominipresent portraits of party and government leaders in official buildings throughout the country. It has also been reflected in unprecedented public praise of the past patriotic exploits of individual religious leaders and in the muting of ideological themes during Poland's national day celebration. Gierek's new style of leadership has also been evi- dent in the changes �both cosmetic and substan- tive �that he has effected in Poland's political in- 14 stitutions. On one hand, it has resulted in a concerted campaign to upgrade the technical competence of the government bureaucracy as well as in a radical streamlining of Poland's rural administrative structure. On the other hand, it has dictated a number of modest moves designed to breathe some life into Poland's moribund organs of "socialist democracy." Thus Gierek has sought to encourage debate in the Seim (parliament) and its commissions. He has made some gestures toward Poland's non Marxist political par- ties �the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party�as well as toward various other organized in- terest groups by soliciting their advice on matters of in- terest to their members. He has rejuvenated the leadership of Poland's political umbrella organization, the National Unity Front, and has made it more representative of the full spectrum of the front's membership. In addition, he has promised his coun- trymen a new constitution. The party, like the government, has been given a new face and a whole new team of leaders. Gierek has not only staffed its upper echelons with younger and more competent officials, but he has quietly purged some 100,000 rank and -file members from its rolls. In keeping with the spirit of the times, he has stressed collegial leadership and restoration of "democratic" practices. Breaking with Gomulka's methods, he has regularly convened full meetings of the Politburo and has often invited nonparty specialists to attend. And although he has emphasized party discipline and moved firmly against old factional alliances, he has encouraged construct sve debate, a freer flow of infor- mation and suggestions from below, and the delega- tion of sufficient authority to lower echelons to per- mit resphiiiun of most local problems without refer- ence o Warsaw. Giei ek's approach to the democratization and decentralization of die PU WP has been under- standably cautious. He is very much determined to preserve the "leading role" of the party�both his posi- tion at home and his acceptability to Moscow depend upon his doing so. He has, in fact, declared his inten- tion to anchor party primacy in constitutional law. But, although Gierek is no more willing than Gomulka to countenance reforms which could weaken the party, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 his ideas on how the organization should carry out its functions are far different from those of his predecessor. This too has had a marked effect on Poland's internal climate. In general terms, Gierek has sought to lower the party's profile, not only vis -a -vis the people, but also in relation to the government. He believes that the party should formulate general policy guidelines (drawing heavily on nonparty expertise), monitor and mobilize, persuade and pressure. Without prejudice to the PUWrs ultimate power to intervene, the practi- cal implementation, of basic policy should be left to the appropriate governmental bodies and mass organ- izations. Increased efficiency is one consideration, but by divorcing the party from the day -to -day manage- ment of Poland's political and economic affairs, Gierek evidently also hopes to cushion it against future crises in public confidence. In the economic field, Gierek has had to contend with structural problems resulting from under- invest- ment in food processing, the construction industry, transport and communication, and agriculture. Moreover, Gomulka's policies had caused Poland to drag its feet in introducing technological change and improvements in management and planning. By rights, Poland �with its relatively ample natural resources, with nearly half of its total land area under cultivation, and with its consistently high overall level of investment� should have been one of the most prosperous countries in the Soviet bloc. Yet after a quarter century of Communist rule, its per capita GNP was only $1,650, about on a par with Bulgaria and Hungary but far lower than the levels that had been achieved in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or the U. S. S. R. Thus Warsaw has had to pursue its quest for greater efficiency and increased production on a number of fronts. Hand in hand with his efforts to win the cooperation of the peasantry, Gierek has sought to en- courage the growth of private services and of state licensed but otherwise relatively independent private or cooperative enterprises. He greatly inten- sified the drive to acquire Western technology in to restructure and modernize Polish industry. He has come up with a new program for improving the system of planning and management which prescribes greater responsibility to the enterprises but also the strength- ening of central control. in addition, he has made some effort to streamline Poland's cumbersome eco- nomic bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Gierek's approach to institutional change has been cautious. No economic reforms of the scale introduced in Hungary in 1968 are presently in sight. For the tune being, at least, Gierek hopes simply to "energize" the existing system, and thus his most striking departure from Gomulka's economic policies has been to cast aside their orthodox emphasis on heavy industry in favor of a more balanced �and more con- sumer- oriented approach to economic development. A change in procedure as well as in priorities has been involved here. Reversing previous practice, targets for increases in average real wages, consumption, and employment are now established at the outset of the planning cycle. In theory, at least, these figures are then used in working out all other indices of the plan, including, for example, production targets and es- timated investment outlays. The draft 1971 -75 economic plan which Gomulka had prepared quite naturally had to be scrapped. A substitute, embodying Gierek's new approach, was de- veloped during 1971 by a commission of experts headed by Politburo member Jan Szydlak and was formally approved by the parliament in 1972. Its goals with respect to improving the economic and social lot of the average Pole are ambitious. Real wages are to rise by 18% while working hours are to be reduced. In contrast to Gomulka's willingness to countenance a high jobless rate, full employment is to be sought �a goal which will require the creation of some 1.8 million new positions for young people entering the job market. A comprehensive review and reform of the educational system is scheduled. The variety and quality of con- sumer goods are to be improved, in part through im- ports. A substantial number of inexpensive personal automobiles are to be produced and marketed. Over 1 million new dwelling units are to be constructed. If, however, Gierek is to fulfill his pledge that every Polish family will have its own suitable place to live by 1990, about 6 million more dwellings will have to be com- pleted during the next three 5 -year planning periods. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 The construction. industry itself is scheduled for major modernization. Agricultural investment has been ac- corded a higher priority. Social services are to be in- creased, and new hospitals and health centers are to be provided for both urban and rural areas. Gierek's innovation in the foreign policy field have been less dramatic, largely because the situation he in- herited there was basically satisfactory. Even though Gomulka ultimately failed to take full advantage of his achievements, he had forged an acceptable new relationship with Moscow, won Poland the place of first among equals �behind the Soviet Union �in Warsaw Pact councils, and pioneered in establishing useful contacts and cooperation with the West. While he had gradually entered into a bitter feud with East Germany's �'alter. Ulbricht, he had been largely successful in overcoming the chill in Warsaw's relations with Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, and Budapest that had resulted from the Warsaw Pact in- vasion of Czechoslovakia (and from Hungary's only half hearted participation therein). Finally, his hard -won agreement with West Germany in December 1970 had laid old fears about the Oder Neisse frontier to rest and had substantially increased Poland's room for maneuver. For Gierek, who shares Gomulka's conviction that Warsaw's and Moscow's basic interests now generally coincide and that Polish policy must rest on active membership in the Foviet Union's alliance system, there was little that needed to be done except to build upon his predecessor's work, resolve Warsaw's differences with Pankow, and give Poland's foreign policy a slightly more assertive and indetxindent cast. The relatively relaxed atmosphere in both halves of Europe which has resulted from Mosww's drive toward detente with the West �and Walter Ulbricht's timely retirement �have been of great help to Gierek here. Relying heavily on summit diplomacy, he has restored Poland to its former position of special grace within the Warsaw Pact and has developed especially close bilateral ties with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. He has nursed Warsaw's warming 16 relationship with Bonn through the ratification of the Polish -West German agreement and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. As part of hie effort to stake out a larger role for Poland in European and East -West affairs, he has hosted Presidents Nixon and Tito in Warsaw and has traveled to Paris himself. Speaking as a man who has spent more than 20 years of his life in France and Belgium, he has appealed to people of Polish birth or parentage everywhere �par- ticularly in the United States where the Polish Com- munity is several miliion strong �to support the renovation of Poland with their talents as well .as with their money. And although he has voiced hip, disap- proval of Romania's ostentatiously ivdependent behavior, he allowed the notion advanced by a leading Polish commentator that the "role of the middle powers" (read: Poland) "increases proportionately to the progress of detente in East -West relations" to pass unchallenged. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 I_1� 16IT M M161:4 111 7111- 5N wo] WIN 11 IrZ QIr 1�Lr1' /:bhIrYrIrh1'DIrY:; The Years Mead (a) Ck-trk h taking Wand d"m a new roati Ihol, bftvu%e of nrceWty as much as his owe pfog atir In- clinttluM, L-` hm Irk latxely undrftnrJ. HK policies 6vo mmlled In a marked Impravemrnt in tho rnaterlol W of runt Pvkt and to th domeslie pditktl tii mate m ucll, &�xuse of thb, he has ge:ncd s cc ii- 1111emble nreasute of support Crown a ikeplioi lwopltia people he has proenlserd rot only to li-Ld but to consult. Nvveitht6f, Clerel?s ctM1( w41h the paprla inn Is not 11MIM51 Yl, and tha ultimto slabililyof Irks reshno la lI!` y to deed con his irwinlaleing Iha morwotum of his trfotms. On ibis qurstion, Puf lsh pubtle i >plrrlon sterns iq br dlsa+Icd into Ihrro ramps: Ae f imt Vt4m the lamest segment of Iho populatl m belkrec ihai Gkfrk w 01 lake elfmive s(eps to anum 'xMilnurd Imprutrumnt of 11M silusth n. A wand Imp also hat trust In Clark's loadrnhip, but foch That he is unlikely to wccrcd in view of Shit swrlrwt obdacks in his pith. A dcltd '=toup simply has no con f ickiltr: in Clerelt and beiimrs that. nitro he hos wn- solidatVd his Pont,, he will rctirt 10 IIir mltsrt IUM sod fnrrllo of the iattr Gonrulka perfod, Allhouo the Ix vlalvwn may ha -ve sine shINJ sanewhal In ClrieWs favor. a .iw% ry oondurtrd by Wntem rrwoft `ten in 14(++.1971 Indicalal that 39% of the ptj- utxtion-tupp+uini the {int V$ew, 25% t he ircond. and UN I hr thctd wil t oungrr lw,*e displaying con. Adrtahle rwme ewficfmvc to Clack thou tWrrldrm For I#r. time lit -ink� thew d4ftgent ittrtrit in pvbtir 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 opinion present no problem for Gierek. He has, in fact, given measured encouragement to "creative unrest" and "constructive dissatisfaction" as needed catalysts for change. Yet populsr expectations in this era of slackening East -West tensions almost certainly exceed the regime's ability to fulfill them. There will be many Poles, even among those who now have faith in Gierek's good intentions, who will be inclined to view any slowdown in his course as an abandonment of his entire program. And aw: consequent shirking of effort or open demonstrations of protest could make this a self fulfilling prophecy. Gierek himself may recognize the need for con- tinuing change. For one thing, his present efforts to imbue his countrymen with a Germanic work ethic may not suffice to overcome the remaining short- coming in Poland's existing economic mechanism. But he will have to contend with forces of inertia �born, ironically, of his initial successes� within the PUWP, with still powerful vested interests in the political and economic bureaucracy who feel that passive resistance to Gierek's reforms will permit them to outlast even this latest threat to their sinecures, and last, but not least, with Moscow. Indeed, the future direction of the Polish experiment will unquestionably continue to depend heavily on the mood of the Kremlin. Gierek's success in restoring 18 domestic order and his care not to maneuver very far from Moscow's position on basic foreign policy issues have won him the respect and the unqualified public endorsement of the top Soviet leaders. Even so, he has shown great caution in assessing the limits of Soviet tolerance of economic and political change �and ap- parently with good cause. The Soviets are reported to have warned Gierek directly and through trusted in- termediaries�of their displeasure with certain of his moves. Their concern has apparently centered on his agricultural and religious policies as well as on his per- sonnel changes. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets are at present really alarmed �much less that they might be considering some dramatic move to bring Gierek to heel. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's persistent ideological orthodoxy gives heart to like minded bureaucrats in Poland and generally complicates the Warsaw regime's task in trying to maintain the momentum of its reforms. Thus it would appear that Gierek will long have to continue to display considerable firmness and skill in dealing with the Soviet leadership in order to prevent its unimaginative views from frustrating his ef- forts to improve the material lot of his countrymen or fron otherwise suffocating his campaign to rejuvenate the Polish nation. The Palace of culture in Warsaw. Stalin's ift to Poland, this towe ing building serves as a constant reminder o)'the Kremlin's influem on Polish affairs. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 >M r6 M y J S 4S'' Y �N� y. a, 7: 41 .j'1y i. V h-' p e Z 9v 1 L Y r o IF r r l *4'p V z s e:. 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The United States Governmem has not recognized the I incorporaion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the 2d 22 Soviet Union. i 1 Circle' MI Mr' F4' G r r, r L 1 fill xL -ff MT lff Land Utilization Urbanized or industrialized area Forest AGRICULTURE Q Oats, potatoes, livestock Rye, potatoes, livestock Wheat, sugar beets, livestock APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9 Otla=sat8w:.' Awlptokrtyskl? 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