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y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 �ar... grew:: a.- +sx!+aaa'ro..!sa5:m Vivid .,'D *::'$!7'$T'::t"rn', NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Tele -c mrnunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that serniannually updates key sta- tistical dara found ;n the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 797 and 791 of file US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unouthori:sd person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019611. EXEMPT FROM GENERI.I DECLASSIFI- SB DECLASSIFIED E ON APPROVAL I OF O THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. lM A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 I i WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. 3 IF C) Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret :iiFF� ="lFfa C'WC >tr.'w.,rrevcC V^. z.. w: ar:� r:' ts a+;, n. s:"� rfri44' t.^ R Lti}t 7f+ FH!!# FgaAA' RR' rtal flNxwrancnm +.r+r- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 rrinorffl rin r S t n BRAZIL CONTENTS This chanter supersedes the political cover- age in the General Survey dated January 1970. A. Introduction I B. Structure and functioning of the government 6 1. Constitutional system 6 2. Federal government 8 a. Executive branch 8 b. Legislative branch 10 c. Judicial branch 12 3. State and local government 13 C. Political dynamics 15 1. Political forces and interest groups 15 a. The military 16 b. Social class interests 17 c. The church 18 d. Students 19 e. Centralism vs. regionalism 20 SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 i@nt -Is@I &ffc Page 2. Political parties 20 a. The party system prior to 1964 20 b. Party activity since 1964 22 c. Brazilian Communist Party 23 d. Terrorist groups 25 3. Electoral law and practices 26 a. Formal election procedures 26 b. Voter participation 27 D. National policies 28 1. Domestic 28 a. Policymaking structure 28 b. Political 29 c. Social and economic 30 2. Foreign 32 a. General principles 32 b. Relations within Latin America 34 c. Relations with the United States 34 d. Relations with other nations 35 Page E. Threats to government stability 37 1. Discontent and dissidence 37 a. Students 38 b. Catholic Church 39 c. Labor 39 d. Military 41 2. Subversion 42 3. Insurgency 43 F. Maintenance of internal security 47 1. Police 47 2. Intelligence and security services 4 9 3. Countersubversive and counterinsur- 8 gency measures and capabilities 52 G. Selected bibliography 53 1. General works 53 2. Specialized studies 54 Chronology 56 Glossary 58 FIGURES t w t o i� 1b f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 Page Fig. 1 President Emilio Medici photo) 1 Fig. 2 Federal buildings in Brasilia photos) 3 Fig. 3 Gen. (ret.) Ernesto Geisel photo) 6 Fig. 4 Constitutional structure of govern- Luiz Carlos Prestes photo) 24 ment (chart) 7 Fig. 5 Vice President Augusto R -idemaker (photo) 8 Fig. 6 Gen. Oriando Geisel photo) 9 Fig. 7 Gen. Joao Figueireido (photo) 11 Fig. 8 Joao Leitao de Abreu (photo) 11 Fig. 9 Gen. Carlos Fontoura (photo) 11 t w t o i� 1b f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 Page Fig. 10 Administrative divisions (map) 14 Fig. 11 Archbishop Helder Camara photo) 19 Fig. 12 Luiz Carlos Prestes photo) 24 Fig. 13 President Medici at Trans- Amazon Highway (photo) 31 Fig. 14 President Medici visits President Nixon (photo) 35 Fig. 15 Brazilian police services chart) 47 Fig. 16 National Police Academy (photo) 48 Fig. 17 In, elligence and security structure (chart) 50 t w t o i� 1b f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 Alk twil -7M Am 1 F b 0 F y Government and Politics A. Introduction (U /OU) The armed forces provide the central block of support for the regime of President Emilio Medici (Figure I). Top ranking military officers hay(- dorninatcd national political activity in Brazil since deposing civilian President Joao Coulart in 1964 in if rioveme'nt which the military labeled the "Brazilian revolution." The federal executive has become even more dominant as the locus of power, with an accorripallyifig decline in the influence of the national legislative and judicial branches and the state governments. The political parties and special interest groups that vied for influence over the direction of political development between 1915 and 1964 have since been circumscribed in their activities. The Medici governnew's image of order and progress has earned it considerable support among the people, although the lack of open elections and censorship of the media make it difficult to determine how deep this support runs. Medici's predecessors had already stifled student and labor opposition, and his administration has used all the force at hand to suppress the� urban terrorists who sli -VNIed in gaining international publicity but never gained significant support from the Brazilian people. The curly sector that the government has found difficulty ;n muzzling is the liberal eying of the Catholic Church. but the church hierarchy wants to avoid antagonizing the regime and has therefore exercised considerable restraint in its dealings %yith the government. Almost ccrta;nh the only real threat to the government no is the Possibility of if fracturing of the military over issues or personalities. However. such divisions are not very likely as President Medici *s selections for President and 'ice President have met with general appneyal. The military in most Latin American countries ascended for it ti to if preponderant role in national politics through their leadership of the independence movements. Brazils peaceful transition to independ- ent status provided no such opportunity to its military forces. Not until the War of the Triple Alliance (156.1- 10) had ;ncreased their numerical strength and prestige did the military assume i t political role. Since deposing Emperor Pedro If in ISS9, however, the armed forces have exerted if dominant infiucmx in Malty political crises. Brazil is the only c�nuitr\ in South America to have existed as if monarcl until late in thu 19th century. The ra!ion achicyed independence from Porti,gal in 1822 with little stniggle, and most of the follosying seven decades were marked by reiatiye stability undo it constitutional monarchy headed by Emperor Pedro 1, who ruled from 1822 to 1831, and his son Pedro 11, from 1831 to 1889. The lwo political parties, labeled Conservative and Liberal, represented factions of the small elite group which ron the county. During the first approximately 50 years of the empire it tradition of peaceful alternation in power bet\%ven these two parties prevailed. In the 1870's, however, republican sentiment began to grow among politicians and the militar, many of \1 limit were strongly influenced by the doctrine of pos;tivisni. At the same time. Pedro 11 came into serious conflict \%:tit the major groups heretofore supporting his rule, beginning %yilh the Catholic Church. The abolition of slavery in 1888 Congressional office building in Brasilia APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 FIGURE 1. President Emilio Medici (U /OU) antagonized %%ealthy plantation owners. tilt- last important group supporting the cro%vn. In 1889 a bloodless military coup deposed the Emperor and substituted if republican form of government headed b% Mavhal Deodoro da Fonseca. The Constitution adopted for the republic in 1591 %Sits modeled after that of the United States. It provided for the separation of po\yers. with a presidential executive. a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary '1 he document re presented an attempt to impose lib dvi n>cratic institutions on a backward, patriarchal. patrimonial agrarian structure. Ilowe%er, the %cry restricted franchise and the lack of it secrv- ballot meant that the transition to if republic brought very little political change for tilt- great majorit% of Brazilians. in operation. the formal pox%er of the national go%ern meat, as granted b% the (:onstitulion. %was %ceakene(I b% the po%%er of some of the states. Th(� political ssstcm that evoked was in fact called tilt- "politics of til states." A "Repoblican Party" %%-its fornied in each state, but there %was ao national partN, nor opposition parties. 'I'll( incumbent President with the approval and support of tilt- large states selveted his successor, who in turn promised till- governors favors. For host of the period front 1889 to 1930, the two 'wealthy states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais dominated till- national government, furnishing nearly all the presidents. 'fill- state governors sent to the capital congressmen "ho %wire favorable to tit( President, and he in tarn gavel- the governors a free hand in running their states. A similar reciprocit% existed between the governors and the astral coronets (bosses, literally, colonels, so- called because of the national gu:ord rank %which till- local leas: ers ctistomaril% held ondrr the empire). %who delivered vote.- in exchange for the right to ruiv their patriarchal domains with an ilon haled. The 1920's bronght if odildun cot pressures for social an(I political changes in this ,%st( t. As the ne%w urban middle class, nwny of the:, immigrants, chall(�nged the power of the sugar barons and coffee planters, young mililan officers took asp the cause of social reform and staged revolts in 1922, 1924. and 1927. TIRISl- iclealistic young officers, known as 1cucnles (lieutenants), combined in 1930 %%-ill) politically clisaffecte(I civilian elements to force the resignation of the President, and his replacement I)v Gelulio Vargas. till- defeated candidate in that Near's presidential election. Vargas niled Brazil front 1930 to 1945, and again front 1950 to 1951. Tor diacritics on ,)lace mars see the list of nano�% at the ontl of the eitttt!cr. 2 i Although he was a constitutional President during most of this period, in effect Vargas ruled as a dictator. His long regime brought irreversible changes in the institutions of political life and public administration. Most important. Vargas transformed the relationship heh\een the federal authority and the state authority. and thereby moved Brazil much closer to a truly national government. In 1945. Bn:zii inherited ;tit immea surahl\ stronger federal executive than it had had \when V arg as took over. ;Many functions previously exercised by state and local government \\ere shifted into the area of federal competence. Federal authority also extended into ne\w domains, including economic fields where private capital --as reluctant to enter. Increasing federal inter entio,t in the economy required it(-\\ agencies. New fec.vral power in social welfare and labor union organization gave urban labor for the first time an interest in government. Sustained industrialization and ur- banization brought about at, increased political role by industrial, commercial. and professional elements. The growth of ne\% institutions on the federal level served tvvo purposes: it was part of till process of unifcing the sprt%wling conntry administratively. and it helped the President to articulate a national network of political alliances. Vargas quickly demonstrated his ability to use persuasion, cajolery, and the promise of spoils to exploit for his own benefit the traditional power struggles \within the political leadership of the major states. During most of his regime. Vargas did not try to create a national political pc(rt\. since the existing system offered h1e^ it perfect medium for his great talents of conciliation and manipulation. which in turn depended upon intimate personal contact with allies and opponents. During the last 2 ye:rs of his regime, however. Vargas farsighted en( ;.gh to realize that his dictatorship could not survive World War 11. Brazil's participation in the war on the side of the Western democracies strengthened tendencies Within till- milit a nd civilian groups for it return of individual liberties, and Vargas began lading the groundwork for his later emergence as a "democratic" leader who \\cold rely on support from a ne\w popular, labor basl-d movement, as \\ell as front more established groups such as rnral landowners, Paulo industrialists, and lhl- government bureaucrat-. In 19.15 he formed two political rtovettl-nts: I) the Brazilian Labor Party (P'fB) to undercut til( Communists on the left and gain for himself the \corking class vole: and 2) the Social Democratic Party (PSI)) to nniIv the poliIici(tns. bureaucrats. lando\\ners, and industrialists Ito hall benefited from 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 j0n L. WE@1. 11 1 U 4 the Vargas \ears and who had grive unc�c�rtainties about the stabilih of a more open political systent. Opposing Vargas were the outs �w ho had organized in 1944 the National Dcmoc�ratic� Union (CDN). the ihird major part\. Dominant in this nuivement were the liheril constitutionalists, who had supported Vargas in 19-3(1 in the hope that he \\oul(I print if new democratic era to Brazil. only to have their hopes shattered bN the emergence of Vargas' authoritarian. personalistic Estodo Noro (Nevv State). The l'DN's protests against Vargas politicA maneuvering in preparation for the scheduled 19 national elections were one factor that led the army c�nnunand to rc�rnove hint rnt 29 October 1945. Vargas, however. retained it strong; hold on the popular imagination: for rnanv Brazilians he was and still is if symbol of governmental concern for the common ntan. Ilis fortiter Minister of War. X:orshai Euric�o Gaspar Dutra, \%as elec, d President on the PSD ticket in December 19 -15, and Vargas himself \vas elected to the F'eder.(I Senate. By 1950, the people had become disenc�hunted with the well meaning but essentially c�onsery itiNe Dutra administration, and Vargas used his new image its it "dernocnit" to regain the presidenc�v �for the first time by dircet popular vote. The political scene which Vargas encountered in 1951, hovvc�ver, was niore difficult to dominate than am he had faced in his Nears of retie beNven 1930 and 1945. He now faced if suspicious bloc in the political center, implacable opposition on the right, and an :trip which \Nils at hest nentral. Vargas' appoinhnent of Labor Minister Joao Gottlart, a voting, ambitious protege, heightened suspicions within middle class and conservative military circles that Veirgas was preparim; to embark on a syndicalist regime of the type that Juan Peron had c�reailed in Argentina. Y Vargas failure to cope with inflation and his ini, ilit\ to satisf, demands for ,oc�iiil reform led to loss of popular support. Corruption also increased greatly. When. in Aoogusl 19� :54. presidential .tides. \%ithrnt Vargas knowledge, tried to assassinate his chief critic. the brilliant polenicist Carlos Lac�erda. the ntilitary dema Vargas resignation. and he c�ommllitted snic�ide. Vice President Cafe Filho stic�c�e Vargas and presided over the 195.3 election. which wits \von by Vargas politicml heirs. the leaders of the t"o parties he had founded. Juscclino habits hek of the PSD became President. and Joan Goularl. head of the PTI3. bec�atne Vice President. Some of the ntilitary opposed their taking office. hoot if countercoup led by Marshal Ilenriyue Tvi\eini Lott, then Ministerof Wier, insured their inaugucition. Kiibitschek. \\tins� c�anipaign slogan Ii al been "Fifh bears of Progress in Five... greatly accelerated ec�onontic� developnient projects but neglected social welfare. Ile c�onstruc�tc(l, at great expense. the if(-\\ capital 01. Brasilia (Figure 2). Ktibitschek's tern, however. wits muirked by it steep rise in the cost of living and increased social unrest. In the� election of 1960 the voters gave an impressive victory to San Paulo Governor Janio Qm idros, the uan with the broom," .%[to had promised to sweep out the corrm tion and inefficienc�v which 11a(1 grown during the three decades following Vargas accession to pow(-r. Ittputient with congres and nther forces frustrating his reform efforts. Cluadros, in what name considered if ploy to gain a free hand, lenclered his resignation in August 1961. To his surprise it woos a;�cepled, anc: he departed after only months is President. The resulting crisis brought the c�ountry to the br ;nk of civil strife between ntilitary constilutiona- Y CR FIGURE 2. Federal buildings in Brasilia. (left) Palace of Justice, with bust of Kubirschek in foreground. (right) Congressional office building in front of Chamber of Deputies (saucer) at left and Federal Senate (dome) at right. Ministry buildings in far background. (U/OU) .3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 list forces and elements unwilling to allow Goulart, who had sought Communist support and had narrowly won reelection as Vice President, to take over the presidency. The crisis was settled by a typically Brazilian compromise: a modified parliamentar ,overnment, with circumscribed presidential powers, was instituted as a prerequisite to Goulart*s taking office. Goulart's conduct during his 31 nnrmhs in office confirmed the misgivings of those who apposed his accession. Even after a popular referendum in January 1963 had restvied full presidential powers, he proved an inept and irresponsible administrator, incapable of coping with the serious economic and lu;litical problems he had inherited. Inflation mounted rapidly; foreign investment in the country dwindled, and economic growth was sharply reduced. Goulart called for "basic� reforms,' but the opposition was convinced that he wanted to revise the Constitution so that he could continue in power beyond the end of his term in January 1966. Moreover, he permitted both infiltration and virtual dominance of the labor movement by Communists and other extreme leftists in return for their help in exerting pressure on the Congress through political strikes and demonstrations. Among his closest advisers were a numberof Marxists, and he abetted extensive Communist infiltration also in journalism, education, and many government agencies. By early 1964 there was a widespread conviction that Brazil was drifting toward veomomic catastrophe, that Coulart was incapable of governing, and that he perhaps planned soon to set tip either a dictatorship of the Peronist type or an authoritarian regime which might fall under Communist domina- tion. After Goulart had condoned political agitation and mutinous attitudes on the part of noncommis- si- -ed officers of the armed forces, and after he endorsed an ultimatum by the Cum: iunist- dominated Workers General Command to the Congress to accept drast;c reforms by 20 April 1964 or face a general strike, the military, joined by leading state governors, revolted against him on 31 March. ll :s support evaporated within a day, anti he fled into exile. The Brazilian military has thus intervened directly in national polities five times since World War II �to topple the dictatorial Vargas regime in 1945, to oust the corruption riddled Vargas government again in 1954, to assure the installation of Kubitsch-k in 1955, to place restraints on Goulart after Quadnis' resignation in 1961, and then to oust Goulart in 1964. On the first four occasions the military immediately relinquished the reins to civilian authority, but in 1964 it kept control with the deterininadon to eliminate corruptic.n L nd ultraleftism from the government, and it remains the dominant power in the ne Brazilian political system. Ilumberto Castello Branco, a highly respected army general who had played a leading role in the Goulart overthrow, was endorsed by Congress to serve for the remainder of Goulart's term �until January 1966, the term was later ext coded by Congress to 15 March 1967. The new President pursued policies which emphasized administrative, political, and economic reform, including greater participation of private canital in the economy. He filled the key Cabinet Posts with experienced, nonpolitical technicians, but relied to a ;great extent on former military colleagues, particularly those of the so- called Sorbonne group senior officev, associated with the Superior War School (ES(;)�for advice on broad policy matters. The government focused its early efforts on checking subversion and eliminating corruption. Several hundred politicians, military personnel, subversives, and other persons charged with illegal activities were stripped of their political rights. generally for 10 y �ars, and many Public officials, including a substantial number of congressmen, were ousted from office for similar reasons. Political activities by labor unions and student groups xyere sharply curtailed. Congress, with many of the opposition leaders purged. from its ranks, generally was reluctant to resist the regime and approved most of the significant administration bills. Although President Castello Branco exercised power with relative restraint for the most part, his period of rule was marked by strong authority embodied in executive decrees with the force of la%v �four institutional acts and more than 30 complementary acts. Under the competent leadership of Roberto Campos, ;Minister of Planning and General Coordinatio'.n, the government instituted A s%veeping financial stabilization and austerity program designed to bring the rampant infiation under control. Housing and banking reforms were very successful, but reforms in land utilization were only slightly successful. Castello Branco's successor, Arthur da Costa e Silva, a retired army marshal, took o iic�e in March 1967, after having been selected by the top military hierarchy and formally elected President bx the purged Congress in October 1966. The new Constitution approved by Congress in January 1967 institutionalized many of the special powers employed by Castello Branco. The political sitination deterior- ated under the Costa e Silva government. The President began by loosening somewhat the strong political controls he inherited. I le also greatly changed P1 N APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 b 1 f I It the style and methods of government operation, moving away from the highly personalized organiza- tional ss'stem of Castello Branco and delegating more extensive authority to his Cabine' ministers. On the economic front the government generally maintained the development and stah;;i;,:;;.,n program initiated by Castello Branco. Ilo the basic problem of seeking to slow inflation while producing some tangible gains for the masses remained. Popular dissatisfactions spread, and the administration reinstituted arid tightened political erg itrols. By late 1968 many military officers believed that a number of factors combined to threaten the maintenance of the 1964 "revolution." Svmptoms included student strikes and demonstrations, the first noteworthv labor agitation since 1964, open criticism of the government by some clerics of the Catholic Church, increasingly critical treatment of the military by elements of the press, an unprecedented series of bank robberies arid urban terrorist incidents, charges of corruption in the administration reaching to the Cabinet level, and a surprising number of victories in the November 1968 municipal elections by persons considered corrup, or subversive by the militarv. Ultimately, it was the defense: by Congress of its diminished prerogatives that catalyzed the military into taking action against the fractious civilians. The military, taking umbrage when a federal deputy denounced them in a spocch before' tit- Chamber of Deputies, demanded that the government prosecute the deputv for "undermining the revolution." The Chamber refused, in a vote in December 1968, to lift the deputy's immunity, and the strong rnilitary reaction forced President Costa e Silva to issue Institutional Act Number Five on 13 December 1968, giving the President dictatorial powers. This act overrode the Constitution by suspending most civil liberties air(], in national securit cases, the right of habeas corpus, arid, unlike the first four acts, carried no expiration (late. i)sing the authority given him by Institutional Act Number Five, the President immediately suspended Congress, arid it new purge of critics of the government was initiated. More than 100 persons were arrested, and many of these including several members of Congress, were deprived t,f their political rights for 10 years. When President costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August 1969, the three ministers of the forces bypass('( the civilian Vice President and assumed control of the government. The top lovel of the armed forces hierarchy selected Gen. Emilio Carrastazu Medici, commander of the "Third Army, to succeed Costa c Silva. Medici chose retired Admiral Ilamann Rademaker Grupewald as his Vice President. The suspension of Congress was lifted so that it could -atif% the "election" of the two men, and they took office on 30 October, 1969. Because the communications media are censored, virtually all public expressions o` dissent are discouraged, and only elections of rational and state legislators and mayors of small towns are held by popular ballot, it is difficult to determine public attitudes toward the Medici government. The popular votes for legislators and very limited opinion surveys that have been taken in urban centers sho"t�d a considerable degree of approval. The administrations success in promoting rapid economic growth, reducing the rate of inflation, arid in pursuing the integration of the nation through the construction of transportation and communications links and opening up the Amazon region have earned the support of man Brazilians. The business arid financial community whose center is Sao Paulo have been firm supporters of the post -1964 governments based on their effective economic performance. On the other hand, Medici has recognized that most workers thus far have received only slight per.;onal material benefits from the economic progress achieved over the past 8 years, and he has said that more attention should be devoted to improving this record. The most consistently negative attitudes toward the military -led govern- ments have been found among certain university students and professors, middle class professionals and iniellectuals, arid clergymen of the Catholic left. Violent opposition to the regime has been almost completely limited to the small urban terrorist groups whose operations reached a peak i:, 1969. By 1972, aggressive, arid at times heavylrande�d, campaigns by the security forces had severely hampered both violent and nonviolent opposition groups, and mail% members of ehese sectors now ha%e abandomrd the goal of ousting the administration or even signific,litly affecting its policies. The Medici government, confidet:i that it is rapidly petting its own house in order, is beginning to pay much more attention tcs tirreign affairs. Medici :�nd others in his ad .uni.stration, such is Minister of For�� ;gn Aff ;tiis Gibson Barboza, are convinced that Brazil L, rapidly becoming an influential factor in ..orld affairs and must play a role, both inside and outside Latin Arnt ica, commensurate with its size and destiny. Notable evidence of this expanding foreign interest was ivledici official visit to Washington in IX- 0 -mbe; 1971 and Barhoza's travels to many Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and European nations in 1971 through 1973. Brazil 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 has also L n the lead in various inter American and worldwide forums on issues involving trade and territorial sea limits. In some cases Brazil has adopted positions on these issues that differ from those held by the United States, and Medici has said that he accepts the liklihood of more such friction with the developed nations in the future as a sign. of Brazils growth into an important power in world councils. Retired army Gen. Ernesto Geisel (Figure 3) will hecorne� President of Brazil on IS March 1974. Ilis selection by President Medici, with the approval of senior military officers, was it result of widespread respect earned during his long army career and subsequent effective performance as president of the Brazilian state oil company, I)EIT11011RAS. Like Costa c Silva and Medici, Geisel is a native of liio Grande do Sul �a state that has produced many successful politicians and military officers. I le was horn in 1905, the last of five children of a German Lutheran immigrant. Of the fonr sons in the family, three rose in the army to the rank of general. One brother, Orlando Geisel, serves as Arm% Minister rider President Medici and probably had a discreet influence in the selection of Ernesto as the next chief executive. After the 1964 revolution, President Castello Branco designated Erneslo Geisel as chief of the presidential military household. Costa e Silva appointed him to the 6 Superior Military Tribunal, and he retired from 44 years of army service in 1969 to take over PETROBRAS. Like Castello Branco, he is associated with the "intellectual" current in the milit:!r, nearly all of whose members are graduates of the Superior War School. He is likely to continue many of the domestic and foreign programs of the Medici administration. B. Structure and functioning of the government (U /OU) 1. Constitutional system The general outlines of the Brazilian governmental structure (Figure 4) are similar to those of the United States; in operation, however, the two systems are very dissimilar. One marked difference is the concentration of poser in the hands of the Brazilian federal executive. The governmental structure is established by a Constitution promulgated in 1967, extensively revised in 1969, and slightly amended in 1972. The governmental structure has also been profoundly affected by it series of Institutional Acts issued by the governments since 1964. The first four of these acts have been incorporated into the Constitution, and, tinder article. 182 of that document, Institutional Acts Five through Seventeen remain in effect until they are nullified h% decree of the President acting with tile advice of the National Security Council. The overall effect of constitutional changes, of the Institutional Acts, and of other presidential decrees since 1964 has been to strengthen the executive's power and greatly reduce those of the legislative and the judicial branches. 'I'll( measures hays also served to remove from the political scene most of the administrations important critics. The 1967 Constitution was designed to institution- alize and codify the principles of the "1964 revolution." The Constitution provides for a federal republic of 22 states, four territories, and the Federal District of Brasilia. It also provides for "independent and harmonions" executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. The presidents since 1964 generally have not depended strongly on :Ile progovernment National Renewal Alliance (AIIENA) party in Congress. In fact, since the erosion of its legislative powers. Congress has only a minimal role in governing the county. Institutional Act Number Five, of 13 December 1968, the most sweeping of the acts, granted the President strong authoritarian powers, including that of recessing the federal Congress and state legislatures. I 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 FIGURE 3. Gen. (ret.) Ernesto Geisel (U/OU) III =Is aCJ7W7A{ ea u %9F 1IIC If n:Tr M nw.a 1 J I Y w I II WA AI ra I I III ra I I I II Ki III N Wws LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL Federal Ap LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL Federal CONGRESS PRESIDENT to. SUPREME FEDERAL FEDERAL VICE PRESIDENT 5 -year terms TRIBUNAL I SENATE 1 8 -year terms A I Federal _I Cabinet Tribunal 1 CHAMBER of I Appeals 1 OF DEPUTIES I j Special 310 Members J Labor, 4 -year terms Federal Electoral, Courts and Military of the Courts First Instance I I 1 State I i Legislative Governors Tribunals Assemblies 4 -year terms of Justice I Other State Courts I Local I 1 I 1 Councils Mayors Capital Local Mayors Courts Key ELECTORATE Election 10 Appointment f -w- Appeal President elected by an Electoral Calk" composed Of all members of the National Congress and 1 sWected members of State Legislative Assemblies FIGURE 4. Constitutional structure of government, 1972 (U /OU) 11C This act overrode the Constitution by suspending the right of li ;Jwas corpus and many other traditional civil liberties in cases involving the broadly defined national security. The chief execut; 'e was also authorized to confiscate the assets of anvc. who had obtained them illegally while holding public office. The act further empowered the President to declare a state of siege for an unlimited time. It also excluded from judicial review all actions carried out under its authorization and virtually eliminated all juridical checks and safeguards. It, in effect, eliminated legal protection against arbitrary actions by the government against individuals who were suspected of acting against national security. The judiciary also became a target of the military. Three liberal judges of the Supreme Federal Tribunal were forced to retire, and two of their colleagues then resigned in protest. Rather than replace the departed jurists. Costa e Silva permanently reduced the court from 16 members to 11. Institutional Act Number Six, issued on 31 January 1969, stripped the court of some of its powers in those matters about which security forces were most sensitive; the act restricted the courts power to review crimes against the very broad national security laws. 'These actions placed the protection of national security above the principle of an independent judiciary. 2. Federal government a. Executive branch The President is the central figure in Rrazilion politics. The President and Vice President serve 5 -year terns. They are chosen, not by direct popular vote, bait by an electoral college composed of Congress and selected delegates from the state :csseniblies. The President may not succeed himself. 'Pile order of president'.) succession after the Vice President is as follows: President of the Chamber of Deputies, President of the Senate, and President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. Despite these procedures, the succession to the presidency in practice is controlled under the present government by the military. The incumbent, retired (:en. I ?milio Carrastam Medici, annococed in June 1973 that another retired army gcoend, Fr lest o (:eisel, ill succeed him in March 197 -1. In case of presidential disability the vice president is supposed to succeed to office. This constitutional measure, however, has not always been followed. When President Costa e Silva was incapacitated in 1969, for vmimple, the military service ministers bypassed the civilian Vice President, Pedro Aleixo, and took power themselves under the terms of Institutional Act Number Twelve. Although this act applied onl} to the succession to Costa e Silva, it similar pattern would probably be followed if Medici were unable to continue in office for any prolonged period. Vice President liadenmker (Figure 5) �a retired admiral �might be allowed to serve during a brief incapacitation of Medici, but the army probably would insist that one of its officers replace Medici if he became unable to continue in office. "Pile authority of the President was greatly strengthened under the Constitution of 1967 and the amendments promulgated in October 1969. He may propose that the Supreme Federal Tribunal suspend for a period of up to 10 vicars th� political rights of persons found guilt of subversive or corrupt activity. They nuy also be deprived of official posts to which they have been elected. Persons accused of crimes against national security can be tried by military courts. When the Presidents power to decree an unlimited state of siege lapses with the terminatio:1 of Institutional Act Nmnber Five, he will be empowered by the Constitution to decree a state of siege for 60 daNs (extendable for another 60 days) Without first consulting Congress. I le has broad powers to intervene in the states and to issue decrees with the force of lacy in the fields of national security and public finance. 1 H 1 9 f oW?.� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 FIGURE 5. Vice President Augusto Rademaker (C) A Il Ic Iq u Congress can approve or reiec�t such decrees, but has no power to amend them. Congressional action is further restricted by if provision %yhich reserves to the President the initiation of legislation pertaining to Public finance, the civil service, the strength of the armed forces, or administration of the Federal District and national territories. Congress must ac t on the federal budget within a specified period or it bec�ornes la%% as submitted �a provision which ended one of the traditional methods held by Congress under previous constitntions for pressuring the President. Time limits may also be set for congressional action on ordinary hills (10) days), but those designated urgent by the President must he acted "Poll within 40 days or they become lase as drafted. With presidential concurrence, Congress may grant Political amnesties. "I'he chief executive may veto congressional hills in whole or in part, hilt the Congress can ove-ride him by a two thirds vote. In addition to his special P�nvers, the President holds normal executive prerogatives, such as appointing and removing Cabi let officers, making high administra- tive and indicial appointments (some of which require Senate approval), and serving as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. In addition to the Vice President, the Cabinet is composed of the heads of the following ministries: Aeronautics Industry and Commerce Agriculture Interior Army Justice Coin mu nica t ions Labor and Social Security Education Mines and Energy Finance N avy Foreign Affairs Planning and General Coordination Health Transportation and Public Works The head of the National Intelligence Service (SNI) and the chiefs of the Presidents Civil and Military Households are also considered to have Cahinet status and participate in Cabinet ine�etings. Some of the Cabinet ministers have considerable influence within the administration, based either on the traditional strength of the entities thev head or on their own personal ability. At the top of the list is the Minister of the Artily, Ge11. Orlando (;eisel (Figure 6), who has effectively maintained the army as a solid base of support for Medici. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mario Gibson Barboza and Minister of hinance Antonio Dclfin) Neto hake earned respect for th �ir effective performance, although personal and policy 'Fora c�urreol listing of kec gocennneot officials consult Chiefs of Slnte and Cabinct Alrnibrn of Forrigil Gouc nments, hohlished 111 -101k by the Direc�torale of Inlellii;enee. (,entml Intelligence Agrnc�y. differences have at times caused friction behveen their ministries. Oelfim Neto is the administrations chief economic architect; among other duties, he chairs the National Monet; -y Council, the top financial Polievinaking body. Minister of "Transportation and Public Works Mario Andreazza and Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho are retired arms colonels who have proved ahle to fill important civilian roles in fields on which the Medici administration places high priority. Medici has been able to maintain considerable continuity in the Cabinet compared with Previous administrations; only three changes of ninisters have occurred during his term. Medici rarely m C eets with the abinet as a body.; Cabinet sessions arc usually called only when he wishes to announce an important policy decision that he has already made. The executive branch of the federal government is an exceedingly complex apparatus, consisting of manv specialized administrative hodies, advisory bodies, foundations, government agencies, and mixed corporations. Some of these are directly under the authority of the President, while others are only loosely supervised by the executive. There are nearly 30 hodies directly under the President, and approximately 40 other entities are coordinated throng'i the office of the presidenev, manv of then, being responsible also to one or inore of the ministries. These include public foundations, such as the GCtulio Vargas Foundation, which conducts research in economics, business, and other fields; mixed capital enterprises, such as the Bank of Brazil, the National Steel Companv, and the government oil enterprise PETBBBOr1S: and government corporations, such as the Brazilian Coffee Institute. Anong the bodies directl under the President is the National Security Conneil (CSN). Since 196.1 the 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 FIGURE 6. Gen. Orlando Geisel, Minister of Army (U /OU) CSN, as a result of an expanded concept of national security. has been given additional authority concerning it wide range of internal matters. The CSN is constitutionally charged with advising the President on the formulation and execution of national seenrity goals and policies in national and international affairs, with special emphasis on problems concerning internal and external security; programs on international cooperation; agreements and conventions with other nations concerning national boundaries; and activities in matters indispensable to national defense. The CSN secretariat also has responsibility for conducting studies on problems that concern national security, specifically policies regarding transportation� development of national resources, nuclear energy, labor. immigration, education, telecommunications, and several other fields. Under Costa e Silva the CSN played the leading role in purging the country of stilwersive and corrupt elements, making the final decision on executive action in the maj�rrity of suspcasions of individuals' political rights. The President is the presiding officer of the CSN and may convoke it whenever he wishes. Other nte�nthe�rs are the Vice President, the Chiefs of the 1residential Civil and Military households, all Cabinet ministers, the director of the SNI, the� Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force. Its principal functions are carried out by its general secretariat. which, by statute. is headed b the Chief of the Presidential Military household. This official is thus in a key position to influence decisions regarding national security. Under Costa e Silva, and to an even greater degree under Medici, three organizations �and their chiefs, included in the CSN �have attained ;treat impor- tance: these are the Presidential Military household, under Gen. Joao Figueiredo, (Figure 7); the Presidential Civil Ilottsehold, under Joao Lvitao de Abreu, (Figure 8): and the SNI, under Maj. Gen. Carlos Fontoura (Figure 9). These men, along with Annv Minister Geisei, constitute Medic�i's "inner C ircle,' and are consulted by the President on policy\ matters on it daily basis. The four head the organizations that represent the real �as opposed to the theoretical �power stmc�htre in Brazil, and they also have a close personal relationship with Medici. Figneiredo formerly served as the I'resident Chief of Staff when Medici commanded the Third Army. The President has it small Special Advisor\ I Staff that prepares rep on designated topics and writes speeches for the chief executive. It is headed by Col. Leo Etchigoyen of the array. The problems of public administration are manifold. Corruption, extending even to the presidential level, had often been sizable prior to the Castello Branco administration and, despite the military's strong moral fervor, retrains widespread. The Brazilian bureaucracy, although reduced under Castello Branco, is still swollen. At the same time, however, there is it scarcity of personnel trained in modern administrative techniques. Time consuming procedures, such as requiring numerous stamps and signatures on official documents, remain the norm, although administrative reform efforts are aimed at streamlining archaic practices. Overlapping functions and responsibilities among government entities often serve to blur lines of authority. Certain ministries are in direct competition, and there is often it lack of coordination within a ministry and the agencies loosely attached to it. Since 1964, however, the efficiency of the executive branch has improved considerably. 'There has been more emphasis on recruiting administrators and bureaucrats with specific technical skills. Several inefficient auronomous agencies have been abolished and many corrupt administrators have been purged. Corruption has proved particularly difficult to eliminate; some cases continue to conic to light under Medici. he� has usually used the powers granted under Institutional Act Number F: 'e to remove quietly the guilty individuals. The persistence of corruption might he used by military and civilian critics to try_ to impair the regime s image. b. Legislative branch The Congress was recessed by President Costa e Silva on 13 December 1968 after the declaration of Institutional Act `dumber Five, and the President and his Cabinet assumed legislative functions. Congress was reconvened in October 1969 to legitimatize the selection of 1resident Medici, and has held its regular sessions since. The Congress, which holds an annual session front 1 March to 30 November with it months recess in Jule, is composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. There are 310 deputies, who are elected for -1 -year terms by popul,.r vote tinder it system of proportional representation. The deputies are di among the states on the basis of the number of registered voters, with each state being entitled to at least three deputies and each territory, except Fernando de Noronha, one. The three senators from each of the 22 states are directly elected for terms of 8 gars: to provide continuity, one third and two thirds for the Senate are elected alternately every .1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 -jnno1nm1nm� Qd:' 11 FIGURE 7. Gen. Joao Figueiredo, Chief of the FIGURE 8. Joao Leitao de Abreu, Chief of the Presidential Military Household (C) Presidential Civil Household (U /OU) N 0 s- Y. F %ears. Members of both looses are re(puired to be native Brazilians ill possession of their political rights: senators imist he mci gars of age and deprntics over 21. The present political makeup of the Congress demonstrates the dominance of the progmernment National (AIIENA), %%hick Controls 59 scats in the Senate and 22.3 in the :hamper of Deputies, compared %%ith the opposition Brazilian Democratic Mox�enrent's seen senators and tii deputies. The Congress leas generallN been a conservative force. reflecting the overrepmsentation of the more static rural regions NN hic�h is brought ghoul bN the electoral ssstem. Presidents 1mve often found it diffiCidt to obtain it nmjor;',c for their legislalivv programs. Agrarian reform hills, banking and t:n reform, and m:m\ other nicasures have become lost in the legislative process. Congressional opposition to President Qmidros, with fre(puent ovcwidivg of his contributed to his (lec�ision to suinnit his resignation in 19(il he :is not granted e\traordimir% po\%c�rs. Major changes in the relationship betm the Congress and the President occurred ender Costello Branco and %core incorporated in the 196 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 FIGURE 9. Gen. Carlos Fontoura, Director of the National Intelligence Service (U /OU) Constitution. Congress lost many of its checks over the President, such its delaying tactics used to slow execution of his programs. Constitlttionally, tilt� Congress retains the exclusive right to approve treaties; to authorize the President to declare war or make peace or to permit. foreign troops to transit or temporarily remain on Brazilian tcrritorv; to approve or suspend federal intervention ora state of siege ;"and to oversee the acts of the President and the decentralize(] agencies. The initiative for proposing legislation has almost completely shifted from the Congress to the President. Nearly all important programs are prepared by the President, with the advice of the organs of the executive branch such as Cabinet agencies, the CSN, and the SNI, and then are submitted to the Congress for ratification as laws. To it degree the Congress serves as a forum where the administration and its policies can he examined and criticized; however, all the legislators recognize that there are subjects which the government considers out of hounds far public discussion. These taboo areas include criticism of Medici and of the armed forces. Legislators who speak ont on these sensitive subjects are likely to hay(- their remarks deleted from the congressional record and banned from press coverage. Under the broad national security legislation, congressmen could he subject to imprisonment for attacking the government; none have actually met this fate, although under Castello Branco and Costa e Silva a number of members of Congress were purged and had their political rights suspended for 10 years. The congress clearly is "on parole,' and any violations of the conditions under which it operates could bring permanent closure. The legislators appear to have accepted this fact, after having experienced an imposed recess from December 1966 to October 1969. The next congressional elections arc scheduled for 13 November 1974. c. Judicial branch Edneated Brazilians have a long tradition of respect for at least the� forms of legal processes, and the judiciary has enjo ed considerable prestige. Brazil's legal order and traditions are based mainly on Roman law and conFnental Enropcan usage, hilt legal thought has conformed more closely to All',lo -Saxon principles. In the early 19th century, the law schools formalized the legal system. The extensively used xyril of habeas corpus and the federal jury are two notable examples of Anglo -Saxon principles that have been "Until Institutional Act Nomber 1�tce is terminated, Ihr President has Iha- right In declare unlimited stales of sirgv without the nrcessilc of appros,d be Congress. 12 Too r introduce]. A jury, however, is mandatorN only in specified :urinal cases including homicide and abortion. The Brazilian legal system differs in severed fund.unental aspects from the P.S. system. Brazilian law is codified; precedents are not binding although they arc considered one element in the chain of judicial reasoning. The application of the express provisions of the code to the case at hand is the key judicial exercise. Brazilian lax\ is recorded in various codes, such as the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, and the Criminal Code. The Civil Code was approved and promulgated b the Brazilian Congress in 1916 after a century of study and evolution. Primarily based on the German Civil (:ode, it was a conservative document but had the virtues of being flexible and practical as well as comprehensive and concise. It has served as it model for other Latin American countries. A new Cavil Code -as tieing prepared in 1973. The Commercial (:ode, promulgated in 1850, was the first such original code in the Western Hemisphere, but it is now largely outmoded. In 1969, the latest Criminal Code, reflecting modern theories of criminal control and rehabilitation, was adopted. Although it judge is theoretically restricted to applying the la\% codes, he still exercises it good deal of initiative and discretion in resolving cases. This flexibility is achieved by alloy ing the judge :o consider each case on its merits. Such an approach, however, often tends to slow down the process. Judicial power is exercised by the Snprenu Federal "Tribunal, the Federal Tribunal of Appeals. federal courts of the first instance, and state courts empowered to apply federal lacy. Brazil does not have it dual system of federal and state hays as does the United States. (hl the local level there is generally one trial court in each ntunidpio (roughly comparable to a U.S. c�ountv). The states nuty also establish inferior jurisdictions, such as justices of the peace. In addition to the regular court system dealing with civil and criminal cases, there are speciJ labor, electoral, maritime, and military courts with final authority in their specialized areas, but with appeal to the Supreme Federal 'Tribunal on constitutional questions. While the election tribunals have contrihnted somewhat toward guaranteeing free elections. they have been more subject to political pressures than have the� other courts. The Snpremc Federal Trif is composed of I I justices appointed by the President, subject, according to the 1967 Constitution, to Federal Senate approval. Members mutt be Brazilian -horn, over 35 years old, and of notable judicial learning and excellent reputation. The Supreme Federal Tribunal is J t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080017 -9 empowered to declare laws nncorstitutional. Its performance in this role h,. been limited, however, by the ver extensive assumption of powers b%� the federal executive branch, which necessarily les :.ens the discretionary powers of the courts. The courts have also tended to interpret the Constitution hroadh, with a presumption in favor of federal executive and legislative action. Judicial tolerance of tilt� executives use of decree power to legislat for example, has become a constitutional tradition. Institutional Act Number Five and subsequent decrees have severer restricted the jurisdiction of the courts. All actions carried out under these acts are excluded f judicial review. Institutional Act Number Si:; restricted the powers of the Supreme Federal Tri)unal to review crimes against the very broad national security laws. Aiti:ough the government has Fvc�one increasingiv authoritarian and the courts* jwAsdiction in several areas limited, the courts have main -wined a degree of independence. A significant deve" 'Ment in the Brazilian judiciary since 1964 has been the increased use of the special military courts in cases involving civilians. The military court ;ysterrt, consisting of the 13- member Superior Military "Tribunal and regional military courts, before 1964 had little impact on the civilian sector. It was until then �and still is �used to tr military persons for violations of military laws. I lowever, under the gov,- rnments of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva the use of military courts instead of civilian courts to try crimes considered to affect national security became an integral part of Brazils legal :,ruchjrv. This came abont larger� because the regimes believed that the civil courts were incapable of dealing with the new problem of urban terrorism. Under Costa e Silva, there was a broadening of the definitions of national security through provisions of the 1967 Constitution and the National Security Lary sanctioned in 1969. Under the extended c�olleept of national security, defense against covert efforts from within the country to destroy national institutions� political, econorric, sociopsychologica1, or military �is as critical as defense against external aggression. Article 122 of the Constitution states that the military courts may try civilians for crimes against the national security or against rnilitar installations. The Nation.11 Security Law states that all crimes connitted under its provisions :%ill he tried by military courts, and the number and type of crimes e