NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 39B; NATIONALIST CHINA; ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
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SECRET
3981GS /dF
r
a
r:
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Nationalist
April 1974
NATIONAL INTELLIGEN
r:
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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b .�..R_.
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CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces cover
age in the General Sur.ey dated August 1970
A. Defense estvl4ishment
1
I. Military history
1
2. Command structure
2
B. Joint activities
3
I. Military manpower
3
2. Strength trends
3
3. Training
4
4. Military budget
5
5. Economic support and logistics
5
6. Uniforms and insignia
5
SECRET No CoxEicu DIssest
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C. Army
I. Organization
2. Strength, composition, and disposition.
3. Training
4. Logistics
D. Navy
1. Organization
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
3. Training
Fig. I
Organization (chart)
Fig. 2
Personnel strengths (table)
Fig, 3
Budgets (table)
Fig. 4
Uniforms (chart)
Fig. 5
Uniforms (chart)
M
Page
14
14
13
16
16
17
17
IS
Page
12
15
15
17
Page
6 4. Logistics
6 5. Marine Corps
11 E. Air force
11
12 1. Organization
12 2. Strength, composition. and disposition
3. Training
13 4. Logistics
13
14 F. Paramilitary forces
FIGURES
Page
3
Fig. 6
Tanker (photo)
4
Fig. 7
F-104's (photo'
7
Fit. 8
F-86F's (photo)
9
Fig. 9
F-5A (photo)
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A rme d F 'cl
A. Defense establishment
TI I(- arawd fnrcl, of the Ilep III lic of
total about 551,901) T ))es c'omlitrlt(� tike filter()) largest
indigVn lwo- :ontnutni,t to in A being
slirpasu�d onit !1, those of India. Solid] Vii�tn:un, atld
South Kor('a The armed forte, cYln of the arm,.
III ;Ind ajr force. P tilt' Combined Scnicc
Forcv_t lol;i,tical organi7:Iti0Tl a('eord('d rgteal,tatte,
%%itll the armed wr%icve h, the ('"II%htIIh( l :old a
,mall paratnilitar} lurc�e. the Tai s :m Garrison t:cner.]I
llcadtluarler, (1'(;(;l I Creatls as I)1 the trlilr�d
51111.,, these fclrcls since 1951 hate become� mhim.ls
modern 'I indj,idua� %mill, are pattcrnld after
those of tit(' t sited States .Ind crltllos I S I,IVII0:ll
doctrine and 1 1 11-111v% 'f'hc( ary I rgam/vd .tied
equipped Pt 111111riIX for defell,e and pie c�� ortlt a
small oHelosive capabdih 1St
Thc Gmernmertt of ))1 R.pubfic' (if C }una i(:1l(:I
ha,a dcfemive bcc�anse it11(31(1,onl s thc,rllall
area of Taiall. the Pvsc�adou�, iPent;hte) i,laud%. and
sc�scral idond group, off the tnairtl:tnd coast of (:11jr,
because it i, heasils &IINId(�nt on foreign It rlited
StatcsI rrlilitan ,ides Itpport. anti ))t�tan,r� it 1
relative)) small armed force, in comparison to to tho 1, se ill
it� arrhertcml, the Pvoplc's Republic' of :hin;1 tP1i(:1
Its militate (3i)jec�1ive, �v to dt fend it, Icrriloriv%. !n
Arcngthcu it, :Irincd forcc,..::cd cvcrUo:lUs to recm,�
rr; "Irtlattd China. ail)) it, prcu�rtt rc,ource, it cannot
acrotnplish tllr�sc 0b1vctis inc1Vpendvath (S1
Defense of CM: territon depends upon control of
the sea approach,�, arld air sulmriorih o%vr lilt
Forrtlrna Strait area (;round delPe,e eapabilit% i, ;11,11
cilntittg('nt 11po11 adequate :ter and na,al nppurt As
ROC air and [I;lval force, c:Innol gUar;Intec� Ihcsc ill
t ))1� eYenl Of 4i (Irlertllirted PR(: ;Itt;I( IIO(: (lcfctt,t� it,
such a c�olltingcoc�N fs crilic�alh dependent nn ac�l:ry
U S. support, Which has boon provided %ince 195"1
under it Nitilltal Dcfcnse Treati {S)
Political comidcrations dictate Ihc dislo,ition of
apprclxilnatVIS It faur(h of the 1100 ,rotmcl Farr(., tit,
the offshore islands '1 'llrsc island, offer liltic cilher a,
cicppirtgstom�s to tile' rttaial;mcl or a, outpost, for the
ticfctlsc of 'I'aisvatn. lent tilt probable ps,chologic:ll
cffcct of their �os, rcyuir,�, thal tile% be hc1d, despite
the rA (n it di lti pvrc�cntage of
RO(; strellgih Tklcs also u�rv(� in tile ,lea of butlt the
RM elect Illc PR(:, to tic 't'aiaan to the rnainlalld
1 Its a I'll(: svi711rt of like islands %k mild I)�
c'ounterprucfuc'tm. It} proti(lirlg a tee� p
argomcnt for an indeperldcnl Tetuan ISI
A lthongit the (:R(: I,,,, rcpcatrdl, soIcvd it
intention to rvitrrn to 111,1trlland ('hin.I .]tell ,(rv%l
control from tit(' (:ntettlrtnlist,. itch tatcrlx�ot, h�Ite
c'onlr� to bc� "'%VI111all, political. ]ntrndr no
d In l.ol.ten
morn an irt c'(rllmktV,l upport r)I till
tSmcrnmt�rtt let 11 1arh the I;oal of tnllelarll,
returning to OW mainland 11.1, g11ictls Ile.n .pE,101d
hs till GIW ail11 more pragmatic pol It 111101
Pres'dcnt \isnn Irip 1 tilt. I R( in Ichru.lr, 1972 It
I Ilat a lit. Ihc t Ili lr�cf SI.tE., agn�I�d att11 t111 1 In Ihc
joint MlatiLleat Dill ill little loc 111.11 .III hlnl ten
both ides I,I tilt- I-rurtlo,.1 Stroll Oumlder 'I'.uu.o, I,,
111 p,lrl of C ))inn. lh.tt th1 ha nsarl .pl(� I1( In
,etllcd hs 1�11 ('111111,. 1114.11t,el,1,. ,toll 11.11 the i
pllds r, to temu,t. tt, force, Imm Tarn�, as !111,rou In
the arv.t clnmr livr I S milit-M sale, support .tied
ku1(1an0c 0oofimlc� tit 110 prosrdcd to th. ItO('.]rmld
forvv% that .!re orgam Ir,llned .Ind 1g all ppld
primoriit for del /11,1 Ofb�usnc c,lp,thilih r sl,lrr�fc
limited A111to hall the .crowd tore., 0011 �t.1 air drop
apprommatc�b :3.00D Troop, tilt Ihc rn.mdand r.suppls
of Ihcsc forces aallld 110 prclblern.Itt( I he nets s,
.Inl;mcnlcd hs .1 rnercle,rtlt s1 el,, t'oold left
hotle nl it mantel (le,tsiun, tabuul 16),:30(1 mete each
Ili .111 an1111nbiao, oplr:Ilion in a11ich ooh Ilehl
n aa cncoulolt -wd Iloac�,1r. 1111 13O( c'nolrl
loot tuvvsslllll, engal r in ,Irnphihtnus uprrlinln,
,tQailNt the People s Rrp11111ic elf ('hina deh�n,e,
aithnut ntaw %v foreign ,11pport While- tl r G!((, lead
prepared dllailcd r1an, In tilt� 111,1 fur r.tnrll to
mainland hina, its priman p!annitt>`,incr i9'? 11:1,
centered ten the delcn of I;uaao .111(1 til off,ltrlrl
kla rats 1 S t
1. Military history (S)
Allbultgh (:11111,1 h as .I Jong rttditan hnton
deseloprm'nl ill tilt' prca�rlt nrrldcrn lorcv, esscnh.]llc
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began with U.S. military aid under letcd lease in earls
19.11. 1i% late 19.11 Chinese forces were brim, trained
and reorganized h% the UiOed Stales. Chincu� :fir
Force personnel were tinned in India and the Uniwd
States a% a separate service after 19 as part of the
Chinese American Composite Wing, this force fought
the J apanese on a tnin)r scald After 19.13, the United
States also operated officer training centers in China.
and U.S. officers sened in the field as instructors and
advisers to Chinese units.
"rhe Nationalists emerged from World War 11 %%itlt
an urmy of almost 3 million men oreanized in 366
divisions, of which 39 aboul 500,00(1 rnen) had
received or were receiving U.S, training and
equipni�nl. Except for a headquarters, there wit% no
navy. The air force consisted of right groups (Iw(;
hontber. four fighter, one composite�, one air transport
and it rec�oonaissarive squadron, and it had about
105.000 men (including almost 1,5()11 pilots) and
nearly 500 S_ aircraft
Despite an initial three -to -one ouni�rical superiorit"
mer Chinest� Communist forces, an air force, and
considerable U.S. materiel and advisor\ mi Janie. the
Nationalist armed fore(� were ineffeeli\e. The
\'atinnalists had long neglected political warfare
lechniques during the tutu� \\hen till- Comrnuni,,t%
were building a politicized arm\ and political base
areas Illrolighnut China. Plagued bN mass defections,
c�lignr it drfen%i\r complex. poor tactics. poor
morale. and inahilil\ !n coordinate and c�enlralicr
eunlrol. Ihey were finally pushed off Ihr Chino
mainland b_\ IhV end of 1919, TllV arrn% had sustained
roost of Ihr losses in (h(� m ainland vampatgn%, and 1)\
lair 19.19 the armed forces (ot:ded 0111\ ghoul 1100,0110.
\lost of Ilivw corn had been withdrawn In Taiwan.
Through 1950, defrulistn iuc�ornpe(ence. and
collhimoo prevailed. and most offshorr island holdings
were lost In mid- 1950 Ili� U.S. Nav% Flerl
brgim patrolling Ilse Forrmsa Strail
In 1951. the Unitcd States brought the 110C into
the \4utual Defense As%iQari�r' Program -11(m the
Militar A% %i%tancr Program OAAF'1 �and a militar
Assistance :Advisor Croup \�IAA( ;l was sent to
Taiwan Since that Iimr Ihr armed forces have brat
almost completely rebuill to provide the means for
defending Taiwan Thm have here reorganized .luny;
V ti lines, officers awl r111NIrd urn have been ironed
in U 5 tavIic% will Ic�chuiques. and weapons,
including jet aircraft and ua%al vessels. have heat
nhlained With :MAP %uppnrt (br armed forces ham(
r %labli %bed a \mend rnilitan orgarcizatinn with the
valmeil% for further impruvrrnrnl and modernization.
ronimmid struelire ha% been m1ablished willl
commnunication% Lind control permitting r1lipl0\
of t c%(- force% in ,tiling dvfensi\e Iitmtiotrs e)n ;II(:-
held offshore i%land% and making po %sihle conrdint-
tion with l' S. forces in defense of 'f and the
Pe%c�adores tPenghut Thk much-rrt militar %tablish-
rnent has a dmree of efficient�\ nr\rr pre%iowd
achir%rd b\ RUC forces- hot it rvillairas hea\ils
Clrpendrnl upon V S. na\ Mid air ,uppnrt in the
went of a full -scale attack h\ the I'M:
MAII support to the ROC declined %teadil\ over the
I:. %t detach� and atrant militar aid \\a% finall\
terminated h\ tlu� United States at the end of Jame
1973. 'I'll( CRC. h(mmer, is still able to purchasr
militar e(lnipmen( front the l States under Ihr
U S. Foreign Militar\ Sales Act This c�Itange in
procurement 111011 cis is not 0.1)VO d to derrea%r Ihr
operational rffic�ienc of tile 110C aruted forces. hul it
is likeh to continue their dvfewt jve orientation.
2. Command structure (C)
The President is the Cotrnnra alder in Chief of the
amulet forces render Elie emislitution (Fi �tire 1) Ile is
a%sisk�d h\ l\ %oad%i%un bodies --the National Sccurit\
(:ouncil and the \IiIi tit ry Stralegp Addison
(:nmrmlitlee. The Nalinn l ScC�urit% Council INS( wits
e %tabhslied by a Presidential decree in Januar\ 1967 in
acc�orclanev with Article IV of the �Ternponar\
Pro%i%ions� of Ilie cons(itution of 19-17 for the �'Period
of Sttppre%sion of the' Comm till is( Rehrllion ll
supersedes the National Defense Council as the
supreme� polic�\ making hod% ill wartime organization,
and its vXktencr is authorized until the end of (hr
period of ''Communist IiebrHimmt." Its purpose is
%iomilar to That of its ,Irnerican counterpart. It has the
power to make the policy concerning mohiliuttion.
national defenw, nationa reconstmetion, the
administration of political affaen in war areas, and all
other %objvets considered related to its function. 11 also
directs the acti \ities of tier National Recnnsimeliott
P lanning Cmmrniller, the Nalional Securit\ Bureau,
time National Grnerd Mobilization Commitler, the
Political Affairs Commitlev for Ihr hear Areas. and the
SCIenC�e Developtuu�nt Conanittee. The coumril 11,
headed 1) President (:hiartg and includes the
following member: Premier (conc�nrrrntly Secretim
Crneral of the Council)- Vice Prrsidmit. Secrelar
General and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office,
Chairman and \'ice Chairman of the President'%
Nlilitetr% 'Aralrgy Advisor Comtrritlee, 4inislrrs of
National Dvfensr. Foreign Affairs, Finwtur, and
Econnnic Affairs. and Armed Forces (thief of the
Ceneral Staff. The Militar% Slralrgy Achisor
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G-1 Raft
I
I t
Cee mew., Ceeinonde,
In Chief, In Chief,
nory AN fa.
I
I
we-"
od
Tup.
(1eFeee
Caleamndr
ll.%h.
Defense
C�Orld
I I
Coe. Xvde,
ie Chief,
f`^
f
1
chin.
and
Ma-41:,
Defame
Can nondI
FIGURE 1. National defense organization (U /OU)
C!"n Kat.d.rlr
4(J 1".149)
AdvM.Y Cecrireee enoF t
C�M i
i
rtlnhtry
of
No iv%til D.F-
011111u(ittcc is till hiworar% both it has rio actisc
func�lion
On the Vilbinet level. the \Hoist. of \atiurl:Il
Defense (MND( Provides tilt, staff orga Ili zaIion
Ihrough 'hfch tbt� PresideFit ev(�rc�ises CYmtro! of the
:trnled forces. The 0inistcr of \atioual 1), fcnsc- the
nanrinal civilian bead of the armed forces. has fornial
control of the artned forces throtq;h the (thief of ti
General Staff tC(;Si. 'bo has ope nitlonal control of
the arnicd forvvc 111e president, hn'rser. rrt,lius tilt�
prerogative of I0s1) :.situ; IIIc 4lirlist(�r of \atiol,:d
Defense with or.lt,n to be issllecl ht Ihr (:Ili(.[ of tlic
Coneral Stall. 1;\1), dircc�tlti to III( ho:ufs of the
various services or olhcr ag c�onverued Tht. CGS
acts its rnilit.in adviser to both the President and the
1��Iiuistcr cif National Defense Agencies directly
sirbordittale to the CGS are the comnn iders of the
cirtnv. air fort,), and navy, and the :nII)hirlcd Sersice
Force The Taiwan Garrison General Ileadquarten. a
paramilitary org kF(i%:.Itir(n prinlarih eonelnwd with
internal ;vclIriI\, and the Ala -tsu and Chin -men
Defence Command are subordinate to Ilse HIND
The ater\ of operation, if activate(]. 'o111d also be
dir(etly subordinate to the MND
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (S)
As of I jarlu;Iry 1971 fi,ert Were .Ipproxiniateh
3.9100)0 civilian Took% in (lie ,tie(� group 1. 3 throng"
49 who were liable for military service: an esitn)ated
75g; of these weregnalified to sent,. The arnivd forces
Caa.mor.de,
1. 01ef,
Cw-bined
SQ. Foe.
rol�
Fre.(ndol
Ga'e,.el.enl
t
f
t
1`
T.iw an
Gorrhon
C+a.a1.l
Readgwrrws
ope,v,:m.ol 4a,e, d
4f+ona(
require Appr((sjimaels iuo.o0o u each dear.
PririciPalls as rcPkkcVIlIvok (or tilt itrrns This
requirontcnt'illl;r.Iduall( incrr assrcalernun,hen
of ntainlaod Chinew are released becattsc of o;e and
physical disabdits
1IIr' a }ti olat('d lturnher of (miles i%.LjI d)lc and the
tttasirttnrn nurnhcr of Fnen fit for military scrn ice bs 5-
sear :igc groul)s its of I Janoart 197 -1 is i t% follo's
The avcril9v nurnhcr reaching n)iht :in age i 191
:fnaualh doriiig the period 1971 .ti will be ;11)11(it
?Ut1,00f1
2. Strength trends (S)
ttcpresentative arnic(l forces strengths for the period
I9C)6 -73 ary shown it, Fit;ur( ContittuC. efforts
under the MAP to reduce tilt 110C ;irmed forces
stren};Ih produced Olinin,ai resuits bct;ifinint; in lobs)
'heu Chiang K- -~lick approved a plan to reduce
arrm strc119111 bs 40.000 nx�n. M the end of 19G9,
much of this reduction had Iwen accomplished in
:3
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TOTAL
MAXIMUM
CIVILIAN
M- FIT FOR
ACE
MALES
MIL]TARY SERt7CE
15 -19
973,000
799,000
20 -24
810,000
841,000
25 -29
325,000
255,000
30-34
490,000
373,000
35 -39
445,000
320,000
40-44
448,000
295,000
4549
419,000
247,000
Total, 1549
3,910,000
2,930,000
The avcril9v nurnhcr reaching n)iht :in age i 191
:fnaualh doriiig the period 1971 .ti will be ;11)11(it
?Ut1,00f1
2. Strength trends (S)
ttcpresentative arnic(l forces strengths for the period
I9C)6 -73 ary shown it, Fit;ur( ContittuC. efforts
under the MAP to reduce tilt 110C ;irmed forces
stren};Ih produced Olinin,ai resuits bct;ifinint; in lobs)
'heu Chiang K- -~lick approved a plan to reduce
arrm strc119111 bs 40.000 nx�n. M the end of 19G9,
much of this reduction had Iwen accomplished in
:3
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FIGURE 2. Approximate personnel strengths of the armed
"Includes army, combined service force, Taiwan Garrison
General 4leadquarters, and armed forces personnel in the
Mini-try of National Defense.
Includes Marine Corps personnel.
was a marked decline in the personnel strengths
of the ground and air forces. The increase in strength of the
ground forces between 1969 and July I970 reflects it refinement
in the personnel strengths of the \INI) and the CSF and not
an actmd increase lit arms strength itsclr.
additiolt. the nave planned 10 cut personnel by .400.
:end furlber force redtiction plans for the air force were
under %turfy. For political reasons, hmvcvrr. ally
ftirther re�dtet�tinns in the trength of the ROC arned
forces are likely to be slow ill comilag.
For several ears after moving to Taiwan, the C11(:
hesitated to use Taiwattsv in (he armed forces, despile
the increasing average age of its mainland personnel.
In 1959, about 80.000 Taiwanu� were inducted�
principally for the arrny �hul were released after
aboul it %ear of service ffn\vc�vcr. Since Ilse revi%ion of
the conscription law in 19541, Tai%varu�se have beell
Irgally \object to can+c�riptinn: they now c�untpri%r
aware� thou our -half of armed forces personn.�I sire�ngill,
a proportion thal i% expected to increase Approsi-
matt�1% Iwo- tlliach of the%(� Taiaatle'w personnel are is
the :Erin_% fr%vor are ill the sir force, and the %mallest
number in the nav% and marine corps.
'I'll(- rniiitir% wrvi(� la\% requires all tnale% to register
upotl reaching 19. 1. lit" are not %ubjecl (o callup
until the age of 20 The tout of erviev is 2 year% for
Ihr army (combat .Erns) and 3 years for the navy, air
fort-(-, and army technical brandies, with assigurm�ol
drlerrnined ill par( h% cla%sific;etion and aptitude test.
After release from service the individual is required by
law to s(�rve 5 %ran ill ;lit organized rrservr unit; It(
llama reverts to the general reserve, subject to calbap
until age -I5. Onty the ante} h a% org;utizvd reserve
ouils for rewrvr duly following release from regular
Service 'I'ho%c rrservr% with Icss than 10 years of active
iand rewrve duly are stibjec�t to first recall.
C
Women ill the armed force% wr%c in the Womcn'%
Auxihary Corps r1CAC :t All fct%e officer %I;alus 1
WAC hattalio0 is unticr the supercimon of the Political
Warfare Dvpartnarnt. MXD. and a number of other
worm�n svr%v in the political departments of the other
service Their \cork inc�ludrs psNchological %carfare
broadcasting. recreational %ervic�es, and welfare
administration.
Following the w�ithdr \%al front the inairdand,
morale of the armed forces was tlarigvrood% Ion As
adectoate food, clothing, and %helter acre acquired,
and NIAP- .upported r�rquipment and training
increased proficiency, morale rosy but is more recrnll%
feeling the effects of stagnation and low pas The
Taiwantcse are resigned to nailitar ser %ice. but
currently only about 4 "i Nerve beyond the obligator%
period. The armed forces, prvdominaoatly 'Taiwanese
in the lowest grad" of service 19 Out Alf 10 arncy
private %ary Taiwanese), are well disciplined and reach
to perform their primary defensive mission. However.
the morale of the average Tak%anesc conscript might
not stand the test of severe combat conditions in
offensive operations away from Taiwan. Therefore,
(31C planning for "relurn to the maim }and"
operations envisions using. it) ill(' initial phases, Only
elite troops with high morale.
3. Training (S;
klilitar%' training is pealemed after that of the
United States. U.S. military training publications,
programs, lc� ildques, and equipment tiro used.
Almost all of the schools are modeled after their
American coutttvrparis. Instructors are advised by
VIAA(; personnel assigurd to the schools and training
c�enlcr%. Senior officers may attend the National War
College, subordinate to the Presidential Office, for
instruction on defense problems. The NiND opeiales
tilt� Armed Forces University, which inchtcles the old
Armed Forces Staff College and the Ihrce service
Command and Staff Colleges, Additionally, the HIND
operates the Political Staff C:(;llege, which trains
political personnel, including civil affairs/militar%
goventmcot personnel and members of the WAC.
Approxim alely Ior of the ROC Officer Corps are
political cadre serving in tmils, staff sections. Lind
schools throughout the armed forces. Selected officers
�rota all services also attend the Institute of
Revolulionary Practice, an advanced school of
strategic studies sponsored by the Kuomintang
Na(ioual Peoples Parl KNIT While ao increasing
ntim1wr of joint and connbinrd exercises have traded
to improve ntililary capahilifies, pOlilic�al warfare
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forces (S)
nHOLfln
.l ne
j l rrnn
s�ncrso
%.tvvA`
tuner.
anal.
1966...
423,700
82,100
�8,300
604,400
1907...........
425,560
74,500
98.300
508,300
1968...........
423,800
74,
98.300
596,500
1969 "s........
40-�800
73,980
83,280
503,000
1070...
409,520
72,1110
81,820
563,750
1971 fJull......
407,460
74,100
82,600
w4,500
1972 (000...
'123,100
75,600
82,880
581,580
1973 (Oct)......
396.300
75,900
82,700
554,660
"Includes army, combined service force, Taiwan Garrison
General 4leadquarters, and armed forces personnel in the
Mini-try of National Defense.
Includes Marine Corps personnel.
was a marked decline in the personnel strengths
of the ground and air forces. The increase in strength of the
ground forces between 1969 and July I970 reflects it refinement
in the personnel strengths of the \INI) and the CSF and not
an actmd increase lit arms strength itsclr.
additiolt. the nave planned 10 cut personnel by .400.
:end furlber force redtiction plans for the air force were
under %turfy. For political reasons, hmvcvrr. ally
ftirther re�dtet�tinns in the trength of the ROC arned
forces are likely to be slow ill comilag.
For several ears after moving to Taiwan, the C11(:
hesitated to use Taiwattsv in (he armed forces, despile
the increasing average age of its mainland personnel.
In 1959, about 80.000 Taiwanu� were inducted�
principally for the arrny �hul were released after
aboul it %ear of service ffn\vc�vcr. Since Ilse revi%ion of
the conscription law in 19541, Tai%varu�se have beell
Irgally \object to can+c�riptinn: they now c�untpri%r
aware� thou our -half of armed forces personn.�I sire�ngill,
a proportion thal i% expected to increase Approsi-
matt�1% Iwo- tlliach of the%(� Taiaatle'w personnel are is
the :Erin_% fr%vor are ill the sir force, and the %mallest
number in the nav% and marine corps.
'I'll(- rniiitir% wrvi(� la\% requires all tnale% to register
upotl reaching 19. 1. lit" are not %ubjecl (o callup
until the age of 20 The tout of erviev is 2 year% for
Ihr army (combat .Erns) and 3 years for the navy, air
fort-(-, and army technical brandies, with assigurm�ol
drlerrnined ill par( h% cla%sific;etion and aptitude test.
After release from service the individual is required by
law to s(�rve 5 %ran ill ;lit organized rrservr unit; It(
llama reverts to the general reserve, subject to calbap
until age -I5. Onty the ante} h a% org;utizvd reserve
ouils for rewrvr duly following release from regular
Service 'I'ho%c rrservr% with Icss than 10 years of active
iand rewrve duly are stibjec�t to first recall.
C
Women ill the armed force% wr%c in the Womcn'%
Auxihary Corps r1CAC :t All fct%e officer %I;alus 1
WAC hattalio0 is unticr the supercimon of the Political
Warfare Dvpartnarnt. MXD. and a number of other
worm�n svr%v in the political departments of the other
service Their \cork inc�ludrs psNchological %carfare
broadcasting. recreational %ervic�es, and welfare
administration.
Following the w�ithdr \%al front the inairdand,
morale of the armed forces was tlarigvrood% Ion As
adectoate food, clothing, and %helter acre acquired,
and NIAP- .upported r�rquipment and training
increased proficiency, morale rosy but is more recrnll%
feeling the effects of stagnation and low pas The
Taiwantcse are resigned to nailitar ser %ice. but
currently only about 4 "i Nerve beyond the obligator%
period. The armed forces, prvdominaoatly 'Taiwanese
in the lowest grad" of service 19 Out Alf 10 arncy
private %ary Taiwanese), are well disciplined and reach
to perform their primary defensive mission. However.
the morale of the average Tak%anesc conscript might
not stand the test of severe combat conditions in
offensive operations away from Taiwan. Therefore,
(31C planning for "relurn to the maim }and"
operations envisions using. it) ill(' initial phases, Only
elite troops with high morale.
3. Training (S;
klilitar%' training is pealemed after that of the
United States. U.S. military training publications,
programs, lc� ildques, and equipment tiro used.
Almost all of the schools are modeled after their
American coutttvrparis. Instructors are advised by
VIAA(; personnel assigurd to the schools and training
c�enlcr%. Senior officers may attend the National War
College, subordinate to the Presidential Office, for
instruction on defense problems. The NiND opeiales
tilt� Armed Forces University, which inchtcles the old
Armed Forces Staff College and the Ihrce service
Command and Staff Colleges, Additionally, the HIND
operates the Political Staff C:(;llege, which trains
political personnel, including civil affairs/militar%
goventmcot personnel and members of the WAC.
Approxim alely Ior of the ROC Officer Corps are
political cadre serving in tmils, staff sections. Lind
schools throughout the armed forces. Selected officers
�rota all services also attend the Institute of
Revolulionary Practice, an advanced school of
strategic studies sponsored by the Kuomintang
Na(ioual Peoples Parl KNIT While ao increasing
ntim1wr of joint and connbinrd exercises have traded
to improve ntililary capahilifies, pOlilic�al warfare
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III d (Wt rinattIII has presided the "%%h% Ile fight
rmwnalc far the 'members of the ROC armed forces
asseml)led %%ith illost If the major eclmperllents
imported from Ille United States. The cotmtn's naval
Ship construction capabilities are )intitc�cl to landing
craft. !'lie Republic of China has it diminutive aircraft
indttstn %vhic'h produces it fe%% pistoll engine trainers
and a%semlb)es LAW Itelicopten. F -5E fighle aircraft
"ill also be enassemb}ed all Taiwan ill a program
supported under U.S. Foreign Aid Sales Act (FAS)
funding. Almost all of the equipment used In the
armed forces has liven provided by (lie United States
its grant aid under its ;Military Assistance ?'rogrtin
OMAN. which terminated in mid -1973 V,S, militar%
assistance extended to the Republic of China duri
the peroid 1951 through 1972 totaled abau( C'S$3.4
billion lit addition, Japan has sold militan
equipment %'()Tilt 53.3 milliaa and Israel S1.S million
to the Republic of China.
The Combined Service Force ((:SF) is a separlle
organization %rithiu talc regular armed forces that is
responsible fur munitions pracfuc�lion, finance seni:e.
survey and Illappitag, and certain inortlr and urlfare
:activities for all the armed forces Its total strr?igth is
6.3W Until 1955. the� (:SF %%as rrsp. tl+il)le for
determining requirements and prac�tiriug and
distributing supplies fur all the :trilled forces In Min
1953. each %er %ice %a% made m%pan%ible� fnr its ono
pmeurvinent except for ]()calla produced item (chicfl}
twivanc�el and all conlr:ac�ls a)f USSS,000 and o%er.
%%hick remain the rrspmi%ibilih c,f the CSF All Ihrev
%vr%icv have� patterned their SuPpl% organinitions
after (hose of ilteir respective 1 S counterparts, and
%uppliv% are classified ac�c coding to the C, S m stem
Inasmuch as tilt- ,rims is the largest user of mans
(�nrlltnutl -rose itt'tta% tvelllCleS, a rilnllillitlon, and small
arms), ii was charged mill cull� ()f the ser%ier%%idr
functions prm iousb perfcumed h% the CSI' i'he (:SI'
i+ responsible for procurement of specified eonitlurn-
use ttrtlls flit all st�ices and for wevipt, %tamge, a nd
(listribulimi of ,ill :trim NIAP i'lerrts and specified \IAP
items for the mw. and air force, A Juinl Transport
(:nimuand %%as established tinder the MN in 1962 to
enntml all ground. ,,it-. Mica sea transport comman-
deered during any vmergvnc�%. Lack of rxperietim in
planning and oprralinp a iltoILlem suppl% s%stvrit is a
cmtititmitlg handicap, but this situation is bring
i m pravc�d.
a. Military budget (S)
The tinh(i n budget of late Republic of China is
prepared the XIimister of National Defense for all
the arm d force+ %ubntitted to Ifle I ?xec�utire Yuan for
imtlu +inn
ill tile� natinnat Midget, and finalh
fur% %anted In the Legi %laIi%e Iran for apprmal.
Although ''err is no %mice breakout, the FY73
tended 30 June 1913) defense budget of the central
gIwcrn file lit indicate% that 1x'nnrtit(l costs alttottnt it)
52r'i r.; the Inlal, clpl�rali()tl+ awl maintenarice 32'i,
alld investment 16r, '*-Iilitilr% budget+ of tilt. central
gm vrnment fnr the Nears 1970 tbrougli 1973 are shun rt
in Figun� :3.
5. Economic support and logistics (S)
The economy Provides substantial Support to its
defense cslabli%hincut. Rapid economic growth to
recent years has enlarged the industrial sector to it
paint %chew it makcs a significailtly greater
emitrihution than agriculture lot the grass national
pr(iduct. Agricultural ntttl)tlt is .Llffidt'llt to Illeet the
demands for fond reNtilling from rapid Population
growth and rising incomes and also to pnnidr a
surplus fnr export. Industrial production is dependent
om imports of raw materials, capital goods, and furls
The Relniblic of Chiuu has fitcilities MIXI }e of
producing a numbrr of military items, [tit cahoot
produce the most sophisticated %%vapons, %%Edell 1 .1
heed smpplied by the United States. !()slay Produc�rd
items include small :trim+, molars, recoilless r; flrs,
rocket laullelIM, 04 live devices. quartermaster
supplies, and' animunitimi IIP Illrotlgh IJJ_11,11,
artillery Projectiles. In .addition� a shrill nttillber rtf
grnertl purpmv tmlilary trucks uP to 2V tons are
FIGURE 3. Military budgets (S)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
FY70� FY71 FY72 FY73
Defense budget 152.0 563.0 15211,0 712.1;
pefrnsv hudgrt Its it prr-
"ninge of tilt- eetalrnl
t. vernment':f budget... 38.8 48.7 0i.2 ��Sc.S
Defense budget ns n per
centnge of GNI'....... 9.S 9.7 10.0
�Fivcna year: 13nds 30 June of the designated year
I)iffnrs from percentage cited in ti reol nm% Chapter avhem the defense share or the budget ip baSrd nn the eau
snlid"WI expenditnrex of the central, provinrinl, nntl lorul
goeere,ments.
6. Uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
Uniftmm worn by ill(- armed force% of Ihr GRC are
gem rally similar in design, material. and color to those
(If the counterpart services ill the anneal forces of the
i'lllted States, The one eNc�rption is the uniftmit of
Wiv% seallum ratings, which resembles Ibat elf
ti.
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comparrble riling% in the� Batish Rural \a%% All
officer personnc�I are authorized [till dross mlifornrs.
complete with ceremonial Suomi% for special Occasions
"I'll(- slandard material for %%inter uniforms is soul
serge and for Su, ter, cotton herriugbone h %ill or
khaki
losigoia of grille i% Mont on shuuldcrhoard
shouldc�rloops, on the collue, of llurform shirt, �nd
fatigovs, or on [lie .lueves The n:n %euman ratings
arc tdkided into three categories etc- tending upon
dol% imignmcnl �Derek Group, Eti4mccring Gronp.
and !viisc�ellancom (:coup The Dcvk Croup i%
identified b horizontal %tri pe� the t,Ogi live ri it g
(:roof) b% c�lie%ruuS, and III(� Mi%cella nut el% (Troup b%
tit verlcd c�li(-%rolls. all of %%hic�h it re %%Ora )Ii llic upper
slecvc.
Ad Ili ira1% 1st and 2d class display similar markiIig%
of grade %%hen ucaring a uniform so ultich grade is
indicated on the %Ive%es but an uniforms uhe�re gr;t(ty
is indicated on slioulderboard%, tile admiral W class
displays four stars and the adlrlifid 2d c�las% Ilre�v stars_
Cromid force and air force personnel displa% braitc�h
of u�ryice or specialty insignia, respec(M-1%, oil each
c�011;u tab of tilt' onif�1rin coat. Naval force% pvrsoom�I
displa% Specialt% insignia on the Jemv ahoy the
indivAor of grade I'll(- princil):d uniforms ;n d
insignia arc� illustrated in Figures -1 and 5.
C. Army (S)
The ;Irins susl;tillvd Inost of tilt' lose% in (lit
mainland campaigns against tlic Coniintinkis, and
Ihe remnants that n�ached Taioan were poorly
equipped, luau ly organized field armies using a bland
of foreign taclfc�al cloc�trine U nder tit( U,S, N ilitar
Avistaoce Program (NIAP). the army has been rebuilt
into a force h :iwd on the U,S. field arnn concept and
using ('.S, Arm,% taclical doc�trioc�s and (veil Ili que%.
Jn 19 58 it major reorgauizdion of 'rho imlfaill.
divi%ioos coninivitced Il1at incrcased the army's
%opporl and firepower capability. Late 1969 and early
1974 sail fore( redactions and further reorganization
directed toward achieving economy of farce and
flexibility. Capabilities continue to he improved
through training and argniAtion Of more and better
equipment. Re�croit. duty reserve, e:id reserve
officer mooning have been placed ulider a reorganized
and strengthened 9- division reserve system.
The ground forces are well prepared to delcild
Taiwao and other lxtsscssions and arc capable of
maintaining iutemal sorority, but wilho]it foreign
a%sislaorc they could nol withstand at prolonged and
determined assaull by MI(; forces. Mo%l units bare
W
mJm a satisfacton degrev of combat rvadiness,
and man% him e e%NI Al.tined a high degree In
gcovral. Ihe� capabilities of lhv i;rourcd forces 11.1u�
iwvn lirniled b% a lack of armored persound carrier,.
nleciinrn tanks, medium irtillvr%. light a%ialion.
modern c�omrnunic�atiom, electr Airs eelmpnacnl.
Iogntical stippnrl. .r11L1 pbhn]]]11'l Ir:riunl{; plccgr;uas
1. Organization
The (anc�rd ;i.;rdyuarlrr, Arnr% I(:IIQ Arr1n%1.
dircc�tl% ,ubnrdivatc to the LI \D, cnotrolS treintng.
adruinislrtUoo, grid logistical support of the arm%
The Chic�f of the Cetivral Staff, \I\D. est'rci %vs
opuratiooal votltrol tllIOW91I tcrritori;tl defcusc�
commands. I It' is ivsiste�d b% four gcncral staff secli00%
(Personnel, Irltelliigem'e. Opcctfion% and Platining.
and Organization and Traioiogl. i l special staff
,evtitai%� and 4, political deportment that perforrm a
%%idc %arid% of fuuctiotrs %%how aim is to in%urc Im all
of the troops Its flit regitnt� Ileadqu;irler% of the Arum
Logistical :omm:orcl serve% it t I(- gcnwral sl,tff
logistical Section
'I'liv largest administrative and tacircal Molt of tilt'
ground forcer% is the field arms Organized along the
lines cif a l'_S. field Fill the nor. lield .trim
ourinall% consist% of is hrvtdquarters. organic %%rice
;tod Supporl troops. and t%%O or more corps Field
:irrnie% have� onl% Ghoul �IU"i of the 101;11 personnel
strength and appmximatels 11'f of the %opporting
troops thal might be found is their U c�nonterpitrl%_
The corps nonmtll% consists of it ltcadctuarterN. organic
service :roof support troops, and Iv v% than ?Sur of the
urlillcn ullits tlsoall-. found ill it U S core%
Until 1969, the arlll\ basic majurc�onilml mtit aa%
the "forward look" infant� di%i %imi- It hall all
authorized %trenglb of 14.82 -1 :rod %y:i, organized along;
the� limes Of it U S. Arms World War II infante
division. H\ the end of ISM). "forward look'' infanlrm
division nr%% called "hcay%" di%i%ions, xcrc
reorganized ulidcr it Ihrve- brt'A;ldc�, b;lltalinn-fle,ibh�
c�oncvpl. The ltcav% iofanln (It\kion has an
aulhorized strength of ilr.61.1 men and inc�hidem one
rnedi+on and three light nrtiller\ battalions bill $tit
armor or aircraft. Tuo of the Ileav) utfantn diyi %inns
%vre ill ;LCti %';lle and their basic cadre per%onnel %sere
insigned tit reserve division cadre% The Grill% has thrcc
armored brigade% of 3.5:)9 pveonnel. %with hm lank
battalion nil one arnutrrd inleuttr battalion In
addilion to the arm% 12 lira%% inL011n di%i%ionS.
there ;ire alms (i light infant r di% i Siun%, orgonizvd %%fill
their 5 battalions dinctl\ Order the Ilk ision
heodcluarlcrs. Them- diwi %ions. with it Awngth of 1.562
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H
SERVICE UNIFORM
Jr
SERVICE DRESS
i
GROUND FORCES
a I A A A
GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL IT GEN ERAL MAJOR
Or THE ARMY IST GRADE 2D GRADE GENERAL CAP INSIGNIA
I
6 A A A i
COLONEL IT COlONPI MAJOR CAPTAIN 1ST LIEUIENA14T 21) LIEUTENANT
NAVAL FORCES
ADMIRAL ADMIRAL VICE ADMIRA REAR ADMIRAL
OF THE FLEET 1SI AND 20 CLASSES COMMODOJtF
i
r rii wRlf. llLwa
COMMANDER LT COMMANDER I
CAP INSIGNIA
LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT JO ENSIGN
AIR FORCES
CAP INSIGNIA
GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL IT GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL
OF THE AIR FORCE IST GRADE 7D GRADE
LAPEL INSIGNIA
A IT L MAJOR I 151 I NT 2D LIEUTENANT
SERVICE UNIFORM
FIGURE 4. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
7
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SERVICE UNFORM
C
SERVICE UNIFORM
PETTY OfFtCER
GROUND FORCES
f
WARRANT MASTER SERGEANT MASTER SERGLANT MASTER SERGEANT
OFFICER 'ST CLASS 2D CUSS 30 CLASS 16
ol CAP INSIGNIA
NCO's
SERGEANT SERGEANT CORPORA,
IS1 cuss
PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE CAP INSIGNIA
IST CLASS 2D CLASS 30 CLASS PRIVATES
WARRANT OFFICER
157 CLASS
H
PETTY Off, ER
IST CLASS
13
A&E
SFAI.LAN
NAVAL
WARRANT OFFICER
20 CtA55
M
PETTY OFFICER
20 CLASS
M
SEAMAN
APPRENTICE
CAP RAND
SEAMAN
FORCES
WARRANT OFFICER
3 D CLASS
0
PETTY OFFICER
3D CLASS 0
CAP INSIGNIA
REM OFFICER
SEAMAN
RECRUIT
AIR FORCES
G
9"
MASTER SERGEANT
IST CLASS
SERGEANT
IST CLASS
PRIVATE
IST CLASS
SERVICE UNIFORM
FIGURE 5. NCO and enlisted men's uniforms al
q;
(MASTER SERGEANT
2D CLASS
M
SERGEANT
PRIVATE
70 CLAS5
Id insignia (U /OU)
Y,
I
SERVICE UNIFORM
SEAM -N
I
MASIER SERGEANT
31) CLASS to
0 CAP INSIGNIA
CORPORAL
PRIVATE
30 CLASS
lqor
LAPEL INSIGNIA
9
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men each, perform security missions nn Taicsarl :reel
01i the offshore islamis.
The air defense artillery group is under tic
Operational canlrol of the air force but is stafft�ol bs
army personnel. Activated i late 1962. it has Iflrce
missifc battalions tw r Nike- 1lervilles and role� Hawk.
provinces of the m aintand. these highly qualified
troops have exceptional esprif de Corps but are not
almvaNs suhnaissive to strict inilitart discipline flit
AC NSC has been trailled and largely rcl- quipped
according to regular arm} standards its one artillen
and sis infantry Batt dious provide the garrison of the
11'11-chill and Taing -vin Defense Commands, svllich
are under the operational c�ontrof of the mass. '1hc
ACNSC also has nne sea asscudt hattalioll which is
assigned to the 11'11 -chill, 'Tling -girl. and Penghit
Cominands as needed.
2. Strength, composition, and dispositioni
The army, with a strength of approximatr1%
317,(}0(), iiiCludes two field armies, six cords,
infantry divisions (12 heav%. six light), three armored
brigades, onv armored infantrl brig ade, an airborne
1 01 `0- colnnlund of two airborne brigades, two armored
eavalrr regiments. four special forties groups. one air
defense missile group (tinder air force c�rintrol i, an(I an
air aril Five of [f hca%% infailtrs divisions, two of
OW light infantry divisions, four armored battalions�
a11d support units arc stationpol 0n the offshore islands.
The relnairidvr arc on 'Taiwan anti the I'c% atloms
(Penghu) IsItIMIs, predonaimu10% in the northern h,df
of Taiavan ill tilt HN Field Arms area. Arrny Aviatitlrl
bas the primary mission of conunand support and
liaison and is organized into three aviation companies.
Its imeiflor comprises 117 t' S built aircraft la"
Cessna 0-1 F., 7 B111DDOG U -17A Ceana 189), ;u1d 8
Ilughcs 011-6 CAYI'SE. 22 011.13 SiOUX, -11 U11-
Ill IROQUOIS, Id Ufi- 1 BI ?AVERS, and 101 -math
Pf -I1.
\lost anus and equipment ill[ of U.S, MV It
design and origin and wert provided through U.S.
rnihtar% :aid program.. Combined Service Porcc(CSF)
Plants pr0d11c- lit ited anlounts of recoiIle" rifles,
+1111111 arms. and 2l�_ and i -tfat trucks. Willi til
exception of R- iliell howitzer anti 76 -nom lank rounds.
CSI' ancrl:lls are operating below capacity due to lack
of funding. The reorganizatioll left the army 50%
short of \1_1T tanks authorized by its tuille of
organization and cgttipment. loin the use of older NI-
2.l larks and v1 -I8 911ti carriage. reduced the unik
shortage to 5"0. Only a srrl;tll po `hon of the 990
authorized \f -I 13 ArInored Personnel Carriers (APC)
are oil band. Shortages in troop -lift helicopters,
nondivisiomal general support artillery and artillery
prime movers, ;ind enr}ticer, ainitlten;lnce. ant]
Modem tactical conirllliniCations ctlatiptllellt also exist.
f n -III(I c1` ill file army personnel strength is talc I)rltl-
bIAV- supported Anti- Commmmist National Salvation
Co11t)naod (ACzNSC), with it strength of about 5,300,
Largely comprising form r guerrillas from the cu:islal
Toir detailed; viment ilrrnrucatua, sev or[lrtof &IIIle Slmunnnl,
Fordgrr G"lunl Forrer, alul the Aldflary lrrtrl g"'ner S18111" raj.
Islith IltiM iched by 1 1 w Derensc 11161 Agelicy
:3. Training
Training is designed to prepare indivieluals and
units for combat and uses U.S. doctrine, techniques.
Mitt equipment. individual training starts with talc
basic training progranis conducted at reerult training
ceillev, and cantillues through a system of advanced
schooling for technicians, nonclunlrtissinned officers,
and officers. The first �1 mouths of recruit training
include basic and advanced individual training, basic
tillit training. and political indoctrination. upon
Collipleti[lin of basic trailing, most recruits it re aU igned
directly to units. Specialists either receive om the job
training in a tillit or, in certain instances, may be
assigord first to i t service school and then to a unit.
Special courses for enlisted personnel are conducted at
the Ill branch and technical service schools amt] the
two \tCO schools of the anily. 'These courses arc
adequate to provide tilt- aTMY with school trained
NCO's and specialists for duty with units and as
instructors. SChools for Villislyd personnel arc also
colidoet at .ht, division and special tilliI level as
deeded All branch and technical service schnuls have
hasic and advanced courses for officers. After
successful completion of the advanced course of their
Particular service. officers Ina% be selected in attend
the Army Command :ind General Staff College
(C &GSC) al Taipei, the highest semiev school in lilt
arnn' :ltd roughly egnivalellt to (1) U.S. :Iris
Cotaalnand and General Sluff C0llcgr at Ft.
I.Cavcimorill, Kansas,
Training of units is C ondticted in thn�e phaWS �unit
training (to conaparty level}. advalluvd a11il training
(battalion :old regiment). and combined trills
(regimental conibat loam) training. Training of large
units (division and corpse is accouaplishcd bs field
nl:nrelivers held innnr[li.,tc�ly after Coll) pletio11 0f
advanced unit training. I ?mpllasis is b-itig placed ell
training that will stv atlily improve the capabilities of
army units ltl ParliCipatte in ioint operations. Some
practical esperictivc and training al this Imcl is
afforded by operations ou the offshore islawts of \la-
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z
3
tsa and Quermns Chi n -s. rn l ao� 'I he area% trsitiing
prognttil is gvtieralls rrfrctiri :.Ithough combined
arntb joint orivratlurm and lice -fire err%i training are
inadequale.
Ott its :Itcn miliative the 1 10C: has ttrtdertaket. the
intensive. specialized training of elite units ti e. the
airbornc� brigades. special force% t!roups. and several of
the "licav,." divisions) to prepare them for specific
roles in "return to the mainland` operilions.
Sirnilarl. the AC \SC it selected intelligence
personnel liare undergone rigouts% training for
advance 1iti5SimnS against the I'eople's Ileptibl of
China.
-f. Logistics
Army unit mquisitionkiQ and %apply procedures
geu�rally folhnv those of the L'S Arun. Some
specified eoninimi -ttsc items are procured hl tltc CSF
and others by the army: ilems procured bi the army
are for (lie navy and air force as +cell as for the arnn
itself. I'rocieremett of other than c�mumsn -use items is
it service respon;iNNIN of the logistic section of the
General licadgtasrters of the Arm Maintei.anc�c-
generally follotivs S. Army concepts, but ROC:
foStall:lIiOils are less efficient for the following reasons:
facilities have fewer personnel and less equipmcttt;
spare parts are ofteii scarce: and the Chinese
i ainiviance num lacks the experience of his U.S.
COL111terpart.
There has hcen it continuing effort to strcngtiren the
army logistical systvm. chiefly through training :end
reorganization of logistical support units. In laic� 1961
;t %j)CC kI army logistics unit was established illy
Army General Ileadquarlers to plan and coordinate
logistical readiness for mainland npemtions. Array
transportation hi a ++a rsitnation would he inadequ
D. Navy (S)
The niv+ 1% a mnderatels effec�tke force It has
improccd since the 1949 \ationalist +r ithdramal from
III, mainland. largely IwCaose of S aid tinder the
MAP. miliels It:u included ship procurement. logistic
support. and tr,,.nutg Foreign Military Sales JAISF
ha+ been more siguihc;utl +vitlt the termination of
.MAP material aid at the end of F) girl f usie� 1973F
In addition. the na%N is starting to procure third
countn material. ik tint appreciable purCII ;tse bcing.1
tanker botighl in O vioimr lWil) tFigure tit The ncrr+
has a fair capalrilih for engaging I'll(: naval farces cif
sintik. size :tad Cormposition, but tli,� irtler%crition of
PRC subtmarines. large number', of last patrol Crufl.
and .tircraft. alinIL with extensive minim.. +could
over lIVItII it
I'rimaril+ it dcfemsi%T fore� the na+s has the
principal missions of I t providing nas defense of
�;Boon ;Hld the offshore islands and resupplying dw
Assoc:,. and 2S mat atai Ili ng sc�a control iit Ibr Formosa
Strait area. For earning Emil fbv first mission, the nas's
is c�onsiulered adequate and has nol as set IFcrrt
cliallenged h% the PKC:. For its second mission.
hitarv: r. it is inadregitale. Inc�idrnls hchreon GIi {:and
HIC na val craft in lugust and November 196.3
resithed in the loss of three ROC ships. tot.ilirtg some
2.5W Ions c6plaeemetit. and ever 300 tires Since
Ihen, I10C naval clvmvnts Mare generally avoided
contact with the PRC \a%%. and it is obvious that it
Could not control the strait without (lu� assMillec of
the U. S. 5evenlll Fleet- This situation is the
ennsequence of the continuing huildnp of the 1
Navy and the relatively static state of (lie ROC Mays
Within the navy as well as Ihc� other services, lack of
planning :rod cuorilination has hindered
effective
action. Ott individual ships, proficiency itI gunnery is
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11
W
comidered good, and antisublrtarinc warfare. air
defense, and minelaying and minesweeping c'apubili-
ties are improving. 1)efcrisivch. the nav% is capal)le Of
carrying on liinited patrol and surveillance of the
T.-Ii wall- Pescadores, and offshore island arras as well
M If logistically supporting the forces oil the offshore
islands. it is also capable of ec)ncfaleting limited
antisubmarine %varfare and rni ne .warfare operations, of
sapporling amphibious assaults %vilhin to ?5U -mile
radius of 'I;li%vaul, and of carrying Out limited Offensive
operatiolls such as shore bombardment, interdiction of
shipping it' the Forniosa Strait, and nlinewarfare, The
navy is considered capable of performing only a f
htsks concnrr�nlly. Naval operations %could also be
restricted by the inability of ships to remain at sea for
extended periml5. prinlarilw beC')i1151' of a lack of
effective mobile logistic support.
Certain weaknesses ha%va stenakned frorn the lack Of
naval tradition and the G)ilure of senior officers to
delegate responsibilities to slibnrcliruates. There have
also beelt marked deficiencies ill P[Illlplllelli. 11051 of
the ships are over27 years Of age and have experienced
hard Osage; sonar and antiaircraft warning rgalipment
are of %V%V 11 vin;.age. Among the iniprovenlents
being introduced are tilt� modernizing of the
anlislahenarine warfare (ASXV) capability by installing
mare modern sonars and e�Ieelrunie countcrnu'asnns
(I ?C \1) eclllipmeiti and providing homing Iorpedots;
by adding nwdern minesweepers, ASIV ships and
patrol craft, and by providing additiomd dcstrovem
I. Organimliorl
The navy is under the adoolillistritiv[ catnrnancl aril
Operational ctaltrol of the Conlntander in G,lief,
Navy. Wilhin naval headquarters at "Taipei, tilt:
Caninlander in Chief is assisted by two principal
deputies, the I)cptliy Commander fit Chief for
Administration and the Dcputy Commander in Chief
for Operatisons. Also repor ling to him is the
Commandant, Marine Corps. Directly subordinate to
laic Deputy in Chief are, tilt. Chief of
Staff and two spatial units �tile Political %Vat. {arc
D artmenl a nd the Olx rationed Research and
Inspection Comtnillee, Under (lie Chief of Staff there
rrc two funclioll;al staff gmmps� gcncrai` and special.
The general sluff group is composed of six 1)lircaus
Pcrsonncf, Intelligence, Operations, I,Ogisties,
Planning, and Comptroller) and the Cornnionication
hind Electronics Department. The special staff
includes 13ureatt of Shills kledieal.,Dcpartrnent, judge
Advocate Department;- talld Dellcnderds Admillisira-
tirm pcj)z,tmt nt.
'rile N,lv:el Logistics Command. established ill Illici-
t t.0, handles approximatef% 7W1' of the looney
budge[cd to the n;ny. Its headquarters 1% in Tso ping
%%here the logistics re%min'cs, including tine four naval
ship%aeres and reapply dcpnis loc;:tccf at the various
bases, are consolid under One command.
The short estahlislilnent Of the Ila%w is divided into
the Firs[, SVc�Ond. ;old Third Naval Districts, with
Itead(iultrtcrs at Tso ying, i\Qa knllg. and Chi Iloilo,
respectively. Undereach district there aresmvral share
establishments such as defense units. barber service
teams, shipyards, and !lOSpitals. "1'11c 1 "irsl Naval
District consists Of the southern portion of "faiwau: the
Second. the Pescadores tilenghu) and the QticntO
(Chin -men Tito) aalaplmes. and the Third, the
norlhcnl portion Of 'faiwan.
Except for small patrol and harbor craft assigned to
the naval districts, naval forces afloat are organised fo
:administrative pur)mses into the I Conlnulud. It is
C'O11lpOtie(I Of tilP Anlpllihln115 Form, the Surface farce,
[Ile \timewarfare force, the Service Force, and the
!'Fee( '1'rainilag Con in jild. OI)crlliorially, tilt fleet is
organised its Task Force 62, which is composed of
several task groups to acennlplish speeific assignments.
The Commander Surface Force serves also as
Con) ni aatder 'task Force 62. A vice admiral, he is
smbordimltt' to tilt Chief of Staff (vice adn)iral) anti
the DepuhY COlr.m;altder in CkJ for Operation (vice
admiral).
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
The pcnonnvl strength of lilt navy a5 Of October
1%173 Was about 7:),900, of wllielt 38,200 were in Ilie
lnarille COTS told the remainder ill golierll se r vice.
The operating forces of the nav% consist Of Is
destmycrs. 2 desire �ter escorts, 1.1 patrol boats, 10
molar lorpcdo hoa(s. 23 Ininv%vatrfare, 20 an)phil)Faus
Ships, ;toll about 323 minor ampbibiol,s craft.
Additionally. there ore about Iasi mixilian %hips and
service craft, five floating docks. and t%wo conventional
subnlarinas In be used for ASW trolling orliv. Tile
navy also has operational control of 10 atir force
Grumman S -2A "I'mcker uir( Operated and
maintained by the air force room Ping -tiing South
airfield, ill southern Taiwan abonl 10 milvs northeast
of Kao- hsiung. )'he nlajoril)' of the ennlbataul ships
arc. former U.S- warships of Conventional WNW 11
TFiir rnrient lnfarommlin, see tilt. aauurttlfrd .vast l)rdrr u/
Bartle (Slips). Vidimir tv and alit AffBtary hueffigrnre Sum monr.
hoib poblislietl gaarteilr Iw� the Derr�nse Inldhitc�nrv� ls;ritt'% Brief
infornmlbxi un I'llig-11mg Smith airfirld is tti%ru is ibis ;enenil
stuvey Bt Ille weliola till Tnl mportalinll ,Int rrll'l E%pilH Untt dliill%
13
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design- 7'Icese ships have good endurance anal sva-
keeping qualities and :it( maint� "�d in fairly good
matc-rial condition.
3. Training
Since World W ar if tilt nlv Ila% patterned it%
training after that of the U S. Navy Trott 1919 oil the
sole source of foreign naval assistance and ad%ic�e has
heen lilt- United States.
Training curriculums are similar to those of
comparable U.S. Na%% schools: ho%%ever, the Imild if,
Facilities are poorI% equipped and Ilavc [overlapping
reslxlnsibilities. Training facilities include the Nasal
Institution of Tvehnologv, the Naval Avadrm%, the
Naval Technical Training Scholl, and the Rating
School. Except for relatively feu coon cs for vvhiell it is
necessary to send officers to the United States� courses
offered by the Technical 'I'mining School meet
specialist officer tr inim! needs. The Fleet Training
Command is resfionsible for the afloat and +bore
training of personnel attached to the flee and
maintains :ln afloat and a store training center at Tso-
ying.
Recruit basic training is conducted for 16 weeks at
the R(cruil Training Center 11 Tso -ying. Aftencard.
selected 3 -ye draftees can qualify as I)etly offices on
l success ll completion of c tr. l ilting. This
training ranges in length from �2 to 31) weeks and
includes courses for quartermaster, signalman,
ra(darnian, ellghleman, and other hasic rates.
The principal training center for enlisted men who
have Villunlecred is the� Rating School at Tso -wing.
Training set the school includes a 2 -year basic and
classification course for volunteers who Innst have at
least it Glh- grlcieeducation. Aftergradnation, they are
appointed 2d -class petty officers, receive as 'I'cchnical
School (1lploma, ;old are re(plired 10 Serve a 10 year
enlistment. The Naval Training Center trains about
44X)0 recruits and over 3,1700 other enlisted personnel
annually.
4. Logistics
The navv supply sysle.n is patterned after that of
the U.S. \save, i.r.� a centralized inventory control
system. The systemm is herded by the Rilreau of
Logistics� which provides butt( policy and technical
guidance to all supply echelons of til System. Th
Central Inventory Manager is Supply Command.
Cnitlrmom use ilenls arc procured for the navy by the
CSF and t army. The four nava Slll ilf KuL1-
hshmy. Tsn -wig. Ma -kung. and Chi-lung ---and :l
cenlrt(1 A ct rill Slores and shil)s' Parts depot at 'I'So-
Ili
%ing submit +lock status information to the Suppl%
C ollinwild These lxlints stor(% issue_ and aec�oumt lot
the supplies uilhin their resperlivc areas all,) provide
+nppW for subordinate and or supported tlnits. such
a% %11415 and stations The Imentor% Control
Department has an automatic data- processing s }stem
for mechanized inventory controls of systetit stocks
Blinker and diesel fuel are locally refined from crude
till imported largv1% fro nt tilt Middle i.a +t The
transportation w it-in suffices for the internal
movement of supplies and equipmegl in peacetime
Taivan+ naval shop construction capabilih I+
linlited to the ('olntnle�tiun of slr,tll naval craft at
naval +Ilipy:rds in Tso -ving, Kilo hsitlog. and %1a-
kung. Prodnetion has includett mechanized landon),
craft i I -C\M) litul %ehic(Ilar personnel landing; craft
ll- ('N'P) Iloy(c1Lvr. components used in ship
('OnStr(ICtion rllm +t be imported A tt HSxlstanet'
contract lnr the ill- c�otultry production (if patrol
gunboats leas rec�elitly been dix�usscd X%ith the United
Stales.
Naval ship repair. modernization. and c�omersion
arc l�ffl�caed at four naval sllipards ill Kao- hsiung.
Tso -ring. Nla -kung. and Chi -lung [Keelung;)
Acti%itie+ have illelllded (he Maintenance aIld
merliaul of ships np to destroyer size� the
rehabilitation of lank landing ships (L and the
conversion of high Speed transports (APD) to patrol
escort tP I'),
5. Marine Corals
The Chinem- Marine Corps ((;N1(:) is a balanced
force, organized and trained as an amphibious acsailll
landing: force The CMC: is organized along the litres
of the U.S. Marine Corps, Its basic combat cientenls
consist of two divisions. one LVT (landing; craft.
Vehicle. track) regiment, and one V.MO (nearine
observation squadron). For administrative and service
support there is a combat service regiment, it signal
hat) -Ilion, a hea(Ic)uarI S batty ?ion, and a guard
hattali()n. Tile marine divisions are triangular, having
three infantry wginients of three haltalions each. Ilk
addition, lit( CMC arndtlets its oven training under
[lie Niatine Coq)s School, late NCO School. the
Recruit and Reserve "Training Centex, tilt( the 11mg-
ch'un 'Training Base. A small marine aviation unit
cgnippc�(1 with seven WE aircraft and tie [.III -13
helicopters based at 'I;no -ying Marine :fir Station
provides aerial observation for naval gutlfiresln)tting;,
batllcfield stirveill :ides;, and cYnnulatlei liaison support.
The GRC Army maintains nlslrinc corps aircraft. Tile.
CN1C has an a altho ri zed pemmorl stren elf 38, 00,
hill actual strength approximates 38,200
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m
The Commandant, alai -ne Corps. is direc�tls
subordinate and T4 's to [lie Commander in
(thief. Na%,% 1 is assisted bl idle lepuls
C.omiIwildant. The ort;aniiltion ;dsei includes a
separate political section charged uith political
indoctrination, srcurit% apid rnorile affairs for 4l.
Corps persarulel. Since 1967 a marine dis Ilas
liven deploged la the perkj;hu islands, divisions he�ing
rotated animalh (:SIC amphibious tec�Flniquc�s,
pallern�d after l' S. doctrines and procedures, hose
attained it good standard of proficiency. Command
iind control is best at the baUalion level and
progressively deervaw at the higher llearlgnarters
Imel, C`I(: equipnlenl is prirnarih cif Korean scar
mtage blot is adequate in hoth qu1111ity ;old state of
rliaintcna lice Shortages iii modern a mm ulicalion
ectnipn:cml limit C.IC effectiveness in combined
operations neverlhe�less, CNI(: Units probable
represent the hest Irained and mast combat -reach
org :lmzahons it, the It()(. rnihtars forces.
E. Air force {S}
With MAA(: and \[Ali assistance, the Chinese Air
Force (CAPS has ilcquired an imcllhirs that includes
modern jet fighter interceptors and air -to -air and
surface -to +air ini%gleS The tat tu'al fighter s(Illadrons
fh the Northrop F -8, the Lockhred 1-101 (Figure 7),
the Forth America ii F -I(H), ;llld the older North
Arneric�an P -86 (Figure 8).
The primar illission of the air force is the air
defense u{ Taiwan. iilcilldillg operational c�outrof of
tilt ROC Arm-,'s surface lo -air missile mmits. Slloulcl a
c�nuntcroffensive to regain the m:linl;uld he fannclled,
the air force's mission svoldd also inclllde aerial
revotInaiasalice, destruction of PRC naval and air
)orgi and support of ROC ground and nasal
,m rations. missions for which it would be ill
equipped.
The air force has no stralegic o {fe.nsive c,lp :lbility
and could not mount it" effective air aUack upon the
mainland. It could defend effectively against isolated
intriusions, recommissalice flights, ,old milauthoriied
overffigills iillri _r most callditiotm During daylight
visual flight conditions it caul also defend against it
force of approximateiv its au�n size, hot during eight
or instrument flight conditions it is aI111ost [()lull�
clependcilt on one fighter scimg of 1()-IC's, '1'lle air force
has the IL- clilicid ability to operate its integrateel air
defense system comprising fighter /interceptors, Ilasvk
and Nike- Hercides surface lo air missiles� and
antiaircraft artillery. ]Is air f :uilities :Ire excellent iind
115
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FIGURE 7. U.S. -supplied F -104's of the GRC Air Force (C)
wvw: s ow wm "K%. Air rorce (u /Qu)

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f
3
comprise an important aitbase c(lmples within 10K)
nautical miles of most of pile important potential
targets it, tile i'RC The cart) darning {till') radar
coverage from ground installations on "Taiwan and the
Pescadores (I'enghut islands is fairl% good, radar on
Qucrnuy and Ma -tsu Tao has a lesser capabilit\ file
air fore, conducts peripheral revonoaiss -.mce along the
PIl(: s coast. and its psychological x %arfare leaflets
occasionally penetrate to the interior. Its trtnisport
capability is adequate since the C -46 aircraft assignee(
to the 6th 'Troop Carrier Wing were replaced by C -t 19
aircraft.
Chief weaknesses are a limited number of all
weather fighters, a corrosion problvm on the F -101C
aircraft, a reluctance to program and fund sufficient
stock levels, a top)hcavy, overstmngth persomid
structure, deteriorating Montle anions, pilots, and die
incoulpatibility of communications cquipnt-lit with
army and navy equipment. A n!nclentiiation program
leas replaced the I' `i6 s Willi 1:- I0.1*s. and F-
100's. Even with the new aircraft, however. the air
force will remain numerically inferior to the NW Air
I' orcc, which could ov,rwlirlrit tile air dcfcnses of
Taiwan. Reconnaissance capability of the CAF is
marginal, depending on Lockheed 1IF -10�IG aircraft.
The Grumman S -2A aircraft have been assigned all
antisubmarine war;.ire (Atilt') mission. This unit was
declared combat- really in March 1969.
1. Organization
Operationally subordinate to the Chief of Staff,
HIND, the Commander in (thief, Air Force, has
operational and administrative control of the air force.
He is assisted by a Deputy Commander for
Operations, a Deputy Commander for Adminislra-
lion, and a staff that includes in Air Force Inspector
General and an Air Force Political Warlate Officer. An
Operations Planning Committee advises him tm all
ve.r plans.
The general staff in sit force headtluartcrs is
directed by the Chief of Staff with the assistance of
two Vice Chiefs of Staff; these two officers are
respunsible for the coordination of staff activities and
for cooperniiara in determining policy oil till matters
concerning the lit force. The office of the Chief of
Staff is organized functitmally into the offices of tits
Deputy Chiefs of Staff (for Personnel, Intelligence,
Operations, Logistics, and Organization): tlte!
Comptroller General's Office-, and four divisions�
Con lilt unications, Judge Advocate, Medicine, and
General Affairs,
'Tile air force has four major commands: two
combat (Combat Air Command .aid Air Defense
Artiller CoannandI and too nonconibat Nir
Training Command and Air Seriee Ceum andi
E %cept in the :fir Defense Artillery Command
tADACi, the field units of tier ennunands .ire
organiivd into yviogs, groups, and quadrom The
ADAC is composed of four air defense artillery
regiments. "hic-h are tactically deployed in critical
areas of Tak%an. the Pescadores tPcn};htl) islanls, and
the offshore islands The transport squadrons are
controlled directly be Genmil ileadquartets (GHQI.
(:Al' The ASW squadron is assigned to the :air force
but is under the operational control of (he nay y
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The (.r11 penonnei strcaiyth is approyintatele
S2 100 of (Iris 1111mber I.,00 are trained pyilot% and
abotil 20.000 lire in the Aar Defenm Artdbvr
Command Th, air force has a total of tart aircraft in
its inventor. The -1a4 aircraft in operational snits
inc�ludc� 246 jet fighter lF -Sail I -I0( }A and F. F-
101A. 11, and C. and I-'-.3A and i3(lrigurc9II. 124 prop
transports (C -119f: and C- 1 jet rvvonnaissaoc,
aircraft fRl'-104(;G 23 helie�opte�rs (1,11 -III Iwtinois
and Grumman Ill' -16A Albatross), all :kit resent�
helicopters. 43 trainers Lockheed T -3:3A and
Nortlimp T -SSA Tulottt. and I(1 :uttisttl:niarine-
warfare aircraft tS -?AI
The CAF loaned -IS I' -.iA aircraft to the Republic of
Vietnam in November 1972 l"went\ 1' -$A's -ill he
returned tie the ROG The remaining 28 will be
replaced by the 1' -5E's under l .S. supported progra lit
to coproduce in eventual 100 F -W's ill Taiwan.
Tactical units cYrmM of four tactical fighter wings,
one composite wing. and one transport veiny; :dl are
stationed on the island of `i There are five
tactical fighter groups, nn tactical Feconiaissince
group, and two transport groups. Combined, these
groups have it total of 2d squadrons -11 tactical
fighter, three all- weather fighterlinterecplor, one
reconnaissance, six transport, one search and rescue,
one forward air control, and one combat crew training
11"it.
The ccmihat forces of the Air Dr4ense Artillery
Command consist of 10 battalions c(linppcd with 90-
min guns. 15 battalions with 40 -1ent antantatic
wealons (Alt'), and 12 ;attached army AW batteries,
also with -10 -111111 gunS. Each batkilion consists of a
Tar vatcnt information, see the Free World AirOrriervillatdr
Soil the Alituary hirelligenee Suranknnr, huth PO401Vti ilkiaricrls
by tike 1)a4eme htttAigmice Agmvy. \aticraalist Cl+Nia's air
facilities syslena is surnnrurixea laud a f+nv (10:10% of fictds used by
tike inililmy an' given in ibis Cane #al sikrve�y in the sactinn all
Trall'iM let lit ilm :rltl 11'l eC" +Bat n +ll llCktlllrk
im
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080022 -3
m
p
headquarter hatter and four firing liatti�ries. The
atlac�hrd arrnti AW batteries provide 1Oxa1 air defense
for air force installations. There are three oprritianal
Missile hatiahotls. As more surface -lo -air missiles are
phased into the air defetise system it is planned to
phase out a munher of air defense artillery traits
3. Training
The i'.ir Training Command is responsible for all
flying and technical training. It operates the Air
Itecrieit 'training Cenlcr and seven majorsc�hools �Air
I'orce Academy, Air Preparalory School, Air'tt.clmieal
School. Air Defense School. Air Communieatioos,till
sleetrooics School, Air Conmumd and Slaff College,
and Tactical Air Operations School. The training
prograTls are satisfactory in concept, scope, aricl
supervision, and the instruction is well Conducted.'l1w
pilot trt4oing program normally gradiiatas .0
qualified pilots per pear, all of whom incur a 7 -pear
military commitment. I'Ite economic boom till iw,n
that has improved the living standards of civilians has
?kilt extended to these pi lots. 'thoir relative social slams
has therefore deereascl, prospects for advancement
appear slight, and morale has diminished. I:nglish-
hitgrrage Irairting is available ill the training centers
and in cornbat wrong.
'training equipment for basic courses ill the Air
1 1'eclodeal School and the Air Communications School
is adequate, bill that for advanced courses is poll. The
1 1 1oMed Icchnical buckgro ollclS of many MCrllitS is one
hindrance whiolr the intensified; on- the -job training
program may mdiive.
d. Logistics
11le plain CAl'supply and maintenance agency is
the Air Service Con,Inand, which receives, stares, and
distributes supplies through two strategically located
depots, nne at 'Taipei and uric al Vai -pan. In the mid-
1960's a Command Lquipnttil `lanagement Centel
a established to machine process cgaiprnent
doeiments, manage distribution of supplies to meet
priorities, and to improve overdl numagenlcot
conlrul.
All aircraft. missiles, and defense radars are U.S,
iutiufacltired. and most replacement parts are
procured ill the United States by commercial agents of
[lie Nljoistry of National Defense. Difficoltics have
liven caused by the inability to proeure parts aid by
disruptions ill the delivery process from the United
States. The U.S, Air Force Supply syslcin is well. 'flee
CRC is reluctant to program ;lid fund stuck levels
Sufficient to meet delliand, atid only enough supplies
are kept till Martel to Inlet Ilasic rcyuimnuuls at
peacetime attrition rates. 'tic air force is responsible
for its own supply acquisition. Cornnlon -use items are
pmenrcd for it by the Combined Service force.
Distinct progress has becii made in materiel control.
aircraft records, and general airvrift maintenance.
111 maintemitice control facilities and Ir -aired
personnel ill till coillbal wings letvt. made li
nlaititenaliee system effective. 'I'hc last aircraft migincs
in file invrnlory that required foreign maintenance
were those of the I�' -ii, hit ire mitt -11165 the air force
also 1wgan overhaulilig those on 1'rliwati- thercb%
r;kising its overhaii and m;oittenanev to
include all aircraft engines in the inventor Major
repair facilities are located nt "Hai- chum; and al l"itig-
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FIGURE 9. F -5A FREEDOM FIGHTER of the GRC Air Force (U /OU)

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SECRF:r
thng South airfield. vtidl base -I(vcl maintenance
carried out at the other operational airhau�s
Subst;)ntial IIM)CCtion and Repair As Neecssan
IRAN F facilities exist at the Air Asia C:ontpan Ltd
and the China Air fines, Ltd Both contpanics
facilities are erigaged in U.S Cmernmeut mait-
tenance contracts. Their IRAN lumnlenance compares
faV0rah1% in gtl:ditt and fl0tt times (Pith U S.
standards. The CAF generalFt does not perform
preventive maintcnaTICE if it can be avoided. The
corrosion prohlerrt an aging airertft. pariicularh F-
10�f's, has clrt)xcrtuentiv hecorne quite scvcre
T�lotical assistance for maintenance of various t}pcs
of e(IuiPrnent is heiltg f);mishcll b% ivIAAG personnel
and contract representatives. where required.
An Aero- Industr% llel -dop vent Center WDC) seas
reorganizeel into its nresent structure at T'ai -chung in
1 witb the mission of research. (levciopntent.
production, and Planning of tile ROC aircraft
industr%. Production of the hell helicopter. LAI -III,
takes place at this facility. and it total of 30 will be
assembled. The F -oR /I? assemble coprodnetion
program twill also be under the direction of AIDC. The
CAF considers it quite important to develop the AIDC
as tile first step in forming it nnelvus of knowledge -in(I
kill front which More adv:utced and eeonoinically
beneficial projects van he realized
F. Paramilitart forces (S)
TIIe Taivan Garrison Gcncral 1 -1 c d(IwtrIvrs
iTGGH), tvitli an estiriuited strength of 27.900, is
subordinate to the %IND through the National
Sccuritt Bureau- t'IUlct the existing ct)tidition of
modified martial :alt however. certain of its activ itics
tvhieh normally would be considered the responsibility
of civil govcrnnll`nt are subject to aclrninistrative
supervision h% the Taiv(an Provitimil Government.
The missions of the "TGGii include counterinsurgcnc%
and the control or suppression of subversion On
Taiwan, antiriot and civil defenso ac ti on and
eomm.end of all internal scetidix forces in Ilie
enforcement of martial law. The TGCN cotnprises
four regional garrison commands and four garrismi
regiments. U%tiall% two or three regular anm divisions
Lire under tperational c`cu)trol of the TGGI -I to support
it in Crllergl`nciCS. These divisions are a&signcd ()It ;t
rotating hasi%.
A
8reRFT
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