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SECRET 48 /GS /GP Morocco March 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSE.EfE APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 t t 6 L NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS l The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provida the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Facthook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or ihrough liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING r This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by a.i unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 U/il oroccc CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed. A. Introduction 1 Historical aspects; pop ilar veneration of mon- archy; disaffection wit), King Hassan's style of rule; government poli.;ies. B. Structure and functioning of the government 2 1. Constitutional provisions 3 Primacy of King's power; parliamentary proc- ess; succession to the throne; popular rights. 2. National government 5 Cabinet; importance of Ministry of Interior; Royal Cabinet; role of parliament. 3. Regional and local government 6 Organization and operation of provinces; ap- pointment of officials; popular representation; assemblies and councils. SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Page 4. Judiciary 7 Need to reorganize maze of overlapping sys- tems; reforms implemented and those pend- ing; special courts. C. Politimi dynamics 8 Causes for declining popularity and increasing isolation of Hassan. 1. The King 8 Autocratic rule; methods of reducing power and influence of military and civilian leaders; popular disillusionment with royal favoritism and government corruption. 2. Civilian and military elements 9 Royal patronage and manipulation of elite groups; coup attempts in 1971 and 1972 by disgruntled officers; continuing tension be- tween military and police. 3. Political parties 10 Hassan's success in weakening parties; lack of grassroots support; establishment and dissolu- tion of opposition National Front; strengths, policies, and leaders of: a. Istiqlal 10 b. National Union of Popular Forces 11 c. Popular Movement 12 d. Party of Liberation and Socialism 12 4. Special interest groups 13 Effectiveness of labor, youth, and student organizations. 5. Elections 14 Procedural laws the King's prerogative; popu- lar cynicism toward electoral process. D. National policies 14 1. Domestic goals 14 Lipservice to social reforms and economic expansion; attitude toward education, over- population, redistribution of farmland; 1\io- roccanization" of enterprises and services; modernization of military forces. 2. Foreign relations 16 Professed nonalignment but actual pro -West- ernism; attempts to normalize ties with neigh- boring nations; stand on Palestine question. ii Page a. The West 17 (1) France 17 Colonial ties; strains caused by Ben Barka affair it 1965; improvement in relations since end of De Gaulle er. (2) United States Long history of cordial relations; U economic and military aid. (3) Other Western countries Ties with Spain and West Germany. b. Communist countries Diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R., East European nations, China, and Mongolia; Soviet and East European aid projects. c. The Arab world Hassan's attempts to build image as pan Islamic leader. d. The Maghreb and Africa Improved relations with Algeria; calls for Maghrcb unity; limited ties with black Africa. E. Threats to government stability 1. Discontent and dissidence Lack o:. �ity and cohesion among dissatisfied elements: stidents, intellectuals, urban slum dwellers, and workers; longstanding tensions between Berber minority and Arabized ma- jority; possibility of another military coup attempt. 2. Subversion Sporadic efforts of small number of leftist students and Communists; ineffectiveness of Moroccan dissidents in exile. F. Maintenance of internal security Organization, strength, competence, and leader- ship of: 1. Poice a. General Directorate of National Security b. Auxiliary Forces c. Royal Gendarm Brie 2. Intelligence G. Selected bibliography 17 13 18 r 19 19 21 21 23 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 Chronology 29 Glossary... 30 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 FIGURES Page Fig. 1 King Hassan II photo) 2 Fig. 2 Main elements of the Moroccan Gov- ernment chart) 4 Fig. 3 Irredentism map) 11 Fig. 4 Hassan with King Husayn of Jordan (photo) 19 Page Fig. 5 Hassan with Algerian Prime Min- ister Boumediene photo) 20 Fig. 6 Police and security organizations i chart) 24 Fig. 7 Mobile Maghzen photo) 26 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Government and Politics A. Introduction (C) Morocco regained its independence in 1956 after 44 years of control by the protectorate powers, France and Spain. The monarchy, which has its roots in nearly a millennium of Moroccan history, figured prominently in the struggle for independence and now dominates the political scene. Although Morocco is theoretically a constitutional monarchy with a modern administrative apparatus, the King still rules in the style of a traditional potentate, and politics remain based largely on traditional loyalties and alliances and on tribal ties. For centuries Islam has been the most important influence on Moroccan political life. The westernmost outpost of Islam �which swept across North Africa in the late seventh century� Morocco rapidly developed into a stronghold of Muslim orthodoxy, and today it is still one of the most conservative and traditional Muslim states. The monarchy's survival through centuries of tribal warfare and four decades of European domination was mainly the result of Moroccans' deep reverence for the King as their religious leader, and among most of the population this veneration for the monarchy is still intact. Also, Islam has helped to perpetuate an age -old social structure based on tribal relationships, personal loyalties, and a partly feudal system which has produced schismatic politics and discouraged the rise of effective national parties. Only the monarchy, combining as it does both religious and political authority, has provided the cohesion necessary to attract the loyalty of the majority of Moroccans. The French. policy of divide and rule, which deepened the historic differences between the Berbers of the mountains and the Arabized population of the towns and lowlands, has also had an important impact on contemporary politics. Deeply rooted antagonism between the Arabized majority, which dominates the government, and the Berber minority continues to percolate below the surface as a major factor contributing to regionalism and political factionalism. The Berbers resent the government's neglect of their interests and the establishment's attempts to Arabize them. During the struggle against the French, King Mohamed V became the single rallying symbol capable of marshaling a unified nationalist movement. Through his personal charisma and the tremendous popularity of the monarchy in the initial postindependence years, Mohamed V was able to engage the support of almost all elements in Moroccan society, and during his reign Morocco embarked on a gradual course toward development. Lacking the prestige of his father, Hassan II, who has ruled since 1961, has relied almost entirely on traditional support from the rural peasantry, the Moroccan establishment, and the armed forces (Figure 1). He has encouraged factionalism among competing political forces, and over the decade of his rule, Moroccans have become seriously divided on national goals and the role of the monarchy. Hassan's major preoccupation since coming to the throne has been to consolidate the power of the monarchy by undercutting the strength of political parties and other contenders to his authority. He has proceeded on a domestic course which insures his support from the Moroccan elite by pursuing policies which protect its wealth and status. Very little progress has been made toward development goals except in the area of universal education, and although Hassan pays lipservice to broad reforms, only token measures have been taken to alleviate the country's serious economi.. and social problems. Hassan depends on apolitical members of the establishment to run the government and has rewarded loyal service by royal patronage. He has not permitted significant constitutional limitations on his powers and has successfully eroded the influence of political parties, which have not participated in government since the mid- 1960's and now probably command only meager popular followings. Although the majority of the tradition -bound population accepts the monarchy as an integral part.of their way of life, disillusionment with Hassan's rule is on the rise. The first dramatic show of discontent came in July 1971 when some high- ranking members of the military, which had been the major prop of the monarchy, narrowly failed to seize power from the King. Only 14 months later, in August 1972, an air APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 force squadron acting under the direction of Maj. Gen. Mohamed OtAir, the Kings closest adviser. attempted to assassinate the King, high- ranking government officials, and other members of the royal entourage. These two coup attempts have seriously weakened Hassan's power base, partl\ because they have riot impelled him to make needed fundamental reforms. 7'h(- corruption and inefficiency which permeate the regime have eroded the traditional ties I)OWeen the palace and the armed forces. Hassan continues to depend on the armed forces for his survival, but this is it considerably shakier prop than it was before the attempted coups. Although students, political leaders, and organized labor have not resorted to extralegal measures, they have been outspoken opponents of Ilassan's autocratic rule, the curtailment of public liberties, and the slow pace of economic and social change. Even among middle level civil servants and some peasant farmers there is 9 evidence of gr unbling. Only the military is capable of effectively challenging King lfwsan. however, and in a time of gro%%ing disaffection and periodic todelit and worker disorders, the unreliability of the armed forces could cause serious problems for the regime. In the area of foreign relations, Morocco has strengthened its ties kith the West, although King Ilassan still professes to follow the policy of nonalignment established after independence. lielations with France Cooled considerably between 1965 and 1970 because of' differences between f'residertt de Gaulle and King Hassan over Morocco's responsibility in tire disappearance of Mohamed lien Barka, it Moroccan o; position leader, in Paris. :kfter the resignation of De Gaulle, ltoNyever, relations between the two countries were quickIN repaired. Since 1965. Morocco has steadily worked to intprove� its relations with other Western European countries and the l'nited States. It leans heavily on ec�onotttic�, military. and technical aid front Prance and the United States, but in recent years flassan has tried to reduce this dependency 1� accepting !invited ,assistance front (;ontnnutist countries despite his \yariness of Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean. Although the King gives verbal support to the Palestinian cause, Morocco has reniained aloof front the Arab- Israeli conflict and has concentrated on improving relations with its neighbors in the Maghreb, which have periodically been strained by border disputes and ideological differences. Ilassan has solved most of Morocc�o�s problems with Mauritania, Tunisia, and Algeria. lielations \%ith tire revolutionary regime in Libya, cool since the overthrow of King ldris in 1969, have rapidly deteriorated because of 1'residen! Qadhafi verbal support for both the 1971 and 1972 coup plotters. B. Structure and functioning of the government Morocco promulgated its third postindependence constitution in March 1972, almost 10 years after bec�onting it constitutional monarchy. Like its 1962 and 1970 predecessors, the constitution provides for it parliamentary system with it Prince ;Minister and cabinet, if legislature elected in part by universal suffrage, and an independent judiciary. Prepared under King llassan's direction and approved by it nationwide referendum, the document opens the way for limited popular participation in government, but it clearly affirms tic ntonarehy's ultimate legal and moral authority over the instituttions of government. (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 FIGURE 1. King Hasson II, Commander in Chief of the Royal Armed Forces, a vital but somewhat shaky prop of his regime (C) 1. Constitutional Frovisio. s (C) While Moroccans do not view their constitutions with a great deal of awe, adherence to the letter, if not always the spirit, of formal legal relationships and procedures is an old tradition. Consequently, Morocco's three constitutions each mirror internal political balances of power. Pronulgatet; just I year after King Hassan acceded to the throne, the country's first constitution reflected the new monarch's relative weakness in contrast to his father, Mohamed V, who had evaded fulfilling his promise to the politicians to promulgate a constitution. King Hassan inherited little of his father's prestige and political stature, and leading politicians consequently were able to gain some modest limitations on royal authority and a constitutional guarantee for the prerogatives of political parties. Hassan so successfully consolidated his position and weakened the country's major political parties, however, that by 1965, using domestic disturbances and the alleged ineffectiveness of parliament as pretexts, he was able to invoke emergency powers and suspend the constitution. Although the legal justification for his action soon disappeared, Hassan continued to exercise extraor- dinary powers for 5 years under a State of Exception (in which the constitution remained suspended and parliament prorogued), ruling for a time as his own Prime Minister with the aid of a succession of cabinets formed of nonpolitical personalities. All of the country's representative groups, including loyalist Political parties, opposed the State of Exception because their organizations were further weakened and demoralized by their prolonged exclusion from normal political activity. Taking advantage of the disarray of opposing political forces, Hassan restored it revised constitution in 1970 to give a legal foundation to his uncontested rule. The document did little to dismantle the Kings autocratic powers, however, and it so limited the competence of the government and parliament that the two major opposition parties, Istiqlal and the National Union of Popular Forces, refused to participate in �or even recognize �the greatly weakened legislative body. Their obstinacy blocked Hassan from achieving his primary objective in reviving constitutional rule: political legitimacy. Moreover, without the support of representative groups with any semblance of popular following, Hassan became increasingly reliant on the military establishment as the only effective prop for the monarchy. The first military coup attempt, in July 1971, demonstrated how undependable this prop was. Badly shaken bN the 197 i military uprising, Hassan initiated a series of dialogues with leading political and economic personalitie- and promulgated the 1972 constitution as an initial step in broadening his political support. Although the ne%y constitution still insures monarchial supremacv, Hassan made some concessions to political leaders' demands. However, none of the institutions provided for under the 1972 constitution had been established at the tine of the August 1972 coup attempt, which again cast Morocco into deep political turmoil. The outstanding feature of the 1972 constitution is the ptinacy of the King's powers, which derive from his position as chief of state and spiritual leader of the country. The Prime Minister and the regular cabinet are aPpointed by the King and can be dismissed at his pleasure. Although the Print(- Minister theoretically is head of government, the King holds sweeping executive powers (Figure 2). He presides over all councils of state, includiut, cabinet meetings, appoints all magistrates and ambassadors, and ratifies all treaties except those drax%ing on state finances, %%bich must have prior approval from parliament. The King is connander of the armed forces and can declare war by simply notifying parliament. Under the 1972 constitution, parliament is composed of it single Ch::.nber of Ilepresentatives which is elected for a 4 -year term and neets for two sessions a year. The King may end a session if it extends beyond 2 months, and parliament may not call an extraordinary session except by an absolute vote of its members. lletails regarding election procedu-es and the total number of representatives are to be determined by organic law which the King has the exclusive right to establish; however, the constitution does provide for two thirds of the Chamber to be elected by direct universal suffrage and the remaining third by an electoral college trade up of communal councilors, members of professional chambers, and representatives of wage earners. Parliament can overturn the government by a motion of censure or by refusal to support a vote of confidence requested by the government. Both actions trust be taken by an absolute majority of the representatives; censure can be applied only once a year. Although parliament is granted full egislative authority within the broadly defined domain of law, its competence is hedged by several executive and royal preugatives. A watchdog judicial body, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, has ultimate authority to determine the constitutional jurisdiction of parliament. As in the past, the King's appointees hold a majority in the Constitutional 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080027 -8 KING HASSAN II Supreme Court PARLIAMENT Constitutional Chamber Chamber Royal Cabinet Special Court of Justice of Representatives CABINET: (2 3 elected; 1.3 appointed) (advisory) (anticorruption) Prime Minister Modern Law Courts Traditional Law Courts ti Other Ministers Religious Courts r E f. Secretaries of e State WL 19 PROVINCES 2 E PRFE CI r RES 19�: PROVINCES 2'P REFECT1jRE'S ;Assemblies pr,.' Assemblies Governors" Governors J 1 u r Z2 Districts Super Caids COMMUNES (66ouY800) CA IDgTS::'::.. I- ARRONDIS SEMENTS 3 Rural Urban Caids Pashas Communal Communal Councils Councils *Provided by constitution but not ,elecfed'as of'.lafg'.1972 **Appointed by King_ but subordinote t0 M inister of Interior FIGURE 2. Main elements of the Moroccan Government (U /OU) Chamber and can still block any bill or amendment the King or government wishes to contest. Parliament's budgetary control also can be circumscribed. If the government's annual budget fails to pass parliament, funds specified in the budget can be allotted by executive decree. Finally, the King can dissolve parliament by royal edict, but lie cannot exercise this critical power again for a year, if a new parliament is elected in the interim. The constitution provides for the establishment of legislative committees to assist in drafting legislation and to continue the activities of parliament between sessions. It also calls for a bureau of the Chamber of Representatives to set up the parliamentary agenda. The bureau's membership is to be selected according to the proportional representation in parliament of the various political parties and headed by an elected president, who also is to appoint parliament's three representatives to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Operating procedures and other regulations concerning legislative committees, the bureau, and the Chamber of Representatives as a whole will be established by parliament itself. 4 The constitution also provides for parliament to share in the constitutional amendment process, which in the 1970 constitution had been the exclusive prerogative of the Kii,g. Under the new provisions, parliament may approve proposed amendments by a two thirds vote of its membership, but proposals cannot be submitted to the necessary referendum except by royal decree, which theoretically provides the King with a loophole for delaying or preventing the final adoption process. The King himself may submit a proposed amendment or revision directly to referendum. The capstone of royal authority is the extraordinary power granted to the King in times of national emergency. The constitution gives him the right to declare a state of emergency when the territorial integrity or normal operations of government are threatened. During this emergency period, the King assumes full powers to defend the country and to conduct the affairs of state, and he alone can terminate emergency control. The magnitude of this prerogative was clearly demonstrated during the State of Exception, when King Hassan ruled for 5 years as an absolute monarch. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Undergirding the King's authoritv as chief 4 state is his traditional role as spiritual leader of the Islamic community in northwest Africa and member of the centuries -old Alaouite (Alawite) dvnasty. As the leader of the faithful, his first duty is to assure the preeminence of Islam. His religious primacy has its political corollary in the supremacy of the monarchy, which is above constitutional .w. Moreover, the King is the guarantor of the continuity of the state and the protector of the rights and liberties of all citizens and minorities. The constitution expands the traditional characterization of the King by calling him the "supreme representative of the people" and declaring his person both "sacred and inviolable." The constitutional provisions which establish Hassan 11's line as inheritors of the crown modify the 1962 constitutional precedent of strict primogeniture and break with orthodox Islamic practice. Prior to the succession of Hassan, a nev ruler was chosen by a college of religious notables (ulama) from among the male members of the dynasty without any fired precedence. According to the 1972 constitution the throne is transmitted to the eldest son of the King and so on down, unless a still living King appoints another of his sons successor to the throne. If there is no male child, sovereignty passes to the King's closest male relative and so on to his sons. (King Hassan has two sons: Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, born in August 1963; and Moulay Rachid, born in June 1970.) :S' a new King has not attained the age of 18, a regency council already established by the previous monarch exercises the royal powers with the exception of those dealing with constitutional revision. The oldest relative, who must be at least 21, presides over the counci:, which also must include the first president of the Supreme Court, the president of parliament, and seven individuals appointed by the King. The constitution describes Morocco as an Islamic state, a part of the Greater Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco), and an African state committed to African unity. The constitution forbids a one -party system and states that political parties, trade unions communal councils, and vocational chambers are to take part in organizing and representing the people. The political rights of citizens include equality before the law, equality of the sexes, and freedom of speech, religion, opinion, assembly, movement, and association. Economic and social prerogatives include the right to an education, to employment, to strike, and to own property. 2. National government (U /OU) King Hassan is in effective control of the country, making all important decisions as well as taking an active: hand in routine and even petty matters. Most ministerial appointments have been based on loyalty to the King, and a minister's influence depends Iurgel on the strength of his personality. Most cabinet members are apolitical personalities described as technicians. The Prime Minister's role has tradition- ally been that of "first among equals" in the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. Within ministries a pattern has emerged wherein administrative functions are freely transferred from one area to another. Ministries are often combined and divided, with the result that a systein of overlapping responsibilities has evolved. As of November 1972 there were 17 ministries, as follows: Administrative Affairs; Agriculture and Agrarian Reform; Culture and Islamic Affairs and Properties; Finance; Foreign Affairs; Health; housing, Construc- tion, and Protection of Natural Environment; Industry and Trade; Information; Interior; Justice; Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports; National Education; Posts, "Celephone and "Telegraph; Public Works and Cominunival'ons; State; and "Tourism.' Given the frequent contradictions between a ministry's apparent and real duties, however, structure of the cabinet has less significance than the individuals who compose it. In addition, a number of other offices filled by personal representatives of the King are often assigned ministerial rank. Because the King's approval is necessary for all important and many minor decisions, most ministries are virtually paralyzed at the .working level. Officials at all levels are usually unwilling to make decisions on even the most elementary matters, and unless specific programs capture royal attention, they usually languish or receive only scant consideration by the bureaucracy. The Ministry of Interior has constituted an exception to this pattern of haphazard ministerial operations, and its elaborate organization appears to function relatively well. This ministry controls all local administration with the e xception of judicial powers), and it has major responsibility for police and intePigence forces, including military and police auxiliaries. It has wide- ranging powers over all local officials, from governors of provinces down to pashas and caids. In addition to wielding considerable administrative control, the ministry's stature and power increased substantially during the 8 years in which it was headed by Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir, who was the most powerful individual in Morocco Tor a current listing f iceq government officials consult Chief of State and Cabinet Menu. ^rs of Foreign Gonernmenls, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 after King Hassan until the August 1972 plot to assassinate the King. Oufkir was a principal conspirator in that plot, and his death a few days later officially reported as a suicide �was probably an execution ordered by Hassan. Some individuals in the Ministry of Interior who were close to Oufkir have been removed, but the overall pe of the ministry will probably remain intact. One politically important body which is a carryover from the traditional system of monarchial government is the Royal Cabinet, a flexible grouping of the King's most trusted advisers which frequently acts as it way station for individuals who have served in the regular cabinet or are designated for a future post in the government. The Royal Cabinet has taken on some aspects of a shadow government which closely follows all ministerial activities. Its members provide the King with technical advice and evaluations of ministerial proposals. Moreover, in contrast to the ministers, the Royal Cabinet frequently initiates major policy decisions, and it functions as tLe King's instrument for supervising the implementation of policy. The lack of a clear distinction between the Royal Cabinet and the government ministers has become ap important stumbling block in the day -to -day operations of government. Individuals holding royal offices oppose granting more authority to their counterparts in the government, and they frequently act as buffers between. the King and government officials. As part of his general reform effort, King Hassan has promised to abolish the post of Director General of the Royal Cabinet, which had been one of the most powerful positions in the kingdom. Traditional positions of power die hard in Morocco, however, and in all likeiiheod, members of the Royal Cabinet will continue to act as intermediaries between the King and government officials. The total number of civil servants is difficult to establish, partic; ilarly since the government's practice over the past decade of absorbing many voting people with university educations into the bureaucracy has produced a fairly rapid expansion. In 1970 there were about 222,000 emplovees within the category of Public Administration, which includes career military officers, teachers, the police, and national and local government officials. Some employees in public enterprise: are probably reflected in this figure also. The government's program of Moroccanization of the civil service has substantially reduced the number of French advisers, who in the initial years after independence accounted for over 60% of all civil servants in the national government. The strained relations between Morocco and France following the z disappearance of leftist opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris in 1965 also gave impetus to the repatriation of many French citizens serving in the bureaucracy. Although exact figures are not available, in 1969 there were approximately 9,000 French leachers, 500 military advisers, and 1,:500 technical assistants employed by the Moroccan Government. Most of the French cooperants serving in the government hold positions bet% een the senior laver of government officials and the mass. of Moroccan civil servants. The King controls the administration throi,gh his monopoly of patronage. All important government posts are filled by royal decree, inciuding positions in state banks, quasi -state banks, credit agencies, and other national offices. Appointments to high -level offices are generally considered an opening for personal aggrandizement, which has led to widespread corruption throughout the administration and quasi governmental organizations. Many high -level officials have no real sense of public service, and their loyalty and service to the King are usually more important to their appointment than competence and expertise. The quality and attitude of high -level officialdom has provoked resentment among the relatively well trained middle -level bureaucrats, who often have greater expertise than their superiors. Among the balk of civil servants, these feelings have resulted in cynical neglect of duties and petty corruption, along with some stirrings of opposition to the regime. Neither of Morocco's two previous parliaments played an effective political role. The hicameral parliament which sat from 1963 until 1967 was largely hamstrung by part\ factionalism and by King Hassan's success in using royal prerogatives to block parliamentary initiatives. Under the 1970 constitu- tion, a greatly weakened unicameral parliament functioned as little more than a rubberstamp for the King's policies. The 1972 constitution more clearly spells out the authority of the legislature than its 1970 predecessor; however, it does not appreciably expand legislative competence. To a large extent, the future role of parliament will be determined by the organic laws concerning election procedur:, and ground rules. 3. Regional and local government (U /OU) Morocco is a unitary state, and its regional and local governments are directly subordinate to the central government. The country is divided into 19 provinces and two prefectures (Rabat and Casablanca) which are administered by governors appointed by the King. The provinces are divided into 72 administrative APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 districts (cercles) and subdivided into 28.1 caidats and arrondissemenis, the basic units of local administra- tion. Governors, who are subordinate to the Minister of Interior, have substantial power in local affairs but are expected to clear major decisions with officials in Rabat. They are responsible for maintaining order in their provinces, but in the event of serious disturbances the military commander in their area assumes direction of all security operations. Governors are chosen more on the basis of their loyalty to the King than for their administrative ability. Lower ranking officials� pashas, caids, and super caids� function as agents of the Ministry of Interior. Caids administer rural afe;is and pashas urban. The super -caids are in charge of the 72 districts. Other central government ministries have representatives in local offices, but they are responsible to their respective ministries, with the governors acting only as coordinating agents. For the purposes of representation in national elections, the basic unit is the commune. The Ministev of Interior defines the physical limits of each commune, which numbered 800 in August 1971. The system of communes parallels the administrative structure, but they have no control over local administration. Each of the urban and rural communes elects communal councils by universal suffrage. When these councils were established in 1959, political leaders hoped they would form the basis for genuine local self government, but the councils were subordinated by royal decree to the centrally appointed caids and pashas, who can veto or ignore their resolutions. The next level of the representative system is the provincial and prefeerural assemblies, members of which are currently elected by and from the communal councils for 6 -year terms. In addition, each assembly has nonvoting representatives from various professional chambers. The assemblies have only limited legislative power, and they are controlled by the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, assemblies and councils have vigorously, but so far unsuccessfully, pressed for increased powers. 4. Judiciary (U /OU) The protectorate powers left Morocco with a maze of overlapping judicial systems. These included six distinct types of court,: Berber customary law courts, sharia and rabbinical courts applying the Islamic Ind Jewish religious laws respectively, the secular courts of the royal government (maghzen courts), and French, Spanish, international, and consular courts. Since independence the government has worked toward combining the hest of these judicial practices into a nationwide legal systern guided by traditional, religious, and modern principles valid for Morocco. Although considerable progress has been made, the process of Arabiration and Moroccanization has not been completed and problems still exist, particularly since many reforms are only on paper. One of the first major reforms initiated after independence was aimed at withdrawing judicial power from local officials and transferring it to new common law, or sadad courts. 'These courts are presided over by centrally appointed civil judges, who have jurisdiction in minor civil and penal cases according to comnon law. A second reform rescinded the Berber Decree of 1930, which favored the preservation of tribal customary law in certain areas instead of orthodox Muslim law. This decree was anathema to the nationalists because its purpose was to further divide Moroccans along ethnic lines. The ::erber customary courts have been replaced by M uslim lacy courts, but special provisions still provide for Berber customary law to be applied in matters of inheritance or personal status and in real estate ea;s. Other steps taken since independence include the establishment of a Supreme Court charged with the appeal functions previously residing with the courts of caseation of France and Spain. In addition, a new penal code, drafted largely by French jurists Ind promulgated in 1963, unifies penal legislation which previously was embodied in several different cor;es� one for foreigners, one for Moroccans, one for the former Northern Spanish zone, and one for Tangier. There is still, however, no unified civil lacy code. In practice, for example, French or Spanish law often supersedes the Moroccan civil law in matters affecting European interests. A comprehensive codification of Muslim law is underway in an effort to modernize and reconcile various forms of jurisprudence 1:y promulgating standardized legal codes. he independence of ine judiciary is affirmed in the constitution, but all magistrates are appointed by a High Council of the Judiciary, which is presided over by the King. The High Council is also charged with safeguarding professional standards, particularly regarding advancement and discipline. 'There is little information available on how the council actually operates. A Special Court of Justice was named in July 1965 in partial implementation of a law promulgated the previous March and directed against corruption. The new court has I president, a vice president, two advising and two alternate magistrates, and an investigation magistrate. Under the March 1965 law, I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 penalties levied by the court may include: fines up to the equivalent of $10,000 and prison terms up to 10 years. The court and its associated laws are the outcome of growing public concern over government corruption. By the beginning of 1972, a relatively large number of middle and high- ranking officials had been arrested on charges of corruption; however, only it few officials have actually been tried and sentenced by the court. C. Political dynamics Since acceding to the throne in 1961, King Hassan has had unequaled authority and prestige in Morocco, but after a decade of rule his prospects for continued domination of the political scene have altered significantly. The widespread popularity enjoyed by the monarchy during the immediate postindepend- ence period has steadily declined, and King Hassan's inability to play an effective modernizing role while maintaining his traditional support has alienated important segments of the population. More importantly, the military establishment, which traditionally has been the major bulwark of the monarchy, no longer provides reliable backing for King Hassan's rule. (C) Hassan's ability to dominate Moroccan politics has depended largely on key support from the military and security forces, his close alliance with traditional elites and modern business interests, and the lack of a credible alternative to the monarchy. For most of his reign he has steadily whittled down the already limited political roles of the country's representative groups and turned it deaf ear to demands for far reaching political reform. The heterogeneity of the population �with differences in goals and outlook among Arabs, Berbers, French educated urbanites, poor and illiterate farmers, young modernists, and traditional established families �has made it relatively easy for the King to balance and divide to his own advantage. Although significant opposition to Hassan's rule has developed over the last decade, most Moroccans �anal particularly the political leaders have -en too narrow and parochial in outlook, too jealous of their prerogatives, and too venal to surmount their differences and seriously challenge the predominance of the monarchy. (C) Nevertheless, the military coup attempts in July 1971 and Atu 1972, which were Icd by some of the highest ranking officers in the Moroccan armed forces, seriously undermined the military's role as the principal prop and coercive arm of the throne. These two uprisings have spotlighted the erosion of military loyalty to the King and have exposed the vulnerability of the narrowly based regime. Without reliable backing from the armed forces, King Hassan is more isolated than ever and faces growing civilian discontent without an effective military counc!r- weight. (C) 1. The King (C) Confident of his hereditary right to rule, liassar, has subordinated all government institutions to royal authority and has permitted only limited popular participation in government. A skilled short -term strategist and political tactician, he has succeeded in gradually reducing the power and influence of civilian politicians by pitting his adversaries and sometimes his supporters against one another. He has relied on apolitical personalities of proven loyalty to run his administration, and he has carefully limited their personal influence by judiciously extending and withholding royal privileges and material benefits. He has encouraged competition and divisiveness among high -level military officers and civilian administrators, thus keeping potential rivals off balance and maneuvering against one another. However, by carrying his divide- and -rule tactics to the point of undermining political parties as valid participants in the political process Hassan has engaged himself more directly as a partisan politician and has sacrificed the buffers which customarily shielded the monarchy from direct criticism and accountability. Hassan has never achieved the widespread popularity of his father, Mohamed V, who was the hero of Moroccan independence, and although most of the country's tradition -bound population still reveres the monarchy, the people have no deep attachment to Hassan personally. By stressing the religious and ritual aspects of his monarchial role, Hassan appeals to the deep traditional sentiments of the great majority of his subjects who have a rural background and little exposure to the modern political process. This segment of the population is largely apolitical, however, and would probably not actively support or oppose any regime unless the\ believed their means for earning a livelihood or their fundamental Islamic values were at stake. Among politically aware Moroccans, the King's failure to establish a truly democratic constitutional monarchy and solve the country's economic and social ills have cooled the popular enthusiasm for the monarchy which followed independence. Hassan's luxury loving style and arrogance have alienated many educated Moroccans, who are disillusioned with a government they realize is corrupt and inefficient. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Reformist elements are the most bitter critics of the King, whom they view as the protector of the status quo, particularly in the political domain. Since Hassan assumed autocratic powers in 1965, many intellectuals, students, and leftist politicians no longer view the monarchy as a viable institution to undertake Morocco's social, political and economic moderniza- tion. Although antimonarchial sentiments are still not widespread, many modernists envision a strictly ceremonial role for the monarchy. 2. Civilian and military elements (C) Active support for Hassan's rule has centered on a few thousand members of the elite, both traditional and modern, whose interests are inextricably tied to his continue; domination of political life. The King is the center of a complex network of relationships linking the royal family with the traditional landlord class, religious leaders, urban merchant families, and modern businessmen, who often have close ties with older, established families. Many members of this privileged class look to the monarchy to protect them from expropriation, nationalization, and agrarian reform of the type that has taken place in other Arab countries in recent years. Through their close connections with the King, many of these individuals have increased their fortunes through special arrangements and privileges granted by the throne. Both the government and higher levers of the bt.reaucraev are dominated by members of these elite groups, most of whom dropped their poliff -al party affiliations in the early 1960's after factionalism in the leading party, Istiqlal, crippled the nationalist movement. To a large extent, Hassan's efforts to preserve his close ties with the elite have kept change at a snail's pace. Furthermore, by tolerating the peculations of his ministers and their proteges, Hassan has aggravated the wide -scale government corruption that has contributed to the regime's poor public image. Formerly an unshakable pillar of the monarchy, the Moroccan military establishment has attained it position of strength second only to the King's and has become a potential contender for power itself. Since 1957, when King Mohamed V designated his son Crown Prince and Commander in Chiei of the Roval Armed Forces, Hassan has personally managed the army. He has made all important decisions affecting the armed forces and has personally charted the careers of high and middle -level officers. He has tried to maintain the traditionally close bond between the monarchy and military through careful recruitment, close personal association, the development of a special caste mentality, and the judicious balancing of military leaders so as to leave himself in the commanding position. To reduce the threat of the armed force; to his own power, 11assar_ has fostered competition and rivalries among commanding officers and between the civilian and the military elite. lie has controlled the personal influence of all but a few high ranking officers by manipulating command posts, and he has rewarded lovalty by material benefits and prestigious appointments. Until July 1971 it appeared that the King's manipulation of the officer corps precluded a military move against him. However, the army attack on the King at Skhirat palace in 1971 revealed that the military was a formidal:.e contender for power. The exact motives of the conspirators will probably never Ile known with certainty, as all the leaders of the coup attempt either were killed in the fighting or were executed shortly after order was restored. Nonetheless, it appears likely that disgust with widespread corruption in the armed forces and in the country as a whole prompted this desperate move by top ranking officers. Just 14 months after the Skhirat upriing, Major General Oufkir Morocco's military strongman and one of the King'.; closest advisers �and high- ranking air force officers again tried to overthro King Hassan. As .vas the case in the July 1971 coup attempt, the conspirators were officers who had long enjoyed the privileges and perquisites granted the military elite. The plotters appear to have been disgusted with Hassan for several reasons, including his lack of sustained attention to the problems of government, his frivolous and profligate ways, and the corruptness and superficiality of many of the persons in his large entourage. "These officers and their equally ill -fated predecessors were willing to risk their favored status rather than continue to serve tinder the King. In both cases, the attacks on the King were planned and executed primarily by Berbers, who dominate the officers corps and the rank anc. file of the army. Berber resentment of the Arabized social and political establishment may have been another motive for these officers, who probably felt little commitment to a political system in which they are a minority. The 1972 assassination attempt and Oufkir's death reportedly a suicide but probably an executL,n during the roundup of suspected plotters �have heightened apprehension in the armed forces, which never fully recovered from the 1971 coup attempt. Many officers have little confidence in their future under the King's rule, and some of these men especially Oufkir's associates�may feel that elimination of the King is essential to their survival. 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Oufkir's death left a vacuum difficult to fill. Although Hassan himself has direct command over the military, he must rely on some of his subordinates if he hopes to soive the manifold problems facing him. The rar':s of the general officers were seriously depleted during the 1971 rebellion, and none of the generals still on active duty has the dynamism and respect needed to take firm command. Sonic of the field -grade officers apparently have strong leadership potential, but these younger men are less committed to the monarchy than are their superiors. Morr e r, sonic are considered to he deeply dissatisfied :h the favoritism and corruption in both the mi1'tary and civilian establishments. Also, as the King seeks eery, leaders, he will make new enemies when officers are shunted aside to make way for the new favorites. Many officers, particularly those in the senior staff, are undoubtedly still loyal to the King, but after the defection of one of his closest advisers, Hassan is suspicious of everyone. Tension between the palace and the military establishment is likely to continue for some time, and morale within the armed forces will remain low. Although the lack of professional leadership in the armed forces may forestall new challenges for awhile, another strike against the King seems a strong possibility. 3. Political parties Hassan has accentuated the centrifugal tendencies within each of Morocco's weak and disunifieJ political parties and has pitted one against the other. Through intrigue and by frequent meddling in the parties' internal affairs he weakened first the Istiqlal, the major party that led the country to independence, then the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a leftist- oriented group which split off from Istiqlal, and even the loyalist parties created at the palace's instigation. The State of Exception from 1965 to 1970 further weakened the parties, whose exclusion from government reduced their leverage with the people and caused their organizations to atrophy. Neither the two main opposition parties, UNFP or Istiqlal, nor the leading loyalist party, the Popular Movement (MP), hold effective sway over large segments of the population. Minor parties, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement, are of even less importance on the national scene, and the Party for Liberation and Socialism, the reconstituted Moroccan Communist Party, was ordered disbanded in 1969. (U /OU) The UNFP and the Istiylal established a National Front (Al- Kullah al- Wataniyah) of opposition in 1970 to boycott parliamentary elections, which they viewed 10 as a facade for the King's continued autocratic rule. However, their inability to gain concessions from the King, their differences in political viewpoints, and personal antagonisms led to the front's dissolution in mid -1972. Since then, the parties have become more fictionalized, and the UNFP has split into two irreconcilable wings. But despite internal squabblings, the parties' hand has been strengthened by the 1972 attempt to assassinate King Hassan. Soon after that attempt, the King appealed to political leaders to join it coalition government in order to restore public confidence in his regime. The principal party leaders rejected his overtures, and the King appo'nted another apolitical government, little different in composition from its predecessors. However, h left the door open to participation by the parties in a government that would supervise the elections promised for 1973. After yea -s of being out of power, participation in government would help the parties to regain their giassroot followings, but at this time no party is capable of mustering sufficient support to seriously challenge the King's supremacy. (U /OU) a. Istiqlal (U /OU) The isiiglal (Independence) is the largest and most durable of Morocco's political parties, but it has been unable to maintain an enthusiastic and disciplined following. Its present strength comes primarily from the urban areas, particularly the old cities of Fes and Meknes, and secondarily from some non- Berber rural areas (see inset to Summary Map in Country Profile chapter). Istiqlal ha!; not participated in elections since 1963, and during the last decade its strength and cohesion have been waning. Prior to independence: the party's popular bast: included the labor movement as well as modernist elements in the coastal cities and liberation fighters. In 1959, the Istiqlal lost many of its younger and more progressive leaders, who, having failed to wrest control from older park- stalwarts, broke away to form the UNFP. This split consolidated the control of the Istiglal's original leaders, who represent the urban merchant class and other established groups. Allal El Fassi, a Koranic- educated traditionalist and a hero of the independence struggle, is by far the foremost Istiqlal leader, but he has serious health problems. The Istiqlal extols traditional values but advocates a reformist program designed to improve the impover- ished lives of the majority of Moroccans. Major objectives center on democratization of the political system, agrarian reform, nationalization of all French holdings, an energetic, social evolution with the tenets of Islam as its center, and realization of the "original" APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 r. er.nar N.K.) m to Ceut, (,r.y o aroa clamed be Morocco Ceuta City claimed by Marocc0 W ad.m:M�d by So� S'. 0 Ix 2u0 300 M:r.a o loo 200 3W t.r. MOROCCO 30 30 ad 0 C11NARY 15. O r5 lSPJO f A a i''"sr 1 ot f. r 'L MAt9R1TANIA j zo N s MALI SENEGAL T L:AMBIA r J y ..r'' LPI'E8 VOLTA ....2 r-j 0 FIGURE 3. Areas claimed by Moroccan irredentists (U /OU) borders of the Moroccan kingdom, which once covered a major portion of the western part of the Maghreb and extended deep into the Sahara I -ig- ure 3). The Istiylal participated in the early postinde- pendence governments and remained a leading political power until 1963, when Istiqlai ministers unsuccessfully attempted to force Ifassan to widen the party's rope in government. Since 1963 it has opposed the police of the regime but has supported the continuation of the monarch}. 'Throughout the long period of strained relations between the Istiylal and the regime, El Fassi has remained on close personal terms with King Hassan. El Fassi has been less flexible than his UNFP partners on issues involving the prerequisites for forming a government of national coalition. He clearly hopes that the Istiylal will again play a dominant political role. Although the Istiylal has maintained its national and local structure, its organization has suffered during the years it has been out of power. The party continues to put out two daily newspapers, the French language L'Opinion and the leading Arabic daily Al -Alain. Both papers are manage by younger inentbers of the party and tend to reflect more militant views than those held by the top party leadership. Since becoming an opposition party, Istiylalis have been frequently harassed by the gave rninent. Party mernhers are periodically arrested, and issues of both papers occasionally are confiscated. The party has an affiliated labor organization. the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), and an affiliated student organization formed in 1962, the General Union of Moroccan Students (UGEM). UGTM is not a particularly strong or effective organization, and it has subordinated its economic interests to politics. Similarly. UGEM has a small membership drawn mainly front students in the traditional Arabic educational progr nis. Most young people connected with the Istiylal view its leaders as too conservative and mainly interested in advancing their own political careers. b. .National ('nion of Popular h'orces I('1 The UNIT appeals to the relatively new groups of intellectuals, skilled workers, salaried employees, and others who have a Western -t pe education. The party was launched in September 1959, follo%%ing the split with the Istiylal earlier in that year, by former Istiylal official Mehdi Ben Barka, former resistance leader `lohaned El Basri, and labor leader Mahjoub Ben Seddik. The goventnient has harassed the UNFP on and of*f since 1963, when over a hundred l'N FN members were rounded up on charges of plotting arned overthrow of the governnent. Most observers concluded that the goyernment*s charges were a political maneuver and that the regime did not really believe such a conspiracy existed. The kidnapping and presumed murder of Ben Barka in 1965 further denoralized UNFP members, who believe the government responsible. As a result of Ben Barka's disappearanec and continued government harassment, a substantial number of radical l'NFP members have sought refuge in Europe, thus scattering party leadership. Furthermore, to prevent government reprisals for allegedly abetting the Jule 1911 coup plotters, the UNI -P dissolved its local party organizations. In late 1972 the party had no rank and -file nurnbership outside Morocco's najor coastal cities, and a serious split between the Casablanca- and Rabat -based leadership further eroded the part's strength. The Casablanca wing of the party has remained closely associated with the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), the strongest labor union and the only broad -based representative group in the country. The Rabat faction, on the other hand, is considered to be more APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 radical in outlook, and, therefore, has wider appeal for the UNFP youth organization, the National Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM). Abdallah Ibrahim and Mahjoub Ben Seddik are the two principal leaders of the Casablanca -based wing of the party. Ibrahim, Prime Minister from 19-58 to 1960, is a yell-respected and prominent national figure but is viewed by many younger party members as be,onging to the old guard. Ben Seddik has clearly emerged as the most popular and gifted leader. Energetic and intelligent, he is an adept politician and a skilled labor leader. His prominence in the opposition movement is largely the result of his successful efforts to keep the UMT disentangled from the clashes between the government and the UNFP. By maintaining the organizational integrity and dynamism of the UMT, Ben Seddik has preserved the only major source of support for the Casablanca group. Ibrahim and Ben Seddik and their followers hae preserved the UNFP's original position as the main political channel for the nun Communist left. Their major objectives include the establishment of a genuinely democratic government, nationalization of basic industries, land reform, a controlled economy, and government welfare services. Their principles differ from those of the traditionalist Istiylal in that the UNFP is neutral toward the Arabic language and Islam, and they clearly envisage the monarch as eventually becoming a figurehead. Abderrahim Bouabid, former Deputy Prime Minister, is the main leader of the Rabat faction of the party. His keen rivalry with Ibrahim and his more radical views appear to he the major causes for the split between the two groups. Bouabid has always aligned himself with leftwing students and UNFP members in exile throughout Europe, and he probably hopes to build his power base from the ranks of younger UNFP members. His group has not clearly distinguished its principles from those of the Casablanca faction, but Bouabid and many of his followers may view the monarchy as completely anachronistic and a major impediment to serious political reform. e. Popular Movement (U Organized in 1957 in the mountainous and almost exclusively Berber ireas of Morocco, the MP was the first organized po:. cal expression of traditional rural discontent among the Berbers, who resented the postindependeace predominance of the urban based, elite oriented Istiylal. The MP has never been homogeneous or tightly organized, and in 1965 it split 12 into two factions. Dr. Abdelkrim Khatib heads the splinter group, known s the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), which represents the Rif Berbers, and Mahjoubi Ahardane is the leader of the MP, which draws most of its support from Middle Atlas Berbers. Neither party, however, has gained a strong following among the independent minded Berbers or developed a sound structural base. Both groups were opposition parties during the State of Exception, but since the return to constitutional rule they have generally supported the King. The MP has been more succ essful than the MPCD in asserting its influence on the national scene. The NIP's principles are based on a vaguely defined Islamic socialism, loyalty to the monarch, and a better deal for farmers, including nationalization of foreign owned lands. Party principles, however, have been less important to the membership than the Berber character of the party itself. To a large extent the MP has been carried ;;,ong by the energies of its leader NMahjoubi Ahardane, a tWionaliv known poet and painter. Ahardane has held both the Agricultural and Defense portfolios and was a leading deputy in the parliament elected in August 1970. lie is highl� critical of the National Front parties, which he contends have little following and do not represent the interests of the majority of the Moroccan people. His attitude toward the King has fluctu over the past decade. During the State of Exception he was openly critical of the regime. Ahardane actively supported government policy following the success of MP members in te parliamentary elections of August 1970, in which a fourth of the nominally neutral deputies elected came from the MP. Since the dissolution of parliament, however, Ahardane has again become a vocal critic of the regime. d. Party of Liberation and Socialism (cl The Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS) yeas established by the Moroccan Communists in June 1968 as a device for gaining government permission to operate as a legal political party. The Moroccan Communist Party (MCP) was officially banned in 1959 but had been operating throughout the early 1960's under periodic harassment from t) regime. By mid -1966, however, propaganda and political activity was generally tolerated a!beit closely monitored by government officials. 'faking advantage of this leniency, individual members of the MCP petitioned the government to form a new party. Finally, in 1968, the PLS received official recognition and permission to operate openly. After only I year of overt activity the PLS was ordered to dissolve, on the grounds that its leaders had reconstituted the outlawed MCP. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Although officially proscribed, the PLS has the tacit consent of the authorities to operate on a semiclandestine basis, apparently because the King has never considered the party a serious threat. T he PLS pursues a watchful police toward the regime and avoids provoking the government and securit officials. The party has a permanent membership, holds semisecret but regular meetings, and circulates appeals in the foreign press. Its leaders travel to Communist Party congresses in the Middle East and Europe. The size of the PLS is difficult to gauge because there is some risk in being identified as it party member or sympathizer. In 1971, the party probably had about 200 or 300 card holding members with several thousand sympathizers. Despite efforts to attract %%orkers and gain standing in agricultural areas, most of the party cadre are civil servants, students, teachers, and professional people. The longtime leaders of the party are secretary general Ali Yata. Abdallah Layachi, and Abdeslam Bouryuia, who is current;, serving an 8 month prison sentence for political activities. All three men have attained considerable stair re as dedicated leaders, and their persecution at the hands of the government has earned them widespread esteem among their sympathizers on the national level and within the international movement. Moroccan Communists engage in the sarne ideological disputes found throughout the interna- tional Communist movement but for the most part, PLS leaders support the Soviet Union and its interests. Some younger members have taken a more radical line, however, and a number of Maoist- oriented factions have split completely from the PLS. Although the stated long -range objective of the party is to establish "scientific socialism" in Mc �occo, party leaders have taken a more moderate, realistic approach to their goals, which resemble those of the UNFP. Before the party was banned, it published a weekly paper; Ali Yata's attempts since 1969 to reinstitute a publication under his own name have been blocked by the courts and police officials. 4. Special interest groups (C) Prior to independence in 1956 a number of special interest groups had begun to ernerge, but it was only after independence that such elements as labor, youth, and students were able to refine their organizations and expand their activities to a point where they began to play an important role in Moroccan political and economic life. The most influential special interest group in Morocco is organized labor; its largest vehicle, the UMT, has a membership esi.mated at some 2(X),000. The UMT is also one of the most outspoken criiics of the government and represents the strongest opposition farce. The UMT is headed by Mahjoub Ben Seddik, who has resisted attempts by the UNFP to absorb the union within the party. Increas-ngly confident of its political muscle, the UMT has been pressing hard for wage incrcas and more fringe benefits, capitalizing on the inability of the government to curb the extended strikes and periodic walkouts which have plagued major industries and contributed to political tensions. Despite government attempts to undercut the UMT's strength, the unions organization and abilit to recruit new members have suffered far less than political parties. Furthermore, UMT efforts to gain benefits for workers have had some notable successes. The UMT provides major financial backing for a French- languu_ -ilv, Maghreb Informations, first published in Noven. t)er 1971. The paper also receives some support from the UNFP (Casablanca) and generally reflects the leftist orientation of the UMT and UNFI' leadership. (other labor unions are generally subordinate to their affiliated political parties, and none is as important as the UMT. These groups include the lstiy:al- sponsored General Union of Moroccan Workers, the Federation of Moroccan Trade: Unions of Free Workers, which is affiliated with the Popular Movement, and several ether minor organizations. Prior to the 1970 constitutional referendum and the parliamentary elections, two government- sponsored unions �the Union of Moroccan Workers and the Union of Autonomous Moroccan Workers �were formed to give government candidates a semblance of trade union backing. Although the government continues to fund these organizations they are likely to wither because they lack genuine worker support. Youth present one of the most serious challenges to the regime. large numbers of uneducated and unemployed young people are moving from rural areas into the cities, where their prospects for finding jobs are minimal. The governments two- pronged objective of persuading young people to return to rural areas and enlist in construction projects has not been fulfilled. Frustrated by their plight and disillusioned with the government, these youngsters are restive and highly susceptible to the importunings of political demagogs and militant student leaders. Since 1965, when student demonstrations precipitated bloody riots in Casablanca and King Hassan assumed autocratic 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080027 -8 powers, students have become more antagonistic to the monarch. Student denonstrations and strikes have become more frequent and violent, and the harsh police countermeasures have aroused further resentment. Most students now believe that major political changes must pret-ede educational reform. The majority of universav students, including those attending foreign universities, belong to the leftist UNEM. Altl!.,ugh the UNENI is an independent organization, its political stance closely parallels that of the L'NFP and UNIT. All three organizations have frequently coordinated their strategies and positions on political issues, and the UNFP has often acted as a parent organization to the UNEM by providing organizational and probable monetary_ support. The UNEM has hot officially backed either fact-lm of the UNFP, but many of its members nevertheless are probable sympathetic to the Rabat wing. While the UNEM has usually been controlled by members whose views parallel those of the UNFP, its leadership has been seriously contested by Communist students i; recent years. its ranks were seriously factionalized in mid -1972. Although these internecine squabbles and clashes have weakened the UNEM. it still continues to act as a catalyst for youthful discontent and has been able to organize effective school strikes and boycotts. Extremism anomg the students is limned to small splinter groups, but the real strength of the radical militants lies not so much in tlicir actual power but rather in their ability to gather and magnify the frustration of increasiny, numbers of young people. Since 1961, the istiglal has sponsored a university student organization, the relatively small UGEM. which is less than a fifth the size of UNEM. The Istiqlal does not effectively control student members, who frequently initiate school strikes on their own. The government has discouraged both UGEM and UNEM from organizing or working with secondary students. Nevertheless. secondary students have initiated a number of school boycotts in widely scattered cities, indicating a degree of effective coordination. In early 1972, secondary students were even more active than their university counterparts in initiating boycotts, suggesting that clandestine groups also exist among the younger students. 5. Elections (U /OU) When he promulgated a new constitution in 1972, King Hassan promised to revise the election laws, which were passed in 1959. According to a special provision in the 19 72 constitution. King Hassan has full legislative powers to enact laws necessary ft r the 1-I establishm- it of constitutional institutions. Armed with this formidable prerogative, Hassan will be able to set all procedures and ground rules for elections of communal, district, and provincial assemblies, professional chambers, and parliament. Soon after the August 1972 coup attempt, King Hassan began consulting representative groups on their prerequisites for participAing in a new government. 'these consultations cane� to nothing, but it is still po: that the parties will participate in tho� government when elections are held; they have been promised for 1973. In the meantime, the King will exercise full legislative authority, in accordance %vith the constitution. Th, country's first two nationwide local and national elections in 1960 and 1963 denunstrated that Moroccans take a lively interest in choosing their leaders. However, the elections held in 1970, following the� :5 -year State of E-:ception, wore so carefully controlled by the palace that many Moroccans have adopted it cynical attitude toward electoral participation. Should King Hassan ever succeed in forming it government which includes principal opposition groups, Moroccans may agar: become involved in political activity. D. National policies (C) King Hassan's major police goals have been to attract private foreign investment. to expand and Arabize the educational system, and to improve the modern agricultural sector. In the foreign police sphere, Hassan has worked toward normalizing relations with neighboring countries by negotiating settlements on longstanding border disputes and by working for greater economic and political unity among the Maghreb nations. Although officially nonaligned, the Moroccan Government has continued to strengthen its close lies with Western countries, particularly the United States and France, who are Morocco Is major contributors of development aid. 1. Domestic goals King Hassan has set very limited economic and social goals so as not to endanger his support from traditional elements, and consequently he has alienated reformists and disillusioned many Moroc- cans who had hoped for holder initiatives. Because he had the support of the military, Hassan was able to proceed for over a decade without a popular consensus, but the situation changed significantly following the July 1971 arm\ uprising. Since the Skhirat coup attempt, the government has put forth it APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 4 s E broad policy statement emphasizing the longstanding goals of agricultural development, educational reform, and economic expansion. To silence criticism from opposition headers and to shore up the regimes image With the people, Ding Hassan has promised to reduce unemployment, curb the rising cost of living, and improve public health and housing. lie has also paid lipsen to narrowing the gap between the ealthy elite and the impoverished majority. The government has always viewed education as a major key to both social and economic advancement. Over the last decade, about W(' of the annual operating budget has been expended on education, and significant progress has been made toward achieving the goal of universal education. In 1963 the government made primary educ ation compulsory for children behveen the ages of 7 and 13, and by 1970 the s% had absorbed the fourfold increase in school population since independence. The popula- tion explosion since independence, however, has doubled the number of school -age children and thus h as wiped out half the gain in terms of the pe rcentage of school -age children in school. Moreover, rapid expansion of the school system has lowered the qualit of education arid increased the dropout and failure rates. Another major police goal, Arabization of education, has had great emotional and political appeal, particularly among traditionalists. However, practical considerations centering on maintaining 'he French language as a useful tool in modernization have produced half hearted and sometimes conflicting directions on the language of instruction at the primary arid secondary levels. By 1967 the government had totally A.rabized the primary system by transferring from the secondary system large numbers of teachers qualified to give instruction in Arabic. The rationale for this action was primarily political, in that it enabled the government to show some measurable progress toward the goal of Arabization. It also, however, effectively reduced the capability of the secondary system to provide training in Arabic, and thus disrupted linguistic continuity between the primary and secondary sectors. To help correct dislocations caused by the changeover, it became necessary to add to the secondary cycle a full extra year devoted primarily to instruction in French. Finally, in 1970, the government, realizing the usefulness of French in modern disciplines, cut back implementation of the Arabization program and gave French equal importance in the last three grades of primary school. The success the government has in implementing its promise to clean up public corruption is likely to becone a measure by which the public judges the regimes sincerity in earning out a policy of reform. Many Moroccans feel that corruption has deprived them of their just portion of national wealth, and that the gap between rich and poor could be greatly alleviated if corruption were stamped out. King Hassan has moved cautiously in his antic -eruption campaign, however, because any determined drive would inevitably involve some major supporters of his regi rne. Although population control became a priority national goal undo r the 1968 -72 state plan, Ding Hassan and th( many traditionalists in the governme give only half hearted hacking to the concept because of the sensitivity of the issue among many traditional Muslims, who value large families. Family planning clinics and programs to inform the public on limiting family size were instituted in 1966. but tire results of these tentative efforts have been negligible so far. The government has actively tried to alleviate population pressures by relocating city slunulwellers in rural areas through various projects directed by the Ministrie of Interior and of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports, but the massive: influx of rural people into the cities has swamped existing programs, and the growth of urban slums continues essentially unchecked. The government's economic policies have empha- sized improvement of agriculture, which is the key sector of the economy, employing about 70i of the population and accounting for 3051 of the GNP. he main thrust of government investment is in the development of a major darn and irrigation system which will primarily benefit the modern sector. Substantial progress is being made in completing hydraulic projec',, but their full impact will not be felt for some tine. The government has clone little in the way of implementing labor- intensive or short -range projects, and almost nothing has been done to help small farmers. Uneven distribution of land and complex tenure patte have been thorn\ issues since Morocco regained independence, and although the government has followed a cautious policy of land redistribution, it has yet to formulate a comprehensive agrarian reform program. Information on land use and tenure is out of date, and Moroccan authorities do not plan to conduct a census on land ownership until 1973. According to available statistics, approximately 60 of the traditional farm families have less than one hectare, and 33% own no land. The government, a few wealthy farmers, and urban investors own most of the prime farmland confiscated from the French. In 1971, the government and wealthy landowners were 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 estimated to control nearly half of all agricultural land. During the 1960's, the government maintained that it could not risk a drop in production by subdividing and transferring large segments of government managed farms to private ownership, and through 1970 only about 100,000 acres had been distributed to small farmers. Although even careful, large -scale redistribution would not totally solve the basic problem of the small size and income of most farms, it would boost morale and slow the rural exodus to the cities. However, the government has been reluctant to move on comprehensive agrarian reform because members of the royal family and the elite own large tracts of choice land. The regime's footdragging policy has provoked bitter criticism from opposition politicians since 1970, and to silence his opponents, King Hassan announced plans to speed up reform. In 1971 about 79,000 acres were distributed, and plans called for distributing 198,000 acres before the end of 1972. Soon after the August 1C assassination attempt, King Hassan again announced acceleration of the distribution program. The government's k; v policy in developing industry and mining is to maintain an open door for foreign private investment. Under its Industrial Investment Code, the government offers a number of incentives, including fiscal and credit benefits, equipment grants, and concessional grants to potential investors in tourism. To reduce the problems of bureaucratic bottlenecks and the lengthy process of approving projects, the government is streamlining its investment code, and the investment commission is becoming more liberal in its approval of new projects. The government permits repatriation of profits and has not nationalized foreign private property. The government has stressed "Morro can. ation," which has meant bringing all parts I the country whieh prior to 1956 consisted of four distinct governmental units �under a unified administration and training Moroccans to replace foreign personnel. The former goal has been accomplished, and national services including the police, army, diplomatic corps, social service agencies, government ministries, and banks have been organized. Replacement of foreign personnel, however, has been slower. At independence there was an acute shortage of trained Moroccan personnel to staff the government. Only 3% of the civil servants in the upper grades were Moroccans, and only 10% in the middle grades. There were two Moroccans trained as agricultural engineers, other types of engineers, and none as veterinarians. France and Spain encouraged their nationals to continue working 16 in Morocco and assisted the Moroccan Govern: nent in recruiting additional contract personnel ii. theii countries. It is still customary to find French technicians and advisers working in .he government at levels directly below that of the director of the office or agency. Comprehensive statistics for all foreign personnel Morocco are not avaiiable, but in early 1972 there were at least 11,000 French civilian technicians, several thousand U.S. technical and military advisers (including 1,680 servicemen at Kenitra); and several hundred East Europe technical advisers. Despite frequent government pronouncements on its intentions to vigorously pursue a policy of Moroccanization of enterprises and employment, progress toward this goal has been slow and cautious. King Hassan's most recent plan for Moroccanization of the tertiary sector (commercial enterprises, banks, insurance and service companies) produced such a negative reaction within the foreign business community that the government quickly retreated. So far, Moroccan officials have exerted some pressure on the tertiary sector to voluntarily employ more Moroccans and to take on Moroccan investment partners. The government has taken over partial control of some foreign banks and insurance companies, but it has not pushed its foreign business community to accept more than what can be amicably arranged. In the sphere of defense policy, King Hassan has gradually abandoned the goal of achieving combat effectiveness comparable to that of Algeria. For over a decade the King gave top priority to modernizing the armed forces whose primary mission was to maintain order at home and to defend Moroccan borders against Algeria. The two military uprisings since 1971, however, have resulted in a major change in King Hassan's attitude toward large -scale modernization of the military. Hassan is now clearly aiming to prevent another attempt to overthrow him by establishing more centralized control and by redirecting military capabilities to better serve as support for the throne. Using the rationale that large -scale modernization of the armed forces endangers Moroccan development goals, Hassan has emphasized that in the future the military will participate to a greater extent in civic action projects and that its primary functions are to insure internal security and to serve only as a first line of defense against outside aggression. 2. Foreign relations Morocco professes to be nonaligned on world issues, and it has sought to reduce its dependence on any APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 single major power. The King's principai objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to demonstrate solidarity with other Arab nations, especially those of North Africa. Virtually isolated in 1964 after a brief border war with Algeria and faced with gradually deteriorating relations with France, King Hassan moved steadily toward normalizing relations with neighboring Arab states, improving and diversifying relations with European countries, solidifying longstanding links with the United States, and repairing damaged ties with France. Since independence, Morocco has maintained close, friendly relations with the. West, while at the same time establishing a variety of diplomatic and economic ties with the Communist states in order to underscore Morocco's nonaligned status. By maintaining the appearance of being evenhanded in his dealings with both East and West, Morocco has secured economic and military aid from both the United States and Communist countries. Such aid was particularly important during the period of strained relations with France. During the early 1960'x, the monarchy was able to ward off leftist critics by closing down U.S. air and naval bases, but oppositionist politicians continue to use the existence of the U.S. communications base at Kenitra to embarrass the regime. Furthermore, the Arab Israeli conflict �in particular, Arab identification of the U.S.S.R. with the Arab cause and of the United States with Israeli interests �has created strains on the policy of nominal nonalignment but actual pro Westernism. So far, King Hassan has been able to keep anti Israeli manifesta- tions in Morocco Nyithin bounds, but his domestic opposition takes a more militant stand for the Arab and the Palestinian cause. The possibility of the opposition parties' inclusion in a new government could provide an opening for greater pressure on Hassan to take a firmer stand behind his fellow Arabs. Despite these two problem issues, Morocco's nonaligned policy has afforded the regime some leverage on the domestic political front and has generally helped the monarchy's image in the eyes of the nonaligned countries of the so- called Third World. a. The West (1) France� Despite 44 years of colonial domina- tion and a bitter struggle for independence, Morocco has always regarded France as its natural partner. Since independence, France has been Morocco's principal trading partner and is the second largest contributor of foreign aid after the United States. Even during the 4 -year period of strained diplomatic relations the two countries maintained close cultural and economic ties. The strain on French- Moroccan relations arose with the October 1965 kidnapping in Paris and presumed murder of leftist opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka. The French Government claimed that Major General Oufkir, then Minister of Interior, was involved in Ben Barka's disappearance, and demanded that King Hassan dismiss and extradite Outkir to stand trial in France. King Hassan refused to meet France's price for continued close relations, and neither he nor President de Gaulle would back clown on the issue Lecause of their strong personalities and the resulting public furor in both countries and abroad. Although diplomatic relations were never broken, the ambassadors were recalled and France refused to extend to Morocco any new economic aid or military assistance. fhe standoff, during which many Frenchmen left \lorocco, lasted until De Gaulle resigned in 1969. Under President Pompidou, relations were rapidly normalized, but by 1972, French assistance to Morocco was still only half the amount prior to the Ben Barka incident. France maintains one of its largest diplomatic missions in Rabat, and in addition has nine consulates throughout Morocco. About 80% of the industrial enterprises in Morocco are French owned, and French investment is estimated at about $3.6 billion. Despite King Hassan's pronouncements on Moroccanization, Rabat has moved very slowly and is almost always careful to accommodate French interests. The mail\ French teachers and technical personnel working in Morocco help to reinforce France's strong cultural influence. The outlook of most urban, educated Moroccans is still oriented toward French values, taste, and style, and the perpetuation of the French language in Moroccan schools and its usage within the social and political establishment assure strong French cultural influence in the future. (2) United States �The United States and Morocco have a long history of cordial relations dating back to a 1787 treaty of friendship. The close association between the two countries centers on U.S. strategic interest in having a friendly nation on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean and the utility for ti, United States in having a friend among Arab nations at a time when it has limited access to many Arab capitals. On the Moroccan side, the United States is an important alternative to France for both economic and military support. Since 1968 the United States has been Morocco's major donor of foreign aid, and in 1971 U.S. assistance was more than double that from France. Since 1960, the United States has supplied Morocco with military equipment and advisers through the permanent Morocco -U.S. Liaison Office. IN APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 U.S. military assistance has totaled about US$67 million, extended mainly through the Military Assistance Program. At the time of independence, the least tolerable vestiges of foreign domination in Morocco were the remaining foreign military forces and installations, including five U.S. air and naval bases. Most of the U.S. installations were established by a 1950 secret agreement between the United States and France within the general framework of NATO defense arrangements. In 1959, the U.S. and Moroccan governments agreed (hat the bases would be evacuated by the end of 1963. This agreement was subsequently modified in 1963 when King Hassan informally agreed to permit the United States to retain for its use the naval communications facilities at Kenitra Naval Air Station and at nearbv Sidi Yahv du Rharb and Sidi Bou Knadel. Approximately 1,500 U.S. Navy personnel operate and train Moroccans to operate telecommunications equipment at the Kenitra base, which is technically under Moroccan command. Oppositionist politicians periodic -ally attempt to discredit the regime for allowing the base to remain on Moroccan soil. (3) Other Western countries� Morocco has had some success in strengthening diplomatic relations and increasing trade and aid agreements with other Western countries. West Germany and the Benelux countries are Morocco's most important trading partners after France, and West Germany ranks third in the amount of development assistance given to Morocco. Relations with Spain, a former protectorate power, are amicable despite longstanding territorial disputes. The Spanish returned Ifni to Morocco in 1969, but the Spanish- controlled territory of Spanish Sahara continues to be a matter of contention between the two countries. Morocco claims sovereignty over the entire area on the basis of the precolonial borders of its kingdom and the religious links with the Saharan nomadic tribes. Periodic border skirmishes between Moroccan and Spanish patrols have led both governments to try to solve their differences through negotiations. The Moroccan Government has downplayed the territorial dispute because of the strong irredentist sentiments which it arouses, particularly among the traditionally oriented Istiqlal party members. Other Spanish possessions, remnants of once extensive holdings in Morocco, are Ceuta and Melilla, two cities on the north coast of Africa with a population of about 70,000 each, and three small, sparsely populated island groups off the coast. Ceuta, 18 which is actually situated on a rock offshore and connected to the mainland by a causeway, has an excellent harbor arid a thriving tourist trade. Melilla's port serves primarily as an outlet for the iron mines in adjacent Nador Province of Morocco. It was from Melilla in 1936 that General Franco launched his attack on Spain, beginning the Civil War. Ceuta and Melilla today aili under the respective lurisdictions of the Spanish provin -vs of Cadiz and Malaga. The mayors of both cities are representatives to the Spanish Cortes, and city councils are elected according to the Spanish Law of Local Administration. These areas have riot recently been an irritant in Spanish- Moroccan relations. Between 1959 and 1962 there were some efforts on the part of local authorities under pressure from the Istiqlal and with at least the tacit approval of the King �to enforce laws relating to tourism and fishing which would make Spain's retention of the cities more difficult. Since 1962, however, enforcement of these laws has eased, and Morocco has not gone beyond verbal demands for the return of the Spanish enclaves. b. Communist countries Despite Morocco's close affinity with the West and the frequently developed therne of the irreconcilable differences between Islamic precepts and Marxist ideology, Morocco maintains cordial and expanding ties with the Communist world. King Hassan is aware that the western Mediterranean, including Morocco, has become a target for the expansion of Soviet influence. Although Hassan is wary of Moscow's intentions in Morocco and North Africa, he nonetheless is confident that the potential Soviet threat can be contained. Morocco established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1958 and with the People's Republic of China the following year. Soviet- Moroccan interchange bas steadily increased, particularly during the period of strained relations with France, and cumulative Soviet aid through 1970 amounted to $88 million. Major Soviet sponsored aid projeers include the Jerada electric plant, the Mansour clam, and agreements for future construction of a hydroelectric plant near Marrakech. The Soviets have supplied Morocco with some military equipment, including MiG aircraft, armor, small arms, and vehicles. Cultural and educational exchanges remain at modest levels. Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, and Mongolia have diplomatic relations with Morocco, but to protect its growing aid and trade relationships with West Germany, Rabat APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 has restricted East Germany to a commercial office. In addition to continuing technical assistance in agriculture and geology, Romania agreed in 1970 to provide assistance for petroleum and copper exploration and some public health aid. Czecho- slovakia provides modest military aid under a 1967 agreement. Bulgaria has about 80 technical experts in Morocco, and smaller numbers of Poles, Hungarians, and Czechoslovaks bring the total to about 215 East European technicians in the country. Development aid from Eastern Europe through 1970 amounted to about $35 million. e. The Arab world Morocco's major concern over the last several years has been to normalize its relations Nvith neighboring Arab countries and to remain politically removed from j the tensions in the eastern Arab world. As both secular and religious head of a nation with an Arab culture, Arabic language, and Muslim religion, King Hassan sees clear domestic advantages in building his image as a leader in the Islamic world. To this end, he promoted the first Islamic summa` in 1969 in Rabat, where he also hosted an Arab summit later that vear. He has tried to maintain the credentials of it committed Arab nation by frequent statements of support for the Arab cause in general and Palestinian rights in particular (Figure 4). The King views the Arab Israel conflict as a remote problem, however, best settled by those countries bordering Israel. His statements of support for the Palestine liberation movement and his call for it multiracial, multireligious Palestinian state reflect a desire to demonstrate his commitment to the Arab cause as well as a determination to avoid involvement in the Arab- Israeli dispute. d. The Maghreb and Africa Since the late 1960's, Morocco has called for greater unity among the Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) to create stronger economic ties and to move toward firmer political bonds. The three Maghreb states and Libya had set up permanent machinery for eventual economic coordination and had even taken a few tentative steps toward rationalization of exports in limited fields, but real progress has been slow and concrete accomplishments few. Libya withdrew in 1969, and the economies of the other three countries suffer from the inherent limitations common to developing nations. There is little actual attraction toward a common market in the Maghreb among economies which are basically competitive. In the political area, Morocco, 'Tunisia, and Algeria have shown a greater willingness to work toward a community of interests, despite distrust and suspicions stemming from border disputes and ideological differences. Morocco's territorial ambitions have been a major irritant in North Africa. Morocco contests the boundaries drawn by the former European colonial powers, which demarcate the borders of Spanish Sahara and of the independent states of Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. Although King Hassan has downplayed these claims since the late 1960'x, irredentism is still strong among traditionalists, and territorial disputes continue to increase underlying tensions between Morocco and its neighbors. The French grant of independence to Mauritania in 1960 was particularly galling to Morocco, which refused to recognize Mauritania until 1970. The issue of borders and the differences between the revolutionary- oriented government in Algeria and the monarchy in Morocco have been disruptive problems since Algeria received its independence in 1962. In October 1963, Morocco's claim to it large part of the Algerian Sahara touched off a brief border war. The clash was quickly ended, but relations continued to be m APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 FIGURE 4. King Husayn of Jordan meets with Hassan during Husayn's official visit to Morocco just 2 months after June 1967 Arab Israeli war (U /OU) badly strained. Algeria's subsequent military buildup heightened Moroccan suspicions that its neighbor might reinitiate hostilities; consequently, MoOCCO began to strengthen its own military forces. The two countries almost clashed again in 1966 when Algeria nationalized the Cara Djebilet iron mine and a lead zinc mine which straddled the Moroccan border. The situation began to stabilize in 1967 as a result of a greater spirit of kinship inspired by the Arab- Israeli war, and after that war, King Ilassan and Algerian Prime Minister Bounediene began to move toward a detente by exchanging high -level visits (Figure 5). In January 1969 the two leaders signed a treaty of friendship at Ifrane, and the following year they issued the Tlemcen proclamation promising to settle border disputes. Although both countries have maintained cordial interchange on Most issues, little progress has been made on border demarcation, despite the creation of a joint border commission i 1970. At the 1972 African summit the two leaders again pledged their cooperation by signing a treaty for the demarcation of disputed areas. So far, neither country has released the details of the 1972 agreement, but the neNv accord probably amounts to little more than a reaffirrnati< n of its 1970 predecessor, and it is unlikely that the border stalemate has been resolved. Morocco and Tunisia have generally maintained amicable relations since the early 1960'x, and the two countries share a common view on the future of the Maghreb. Both countries maintain moderate positions on the Arab Israeli issue and view themselves as a bridge between the Arab world and the West. Relations cooled in 1960 when Tunisia recognized 20 Ma�iritania, but they improved substantially following a meeting of the two Leads of state at the Arab summit in 1964. By the end of the decade, both countries had pledged to strengthen their ties arid work for greater Maghreb unity. Morocco's relations with Libya have deteriorated steadily since the 1969 military overthrow of King Idris, who had special bonds with King f lassan as one of the four reigning Arab monarchs. Moroccan suspicions of President Qadhafi and his Revolutionary Command Council Nyere confirmed in July 1971, When the Libyan regime gave verbal support to the Skhirat rebels. Morocco's subsequent execution of high- ranking rebel officers was strongly condemned by the Libyans, and the Moroccan Government alleged apparently with no justification Libyan involvement in the unsuccessful coup attempt. The two countries have not broken diplomatic relations, but the ambassadors and diplomatic staffs in the respective capitals were expelled after the Skhirat uprising. Neither government has atter-pted publicly to repair t1ro damaged relations, and in late 1972 each was engaged in vitriolic press and radio campaigns against the other. Although Morocco is a member of the Organization of African Unity and sends observers to the African Malagasy Common Organization, it does not have a close identity of interests with black Africa. The King believes it important to show an interest in African issues, however, and Moroccan representatives in the United Nations and other international meetings vote with African groups on problems of concern to African countries. FIGURE 5. Algerian Prime Min- ister Boumediene and King Has- san reviewing guard of honor in Rabat (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 E. Threats to government stability (S) 1. Discontent and dissidence Disaffection with King Hassan's form of rule is widespread, and there are growing demands for el reforms that would reshape the political, social, and economic life of the country. Strikes and minor disorders by discontented students and unemployed youths coupled with persistent demands for reform from opposition politicians, organized labor, and intellectuals have brought the regime under pressure. In essence, the ill will shared by dissatisfied elements stems from their feeling that they are being denied a share of political power and are not receiving sufficient social and economic benefits. Many individuals view the regime as corrupt and immobile, and although anti monarchial sentiments are still not widespread, many believe the system needs massive reform. Students and opposition political parties are particularly frustrated by the limited scope of permissible political activity and the repressive tactics used by the government to restrict public liberties. For the most part, expression of these feelings has taken the form of student and labor strikes, spontaneous lawlessness, and localized clashes with the police. However serious student riots in 1965 have demonstrated that violence can erupt swiftly. The prospects of insurgency or organized subversion seem limited by the lack of a common ideology among disaffected groups, their poor organization, and lack of an effective means to challenge the government. With the important exception of the conspirators in the armed forces who led the attacks on the King in 1971 and 1972, most disgruntled groups have not attempted to initiate extralegal action of a subversion nature. Should strikes, disorders, and other acts of defiance reach such proportions that military intervention is necessary, however, the uncertain loyalty of the army could prove perilous for Hassan 's continued rule. Since independence, the level of living of most Moroccans has improved very little. The large majority of the population still farms small plots of land which barely provide a subsistence living because of frequent drought. The peasants' hopes that their lot would get better after independence have largely been unfulfilled, and what modest gains have been made are frequently nullified by population growth. For those who remain in the countryside, the workings of government seem remote and the monarchy still is an important part of their tradition -bound way of life. Many farmers resent the slow pace of agrarian reform, however, and their deep personal attachment to the King has been fading along with their expectations. Land disputes between high ranking government officials and peasant farmers have intensified discontent in many rura! communities. Incidents periodically erupt, but they have been quickly suppressed. An increasing number of rural villagers, particularly young people, are moving to the cities, where conditions in the rapidly expanding bidonvilles (shantytowns) are worse than those in the countryside and opportunities for earning a living are poor. In the cities, the elegant homes of wealthy Moroccans and members of the foreign community stand in stark contrast to the ramshackle hats of the slum areas, where most rural migrants are forced to live. Lack of jobs and the wide gap between the rich and the poor foster growing resentment toward the government, particularly among youngsters whose opportunities for getting an education or vocational training are negligible. Frustrated by their plight, these unemployed and disillusioned migrants have a natural bond with other city slumdwellers. Among the urban poor and unemployed, hostility toward the regime is generally vented by joining in student and labor demonstrations and protests. A substantial portion of the unemployed urbanites in Casablanca participated in the violent antigovernment riots in 1965, and they have been a part of other less dramatic but frequent disorders in other localities. Their major threat to the government is the potential mass following they could provide to the organized agitation of smaller interest groups. Of the various discontented groups in Morocco, the most disillusioned and defiant are students and young urban militants. Most of their grievances center on the lack of jobs, the irrelevance of educathri to Moroccan realities, the government's inept handli ig of problems concerning students and youth, and the repressive measures used against them. The e of youth combined with the inability of a slowly developing econorny to provide the necessary jobs have created many of the problems common to most developing nations. However, the excessively slow pace of change in Morocco has increased tensions between students and the regime to such a degree that student restiveness is Morocco's most volatile problem. Student discontent began to emerge in the early 1960'x. At that time, grievances centered on the inefficiency of the educational bureaucracy and parochial problems in various universities and secondary schools. Furthermore, students were basically voicing their fears that an education no 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 longer guaranteed automatic admission to elite employment status and the privilege of joining in the patronage system associated with the political and social establishment. Although these frustrations and fears are still underlying causes of student discontent, a growing number of students no longer believe their problems can be solved without major changes in the political system, which they view as corrupt, oppressive, and reactionary. They blame the lagging pace of social and economic change on King Hassan Is pandering to wealthy, established families and foreign commercial inte-ests. Although many young Moroccans espouse political philosophies ranging from moderate reformism to Mao's brand of radical Marxism, ideological conviction appears to be less important as a motivating factor than anger and frustration with their inability to effect change. Although many students are associated with the opposition National Front, they regard party leaders with growing skepticism and see them as the old guard, who are willing to sell out to the regime for only token concessions. Perennial student strikes have become sufficiently widespread to affect seriously the continuity of instruction in many universities and secondary schools. Demonstrations and widespread boycotts have resulted in clashes between protesting students and police and security forces, who in some cases respond with severe and brutal countermeasures. Rather than quiet the students, these measures seem to provoke recalcitrance. Only a few extremist groups actually call for abolition of the monarchy, but more and more students have become openly critical of the King and more bitter in their denunciation of government policies. Student agitation is a threat to stability in that it may serve as a potential catalyst for widespread urban rioting. Workers harbor considerable resentment toward the government because of the slow pace of economic reform and the complacency of the regime toward labor interests. The workers' major grievances are low wages, minimal fringe benefits, and poor hiring and promotion policies. Although organized labor is a major component in the National Front, the largest union, UMT, has concentrated on exerting pressure for improved benefits for workers rather than take on a major role in the Front's fight for more representative government, free elections, and a liberalized constitution. B ;-n Seddik, founder and secretary general of the UMT, has been able to keel) the UMT's immedi: economic Clem: lh seT from dde union's long -range politic�,, 6jectives, which p 22 those of the UNFP. So as not to risk labors gains, he has remained aloof from the friction hetween the palace and opposition parties, and has cautioned UMT members not to participate in student disorders. Workers have taken advantage of the political tensions generated by the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts to press their demands by staging a number of effective walkouts, wildcat strikes, and sympathy boycotts. A 10 -week strike of miners paralyzed the important phosphate operation in Khouribga in 1971, clashes between laborers and plant officials disrupted the Moroccan Automobile Construction Company s assembly plant for several weeks the same year, and similar incidents have plagued other industries. Following the assassination attempt in 1972, a rash of 24-hour strikes and more prolonged labor boycotts contributed to serious political tensions. Many young intellectuals in the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracv and in various professions and commercial enterprises are impatient and disillusioned' with the political establishment. The young elite consider their expertise underutilized and undervalued and want a greater share in political power. Additionally, they are dissatisfied with their rate of advancement, salary levels, and fringe benefits. Of broader concern to the intelligentsia is the lack of freedom to express dissent and the excessive influence of tradition in all facets of Moroccan life. They also blame the monarchy for the slow development of the nation and the lagging pace of Moroccanization of business and employment. Much of their cynicism and pessimism is expressed in open grumblings about the King and in willful neglect of their work responsibilities. Some have channeled their resentment into political activism, usually within the framework of opposition political parties. The small Communist movement in Morocco also benefits from the discontent of the young elite, .vho comprise the single largest element among Communist supporters aril sympathizers. Longstanding tensions exist between Moroccan Berbers'- and the Arabized majority of the population. Most mountain Berbers believe that the\ have been neglected and discriminated against by the Arab dominated government, and that attempts to Arabize the Moroccan culture threaten the Berber way of life. Berber discontent frequently erupts into brawls "]'he Moroccan population is overwhelmingly of Berher stock, and the distinction between the approximately i5% called Arab and thr roughly 25% called Berber is cultural and linguistic�. Thow calheet t.f g h s are realh. Arabized Berbers. The so- called Berber n�nnrih le s in the mountainous parts of Morocco and adheres to Berber ;rxech and folkway~. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 between individual Arabs and Berbers, occasionally developing into larger clashes involving numerous members of both communities. Strife among Berber tribes, however, has inhabited the formation of an organized channel for Berber discontent. Two Berber parties, the MP and the MPCD, represent the interests of their leaders rather than reflect true Perber sentiment, and neither party consequently has substantial support. Lacking a direct channel for political expression or decisive leadership, the majority of the Berber people have remained aloof from traditional Arab domination by maintaining their isolated way of life in the remote regions of the countryside. During the protectorate period, the French actively encouraged competition between Berbers and Arabs using one group to offset the other. The French encouraged the Berbers to join the military forces� to counterbalance Arab domination of the political scene �and Berbers still dominate the armed forces today. Half of the cadets and officers through the rank of captain are Berber and half are Arab, but from the rank of major on, Berbers make up about 75%-805 of the officer corps. Some Berbers have also attained important positions in the government, and many are now an integral part of the elite establishment. However, the vast bulk of Berbers who have moved into Arab dominated cities and towns are poor, and many are unemployed. Like their Arab counterparts, most impoverished Berber city dwellers blame the government for their squalid living conditions, the high cost of living, and the lack of jobs. Their discontent takes on a distinctive Berber coloration, however, in that they blarne Aral) domination for their plight. Along with the rest of the poor and unemployed, these Berbers are a potential source of agitation. Among the Berber elite, resentments are difficult to identify. M uch has been made of the fact that most of the high ranking officers who led the attacks on the King in 1971 and 1972 were Berbers. Their alleged antagonism toward the Arab elite: in the go ernment is frequently singled out as a prime factor ;n their move against the King. The personal backgrounds and characters of most of these officers suggest, however, that Berber disaffection was of secondary importance to other motives. Nevertheless, their actions indicate that, given other sources of dissatisfaction and frustration, the Berber elite does not feel deeply committed co a system controlled by an Arabized majority. Discottent within the military establishment has W%Wlheel serious proportions in the wake of the two coup attempts. Officers are keenly aware of King Hassan's suspicions of them, and many men ho have given years of loyal service to the palace deeply resent this distrust. Many senior officers have been dismissed or retired, and those who remain are bitter about the rapid promotion of a number of younger officers to command positions. Mane field -grade officers are disgruntled with the degree of corruption and nepotism within the armed forces, and some undoubtedly feel they have little future in the military under King Hassan's rule. Moreover, the junior ranks of the officers corps, NCO's, and enlisted men are more politically conscious than senior officers, and some reportedly have connections with opposition political parties. These: younger men also have close contact with their peers outside the military establishment and are probably sympathetic to civilian criticism of the regime. Despite King Hassan's assumption of direct command of the armed forces, low morale, and Lek of firm leadership in the officer, corps, and tension between the palace and the military establishment are likely to continue for some time. Thus the possibility that another handful of officers will attempt to overthrow the regime is stronger than ever. Moreover, if the armed forces were called on repeatedly to maintain public order, whole units might consider such duty so demeaning that they .would refuse to obey orders and thus precipitate a military takeover. 2. Subversion Dissident groups and malcontents in Morocco and in exile have frequently resorted to lawlessness, political intrigue, and sporadic propaganda activit in an M( +I lu weaken the regime's hold on the people. Scattered cases of violence and plotting are not uncommon. The potential for the emergk-nee of organized subversive activity will remain as long as a large part of the population is disaffected and believes that the regime is not prepared to initiate meaningful reforms. For the short term at least, these disaffected elements are likely to remain disorganized and lack political influence as long as the opposition political parties, tribal elements, and special interest groups are splintered and unable to agree on a measure of cooperation. Although opposition politicians have privately threatened to resort to extralegal measures, there is no indication that they have acted on such threats or that they are prepared to attempt to overthrow Hassan. The only groups which currently are engaged in Planned subversion are a small number of leftist students. 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 25X1 controlling racetracks and gambling operations, issuing licenses for communications equipment, aerial photergraph% and otht -r diverse activities, and Controlling firearms and explosives. It also :u,niturs and regulates the nwyenu nt of foreigners into N1orocc�o and their ac�tiyities \%ithin the count rn Following it reorganization in 1967, \%hen it absorbed the personnel and presanably the mission of the counterintelligence and counterespionage components of the DGS\, this subdirectorate probabl\ had major intelligence responsibilities. Recent information suggests, lim%ever, that the sabdirec�torate no longer conducts counterintelligence and counterespionage operations. Nevertheless, it probablN still collects and analyzes information pertaining to 11oroccan political and social organizations, key Moroccan individuals of scc�urity interest, and foreign elements and c�om- naunities in the country. Its relationship to ;ether organizations with similar reslxmsibilities and its capabilit\ in the intelligence field are not clear. b. Auxiliary Forces 'The Auxiliary Forces arc administered by the General Inspectorate of :luxiliury Forces under the `1inistry of Interior and are commanded b\ c�iyil authorities on the provincial and municipal level. "I'hc Arxiliary Forces arc of three basic types the Administrative Maghzen (nade up of 11,500 provincial troops), the Mobile Maghzen, and the Xur icipal Guard. The Administrative Maghzen and the 3,000 Nlunic�ipal Guard troops arc used 6 throughout Morocco for maintaining order, guarding sensitive areas, escorting tax collectors, controlling cuntrab:and, manning border crossings and patrolling the borders, and protecting people and property. Some patrol on foot, while others ride un camels or bicycles. These forces generidl\ supplement the activities of the Urban Corps and the Mobile Inter%ention (:om- panics. The Mobile Maghzen Figure ore a motorized. rapid response organization of some 6.000 men. They remain permanently on alert and are often used to patrol key border areas or to backstop the :Wministratiye Maghzen, the DGS\, or the Rmal Gendarmerie. Auxiliary Force persomiel �known as ,1laghzani �are recruited from local tribes, are often illiterate, and receive the lowest paN of all go%ernnu�nt servants. Thee arc not m�II trained but are probably it reliable source of support for the Ding. c�. Royal Gendarmerrr "I'he gendarmerie, an elite organization subordinate to the defense administration under the Ding, has extensive lass enforcement responsibilities in rural areas. Gendarmerie units arc charged \sith nuain- teuanc�e of public order in these areas, control of higF\y,a% traffic, sun against contraband. and criminal investigation. Conunanded b\ an army officer. the gendarmerie has a personnel strength of 3,500 men organized into 19 companies stationed at eight regional command centers and one nubile unit at the headquarters in Rabat. The basic working unit of the gendarmerie is the brigade, some of \yhich have APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 FIGURE 7. Mobile Maghzen (U /OU) motorcycles or jeeps. Motorized brigades ,were fornned specifically for rapid intervention, and their personnel receive special training in riot control. There also are special brigades for criminal investigation. Although the gendarmerie is a relatively small force, the quality of performance of the brigades is considered good by Moroccan standards. After two uprisings led i,y regular armed forces personnel, King Hassan apparently has decided to rely more heavily on the gendarmerie, ,which so far has proved itself a dependable arm of the regime. In eni& 1972 there were indications that Hassan planned to expand the force to caunterbalance the regular military services. Many gendarmerie officers are considered competent and have received specialized training. A 2 -year Gendarmerie Training aril Qualification School, now located in Marrakech, was opened in 1963 to give gendarmes special training in rural police activities. Some officers and NCO's also receiyc training in France. Although the regular police units of the DGSN are capable of handling their duties adequately under normal conditions and are able to suppress localized outbreaks of violence, a number of deficiencies would limit their capability to contain widespread urban disorders without major support from Che Auxiliary Forces and the army. All of the police field units suffer from shortages of properly trained administrative and technical personnel. Police commissariats are inefficient and generally understaffed. Except during periods of extended alert, there are serious gaps in the communications network between headquarters and field units. Even in major cities, there are shortages of equipment and much of the inventory is in disrepair. These factors ,would seriouslw inhibit the police ill reacting swiftly and effectively in an emergency. In the event of widespread or prolonged Iting, the Auxiliary Forces ,would probably be c �pled in to support the police, but these forces are not organ;, armed, or trained for traditional police work. In the Casablanca riots in 1963, when the Auxiliary Forces were finally moved in, order was restored only after heavy loss of life. In contrast, the Royal Gendarmerie is well trained and equipped and is capable of maintaining order in rural areas. During either urban or rural emergencies, the Mobile Intervention Units of the DGSN and the Mobile Maghzen could prove decisive because of their ability to shift quickly to troublespots. 2. Intelligence Morocco's intelligence services are undergoing major changes as a result of their failure to uncover the Skhirat conspiracy and the 1972 assassination plot. The Ministry of Interior still has major respomsibility for countersubversion counterespionage, and intelligence collection, but some personnel and responsibilities from its intelligence components have been transferred to a new elite service directly responsible to King Hassan. This new organization, the Palace Intelligence Service (PIS), is under the direction of Col. Ahmed Dlimi, former head of the DGSN and one of the King's closest advisers since the August 1972 assassination attl_rmpt. The main corps of the PIS is made up of former members of the DGSN clandestine wing who have the greatest experience :n security and intelligence matters. As the King's private service, the PIS coordinates and maintains a close watch over the activities of the various security organizations. Although the PIS performs special technical and surveillance tasks for the palace, this small elite corps does not have the capability to undertake the broad range of intelligence tasks which the DGSN can perform with its extensive operational network. Nevertheless, the PIS probably handles the most sensitive security matters without the assistance or knowledge of the DGSN. Within the DGSN, two units, the General Information Subdi rectorate and the Special Brigade Subdirectorate, handle intelligence and counterintel- ligence operations. The General Information Subdirectorate is an overt political police force: stationed throughout major cities and provincial districts, with units operating out of local police commissariats. These police units keep track of dissident individuals and groups and gather information involving security matters. They have virtually unlimited powers of arrest and consequently are the most feared organization in Morocco. The Special Brigade, which is usually called Cabinet 1: is the clandestine ,wing of the DGSN and has major responsibility for counterintelligence and counterespionage. Cabinet I has a network of informants in various opposition organizations and is targeted against foreign elements within the country. The internal organization of Cabinet I has been in a state of flux since early 197!, when its regional and urban component were restructured to improve security. Also, a number of its members have resigned to join the PIS, and presumably Cabinet I's capability has been significantly reduced as a result. The Center for Information and Political Activities is an intelligence- collecting unit directly subordinate to the Minister of Interior rather than to the Directorate General of the DGSN. Little is known 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 about its structure and duties except that it is responsible for monitoring all political activity in Morocco. It functions at all levels of government and has access to the Ministry of Interior's extensive apparatus throughout the country. Military and strategic intelligence are the responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, fo- :merly the Deuxieme Bureau, of the Royal Armed Forces General Staff. This directorate has expanded rapid; in recent years and has designated officers in all major army units, az well as in the navy and air force, to handle intelligence matters. Little is known about its complex internal organization because of the tight security practiced by its members. The directorate is divided into two main sections: the Surete Militaire, which handles personnel and installation security, counterintelligence operations, and specialized investigations; and the Foreign Relations Section, which maintains liaison with foreign military attaches and coilects foreign intelligence. The failure of the Surete Militaire to uncover either of the two military conspiracies which nearly toppled Kind; Hassan, however, has cast serious doubt on its capability and even its loyalty. Although there is no information on the internal changes within the military intelligence services since the August 1972 attack on the King, personnel of both services presumably have been prime targets in the overall purge of the armed forces. Moroccan intelligence has usually been fairly effective in neutralizing subversion and in alerting the police to the possibility of disorders. Temporary detention of suspected agitators and preemptive I arrests of known malcontents have helped to defuse potential outbreaks of violence and, in some cases, have minimized the effects of protests and demonstrations. Close surveillance and harassment of opposition groups, punitive measures for alleged '.wersion, and other more brutal countermeasures gave also served as temporary deterrents to potential dissidents. Such measures have increased resentment toward the regime, however, and are probably counterproductive over the long term. G. Selected bibliography (U /OU) Ashford, Douglas E. Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. Princeton: Bedminster Press. 1964. A case history of political development in Morocco, with importa:.t insights on the impact of the struggle for independence and of Islam on the nationalist movement. Political Change in Morocco. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Although somewhat dated, this work treats many of the factors which continue to have an impact on current politics. Gallagher, Charles F. \11orciceo and Its Neighbors. New York: American Universities Fielcl Staff, Inc. 1967. Briefly summarizes Morocco's border claims and analyzes its relations with surrounding countries. Waterbury, John. "The Moroccan Putsch." New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc. 1971. Chroi,1cles the events leading up to the July 1971 coup attempt, the skirmish, and the aftermath. The Commander of the Faithful. New York: Columbia Press. 1970. An in -depth analysis of political dynamics in Morocco and the role of elite groups. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 CHRONOLOGY (U /OU) c. 146 B.C. -A.D. 400 Roman influence and subsequent control replaces that of the Carthaginians. A.D. 429 Invasions by Vandals and Visigoths begin. c. 685 Arab raiders enter through the Taza gap. 711 Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn Nusnyrancl his Berbersuballern Tariq invade Spain. c. 788 Moulay Idriss, it descendant of the Prophet, establishes the first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegenxmy over most of the northern part of the country. c. 1000 Arab tribes of the I Mal invade Morocco. 1062 Berber tribes from the south make Marrakech the new capital and found Almoravid dynasty. 1147 Nevv confederation takes Marrakech and its leaders become the Ahnohad rulers. 1212 Almohad forces are defeated in Spain, and Muslim power there begins to wane. c. 1216 The Beni Merin tribe enters Morocco, defeats the Almnhads, and eventually establishes the Merinid dynasty. 1549 Capture of Fes marks beginning of control by the Saadians, who had previously defeated Portuguese forces. c. 1576 Sultan Abd al -Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Auks, who then controlled the rest of the Maghreb, but he resists their domination. 1664 Moulav al- Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660. 1787 Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of U.S, ships. 1912 Treaty of Fes establishes the French Protectorate; Spanish zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing international status of Tangier is accepted. 1956 March Formal independence is granted by France to French Protector- ate of Morocco. April Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco. October International status of Tangier is revoked; none is integrated into Morocco. 1958 April Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of Morocco. 1960 June U.S. militarc assistance program is initiated. 1961 February King Mohamed V dies. March Mohamed's son is enthroned as King Hassan 11 and maintains royal control of the govcnunent, acting as his own Prime \lin- ister. 1962 December Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following approval by popular referendum. 1963 October Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3 -week border vvar with Algeria. December U.S. Strategic Air Command completes evacuation of three bases in Morocco. 1965 March Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent antigovernment riots joined b\ the unemployed and by young militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 8.30 arrested. 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 1965 June King declares a State of Exception (I'etut d'exception), dis- misses parliament, and promises a revised constitution and new elections. October Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnapped in Paris. Facts of his disappearance remain unclear, but case leads to a deterioration in Morocco's relationship with France. In January 1966, France recalls its Ambassador to Morocco, and Morocco recalls its Ambassador to France. 1966 October Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including a general economic aid agreement. 1969 January Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni. Morocco and Algeria sign the Ifrane treaty of Friendship December France and Morocco agree to reestablish full diplomatic rela- tions. 30 1970 August King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State of Exception. Elections are held for a new unicameral legis- lature. 1971 July High- ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat Palace. Loyal forces under the direction of Gen. Mohamed Oufkir restore order within a few days. 1972 March King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no firm promise on a date for new elections and the establishment of parliament. August The King escapes another attempt on his life when three Moroccan Air Force F -5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from France. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 Sr:CIirT Glossary (U/OU) ABBREVIATION FRENCH ENGLISH DGSN Direction Generale de la Securite Na- General Directorate of National Se- tionale curity MCP Moroccan Communist Party MP Mouvement Populaire Popular Movement MPCD Mouvement Populaire Constitutionel Constitutional and Democratic Popu- et Democratique lar Movement PIS Palace Intelligence Service PLS Parti de la Liberation et du Socialisme Party of Liberation and Socialism UGEM Union Generale des Etudiants Maroc- General Union of Moroccan Students ains UGTM Union Generale des Travailleurs Ma- General Union of Moroccan Workers rocains UMT Union Marocaine du Travail Moroccan Labor Union UNEM Union Nationale des Etudiants Ma- National Union of Moroccan Stu rocains dents UNFP Union Nationale des Forces Populaires National Union of Popular Forces SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8