NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 33; IRAN; ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070042-2
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SECRET
33/ GS /AF
Iran
May 1973
NATIONAL_ INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECP,ET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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I "ra
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated No-
vember 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Defense establishment 1
Major expansion and reorganization program
underway to increase capabilities of 278,000 -man
forces; Iran is part of CENTO and has bilateral
defense agreement with United States; armed
forces can maintain internal security and are
primary factor in maintaining Shah in power.
1. Military history 1
Traditions date to Persian empire in 550 B.C.,
but modern combat experience since 1943
has been limited to security operations, border
clashes with Iraq.
2. Command structure 3
Shah is supreme commander, controls directly
or through Supreme Commander's Staff.
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Page
B. joint activities
1. Military manpower
Breakdown of male population by age group
and fitness; sources of manpower, largely
onscript; no effective reserve system.
2. Strength trends
Fluctuating buildup since 1958 to present
peak strength, which is expected to increase.
3. Training
joint service schools; foreign staff and opera-
tional training; joint and combined operations.
A. Military budget
Budgetary procedures and 1969.73 budget
figures.
5. Logistics
Reliance on foreign sources of material, pri-
marily U.S. but diversified to include U.K.,
U.S.S.R., Israel, and Italy.
C. Ground forces
Defensive mission; strengths and weaknesses.
1. Organiza ":on
Operational control and chain of command;
general, technical, and special staffs; tactical
areas.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Strength in men and tactical units; 1971 re-.
organization; major equipment items; troop
concentration on Iraq border.
3. Training
Training centers modeled on U.S. inshlla-
tions; conscript training; military academy;
foreign training; army aviation instruction.
4. Logistics
Logistics Command and three area support
commands have replaced army support com-
ponents.
5. Army aviation
Upgraded and reorganized; 489 new U.S. heli-
copters on order.
3
3
4
5
5
5
6
8
6
7
8
8
Page
0 tram th, composition, and disposition 9
Ship and personnel strengths; major L- n-
batants based at Bandar 'Abbas; strengths,
weakn. saes, and long -term outlook.
3. Training
Dependence on foreign training being re-
duce4l; conscript, petty officer, and officer
schools; international exercises.
4. Logistics
Logistical support still far from adequate;
principal supply center at Khorramshahr; all
major construction, repair, and overhaul done
in foreign countries.
5. Naval infantry
Physical security proviued by 3,000 -man bri-
gade with IIGF officers.
6. Naval air arm
Hovercraft and helicopter squadrons operate
in Persian Gulf.
'E. Air force
Mission anti capabilities; new air defense system;
strengths and weaknesses.
1. Organization
Command structure, staff, and operational
forces based on 10 tactical squadrons with
air defense and ground support roles.
2. Strength, composition, and dispo fiat
Personnel and aircraft strengths; Tactical
Fighter Bases; defensive SAM system being
installed; aircraft on order; military ai.fields;
antiaircraft guns; no reserve potential.
3. Training
Training organ' c-ation; conscript, officer, and
pilot schools; reliance on foreign assistance;
technical personnel speciality.
4. Logistics
Complete dependence on foreign aircraft and
equipment; Logistics Command; maintenance
at air depot. also dependent on foreigners.
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
16
D. Navy
Mission aml capabilities; concentration on Persian
Gulf; little defense planned for Caspian Sea.
1. Organization
Command structure; headquarters; bases;
communications.
9 F. Paramilitary 17
Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie under :Ministry of
Interior; wartime mission; internal security
9 responsibilities; equipment; training; manpower
problems; National Resistance Forces, a local
militia.
FIGURES
ii
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Page
Fig. 1
Iranian defense organization chart)
2
Fig. 6
IIS Saam photo)
11
Fig. 2
Iranian armed forces personnel
Fig. 7
IIN Hovercraft (photo)
11
strength table)
4
Fig. 8
IIAF F -58 photo)
15
Fig. 3
Chieftain tank (photo)
'7
Fig. 9
l:cwly acquired Fokker F -27 (photo)
1
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
BTR-60 pb photo)
IIN organization chart)
10
Fig. 10
Rapier surface -to -air missile photo)
16
ii
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1
d
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Shah presents standard to officers (C)

1. Military history
Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment
The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces include both
the military forces, referred to collectively as the
Imperial Iranian Army, and the paramilitary forces.
The military forces, totaling approximately 728,000
personnel, are composed of a predominantly conscript
ground force of about 165,000; an air force of 50,000
with approximately :320 aircraft, including 170
tactical jet fighters; and a navy of 1:3,000 with 64 ships
and craft. The paramilitary for are the 70, 300 -man
gendarmerie, which has it wartime mission under
Ground Forces Command. The Iranian rnilitan
forces, while not battle tested and lacking the degree
of professional leadership available in most Western
forces, have embarked upon a major expansion and
reorganization program in an effort to increase their
capabilities. (S)
The armed forces have been able to maintain
internal security in the face of localized disturbances
and could probably do so under most conditions short
of serious nationwide disorders. They could not halt
simultaneous external attacks from two directions or
significantly delaN an attack by a major power. To
offset its vulnerability, Iran has allied itself with the
West through membership in the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) and bilateral defense
agreements with the United States. Iran has also
attempted to improve relations with the Soviet Union
by pledging as early as 1962 that it would not permit
foreign bases on its soil. (S)
Until 1967, the United States was practically the
sole source of foreign military assistance. Since that
time, Iran has attempted to diversify its sources of
armament and materiel by turning primarily to the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Additional
equipment has been purchased from other Western
countries. (C)
Support by the Iranian military establishment is a
primary factor in maintaining the Shah in power.
Accordingly, the military establishment has been the
recipient of considerable royal patronage, favor, and
close interest. Decisions affecting the military forces
are often made from political rather than military
considerations. (C)
The Iran:au; are proud of their country's military
traditions, dating from the Persian empire of the sixth
century B.C. However, since the 18th century military
genius and adventurer Nadir Shah freed Iran from the
Afghans and 'Turks and forced Russia to abandon the
Caspia:t provinces, Iranian armies have not been
noted for their accomplishments. Reza Shah, father of
the reigning monarch, vNitalired the armed forces in
the 1920's. In 1922 an air arm was added to the
ground forces, and in 1929 the navy was founded.
These forces were not employed in aggressive national
action outside Iran's borders, and they offered no
appreciable resistance in World War II when the
country was overrun by British and Soviet forces.
(U /OU)
In 1943, a U.S. training mission was established to
assist in the development of the ground forces and
gendarmerie. Since World War II, the armed forces
collectively have undergone inercuses in strength and
numerous organizational changes. The military forces
have concentrated on defending against externa!
threats, while since 1963 an increasingly effective
gendarmerie has assumed greater responsibility for
maintaining internal security. (U /OU)
U.S. influence on the Iranian military establishment
has increased continually since World ar It as a
result of the extensive aid programs and training
missions. This influence is reflected not only in
materiel on hand but also in organization and training
and in tactical and logistic concepts. The U.S. mission
continued its advisory functions after World War II,
but its operations were not formalized by contract
until 1917, when the bilateral advisory agreement was
signed. The U.S. Army Mission and Military
Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISII -MAAG) was
established in 1950 to advise on the use of U.S.
military aid. In late 1955 Iran joined the Baghdad
Pact (now CENTO), and in 1959 signed a bilateral
defense agreement with the United States. The most
recent aid progran, is based on an agreement of 1962,
whereby the United States agreed to deliver military
equipment to Iran through mid -1967, subject to
approval of annual appropriations and the capability
of the Iranian forces to absorb the equipment. The
agreement of 1962 was revised in 1961 by it
memorandum of understanding under which grant
aid was extended to include the period U.S. FY67
through FY69. mince that time, United States aid has
been confined to military credit sales and training
assistance; military credit commitments are provided
on an annual basis. Iran also purchases directly_ front
manufacturers through cash sales. (S)
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Since� 19 -13, cotttbal experience of flu� Iranian arrtted
force, bas been liltitcd ntuinlly to tltc reasscrlion oI
national cemtrul over northwestern Iran at tit(. ertd of
World War II, periodic punitive operations agai isI
troublesome Iranian tribes, and support of the 196:3
l'i fted Nations operations in tit( Congo b% ;tit air
fore(- eontingcnt (if four F -86 fighter airc�rafl. Al 11,11
end of November 19; I, when Irau occupied tit(�
islands of Abu Musa and the tvo 'I'unls (Jazirch -)c
Toth -e Bozorg), the oil[% resistance encounlercd vc;rs
front the local gendartncrie on the larger of the 'I'mtlr
islands. Although the occ�upatfon vv ;ls acc(nnplishecl
within a few hours of balding, ground. nav;ll. and air
force� el(-Itents gained valuable cxpericncv in
dePloYnu�nt. sustained alert, awl support operations.
(Sl
During 1968 the Iranian anned I' rces were alerted
and deployed when fighting between Ira(li govern-
ment forces ;utd the rebellious Ira(li Kurds spilled over
into Iran. Oc�c�asionaI ninor skirmishes, mail II
artillery and mortar (fuels. occurred between the
Iranian and Iraqi forces when the Iraqis fired on
suspected rebel positions within Iranian tcrritor.
TIIVsV incidents were tit(- result of Ir. ;(li suspicions that
Iran had provided covert support and operating bases
to the Kurdish dissidents or northern Iraq. Iranian
armed forces replied in kind to irmli provocations.
'These (-ncoonters had generally diminished by the end
of 1968. In early 1969, tit(- armed forces had tit
oppertnnit' for large scale testing of their training and
capabilities when ground forces and gendanterie emits
were deployed along tit(- border of Iraq, particularly in
the vicinity of the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and
Abadan, during tit(- recent, and as vet unsettled,
dispute over ownership of t1,(- Shutt ;l Arab. Air force
and nave units wc�r(- also placed on alert in battle
ready status. 'I'll(- response of the� armed forces in this
(-ncount(-r indicated an overall improvement in their
capability to respond to (-xlc�rnal threat. Armed
conffict was avoided, het the Iranians stood ready to
meet force with force. In tile f of i t loc�;lly superior
force and constrained by large troop c�on>mitnu�nts to
the Arab cause in Jordan ;old Syria and to ch tit(-
rebellious Kurds, Iraq declined to engage ill a military
confrontation. Border skirmisit(-s have continued.
however, and the Iranian forces have concentrated
their primary units along tit(- border with Iraq. The
f ranian armed fortes also had experience in January
1973, when it battalion was sent to assist the Sultan of
Oman in curbing the rebellion in 'Lufar (Dhofar). (S)
2. Command structure (S)
His Imperial Majesty tit(- Shah (Figure I exercises
actual control of tit(- Iranian armed forces as Suprei n�
Con mandur le) the cvtwtl of arbilraril% concerning
hitrtself wills elclailcel da% Io -dae operation,.
Operational cnnlrol is theorelic�ally dcicgatvd. thro inch
the (:hicf of the Suprctuc Coming dcr's Staff t SCS). (o
Ille commander of the individual sery ice ground
lore�(-,, navy, and air force �none of wbon. howcvcr.
are nu�tnber, oI' the S(:S ;t joint sl ;eff The Shah cltl.n
merckv% hi, c�onun:uul prerogathes through direct
contact with 1 11 111\ of his senior officl.rs. whl.thl.r or
not the\ arc mcrltbers of the S1tprenu� Conunander',
Staff. 'I'll. position of Chief. Supreme Cotnntancicr *s
Staff, 1,:u the cquiv;d(-nt of tnini,terial rank. although
the incuntb(vtt is not a Inetnber of tit(- Cahinct. The
Minister of War has (-gttal status will, the
Snprctne Cotnntauder's Staff. and takes his orders
dircclly from the Shah. Ile is not in (he operational
chain of command bud is r�,pon,iblc prinaril\ for
representing the military forcers in the Iranian
parliammit and for super khm Icgal and buclgl.tarc
matters. I'hc `linkler of Interior is normally
responsible for the operation, of (1,c gcndarnu ril. and
the national police: in tincs of war or national
enn�rgenc\, howeyl.r, the gcndartnerie is placed under
tit(- operational control (if' tit(- ScS.
The (:lief. Sttprene Contlnander', Staff. is assi,tcd
by ;e Vice (:lief and a of seven section,:
J -1 (personnel). J -2 (intelligcncet. J ((operations). 1 -4
(logistics). J -5 (plans), J -ti (cotntltttttic�ations), and J -7
(comptroller).
Although the SUS is theoretically responsible for
long -range phutniog, and intcr coordination. it
act(tally exercises direct control and much of till. day
to -(lay direction (if the ,vrviccs. The staff, of the
service commander-, are frequently ignowd and their
Functions usurped b% tllc ,enior ,tuff.
B. Joint activities
1. Militan manimwer
As of
I January 11,7:3 Iran had 7.255.000 males in
IIIe age:,
of 15 -49, of w hntn abort
59 1 were ph\ sic�all\
fit for military
service. (t '0V t
TOTAL.
MAXIMUM
NUMBER
XC \IDEA FIT FOR
AGE
OF MALES
'MILITARY SERVICE.
15 -19
1,725,000
1,120,000
20 -24
1,503,000
925,000
25 -29
1,128,000
685,000
30 -34
809,000
475,000
35 -39
711,000
400.000
4044
713,900
370,000
45 -49
6166,000
315,000
Total, 15 -49 7,255,000
4,290,0
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'I'll( Oriniar\ smirces (1I tn;1mu! le.' (111� armt�t1
hirc1��, art Ili� 111'.IN;Illts and Thus, 111(�1) ;Ill�
accush)tue(I to a I lit nl ;de in the often. ;Intl Ili�
tnaj(1ri:\ hat- (i\4-d it Iare stnbsis(etce lt-\cl W101e
trilov%iiien are 1lsnall\ able to rid- and s1o(11 sell. Ihose
c'utlst-ril)ted from the tilt, ar(- likek to Ie less rw;t;1�II
l)h\sicall\ ;1 Ill 1 11411 its aillint: 10 plit 1111 \\ith Iht-
hardships of -nilitar\ life. Illiterac\ is billl 11111 has
decreased ..I Ilic spread of t�cliwittiona) IIll)or-
tunities. Althousth technical e\1)erienur is uetaiuiblc.
nl;ul\ conscril,ts Oassess met�h;ulical aptitudes that are
dr\el(1ped irth) nst-fnl skills \\hill� Ihr\ :Ire in service.
All c(1nse�ripl% am rt-ynired to Hearn to rcud and \\ri11�
before� being discharged. tl (A
I�:nlistvd two -.I are procured pritnaril\ I)\
conscription. since Iranian lit Iro\ith�s for'_ \e;trs (1f
acli\e miliI Ir\ s4-r\ ice for all 411 ialified nude� bo\%een
age 19 :uil 1-. .::natal re(luirements of aluntt 65.I1
are met Ii,n, flit- a),pi,\imatt-l\ 310.19H1 mvii reaching
tnilitar\ age earth %var. 'I'hc gen(larinerit- is rv%l)onsil,ll�
for handling co %uriptio11 for all flit tnililar\ s4-r\ ices.
(:onst�rilN. are Inrnt-d o\4-r to flit� scr\ices for nit:l)
and ph\sical tt-sts ,uif arc g,-nt-rall\ assismed tit jobs
ct11u is nsur .1Ir with their ed licit titmal attainments.
S4-ctmdar\ school :uil uni\ersih graduates dralted
into the I.in-ract. l:IIrips. Ilealtb (:orps. mid the
Dr\t-l(1pmetit and Atuicidoiral I:\h 1136(111 t:nrl)� are
graduall\ ruisirlt; the tlualil\ A flit- m:tnpuaer p((1I
available for c�nnscril)ticm Ihr(1,tgh the edncatinnal and
he;dth prot;ranls flit.\ c:trr\ on Ihrotghottt tht- comilr\.
(l" Ol I
The groun(I Ivrces are co11tprised primaril\ of
c�onK ripts. \,mu missitined olbcv�rs :Ire lit, i,11\
\Ihintevr% lit hat. conlplefed their 1a lent I,f
"t-nice. The terms of cnlistnit-nt are 5. 7. or 111 \4-..is.
art most M:O*s centime until i�tirviii�nt of :ill \ears
41f svr \tee. :misc�ril)ts coomprlse Allo f till', of tla \,11
strength. ahilt. (1111\ al)(ml 15 cif ,fir f11rce int-n art-
co11scripls. The nlajorit\ of flit- officers are \olutleers:
ho\\c\t-r. Ihurr are sonic 2 -\4-ar co11u11iiint- t officers
st-l4-cfed front highly clualifi4-tl t(1nscripts. ((:1
�Then� is im effective res4 .\stein despite fh4- fact
that conscripts are It-chnicall\ in the rt-ser\e until Ihe\
h.1c4- reached Ih4-ir 1 Ill birthd .1\. Althom,h I,\ur
I.M11011) 1114-11 Have been since 191:. 11111\ a
small prtI>,rlio11 could be rt-adil\ recalled to active
d tit b4-ca oist of administrative and los;istica:
li11titatiim% :trre11f plans wall fttr flit formation (1f
four rt.svr\t- infanta divisions to srllpl4-mt-nt th:-
rctltlar tents. T%%o rt-.er\4- div isio11s ha\c bo-vii lormcd
in 'I' .1brior. ;uil 'Tehran. The other tats, to be
(y urati(in.11 ill 19, I. are to be lot:lted in Mt-shed and
Shiraz. \14A)iIi /.IIi11u ill be liinitcd to personnel
increases in e\istinq units uulil the reserve units am
lurnlecl. 'I'll(- air force :Intl na\\ ha\e no plans fur u
reser\v� s\ stein. (S)
2. Strength trends (S)
Betaeeu I 95 ;Intl 1972 strengtII of the armed
forces. (.\cludilig the gvndannerie, rose front 17:3.900
111 225,000 (Figiire 2). In the inler\eni11s; rears
nu11t�rons orgaiIi sit Iio lit l �il;tIIgvs have (�a used
significant flllctualions in the armed lor('es strcni!th.
Gromid forces sti�iglh increased to it l,1�ak of 191,11110
in 19611 tud has snbsellucntl) c\I)erieuce(I %lilt
llnclualiom: is major decrease ut'c�Ilred belaren 19162
and 1916:6 \\hen o\c�r 31,111111 persunncl \\4-i� tnlnsferred
to sttl)I)(1rl the n4- lmi C(mimand and joint staff
functions and ben ()\er 5.000 Border ;u ird
per +tne1 \%urc� transfern�cl to the genclarnerie. In 191616
the Logistics (:immi uil its placed miner tit(- grmind
forces. aml flit- lallc�r*s strength l)�akcd at 150.500.
major rvwtn anizutitn of tactical units ill 19168 n�sulled
in another strengtb decreiise: it Further reorganization
in 147 1 increased Ihr strengiIt I it total of 165.000.
I'ht� u:t\\ increased frtti 1.01111 to !I.S1111 in 1962 and
thvii decreased. tnuinl\ because (,f a reduction 4 800
n;t\al infanlr\: its strength has subsecluentl\ risen to
its eurrenl level of 1:3.000. The air force experienced it
continu(1ns increase from. 1.91111 to 50.000 b\ tic end (If
1972. The gendarni�ri, has ;clsn e\l)crience�d it
relati\el\ continuous increase front 3- 1.0011 to (1\cr
0.01H). The slmngth for all flit- artned services is
c\pccled to increase steadil\ during the next 5 \ears.
FIGURE 2. Iranian Armed Forces Personnel Strength* (S)
*National Police strength has been excluded because d its
e xtrelued limitt�d paramilitary capabilitc.
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e:110I']1,
.\lit
GEVn.\It-
\F:AII
F ItCE-4
N.t\Y
F, )II CE
\1 Fit IF.
'r,)�rm.
1!155.......
1 11 .0110
1,1106
1,91111
21,6011
17:3.900
11159.
17 :3,111111
1,11011
:,.:300
25,000
207,300
19611.......
191 jiml
1.31111
7.000
26,0110
225,300
1961.......
IitI.mill
1, lit W
1,11(1(1
26, 600
2311,2(111
196'.......
I S;''.0011
I SII0
4, 600
27.100
223,500
(96:3.......
1x0,11110
1,111111
10,000
36,100
IS(,1011
1961.......
1 :3 1 .000
3,9110
10. .100
36, 100
1"0
1965
132,000
1.000
1(),S()()
:32, 100
17S.900
11166.......
150,500
.1, 11)()
11,101
x5.30()
201,600
1967.......
150,500
1,.100
12,200
35,300
205, 100
IMS.......
13 .1.11111
(6,300
12,700
10,9011
193.900
1969.......
I If, 11111
S.700
17,200
52, 100
22.2.400
1970.......
152. (it W
10,500
2.1.21111
63.1100
2 49,700
1!171.......
159,11110
11,500
30,1100
6:6,000
265,500
197'_.......
16:.001)
13,000
5(1,0(10
70,3110
295,300
*National Police strength has been excluded because d its
e xtrelued limitt�d paramilitary capabilitc.
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:3. "Training (S)
The overall training organization b.,., d
considerably since late 1961, when the first joint
military school �the Iligh ::onuna nd and Joint Staff
College �was established and the supporting schools
became more systematized. The college, modeled on
the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 111 a (:onunund
and General Staff College comprised the War
Universi `y, whose curriculum included subjects
translated faun those taught in comparable U.S.
service schools. Ili 1966 the War University was
divided; the Iligh Command and Joint Staff College
(now the National Defense University) was placed
under the SCS and the Command and Central Staff
College under the ground forces.
Selected officers attend staff colleges in the United
States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Pakistan,
Turkey, IFaly, and Nest Germany. Commissioned and
enlisted personnel from all services attend scFewls and
courses in the United States. Western Europe, and ill
CF,NTO member countries. The U.S. Military
Assistance Program has arranged training for over
10,000 personnel both in the United States and in
Iran.
'training exercises involving two or more military
services have been conducted with increasing success.
In April 1964, ground, navy, and air force elements
participated in the Delawar Exercise with U.S. forces;
this was of great benefit to the Iranian forces in
acquainting them with command and staff procedures
for combined operations. The air force has
participated in joint training exercises with both the
ground forces and the navy; counterinsurgency field
exercises in air ground operations have also included
gendarmerie personnel. Some joint exercises involving
navy and air force units have been conducted with
CEN'tO forces. All these exercises have continued to
develop Iranian capability to carry out coordinated
force operations.
4. Military budget (C)
Military budget estimates are prepared by each
branch of the armed forces under the supervision and
coordination of the Supreme Commander's Staff and
the Ministry of War. The military budget is then
Defense budget
Defense budget as a percent of
national budget
Defense budget as a percent
of GNP
na Data not available.
presented to the Ministry of Finance for review and
incorporation into the total national budget.
Following approval by the parliament and the Shah.
the budget hill is enacted into law. It. practice,
however, the Shah exercises a strong inflrnence over the
forntilation of the defense budget, and there is little if
.uty opposition to military appropriations. Defense
budgets, including appropriations for internal
security, have averaged 25r of the total national
budget, which iaclud both current and develop-
mental expendi tires and the funding of all
government organizations. From the Iraniat; fiscal
year (21 Vlarch -20 Marcl) 1966//59 through 1972!73.
file budgets were as slim.. below in nillions of' U.S.
dollars.
5. Logistics (S)
Constructive use of rising oil revenues has enabled
Iran to develop at small but expanding modern
industrial sector, which despite its rapid growth is
capable of providing only modest support For the
armed forces. Although a wider range and larger
output of ttnsophisticuied military equipment caul be
expected in the future, production of heavy and more
complex materiel will be restricted by the inadequacy
of Iran's industrial base at its shortage of skilled
manpower. Production in support of the armed furors
is limited to relatively small amounts of rifles. light
machineguns. ammunition (ill) to 105 -nun), explosive
devices, and quartermaster supplies. The output of
military item; is insufficient and must be suppl��
tnellted by imports.
From an almost exclusive reliance on the United
States for military ^quipment prior to 1967, Iran has
diversified its supply sources considerably. The United
States still has provided by far the largest attnount of
military assistance �about $1.7 billion, some 50r,(' of it
on a grant basis. Items provided include many types of
aircraft, combat vehicles, infantry weapons, and
Cori) ill (nications equipment. In 1967 Iran signed its
first military assistance agreement with the U.S.S.R.
for the procurement of military equipment. Since then
it has received substatntiad quantities of armored
personnel carriers, antiaircraft and field artiller;,
vehicles, spare parts, and ammunition under military
agreements with it total estimated value of $480
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73(est.)
624.3
766.3
926.3
1,195.4
1,471.2
24.7
26.6
25.0
25.4
20.3
,8
8.4
9.1
9.9
not
5
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million. Other major suppliers, and the types of
mutteri. -I ordered, hayc inclodcd the Unitcd Kingdom
(surface -to -air missiles, it destroyer, destroyer escorts.
hovercraft, and it variety of ground forces e(jctipnuent.
ilu�iudiug Chieftain tanks. valued at over 85110
million). Israel (infantr% weapons, auuuunition.
cnnuuunications e(lttilnnent, and Soviet vehicle share
parts captured in the 1967Rrab- Israeli war, valued at
over SKA million), and Italv (mortars. helicopters, and
naval cruise missiles also valued at over S70 million).
C. Ground forces (S)
The primary mission of' the Imperial Iranian
Ground Forces (II(:F) is to defend Iran against
aggression by any neighboring country and to assist
the 4endiirnmric and the national police in the
maintenance of internal security. IIGF strengths
include good discipline. good ph\sical Condition of
enlisted personnel, an increasing number of' WYestern-
traincd officers, and terrain generally favorable to the
conduct of defensive operations. It is hampered b
such weaknesses ,.s it logy level of' general and technical
education, some inept leadership. inflexibility of
command and logistics. inadequate transportation
and communications facilities, inadequate combat
intelligence, general lack of combat experience, and
poor caliber NC(Ys. many units cio not have their fall
complement of personnel and equipment. Although
these shortcomings are known to II( ;F commanders
and action is living taken to overcome them. total
elimination of the weaknesses will take several years.
1. Organization
Operational conirol of the ground forces is
nominally exercised by the Commanding General.
Imperial Iranian Ground Forces, who has the rank of
general. lic is assisted by it general staff mid it
combined technical and special staff. General staff
sections irtel'tde personnel, intelligence, operations.
logi;tics, and comptroller. 'Technical and special staff
clemu'nts are ordnance, engineer, signal, finance,
medical, quartermaster, transportation. veterinary.
adjutant general, and military police.
The tactical chain of command passes from the
Commanding General. IIGF, to the corps com-
manders and that to the subordinate divisions ,and
independent brigades. The Ground Forces Command
exercises direct :control over ill ground force units
which are not assigned to either of the two corps.
Iran is divided into three tactical areas. TIie
nortbwt�stcrn portion of the country is t!tc
responsibility of I Corps. The southern portion of the
6
comitr is the responsibility ul' II Corps, while the
remainder of the country is the direct responsibility of
the Ground Forces Command.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The strength of' the ground forces is about 165.000,
ol' \hunt about 69 are conscripts. The II(:I is
overstmnglh itt the number of enlisted tnen and
NCO's and slighll\ uudcrstrcnglh in the number of
officers. Combatant forces consist of three armored
divisions, two infantry divisions, an army aviation
command. and four separate brigades (two infanta.
one airborne infantry, and one special forces). The
Infantry Guard I)iyisiou, which is assigned to urnrity
duties in 'Tehran, is under the direct Comm ;utd ol' the
Supreme Comm-miler's Staff and is not incbtded in
the ,round forces oreler of battle.
In the early part of 1971. the ground forces
underwent it major reorganization. The basic infanta
division of bethyeen 9,000 and 12.000 personnel
comprises three brigades of three battalions each. one
combat engineer battalion. one signal battalion. one
armored cavalry squadron, diyisin,ntl artillery. and a
divisional support command. The armored divisions (,f
bchyeen 12 and 13.000 are similarly comprised of
three brigades of three battalions each. Each bri"ade
of the armored divisions itas one tank and No
mechanized infantry battalions or tm) tank and one
mechanized infantry battalion. Fach armored division
also has out� signal batta {ion, one combat engineer
battalion, one arnu,md cavalry squadron. divisional
artillery, and c{i%isu,nal support commimd. The
independent brigades vary in authorized strength front
I. -100 to 1.000 depending on type and composition.
TIT( Imperial Iranian :\yiution Cnnituand which has
been upgraded from brigade level will have thmc
direct support aviation brigades. one general support
brigade, it command aviation unit, it logistics
command, it training center. and it national depot.
I'hc reorganization is to be carried out over it 5 -year
period. after which the aviation cunlnuuul will he
completer� rel'ormed and equipped.
\Major items of equipment on hand in the latter part
of 1972 include 927 X1.17/60/( Iiiel'tain tanks (Figure
.3), 1,600 armored personnel carriers. 959 howitzers
and gams (75 -nun to 8-inch). 512 antiaircraft artillery
weapons (i.. -nun t057 -moo), 1.295 recoilless rif1cs (57-
min to 10(1 -nom), 270 antitank mtissilcs (SS -Ill and SS-
I I 2.590 mortars (60 -runt to 1.2- is,cla,. and 35,000
lFor current, detailed information, gee .Military Inge i wilce
Summary �Iran and (hrhv of Battle Surnmarij. Foreign Ground
Forces. both published In the M -fense Intelligence :\genet.
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assorted %iiplt"rt %epic le%. \I()sl "I th(� is III
C.S. origin; ho%%v%vr. since( I)li;, n1un itt n1s hac
liven obtained frn1 c�(ntitlries. The St%it�t 1 "i(m
has Irt ided anntrc�d per -iiii �I viirrivrs F it;ure 1
;mtiairc�raft ;unl li(�Id irtill(�r. lank tra"sl)(0ers.
nla ill tc� lit Iit- 4- is. %chic iv,. r((c�k(�I Mid gr�"a(h�
IattnI. -Iwr%. :i nl amtnitniti(m. Isrm has s"I)Ilit�II
c;tlitur(�(I So I% %Chic�h� %I)ary Imrh. ;u11"ti11lili(In.
small arms. and 120 -111111 'I'ampell ;t nl(rlars. Ital% It;,,
ltri)%icl(�cl lu�lic�(,pIvr, f"r :trmt a%iali"n.
The nlajt)ril% "f tru(Is cnnctntraltd;dlnig Irian s
htir(I(�r %title I rat I. tic latitc It light sir�nglh is
I- ticutintc�rc�d it; the viol tI lusitc� tit(- htrtler %%illI
:11;91latiWan. Since(� Iran is allit�d %%ilh �1'tirkv% and
I thrtigh flit� (:central Treat% On;anizatinn
((:1 .NTO), h(rdvrs %%ilh Iliv%v (�I)ntiIriv% it re %ter
light 1% rn; tinvd. Siiiiil;irl Ili( I etc 11.iI� htrdc�r� %%ilh
Iht� SIcicl l'ni"n arc light 1% garrimmc�d.
3. Training;
'I'lle tltialit% "f Ir;tining has imprt\c d (�(rtisidurahl%
in recent \(�itrs hill is n"t \vt u(milmrahh� t" l .S.
trtining ac�ti%itiv% and standards. Tito- It 1(�\(�I (I
g( lend ;I"(I t(�c�hnic�al (�ch1(�iIIi()n 111ak(�s it dillic�till It .r
tht� a%c�rage s"Idivr 14 inw -tc�r Ili(� ciiinplic�alt�c1
lc�c�Flnicltic�s "f Opvralitt, aii(I nai ill Atli riv in(d(�rn
M(ati)ns :tiul c�(I"ilnl(�nt.
.1lthtitigh lield trainii,, has invrI�ast�(I. it h�tids I( h(�
c�r fnrnr,tl. la(�ks n;disnl. d(n�s r,It c�h;dlt�ng(� flit�
initiatit ()r ingviiitit\ ()f irni(r (ffic�(�rs. Iiicr�:cs(�d
itnl)(0;ttice has beet alla(�hrd t() itint (lu�r,tli(nis %%ilh
hreal gc�n(Iarnivriv "nits -ul(l natal and air ft)r�t�
(�Ir"l( ills.
All Irani:" training c�c�nlrrs are nl(dc led aft(�r
:ih�nt 1'. S. Arta\ insl:tllalitms. (:r("nd I tire(�.
"tntnand is rv%pfnsihIv ftrAl gr iiid l(r�t�s Ironing.
P itt� rc�Ilacviiw"1 Ir ;blintz (�tellers pr(\idc� :I hasic�
Ir;rining c�nnrsc� h)r all c�( nsc�riI)Is. 'Phil~(� c�(Iusc�riIits
lal�k hwic r u(litit; ;rncl 11 riling skills ninsl attvijd ;c 9-
%%c�c�k I;c1tt; Litre c�(mrs(� 1whin (�nt(�riut; basic c�imihal
Iminii Iit iI iii l Ir ;Iiit iiig hir c�(It ix�ri1)tcd \(:O :,id
"ffict n is cim(hicted ;it flit� Ciidr� 'I'rairirit (:c�utc�r
hwillc�d in Ill( c�asivni Intrl ()f Tehran. Tniini ig omsisls
"f ;t Ii- ttc�(�k c�ti11rs(� in basic c(milmt skills mid ;t I-
ttc�c�k c(mrs( ill ,t;c�nvr iniliLcr stihicoN. 11O rc c.Id(�ts
;tlxr alll�nd lh(� C ;idw Tr:tininv Center frtr r, \\vcks (4
�cuirtnc�r c� ;tncl). (:(nrsc�ripted (Iffic�c�rs acid N(:0',
r(�cei\I idviiIic�al i list nrc�ti("s ttit1, it( c fh)rl (u
dific�rviiii ;itc� h(�I \(�(�11 Ili(� n,itury (I( flit� (Inli(�s that
c�ac�h tn;t\ by v\I)c�c�lc�cl It pvrl(irin. The Ii(�Id training
an(I 1(( alnl(s firing lmrti(m (rI tit(- Ironing is
��tinclti(�t(�d ;it lh(� sI cvnul garrisnn (�;tint kwzil(�d i t
I. -is It kit mk t( t w it) rlIwasl ill *1'1.1inin. Cr adti;ttes ((f
ill(- basic (raining c�(ntrs(� r�cvitc� 1 to I, \%(�(�ks ()f
training ;it it I)ranc�h tr c�("ti l arms sc�h(Iid 1'()l I(
h\ 22 \%veks (f (m- Ill(� -itch training in tin assigned unit.
I`(tll(tcint; c�(int Icli((n ((i branch training. c�(aisc�ript
\(:O's sc�rc� IS nl(mllis.
�I'hc� Iiii1wrial Irani ;tit Milit :(r .\c;i(Ic�tn\ in Tvhr:tn.
flit (rill\ sttirce of r(�tCalar (Ifficers, tt(f( rs it i t(ar
(tunt in inilitar and ac�adt�ntic� stihi(�c�Is. Gnidwiti's
ii re *()l"ntissiIIlled st�c�tnd licill(�nanls. F( III( I ig
grad lit li"rt. rvt;iilar (4fic�(�rs r c(itc ;i 1 vir basic
c(urst in Ill(- cv)lnhat arms sc lio id% ()r the branch
sc hntIs desigw d I(I pr�larc� thein f(r cimin(:,11(I "f
ltlal( 11% :till cnnilr,utic s. Inlantr mid ;irtno r cciit(�rs
ar(� l4wi ed ;II Shiraz; th(� Arlillvrn mid \li.sil: (:center
is I"t-at"d tit 1'sfah,tn. '1111� C(nth:tl Snl)I)crt Training
(:center in 'Tabriz offers Ironing in lhc� (Irdimit(�(�.
Ir:inslnrl: lit)it, inilitar\ i"licv. fin;til(�(�. (luart(�rilms-
t(�r. ;til(1 adtninistr:tli\c� fields. Fmir tears after th(-
hitsic c(ntrs(. r�gtilar (ffict rs return 1 a I -1(:ir
a(l\anced c,)iirsv (Ic%it!iwd (r Ir(�I);Ir(� th(�n1 to
FIGURE 4. Soviet -built BTR -60pb shown during
Iranian Armed Forces Day, 12 December
1971 (U /OU)
P
r
INN
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FIGURE 3. British supplied Chieftc n
tank (U /OU)

co nunand battalions and to serve as stuff officers up to
brigade level. Selected officers. captains or higher rank
with 13 gars of ser\ice, attend the Coni nand and
General Staff College in I't-hran; this instruction
prepares them to conduct command and staff
functions in tactical units and in ground forces staff
departments.
Foreign training for Iranian officers, cadets, and
NCO's is provided on a grant aid, purchase, or
exchange basis by the United States, United Kingdom,
France, West Germany, Bclgiun, Turkey. and
I'akistan. Courses offered vary front basic specialist
courses to war college -level inslr(tction. lu 1968 Iran
sent 2 -1 N(Y)*s to the U.S.S.R. to attend an armored
personnel maintenance course; in 1967, as small
U.S.S.R. training team provided in- country instruc-
tion on the maintenance of newly acquired eyuipmont
to it select cadre of Iranian personnel. During 1971,38
Iranian officers were sent to the Soviet Union to attend
armaments courses. In the early part of 1972, 1 -1
officers and men were sent to the'Soviet Union for
maintenance training on the 122 -nun rocket
launchers. Most in- country training by foreign
personnel has been provided by the United States.
However. the United Kingdom has provided technical
advisers following the purchase of Chieftain tanks by
Iran, and South Korea has assisted with special forces
training.
The U.S. Army Mission kill(! Military Assistance
Advisory Group is responsihlc for arrangements to sand
Iranian officers and NCO's to the United States for
training at military educational institutions. More
than 3,000 officers halve attended U.S. Army service
schools Since 1950.
Alloy aviation training has developed with the
assistance of the in- country training facilities. Basic
fixed -eying instruction is provided by the Civil :fir
Club, a goycrnnu srtbsicli�rc(I organization. and
helicopter instruction by it civilian contractor.
Advanced fixed -eying training is conducted in Iran,
while advanced helicopter training is provided in
Italy. There are plans to establish all army aviation
training center in Esfahan, which would come under
the direct control of Headquarters, Imperial Iranian
Ground Forces. This school is to have an annual inlntt
of 400 pilot trainees each year; the anticipated "wash
out" rate is about 50%.
4. Logistics
Ground forces logistics reflect the problems evident
throughout the armed forces, including the tendency
of field units to stockpile. specific itcns. In the latter
part of 1970, the Shah directed a reorganization of the
8
Imperial Iranian Ground Forces under which the thr :c�
field ani ies were reorganized into two corps and
divested of the reyuirenents for providing their own
logistical support. All logistical units, installations,
and facilities were placed under the control of llu�
Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. (ht 21 March 1971.
the First and Second Area Support Commands ware
formeci'and made directly subordinate to the Logistics
Command, IIGF. Late ill 1971, a third area command
was formed to provide logistical support for the two
divisions and those other units and facilities directly
subordinate to the 11(;F.
Logistical support for the ground forces aviation
command will be provided by an organic logistical
command.
5. Arniv aviation
Oil 17 April 1972, the Shah approved a it(-\%
organization for ground forces aviation. The former
-lid Arnty Aviation Brigade has been upgraded and is
to be completely reorganized and equipped within 5
gars. It is to be composed of one general support
brigade and three direct support brigades. Personnel
strength will exceed 10.000. of which 1,715 will be
pilots and -1,125 will be maintenance personnel. All
emits within the existing aviation brigade will be
upgraded. Each direct support brigade will have it
utility helicopters, 10 fixed -wing observation aircraft,
i3 Scout helicopters, and 48 attack helicopters. The
general support aviation brigade, which has not been
formed yet, will have 16 CI1 -47 helicopters, 60 utility.
48 attack, .and 27 scout helicopters. The Command
Aviation Unit which is located at Quleh \lorghi Air
Base in Tehran will have four fixed -eying observation
aircraft, four fixed -wing command aircraft. f0 utility
helicopters, and 10 scout helicopters. The- Training
Center. located at Esfahan, will be authorized 50
aircraft: five fixed -eying observation craft. 20 utility.
10 scout, and 15 attack helicopters. The aviatio n
command has i3 fixed -wing Cessna aircraft, one (11-
-17, and 62 Agusta Bell 20.E and 206 helicopters on
hand. In December 1972, the Iranian Government
signed contracts with the U.S. Government for the
purchase of 489 helicopters. Of this number, 287 will
be the "lluey -Plus" Bell Model 214A, and 202 will !)e
the Al 1-1) Sea Cobra armed helicopters to be built by
the Bell I Ielicopter Dk of "Textron, Incorporated.
The agreenemt also provides for spare helicopter parts.
Pilots will be trained in Iran under a supporting
contract with Bell; nnechanics \gill be trained by U.S.
technical personnel, both military and civilian, until
army personnel have become familiar with the
complexities of maintaining the helicopters. Depot
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maintenance will probably be run by the Iranian
Helicopter Industries, it firm origimally set up b
Agusta Bell of Italy and totally Iranian owned. Th ere
is it possibility that additional helicopters, All 205 and
AB 206 models, necessary to the mission of army
aviation will he purchased from Agusta Bell.
Helicopter deliveries will begin ill 1974 and will
continue for a period of 3 to 5 gars. The expansion of
army aviation is an ambitious undertaking, and the
IIGF %\ill find itself hard Dressed to fill(] trainable
personnel with the necessary mechanical aptitude to
meet these requirements.
D. Navy
The primary mission of the Imperial Iranian Nays
(IIN) is to defend the coastal areas and offshore
islands. With the expansion of the IIN, its mission has
been extended to provide protection of Iran's sca
communications thr,ugh the I'ersia,t Gulf and the
Strait of Hormuz and to maintain the freedom of gulf
waters for international trade. The navy also has the
responsibility for assisting CEN'I'O nations or other
allies of Ir ll in defending surrounding water areas
against foreign aggression and for supporting Iran's
other military forces as needed. (S)
The Imperial Iranian Navy has become the major
nasal force in the area since the withdrawal of British
forces from the Persian Gulf ill 1071. The Shah ordered
that nasal personnel strength be increased from the
1971 level of 11,500 to 20,290 men within the next 5
years. Planned along with the personnel increase is the
acquisition of new and sophisticated equipment which
will give the navy increased offensive and defensive
capabilities. The IIN is capable of limited defense of
the Persian Gulf coastline and has increased its
surveillance capabilities through the establishment of
patrols from the Strait of Honnu into the Gulf of
Oman. Coordination with the Imperial Iranian Air
Force in the area of logistical support and exchange of
intelligence information is becoming a reality. Two
Vosper Mk. 5 frigates, equipped with surface to-
surface and surface -to -air missiles, were purchased by
Iran from the United Kingdom and arrived in the
Persian Gulf in August 1972. (S)
Although Iran is dependent on foreign assistance ire
training and logistics, the first in- country overhaul
effort is currently in progress on two ex -U.S. coastal
minesweepers at Khorramshahr and on three ex -U.S.
motor gunboats at Bandar 'Abbas. (S)
There are only a�small number of ships maintained
in the Caspian Sea. Iran has made no attempt to
d(-f(-u(] its Caspian Scar coasts and could offer only
token resistactce against an attack In the Soviet Union.
(S)
L OrganizAtion (S)
'I'll(- Commander. Imperial Irntian Navy, cum -fitly
a rear admiral. is responsible for the nasal
headquarters organization at Tchrau, the shore
establishment. and the operating forces. 'I'll(- navy is
under the direct control of the Shalt, although
operational control is, in iiteory, delegated to the
Commander. IIN, through the Chief, Srprctnc
Commandcr's Staff. The Commander is assist(-(] by
the Vice Commander. IIN (Figure 5); Depute
Commanders for Logistics, Nllyal I'hrsowiel, and
Operations and flans; Directors fur :Administration,
Medicine, Plans and Programs, and Operations
Communications and Intelligence; and Commanders,
Persian Golf and Onan Gulf Flect. Naval Base
Bandar Abbas, Naval Base Bandar Pahlavi. Nasal
Base Bushehr, and Commander, Nasal Ayialion.
Persian Gulf Fleet I leadquarters is located currently at
Khorramshahr, but plans have be(-it made to nun the
headquarters to Bandar ':Abbas upon completion of
shore facilities. 11 elico1) tcrjhovercraft bases are
locate(] at Khosrowabad and Kharg Island (Jazir(-h -ye
Khark). flans also call for helicopter ihoyercraft bass
at Bushehr and Bandar 'Abbas, and plans are being
active pursued to develop it naval facility at Chat
BaIlar. No combatant ships are assigned to the
Commander. Bandar -e Pahlavi, whose primary
responsibility is that of conducting the naval training
program. Command communications betweel all
headquarters, bass, and ships art provided by Iow
through ultra -high frequency radio operating in code
or voice mode.
Strength, composition, and disposition"- (S)
Ill August 1972, ship strength consisted of one ex-
British "Bath(-" class destroy(-r (DDGSP), two Vosper
Mk. 5 destroyer escorts (DE,G) (Figure W, fourex U.S.
PF 1033 class patrol escorts (K. E). three ex -U.S. PGX1
class 59 motor gumboots (PGNq), four 95 400l U.S.
Navy I)GM 39 class motor gunboats, four coastal
minesATepers (MSC), two inshore minesweepers
(MSI), four minor amphibious craft, eight SRN -6
Ilovercrtft (Figure 7), two BII -7 Ilovercraft. 21
service ships and craft, and two yachts. Nlajor
For current, detailed information, ,ev Military Intrlligenc
Sunmmary �Iran, Naval Forms Intelligence Study�Iran. and
AutornaRxl Naval Order of Battlr (Ships). all published bs lil
Defense Intelligence Agency.
9
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r^
FIGURE 6. IIS Saam, the Vosper
MK -5 destroyer escort purchased
from the United Kingdom (U /OU)
c�onlbatants of the IIN are based at Bandar 'Ahbas.
The inujority of olber vessels are at Khorramshahr,
with several ships and craft at Kharg Island and
:hud:ui. The Shahs yac�hl, one insh,e riiines,eeper,
and three minor patrol craft are hosed in tale Caspian
Sea at Bandar -e P-Adavi. All ships are maintained in
fair condition Ineelianically and are generally cic.n
and Well painted. Two additional Vosper vlk. 5
destroyer escorts have been purchased from the United
Kingdom a116 we in the final stages of completion,
and four additional 1311 -7 Ilovereraft, two with
surface- to surface missile capability. are expected in
country. Two small guided missile destro\ers (1)1)(;S)
purchased from the United States will he delivered in
earl 1974 and will provide a surface -to- surface missile
Cilpability.
Tw o cargo /tanker resupply ships are tinder
construction in the I-ederal liepublic of Germany and
are expected to be delivered 1w late 1973 after the
FIGURE 7. U.K. -built navy amphibi-
ous Hovercraft (U /OU)
addition of helicopter hungers on the stern of each
ship. TWo amphibious support slips are also wider
construction in the United Kingdom with delivery
anticipated during late 197.1. These four new
cmistruc�tion ships are expected to alleviate soave of the
supply and support problems for the gulf islands. One
protol\pe ferrous i.-vinent hull fast patrol bout is heing
constructed by it eoininercial shipbuilder al Bushehr.
Also under consideration for purchase are h%enhy 65-
foot fast patrol beats front the United Stales. six
guided missile fast pairol boats from the Federal
M- pantie of German\. and (wo additional surplus U.S.
lest rovers.
Personnel strength totals 1i.000offic, -s and (�misted
men. of wboni i.000 are naval infantry. 'There is a
significant shortage of technically trained personnel
which will be compound-O as additional ships are
delivered. IIN personnel have fairefficiency. arc� fairly
\cell trained. and have logh morale. As a group. junior
officers compare favor ibly with those of major
Western c�onntries. The j wrforniance of the IIN will be
hampered by the strain on manpower and h �fining
imposed b\ th'. ac�dlnisition of ad1�!;tional ships. brit the
long -terin prospects for a \cell- trained, competent
navy are brii