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a,. t; -s 'n s+ r ni. ,Y i r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, h -)wever, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret ;r =ka, i, ...r 'n.Y'a' yak;: i .fca.;4.:.:,.,;..'Z+i.x. d.,: w;:+ xa +:::...e.:...ux,.H F ;:a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS COUNTRY PPOFILE integrated perspective of the subject country Chronology Area Brief Summary Map THE SOCIETY Social structure Population Employment Living conditions Social prob- lems Health Religion Education Artistic expression Public Information GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu- tion of the state Governmental strength and stability Structure and functioning of government Political dynamics National policies Threats to stability Internal security The police Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabili- ties w THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its structure� agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction Domestic trade Economic policy and development Manpower International economic relations TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems Strategic mobility Railroads Highways Inland waterways Pipelines Ports Merchant marine Civil air Airfields The telecom system .F f A r' MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and cli- mate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, .:r ARMED FORCES The defense establishment Joint activities Ground forces Naval forces Air forces Paramilitary INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Structure of organizations concerned with internal security and foreign intelligence Their responsibilities, pro- fessional standards, and interrelationships Mis- sion, organization, functions, effectiveness, and methods of operation of each service Biographies of key officials This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 SOUTH KOREA A Protege's Progress 1 A Shrimp Among Whales 9 Material Modern- ization: The Miracle on the Han Spiritual Modernization Revitalization or Retrogres- sion in Politics? A House Stands Divided Chronology .............................22 Area Brief .............................24 Summary Map follows 25 This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by July 1973. CONFIDENTIAL .:is 1 "a''L:; Wier tlis4; ks+. icet' as: s.� x; trMnr: y; r. r: ucrs;s rn.. Y. o. t... y.......,.......- ����������_"'�rerv.�aw:n:m:V Sf:. rvzc ,ey%Fai.C..ySViWhB.AiT..P.i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Q Protege's Progress ,.v 4 Y t e i a t. �r -r The "special relationship" that exists between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea �ROK) developed from the defeat of Japan in World War II, and particularly as a result of U.S. sup- port in blood and treasure following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Since that time U.S. forces have remained in South Korea to bolster its defenses. In return, South Korea provides a base that enables the United States to maintain a forward defense position in the Far East. More recently, ROK troops stood alongside the U.S. forces in serv_:ig as South Vietnam's principal allies. South Korea, moreover, is becoming an increasingly significant trading partner and an attractive location for U.S. in- vestment. (U /OU) To Koreans, at least, this relationship is both more natural and has deeper roots than is generally realized by Americans. Throughout most of its more than thou- sand year history as a unified country, Korea was un- der Chinese protection, but when China declined and fell prey to European imperialism in the 19th century, Korea was left exposed to rival Japanese and Russian ambitions to gain control of the strategic Korean Peninsula. Like Japan, Korea had gone into seclusion in the early 17th century and, as the "Hermit Kingdom," isolated itself from all foreign contacts, ex- cept those with China. This isolation was ended abruptly in 1876 when Japan, aping Commodore Perry, sent a military expedition o the port of Chemulp'o (now Inch'on)* and "opened the door" to Korea. Unable to protect Korea, China advised it to negotiate treaties with the Western powers in order to establish a body of foreign interests sufficiently exten- sive to thwart any dangerous expansion of Japanese influence. Beginning in 1882, therefore, Korea con- cluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States and by 1886 had negotiated similar agreements with all major European powers. The United States secured the lead over the other Western powers because many Koreans, aware of American commercial interest in their country and often ac- quainted with American missionaries and educators, had come to feel that the United States did not have the territorial ambitions of Japan and the other great powers and thus might make an ideal successor to China as Korea's patron and defender. (U /OU) *For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself. I .�sIPN:oex. wt� F:. e 1 R{ 2.:.KtFI+'r+:f?p,(rq,y,ii, -y .,.5.. _.b., APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 4 i P. r The U.S.- Korean Treaty of 1882 seemed to meet both Korean and Chinese hopes because it included a clause that promised America's "good offices" in any difficulties Korea might have with a third nation. The Koreans were disillusioned, however, to discover that this clause remained a dead letter against persistent Japanese encroachment and, finally, annexation of their country in 1910. Korean hopes were dashed in 1919, when they found that President Wilson's princi- ple of national self determination was applied in Europe but not to Asia. Hope was not raised again un- til World War II when the Allied Powers promised at Cairo in 1943 to liberate Korea and make it a free a_n_d independent state "in due course" after Japan's defeat. Fulfillment of this promise was thwarted after Japan's collapse, however, when the United States and the U.S.S.R., becoming locked in the "cold war," were unable to agree on the form of a united Korean state. The result was that the arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel �a temporary expedient adopted in 1945 for the sole purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces then in the country �was frozen. By mid -1948 two separate states had emerged, the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. (U /OU) The partition disrupted the Korean economy because most of the mineral ores and most of the modern economic infrastructure that Japan had developed were in the north. Lacking an industrial base, the largely agricultural South needed massive foreign economic aid to survive. T'-e South Koreans felt that the United States, having participated in the division of the country, was responsible for supporting them. The United States, therefore, was obliged to shoulder the burden of supporting the less naturally endowed but more populous South. After the ROK Government was established, the United States con- sidered it had largely fulfilled its obligations and, after Soviet forces had been withdrawn from the North, withdrew all of its forces in mid -1949, leaving only an ongoing economic aid agreement and a small military advisory group. (U /OU) In June 1950 Soviet equipped North Korean forces launched a highly successful surprise attack across the 38th parallel and quickly overran most of the South. By September, U.N. forces under U.S. command had driven the North Koreans out of the South, but when they then drove on toward the Manchurian border Chinese "volunteers' ^ntered the war in great strength. After much ,"lifting back and forth, a military front was eventually stabilized along the 38th parallel and an armistice signed in July 1953. The war reduced South Korea to complete dependence on the United States, and even after the war massive infusions of U.S. aid were required for relief and reconstruction as well as for equipping and maintaining the army of 600,000 men that the South felt it needed to guard against renewed attack from the North. The extensive and continuing U.S. commitment can be gauged from the fact that economic aid to South Korea totaled $5.6 billion during U.S. FY1946 -72 and military aid $5.7 billion during FY 1950 -72. (U /OU) In the 20 years since the armist'ce was signed at P'anmunjon, South Korea's economic dependence on the United States has been greatly reduced. It is a success story largely of the 1960's, during which the ROK Government under President Pak dedicated itself to a major effort to develop a viable economy, alleviate widespread poverty, and lessen dependence Gn foreign aid. Two successive and highly successful 5 -year plans (1962 -71) made is possible to virtually ter ininate U.S, grant aid by the end of the 1960's. In the military realm, South Korea is still heavily dependent on the United States for sophisticated weapons systems and modernization in general, but South Korea now shoulders a major portion of its defense burden. (U /OU) Internationally, the Pak government has progressively broadened its contacts and role, nor- malizing relations with Korea's ancient foe, Japan, in 1965 and winning diplomatic recognition from a grow- -rig number of states (88 in mid 1973). A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in 1966 accorded South Korea a proud symbol of equal- ity, and its military participation in South Vietnam was considered by Seoul to represent an important role in world affairs, as well as measure of its continued close ties with the United States. (U /OU) r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 i i C L 1y f P .j i Since the birth of the republic, South Korea has taken on the character of a wayward ward rather than that of a puppet. Its venerable but wily and irascible first president, Syngman Rhee, was the undoing of many an American adviser and of some important U.S. policies, particularly during the Korean war. While the present President, who first came to power through a military coup in 1961, finally came around �in response to U.S, prodding and the pressure of public opinion �to the restoration of civilian government in 1963, a decade later he similarly demonstrated his independence of U.S. sensitivities by an abrupt abandonment of all but the most superficial trappings of democracy. (C) An equally striking manifestation of Seoul's in- dependent initiative was the upening of secret, high -level talks with North Korea in early 1972 looking toward reunification of the peninsula. Pointing to the "delicacy" of his negotiations with the North, in late 1972 President Pak assumed almost complete dic- tatorial control by procl aiming martial law and carry- ing out a sweeping reorganization of the government. Whether or not such steps were necessary. ROK diplomacy since that time has moves: more rapidly and flexibly than before. (U /OU) Despite Seoul's new confidence in its ability to talk to P'yongyang, its moves on the domestic front could over time critically undermine the Pak regime. The great strides made in modernizing not only the military machine but also most aspects of material ex- istence, which have encouraged Pak to venture upon reunification talks, may be brought to naught if domestic opinion becomes disaffected with the in- creasingly autocratic rule which he has imposed. (C) 3 W.,... m,............ ws.... c. hu: ncr.* onar.' rsaat ::ut:u:3tr;VSbEl.4;sKi ET.i;;?c` `.w-x a'P;;h;:::..+..'.Yw.:f Mi%at y:> i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 0 t -9- 01; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080005-2 A Shrimp Among Whales (u/ca) t. IR 0 t -9- 01; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080005-2 A Shrimp Among Whales (u/ca) w k N z' n When Allied victory in World War II freed the Koreans from almost 40 years of increasingly harsh control by Imperial Japan, they had anticipated finally winning the national self- determinatio:, that had been denied them after World War I through es- tablishment of a free, independent, and united Korea. Instead, the country was sundered for the first time in a thousand years, and each of the truncated halves became in fact the ward of one of the two superpowers. Wardship, however, is nothing new to Korea. The pattern of the "client- state" has prevailed throughout most of the peninsula's long history. China was the patron, and the relationship was specifically cast in Confucian terms of the mutual obligations of elder and younger brother. In practice, thus usually meant a fairly flexible relationship and considerable autonomy for the Korean protege. Although the Korean kings received their authority at the hands of the Chinese emperor and followed his lead in foreign policy, Korea largely retained control of its internal affairs. At times, particularly early in the history of the Korean monarchy and near its end, when China was weak, ef- forts were made to assert full independence from foreign rule, but for the most part Korea had to temper its course in deference to greater power on its frontiers. This subservient role was forced on Korea by geography. In the history of East Asia, the Korean Peninsula has been a critical crossroads where larger and stronger powers have seesawed back and forth in centuries of struggle. The welfare and wishes of the Koreans, even after they had come to constitute a relatively sizable nation, were almost invariably ig- nored. The ambitions and quarrels of its larger neighbors have thus brought the unhappy peninsula more than its share of bridgeheads, battlefields, and buffer states. Since prehistoric times nomads from Central Asia have collided with the more settled peoples on the eastern fringes of the Asian continent and invaded the Korean peninsula; some even pushed on and crossed the sea to Japan. Refugees from ancient dynastic struggles in China escaped to Korea, and were subse- quently followed by invading Chinese armies. To hold the northern half of the peninsula, the Chinese planted a flourishing colony in northwestern Korea which in- educed the civilization of China to the Koreans and served as a buffer against the northern barbarians from approximately 100 B.C. to A.D. 300. From then until the late 19th century, the rulers of China usually retained paramount influence in Korea without any direct presence there. Since early in the Christian era the Japanese also sought intermittently to exert control over part or all of the peninsula --on occasion as a bridgehead and base for operations against China. In the late 19th century colossal Tsarist Russia came into the contest in its search for warm -water ports in the Far East. In two short wars around the turn of the 20th century Japan defeated both China and Russia, with hapless Korea as a battleground and the eventual vic- tim. The peninsula's pivotal position has brought little but suffering to its people, who have a proverb, "When whales fight, the shrimp suffers." In one sense, however, geography has helped the Koreans by providing clear natural frontiers within which a remarkably homogeneous population developed at an early date possessing a strong sense of separate identity. Deeply entrenched rivers and rough mountaincus terrain along the peninsula's long northern base impede easy access from the Asian mainland. On the other three sides, Korea is separated from its neighbors by wide stretches of the Yellow and East China Seas and by the Sea of Japan. Except for sporadic raids from China and Japan in ancient and medieval times and a major Japanese invasion in the late 16th century, the encircling seas remained largely inviolate until the latter half of the 19th century, when French, U.S., and Japanese warships penetrated "Her- mit Kingdom" waters. Within the well- defined confines of their peninsula the ancient Koreans developed a distinct and remarkable uniformity of physique, language, and culture that clearly sets them apart from their neighbors. With few resident foreigners and no minorities, the Koreans, North and South, constitute perhaps the most homogeneous of the major ethnic groups possessing independent (if divided) statehood today. Numbering almost 50 million, the Koreans are the 13th largest ethnic group in the world today. The 5 ....>.n. v'..,...,., cttG.:..;.: i'.,.....,_ Y,..>i:;,'fKS;..a.F- 'a..:ng; Sir. n:;; iau: :rsc.aF.ark d 7 .L/t:zvs.;.An< ere. mk a. tL..:. x.. a. .an.i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 k i i ,y r yr. p F Korean language, temperament, dress, and cuisine are distinct and contrast sharply with those of their neighbors. The proverbial quick temper and volatility of the Koreans contribute to that rebellious spirit which has won them the sobriquet, "the Irish of the East," and has helped preserve their independent identity in the face of foreign encroachment. Although mountains and waters clearly demarcate the peninsula for its inhabitants, these natural features also produce more than a dozen topographic divisions in the South alone which make central control and communication difficult. The South is almost as mountainous as the North, with the major mountain chain running along the east coast and sending a spur southwestward down the middle of the peninsula. Hilly or mountainous terrain takes up at least three fourths of the country's area. Offshore South Korea has more than 600 inhabited islands, serveral of them 60 miles or more at sea; the largest and most important of all is Cheju -do, a separate province in the East China Sea. Despite such geographic diversity �or perhaps because of its potential threat to political unity Korean rulers early imposed a remarkable measure of political and cultural homogeneity. Customs, behavior, dress, and even folklore have usually borne the standardized stamp of the capital as a result of the ruler's policy, which frequently included regular rotation or exile of court officials to all parts of the country. The basic belief of the North Asian pop- ulation, shamanism �still widespread today �was carefully overlaid with higher religions from China, first Buddhism and then Confucianism, which were also used to support centralized control. Although the systematic introduction of Cop fucianism as the court philosophy caused some friction with the vested interests of Buddhism when a new dynasty took power in the 14th century, it never led to any serious division of the country. Confucianism cultivated a uniform pattern of behavior and the sense of belonging to a homogeneous, if hierarchical, family of all Koreans. Many Buddhists continued to practice their faith in peace, as much later a small but rapidly increasing minority of Christians could, after an initial N period of fierce official persecution. As in China and Japan, the people of Korea have been generally tolerant of all religions except when they appeared to be linked to the political ambitions of foreign powers. The Confucian code had the most profound impact of all the aspects of Chinese civilization borrowed by Korea. Not only di3 it serve to provide the pattern governing Korea's relations with China but it also produced the ethical foundation and the hierarchic framework for Korean society. Korean etiquette came to be rigidly molded along Confucian lines, helping to curb and control the boisterous ebullience and rebelliousness of the Korean temperament so that in most circumstances Koreans strove to maintain a staid sobriety or a patient stoicism. Above all, Confucianism served to buttress the claims of the state. The need of a strong, central authority apparently became manifest very early in Korean history, well before the adoption of Confucianism. It arose from centuries of struggle between the small entities which first contested control of the central and southern parts of the Peninsula. Such contests soon invited the in- tervention of outside powers. About the third century A.D., three clans of triEa! groups, known collectively as Han, shared control of the tip of the peninsula. Their name survives today in the official title taken by South Korea: Taehan Minguk, (Great Han People's Country). One of these clans had close ties to, and probably support from, Japan. It was eventually defeated and incorporated into a kingdom of Silla built up by its rival to the east. When Japanese in- fluence shifted to a second kingdom in the southwest, Silla sought Chinese aid against that kingdom and a third one to the north. During the three centuries of this "Three Kingdom Era" it became clear to the Koreans that their internal rivalries were being ex- ploited to aggrandize foreign powers, a lesson they have not yet forgotten. Silla managed to unify most of the peninsula in the late seventh century with Chinese aid, and then forced China to withdraw its armies, allowing Silla to become tributary but autonomous, a Confucian younger brother. Silla's success inaugurated a golden age with a brilliant efflorescence of art and learning under +a t r; r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 t; iw F:1 G k, t t t r Chinese Buddhist influence. All Koreans look back with pride to this period, particularly the South Koreans who since 1950 see in the unification of the peninsula launched from Silla's original "Pusan perimeter" in the extreme southeast an auspicious augury for our day. During the Sill- dynasty (676 =918), Korea was ruled by kings �and frequently by strong queens� assisted by a powerful hereditary nobility legitimized by a rigid system of ranks. The administrative system was organized mainly on the Chinese model, under which officials, military and civil, were chosen through highly rigorous civil service examinations. This system continued relatively unchanged throughout the two succeeding dynasties and has had a marked impact op. Korean society. The Silla dynasty was overthrown in the 10th century by a general who established the Kingdom (and dynasty) of Koryo (918 1392), from which the name Korea is derived. Korea soon came to occupy much its present overall boundaries and the peninsula remained united for the next thousand years. It was not divided again into separate states until after World War I1. The country, however, was not spared war and devastation during this long period. The later Koryo period was truly a time of troubles. The Mongols, expanding across Eurasia from the Danube to the Yalu, conquered China and invaded Korea. Koryo managed to resist for almost 30 years, but finally capitulated in 1250. Korean kings were married to Mongoi princesses, and many court ladies were sent to Peking as hostages or members of the Mongol Emperor's harem. The Koreans were sub- jected to great cruelty and hardship, especiLlly when they were obliged to assist the Mongols in their two unsuccessful attempts in the late 13th century to in- vade Japan. The Koreans sustained heavy losses in men, ships, and supplies when a typhoon (Kamikaze, the "heavenly wind largely destroyed the Mongol armadas. The Mongols were diverted from another attempt on Japan by troubles in Indochina and elsewhere, but kept their yoke over Korea intact for nearly another century. Further suffering came to Korea when Glinese forces, rebelling ag the Mongols' waning grip, raided across the Yalu, once more laying waste the north. In addition, throughout this period, Japanese freebooters, who developed sea -raids as a way of life, kept up continuing attacks against the coasts of Korea, even raiding the island refuge where the Korean kings had long escaped the Mongols, and burning Hanyang (now Seoul) to the ground. The Koryo dynasty did not long outlive the collapse of Mongol rule in China in 1368. An anti Mongol Korean general, Yi Song -gye, set up his capital on the site of Seoul, overthrowing the Koryo king in 1392 and establishing the Yi dynasty, which reigned until the Japanese ar:nexed Korea in 1910. The Yi revived th,! ancient name of Choson for Korea, which is the of- ficial name used by the North Koreans today. During the Yi dynasty, Confucianism replaced Buddhism as the state religion and Confucian political and social ideals became the national standard. As in China, ger,d government was regarded as possible only under a virtuous, paternalistic ruler and his morally and in- tellectually excellent scholar- officials. As in the two earlier dynasties, the civil service was recruited on the Chinese pattern of rigorous competitive examinations. Successful candidates, known as yanghan, entered either civil or military service. In theory, as in China, the examinations were open to all aspirants, but in the later Koryo and Yi dynasties they became limited in practice mainly to the affluent, who could afford the leisure to master the Confucian classics. The term yanghan came generally to stand for the landed no bility, and today has become roughly synonymous with "gentleman." This small elite group of scholar officials set the pattern of administrative authoritarianism which has characterized so much of the Korean political ex- perience. The claims of a rigid and increasingly sterile orthodoxy left little room for flexibility or mobility of any sort. Political struggle took the form of bureaucratic in- fighting, the most obvious form of the factionalism which seems to be endemic in all Korean activities. Despite Korea's internal and external woes, the very high level of artistic expression ac'.?_ved during the Silla dynasty was revived and de. in both the 7 Yi. KM! xi.' Aw.: J` AE' S1r: w!.:' kPksi+ tYS. n::. a..: u'.. v n..' wrruvsawuuww uww. w. uwwr aw se a unrawrv' i':� YhMNikSAlc' u^ is4! 9. GGfa.' Q 9Ci' R_f ak: Ya:: iw4' 4i? J: c. s..� '.i`a4'.sufi.:.A' a :_M.. .;n... 1:�. .K APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 t 1C. i Koryo and Yi eras, during which Korea made some noteworthy contributions to world culture. In ceramics, Korean artists elaborated on Chinese styles and techniques, passing them on to Japan, and made an original contribution to coloring in the blues and greens of Korea's unique celadon ware. In painting a similar development took place, with Korean artists scholars carrying calligraphy in Chinese characters to a perfection unmatched �and widely ad- mired�by their Chinese masters. Even where the Koreans did not add distinct contributions, they preserved and passed on to the modern age arts which died out in China, such as the ancient classical court music. In technology and learning there were also some remarkable achievements. Along with skill in metal casting came the use of movable metal type for printing well before it was known in the West. Shortly thereafter the Koreans invented a phonetic system of writing which, hoi -ever, did not come into general use until modern times because the yangban wished to preserve their monopoly of learning in the much more complicated Chinese ideographic script. Despite such occasional blighting of native Korean innovations by the overwhelming prestige of Chinese civilization, the Koreans developed a rich, vigorous, and quite distinct culture of their own. In the late 16th and early 1.7th centuries, Korea ex- perienced renewed foreign invasions. In 1592 the Japanese launched a full -scale invasion as part of an ambitious plan to conquer China. The Koreans suf- fered great reverses and the country was ravaged, but Chinese aid and the death of the Japanese ruler, Hideyoshi, saved them. The war produced one of Korea's great national heroes, Admiral Yi Sun -sin, who defeated the Japanese fleet in an engagement in which he used the world's first iron -clad vessel, a tor- toise- shaped warship. The abortive Japanese invasion was followed by the successful Manchu conquest of Korea in 1627 and of China in 1644. Korea was to re- main a Chinese vassal state under the Manchu dy- nasty until the end of the 19th century when Russian and Japanese power displaced Chinese influence. These great invasions reinforced the Koreans' long- standing desire to avoid all unnecessary foreign 9 K O 8 m contacts. Much earlier their kings had supplemented Korea's natural barriers by a small version of China's Great Wall across the peninsula's narrow ncck near the 39th parallel. In the 17th century Korea preceded Japan in closing its door to foreigners, and it even dis- couraged commercial activity and the mining of precious metals to avoid arousing the avarice of foreign interests. Korea tried to remain the "Hermit Kingdom" even after Japan was forced to open its door to the West, but when Japan itself applied Perry's tac- tics, Korea succumbed and in 1876 signed a treaty opening Pusan, and subsequently two other ports to foreign trade. There ensued growing pressure from Western nations especially from the United States, France, Russia, and Great Britain �which evoked con- siderable internal dissension over how much contact should be allowed, and with whom. Powerful and bitterly hostile factions aligned themselves either behind Korea's traditional patron and protector, China, or one of the ri al neighbors, Russia or Japan. China hastened to have the Koreans open relations with other Western powers to offset Japanese predominance, at the same time seeing that China's suzerainty over Korea was recognized. In 1894 an antiforeign rebellion led to Chinese and Japanese intervention and subsequently to the Sino- Japanese war. Victorious Japan forced China to abandon any claim to a special position in Korea. Conservative, anti Japanese forces within the country then turned to Russia for support, and helped the Russians gain concessions for raw materials in northern Korea. The Russians helped Korea reorganize its finances and its army and then moved to acquire naval bases on the southeastern and southwestern corners of the peninsula. Although the British and Japanese, fear- ing the establishment of Russian control of the Korea Strait and the entrance to the Yellow Sea, jointly blocked the Russian move, Russia continued to pursue its ambitions. The Japanese ultimately responded by launching a surprise attack in February 1904 on the Russian fleet. Engagements were fought off the Korean coasts and Japan made iull use of Korea as a base of operations, despite Korea's declaration of neutrality. After Russia's defeat in 1905, Korea became -o APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 ,s a Japanese protectorate, and in 1910 it was annexed and became part of the Japanese Empire. To 20th century Koreans, their country's subjuga- tion as a colony of Japan seemed the cruelest of the many blows Korea has suffered. The efforts of all prior governments to preserve Korean autonomy had failed. Korea lay supine and subject to harsh Japanese rule. Nevertheless, something remained of the past heritage and some gains were made under the Japanese. Japan did much to modernize Korea, even though this was done merely to integrate the area into the Japanese Empire and to make it a strong jumping -off point for the later Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China proper. While Korea served primarily as a source of raw materials for Japan, agriculture and irrigation were greatly improved, lands reclaimed, and roads, railroads and harbors were built. A modern infrastruc- ture was begun, and Japanese rule brought unac- customed efficiency and a stability that had not been known in the peninsula for almost a century. Despite economic gains, heavy- handed Japanese rule and subordination of Korean interests to those of Japan produced a chronic discontent that gave birth to a modern nationalist movement. The high point of this largely peaceful movement was a massive demonstra- tion of 1 March 1919 �Samil Day �now a great national holiday, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's prin- ciple of national self- determination. It was brutally repressed, and henceforth opposition to Japanese rule was largely organized by Korean refugees in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. One such refugee, Dr. Syngrnan Rhee (Yi Sung -man), schooled both in the Korean classics and at Harvard and Princeton, became head of a Provisional Korean Government abroad in 1919. He finally returned to Korea in 1945 and became the first President of the Republic of (South) Korea in 1948 under a constitution establishing a strong presidential form of government. He seemed a natural choice as Korea's foremost patriot, being a descendant (distant) of the last reign- ing family and possessing the proper Confucian credentials. Unfortunately for the fate of Korean democracy, Syngman Rhee fell too easily into the old monarchical pattern, and after the Korean war he grew increasingly despotic in advanced age. He was forced to resign in April 1960 after arbitrary and fraudulent elections had sparked a nationwide "student revolution" which the military quieted but refused to quell. A caretaker government produced a revised constitution for the "Second Republic" that changed the form of govern- ment from the presidential to the parliamentary type and carried 'through the most democratic elections in ROK history. Under Prime Minister Chang Myon (John h1. Chang), the experiment in parliamentary democracy proved short lived. Chang was overturned in May 1961 by a cabal of "young colonels," and Maj. Gen. Pak Chong -hui became head of the junta's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. In 1963 Pak was formally elected President of the "Third Republic," and South Korea reverted, in theory at least, to civilian, constitutional government. 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Material Modernization: The "Miracle on the Han" (u/ou) ti i 1 1 1 y t t fi During the period of Japanese administration, the Korean economy was developed essentially as a com- plement to the Japanese economy. A substantial in- dustrial complex developed in the northern part of the country based largely on local raw materials and power, but the southern part remained heavily agrarian in character and developed only a thin veneer of small -sca!e industry. The material benefits from such development, however, were largely monopolized by the Japanese. In manufacturing, for example, 90% of the capital and 80% of the skilled labor were Japanese; very few Koreans acquired any technical or managerial skills. With Japan's defeat ;n 1945, th Korean economy virtually collapsed, having alrea been drained to a very low level in the course of r T f M Japan's long and increasingl desperate war effort; production fell 75% and 60% of the industrial labor force was unemployed. The division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel in 1945 was another great blow because the South found itself left with the best agri- cultural land, a surplus of unskilled labor, but little else. At the birth of the Republic in 1948, the stand and of living in the country was actually lower than it had been in prewar days. Less than 2 years later came the holocaust: all -out fratricidal war launched across the 38th parallel by the North Korean Communists, supported with Soviet material and, shortly thereafter, by massive Chinese intervention. During the war, nearly 1 million civilians were killed or wounded, and more than 5 �n r 10 M AL Lis aL I 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 d i million �about one quarter of the population �were displaced. Property damage was estimated at between $2 and $3 billion. Following the war, the need to maintain one of the world's largest armies was far beyond the economy's capacity. As a result, through the 1950's the vicious cycle of poverty, inflation, and overwhelming dependence on U.S. a; -1 other foreign aid continued. Nevertheless, in several ways, the war and its results paved the way for solutions to South Korea's economic and social, if not its political, problems. Much of the old order was swept away, in some measure simplifying the social system. The traditional order was undermined by the weakening of the hold of the family on its members in the wartime chaos, by the influence of foreign troops and technicians, and by war -born urbanization. Modernization was primarily the result of the crea- tion of a modern and effective military force and ex- tensive U.S. aid. The almost overnight build -up of South Korea's army during the Korean war brought with it rapid mobilization of the population. Thousands of farm boys were enlisted and exposed for the first time to modern organization and technology. Far beyond this, however, was the appearance of a huge subsociety �the military organization �some- thing quite foreign to Korean tradition and general experience. k Prior to liberation in 1945, a small nucleus of Korean t officers had been trained by the Japanese in Japan or Manchuria. A few others were trained in China or Russia and were engaged largely in guerrilla -type t operations against the Japanese in Korea. During 1946 -48, the U.S. forces in South Korea organized and trained a small constabulary from a variety of such s elements. Its leaders were mostly bitter rivals of the factionalism generated by their diverse y: backgrounds and experience. Following the establish- ment of the republic, this constabulary was converted Y with U.S. assistance into an army that had reached nearly 100,000 men by the outbreak of the Korean war. During the war, the army was expanded almost f seven fold; the ROK Army today has over 500,000 men 'i and is the fifth largest in the world. U.S. military assistance has helped to make the ROK military forces by far the most modern entity in South Korea, possessed of technological and managerial skills still scarce in the society at large. The army replaced President Syngman Rhee's ubiquitous police as the dominant force in the land. It possesses a very different outlook and morale, having been ex- posed to concepts of national ideals and goals far above the limited loyalties of the police. Training in the United States, particularly of some of the senior of- ficers of the postwar crop, has helped develop managerial skills of great potential value for South Korea's economy. The cutting edge of this new force in Korean society is the officer class, both commissioned and noncom- missioned. This class has come to constitute a social group rivaling in numbers the traditionally prestigious teaching profession., which has maintained its wonted precedence by also expanding rapidly, having presided over the educational explosion that has occurred since 1945. Both groups have their followers: the officers with their men; the teachers and intellectuals with great hordes of students, concentrated primarily in the capital where so many new educational institutions have sprung up. Loeb groups are far more modern in their outlook� though in different ways �than the society around them, and both became increasingly impatient with the stagnation an4 corruption during the 1950's under the Rhee regi In sequence, they engineered a major generational change that brought Rhee's regime down and subsequently established a very different order. Determined young officers saw economic develop- ment as a way both to end Korea's crushing poverty and its humiliating dependence upon the United States. A military voup was briefly forestalled by the student revolution, whose democratic leaders appeared to share the young officers' ideals, though not their authoritarian methods. When delay and indecision on the part of the hitherto untried and little understood democracy as established by Prime Minister Chang Myon seemed to offer little hope for the economic reforms that the young military officers wanted at once, they seized power in May 1961 and set up the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 t i i I .t 1 i �i A s Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which thereupon undertook a milita,,�led modernization of the whole country. General Pak Chong -hui, one of the few older officers associated w ;ih the 1961 coup, headed the SCNR. He was elected President in 1963, when the government was "eivilianized" under a revised constitution that returned government to the strong presidential type of Rhee's time. The constitution was further amended in 1969 and 1972 to give Pak even greater leeway. Presi- dent Pak is a peasant's son whose military career was boosted by the prestigious prewar officer training he had undergone in Japan. His twin goals for Korea reflect his background as a peasant and as an officer: agricultural improvement and technological advance- ment. He is a good example of the modern, scien- tifically trained officer who nevertheless retains a deep bias against urban life and politicians. Democratic political values have been subordinated to economic considerations under Pak, as under the Japanese. In fact, in many ways Pak's Korea is reminiscent of the bureaucratic, economy- oriented, militarily efficient, depoliticized, and rigidly anti communist regime un- der Japan. The great difference of course is that it is a strongly nationalistic government of, by, and for Koreans. In any case, the Pak regime has reaped remarkable economic results. Under a series of 5 -yoar plans, natural resources and manpower have been mobilized to achieve economic modernization. Although the Pak government has resorted to centralized planning, governmental direction and support, and even out- right public ownership and operation, it has eschewed any reference to socialism and describes the country as a "capitalist showcase." By and large, the government has not been coercive and has carried out its economic plans pragmatically and with deft flexibility. The South Koreans like to look to West Germany as an ex- ample of the successful survival of a divided country; they point with pride to their own "M;i on the Han." (The Han River is the "Korean Rhine" and the nation's main inland waterway.) South Korea achieved an economic breakthrough in the mid- 1960's which has basically altered the 12 1;Imc.'r l .�:.....,_r,-- W economy. Sparked by an expansion of manufacturing, which about doubled its contribution to the gross national product (GNP) between 1961 and 1971, the real GNP grew at the extraordinarily high average rate of about 10% annually. During the decade, per capita GNP rose from $100 to over $250. The government has already set a goal to achieve a per capita GNP of $1,000 by 1980; even half that in real terms would be a great jump. During the 1960's living standards im- proved, particularly in the cities. In the process, South Korea is becoming more urban than some of the in- dustrialized countries of Europe; it is moving out of the less developed category and may be considered a semideveloped country. In late 1972 the Director of the Economic Planning Board foresaw South Korea achieving a self- supporting economy in the 1980's. In the meantime, however, South Korea remains heavily dependent on its ability to continue to reduce imports and expand exports, and on continued in- fusions of foreign capital, including aid as well as in- vestment. In these respects, Seoul depends heavily on economic relations with the United States and Japan. These two countries account for about 70% of ROK ex- ports, 67% of its imports, 90% of foreign private invest- ment, and the bulk of official economic aid. The most immediate economic problems facing the Pak regime include inflation, a lagging agricultural sector, inadequate housing and other largely urban ills, and the growing inequality of incomes making for large, depressed sectors of the population. Basic ser- vices are still unavailable to many, particularly in the urban slums. Poor sanitation, industrial pollution, and a high incidence of disease and delinquency plague many Korean poor and detract from the success of in- dustrial progress. The Pak government, concerned with a population growth rate of nearly 3% between 1955 and 1965, has succeeders in cutting it down to about 2 primarily through birth control measures. Abor- tion has recently been legalized and the government's goal is to reduce the rate of growth to 1% by 1981. Social welfare is still largely in private hands, though the regime has talked about moving in a comprehen- sive way to meet the crying need for action in this field. w. v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 E: r "Spiritual" Modernization (u/ou) The group of junior officers who brought Pak Chong -hui to power in 1961 had no political program other than to weed out corruption and accelerate economic modernization. They claimed they were only carrying through the unfinished business of the student revolution of the previous year to save Korean democracy from corrupt, inefficient, older generation politicians. However, they felt the need for an ideology more attuned to the modern world but compatible with the Confucian heritage, with which Pak and most of his associates are still deeply imbued. They sought some systematic guide to action which would at least popularize their economic goals and help mobilize public support. Because of passions aroused by the Korean war, anticommunism was a cardinal tenet for the military �as it was for most older Koreans. Nevertheless, anticommunism had been so abusively exploited by President Rhee that it could no longer have the vigor of a fresh appeal and could not arouse the fervor that the colonels required in order to rally popular support. Democracy as an ideology also had drawbacks for the military. Rhee had consistently abused presidential powers, and his successor, Chang Myon, had been too indecisive and his supporters too beset by factionalism to win any wide support for his own hopeful democratic experiment. Nevertheless, Pak recognized the strong attachment to the democratic ideal of most articulate Koreans, as demonstrated by the students and intellectuals during the upheaval in 1960. He has professed his adherence to democratic principles but also has warned against a democracy "imported lock, stock, and barrel" from the United States, recom- mending instead a "Koreanized form of welfare democracy." Even today the Pak regime preserves the forms of constitutional democracy, however far it has departed from its spirit. Because Korea has been subjected to such sweeping, kaleidoscopic changes in the space of just one genera- tion, there are insistent demands for a new spiritual identity. Both the student revolution and the military coup were carried out by representatives of a younger, very different postwar generation. Its members had been more exposed to modern education and a variety of new influences and sources of information. They were the first generation to be broadly educated in the native script, Hangul, a truly more national means of self- expression than the Chinese writing system for- merly prescribed. Thanks to the easier, popular script and the "educational explosion" of the postwar era, literacy has jumped from about 21 in 1945 to 88% in 1970. Literacy is no longer the privilege of a small, ex- clusive elite; its spread ended the elite's monopoly of power, weakened the authority of the family and of class distinctions, and brought rural areas into touch with the modern city and its life. Combined with the impact of the war -born urbanization, postwar educa- 13 >'.k'a!i�}i. c`"N+ti 5' bJbl ':iv:%`:iG.W3i1'v "dLCfi.A ti:.:Yi;Oi{T" ASAP :..tiu'+: �L'e+51Yia1'. ^'.1:{' Cry( y'.' i9L3ieA1!! 3s': Ji' n' b' gV4ti4we ".lNYaxvrx'nrew:scaaY`C.:4 :Y.Li APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Proliferating universities are attended by nearly 200,000 students� including 50,000 coeds almost a 2,000% increase since the end of World War II 1 ,1 s i s w s E tion developed a new, widespread consciousness of social and political affairs which could not be ignored. At the same time, it was becoming clear that Korea would remain divided for some time to come. Rhee's strident calls for a "March North" were quietly dropped and a new national identity for the South was becoming acceptable. The government has sought to snake this meaningful by stressing that reunification �still the cherished goal of all Koreans �would become possible through diligence and discipline, and by building up South Korea's economy until it left the North far behind in any kind of competition. The emphasis on the program of economic develop- ment and modernization has lent a certain elan to the government's efforts, but it also has tended to obscure some of Pak's more arbitrary acts that contravene con- stitutional procedures and civil liberties. Yet something more than the dramatic success of the economic development program was needed. Nationalistic ex- hortations voiced in a suprapatriotic vein have reappeared and remain a perennial theme, but with diminishing effect. Memories of the Korean war are fading, particularly among the young, who might recall at most the discredited Rhee's abuse of the national defense theme. Shortly after they seized power in 1961, the military leaders promptly called for "spiritual" as well as economic modernization, incor- porating these goals in an ambitious, if short lived, National Reconstruction Movement that stressed austerity, diligence, and "national morality." After that particular program was phased out, President Pak elaborated a "National Renaissance: Social Reconstruction and the Remaking of Man" in Korea. He called for new ethics, stressing the deficiencies of his people in the pioneering or entrepreneurial spirit and in a sense of national honor. A man of grim and austere mien, Pak has always dis- played the pttritarical streak that was characteristic of the young colonels who ha4 organized the coup. Their suspicion of "corrupt politicians and capitalists" is reminiscent of attitudes held by young officers in prewar Japan, whose influence Pak undoubtedly felt in his formative years. Despite his interest in economic 14 modernization, Pak has a distrust of Western beliefs; at the time of the coup he had had less contact with Americans that most senior officers. He disparages Western liberalism and "Americanizing" influences, and the "Revitalizing Reforms" he has enacted since late 1972 include a reduction in the hours of English taught in the schools and the introduction of "national education" in Korean ethics and history. Western terms are to be replaced on shop signs and Western "pop" songs discouraged. Ever since its earliest days, the present regime has made periodic efforts to "clean up" the cities, whose "debilitating" influence Pak deeply distrusts. Hun- dreds of hoodlums, petty criminals, and prostitutes have been apprehended and removed from the capital for varying periods of rustication. Shortly after the coup, coffee- drinking and nightclub dancing were banned for a time, and more recently, legislation has been directed against "decadent tendencies" such as miniskirts, long hair, and the like. To discourage the drift to cities and keep Koreans "down on the farm" a broad new program has been enacted to make the tax burden much less onerous for rural and small town in- habitants and to improve living conditions there. Despite his evident dislike of foreign influences :nd the effects of urbanization, Pak likes to think of himself as playing a modernizing and westernizing role like that of Peter the Great of Russia, the Meiji emperor of Japan, or Ataturk of Turkey. His recent reforms, like the early National Reconstruction Move- ment, combine ethical exhortations with broad economic measures and call for a balance between the spiritual and the material, the East and the West. Some of the "Revitalizing Reforms" enforce Confu- cian strictures while others �more sumptuary in in- tent� curtail the practice of deeply engrained Confu- cian rites. In May 1973, "Mothers Day" was con- verted to "Parents' Day" to stress filial piety and respect for the aged. On the other hand, the new law on Family Ritual interferes with the traditionally strict observance of matrimonial and funeral ceremonies. June brides were scarce in 1973 as many couples rushed to the altar in May to beat the deadline that restricts expenditures on wedding cerPmonies. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Such interference with the age -old traditions that are deeply held are part of the social engineering that Pak feels his people need. Although government spokesmen occasionally justify the reforms as being designed only at making the Koreans a more disci- plined people, they also serve both to expand and demonstrate the regime's power and control. These features are evident in the accelerating Sae Maul Un- dong (New Community Movement), which now in- cludes urban as well as rural restructuring. The Prime Minister recently hailed it as a program for improving "social discipline and revitalizing the virtues of Some Confucian customs are re- ceiving new stress, such as en- couraging children to bow to their elders on New Year's Day diligence, self -help, and cooperation." It is too early to tell how much progress has been made in these direc- tions. Corruption, for instance, still appears in high political quarters. Nevertheless, Pak's ability to subject so many aspects of Korean life to his reforms clearly buttresses his political control. In the dozen years he has dominated Korea, Pak has been concerned fun- damentally with reviving some modern approximation of the old Confucian order that was the fabric of Korean life and the means whereby Korean rulers through the centuries presided over public mores and maintained highly centralized power. is y s .�k r S? j r3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 "Revitalization" or Retrogression in Politics? (c) 1 F s ;tip" f ,t t President Pak, a peasant's son, keeps in touch with his "riceroots" by leading off in paddy planting on the anniversary of the 1961 coup The revival_ of past patterns is perhaps clearest in Pak's approach to political "renovation." His style combines some modern political methods and forms with the age -old tradition of authoritarian rule. The President's autocratic proclivities, however, finally became painfully clear in 1972. In late 1971 he had and the arrest or harassment of those who might ob- ject. He justified these actions on the grounds that they were needed if he was to engage in a successful dialog with the North over the issue of Korean reunification. Pak's move was no spur -of- the moment improvisa- tion. it had been long prepared in secret, though the proclaimed a state of national emergency, partly to precise timing was perhaps fortuitous. As early as j prepare the country for talks with the North. Then in November 1969, Pak proclaimed in a major speech October 1972 came his sweeping "Revitalhiing that the 1970's would be a "decade of national Reforms," along with martial law, rigid censorship, revitalization." Moreover, the October reforms merely f 16 t Z APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Wk M I i complete the process of concentrating power in the President's hands, begun when Pak first assumed that office in 1963. In fact, the term "revitalization" sub- sumes all the goals of the original coup. In mid -May 1973, on the twelfth anniversary of the coup and the eve of the first session of the newly emasculated, hand- picked National Assembly, Pak stated that the spirit of the "Revitalizing Reforms" was "identical with the spiritual basis of the Military Revolution." The early efforts at "spiritual mobilization" had been undertaken partly to prepare the way for the revolution in political life which some of the coup plotters had envisioned. In part, they also served as a substitute for the long -range political program that the military leaders were hardly prepared to provide. These leaders had no ready -made panacea beyond their strong commitment to economic development, and Pak has even yet to develop any systematic program of political organization or ideology. He has, rather, effectively improvised and gradually gathered ali the threads of power into his own hands. No direct attack has been mounted on the concept of popular, democratic government, and a facade of constitutional forms has been maintained. Despite the abuses of democratic forms under President Syngman Rhee, wid the subsequent failure of Korea's closest ap- proach to democracy under Rhee': immediate successor, the ideal of democratic government is not discreaited. Korea's history and political experience, however, provide a poor base :or nurturing democracy. The strong paternalistic and authoritarian traditions of Korean governments, continued by the Japanese and to a remarkable degree by Rhee, inculcated a master servant relationship between people and government. There has been little or no opportunity for political parties or even interest groups to mature and compromise. Neither has there been any sizable middle class with the interest, training, and opportu- nity to participate in public affairs. The "cold war" confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the lingering affects of the Korean war played into the hands of the rightwing ex- tremists, whose whole stock -in -trade was anticom- munism. Even moderate opposition parties were proscribed before they had any chance to leaven the political process. The government of Prime Minister Chang Myon was fatally handicapped by the barren conservatism and bitter factional bickering among the only political survivors of Rhee's practice of divide, destroy, and rule. The concept of a golden mean, or a middle -of- the -road approach, is totally missing in Korea. Because the military leaders had no systematic ideology to substitute for democracy, they looked abroad to militarily -based regimes elsewhere in Asia. The plotting Im the 1961 coup began shortly after army takeovers in Burma and Pakistan. After the coup, study missions were dispatched there, as well as to South Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The example of Chiang Kai- shek's party, the Kuomintang, in par- ticular, influenced the thinking of the junta leaders. Again, the recent "Revitalizing Reforms" followed hard on similar trends in Thailand and the Philippines. Whatever Pak may have imported from abroad, however, his style is closest to Korean tradition. His "administrative democracy" is little more than the ad- ministrative authoritarianism of the past, plus modern methods and efficient; There is precious little room for any expression of public opinion through political parties, the legislature, or the media, and little regard for the concept of an independent judiciary and the protection of individual freedoms. What the military has managed to exploit successi'ully, however, is the energy and modern training of a younger generation free of the trammels of tradition. The youthful military leaders were quick to enlist the force and enthusiasm of the new pastwar generation released in the 1960 stu- dent revolution but not effectively channeled by the Chang Myon regime. In his first years of power, Pak coopted the almost puritanical zeal for reform of his youthful cohorts. The old, Japanese trained bureaucracy was replaced by younger, much more broadly educated recruits to provide a more effective, "revitalized" civil service. Nevertheless, in the early days following the coup its leaders were so eager to get an economic program mov- ing that many older, less motivated types were also accepted. In time, the more enthusiastic young 17 e.. a. wn: rroew..s oc sa.- a,.. wxnr r,:� abr 'rGtwsBk`�SS"a'?,t:'i..4wS.. '.,c APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 i i --f .f reformers no longer set the tone. This trend was rein- forced by the move to restore civilian government in 1963. Senior officers, donning mufti, managed to get the lion's share of important posts, largely due to their more extensive administrative experience. The zealous young colonels who had occupied the top posts in the SCNR lost out in the shuffle and this reFulted in a general change of tone under the present "Third Republic." This did not mean, however, that political reform was dead, but only that Pak was working with somewhat different means in the same general direc- tion. The military leaders generally had been highly reluctant to honor their original pledge to restore a constitutional form of government, and did so only in response to a variety of pressures. U.S. prodding was perhaps the most important inasmuch as they were well aware of their dependence upon U.S. goodwill. A significant factor, too, was that there was still strong attachment to the principle of democracy despite the weakness of political parties. At least equally impor- tant, however, was division and mutual suspicion among the military leaders. Their infighting, com- bined with cases of ineptitude, left some room for democratic opinion to put pressure on Pak to restore civil government. The dropping of the more radical junior officers from administrative posts of importance and the con- cession to civilian participation under a constitutional framework did not prevent the gradual growth after 1963 of the role of former military men in Pak's government. Even more significant, however, has been the growth of executive power concentrated in- creasingly in Pak's own hands. Particularly since 1968 -69, when Pak pushed through a constitutional amendment enabling him to run for a third term, he has steadily increased his powers, most spectacularly since October 1972. Under the October reforms, the way is paved for Pak's lifetime presidency even more clearly than it was for Rhee in the mid- 1950's. This situation merely postpones the succession problem. The only constitutional succession that Korea has experienced was hardly a normal transition. President Rhee's forced resignation in April 1960 was 18 followed by drastic revision of the constitution in June and elections in August. The election victor, Chang Myon, became Prime Minister, but he was ig- nominously turned out of office less than 9 months later by the military. Rhee had persistently eliminated any potentially strong successor as a threat to his power, and Pak appears to be pursuing his example here, too. He has played off the military factions against each other, and by occasional rustication abroad has kept his nephew -in -law, Kim Chong -p'il, first head of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency and now Prime Minister, from becoming too powerful. The chief architect of the coup, Kim had quietly organized a sort of Trojan -horse Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which won Pak his first term, having had a head start when parties were permitted to reappear in 1963. Suspicious of politics, Pak has kept all political par- ties, including the government's own DRP, from becoming strong forces which might support a challenge to his position. The DRP has helped to preserve the facade of democratic government, but its job has been purely electoral. Pak now calls for parties "on the American pattern� active only on the eve of an election," as he has put it. In fact, their role has beep rigidly curtailed under the 1972 -73 reforms. The DRP is confined largely to propaganda peddling and training youthful supporters. Pak's curbing of the DRP is in keeping with his careful control over all his former comrades -in -arms occupying positions of power. The military constitute the only force which could conceivably mount a successful threat to his authority under present con- ditions, and many ex- officers are well entrenched in of- fice. Some of them have also built up private fortunes through bribery and corruption, thus flouting Pak's strictures. Officers on active duty are still prone to Korea's endemic factionalism. In early 1973 Pak cracked down by arresting one of his oldest associates, the commander of the Capital Security Command, who had been building up his own personal following and had broached the idea of expanding the military's role in running the nation by having it supplant the ex- isting civilian political organizations. In Pak's reaction i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 there was little solicitude for the principle of civilian participation; his primary motive was doubtless to protect his own power from any possible threat and to demonstrate that he would tolerate suspicious activity by no one. "Korean democracy" remains the name of the game. In reporting state policies at the opening of the new National Assembly in May 1973, Prime Minister Kim Chong -p'il announced that the ROK "had succeeded in surmounting the superficial imitation of J I S 1 Western -style democracy we have established our own democracy in accord with our traditions and history." This "revitalization" has, however, reduced the role of the parties and the legislature and curbed civil liberties to the point where domestic critics, primarily the intellectual and Christian communities, privately maintain that South Korea can no longer claim to be the "frontier of freedom," but instead is becoming a mirror image of the totalitarian regime in the North. 19 cs: wzx.: x+ c^..: paxru: xa' u. xsa-. Rs� a.. rnwc_< zar_ v4w�: oce aso-vww.n.m....e,..n..:a+ms a�wc �aa1ar:r i: w Ek 3 k. arc' y% ti' i'47ii+'.�?iR. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 A House Stands Divided (c) :r i The rationale for Pak's assumption of autocratic powers in 1972 was the newly- opened dialog with Pyongyang. Whereas alarm at student demands for direct talks with North Korea had provided the im- mediate occasion for the coup in 1961, a decade later Pak had come to feel that the changed international situation required Seoul to take some initiative on the basic issue of Korean reunification. His first feeler was the August 1971 proposal for talks between the South h and North Korean Red Cross societies, which led to t; secret high -level political talks that were not made public until 4 July 1972. These talks continue with 20 n3 considerable caution and hesitation by both sides, but are kept alive by mutual self- interest and world trends, as well as by the fundamental longing of all Koreans for their historic unity. National unity remains the ultimate goal. As a natural geographic and economic entity which ages ago produced a unique ethnic homogeneity, Korea was the least divisible of the postwar divided countries. The Korean people are ever mindful of their 1,000- year -old history as a unified nation, contrasting, for example, with the long separatist history of the Ger- manies. Today, though they have been separated for a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 First session in Seoul of the North -South Red Cross talks; South Korean delegation on right j i i generation, all Koreans remain deeply motivated by the underlying desire for unity. The problem of reunification has figured large in all postwar Korean governments, but it remained for the Pak regime specifically to replace Syngman Rhee's stri- dent demand for a military "March North" with the present call for" peaceful competition for reunification of the fatherland." Seoul's 5 -yezr plans have been dedicated to building up the South's economic strength so that it might become a "magnet" for the people of North Korea. Pak's recent reforms and con- stitutional revision specifically prescribe ad infinitum the fundamental goal of a universal effort to achieve national unity. Following the Korean war, Seoul's official formula for Korean unification remained U.N.- supervised elec- tions throughout the peninsula, a formula which P'yongyang has always rejected. North Korea has always refused to recognize any role for the United Nations in Korea. The development of an East -West detente and growing doubts about the permanence of a U.S. role in the ROK's defense largely determined Pak's decision to open the dialog with the North. Security conditions remain vital. Rhee had refused to sign the 1953 truce agreement ending the Korean war, thus leaving the two Koreas still officially at war, and huge opposing forces still stand constantly alert all along the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang has ceased its efforts to foment revolution in the South by infiltra- tion and guerrilla raids, and Pak apparently desires to use the present dialog to involve Pyongyang in a relationship that may preclude further hostilities. Finally, in light of Korea's tragic history, both North and South have a common interest in solving their problems without foreign intervention. Thus far, the talks have served to reduce tensions between the two Koreas, but at the same time they have shown each side hov little it can influence the other. It is clear that there is little prospect of unifica- tioc: in the foreseeable future, but there may be steps toward some humanitarian, cultural, or economic ac- commodation, as Seoul has proposed. Pyongyang professes to desire more far reaching steps, particularly in the field of disarmament, but Seoul is certainly un- likely to concur in the North's demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Seoul's anxieties stem from a long- standing senb, of inferiority vis -a -vis the North. It wishes to postpone indefinitely the departure of American forces and to continue the U.S. supported modernization of its own. It will resist the dissolution of the U.N. Command, though it has now acquiesced in the termination of the United Nation's politi- cal role in Korea, represented by the U.N. Com- mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which actually has been moribund for some time. Since P'yongyang's recent successes in following the ROK's example of winning greater inter- national recognition and respectability, Seoul has given up its rigid diplomatic refusal to be represented in any country or international organization where Pyongyang is present. Its new flexibility now extends to recognition, not of the North Korean regime, but at least of the de facto existence of two Koreas. This ma- jor policy switch, announced in June 1973, tacitly recognizes that the peninsula will remain divided for the foreseeable future. North Korea's President, Marshall Kim Il -song, so far rejects President Pak's proposal for dual representation in the United Nations as perpetuating the division of Korea, and calls for a "Confederal State of Koryo," named after the first Korean dynasty, to unify the entire peninsula. However, Kim has accepted observer status at the United Nations. Pak's use of the unification issue to justify imposi- tion of the most restrictive political controls the South has known since 1963 has its rationale in the fear that the talks with a seemingly less hostile North may weaken his people's resolve to keep up their guard. On the other hand, should it become apparent that the talks are getting nowhere, the Southerners' restiveness with these onerous controls might reintroduce the in- stability that delayed all progress under preceding regimes. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 n is i� 111& ��a r ,i f ,f t �l F 1 Chronology Wou) 1910 August Korea is formally annexed by Japan, ending 500 -year rule of Yi dynasty. 1943 December China, the United Kingdom, and the United States assert in Cairo that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." 1945 August U.S.S.R. enters war against Japan. Allies order Japanese in Korea to surrender to Soviet forces north of 38th parallel and to U.S. forces south of it. December The United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States agree at Moscow on "reestablishment of Korea as an inde- pendent state" following a period of trusteeship by the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China; China subsequently concurs. 1946 March U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission is established to assist in forming a provisional Korean government; discussions lead to deadlock on major problems. 1948 May U.N. supervised elections are held in South Korea but rejected by Communists in North Korea. August Republic of Korea is established in the south, with 5yngman Rhee (Yi Sung -man) as first President. September Democratic People's Republic of Korea is established in the north, with Kim II -song as Premier. December U.N. General Assembly declares the Republic of Korea the legitimate government in South Korea. Soviet troops are evacuated from North Korea. 1949 June All U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea except for a small military training mission. 22 1950 Jane North Korean forces invade South Korea. October U.N. forces cross 38th parallel in pursuit of North Korean forces; Chinese Communist forces intervene. 1953 July Armistice agreement between U.N. Command and North Korean Chinese Communist side signed at P'anmunjom. October United States -Korea Mutual Defense Treaty is signed. 1954 April �May "Geneva principles," as basis for settlement of overall Korean question, formulated at Geneva Conference on Korea. 1956 May Rhee reelected President for third term, but opposition leader Chang Myon (John M. Chang) defeats Rhee's running mate for vice presidency. 1960 March President Rhee and Liberal Party gain sweeping victory by rigging elections. Apri'. Student demonstrations in Seoul against election rigging lead to violence and declaration 4 martial law; Rhee resigns and Foreign Minister Ho Chong becomes acting president. June National Assembly passes constitutional amendment adopt- ing parliamentary form of government. August Yun Po-son becomes President and Chang Myon becomes Prime Minister of Second Republic, following Democratic Party victory in general elections. 1961 May Military junta led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong -hui and Col. Kim Chong -p'il seizes government in bloodless coup. June Supreme Council for National Reconstruction assumes all executive and legislative power. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 i i J i :1 I F1.r U 1962 December Major constitutional changes ratified in national referendum. 1963 October General Pak wins narrow victor- over former President Yun Po -son in presidential elections. December General Pak inaugurated as President of Third Republic. 1965 January National Assembly votes to send noncombat troops to South Vietnam. August National Assembly approves dispatch of first combat troops to South Vietnam. August� December South Korea -Japan normalization accords ratified and in- struments of ratification exchanged. 1966 March National Assembly approves dispatch of additional combat troops to South Vietnam. 1967 February Korea -U.S. Status of Forces Agreement enters into force. May Pak Chong -hui is reelected for second term as President. 1968 January 31 -man North Korean commando squad tries to seize Blue House (presidential mansion) in Seoul. 1969 October Constitutional change to permit presidential third term ratified in national referendum. 1971 April Pak Chong -hui wins third term in close election by defeating Kim Tae -chung of the New Democratic Party. August Seoul proposes talks between North and South Korean Red Cross societies for purpose of reuniting families separated by the Korean war. 1971 September Informal talks between Red Cross societies start. December President Pak declares state of national emergency to tighten controls on the population in conjunction with the North South talks. 1972 August Formal Red Cross talks between North and South Korea begin. October President Pak declares martial law and abrogates constitu- tion preparatory to making major government changes. November Constitution rewritten to give the President sweeping new powers. December Pak Chong -hui elected to extended 6 -year term. 1973 March Withdrawal of South Korean forces from South Vietnam completed. 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 i i .fi tt i 4 i C r. k n L Area Brief (u/ou) LAND: Size: 38,000 sq. mi. Use: 23% arable, 10% urban and other, 67% forested Land boundaries: 150 miles WATER: Limit of territorial waters (claimed): 20 -200 n. mi. Coastline: 1,500 mi. (excluding offshore islands) PEOPLE: Population: 32,377,000 (mid -1973) Ethnic divisions: Homogeneous; small Chinese minority (approx. 20,000) Religion: Strong Confucian and Buddhist tradition; pervasive folk religion (Shamanism); vigorous Christian minority (13% of the population); Chondokyo (religion of the heavenly way), eclectic religion with nationalist overtones founded in 19th century, estimated 718,000 members (1972) Language: Korean Labor force: 10.2 million (1971); agriculture, fishing, forestry, 48.5 manufacturing and mining, 14.2 transportation and communication, 3.6 construction, 3.4 commerce and other services, 30.3% Organized labor: About 10% of nonagricultural labor force GOVERNMENT: Legal name: Republic of Korea Type: Republic; power centralized in a strong executive Capital: Seoul Political subdivisions: 9 provinces, 2 special cities; heads centrally appointed Legal system: Combines elements of continental European civil law systems, Anglo- American law, and Chinese classical thought; constitution approved late 1972; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction Branches: Executive, legislative (unicameral), judiciary, National Conference for Unification (NCU) Government leaders: President Pak Chong -hui; Prime Minister Kim Chong -p'il Suffrage: Universal over age 20 Elections: Presidential every 6 years indirectly by the NCU; last election December 1972. Two thirds of the 219- member National Assembly is elected directly for the same period within 6 months of the presidential election, remaining one third nominated by the President and elected by the NCU for a 3 -year term. Last election February 1973: Revitalization Group, 73 seats; Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 73 seats; New Democratic Party (NDP), 52 seats; Democratic Unification Party, 2 seats; Independents, 19 seats 24 Political parties and leaders: Revitalization Group (ap- pointed), chairman Pak Tu -chin; Democratic Republican Party (DRP), acting chairman Yi Hyo -sang; New Demo- cratic Party (NDP), chairman Yu Chin -san; Democratic Unification Party (DUP), chairman Yong II -tong Voting strength: Popular vote in December 1972 election, 11,196,484; DRP 38.8 NDP 32.8 DUP 10.2 Inde- pendents 18.1%, Invalid 0.1% Communists: Communist activity banned by government Other political or pressure groups: Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU); Korean Veterans' Association; large potentially volatile student population concentrated in Seoul Member of: ADB, Colombo Plan, ECAFE, FAO, GATT, Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHB, IMCO, IMF, INTELSAT, Inter Parliamentary Union, INTERPOL, ITU, UNESCO, U.N. Special Fund, UPU, WHO, WMO, World Anti- Communist League (WACL); does not hold U.N. membership ECONOMY: GNP: US$9.7 billion (1972 current prices); per capita GNP $300 (1972) Food: Not self- sufficient in foodgrains; grain imports reached 2.92 million tons in 1972 Electric power: Production 11.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972) or 370 kw.-hr. per capita; installed capacity 3,871,000 kw. !972) Major industries: Textiles and clothing, food processing, plywood, coal mining, fishing, cement, chemicals, and chemi- cal fertilizers Exports: $1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1972); textiles and clothing; veneer and plywood; wigs; electrical equipment, fish, and raw silk Imports: $2.5 billion (c.i.f., 1972); machinery and transport equipment; foodgrains; chemicals; wood, petroleum, textiles, and iron and steel Major trade partners (1972): Exports �U.S. 47 Japan 25 imports �U.S. 26 Japan 41% Exchange rate: Bank of Korea average annual exchange rate: 393 won per US$1 (1972); rate fixed at 400 won per US$1 at the end of 1972 Fiscal year: Same as calendar year COMMUNICATIONS: Railroads: 1,987 route miles: 1,910 miles 4 gage (325 miles double tracked); 77 miles 2 (narrow) gage; all government owned Highways: About 25,650 miles: 1,845 miles concrete or bituminous surfaced (including bituminous surface treat- ment), 18,610 miles gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized soil, 3,200 miles improved earth roads; 1,995 miles unimproved earth roads .�..rte�- yw: eia: ttlA: .'Ci'fA3S$,uG>< "L't::. -wkt: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 CONFInF N,r[AL Inland waterways: About 1,000 miles navigable; for most part use restricted to small native emit Pipelines: 278 miles refined products Ports: 10 major and 18 miner Merchant marine: 126 ships 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 934,323 g.r.t. or 1,543,053 d.w.t.; includes 81 dry cargo, 24 tankers, 12 bulk cargo, 2 combination passenger- cargo, 5 specialized carriers (October 1972) Civil air: 19 major transports; 8 additional transports are leased by the Korean Air Lines i 0 1 Airfields: 262 total, 126 usable; 50 have permanent- surfaced runways; 11 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 17 have runways 4,000 -7,999 ft., 2 seaplane stations Telecommunications: Domestic and international services satisfy country requirements; about 748,474 telephones; about 3.8 million radio receivers, 1.9 million wired- broadcast speal rs, I million TV receivers; 67 (ROK), 17 (U.S. Armed Forces) AM stations; 6 (ROK), 3 (U.S. Armed Forces) FM stations; 12 (ROK), 7 (U.S. Armed Forces) TV stations; 1 submarine cable (not in operation); 2 tropuscatter -links to Japan; 1 ROK International Satellite station, and 1 U.S. Armed Forces transportable satellite terminal for inter- national military communications APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Places and features referred to in this General Survey (ulou) an 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 COOn DIYATF.S COORDINATES IN 'h'. o 'N. 'F.. 36 34 128 44 Osan 37 09 127 0-1 Andong 36 4 1'2U 14 Paen'n 6n do NI 6 Y B 37 07 124 40 Ans6ng ch'On (strm) 36 01 126 1 Pan 6'in hang (harbor) B J B 35 29 129 26 Changhan g� 35 38 126 o 55 North Ka P'annnm 6m, ore 1 37 59 12610 Changhang -ni (Icty) 35 12 129 09 P'aro -ho reservoir)..................... 38 07 1L7 ;a Chang -san (min) 37 08 128 12 P' ohang 36 02 129 22 Cheju 33 31 126 Pukp' y6ng- ni.......................... 37 29 129 O8 Cheju -do (isl) 3:3 20 126 30 P' unggi 36 52 128 32 Chinhae........ 35 08 128 40 Pusan 35 06 129 03 Ch' 6nan 36 48 127 09 P'yC)nggang, North Korea 38 25 127 17 ClO ngha ri( 37 26 129 11 P' y6ngt' aek............................ 36 59 127 05 C11' 611gj u 36 38 127 30 P'y6ngyang, North Korea............... :39 01 125 45 Ch'6ngnyangni- Bong 37 34 127 03 Sach' 6n 35 05 128 06 ChC mju 35 49 127 09 Sam ch' bk 37 27 129 10 Ch' 6rw6n 38 15 127 13 Sa m ch' 6np 'o........................... 34 55 128 04 Chosa 35 11 127 24 Sa m nangjin 35 23 128 50 Chukpy6n- ni(lely) :37 03 129 25 Seoul.. 37 34 127 00 Chu m unjin 37 53 128 49 S6gwi- ri 33 14 126 34 Ch' unch '6n 37 52 127 44 Sokch' o 38 12 128 313 126 37 Chungang -myoji (anch) 34 50 128 12 SOkp' o- dong........................... 36 28 34 58 127 46 Chungjo 36 14 126 42 S6 mjin -gang (strm) 37 28 127 38 Ch'ungm u 34 51 128 26 Songhyft -ni Ucly) 37 30 129 OS Chungny6ng- gul (railroad lunnel) 36 56 128 26 Songj6ng- ni 34 55 128 32 East China Sea 29 00 125 00 Songp'5 (100 33 27 126 56 Hadon 35 04 127 45 S6ngsan- ni 37 52 127 40 lIaep' y6ng 35 10 127 33 Soyang-gang (siren)..................... Haeundae 35 09 129 10 Suwon................................ 37 16 127 01 llalla -san (ml) 33 22 126 32 Su 6n 35 10 129 07 H a North Korea 39 54 127 3'2 Taeby6n 35 13 129 14 IIangch 'on 34 32 126 94 I' aegu.. 35 52 128 36 Ilan -gang (slrm) 37 45 126 11 Taehung- ni............................ 35 53 127 02 127 26 Hoengsan- ni(Icly) 38 07 126 59 T aejbn. 36 20 36 28 127 16 Hong -do (isl) 34 41 125 13 Taep' y6ng -ni (Icty)...................... 129 24 lRingna North Korea (rsta) 39 50 127 38 Ulchin 36 59 35 33 129 19 Ilup'o- ri(lety) 36 41 129 28 Ulsan................................. 35 30 129 2.1 Hwan i -ri (let+ 37 10 128 59 Ulsan -man (bay) 35 59 128 23 Hwangj6ng 37 33 127 43 W aegwan- ni........................... 37 46 126 30 H y6ngsan -gang (slrm) 36 01 129 23 W6lgon- ni (lely)........................ 37 21 127 58 Imjin -gang (sirm) 37 47 126 40 W6nju. 39 10 127 20 I nch' bn 37 28 126 38 W6nsan, North Korea 126 50 Iri 35 56 12(3 57 W6n w6n'6n 36 59 127 30 Japan, Sea of 43 30 135 45 Yangp'y6ng6m nae...................... 37 29 124 00 Kaes6ng, North Korea 37 58 126 33 Yellow Sea............................ 36 00 127 38 Kamp' o 35 48 129 30 Y6ju... 37 18 126 3.1 Kanggu 36 22 129 24 Y6 m -ha (strm)......................... 37 35 128 56 K anggy6ng 36 09 127 01 Y6ngeh' 6n............................. 35 58 36 10 12r 4r KanB 8 n6n 37 44 128 54 g g........................ Y6n don log 54 Kim hae 35 14 128 53 Y6n o -d 8 dun B BP on 37 31 128 37 Kim p' o 37 38 126 42 Y6ngju. 36 49 37 33 126 58 K odubawi 37 09 128 50 Yongsan (rsln)......................... 126 32 Kohan-ni (lay) 37 12 128 52 Yongsan -gang (slrrn).................... 34 54 128 K orangp' o- ri(lety) 37 59 126 50 Y6ngw61 37 11 127 44 Korea Strait 34 00 129 00 Y6su... 34 4,1 KCtln -gang (sirrn) 36 00 126 40 Selected airfields Atrnho- an strm 35 50 128 29 127 02 Kunsan 35 59 126 43 A- 511.. 36 58 126 30 Kuryongp'o -n (lcty) 35 59 129 34 Cheju International.......... 33 30 128 57 Kwangju 35 09 126 55 Kangnung.................... 37 45 128 56 Ky6ngju 35 50 129 13 Kini 35 11 126 48 Man' on an (stun BY B B 35 53 126 40 Kim o International P 37 33 126 37 Masan 35 it 128 34 Kunsan AB 35 54 126 49 Mokp' o 34 47 126 23 Kwangju :35 07 127 02 Moraedun g............................ 35 32 128 22 Osan AB 37 05 129 25 M osulp' o 33 13 126 15 Pohang 35 59 129 08 M ukhojin- ni(lay) 37 33 129 07 Pusan International 35 10 8 42 2 Munsan- ni(lcly) 37 51 126 47 R- 813. 35 08 128 05 M uryong -san (min) 35 35 129 24 Sachon. 35 05 129 N aju 35 02 126 43 Samchok 37 30 56 126 56 N akton an rn g B (sir m) 35 07 128 57 Seoul AB 37 31 Nonsan. 36 12 127 05 Suwon....................... 37 14 1 27 01 128 40 6nyang 35 34 129 07 Taegu International 35 53 an 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 A is lllA� I NF& r ro 'W12t3 Tt a t '31h bf'P' T 12H r F bX� s k'E" Muamy0ng a i f `d d fin r r K o r e a On c jafp B i t LU a y Nimpoy Songnim fy r r 6 'l[r 7 a f A li 'f 1 4 S4d' R F' r t r ,V y 6 lltvr i Al c n r r 'i ihau A" 4 3e"y 1 r t ChlhJr J x j S nx a a Ch'u du i'` '4x, f Sarrvvbn r r 7 rt to t a it a n Rukke ,t�r A Y roil�` 0 0 u SlnClatl Y9 *'f;'e -nl .J' A ,.serdil'` 9 P ;f l r 7rvrf'Sjr m 'r 6' J� �gy�rt' v S 1 t', c t`.. y.. ��4' I r p'^' k .5 fi rUfnhW r I I j ow I w. i a t 1 "a M y o Ch bwG gg hF�N 4r` ..M ."�i 7'� C ib0. 0 0 Vf t t o r ..d' C .+'F'� r� a $q,' j Y j g B s atmela8n �IYS� :r r n t .r, 7;Y v a �"(i r r� q a, f x� r.:: v a; tjl f Ora Vi `J yYanggu l r Tr,r�rli)rr,y'JJJ Jra t c x 1 r t Y r A p Ito 40 I do c, J. 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Q!r Q' 1 i YOngdbg KGntpan.. o t c o S_., I 2 I &Angha e e�ri �F I32 J t y, y KOGUNSAN- IS /.v_ c4r x 13fu J r YaLTO APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 ICYONGNYOLBt- i U `_r,., H0 t t bn u t. �s'' YOLTO h Y AnmytSn -do r J 1 ad ang t n rfr eIlo Ak W IPOBn mra� v S sit 4 .1913' e a x I r Och'ong -do. x KGmaan vY t O Cftangha 2490 'i Y t 2.. rl b Yn I c 94 88 Mangy ye i A ?32 KOGUNSAN- i Q t su bn V rc YOLTO G Ktmje ChtSnju d C Man tl� k J IV la \i do to Changhang l 9 t Z .+L A tt �Anma n P r amwin kb W do y 2.03 t9 ."t' 6283,x u Son no b I(wan9ju I i a S bn .'fi an94 n t u Q KUNDO N Y. a X ry i eo f td C? Yy an Sachbrl J .IJ yi Y C '11 p' 3 o r lingssi o a Chaun -do r f +"i fa a( r .omr'.unch a 4 l ��v Ki Hong-do(1 -6) fit// ri C I r t� Taehuksan -do S P i U v U o a l ri3 ti8u r Nadu aq 9 h' k 0t o o��� S a p Tolsan Huksan- ry 7 Haenam i ngch n 7 A y t o d0 Yokch v .�I V S �y1401 Q roc 9 �2 c ir chedo KOCHAU., d0 `7 Sori do N KUNDO I 4 o C u `Sohu 0 ksan�do f Polgil -fo �p Ch'dngsan -do CH'UlA- KUNDO, e Y&6-do Cheju haehyop o Names end 6oundery representation are not necessarily authoraative 126 9.73 Or 4, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Cheju -do South Korea Internal administrative boundary National capital Pus Internal administrative capital �r�+- Railroad (4'8!i2' gage) Railroad (26" gage) Expressway Road Airfield L Major port Populated places (,000,000 to 6,000,000 O 150,000 to 1,000,000 O 50,000 to 150,000 Under 50,000 Seoul 6,000,000 Spot elevations in feet Scale 1 0 10 20 30 4p 50 Statute Miles 0 10 20 30 40 50 Kilometers 1 Ullung -do i Sea of Jap c D 0 i Economic Activity INDUSTRY 8 Iron and steel 0 t Plywood ard vene A Shipbuilding and repair 4L Smelter Tetiles A Automotive assert Q Food processing Electronics Q Chemical Petroleum refining Cement A Thermal electric p 9 Fertiker U Hydroelectric pov Major fishing port MINING Sn Tin Fe Iron ore W Tungsten G Graphite Cu Copper Ka Kaolin JW Anthracite coalfield Textes k t Food Processing Chemical p� A AO Cement Fertilizer n g S 'ti I Major fishing p t s 4 F MINING S r ngQu Sn Tin Fe h It; I W Tungsten G f I Cu Copper Ka M Z Anthracite oc Changgi -aP r Ybngil ma -36- .Y Kuryongp'o -ri i nMu egu.'' a Kamp o Kew 68 a o a i Pangbjin-hang 7 Ab' lsan -man t 44 W I vak i fia r Kmnxae,; art O ul y aebybn O aeundae c c o -811 I U� e p i) m/ 0 9 1 Enlu h\ohae .Kaddk -to so a, Koje -do I Qv nazi.. o �o a pep o U A d7 D o sasuna si\ o S J o a c Z r Chin p i Q sk s Honshu hara a C o p o P o 30 e d �1 ar Kit aWOO J a p a n cneja o D ukuoka mil' 0a u CJ D A 0 ell Kyushu o Kurume Hirado- Uku- shima shima D e t'r o a Sasebo APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 0 a Cheju Economic Activity INDUSTRY Vegetation and Land Utilization CULTIVATED AREAS Paddy crops Dry crops UNCULTIVATED AREAS Forest Scrub, brush and barren land Inch'bn U o Q D �o Iron and steel Plywood and veneer Shipbuilding and repair Al Smelter Textiles aft Automotive assembly Q Food processing Electronics Q Chomical Petroleum refining Cement Thermal electric power 4) Fertilizer Hydroelectric power K Major fishing port MINING Sn Tin Fe Iron ore W Tungsten G Graphite Cu Copper Ka Kaolin JffW Anthracite coalfield 0 Hwach'on. 11 Ch'dngp'ydng -ni 4) Fe .Ch'Ongju G G 1 Masan p Kwangju Ka e4 Naju 'J O u 0 o�okp' :.J o n 0� V O I CZ O op O Cheju Fe I Pok 'yongi S. S W e Yanpnam' Cu S.a aQ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2 Electronics Kunsan Food proc A Q sling W TaeAu Fe Q AA Q Chemical $11 Petroleum refining Yongnam' Ulsan Cement A Thermal electric, power O s c Fertilizer A Hydroelectric 9r a e Pov' Masan Cu Fe OK Major fishing port O e Kwangju Ka MINING p I) O Q Fe Iron ore u L.Naju Sn Tin cU W Tungsten G Graphite D 42gmu t Pusan ok cb Cu Copper Ka Kaolin yep 11 o Chinhae Anthracite coalfield O V co p o O Yosu 0 Q O p Cheju 'unch'iin Kangniing 4` U. 0 D YYonju Population Persons per square mill v Ch AnAhr 111 1 259 c T 0 50 100 200 Persons per square kilometer V Pod 0 nW e et p e usan �t Honshu c r -3d c o KitakyoshO Cheju a ut kuoke IF" f r Waahi on! 'shades `L j/l/$jll Kurume O chadona, t; r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2