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V IM SECRET MY MU. 39B/GS/GP .1 H !Nationalist China April 1974 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080025-0 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small Countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unc!assified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organi7ations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the ma;ar portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 19, sections 793 and 79+ of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 56 (1)' (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 The NIS is lliational Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to represEnlatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Certral Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Secu. ity Council itelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret N f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 FAMMUMM1 -arJ9 M!W,0049rJ In V IJ I I VE,11 ^UNIIII[IIr F/wrJ 1'I -1It, w l I I WA I WA rill I I I rJ n I 1 Y 1 rwLlw M`M d Ifl CONTENTS This chapter supersedes the political cover- age in the General Survey dated August 1970. A Introduction 1 B. Structure and function of government 3 1. General 3 2. Constitution 4 3. Central government 6 a. National Assembly 6 b. President and Vice President 6 c. Executive Yuan 7 d. Legislative Yuan 7 e. Judicial Yuan 7 f. Examination Yuan 8 g. Control Yuan 9 4. Provincial and local governments 9 5. Civil service 10 i SEMET LNA4RiaRQfSC* 1xM'... wN4. P' is. IV.� m. rw �w Y'' ..'k.., APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 y1 n0 a I M"lff I Page Page C. Political dynamics 10 F. Maintenance of internal security 23 L i 1. The President and the Premier 10 1. General 23 2. The Kuomintang 11 2. Police and the internal security services 24 3. Election laws and practices 14 a. Police 24 4. Succession 16 b. Internal security services 26 D. National policies 17 G. Intelligence 27 1. Introduction 17 1. National Security Bureau 27 2. Domestic 18 2. Military intelligence agencies 28 3. Foreign 19 3. KMT intelligence activities 28 E. Threats to government stability 21 H. Suggestions for further reading 29 1. Discontent and dissidence 21 Chronology 30 2. Communist subversion 23 Glossary 31 t I FIGURES Page Page Fig. 1 President Chiang Kai -shek photo) 1 Fig. 3 Premier Chiang Ching -kuo photo) 11 Fig. 2 Constitutional structure of the GRC chart) 5 Fig. 4 Vice President Yen Chia -kan photo) 17 M M 0 9 Government and Politics A. Introduction (C) The Government of the Republic of China (GRC), which combines traditional Chinese, modern Western, and contemporary Communist governmental con- cepts, is in form it constitutional republic. According to the constitution, adopted in 1947, governmental powers are shared by the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuans (branches). The parliamentary function is shared by the Legislative Ynan and the National Assembly, the latter of -which is constitutionally an elective body that exercises "political powers on behalf of the whole body of citizens." Obvious discrepancies exist, however, bet- een constitutional provisions and political realities. Historically. the CRC essentially has been a one- party, one -man government. Governmental power has been concentrated chiefly in the executive ,ind, more specifically, in the person of the increasingly feeble 86- year -old President, Chiang Kai -shek (Figure I Moreover, President Chiang dominated the Kuonin- tang (National Peoples Party �KMT) a monolithic political organization, in his capacih as Director General. In turn, the Kuomintang exercises firm, and pervasive coi trot over governmental and political proc,sses. Since raid -1972, President Chiang's declining health has confined him to a hospital and ended his active participation in political affairs. The mantle of power has descended to his son, Premier Chiang Ching -kno. The Premier has been carefully groomed by his father to take up the leadership and, although the succession has occurred carlir-r than was expected, it has gone smoothly. Although power theoretically resides in the people through the right of franchise, wily a few limited, controlled elections have been held since the removal of the central government to Taiwan in 1949. As a result, those Chinese from the mainland who were chosen in the national elections of 1947 have continued to dominate the central government's elective bodies. Beyond this, the maintenance and enforcement of a st, of martial law since the retreat to Taiwan has circumvented many of the individual rights and guarantees in the constitution. 1` Iu I The Rennblic of China (ROC), like th I'cople's Republic of China (PRC), lays historic claim to "Taiwan. This clain, is bases; on Chinese ownership prior to the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-95; the Cairo Declaration of 1913, which promised the return of Taiwan to China and which was reaffirmed in the I'visdam Declaration of 1945; and Japans renuncia- tion of smoreignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) islands in the peace treat\- of 1952. The legal static, of the province remains somewliat anomalous, however, since no stlecific disposition of the territory was made in the e,( -aty. The GRC's move to Taiwan resulted in a unique political phenomenon. A national superstruetnre was imposed upon the provincial government, with both having jurisdiction over essentially the sane administrative and geographic :area. Not only h." this APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 FIGURE 1. President Chiang Kai -shek (C) resulted in constitutional inconsistencies, but it also has greatly compromis the integrity of the Taiwan Provincial Government, which serves as the passive and unobtrusive agent of the central government. Prospects of survival appeared bleak in the initial years following the retreat of the GRC to Taiwan. Disorganized and dispirited national leaders went ahcut the task of reestablishing central governmental institutions and restoring required government service;. Desertions. defections, and defeats had demoralized both the armed forces and the KNIT. A Chinese Communist invasion of the island appeared imminent, particularly following President Truman's assertion on ,3 January 19,30 that the United States was not committed to the defense of Taiwan. The prospect of collapse from internal subversion was hardly less sobering. The native Taiwanese were sullen and resentful as a result of both the intrusion of the mainland refugees and the harsh suppression of a Taiwanese uprising in 194T in protest against 2 years of Nationalist misgovernment and brutality. The pro,rlems of inflation and corruption, prime factors in the Chiang regime's collapse on the mainland, accompanied the regime to Taiwan. Added to all this was the question of whether the predominantly agricultnral economy of the island would be able to sustain an additional 1.5 million persons. There was unevrtaint that these major problens, whose solution aas required if 'Taiwan was to velop into it springboard for the "counterattack" ag.:inst the mainland, would he surmounted. Moreover, the 11M.'s standing within tht� international communit N as rendered precarious by expulsion from the mainland and by recogniCon of the People's Republic of China by a number of governments. A thoroughgoing transformation has been ac- complished in the more than two decades the Nationalists have been on Taiwan, and the GRC has emerged as a model of internal stability with the region. Failure of the Communists to follow np their victory or, the mainland and the ability of tic Nationalists to regroup restored the latter's confidence and nosol The outbreak of the Korean war in raid 19:x(1 and the subsequent dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Formosa 5trai! largely nullified the threat of a Communist invasion from the mainland. These developments were followed in 19,54 by the conclusion of the Sino -U.S. Mu!ual Defense "treaty, which committee! the United States to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores islands. Reginni ig in 1931, the armed forces were reorganized and were given modern equipment and training, mainly by the United States. With the gradual 2 reduction of U.S. grant military aid during the 1960's and its termination on 30 June 1973, the (,RC has been compelled to rely on its oxvn financial resources for further modernization of its military establishment. As it result of effective countermeasures b% the national intelligence and security forces, subversion was brought under firm control by 1932, and by the mid- 1930's the problem was nominal. There have been some modest recurrences of subversive activities, however, and uncertain future prospects could offer a potential for subversion. During the past :3 or 4 years, the decline of Taiwan's international political stature. U.S. efforts to normalize relations with Peking, and mainland efforis to win support on the island for eventual reunification have raised questions about the future of tit( Nationalist regime on Taiwan. The regime must cope both \%ith native Taiwanese advocates of it juridically_ independent Taiwan as well as with dissatisfied groups within the island's mainland Chinese community. Debate -within the leadership over v. course will best serve their own interests, and the survival of the regime could engender domestic unrest. The smooth assumption of control by Premier Chiang Ching -kuo, however, precluded uw, chance that Taiwan might he subjected to the strains of an immediate succession crisis. Moreover, the present KM "T leadership appears to have learner several lessons from their loss of the mainland. They are well aware that continued economic prosperity, controlling inflation, and cutting clown on corruption are necessary if the regime is to maintain c;ornestic support. Unless the regime should nm into opposition on the scale of a massive, organized uprising. the nation's security forces appear fully capable of maintaining internal security. Although community tensions have eased in recent years aad there is more Taiwam se re :cplivity to Chiang Ching -kuo than to earlier mainland leaders, native Taiwanese still feel some resentment toward the CRC, mainly because of their virtual exclusion from policynuaking and command positions in the central government, the ruling Kuomintang, the government sector of the economy, and the armed forces. To a somewhat lesser extent they are also resentful of the burdens of taxation and military conscription they are required to assume to maintain tic disproportionately large military establishment, as well as the denial of personal rights under martial law and the unwilling- ness of the central government to permit an opposition political rnovenient. Moreover, they generally do not identify thetnselves with the Gli(:'s goal to regain control of the mainland. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 '4�.1 A serious challenge to the GRC under prevailink conditions, however, can he largely discounted. Uncertainties over the islands future appear to have convinced many Taiwanese that they must acquiesce to the Nationalist regime to preserve what they have. The Taiwanese are achieving, alheit slovdy, increasing representation in political and governmental institutions. While they have not acquired substantial political power, they dominate politics at the provincial and local levels and have achieved supremacy in the private sector of the economy. At the national level they have gained more repre,entation than ever before. Ambitions young Taiwanese politicians are becoming increasingly willing to enter the KMT in the well- founded belief that it is the only way to success. Once they start working within the systern, they often acquire an intc-est in its perpetuatio The governments land reform program was well received by the peasantry. The standard of living is one of the highest in Asia, and it is rising rapidly. In addition, the Taiwanese view time as their ally and are disinclined to challenge the government. To do so would not only risk the material and social benefits already achieved but also invite harsh retributive measures and in the Taiwanese vies%, would risk chaos and invite Communist intervention. Taiwanese der not desire Communist control and appear for the present to be almost insesceptible to Communist propaganda. Although the Nationalist government officially remains publicly committed to the recovery of the mainland, this therne has lost its reality and is being giver di fill r,;shifig emphasis by national leaders. A reordering of priorities has emerged it fact, with emphasis on the development of 'Taiwan into it modern, economically progressive island. No military offensive against the mainland is seriously contem- plated. F,ven the minor sabotage and if operations directed against the mainland by GRC agents have generally come to naught, and operations from Taiwan appear to hav been stopped after 1969. F.rnphasis on economic development has caused technocrats to assume an increasingly responsible role in national plans, and greater amounts of national resources are being used for economic and social development programs. The hallmarks of GRC foreign policy have been the preservation of the (RC's identity abroad as the legitimate government of China and an uncornpronais- ing opposition to communism. In pursuit of both of these airns, the (AW, has relied heavily_ on the United States to holster its defenses :111(1, to a lesser extent, to advance its economic development. For about two decades the GRC displayed virtually no flexibility in foreign affairs. Peking's success in expanding its international relations, symbolized by the PRC's replacement of the ROC in the United Nations in October 1971, led to growing anxiety about the future status of Taiwan. A concerned leadership in Taipei adapted some\yhat more flexible tactics in foreign policy as the Nationalist regime continued to decline in international status. Starting in 1969 an increasing number of countries switched their diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking. The visit of President Nixon to Peking in February 1972 and the exchange of liaison offices between Peking and Washington in February 1973 have increased the Nationalists apprehension concerning their future. A particular! hard jolt was the diplomatic recognition of Peking by Japan, which has been if major trade partner for the ROC. "Taipei has quietly tried to maintain informal ties with nations recognizing Peking, and wherever possible it has continued to send technical missions abroad, particularly to those African and Latin American nations which continue diplomatic relations with Taipei. By such efforts it has enjoyed some successes in offsetting their growing political isolation. but the problem of their future international status remains unsolved. Thus far, the ROC has been reasonably successful in suhstitnting trade relations for diplomatic relations. B. Structure and function of government (C) 1. General Although the central government theoretically shares its powers with governmental systems at the provincial, count}, awl municipal levels, obvious discrepancies exist between constitutional provisions and governmental practices. The influence of the central government, for vicars dominated by the now inactive President Chiang Kai -shek and now tinder the leadership of his sun. Premier Chiang Ching -kuo, is pervasive. Since the exodus of the (AW to Tai%%an, the central and 'Taiwan provincial governnu�nts have exercised jurisdiction within practically identical geographic boundaries. As it result, the provincial government has functioned mainly as in unquestion- ing and pliant :agency of the central government. The maintenance of martial law for more than 20 years has :accentuated the nondemocratic aspects of executive power. Although extensive individual rights are guaranteed by the constitution, their exercise may he limited "for reasons of preventing infringements :3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 upon the freedoms of other people, averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order, or advancing the general .welfare." This constitutional provision is the basis of restrictions known as Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, .which have been in force since their adaption by the National Assembly in April 1948. The Temporary Provisions enabled the President the following month to declare a state of martial law without obtaining the pproval of the Legislative Yuan. The Temporary Provisions also stated that the President was to call an extraordinary session of the National Assembly not later than 25 December 1950 to decide whether or not the provisions were to remain in force. This requirement was not met, however, because of the disorganization resulting from the withdrawal of the central government to Taiwan in 1949. Continuation of the President's emergency ,owers has been maintained by subsequent sessions of the National ;Assembly, which has consistently bent to the President's will oil basic policy questions. Alert to any advantages that might ensnc from the excesses generated by the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, the National Assembly in 1966 gave the President two additional extra constitutional powers at t :w same time it renewed his emergency authority. The first permitted him to establish what was its effect to be a planning agency for the recovery of the mainland. Under this authority ti e National Security Council (NSC) was created in early 1967. Until his incapacitating illness in the summer of 1971, the NSC was dominated by its chairman, President Chiang Kai -shek. The NSC is empowered to formulate major policies, decide on general mobilization, lay down principles for national reconstruction, administer civil affairs and supervise the military government in "liberated areas, and determine basic policies for suppression of the "Communist rebellion." 'Technically the NSC also has authority over the National Security Bureau (NSB), the supreme coordinating agency for the ROC's intelligence and security community. Despite its wide mandate, however, the NSC; has not produced practical results. Its reorganization in the summer of 1972 by Premier Chiang Ching -kuo appeared further to reduce the NS(: s potential as a locus of power, and it has served only in a secondary consultative role in the Chiang Ching -kuo government. The other power given the President allowed him to "readjust the administrative and personnel organiza- tions of the central government's and to hold elections to fill vacancies in the central government or add representation to reflect population increases in 4 Tai%%an and in mainland areas that might he recaptured by the GRC. Under the latter authority. elections were held in December 1969 to select 15 members to the National Assembly and additional members to the two elective yuans of the central government. Further elections held in December 1972 gave the KMT its usual sweeping victory at all levels. The party scored it clean sweep in races for county magistracies and mayors of large cities, 58 of 73 seats in the Provincial Assembly, 43 of a3 new National Assembly seats, and :30 of 36 new seats in the Legislative Yuan. Ten ne%w members were elected to the central gove-nment's Control Yuan in February 1973 by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, with the KNIT %winning nine of the seats. 2. Constitution The constitution of the GRC was adopted in December 1946 by a constitutional assembly convoked to fulfill the promise Chiang Kai -shek made during World War 11, to end the 20 -year period of KMT "tutelage" and inaugurate a representative form of government. The constitution derives chiefly frorn the political precepts of Sun Yat -sen and is fundamentally democratic. Subject to the limitations and restrictions engendered by a continuing state of martial law, the constitution enumerates the freedoms, rights, and duties of Chinese citizens, including the rights of election, initiative, referendum, and recall. It grants suffrage to all Chinese over 20 years of age and includes it broad bill of rights guaranteeing freedom of domicile, speech, correspondence, religion, and assembly, and all "other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare. The umstitution also enumerates obligations the citizen has to the state, including payment of taxes, military service, and the "right and duty to receive citizens e.lucation." The constitution further commits the government to limited state socialism by assigning it responsibility for the enactment of progressive economic and social legislation and by according it broad control powers over educational and cultural institutions. Opportu- nity for employment commensurate with the capacity and ability of the peopie is encouraged, and the state is required to provide assistance and relief to the aged, the infirm, the disabled, and the victims of natural calamities, as well as to give special protection to working women and children. The constitution provides for an elective National Asernbly, a President elected by that body, and, in accordance with the theories of Sun Yat -sen, a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080025 -0 Ie SR La TEN TNW& ff 6 government consisting of five independent branches, called Moans, which perform executive, legislative, and judicial functions plus the traditional Chinese functions of examination and contmi. Each of the five Yuan is under the direction of a president, vice president, and secretariat. The parliamentary function is shared by the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly; tit�� latter exercises "politico' powers on be half of the whole body of citizens.' Fite actual structu :c of political power differs in man} respe front the formal governmental structure described in the constitution a�td shown in Figure 2. During the lifetime of Chiang Kai -shek the paramount authorih has been the President of the RC. This extreme concentration of mower is explained primarily by three factors: 1) the Chinese political tradition of vesting virtually unlimited power in one person: 2) the forceful and pervasive personality of Generalissimo Chiang Kai -shek; and 3) Chiang s position as Director General of the KMT and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The constitutional limitation of the two pre sidential terms has pe repeatedly set aside, most recently in 1972, so that the Generalissimo could stay in office. I'he purported reason for this suspension, appro%ed by the Generalissimo as in alternative to it constitutional amendment, was the emergency resulting from the "civil war" with the Communists. Since jol) 1972 President Chiang has been unable to perform his governmental functions clue to illness and advanced age. Since then his son, Premier Chiang Ching -kuo, has beco!nc dic center of political power and authority', but he seems to he more responsive to senior aides than was his father. 4" -A a a NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (6 -Year Term) NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENT COUNCIL President VICE PRESIDENT Vim President (6 -Yaw T CONTROL LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL EXAMINATION YUANe YUAN YUAN YUAN YUAN Yuan President Yuan President Yuan President Yuan President Vice Presldanf Vice President PREMIER Vice President Vice President (6 -Yaw Term) (3 -Yaw Term) Grand Justices Vice Premier Auditor and Minister Gercrol AW. 0 1 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY" Govemor^ k LtBR/lOS1 or AKA P I 'I COUNTY COUNTY O,t OTY GOVERNMENT 1 le(IIOIM CCLIBIm OR CITY 2 Co" vrm Cad&XR ASSEMBLY County Magistrate 3 t or City Mayors** eM ad'/gpl le *80 C*AW jUM ftEs Bf/ eel bded by i.rleAr t a wl.' .Bd(LIxM a(.. r�w P M i alBd b y jMW Ot AAIII!(OORW OW GIER IM)R iii. 0. R, t&r,: tEllw _0s0sl &AW Ibi" vAwA ire ow ill �*want Bit f4ii , a,I 0WW FIGURE 2. Constitutional structure of the GRC, 1973 (U /OU) j APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 3. Central government a. National Assembly The highest organ of government is the National Assemhly, which theoretically implements Sun 1'at- sen's doctrine that political power should be held by the people. The Assembly's powers include the right to elect inc President and Vice President, to act on impeachment measures initiate against the President or Vice President by the Control Yuan, to amend the constitution, to ratify anry constitutional amendments introduced by the legislative Yuan, to alter national boundaries, and to initiate national legislation when requested by the President. Under the constitution, members are elected for year te from regional and occupational groups. The first National Assembly elections were held in 1947 and resulted ;n a 2,962 member holy. Those me mbers from th mainland who fled to Taiwan in 1949 have continued to comprise the overwhelming majority of the Assembly, although their ranks have been greatly reduced by deaths, resignations, and retirements. Central government elec' ;ons held in November 1969 and December 1972 added it total of 68 nee me mbers, as well as n:.v members to the Legislative and Control Yuans. In late 1973 Assembly membership was 1,102. The decisions to hold the elections were based officially on the desire to give added representation to Taiwan Province, since its population had more than doubled since 1947. More practical but unexpressed, reasons were that the elections provided a means of increasing membership in the central governments principal branches since their membership had dwindled over the vears. without., however, increasing the power of the Taiwanese in these branches of the government meaningfully. flans for larger scale elections in the 1'uans were cut clown substantially shortly after 1'remier Chiang took office. Since the constitution was adopted, the National Assembly has met every 6 years since 19.8 for the purpose of choosing the President and Vice President and sanctioning the continued exercise of emergency powers by Hie President while it state of War with the Communists exists. The Assembly is summoned into regular session by the President 90 clays before the expiration of cacti presidential term, but extraordinary sessions are called for such purposes as the ratification of constitutional amendments. A special 10 dav session was convened just prior to the session in Febnnary 1966 to discuss giving the Assembly the powers of initiative and referendum, but the onl action taken \vas to increase the salarie!, of its members, a hpical ex:,rnple of compromise, whereby the Assembly acceded to the Presidents \%ill in exchange for personal perquisites. A presidium of 8.3 members is elected from among the delegates to serve as a steering committee, kith members of the presidium presiding in rotation mer plenary sessions of the Assembly. In addition to its regular committees, the National A, sembl' has it permanent secretariat headed by it secretary general. In recent scars. the Assembly has remained largely inactive, except during its regular sessions every 6 vears. b. President and V %ce President The President, who must he a Chinese citizen and he at least 40 years of age, is titular head of state and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. With the consent of the Legislative Yuan, he appoints the President (Premier) of the Lxecutive Yuan and the auclitar general of the Control Yuan, and he promulgates lays, treaties, and declarations of war. He may also ask the Legislative Yuan to reconsider any hill enacted by that body, if the executive branch thinks it enforcement will he particular) difficult or inexpedient, but his request may he overruled hy_ it two thirds vote of the� legislators in attendance. Of prime importance is the Presidents power to issue ordinary and emergency decrees. The President is also authorized to declare martial law and, under it issue emergency decrees "in case of a natural calantih, an epidemic, or it serions national financial and economic crisis." The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, adopted by the National Asscntblc in 1948, nullified the original constitutional requirement of legislative approval for the Presidents emergency actions, but all decrees issued by the Nesident mnst he countersigned by the Premier, who is constitutional) responsible to the Legislative Yuan. As Commander in Chief of the armed forces, the 1resident also controls the military establishment. "Thus in practice the President possesses almost unlimited a tit horith, but his powers are informally limited by extraconslitutional factors such as pressure front other KMT and government leaders. Possible reaction from the people if it were to follo\y grossly unpopular actions is also it factor, but of lesser significance than pressures that can he exerted within the leadership. Moreover, the aulhorih of the ['resident over subordinate leaders and his countrvrnen may be eroded if his government proves dvinonstrably unahle to induce the I'nited Slates to take account of Taiwan's interests. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 0 a Like the President, the Vice President must be it Chinese citizen and be of least 40 years of age. He likewise serves a 6 -year term normally and is restricted c�onstitutionallw to two terms. The Vice President has no significant crmstitntional functions except to succeed to the presidency if the office becomes vacant or to exercise the functions of the presidency if the President should be unable to attend to office due to any cause. Since President Chiang Kai- shek's incapacitation in Jule 1972, Vice President Yen Chia kae has undertaken marry of the ceremonial duties of the presidency, but he has not officiall.c assumed the office nor does he exercise its executive functions. Premier Chiang Citing kuo has acted as de facto of the government in the day -to -day administration of affairs and in the formulation of policy. c. Executive Yuan The highest administrative organ in the national government is the Executive Yuan, which ftmctions primarily as a cabinet. Second only to the President in influence and power, the Executive Yuan is under the supervision of a president, or Premier, as he is known informally. The Premier is appointed by the President, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. Ministers, chairmen of commissions, and ministers without portfolio compose the Executive Yuan, and are appoh tcd by the PreAdent upon the i.�comniendation of the Premier.' The Executive Ynan is responsible to the Legislative Ynan, to which it must submit its administrative policies and reports as well as the national budget. The Legislative Yuan may question members of the Executive Yuan and disapprove or alter policies. If the Executive Yuan objects to it hill or policy resolution passed by the Legislative Yuan, it can request it "reconsideration," which is in effect it veto. An executive veto may he overridden by it two- thirds majority of the Legislative Yuan in attendance, in which case the Premier roust acquiesce or resign. Because of KNIT dominance in both the Executive and Legislative Ynans, major impasses between the two bodies under previ:iling conditions arc unlikely; consequently, an executive veto normally would he sustained. In practice the Legislative Yuan does not initiate legislation, but it enacts measures occasionally with modifications� suhrrtittcd to it by the I ?xec�utive Yuan. 'For a current listing; of kc' n c� go%eunnt officials comalt Chiefs of State and Cabinet Member of Foreign Gocern� published nwnthh In the Dirvetorate of Intelligence, entral Intelligence Agenc d. Legislative Yuan The Legislative Yuan, it unicameral body, is the highest lawmaking organ in the state. Its members are elected for -vear terms by geographical and vocational constituencies and may be reelected. The first Legislative Yuan was elected in 19.17 and had 760 members when it first convened in 1948. Until December 1969 it was composed of members chosen in the 1947 election who withdrew to Taiwan in 1949 and have since remained active, plus alternates elected in 1948 and designated between 19.19 and 1951 to fill vacancies that occurred during those years. Eleven new members were eluted in 1969 and 36 in December 1972, giving it 161 members as of January 1973. The Legislative Yuan is empowered to adopt laws, review budget estimates. ratify treaties, and declare war. It may also force the resignation of the Premier, either by it motion of censure or by overriding it veto. The Legislative Yuan also administers grants -in -aid to local governments and resolves jurisdictional disputes between the central and local governments. The Legislative Yuan in practice serves mainly as it gadfly of the Executive Yuan, however, deriving its principal influence as an institution from its ability to bring minor e mbarrassment to executive officers by questioning them. The Legislative Yuan meets twice a year, from February to May and front September to December, but its sessions max be extend( if necessary. Extraordinary sessions may be convoked upon request of the President or of at least one- fourth of the membership. A quorum consists of not less than one tifth of the entire membership resident in Taiwan, and hills and resolutions are adopted by majority vote. e. Judicial Yuan "I'he Judicial Yuan, the highest judicial organ of the state, interprets the constitution and has the power !o unify the interpre of laws and orders." Moreover, it has responsibility for the adjudication of civil, criminal, and administrative cases, as well as the discipline and punishment of public functionaries, except those tried by military courts. The president and vice president of t1w Judicial Yuan are appointed by the President. with the consent of the� Control Yuan. I'll( four judicial agencies of the Judicial 1 uan are the Council of Grand Justices, the Committee for the Discipline of Public F inictionarie�s, the Administrative Court, and the Supreme Court. Members of the Council of Grand Justices are appointed to 9 year 6 r 1d- aa'.LL :.Y..]4. y. 4i :tY'Y.' f, G 1 i:.Aa.,'. I�,., ':e� Y S6 eL d wY: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 terms by the President, with the consent of the Control Yuan. 'Phis body is responsible for interpreting the constitution, settling conflicts between national and local laws, and resolving divergent constitutional interpretations rendered by judicial agencies. This authorit can he exercised only upon application by nationa: or local organs of government and when doubts arise between two or more departments of government about constitutional interpretations. Tae Committee for the Discipline of Public Functionaries metes out penalties to government officials who have either been impeached by the Control Yuan or been referred to the Committee by competent authorities. The disciplinary action may take the form of dismissal, demotion, salary reduction, or reprimand. The Adminisfrotiye Court is responsible for the adjudication of administrative suits brought by individuals who seek redress for alleged wrongs or for illegal administrative acts by government agencies. The Supreme Court, the highest tribunal, is the court of final appeal in both civil and criminal cases. It consists of it number of civil and criminal divisions, each of which is formed by a presiding judge and four associate iudges. A rey ular system of civil and criminal courts functions below the Supreme Court level, with all judges appointed for life. District courts, set up at the municipal and count' levels, handle civil and criminal cases of the first instance. High courts, which operate at the provincial level (their number is determined by the sire of the province), hear appeals from the district courts and theoretically take under advisement cases of the first instance pertaining to insurrection, treason, and other forms of conspiracy against the government. In practice, however, these types of cases have been handled by the military courts under the provisions of martial lane. Appeals may lie made from the high courts to the Supreme Court. Formerly, the entire court systern was under the Ministry of Justice of the Executive Yuan, hiit in 1960 the Council of Grand Justices roiled that all courts should he under the jnrisdic�tion of the Judiciai Yuan. Neverthele,;, the Ministry of Justice, which is also responsible for the administration of judicial and penal institutions and for t1w selection and appointment of judges, procurators, and other personnel in the high and district courts, has continued to exercise jurisdiction over the lower courts. The civil, criminal, and penal codes are modeled after continental European codes particularly those of France and Germany, while retaining sonic Chinese features. Judges are admonished constitutionally to he ��above partisanship and to "hold trials inde- S pendently, free from any interference," hot political pressures played an important role in major judicial proceedings. The legal and judicial system has a number of weaknesses and deficiencies: sonic judicial officials have been amenable to corruption and pressure; law schools have been unable to provide a sufficient number of adequately trained legal personnel; rules of evidence, as viewed by V-'estrrn juridical standards. have not been developed sufficiently: and judicial uncertainties persist. Failure to implement the 1960 ruling of the Council of Grand Justices that thr nations entire court system be placed under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan has inhibited judicial independence and permitted the Executive Yuan to influence legal decisions. The influence the Executive 1 has on the Council of Grand Justices. in particular, can he see:: in the fact that appointees to the Council of Grand Justices serve only 9 -year terms and thus are more susceptible to external influence than regular judges who have lifetime appointments. Even more serious, the continuing national emergency has compromised many constitutional guarantees -nd encouraged arbitrary procedures. For these reasons, the judiciary has been unable to command the full confidence, respect, and esteem of the general popular c. J. Examination Yuan Functionally analogous to the U.S. Civil Service Comn the F.xatnination Yuan is the content- porar.� manifestation of the ancient Chinese tradition or administration by a scholarly elite chosen through public service examinations. The president, vice president, and commissioners of the Examination Yuan are appointed by the President, with the consent of the Control Yuan. The Examination Yuans three principal components are the Examination Yuan Council. the Ministry of Examinations, and the Ministry of Personnel. The Yuan selects civil service personnel through competitive examinations and is responsible for such related matters as salary scales for government employees, promotions and transfers, tenure policies, personnel commendations, and retirement and death benefits. The government bureaucracy has four ionnal ranks of officials and the examination system is intended to select candidates under each. In practice, Kuomintang domination of the government has discouraged the selection of appointive officials on a nonpartisan basis. The GIiC has put a premium on personal loyalty to Chiang Kai shek and the ruling group. In consolidating his APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 Ell I pusitloll as his fathei c succcsutr Chiang C:bing ill has engaged in similar 1:ractices. ttith important powers 4 appointment cmceOtrated in the Department of Organizational Affairs. Although important Official., have seldom, if ever, been appointed from its rasters. the E*xatnination Yuan has served a useful purpose in preparing registers of technical and professional persuotiel and rank -and -file oi;lcials for appointment to minor civil sem ice posts. g. Control Yuan I,ik the E :xuminalion Yl1all, the C:nntrul nail is a eart)(WIr from the traditional Chinest syslem of supervi inn and control of public fmic�tionaries. Constitu- ionaallx the liighesl control organ of the state' it has the powers (of consent. impeachment, censure .Ind autlit The r,itiler suhsl]nlial illflocncc of this body tied% es mainly from its occasional interpcllations and invest gulions c�f officers of the Exec]t,e Yuan. III theory [lie appoiulinent of lhP presidenl, vice president, and justices of the Council of Grand j usliccs of the jmixial Yuan and the president, vice presiclenl, alld commissioners of tilt Lxamivatioti Z non is contingent III-Hill the u(msent of the Control Yoan. The Control Yuan also lilts power to censum Iliv behavior Of public functionaries ill boll tl cerltril and local governments. Any impeachment or violation of law OF dereliction of slut% is referred to the judicial Yuan for disciplinar; action. 'Impeachment proccvdim: s itgaiust the President or Vice President of the G111" which may br instituted by tin less than ow-fourth of the Control Yuan file illbershi1), Illlut he presented to the N;Itinnul Assembly for dispositinn Criminal cases are referred to the aplpropriate court%. Thr N'Iirli Stry n1 Audit, under the Control Yuan. audits government accounts. Members of the Control Yti:iu, according to tau� eonstitntion, im indirrictl% eleeled by the provincial level governments for(i -year terms The removal (1f the (:1[C, to Taiwan has required file usual extended (Pill"` of all ll]CTItbCrx elected Oil 1IIC MaiOlalid and on Taiwan prior to 1973. A quunnn is formed "when more than one -fifth of the total members lire present," and a resolution or motion may he adopted by ;l majority vole of those members in :I ttendauce. "Tan new members were added to the Control Yuall ill 1970, and ten mom were elected in February 1973, giving tile� Ynan a total memhcrship of i$. 4. Provincial and local governments The umism tit intt provides for elective pmvillcial lit Id local goverIMICnls possessing some degree of ]utonolny. �again, however, the centre goverimiciit's expulsion from the mainland bas compromised the II1tCgrill of tjle COIIstitiltinn. The "T ;liMilll Provincial CovPntnlent t T1'G i has been dominated since 19-19 ht Iht� central gmvnimenl. tthich is �tiperimposed upon :t. "The ndminislrative jurisdiction of the "TPG eoconlpa%ses'Taixtall. cxrept I aipei Cit%, sovcrai small islands in adjacent loiters, and the Pescadores. Tilt- of the "I "PG is ('11 kit ll;- IISiIIg-hSi11AN 1111, just south Of "T'ai- ClIIIng. During the emergenct, the gut crnur is appointed bt Ill(. President of the G11C: upon noulinatioll bt the President of pile Exec�utitie loan. Governor I -isich Tit ng -111i it, olle of the felt native -born Taiwanese to hold high political office in the KM'I was named to the post in \tar 1972. The governor in turn appoints the c�oancilors, almost equally dkidmI between mainlatidt�rs and native Taiwanese, upon recom- fuendatioll bt the I "welitive Yolitt. The 17- member council is Iht� pclligmaking body of tile TPG; it meets trtcklti, ttitlt the goycrnor serving as vx- offivio Chairman. The governor is assisted b% a secretariat. 12 departments (civil affairs, finance, reconstruction. education. agricidture and forestrt. social affairs. comrnrntications, health. Information, budgets, ilecounts and stati .tics, Audit, .111d persounich. a food bureau, and various offices for such essential services ]s public health, budgets and accoulik, police, ]fill personnel. A popularh elected Provincial Assembly provides ;I fonun for airing Taiwanese c icws, but it exerts little if.fluencr over the governor and his execulivv branch. N4embers of the unicameral T- iwan Provincial Assemble, presently consisting of 73 members. are elected directly by the ciii, -its of the counties (lisicri) and municipalities every a years, and quotas are deternlilml on the basis of population. The streaker and deputy s1waker are elected by the assvinhlymen in secret ballot. :w assembly meets for 2 months every 6 months, but may he called into spccpal sessiotl by the govenlor or by more than one- third of the ;assembly's members. In the December 1972 elections the KNIT won 33 setts, while ntlim gained 15 seals. On I jnly 1967, Taipei became a special municipality administered directly by the ceaitral goverttinent. its mayor is directly appointed by the central government. Under the cnnstitulian. Taipei's status is comparable to that of a separate province. Taipei lilts a city council consisting of -19 members who are directly elected by the people every -1 years from multi member districts whose size is detcrillillyd by population. The council nlcels for a0 days even (i nttxtlhs, but reap be called into session by the mayor orby more than one -third of litecouncil's metnhen. In the Decembr� 1973 elections, the KN'I'T won �I5 of the -19 seats. t i. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 %S in the cam of tilt pratinwe. ho 11 c�ouitt% and mt III icyktl pxmer, are derv,ed .!boost %hull% from the t�enlral gmernment AI this Ie%(�!, the emernuleril i% m adtd In a counts magvttate or cite ina% \%Ito is rlettrd for a t %eaf terra and net\ be reelected once (:aunt; and itltmic�ipal grnernments ha%e riancil% detil.craUre bodies. \rith rnetnbers elected for 4 -Near turns If an art or resolution ill a local vouricil is c�on%idt�red difficult to enforce. the pro%incial s;mernntent ma\ retnne it for recoi+sitlt�ration If the vounc�il upholds till- measure h% an affirltlati \r 'Lott- of Into thirds of livae t�auncilo(% in altvildallce. ho%\ e%:�r. it tht,n becomes %alid At the hsivu wail municipal Imds, the idutinistr:iliicin composes tilt- hurea:" of c�i\il affairs, finance, education, recomlrnction. police, he;rltlt. and tit\ eollretton illuge% are admirusterml b% elected chief assictrd by village councils At all Ir%rls of loeill gmenimrnt, finiuu�ial resrtircrs are forager. :tilt] local official% nil %t solicit ildditional grants from Ieit;hrr authorities 5. Civil service 'I'll(' (.Iliilest� Cildl x�r% is an imlilnlian of lollg standing. frith rxtrnsivc and detailed reiulations based nn it S%StVlli of publit� (�runinatian amt rveri itnimil There are three hpe� of (.\at(linations� high. general. ant-! %prciot �t icru to c boast- officers for service in tilt f(,ur civil service ranks The first, for %eieior -level ;tdn�ini%Irator%, is open to toll' Rr graduate%. qualific.f teclillici :efts, and ollicial%of loner risk %elecitid for proittotion. The gvncrid oxamination. opell la high School graduates, is used to seleei iurlior- lex(rl civil %rni.v personnel The special e\amination% are open to individuals with technical %kills. Although Chil u�rvicr malttillatiott% are u%11s11% held annual!\ and arc given wide public�ih, onl\ it %mall percer+tage (sf civil 'emilth aw ac�tuall\ selected from the roil% of those Who pa%%, and none of the offivi :el. in more important rank ha" bear %rlec�lecl through e%amilla- tion Mainlanders predominate in Ihl- ceatrad gover.mient hureaurrne%. while Taivanesr are most numerous ill provincial and local govertrrient%, with older maiii oilers (wcul in>; the top pxisition Frequenlly, military officer are given %mb %inec�tlrv% lifter reiimnit�nl from WTI iCe. The IrtldiIiollril Chinese desire to enter the hnmauc�rac�y has been undrrruined b% the loo Salaries. he:evr political (firection, and unrealistic polic�ie% "\Bell for sit long plagued the civil sen�iev ilk Taiwan. lfetnulierttion is so illeaget Ili:tt lil.tu% officials have second jobs and engage in pelt% gr.tft Adrancenment often is slow" and the chalinds of work air frequent\ clogged with super- anniv .i (-evil sercauts who resist Ip tctireme�nt ht-t-atlu� of meager pensions Indiffert�ner. di%sati %fac�tion, and lack of iuitiati\e are common atnoug offic�iais al all Ie%els it >;ort-mmeut In Soitu� stmernment organitatiom, such a% dir Tilivall Power Compam. Ifiv ](riot Co mni%sion oil Hisral 11monstruc- Lion and %omv departinrnt% of the \linistn of Kconoiniv Affairs the 13:t% is better than in old -line gint-minenl offiev%. and it grvatrr sense of responsibilit% exists ]'tie toll echelons of the Ministn (if Foreign (fain ;tad of the Chinese Foreign Servce are staffed b% compett varver officials of mctm ,in srr\icr Since bewaring l'rcotit�r in \la\ 1972. C1uanr (:)it mt. kuo Ili IlLtd omit� suc�c�e%% ill his efforts to print; rw%t. \ontirer. more competent pt�rionnel- --both Ta(uarn�u� iit(] ne:tinl:uulrrs �into all lc%e�ls cif Ow Lim vrnrnent C. Political dynamics (S) 1. The President and the Premier V ntil Jul% 1972. [tell %e\ere� ilines% complivated lilt- infirmitiv% of age. President Chiang kai 11A h:ld dominated the political. nrihtan. and economic lilt of tilt- Iteptibliv of (:hita since 1925 A% it \outhful professional soldier. Chiling Kai IIA phi%ed ;ill avti%e role in till' e%l ;thli%hlitent (if the Satioualist (.tn ern mei It it Iter t c n\erl I os\ of the \f.i nettel D%ire%l% ill lull and %tits closet\ associatr(I %%ills the f otnding of the K \IT in 1912 Sub%rtpurnlh Chiang hre�aniv it protege of l)r Still lilt -sell. and folitMiag Dr Sun's death Ili 1925, hr ht,gan to drift lma\ from the left%%ing of tilt KMT lie 19211 lit commanded tilt Northern E\Iwdition. thr,"1 1 %%hick the \atiotialists gained control of tilt- Wier Tangtzt, %all%�\ In Mardi 1927 hr tinted against his Comillotiist allic%. and a month later he captnrt�d \ankirtg and e%tahlishrd the Nationalist Gmernment there Defeat on the mainland b% tilt Conml(ini%t% in INS) forced Chiang io hi% final refuge on Tai\%an but (ailed to tuedermine %eriouSi\ lei% firm trip on the gme rlrment he had headed for %o Ioi(g In later Nean Chiang Kai -%hlrk began to delegate atilhorik to lti% San. Chiang Chitig kuo, or to the Premier of the moment Up until mid -1972. h(mi -Nrr. President Chiang made the basic deCisioels on all mater of nalintud polio\ Since Iii% father'% incapacitation Chiang Ching -lion tFigum 3}, who has been Premier sinc�r \-lay 19,2, tills been the de facto head of Iht� regime Although tic lacks hi% hither'. charisma. ht- ha% had it l period of grooming in carious important position%. such as \jir,i%Ivr of f }eh�tist� orvt eer. mer the \varrs Ching kuo hti% beer1 able to tirarleener hi% supporters into _1. l APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 NJ positions of power and anthorih The trJnsfcr of pow-r after July 1972 thu% "as accorllplislied srnoolhl% ;Wd Prerllier Chiang (:hint; -ktlo is fulls in control of file regime. Since beC0110119 Preinivr- lie has consciously morked to establish his o:t n 'mag' %%ill, Iliv pl-ople br making frequent appearance% ill ptlblic throaghot.rt Taiwan that :ire widelN repor(ed in file local rnt'dia. The Kuornintang As the GftC is essentially is our -niau government. so it is c svnlially it one -party governnleut 'f'he K\IT's political tutelage osterlsibli ternlin:lled ill 1917, but the party's political hegemony has not breu altered. even Ihouglt it is not s;Inetinrlyd by law. Important posts in the government, the artned forces. and till- last, enforcement and security agencleti:Ire oiunopoli %ed b% KNIT IlleIrlbers. Policies are fornluialed within KNIT codicils and iniplumented by KNIT nlcnlbers %%�hcl bold governniviit positions, :vul p:trtc status trill influence often arc of greater significance than official dale posts. As in the governnlev I. (ht- d (lIInn:Int figure within the party has liven Chiang Kai-shek, who serves :IS DirM01' 0 110 ll. Since (:hiang's he :dlh declined, Premier Chiang Ching -kuo. who is it member of the policy- setting Standing Conmlitlet of Ihr Parl"'s 1 (:Cenral Committee, probably lets as de facto party chief. '4'he relationship hetwern flit' KMT and (Ile GRC is sitrnlar to Ili-it between ruling Con11nm1ist parties :Ind their national goverome�nts. The structural orgauizali(ln of till KNIT is essentialh the same as Ihat of most national Gonlalunist p:lrtics 'file KX1�f is divided into tCrritorial Itllits %spiel encoalpass 60111 Tals%:lll and osersras Chinese -orziniunitiv%. and into (LI110011:ll Unit. %shish largely parallel inlporlant go%croine'nt ,Ind pnlfe- s; gaup, Itt flit bas,' of flit- p%rinnid.d striwturc is the local unit, or cell. c�onststing of form Ilirce It IS rnembvers Thi is flit K \1'1"s most dircct link %%ith the ;;encral public. as it c�on%vv, (hr park 's message tied is responsible for inl-nibersbip reerait- relent ithosc Iht� local unit are the subdistrict, district. c�ounh. and provincial organi Each l %el of 1 IrgJlli Zit1a11 Ill:lillt.13M ;1 central Corn I711tte' and ill] advison vornillittev Coin [nit(ecs in the base IvAvI are clt�cted direelk b% (he part% nlenrbcnlnp, but al higher hsels the% an� chosen h% park congrevvN eleelt,d ill turn b% congrv%sesal the nett lower Icsel lie pmclice, ho%%v%er. central conirniller slates are often ch-wrtniucd ill aclsancr Its higher parts echelons 1'he counts and pro%incial c�onge -,%v% corn out ports dire slithin their jurisdictional compclrner. The count% ('ongcs' is contit�ncd annually. (ht- pro%incial congress invek hicn,lialh The district and subdistrict Jsst�rrlblivs fits flit- c'aagresses are known at this Iese�I1 arc composed of the� entire parts menlbvrship in their rvspective areas The National Parh Cnngess theoretic'alk is t.:. higlieQ part% authority It is charred a0111 till fortnulaliori of policies. objce�ti e%, and programs, is -Il as the election of the Director (;vticrll and fli Central Crnlmittec 'hhe principal operating organ of the KMT is the Central Parts liew1cluarter% Till bod%� nhic�h is under the direction of it eurviarx general. celtlsists of tilt� \aliaual Parts :ollgmss, the 21- mernbvr Standing Committee. cho%vn Ix the 99- nlenlber Central (:oTimi ittev, and the Central Advison Collllmtter �a large' colrnn3ttee oillllbenng cell orcr 100 nu tnbcn� appointed by Elie Director (:etirrll bell silbiect tie confirmation by the Nat'lorml Parh Congress. Anteing tiff' ongoing n"potl5illilitiV% of the Central Parh lleaclgnarters is direct control of party members without fist-d residence, such as railroad workl-rs, u':uilen. other %ocationul groups, amt overseas 01inesr Becansl- [lit Central Advisors Counniltee is iargeh hotiorary will till :ent .d (;ontiliticc (�onscros only t wife it year. lilt- Director GrnemI relies greatly on the Standing CamullUev, which meets Iwice a %seek, The Standing (:ommiltee issm�s (letters, slakes appoint nlcnls, and even modifies resolutions {rallied In vithrr the� NalionaI ]':Ire% Congers or The (:etllral Conunittee, although it does not spl-cific�alk ha%�c such :olthoril\ flit, Standing 0iiiii .ttee ostensibly also lllakt-s ded"iolls dealing with the KNIT and government internal policy and admintslrition, but W t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 FIGURE 3. Premier Chiang Ching -kuo (C) actually it merely provides a mechanisms for police formulation and decisionmaking since the Director General makes all important decisions and may veto actions taken by it. The Standing Committees role therefore has been to give legality to the decisions of the Director General, who sen ,s chairman of the body. As the Standing Committee very rarely challenges the decisions of the Director General, so the National Part Congress seldom takes issue syilh policie�, drafted in the name of the Standing Committee. under Chianti Ching -kno's leadership, the Standing Committee is apparently decreasing in importance and is fulfilling only a proforrna role. Since the reorganization of the part headquarters in the spring of 1972, the major organs of the Central Committee are the Secretariat. seven departments, and four committees as follows: Departments: Organizational Affairs ]Mainland Operations Overseas Affairs Cultural Affairs Social Affairs Youth Activities Womens Activities Committees: Policy Coordination Disciplinary and Evaluation Finances History Compilation The old organization had consisted of the Secretariat, six sections, it number of committees, and it board, By streamlining the Central Part headquarters, the KMT leadership hoped to rednce the duplication and overlapping of responsibilities among the various components. The reorg anization also entailed some redistribution of power within the party hierarchy. "The Secretariat is responsible for the party's overall routine and ad hoc administrative and business matters, for the management of the agenda and records of the party congresses, meetings. and conferences, and for the Intclget and finances. The Department of Organizational Affairs is responsible for the functioning and maintenance of party headquarters up through the provincial level, including the meeting of personnel requirements and the supervision of cadres. It also implements party policies and programs and supervises the estab- lishnw nt. reorganization, and utilization of headquar- ters bodies set up to serve part goals. 'I'll( Department of Mainland Operations is charged with maintaining and providing v,uidance for covert operations on the mainland, planning and supervising psychological 12 warfare, sabotage, and intelligence operations, and performing communications duties, -,rch as liaison kith advance base and overseas stations. It also reportedly conducts studies on international coin nnnnism and reports on Chinese Communist activities. Under the reorganization, this department may have become responsible for most of the party security functions previously within the pin-view of the abolished Sixth Section. The Department of Overseas Affairs concentrates on countering Peking*s proselyt- izing among Chinese living abroad. It handles such matters as organizing, training, and conducting liaison activities with overseas Chinese movements, providing direction for overseas propaganda efforts, organizing training for overseas Chinese students. and recruiting for the KMT atwong the overseas Chinese communi- ties. The Department of Cultund Affairs engages in it broad range of domestic propag informational, and cultural activities. Heavy emphasis is placed on disseminating the teachings of Sun Yat sen. The Department of Social Aff airs apparently assumed the duties of the former Fifth Section (Mass Mcvements), directing its activities and efforts rnAnly toward such groups as youth, professional, labor, business, religious, and social organizations. Each department is divided into a number of functional divisions. Other Central Committee organizations include committees for financial affairs, party 1 evaluation and discipline, and police coordination. In October 1973 KNIT membership on 'Taiwan and the offshore islands was reported variously to be "approximately 600,000" and nearly 1 million. The discrepancy appears to reflect the KM'T practice of claiming more members than actually take part in party activities. Reflecting its claim to Fee an all -China party, in 1968 the KNIT reported that it had 17 provincial -level party headquarters, 260 hsien branch party headquarters. 2,675 district party headquarters, 6,5x3 district branch headquarters, and 79,200 culls. KMT leaders also claimed to have 103 organiza- tional units in overseas areas and to have more than 85,000 members among the overseas Chinese, distributed as foilows: Asia, 73`.' United Stales, 21 SC': Africa, 2`'r: Europe, I and Oceania, 3r'. Although not citing specific figures, leaders also claimed a 2Wr' increase in membership and an 87i increase in the number of organizational units in mainland China between 1963 in(] 1967. In accordance with Director General Chiang Kai shek's instructions in his directive "Urgent Tasks To Be Carried Out by the Government and the Party in the Future," party leaders in late 1963 launched the Second 'Three Year Plan for the Development of Party APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 LL Organizations. All park headquarters were instructed to "pay special attention to the recruitment of Taiwanese and young intellectual women.' A total of 2500)0 new KNIT members were to be recruited during the 3 year period. with specific quotas assigned to the various part} headquarters and to occupational and profesionai groups. According to the recruitment directive. 8U i of the 230,(00 were to he native Taiwanese (approximately 65 "i of the 74,552 members recruited during 1966 were Taiwanese); 60'i were to he youths; 255(' were to be young women, working women, and housewives; 2551 were to he recruited from the armed forces. and 6.5rr' were to have had at least it middle school education. Moreover, priority consideration was to be given to tht recruitme of scientific and technical personnel. Party leaders also support a program whereby the retirement of older members is encouraged. in addition to its regular membership, the KNIT has mobilized a wide range of mass organizations to insure broad popular support for the party and to improve Party services to society, as well as to strengthen the Party itself. These organizations include labor, industrial and commerc agricultural, veterans. cultural, religious, professional. anti youth and women's groups. The party's mass movement activities are centered mainly in. the youth movement, however, and are carried out chiefly through the China Youth Anti- Conununist National Salvation Corps, some of whose activities are fwer. 'I potential for T.Iiwan(.se dissidence has also been diminished by according them the appearance of political primacy at the provincial and lower levels, growing representation in the KMT, and a dominant role in the private sector of the economy. Moreover, close government sur- veillance of anv open challenge to the regime and pnrishment for those who do challenge it make advocacy of independence a risky prop:sition. For (,xanple, Deng \ding -min, one of the most outspoken antinainlandvr members of the Taiwanese intel- Icchal community. was convicted in April 1965 for 72 printing a pamphlet strongly critical of President Chiang and the KMT. Although Chiang suspended Peng's sentence of 8 years imprisonment, apparently as a result of pressure from the United States, others have not fared as well. Peng, who for some years was regarded locally as the leader of the TIM, was closely watched after his release, but in early 1970 he escaped from Taiwan. He currently lives in the United States, but his reputation locally has declined drastically. partly because he failed to bring any benefits to the TIM in Taiwan and partly as it side effect of the Shanghai Communique. The loosely knit independence n ^meat overseas has been characterized over the past two decades by periods of relative vitality on the part of Tai\tanese in Japan and the United States, but for several \ears the movement has been leaderless, factionalized, and moribund. The government has successfully induced several independence leaders to return to Taiwan and openly support the GRC. Increasing concern about the future international stutns of 'Taiwan and the helief that the Shanghai Conununigtie has precluded independence has minimized TIM's appeal to potential nc\y recruits, who apparently consider that subversion is not it viable alternative under present circumstances. Of greater concern to the KMT leadership since 1972 has been the� step -tip in propaganda from the mainland directed at convi..:ing major segments of Taiwan's society �army, KMT, bureaucrats, students, and inteilectuals �that eventual reunion with the mainland is inevitable, and appealing to individual interests and to Chinese patriotic feelings in order to hasten the day. So far, Peking's campaign, as well as the efforts of the pro independence groups hay( Kwon few converts; some students have evidenced interest in reunification. some have engaged in pro- indepen- dencc activities, �ul their nunhers are very small and they have had no success. Since Taiwanese constitute the� overwhelming majority of the armed forces, they are natural targets of those who .iry actively promoting Taiwanese independence or reunification with the mainland. Alertness by the authorities, periodic rerr.ii: -ter, to the major commands about the potential threat, and intense political indoctrination of members of the armed forces hay( prevented this from developing into if serious problem. In general, Taiwanese thus far have expressed a rather clear preference for their present ruler and virtually no receptivity to mainland nle. The government relies primarily on its police and intelligence agencies to control subversion. Ry means of an elaborate net of informants in military units and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 printing a pamphlet strongly critical of President Chiang and the KMT. Although Chiang suspended Peng's sentence of 8 years imprisonment, apparently as a result of pressure from the United States, others have not fared as well. Peng, who for some years was regarded locally as the leader of the TIM, was closely watched after his release, but in early 1970 he escaped from Taiwan. He currently lives in the United States, but his reputation locally has declined drastically. partly because he failed to bring any benefits to the TIM in Taiwan and partly as it side effect of the Shanghai Communique. The loosely knit independence n ^meat overseas has been characterized over the past two decades by periods of relative vitality on the part of Tai\tanese in Japan and the United States, but for several \ears the movement has been leaderless, factionalized, and moribund. The government has successfully induced several independence leaders to return to Taiwan and openly support the GRC. Increasing concern about the future international stutns of 'Taiwan and the helief that the Shanghai Conununigtie has precluded independence has minimized TIM's appeal to potential nc\y recruits, who apparently consider that subversion is not it viable alternative under present circumstances. Of greater concern to the KMT leadership since 1972 has been the� step -tip in propaganda from the mainland directed at convi..:ing major segments of Taiwan's society �army, KMT, bureaucrats, students, and inteilectuals �that eventual reunion with the mainland is inevitable, and appealing to individual interests and to Chinese patriotic feelings in order to hasten the day. So far, Peking's campaign, as well as the efforts of the pro independence groups hay( Kwon few converts; some students have evidenced interest in reunification. some have engaged in pro- indepen- dencc activities, �ul their nunhers are very small and they have had no success. Since Taiwanese constitute the� overwhelming majority of the armed forces, they are natural targets of those who .iry actively promoting Taiwanese independence or reunification with the mainland. Alertness by the authorities, periodic rerr.ii: -ter, to the major commands about the potential threat, and intense political indoctrination of members of the armed forces hay( prevented this from developing into if serious problem. In general, Taiwanese thus far have expressed a rather clear preference for their present ruler and virtually no receptivity to mainland nle. The government relies primarily on its police and intelligence agencies to control subversion. Ry means of an elaborate net of informants in military units and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 b, L goyenrnu�nt offices, registration and extensive� Provincial Working Committee serving as the primary screening of citizens. issnance of identih cards, and censorship of the mails, the security forc�cs have been able to neutralize quic�kk and effec�tiyeh any orgam..ation or grotp that threatens, even re�motek, to oppose the government. Although these controls have been somewhat relaxed, they are still sufficient to inhibit subversion. Efforts of opposition elements to organize- even for such limited purposes as local elections, have been only sporadic and successfully thwarted. Popnlati �n control methods have changed noticeably since the GRC's flight to Taiwan in 1949. fhe government initially relived on direct police measures, large- sc�alc arrests. and other punitive measures to maintain political stahilih and stamp out potential threats. It has since come to adopt more positive policies in an effort to \vin popular support. partic�nlarly as scc urity conditions have improved. The sec�urih agencies are less inclined toward overt use of police powers, instead favoring preventive measures and more subtle pressnrrs. Nonetheless. the government would not hesitate to use its police powers aggressively and ruthlessly ,tanip oul real or potential threats. The go\ernnu�nt seeks to remove or lessen nnderl. causes of political and social discontent he promoting economic development programs. property ownership, bigber levels of living� improved education, and a broad range t.` social services. Moreover, n.tional leaders are making ono� efforts to break clown distinctions between elements of the populace and to promote national unit, while fostering givater popular participation and involve- nu�nt in political and governmental processes. The exercise of political and personal freedonis is more pronounced than heretofore although restrictions remain, as shown by the absence of nu�auringful political opposition, by government supervision and control of the communications media, and by limitations on freedom of speech. \Iost of these restrictions are justified on the basis of the Ili ng emergency, but it truly open soviet) retrains larger alien to dw Chinese experiem c :un vvay. 2. Communist subversion Communist subversive activities in Taiwan were particularly apparent in i9 -19 and 19.O. and it limited rec wrence was reported from 1962 to 1966. The intervening and subsequent periods have been generally quiescent. Subversion at that time was �Ak 6v direct acts of sabotage. assassination, kidnaping, and extortion� with the so- called Taiwan agen 1 for such activities. The operational aims of Peking s program of subversion were to create it feeling of despair among the population, to sabotage the monetary system and the economy, and to cache military equipment in preparation for a Communist led revolt that would be supported by an invasion from the mainland. After the Communist regime consolidated its hold on the mainland in 1949, it sought to coordinate its subversive efforts in Taiwan with it military offensive against the island. The Peking regimes plans vycre frustrated h} President Truman's decision to resist the Communist invasion of South Lorca in June 1930 with armed force and by his declaration neutralizing" Taiwan. During the carp� 1950 the GRC sectrih services :!r-troved nuc�b of the Chinese Communist Part ,rganization in Taiwan, which had successfully penetrated all levels of the military and government in the confusion of the Chinese civil war and the GRC retreat from the nwlnland. About 1951, the Chinese Communist Irndergr01111d adopted it polic�\ of withdrawal, and its agents dispersed and went into hiding. According to GIW wetirity officials, there has been no formal Communist organization in Tat;wan since 1934. CRC estimates in early 1969 set the number of active Communist agents in 'faiw�an at about 1.000 pwsuniably limited to the fcvy c�aclres who evaded the government's r:;undup in the early 1950 and it small number of at tints who were subsequently infiltrated. "I'here� is no indication that these agents in Taiwan are in a position to mount serious guerrilla or sabotage operations. There probably is a residue of �sleeper� agents who could be activated to support an assault front the ma; :Jand. F. Maintenance of internal security (S) 1. General A c�onrplex and elaborate police and svetirih apparatus that includes government, part, military, and civilian organizations is maintained in Taiwan. Its primary wsponsibilities are the preservation of internal securih and public order through enforcing the criminal and civil codes and police regulations, while at the same time maintaining paternal control over the populace. Mane antigovernment and anti KMT activities are regarded as Communist inspired by the authorities, who thereby justify the use of repressive action which under other circumstances vyould be regarded as extralegal. The police and intelligence apparatus, v.hose operations fregnently constitute an impediment to the full exercise of civil 23 Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 25X1 0 X The Sixth Section was primaril} responsible for conducting and coordinating Chinese Nationalist propaganda programs directed at mainland China. It also engaged in propaganda activities in Hang Kong, Southeast Asia, Japan. and. to a lesserextent, Taiwan. The section also acted as General Secretariat of the interagency Psychological N arfare Guidance Com- mittee, %,,Ach coordinated CRC militarv, civilian, and Kuomintang psychological warfare. It administered the multimillion dollar facilities of the Mainland Broadcasting Division, which beams both shorhyave and rnediurnwave broadcasts to mainland China. The Free China Relief Association, in conjunction with the Sixth Section. mvelcorned and provided shelter for all refugees from mainland China who arrive on "Taiwan. The Sixth Section interrogated and assisted in the rehabilitation of these refugees, and used them to advance GRC propaganda. The section Conducted propaganda activity for the CRC through such international Organizations as the Asian Peoples' Anti Communist League. The section also helped arrange and sponsor National Day Double Ten celebrations among overseas Chinese c�nmmunitics, arrange] anti Communist propaganda displays on Taiwan, and participated in KNIT negotiations with leaders of other political parties on Taiwan to line up their support for Kuomintang programs and policies. i i 29 H. Suggestions for further reading (U /OU) Chien Twang- sheng, The Cocemment and Politics of China 1912 -1949 (Stanford University Press, 1970 paperback ed.) A detailed study of the origin and structure of the Republic of China's political institutions. Fairbank, John K., Reisc�huer, Edwin O., Craig, Albert M., Fast Asia -The Modem Transformation (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1963). The standard history of East Asia. The chapters on China coyer the impact of the West, the Chinese Revolution, the rise of the KNIT and Chiang Kai -shek. and the Communist victory over the Nationalists. Manc�all, Mark, ed. Formosa Today (New fork. Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Contains cha pters by various authors concerning Taiwan's history, politics, culture, and soc�ieh. Mendel, Douglas, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970). A well written account of Taiwanese nationalism and nationalist organizations. Heavily biased in favor of the Taiwanese. Payne, Robert, Chiang Kai -shck (N( fork, Weybright and "Palley, 1969). A relatively unbiased and complete biography of the leader of Nationalist China. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080025 -0 Chronology Wou) 1913 December Cairo Declaration states Allied objective of restoring to China territories stolen by .Japan, incluc'ing "Formosa and the Pescadores. 1915 July Potsdam Proclamation reaffirms t.iat terms of the Cairo Declaration shall he carried out. October China regains control of 'Taiwan after 50 }cans of .Japanese rule. 1946 December First National Assembl' adopts constaution to he pronittl- gated I .January 1917 and effective 25 December 1017. 1917 February Rioting on Taiwan occurs its result of oppressive measures of Nationalist regime; large numbers of Taiwanese are lain. November General election for National Assembly is held. 1918 April Chiang Kai -shek .s elected China's first President under terms of new eonstitullion; First National Assavnhly approves "ucnaporarv" provisions of constitution graoling emergenvy powers to the President during period of anti- Conrtnunisl campaign. 1949 January President Chiang announces his retirement from office in fa� or of %'fee President, Li Tsung -jen. December ('hinese communist forces take over control of mainland and estnhlish the People's Republic of China WIW); (-R(' with- draws to 'Taiwan and establishes seat of government at Taipei. 1950 January C.N. Security Council rejects Soviet proposal for expulsion of (.11c delegation and seating of Chinese Communist representatives, in first of annual discussion of Chinese representatio March Chiang Kai -slick resumes office of President. April Executive Yuan gra tits Taiwan Province authority to estab- lish self government by electoral process in districts and municipalities. June Presid -nt Truman orders V.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol Taiwan Strait to prevent hostile activity by either Communist., or Chinese Nationalists. 1951 May U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group MAAG) is established on 'Taiwan. 1952 April Treaty of peace is sigr I between GRC and .Japan. 1953 January Legislative Yuan adopts Land -to- Tiller Act as GIW land reform program. i 95 March National Assembly approves indefinite extension of "tem- porary" provisions of the constitution. President Chiang is reelected President by National Assembly. December \lutua l Defense "Treaty with the U.S. is signed by (.RC. 1958 August Battle of "Taiwan Strait is precipitated as Chinese Conl- nntnist.s begin concentrated bombardment of (luenloy (Chin -men Tao). September U.S. Marines arrive on 'Taiwan for joint maneuvers; U.S. warships convoy R(1(' ships carrying supplies to Quemoy. October Joint ('.S. -GlIC communique deenlphasizes liberation of mainland by military force. 30 i 3