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SECRET 33/ GS /AF Iran May 1973 NATIONAL_ INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECP,ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Bosi Intelligence fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some derails on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part ofi the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly lWing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publico!ions, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classificoeion and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General forveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central intelligence Agency. WARNMC This document contains information affecting the notional defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections M and "Al of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by on vnosithorised person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED Rr 019641. EXfM#TT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCMEDUIE Of E O 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES SR (l), M. 3i- DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLICENCE APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 WARNING The NIS is National Intell ;gence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the De- fense Intelligence Agency. Research was substan- tially completed by January 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 I "ra CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated No- vember 1969, copies of which should be destroyed. A. Defense establishment 1 Major expansion and reorganization program underway to increase capabilities of 278,000 -man forces; Iran is part of CENTO and has bilateral defense agreement with United States; armed forces can maintain internal security and are primary factor in maintaining Shah in power. 1. Military history 1 Traditions date to Persian empire in 550 B.C., but modern combat experience since 1943 has been limited to security operations, border clashes with Iraq. 2. Command structure 3 Shah is supreme commander, controls directly or through Supreme Commander's Staff. SECRET No FOREIG1 DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 Page B. joint activities 1. Military manpower Breakdown of male population by age group and fitness; sources of manpower, largely onscript; no effective reserve system. 2. Strength trends Fluctuating buildup since 1958 to present peak strength, which is expected to increase. 3. Training joint service schools; foreign staff and opera- tional training; joint and combined operations. A. Military budget Budgetary procedures and 1969.73 budget figures. 5. Logistics Reliance on foreign sources of material, pri- marily U.S. but diversified to include U.K., U.S.S.R., Israel, and Italy. C. Ground forces Defensive mission; strengths and weaknesses. 1. Organiza ":on Operational control and chain of command; general, technical, and special staffs; tactical areas. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition Strength in men and tactical units; 1971 re-. organization; major equipment items; troop concentration on Iraq border. 3. Training Training centers modeled on U.S. inshlla- tions; conscript training; military academy; foreign training; army aviation instruction. 4. Logistics Logistics Command and three area support commands have replaced army support com- ponents. 5. Army aviation Upgraded and reorganized; 489 new U.S. heli- copters on order. 3 3 4 5 5 5 6 8 6 7 8 8 Page 0 tram th, composition, and disposition 9 Ship and personnel strengths; major L- n- batants based at Bandar 'Abbas; strengths, weakn. saes, and long -term outlook. 3. Training Dependence on foreign training being re- duce4l; conscript, petty officer, and officer schools; international exercises. 4. Logistics Logistical support still far from adequate; principal supply center at Khorramshahr; all major construction, repair, and overhaul done in foreign countries. 5. Naval infantry Physical security proviued by 3,000 -man bri- gade with IIGF officers. 6. Naval air arm Hovercraft and helicopter squadrons operate in Persian Gulf. 'E. Air force Mission anti capabilities; new air defense system; strengths and weaknesses. 1. Organization Command structure, staff, and operational forces based on 10 tactical squadrons with air defense and ground support roles. 2. Strength, composition, and dispo fiat Personnel and aircraft strengths; Tactical Fighter Bases; defensive SAM system being installed; aircraft on order; military ai.fields; antiaircraft guns; no reserve potential. 3. Training Training organ' c-ation; conscript, officer, and pilot schools; reliance on foreign assistance; technical personnel speciality. 4. Logistics Complete dependence on foreign aircraft and equipment; Logistics Command; maintenance at air depot. also dependent on foreigners. 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 D. Navy Mission aml capabilities; concentration on Persian Gulf; little defense planned for Caspian Sea. 1. Organization Command structure; headquarters; bases; communications. 9 F. Paramilitary 17 Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie under :Ministry of Interior; wartime mission; internal security 9 responsibilities; equipment; training; manpower problems; National Resistance Forces, a local militia. FIGURES ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 Page Page Fig. 1 Iranian defense organization chart) 2 Fig. 6 IIS Saam photo) 11 Fig. 2 Iranian armed forces personnel Fig. 7 IIN Hovercraft (photo) 11 strength table) 4 Fig. 8 IIAF F -58 photo) 15 Fig. 3 Chieftain tank (photo) '7 Fig. 9 l:cwly acquired Fokker F -27 (photo) 1 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 BTR-60 pb photo) IIN organization chart) 10 Fig. 10 Rapier surface -to -air missile photo) 16 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 1 d APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 Shah presents standard to officers (C) 1. Military history Armed Forces A. Defense establishment The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces include both the military forces, referred to collectively as the Imperial Iranian Army, and the paramilitary forces. The military forces, totaling approximately 728,000 personnel, are composed of a predominantly conscript ground force of about 165,000; an air force of 50,000 with approximately :320 aircraft, including 170 tactical jet fighters; and a navy of 1:3,000 with 64 ships and craft. The paramilitary for are the 70, 300 -man gendarmerie, which has it wartime mission under Ground Forces Command. The Iranian rnilitan forces, while not battle tested and lacking the degree of professional leadership available in most Western forces, have embarked upon a major expansion and reorganization program in an effort to increase their capabilities. (S) The armed forces have been able to maintain internal security in the face of localized disturbances and could probably do so under most conditions short of serious nationwide disorders. They could not halt simultaneous external attacks from two directions or significantly delaN an attack by a major power. To offset its vulnerability, Iran has allied itself with the West through membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and bilateral defense agreements with the United States. Iran has also attempted to improve relations with the Soviet Union by pledging as early as 1962 that it would not permit foreign bases on its soil. (S) Until 1967, the United States was practically the sole source of foreign military assistance. Since that time, Iran has attempted to diversify its sources of armament and materiel by turning primarily to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Additional equipment has been purchased from other Western countries. (C) Support by the Iranian military establishment is a primary factor in maintaining the Shah in power. Accordingly, the military establishment has been the recipient of considerable royal patronage, favor, and close interest. Decisions affecting the military forces are often made from political rather than military considerations. (C) The Iran:au; are proud of their country's military traditions, dating from the Persian empire of the sixth century B.C. However, since the 18th century military genius and adventurer Nadir Shah freed Iran from the Afghans and 'Turks and forced Russia to abandon the Caspia:t provinces, Iranian armies have not been noted for their accomplishments. Reza Shah, father of the reigning monarch, vNitalired the armed forces in the 1920's. In 1922 an air arm was added to the ground forces, and in 1929 the navy was founded. These forces were not employed in aggressive national action outside Iran's borders, and they offered no appreciable resistance in World War II when the country was overrun by British and Soviet forces. (U /OU) In 1943, a U.S. training mission was established to assist in the development of the ground forces and gendarmerie. Since World War II, the armed forces collectively have undergone inercuses in strength and numerous organizational changes. The military forces have concentrated on defending against externa! threats, while since 1963 an increasingly effective gendarmerie has assumed greater responsibility for maintaining internal security. (U /OU) U.S. influence on the Iranian military establishment has increased continually since World ar It as a result of the extensive aid programs and training missions. This influence is reflected not only in materiel on hand but also in organization and training and in tactical and logistic concepts. The U.S. mission continued its advisory functions after World War II, but its operations were not formalized by contract until 1917, when the bilateral advisory agreement was signed. The U.S. Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISII -MAAG) was established in 1950 to advise on the use of U.S. military aid. In late 1955 Iran joined the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), and in 1959 signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. The most recent aid progran, is based on an agreement of 1962, whereby the United States agreed to deliver military equipment to Iran through mid -1967, subject to approval of annual appropriations and the capability of the Iranian forces to absorb the equipment. The agreement of 1962 was revised in 1961 by it memorandum of understanding under which grant aid was extended to include the period U.S. FY67 through FY69. mince that time, United States aid has been confined to military credit sales and training assistance; military credit commitments are provided on an annual basis. Iran also purchases directly_ front manufacturers through cash sales. (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 Y N x L Q x Q N w W i O K 0 z 2 f N 0 N Q N f w U O 1 O K 7 d N S V N Z O G z 6 O O W a n 3 Z_ V N V Z z _z 0 z a K Q Z Q Z LL O- o Z Q o Q V Q inQ Z O aLLZ LL K i V O n s a F S Q O Q m W v W Q N Z 2 0 Q i K a vi N c w z Z w J F a i u o d z z l z Q Z Q N U 6 W I V a u E a MD I N O o O Q x N a a I I I Z 0 I 0 0 Q Q N m z I z V S' a N a O w f w U O 1 O K 7 d N S V N Z O G z 6 O O W a n 3 Z_ V N V Z z _z 0 z a K Z Q Z LL Q Q o Z Q o m a G a Q inQ O aLLZ V Q w N S Q Q m W Q K W N LL L Z o Z Q o m a G a a z Z inQ F aLLZ O U N a v .O W f O z n z O Z Q 0 :E Z :E Q O z V Q 95 6 z W f W a Z O a z O a 3 f z 0 o i V 0 a Z a a Z O a F a f O 0 I T C O 8 N C L 0 d N C d v C C 0 L w CC D 4 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 Since� 19 -13, cotttbal experience of flu� Iranian arrtted force, bas been liltitcd ntuinlly to tltc reasscrlion oI national cemtrul over northwestern Iran at tit(. ertd of World War II, periodic punitive operations agai isI troublesome Iranian tribes, and support of the 196:3 l'i fted Nations operations in tit( Congo b% ;tit air fore(- eontingcnt (if four F -86 fighter airc�rafl. Al 11,11 end of November 19; I, when Irau occupied tit(� islands of Abu Musa and the tvo 'I'unls (Jazirch -)c Toth -e Bozorg), the oil[% resistance encounlercd vc;rs front the local gendartncrie on the larger of the 'I'mtlr islands. Although the occ�upatfon vv ;ls acc(nnplishecl within a few hours of balding, ground. nav;ll. and air force� el(-Itents gained valuable cxpericncv in dePloYnu�nt. sustained alert, awl support operations. (Sl During 1968 the Iranian anned I' rces were alerted and deployed when fighting between Ira(li govern- ment forces ;utd the rebellious Ira(li Kurds spilled over into Iran. Oc�c�asionaI ninor skirmishes, mail II artillery and mortar (fuels. occurred between the Iranian and Iraqi forces when the Iraqis fired on suspected rebel positions within Iranian tcrritor. TIIVsV incidents were tit(- result of Ir. ;(li suspicions that Iran had provided covert support and operating bases to the Kurdish dissidents or northern Iraq. Iranian armed forces replied in kind to irmli provocations. 'These (-ncoonters had generally diminished by the end of 1968. In early 1969, tit(- armed forces had tit oppertnnit' for large scale testing of their training and capabilities when ground forces and gendanterie emits were deployed along tit(- border of Iraq, particularly in the vicinity of the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan, during tit(- recent, and as vet unsettled, dispute over ownership of t1,(- Shutt ;l Arab. Air force and nave units wc�r(- also placed on alert in battle ready status. 'I'll(- response of the� armed forces in this (-ncount(-r indicated an overall improvement in their capability to respond to (-xlc�rnal threat. Armed conffict was avoided, het the Iranians stood ready to meet force with force. In tile f of i t loc�;lly superior force and constrained by large troop c�on>mitnu�nts to the Arab cause in Jordan ;old Syria and to ch tit(- rebellious Kurds, Iraq declined to engage ill a military confrontation. Border skirmisit(-s have continued. however, and the Iranian forces have concentrated their primary units along tit(- border with Iraq. The f ranian armed fortes also had experience in January 1973, when it battalion was sent to assist the Sultan of Oman in curbing the rebellion in 'Lufar (Dhofar). (S) 2. Command structure (S) His Imperial Majesty tit(- Shah (Figure I exercises actual control of tit(- Iranian armed forces as Suprei n� Con mandur le) the cvtwtl of arbilraril% concerning hitrtself wills elclailcel da% Io -dae operation,. Operational cnnlrol is theorelic�ally dcicgatvd. thro inch the (:hicf of the Suprctuc Coming dcr's Staff t SCS). (o Ille commander of the individual sery ice ground lore�(-,, navy, and air force �none of wbon. howcvcr. are nu�tnber, oI' the S(:S ;t joint sl ;eff The Shah cltl.n merckv% hi, c�onun:uul prerogathes through direct contact with 1 11 111\ of his senior whl.thl.r or not the\ arc mcrltbers of the S1tprenu� Conunander', Staff. 'I'll. position of Chief. Supreme Cotnntancicr *s Staff, 1,:u the cquiv;d(-nt of tnini,terial rank. although the incuntb(vtt is not a Inetnber of tit(- Cahinct. The Minister of War has (-gttal status will, the Snprctne Cotnntauder's Staff. and takes his orders dircclly from the Shah. Ile is not in (he operational chain of command bud is r�,pon,iblc prinaril\ for representing the military forcers in the Iranian parliammit and for super khm Icgal and buclgl.tarc matters. I'hc `linkler of Interior is normally responsible for the operation, of (1,c gcndarnu ril. and the national police: in tincs of war or national enn�rgenc\, howeyl.r, the gcndartnerie is placed under tit(- operational control (if' tit(- ScS. The (:lief. Sttprene Contlnander', Staff. is assi,tcd by ;e Vice (:lief and a of seven section,: J -1 (personnel). J -2 (intelligcncet. J ((operations). 1 -4 (logistics). J -5 (plans), J -ti (cotntltttttic�ations), and J -7 (comptroller). Although the SUS is theoretically responsible for long -range phutniog, and intcr coordination. it act(tally exercises direct control and much of till. day to -(lay direction (if the ,vrviccs. The staff, of the service commander-, are frequently ignowd and their Functions usurped b% tllc ,enior ,tuff. B. Joint activities 1. Militan manimwer As of I January 11,7:3 Iran had 7.255.000 males in IIIe age:, of 15 -49, of w hntn abort 59 1 were ph\ sic�all\ fit for military service. (t '0V t TOTAL. MAXIMUM NUMBER XC \IDEA FIT FOR AGE OF MALES 'MILITARY SERVICE. 15 -19 1,725,000 1,120,000 20 -24 1,503,000 925,000 25 -29 1,128,000 685,000 30 -34 809,000 475,000 35 -39 711,000 400.000 4044 713,900 370,000 45 -49 6166,000 315,000 Total, 15 -49 7,255,000 4,290,0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 'I'll( Oriniar\ smirces (1I tn;1mu! le.' (111� armt�t1 hirc1��, art Ili� 111'.IN;Illts and Thus, 111(�1) ;Ill� accush)tue(I to a I lit nl ;de in the often. ;Intl Ili� tnaj(1ri:\ hat- (i\4-d it Iare stnbsis(etce lt-\cl W101e trilov%iiien are 1lsnall\ able to rid- and s1o(11 sell. Ihose c'utlst-ril)ted from the tilt, ar(- likek to Ie less rw;t;1�II l)h\sicall\ ;1 Ill 1 11411 its aillint: 10 plit 1111 \\ith Iht- hardships of -nilitar\ life. Illiterac\ is billl 11111 has decreased ..I Ilic spread of t�cliwittiona) IIll)or- tunities. Althousth technical e\1)erienur is uetaiuiblc. nl;ul\ conscril,ts Oassess met�h;ulical aptitudes that are dr\el(1ped irth) nst-fnl skills \\hill� Ihr\ :Ire in service. All c(1nse�ripl% am rt-ynired to Hearn to rcud and \\ri11� before� being discharged. tl (A I�:nlistvd two -.I are procured pritnaril\ I)\ conscription. since Iranian lit Iro\ith�s for'_ \e;trs (1f acli\e miliI Ir\ s4-r\ ice for all 411 ialified nude� bo\%een age 19 :uil 1-. .::natal re(luirements of aluntt 65.I1 are met Ii,n, flit- a),pi,\imatt-l\ 310.19H1 mvii reaching tnilitar\ age earth %var. 'I'hc gen(larinerit- is rv%l)onsil,ll� for handling co %uriptio11 for all flit tnililar\ s4-r\ ices. (:onst�rilN. are Inrnt-d o\4-r to flit� scr\ices for nit:l) and ph\sical tt-sts ,uif arc g,-nt-rall\ assismed tit jobs ct11u is nsur .1Ir with their ed licit titmal attainments. S4-ctmdar\ school :uil uni\ersih graduates dralted into the l:IIrips. Ilealtb (:orps. mid the Dr\t-l(1pmetit and Atuicidoiral I:\h 1136(111 t:nrl)� are graduall\ ruisirlt; the tlualil\ A flit- m:tnpuaer p((1I available for c�nnscril)ticm Ihr(1,tgh the edncatinnal and he;dth prot;ranls flit.\ c:trr\ on Ihrotghottt tht- comilr\. (l" Ol I The groun(I Ivrces are co11tprised primaril\ of c�onK ripts. \,mu missitined olbcv�rs :Ire lit, i,11\ \Ihintevr% lit hat. conlplefed their 1a lent I,f "t-nice. The terms of cnlistnit-nt are 5. 7. or 111 \ art most M:O*s centime until i�tirviii�nt of :ill \ears 41f svr \tee. :misc�ril)ts coomprlse Allo f till', of tla \,11 strength. ahilt. (1111\ al)(ml 15 cif ,fir f11rce int-n art- co11scripls. The nlajorit\ of flit- officers are \olutleers: ho\\c\t-r. Ihurr are sonic 2 -\4-ar co11u11iiint- t officers st-l4-cfed front highly clualifi4-tl t(1nscripts. ((:1 �Then� is im effective res4 .\stein despite fh4- fact that conscripts are It-chnicall\ in the rt-ser\e until Ihe\ h.1c4- reached Ih4-ir 1 Ill birthd .1\. Althom,h I,\ur I.M11011) 1114-11 Have been since 191:. 11111\ a small prtI>,rlio11 could be rt-adil\ recalled to active d tit b4-ca oist of administrative and los;istica: li11titatiim% :trre11f plans wall fttr flit formation (1f four rt.svr\t- infanta divisions to srllpl4-mt-nt th:- rctltlar tents. T%%o\4- div isio11s ha\c bo-vii lormcd in 'I' .1brior. ;uil 'Tehran. The other tats, to be (y urati(in.11 ill 19, I. are to be lot:lted in Mt-shed and Shiraz. \14A)iIi /.IIi11u ill be liinitcd to personnel increases in e\istinq units uulil the reserve units am lurnlecl. 'I'll(- air force :Intl na\\ ha\e no plans fur u reser\v� s\ stein. (S) 2. Strength trends (S) Betaeeu I 95 ;Intl 1972 strengtII of the armed forces. (.\cludilig the gvndannerie, rose front 17:3.900 111 225,000 (Figiire 2). In the inler\eni11s; rears nu11t�rons orgaiIi sit Iio lit l �il;tIIgvs have (�a used significant flllctualions in the armed lor('es strcni!th. Gromid forces sti�iglh increased to it l,1�ak of 191,11110 in 19611 tud has snbsellucntl) c\I)erieuce(I %lilt llnclualiom: is major decrease ut'c�Ilred belaren 19162 and 1916:6 \\hen o\c�r 31,111111 persunncl \\4-i� tnlnsferred to sttl)I)(1rl the n4- lmi C(mimand and joint staff functions and ben ()\er 5.000 Border ;u ird per +tne1 \%urc� transfern�cl to the genclarnerie. In 191616 the Logistics (:immi uil its placed miner tit(- grmind forces. aml flit- lallc�r*s strength l)�akcd at 150.500. major rvwtn anizutitn of tactical units ill 19168 n�sulled in another strengtb decreiise: it Further reorganization in 147 1 increased Ihr strengiIt I it total of 165.000. I'ht� u:t\\ increased frtti 1.01111 to !I.S1111 in 1962 and thvii decreased. tnuinl\ because (,f a reduction 4 800 n;t\al infanlr\: its strength has subsecluentl\ risen to its eurrenl level of 1:3.000. The air force experienced it continu(1ns increase from. 1.91111 to 50.000 b\ tic end (If 1972. The gendarni�ri, has ;clsn e\l)crience�d it relati\el\ continuous increase front 3- 1.0011 to (1\cr 0.01H). The slmngth for all flit- artned services is c\pccled to increase steadil\ during the next 5 \ears. FIGURE 2. Iranian Armed Forces Personnel Strength* (S) *National Police strength has been excluded because d its e xtrelued limitt�d paramilitary capabilitc. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 e:110I']1, .\lit GEVn.\It- \F:AII F ItCE-4 N.t\Y F, )II CE \1 Fit IF. 'r,)�rm. 1!155....... 1 11 .0110 1,1106 1,91111 21,6011 17:3.900 11159. 17 :3,111111 1,11011 :,.:300 25,000 207,300 19611....... 191 jiml 1.31111 7.000 26,0110 225,300 1961....... IitI.mill 1, lit W 1,11(1(1 26, 600 2311,2(111 196'....... I S;''.0011 I SII0 4, 600 27.100 223,500 (96:3....... 1x0,11110 1,111111 10,000 36,100 IS(,1011 1961....... 1 :3 1 .000 3,9110 10. .100 36, 100 1"0 1965 132,000 1.000 1(),S()() :32, 100 17S.900 11166....... 150,500 .1, 11)() 11,101 x5.30() 201,600 1967....... 150,500 1,.100 12,200 35,300 205, 100 IMS....... 13 .1.11111 (6,300 12,700 10,9011 193.900 1969....... I If, 11111 S.700 17,200 52, 100 22.2.400 1970....... 152. (it W 10,500 2.1.21111 63.1100 2 49,700 1!171....... 159,11110 11,500 30,1100 6:6,000 265,500 197'_....... 16:.001) 13,000 5(1,0(10 70,3110 295,300 *National Police strength has been excluded because d its e xtrelued limitt�d paramilitary capabilitc. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 :3. "Training (S) The overall training organization b.,., d considerably since late 1961, when the first joint military school �the Iligh ::onuna nd and Joint Staff College �was established and the supporting schools became more systematized. The college, modeled on the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 111 a (:onunund and General Staff College comprised the War Universi `y, whose curriculum included subjects translated faun those taught in comparable U.S. service schools. Ili 1966 the War University was divided; the Iligh Command and Joint Staff College (now the National Defense University) was placed under the SCS and the Command and Central Staff College under the ground forces. Selected officers attend staff colleges in the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Pakistan, Turkey, IFaly, and Nest Germany. Commissioned and enlisted personnel from all services attend scFewls and courses in the United States. Western Europe, and ill CF,NTO member countries. The U.S. Military Assistance Program has arranged training for over 10,000 personnel both in the United States and in Iran. 'training exercises involving two or more military services have been conducted with increasing success. In April 1964, ground, navy, and air force elements participated in the Delawar Exercise with U.S. forces; this was of great benefit to the Iranian forces in acquainting them with command and staff procedures for combined operations. The air force has participated in joint training exercises with both the ground forces and the navy; counterinsurgency field exercises in air ground operations have also included gendarmerie personnel. Some joint exercises involving navy and air force units have been conducted with CEN'tO forces. All these exercises have continued to develop Iranian capability to carry out coordinated force operations. 4. Military budget (C) Military budget estimates are prepared by each branch of the armed forces under the supervision and coordination of the Supreme Commander's Staff and the Ministry of War. The military budget is then Defense budget Defense budget as a percent of national budget Defense budget as a percent of GNP na Data not available. presented to the Ministry of Finance for review and incorporation into the total national budget. Following approval by the parliament and the Shah. the budget hill is enacted into law. It. practice, however, the Shah exercises a strong inflrnence over the forntilation of the defense budget, and there is little if .uty opposition to military appropriations. Defense budgets, including appropriations for internal security, have averaged 25r of the total national budget, which iaclud both current and develop- mental expendi tires and the funding of all government organizations. From the Iraniat; fiscal year (21 Vlarch -20 Marcl) 1966//59 through 1972!73. file budgets were as slim.. below in nillions of' U.S. dollars. 5. Logistics (S) Constructive use of rising oil revenues has enabled Iran to develop at small but expanding modern industrial sector, which despite its rapid growth is capable of providing only modest support For the armed forces. Although a wider range and larger output of ttnsophisticuied military equipment caul be expected in the future, production of heavy and more complex materiel will be restricted by the inadequacy of Iran's industrial base at its shortage of skilled manpower. Production in support of the armed furors is limited to relatively small amounts of rifles. light machineguns. ammunition (ill) to 105 -nun), explosive devices, and quartermaster supplies. The output of military item; is insufficient and must be suppl�� tnellted by imports. From an almost exclusive reliance on the United States for military ^quipment prior to 1967, Iran has diversified its supply sources considerably. The United States still has provided by far the largest attnount of military assistance �about $1.7 billion, some 50r,(' of it on a grant basis. Items provided include many types of aircraft, combat vehicles, infantry weapons, and Cori) ill (nications equipment. In 1967 Iran signed its first military assistance agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the procurement of military equipment. Since then it has received substatntiad quantities of armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft and field artiller;, vehicles, spare parts, and ammunition under military agreements with it total estimated value of $480 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73(est.) 624.3 766.3 926.3 1,195.4 1,471.2 24.7 26.6 25.0 25.4 20.3 ,8 8.4 9.1 9.9 not 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 million. Other major suppliers, and the types of mutteri. -I ordered, hayc inclodcd the Unitcd Kingdom (surface -to -air missiles, it destroyer, destroyer escorts. hovercraft, and it variety of ground forces e(jctipnuent. ilu�iudiug Chieftain tanks. valued at over 85110 million). Israel (infantr% weapons, auuuunition. cnnuuunications e(lttilnnent, and Soviet vehicle share parts captured in the 1967Rrab- Israeli war, valued at over SKA million), and Italv (mortars. helicopters, and naval cruise missiles also valued at over S70 million). C. Ground forces (S) The primary mission of' the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (II(:F) is to defend Iran against aggression by any neighboring country and to assist the 4endiirnmric and the national police in the maintenance of internal security. IIGF strengths include good discipline. good ph\sical Condition of enlisted personnel, an increasing number of' WYestern- traincd officers, and terrain generally favorable to the conduct of defensive operations. It is hampered b such weaknesses ,.s it logy level of' general and technical education, some inept leadership. inflexibility of command and logistics. inadequate transportation and communications facilities, inadequate combat intelligence, general lack of combat experience, and poor caliber NC(Ys. many units cio not have their fall complement of personnel and equipment. Although these shortcomings are known to II( ;F commanders and action is living taken to overcome them. total elimination of the weaknesses will take several years. 1. Organization Operational conirol of the ground forces is nominally exercised by the Commanding General. Imperial Iranian Ground Forces, who has the rank of general. lic is assisted by it general staff mid it combined technical and special staff. General staff sections irtel'tde personnel, intelligence, operations. logi;tics, and comptroller. 'Technical and special staff clemu'nts are ordnance, engineer, signal, finance, medical, quartermaster, transportation. veterinary. adjutant general, and military police. The tactical chain of command passes from the Commanding General. IIGF, to the corps com- manders and that to the subordinate divisions ,and independent brigades. The Ground Forces Command exercises direct :control over ill ground force units which are not assigned to either of the two corps. Iran is divided into three tactical areas. TIie nortbwt�stcrn portion of the country is t!tc responsibility of I Corps. The southern portion of the 6 comitr is the responsibility ul' II Corps, while the remainder of the country is the direct responsibility of the Ground Forces Command. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition' The strength of' the ground forces is about 165.000, ol' \hunt about 69 are conscripts. The II(:I is overstmnglh itt the number of enlisted tnen and NCO's and slighll\ uudcrstrcnglh in the number of officers. Combatant forces consist of three armored divisions, two infantry divisions, an army aviation command. and four separate brigades (two infanta. one airborne infantry, and one special forces). The Infantry Guard I)iyisiou, which is assigned to urnrity duties in 'Tehran, is under the direct Comm ;utd ol' the Supreme Comm-miler's Staff and is not incbtded in the ,round forces oreler of battle. In the early part of 1971. the ground forces underwent it major reorganization. The basic infanta division of bethyeen 9,000 and 12.000 personnel comprises three brigades of three battalions each. one combat engineer battalion. one signal battalion. one armored cavalry squadron, diyisin,ntl artillery. and a divisional support command. The armored divisions (,f bchyeen 12 and 13.000 are similarly comprised of three brigades of three battalions each. Each bri"ade of the armored divisions itas one tank and No mechanized infantry battalions or tm) tank and one mechanized infantry battalion. Fach armored division also has out� signal batta {ion, one combat engineer battalion, one arnu,md cavalry squadron. divisional artillery, and c{i%isu,nal support commimd. The independent brigades vary in authorized strength front I. -100 to 1.000 depending on type and composition. TIT( Imperial Iranian :\yiution Cnnituand which has been upgraded from brigade level will have thmc direct support aviation brigades. one general support brigade, it command aviation unit, it logistics command, it training center. and it national depot. I'hc reorganization is to be carried out over it 5 -year period. after which the aviation cunlnuuul will he completer� rel'ormed and equipped. \Major items of equipment on hand in the latter part of 1972 include 927 X1.17/60/( Iiiel'tain tanks (Figure .3), 1,600 armored personnel carriers. 959 howitzers and gams (75 -nun to 8-inch). 512 antiaircraft artillery weapons (i.. -nun t057 -moo), 1.295 recoilless rif1cs (57- min to 10(1 -nom), 270 antitank mtissilcs (SS -Ill and SS- I I 2.590 mortars (60 -runt to 1.2- is,cla,. and 35,000 lFor current, detailed information, gee .Military Inge i wilce Summary �Iran and (hrhv of Battle Surnmarij. Foreign Ground Forces. both published In the M -fense Intelligence :\genet. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 assorted %iiplt"rt %epic le%. \I()sl "I th(� is III C.S. origin; ho%%v%vr. since( I)li;, n1un itt n1s hac liven obtained frn1 c�(ntitlries. The St%it�t 1 "i(m has Irt ided anntrc�d per -iiii �I viirrivrs F it;ure 1 ;mtiairc�raft ;unl li(�Id irtill(�r. lank tra"sl)(0ers. nla ill tc� lit Iit- 4- is. %chic iv,. r((c�k(�I Mid gr�"a(h� IattnI. -Iwr%. :i nl amtnitniti(m. Isrm has s"I)Ilit�II c;tlitur(�(I So I% %Chic�h� %I)ary Imrh. ;u11"ti11lili(In. small arms. and 120 -111111 'I'ampell ;t nl(rlars. Ital% It;,, ltri)%icl(�cl lu�lic�(,pIvr, f"r :trmt a%iali"n. The nlajt)ril% "f tru(Is cnnctntraltd;dlnig Irian s htir(I(�r %title I rat I. tic latitc It light sir�nglh is I- ticutintc�rc�d it; the viol tI lusitc� tit(- htrtler %%illI :11;91latiWan. Since(� Iran is allit�d %%ilh �1'tirkv% and I thrtigh flit� (:central Treat% On;anizatinn ((:1 .NTO), h(rdvrs %%ilh Iliv%v (�I)ntiIriv% it re %ter light 1% rn; tinvd. Siiiiil;irl Ili( I etc 11.iI� htrdc�r� %%ilh Iht� SIcicl l'ni"n arc light 1% garrimmc�d. 3. Training; 'I'lle tltialit% "f Ir;tining has imprt\c d (�(rtisidurahl% in recent \(�itrs hill is n"t \vt u(milmrahh� t" l .S. trtining ac�ti%itiv% and standards. Tito- It 1(�\(�I (I g( lend ;I"(I t(�c�hnic�al (�ch1(�iIIi()n 111ak(�s it dillic�till It .r tht� a%c�rage s"Idivr 14 inw -tc�r Ili(� ciiinplic�alt�c1 lc�c�Flnicltic�s "f Opvralitt, aii(I nai ill Atli riv in(d(�rn M(ati)ns :tiul c�(I"ilnl(�nt. .1lthtitigh lield trainii,, has invrI�ast�(I. it h�tids I( h(� c�r fnrnr,tl. la(�ks n;disnl. d(n�s r,It c�h;dlt�ng(� flit� initiatit ()r ingviiitit\ ()f irni(r (ffic�(�rs. Iiicr�:cs(�d itnl)(0;ttice has beet alla(�hrd t() itint (lu�r,tli(nis %%ilh hreal gc�n(Iarnivriv "nits -ul(l natal and air ft)r�t� (�Ir"l( ills. All Irani:" training c�c�nlrrs are nl(dc led aft(�r :ih�nt 1'. S. Arta\ insl:tllalitms. (:r("nd I tire(�. "tntnand is rv%pfnsihIv ftrAl gr iiid l(r�t�s Ironing. P itt� rc�Ilacviiw"1 Ir ;blintz (�tellers pr(\idc� :I hasic� Ir;rining c�nnrsc� h)r all c�( nsc�riI)Is. 'Phil~(� c�(Iusc�riIits lal�k hwic r u(litit; ;rncl 11 riling skills ninsl attvijd ;c 9- %%c�c�k I;c1tt; Litre c�(mrs(� 1whin (�nt(�riut; basic c�imihal Iminii Iit iI iii l Ir ;Iiit iiig hir c�(It ix�ri1)tcd \(:O :,id "ffict n is cim(hicted ;it flit� Ciidr� 'I'rairirit (:c�utc�r hwillc�d in Ill( c�asivni Intrl ()f Tehran. Tniini ig omsisls "f ;t Ii- ttc�(�k c�ti11rs(� in basic c(milmt skills mid ;t I- ttc�c�k c(mrs( ill ,t;c�nvr iniliLcr stihicoN. 11O rc c.Id(�ts ;tlxr alll�nd lh(� C ;idw Tr:tininv Center frtr r, \\vcks (4 �cuirtnc�r c� ;tncl). (:(nrsc�ripted (Iffic�c�rs acid N(:0', r(�cei\I idviiIic�al i list nrc�ti("s ttit1, it( c fh)rl (u dific�rviiii ;itc� h(�I \(�(�11 Ili(� n,itury (I( flit� (Inli(�s that c�ac�h tn;t\ by v\I)c�c�lc�cl It pvrl(irin. The Ii(�Id training an(I 1(( alnl(s firing lmrti(m (rI tit(- Ironing is ��tinclti(�t(�d ;it lh(� sI cvnul garrisnn (�;tint kwzil(�d i t I. -is It kit mk t( t w it) rlIwasl ill *1'1.1inin. Cr adti;ttes ((f ill(- basic (raining c�(ntrs(� r�cvitc� 1 to I, \%(�(�ks ()f training ;it it I)ranc�h tr c�("ti l arms sc�h(Iid 1'()l I( h\ 22 \%veks (f (m- Ill(� -itch training in tin assigned unit. I`(tll(tcint; c�(int Icli((n ((i branch training. c�(aisc�ript \(:O's sc�rc� IS nl(mllis. �I'hc� Iiii1wrial Irani ;tit Milit :(r .\c;i(Ic�tn\ in Tvhr:tn. flit (rill\ sttirce of r(�tCalar (Ifficers, tt(f( rs it i t(ar (tunt in inilitar and ac�adt�ntic� stihi(�c�Is. Gnidwiti's ii re *()l"ntissiIIlled st�c�tnd licill(�nanls. F( III( I ig grad lit li"rt. rvt;iilar (4fic�(�rs r c(itc ;i 1 vir basic c(urst in Ill(- cv)lnhat arms sc lio id% ()r the branch sc hntIs desigw d I(I pr�larc� thein f(r cimin(:,11(I "f ltlal( 11% :till cnnilr,utic s. Inlantr mid ;irtno r cciit(�rs ar(� l4wi ed ;II Shiraz; th(� Arlillvrn mid \li.sil: (:center is I"t-at"d tit 1'sfah,tn. '1111� C(nth:tl Snl)I)crt Training (:center in 'Tabriz offers Ironing in lhc� (Irdimit(�(�. Ir:inslnrl: lit)it, inilitar\ i"licv. fin;til(�(�. (luart(�rilms- t(�r. ;til(1 adtninistr:tli\c� fields. Fmir tears after th(- hitsic c(ntrs(. r�gtilar (ffict rs return 1 a I -1(:ir a(l\anced c,)iirsv (Ic%it!iwd (r Ir(�I);Ir(� th(�n1 to FIGURE 4. Soviet -built BTR -60pb shown during Iranian Armed Forces Day, 12 December 1971 (U /OU) P r INN APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 FIGURE 3. British supplied Chieftc n tank (U /OU) co nunand battalions and to serve as stuff officers up to brigade level. Selected officers. captains or higher rank with 13 gars of ser\ice, attend the Coni nand and General Staff College in I't-hran; this instruction prepares them to conduct command and staff functions in tactical units and in ground forces staff departments. Foreign training for Iranian officers, cadets, and NCO's is provided on a grant aid, purchase, or exchange basis by the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Bclgiun, Turkey. and I'akistan. Courses offered vary front basic specialist courses to war college -level inslr(tction. lu 1968 Iran sent 2 -1 N(Y)*s to the U.S.S.R. to attend an armored personnel maintenance course; in 1967, as small U.S.S.R. training team provided in- country instruc- tion on the maintenance of newly acquired eyuipmont to it select cadre of Iranian personnel. During 1971,38 Iranian officers were sent to the Soviet Union to attend armaments courses. In the early part of 1972, 1 -1 officers and men were sent to the'Soviet Union for maintenance training on the 122 -nun rocket launchers. Most in- country training by foreign personnel has been provided by the United States. However. the United Kingdom has provided technical advisers following the purchase of Chieftain tanks by Iran, and South Korea has assisted with special forces training. The U.S. Army Mission kill(! Military Assistance Advisory Group is responsihlc for arrangements to sand Iranian officers and NCO's to the United States for training at military educational institutions. More than 3,000 officers halve attended U.S. Army service schools Since 1950. Alloy aviation training has developed with the assistance of the in- country training facilities. Basic fixed -eying instruction is provided by the Civil :fir Club, a goycrnnu srtbsicli�rc(I organization. and helicopter instruction by it civilian contractor. Advanced fixed -eying training is conducted in Iran, while advanced helicopter training is provided in Italy. There are plans to establish all army aviation training center in Esfahan, which would come under the direct control of Headquarters, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. This school is to have an annual inlntt of 400 pilot trainees each year; the anticipated "wash out" rate is about 50%. 4. Logistics Ground forces logistics reflect the problems evident throughout the armed forces, including the tendency of field units to stockpile. specific itcns. In the latter part of 1970, the Shah directed a reorganization of the 8 Imperial Iranian Ground Forces under which the thr :c� field ani ies were reorganized into two corps and divested of the reyuirenents for providing their own logistical support. All logistical units, installations, and facilities were placed under the control of llu� Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. (ht 21 March 1971. the First and Second Area Support Commands ware formeci'and made directly subordinate to the Logistics Command, IIGF. Late ill 1971, a third area command was formed to provide logistical support for the two divisions and those other units and facilities directly subordinate to the 11(;F. Logistical support for the ground forces aviation command will be provided by an organic logistical command. 5. Arniv aviation Oil 17 April 1972, the Shah approved a it(-\% organization for ground forces aviation. The former -lid Arnty Aviation Brigade has been upgraded and is to be completely reorganized and equipped within 5 gars. It is to be composed of one general support brigade and three direct support brigades. Personnel strength will exceed 10.000. of which 1,715 will be pilots and -1,125 will be maintenance personnel. All emits within the existing aviation brigade will be upgraded. Each direct support brigade will have it utility helicopters, 10 fixed -wing observation aircraft, i3 Scout helicopters, and 48 attack helicopters. The general support aviation brigade, which has not been formed yet, will have 16 CI1 -47 helicopters, 60 utility. 48 attack, .and 27 scout helicopters. The Command Aviation Unit which is located at Quleh \lorghi Air Base in Tehran will have four fixed -eying observation aircraft, four fixed -wing command aircraft. f0 utility helicopters, and 10 scout helicopters. The- Training Center. located at Esfahan, will be authorized 50 aircraft: five fixed -eying observation craft. 20 utility. 10 scout, and 15 attack helicopters. The aviatio n command has i3 fixed -wing Cessna aircraft, one (11- -17, and 62 Agusta Bell 20.E and 206 helicopters on hand. In December 1972, the Iranian Government signed contracts with the U.S. Government for the purchase of 489 helicopters. Of this number, 287 will be the "lluey -Plus" Bell Model 214A, and 202 will !)e the Al 1-1) Sea Cobra armed helicopters to be built by the Bell I Ielicopter Dk of "Textron, Incorporated. The agreenemt also provides for spare helicopter parts. Pilots will be trained in Iran under a supporting contract with Bell; nnechanics \gill be trained by U.S. technical personnel, both military and civilian, until army personnel have become familiar with the complexities of maintaining the helicopters. Depot APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 maintenance will probably be run by the Iranian Helicopter Industries, it firm origimally set up b Agusta Bell of Italy and totally Iranian owned. Th ere is it possibility that additional helicopters, All 205 and AB 206 models, necessary to the mission of army aviation will he purchased from Agusta Bell. Helicopter deliveries will begin ill 1974 and will continue for a period of 3 to 5 gars. The expansion of army aviation is an ambitious undertaking, and the IIGF %\ill find itself hard Dressed to fill(] trainable personnel with the necessary mechanical aptitude to meet these requirements. D. Navy The primary mission of the Imperial Iranian Nays (IIN) is to defend the coastal areas and offshore islands. With the expansion of the IIN, its mission has been extended to provide protection of Iran's sca communications thr,ugh the I'ersia,t Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and to maintain the freedom of gulf waters for international trade. The navy also has the responsibility for assisting CEN'I'O nations or other allies of Ir ll in defending surrounding water areas against foreign aggression and for supporting Iran's other military forces as needed. (S) The Imperial Iranian Navy has become the major nasal force in the area since the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf ill 1071. The Shah ordered that nasal personnel strength be increased from the 1971 level of 11,500 to 20,290 men within the next 5 years. Planned along with the personnel increase is the acquisition of new and sophisticated equipment which will give the navy increased offensive and defensive capabilities. The IIN is capable of limited defense of the Persian Gulf coastline and has increased its surveillance capabilities through the establishment of patrols from the Strait of Honnu into the Gulf of Oman. Coordination with the Imperial Iranian Air Force in the area of logistical support and exchange of intelligence information is becoming a reality. Two Vosper Mk. 5 frigates, equipped with surface to- surface and surface -to -air missiles, were purchased by Iran from the United Kingdom and arrived in the Persian Gulf in August 1972. (S) Although Iran is dependent on foreign assistance ire training and logistics, the first in- country overhaul effort is currently in progress on two ex -U.S. coastal minesweepers at Khorramshahr and on three ex -U.S. motor gunboats at Bandar 'Abbas. (S) There are only a�small number of ships maintained in the Caspian Sea. Iran has made no attempt to d(-f(-u(] its Caspian Scar coasts and could offer only token resistactce against an attack In the Soviet Union. (S) L OrganizAtion (S) 'I'll(- Commander. Imperial Irntian Navy, cum -fitly a rear admiral. is responsible for the nasal headquarters organization at Tchrau, the shore establishment. and the operating forces. 'I'll(- navy is under the direct control of the Shalt, although operational control is, in iiteory, delegated to the Commander. IIN, through the Chief, Srprctnc Commandcr's Staff. The Commander is assist(-(] by the Vice Commander. IIN (Figure 5); Depute Commanders for Logistics, Nllyal I'hrsowiel, and Operations and flans; Directors fur :Administration, Medicine, Plans and Programs, and Operations Communications and Intelligence; and Commanders, Persian Golf and Onan Gulf Flect. Naval Base Bandar Abbas, Naval Base Bandar Pahlavi. Nasal Base Bushehr, and Commander, Nasal Ayialion. Persian Gulf Fleet I leadquarters is located currently at Khorramshahr, but plans have be(-it made to nun the headquarters to Bandar ':Abbas upon completion of shore facilities. 11 elico1) tcrjhovercraft bases are locate(] at Khosrowabad and Kharg Island (Jazir(-h -ye Khark). flans also call for helicopter ihoyercraft bass at Bushehr and Bandar 'Abbas, and plans are being active pursued to develop it naval facility at Chat BaIlar. No combatant ships are assigned to the Commander. Bandar -e Pahlavi, whose primary responsibility is that of conducting the naval training program. Command communications betweel all headquarters, bass, and ships art provided by Iow through ultra -high frequency radio operating in code or voice mode. Strength, composition, and disposition"- (S) Ill August 1972, ship strength consisted of one ex- British "Bath(-" class destroy(-r (DDGSP), two Vosper Mk. 5 destroyer escorts (DE,G) (Figure W, fourex U.S. PF 1033 class patrol escorts (K. E). three ex -U.S. PGX1 class 59 motor gumboots (PGNq), four 95 400l U.S. Navy I)GM 39 class motor gunboats, four coastal minesATepers (MSC), two inshore minesweepers (MSI), four minor amphibious craft, eight SRN -6 Ilovercrtft (Figure 7), two BII -7 Ilovercraft. 21 service ships and craft, and two yachts. Nlajor For current, detailed information, ,ev Military Intrlligenc Sunmmary �Iran, Naval Forms Intelligence Study�Iran. and AutornaRxl Naval Order of Battlr (Ships). all published bs lil Defense Intelligence Agency. 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 n G Z z Q Z Z Z O Q O a 2 z Z V Z O V Q Z O 0 V C _O O z Z tt Z N Z V OO O a 0 z Z a a c Z Y V _O N V p V a G Z a �I S Z 0 V O N w V C7 O G Z a a e a O Z V 0 z V a Z D Z N w 1 d O w O U O n a c z a v Z Z �t O V Z `a D v z N 0 Z Z a Z n G a I h oN z w 4 K Q N w V Z Z O a` O L' N O m a o. s Q v X N w V I Q n G Z z Q Z Z Z O Q O a 2 z Z V Z O V Q Z O 0 V C _O O z Z tt Z N Z V OO O a 0 z Z a a c Z Y V _O N V p V a G Z a �I S Z 0 V O N w V C7 O G Z a a e a O Z V 0 z V a Z D Z K z Z Q Z h �001 d V Z aO G W t G v O z .S Z r O V Z a m a a Z a Z n o �t z o a Z m O v N m Z Q Z w a G Z m O V f m r a a m m Z a o z z m O Z G a Z a Z O o z O Z Z o O O O V V 00 L f O O N N �E a aZ c 'c a h W 0 ad V_ Q APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 N 1 d O U O n a c z a v Z �f G Z �t O O V Z O D v z i O 0 Z a Z n G O z h oN z O O a V Ca O V K z Z Q Z h �001 d V Z aO G W t G v O z .S Z r O V Z a m a a Z a Z n o �t z o a Z m O v N m Z Q Z w a G Z m O V f m r a a m m Z a o z z m O Z G a Z a Z O o z O Z Z o O O O V V 00 L f O O N N �E a aZ c 'c a h W 0 ad V_ Q APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070042 -2 r^ FIGURE 6. IIS Saam, the Vosper MK -5 destroyer escort purchased from the United Kingdom (U /OU) c�onlbatants of the IIN are based at Bandar 'Ahbas. The inujority of olber vessels are at Khorramshahr, with several ships and craft at Kharg Island and :hud:ui. The Shahs yac�hl, one insh,e riiines,eeper, and three minor patrol craft are hosed in tale Caspian Sea at Bandar -e P-Adavi. All ships are maintained in fair condition Ineelianically and are generally cic.n and Well painted. Two additional Vosper vlk. 5 destroyer escorts have been purchased from the United Kingdom a116 we in the final stages of completion, and four additional 1311 -7 Ilovereraft, two with surface- to surface missile capability. are expected in country. Two small guided missile destro\ers (1)1)(;S) purchased from the United States will he delivered in earl 1974 and will provide a surface -to- surface missile Cilpability. Tw o cargo /tanker resupply ships are tinder construction in the I-ederal liepublic of Germany and are expected to be delivered 1w late 1973 after the FIGURE 7. U.K. -built navy amphibi- ous Hovercraft (U /OU) addition of helicopter hungers on the stern of each ship. TWo amphibious support slips are also wider construction in the United Kingdom with delivery anticipated during late 197.1. These four new cmistruc�tion ships are expected to alleviate soave of the supply and support problems for the gulf islands. One protol\pe ferrous i.-vinent hull fast patrol bout is heing constructed by it eoininercial shipbuilder al Bushehr. Also under consideration for purchase are h%enhy 65- foot fast patrol beats front the United Stales. six guided missile fast pairol boats from the Federal M- pantie of German\. and (wo additional surplus U.S. lest rovers. Personnel strength totals 1i.000offic, -s and (�misted men. of wboni i.000 are naval infantry. 'There is a significant shortage of technically trained personnel which will be compound-O as additional ships are delivered. IIN personnel have fairefficiency. arc� fairly \cell trained. and have logh morale. As a group. junior officers compare favor ibly with those of major Western c�onntries. The j wrforniance of the IIN will be hampered by the strain on manpower and h �fining imposed b\ th'. ac�dlnisition of ad1�!;tional ships. brit the long -terin prospects for a \cell- trained, competent navy are brii