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SECRET 48 /GS /AF Morocco March 1973 NATIONAL IN i ELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence C; and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. l A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventor lists all NIS units b area name and Y Y number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the 4 ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate` chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. c The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNIi1G This document contains information affecting the r:ationol defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. 5 E' L r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poles to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 `c 1. This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub stantially completed by November 1972. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 (/tlorocco CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated Jan- uary 1969, copies of which shotald be destroyer'. A. Defense establishment 1 Summary of components and their strengths. Mis- sion and capabilities of the armed forces. Military ties with Arab and other states. Spanish troops in Ceuta and Melilla. 1. Military history 2 Growth of forces after independence and the 1963 border war with Algeria; the attempted coups of 1971 -72 and their aftermaths. 2. Command structure 3 Alterations in the chain of commar..d; role of former Major General of the Royal Armed Forces; establishment of National Defense Administration. SECRET No FOREIGN DmEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 Page B. Joint activities 4 1. Military manpower 4 Breakdown by age group of ;he male popu- lation and those pLysically fit; appraisal of Moroccan soldier; recruitment, terms of serv- ice, and role of reserves. 2. Strength trends Strengths of components since 1956. 3. Training Schools and foreign assistance. 4. Military budget Statistics 1967 -71. 5. Logistics Domestic production, foreign sources of sup- ply, and support functions. C Army Mission and major weaknesses. 1. Organization King's assumption of control. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition Brigades, battalions, troop concentration, and equipment. 3. Training Details on schools and training centers. 4. Logistics Central control of network, transportation companies, and storage facilities. D Navy Limited aims and capabilities. 1. Organization Headquarters and naval staff sections; the "marine corps" or naval security force. Fig. 1 Military budgets (table) Fig. 2 Infantry troops on parade photo) Fig. 3 Light tanks and oar armored car (photo) 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 9 9 9 Page 2. Strength, composition, and vi. nosition 10 Data on personnel, fleet, and t 3. Training 10 Academy in Casablanca; Fxznc h assistance and attendance at U.S. schools. 4. Logistics 11 Requirement submissicn to General Staff; French su-pervision of repair work. E. Airforce 11 Assessment of capability for combat, air defense and grounu support. 1. Organization 11 Subordinate sections, bases, and squadrons. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 11 Personnel and airorafi� inventory 3. Training 12 Program of Marrakech academy; foreign as- sistance. 4. Logistics 13 Reliance on foreign sources, procurement re- sponsibilities; repair and supply facilities. F. Gendarraerie 13 Strength. capabilities, organization, and training. G. Paramilitary fo:res 14 1. Mobilc Maghzen of the Auxiliary Forces 14 Strength, origin, control, and competence level. 2. Mobile Intervention Companies 14 Strength, control, urban concentration, and ,2pabilities. Glossary 15 FIGURES Page Page 6 Fig. 4 Navf flagship (plwto) 10 7 Fig. 5 F -5 Freedom Fighter photo) 12 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 Armed forces A. Defense establishment' The Royal Armed Forces of Moroc.!o consist of the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA), the Royal Moroccan Navy (RMN), the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF), and the Royal Gendarmerie (RG). Total personnel strength is about 57,000: 49,000 in the army, 1,600 in the navy, 3, in the air force, an l 3,500 in the gendarmerie. They comprise the third iargest force in North Africa, following those o,` Egypt and Algeria. In addition to the regular military forces, Morocco has two paramilitary -type organizations-- the Mobile Maghz,-n of the Auxiliary Forces, and the Mobile Intervention Companies cf the Directorate General of National Security �with a total personnel strength of 8,500. These local security forces have some potential for augmenting or supporting the regular ground forces during hostilities or other national emergenc They normally operate under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Interior but could be subordinated to military control if required. (S) The n i lion of the armed forces is to defend the nationai territory and to insure internal security. Fulfillment of this mission devolves largely on the army, as both the navy and air forces are small and underdeveloped and have virtually no combat capabilities. The armed forces suffer from a shortage of experienced leaders, as well as equipment and logistics deficiencies, and are not capable of defending the nation against an attack by a major power. Neighboring Algeria, whose military forces are numerically superior to those of Morocco, has posed tho principal threat, although relations between tho two countries have improved greatly since the border conflict in 1963. The Moroccan forces are probably capable of containing, for a few days, an Algerian invasion along the 975 -mile common border. The capability of the Moroccans to initially defend their territory would depend largely on the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence indicating the enemy's only fragmentary information is currently availab!e on the changes being mane in the arrr:ed forces following the coup attempt of August 1972 This chapter is, therefore, to be regarded as an interim study. military objectives and axis of attack, but the Moroccan logistic system could not support large -Male combat operations for an extended time. On the other hand, a successful A:gerian drive to Morocco's major population centers would be extremely difficult because of the considerable distances involved, Algerian logistical limitations, and Moroccan capabilities to harrass and delay an advancing force. (S) The Moroccan armed forces have a good capability in internal security. However, questions have been raised concerning their reliability following two attempts on the life of King Hassan organized and led in 1971 -72 by military officrrs. Barring a simultaneous outbreak of violent disorders throughout the country, the paramilitary forces would not require the assistance of the regular forces in restoring law and order. (S) The armed forces constitute the largest group of disciplined and trained manpower in the country. In addition to performing the usual defense and security missions, theN participat&- is civic action work. The army has constructed roads, bridges, dams, houses, schools, d :snensaries, hospitals, and irrigation systems and has done emergency relief and rescue work following earthquakes and fiaods. The military forces also train civilian personnel for various government agencies; the army .onducts schools for administrators for the Ministry of interior and for livestock managers for the Ministry of Agricultury and Agrarian Reform. Under the military conscription law enacted in 1966, the army provides training in various civilian -type occup::tions for about 5,000 to 7,500 young men serving their 18 months of military service. All these activities have been given good publicity, with the result that the armed forces have enjoyed considerable respect and prestige for their contribution to public welfare and improvement of the nation. The extent to which military involvement in the 1971 -72 coup attempts will alter the armed forces' role in government and public image cannot as yet be ascertained. (U /OU) Military relations between Morocco and other Arab nations are not particularly close, and Morocco APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 traditionally has been reluctant to become involved in eastern Arab affairs. Although it inember of the Aral) League and of the Arab League Collective Security Pact, Morocco deployed no troops to the Arab Israeli conflict in 1567. Moroccan support to the Palestinian fedayeen org.nizations has inclided token financial contributions and small -scale military assistance in both training and materiel. Relations with Algeria have improved and the border situation has been quiet since the two nations signed a friendship agreement in 1969 which denounced the use of force to settle boundary disputes. S) Morocco is a member of the Organization of African Unity. It maintains close military tics with Western European countries and the United States, but it has also accepted military materiel and training assistance from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. (U /OU) In addition to the Moroccan forces, 18,000 Spanish troops are disposed in Ceuta and Melilla, the plazas de soberania, or Spanish "places of sovereignity," whi are located on the Mediterranean coast. These forces are organized into 12 regiments, of which there are six (three infantry, one light cavalry, one artillery, one engineer) in each of the two plazas. (S) 1. Military history (S) The Royal Moroccan Army, including a small, integral air arm, was established in May 1956, shortly after France and Spain had relinquished authority o Moroccan territory. The initial army complement of 15,000 men consisted of Moroccan soldiers transferred from the French Army of Morocco. In July 1956 the total strength of the army was raised tc 30,000 by the incorporatiriv of about 5,000 men from elements of the irregular Army of Liberation, which had carried on guerrilla warfare against the French before Moroccan independence, and about 10,000 men from the northern zone who were transferred as a group from the Spanish controlled Moroccan forces or individually from the Spanish Army of Morocco. In the French and Spanish forces up to 1956, Moroccan soldiers were idered highly valuable and reliable troops. M atz) combat experience in the French Army in Furope during World War II and subsequently in Indochina. Most of the former French and Spanish Moroccan units also were experienced in security -type operations. In 1960, the Royal Moroccan Navy was established as the naval section of the Royal Moroccan Army and was assigned the mission of patrolling the coastline and suppressing illegal entry and arms smuggling. On 1 February 1961, the army air element was 2 redesigna :L -d the Royal Moroccan. Air Force, and both it and the navy became autonomous e ntities, coequal with the army. Moroccan for fought the Algerians during the frontier crisis from October to December 1963. The strength of the army ground element was increased to .;7,000, and the number of ground units was nearly doubled. In military engagements the Moroccan forces proved themselves qualitatively superior to the Algerian forces, though the operations revealed inherent weaknesses in Moroccan command and staff structure. In late 19137, the King issued a series of royal decrees which redefined and formalized the duties of the Minister of National Defense, established the position of Major General of the Royal Armed Forces, created an Inspector General Corps, and transferred control of the Roval Gendarmerie from the Minister of Interior to the Minister of National Defense. During the following several years, Morocco became increasingly concerned over the great quantities of Soviet military equipment acquired by Algeria, and intensified its efforts to develop a military capability to counter the Algerian threat. As a result of plans drawn up by a high -level commission appointed by the King, the army began reorganizing into brigades, territorial commands were redefined, and additional units were deployed to reinforce the border area. By mid -1971, considerable progress and improve- ment had been achieved in army reorganization, and negotiations were underway with the United States for he acquisition of additional equipment for the army and air force. Although there had been no evidence that discontent, disloyalty, or strong opposition to the King existed among any segment of the armed forces, on 10 July 1971, a group of high ranking army officers nearly succeeded in overt hrowi._g him. The King was entertaining about 500 foreign dignitaries and Moroccan officials at the Royal Palace at Skhirat and narrowly escaped being killed %when some 1,500 cadets from the noncommissioned officers school at Ahermoumou, armed with rifles and submachine guns, arrived and began firing wildly into the crowd. The King was held prisoner for over 2 hours, during which time the alleged leader of the coup, Brig. Gen. Mohamed Medbouh (Director of the Royal Military Household) attempted to negotiate with him, but the King refused to step down. The turning point occurred when Medbouh was killed, presumably by accident, and the rebels were thrown into panic and confusion. They shortly ran out of ammunition and, left leaderless, switched their support to the King. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 1 4 Meanwhile, an accomplice of Medbouh, Lt. 04. Mohamed Ababou. who was CAnninand of the NCO school, led a group of soldiers to Rabat to seize control of key government installations, including the radio station, the Ministries of National Defense :end Interior, and armed forces headquarters. Loyal troops at Rabat, led by Maj. Gen. Bachir Bouhali (who as Major General of the Royal Armed Forces headed the General Staff), attacked the rebels and regained control of armed forces headquarters. Both he and Ababou were killed. Following the King's release at Skhi:al,, he bestowed unlimited powers on Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir (then Minister of Interior) and Maj. Gen. Driss Ben Omar Minister of Posts, Telephone, arid Telegraph) to restore order. Using both the security forces and the army, Oufkir crushed the rebellion and order was restored to near normal within 24 hours. It is not entirely clear what motivated the coup plotters, but indications point to dissatisfaction with the personalized rule and luxurious life style of the King, and the conviction that he tolerated blatant corruption in high places. Presumably Medbouh and his small group of conspirators became convinced that the King would not take remedial action, and decided to act on their own to bring about reform. The Skhirat affair and its aftermath severely weakened the military establishment. The top command structure was virtually destroyed �nine of Morocco's 16 general officers lost their lives, including the Major General of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the Air Force, the Director of the Military Household, the King's Aide -de -Camp, and one Military Region Commander, who were killed in the fracas. Four other generals (the Director of Schools and three Military Region Commanders) and six lower ranking officers were executed the next day. Less than a month later, Major General Oufkir was appointed Minister of National Defense and, in an unprecedented move, was concurrently named Major General of the Royal Armed Forces. Unlike his predecessors in the ministerial post, General Ot:fkir was given broad policy and decisionmaking powers and responsibility to restructure the entire defense organization. In early 1972, 1,083 officers, cadets and NCO's implicated in the coup attempt were tried by a military tribunal. One cadet was condemned to death for killing the Commander of the Royal Gendarmerie, three individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment, 70 received prison sentences ranging from I to 20 years and the remainder were acquitted. Testimony presented at the trials supported most of the defendents' claims that they were misled arid duped into thinking they were going to the palace to prote(t the King, or that they were doing their military duty by following orders. On 16 August 1972 King Hassan survived a second attempt on his life. Three F -5 jets of the air force squadron based at Kenitra fired on arid damaged the Boeing 727 that was bringing the King :come from Paris After the King's plane landed, the rebel pilots strafed both the airport arid the palace at Rabat. The army then occupied the 3d Royal Air Base, Kenitra and arrested a number of officers. The Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Lt. Col. Mohamed Amekrane, fled to Gibraltar but was refused asylum arid returned to face Moroccan justice. It was officially announced the following da., that the attempted regicide: was part of a plot masterminded by Major General Oufkir to seize control. He was said to have committed suicide, but probably he wo+ summarily executed. According to some sources, the conspirators numbered only 14 or 15 officers. However, over 200 officers and men, mainly from the Kenitra base, are under arrest. It was announced 7 November that 11 had been sentenced to death. Other officers, including the Commandant of the Navv and the Commander of the Air Farce, have been relieved of their posts, probably because of past association with Major General Oufkir. The King's reaction to this attempted coup was to tighten the reins of his power. He announced on 19 August that he was taking over direct control of the armed forces, aril he abolished the positions of Minister of National Defense and Major General of the Royal Armed Forces. Publicly he derided and castigated the armed forces. Some steps have been taken to formalize a new defense administration, but considerable time will be required to restore to the military establishment its former effectiveness. prestige, and morale. The loyalty of the armed forces, once the princip,;i support of the monarchy, is doubtful, and their disaffection is reportedly serious. 2. Command structure (S) King Hassan II has always been Supreme Commander of the Royal Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff. While Hassan was Crown Prince, he was delegated responsibility for creating the armed forces, and he has been intimately involved in their management and development. He has consistently maintained close relationships with trap -level officers, and personally made all major decisions concerning every aspect of national defense. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 Before the attempted coup of 1972, the Minister of National Defense was the King's principal military adviser and assistant. Subject to the King's final approval, the minister formulated defense plans and policy and was responsible for the organization, deployment, readiness, hadget, equipment, and training of the armed forces. The chain of command over the armed forces descended from the King through the Minister of National Defense to the Major General of the Royal Armed Forces. The position of Major General, an adaption of the French etat -major general, was created by royal decree in 1967. After the first coup attempt in mid -1971, the entire military establishment was extensively reorganized. Apparently designed to reduce the possibility of any future uprisings, the new organization centralized control over the combat units at the highest command level and decentralized the territorial structure. Three principal General Staff entities command, opera- tions, and logistics �were established. The command element, which included the Deputy Major General, the Inspector General, and the Director of General Studies, controlled the army units, as well as the navy and air force. The Directorate of General Studies �an advisory and coordinating body 4 senior staff officers responsible for drawing up overall defense plans specifically relating to the organization and operation of units, territorial commands, and communications centers reviewed all plans and projects developed by the other directorates, recommended approval or disapproval, and passed them on to the Major General for his studv and decision. Similarly, all orders and directives of the Major General were channeled through this directorate downward to the other staff elements or to the force commanders for implementa- tion. As of late 1972, only sparse information is available on the operational effects of the abolishment of the posts of Minister of National Defense and Major General of the Royal Armed Forces. King Hassan in September 1972 established the National Defense Administration, headed by a secretary general, to take over the functions of the Central Administrative Services of the former National Defense Ministry. Responsibility for military justice was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Both these measures appear to be ad hoc arrangements. No further changes in the command structure have been announced. Presumably the operations element of the General Staff continues to perform administrative functions. primarily for the army, but also those common to the other services. Presumably too the separate directorates for personnel matters, intelligence and military security, training, communications, and transportation continw,- to exist. The logistics element provides all service and support for the army and coordinates the logistics requirements of the navy and air force. Various directorate are responsible for fuels, munitions and armaments supply; materiel repair; engineering; welfare and social services; and medical services. B. Joint activities 1. Military manpower (C) As of 1 January 1973, Morocco will have an estimated 3,827,000 males between the ages of 13 and 49, of whom about 68%c will be fit for military service. Their distribution by -year age groups is as follows: The average number reaching military age (18) annually in the period 1973 -77 is about 17,000. Historically, most of the nation's military manpower has been furnished by the Berbers. Accustomed to a harsh physical environment, he Berbers, with training, make excellent field solic;ers. Moroccan Arabs, normally residents of more densely populated areas, adapt more readily to administrative tasks and are used principally as headquarters troops or in the noncombatant technical arms. The Moroccan soldier, Berber or Arab, is adaptable to military training and possesses some degree of mechanical and technical aptitude. However, there is a general shortage of properly qualified instructors to develop these aptitudes. Because of the unemployment problem, most Moroccans consider military service highly desirable economically. Moreover, members of the armed forces, particularly officers w`no are generally from the upper or governing class, enjoy considerable respect and social status. Armed farces participation in civic action projects arid success: in combat during the 1963 border conflict with Algeria enhanced further the prestige of a military career. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 TOTAL MAXIMUM NUMBER NUMBER FIT FOR ACE OF MALES MI:.ITARY SERVICE 15 -19 841,000 W5,000 20-24 689,000 485,000 25 -29 651,000 455,000 30 -34 630,000 430,000 35 -39 466.000 300,E 4044 311,000 185,000 4549 239,000 130,000 Total, 1549 3,827,000 2,600,000 The average number reaching military age (18) annually in the period 1973 -77 is about 17,000. Historically, most of the nation's military manpower has been furnished by the Berbers. Accustomed to a harsh physical environment, he Berbers, with training, make excellent field solic;ers. Moroccan Arabs, normally residents of more densely populated areas, adapt more readily to administrative tasks and are used principally as headquarters troops or in the noncombatant technical arms. The Moroccan soldier, Berber or Arab, is adaptable to military training and possesses some degree of mechanical and technical aptitude. However, there is a general shortage of properly qualified instructors to develop these aptitudes. Because of the unemployment problem, most Moroccans consider military service highly desirable economically. Moreover, members of the armed forces, particularly officers w`no are generally from the upper or governing class, enjoy considerable respect and social status. Armed farces participation in civic action projects arid success: in combat during the 1963 border conflict with Algeria enhanced further the prestige of a military career. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 Officers are commissioned upon graduation from the Royal Military Academy or from an acceptable foreign academy. Exceptions to requirements for commissions can be made for individuals who meet certain conditions and stand:_rds of service and for those who hold degrees from universities and engineering schools. Officers commissioned on the basis of academia; degrees are required to undergo 6 months of training at the Royal Military Academy and must agree to serve for periods of from 5 to 8 years. Enlisted volunteers serve 5 -year terms. An 18 -month compulsory service program was enacted in 1966. Although conscription provides short term manpower to augment armed forces strength and permits the commandeering of civilian medical and technical specialists, it was designed primarily to mix diverse elements of the population by putting them into the ranks and to train there in tasks economically useful to the nation. Between 5,000 and 7,500 men are inducted annually in two increments. The conscrip- tion law also specifies that on release from active duty all draftees must go into reserve status, in predetermined mobilization assignments, and remain until they reach age 50. They are subject to recall for up to 30 days of annual training with their designated parent unit and for an indefinite period during national emergencies. Available for mobilization are some 25,000 reserves (ex- conscripts) and an additional 20,000 to 25,000 former military personnel, all subject to recall. Initial effectiveness of recalled personnel would be minimal because of the inadequacy of reserve supplies of equipment and armament and because of training, logistic, and transportation problems. Mobilization planning is probably based on the concept of short duration border clashes with neighboring forces. Mobilized personnel would likely be assigned initially to augment existing units, as was done during the hostilities with Algeria in 1963, and additional units would be formed if the conflict continued or intensified beyond M plus 30 days. 2. Strength trends (S) When Morocco bef. independent in 1956, army personnel strength (including an air arm of 35 men) was about 15,000. Its strength rapidly increased and by 1960 total military strength had reached 30,800, including an increase in air personnel to 240 and a 60- man naval component, established in 1960. From mid -1963 to the end of that year because of the border conflict with Algeria, the army expanded rapidly to a peak strength of 57,000. Following cessation of hostilities and inactivation of units in 1964, strength diminished to 43,000 and then was further cut back to 35,000 by early 1965 for economic reasons. The navy and air force, removed from army control in 1964, have both increased gradually to their present strengths. Since 1966, army strength has again increased, primarily because of the instituting of conscription. Strength of the armed forces for selected years, including the gendarmerie since 1967, is shown in the following tabulation: Not pertinent. *Air and naval components were part of the army. 3. Training (S) The Royal Military Academy at Meknes'' is primarily an army officer candidate school, but a few graduates are commissioned each year in the Royal Gendarmerie. Under a new program initiated in 1971, all nave and air force officer candidates are required to complete the first year course at the military academy prior to attending their respective service academies or foreign schools for 2 or 3 vears. Joint army /air force training is conducted at Rabat -Sale air base, where transport aircraft are used for army paratroop jump instruction and for heavy equipment drop training. The army administers induction and basic training centers for all conscripted personnel at El Hajeb, Sidi Slimane, and Benguerir. Morocco is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for training, particularly of air force and navy officers and technical specialists for all the services. France is the principal source of such assistance, both in- country and abroad. The annual quota of Moroccan students accepted by French military schools is about 300, and 'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of the chapter. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 AiR l E\D- DATE ARMY FORCE NAVY ARAIERIE TOTAL May 1956 15,000 15,000 Jan 1958 30,000 30,000 Jan 1960* 30,500 240 60 30,800 Jan 1961 30,550 300 150 31,000 Jan 1962* 32,500 700 400 33,600 Jan 1963* 32,500 1,900 500 34,900 Nov 1963* 57,000 2,200 500 39,700 Jan 1964 43,000 2,300 500 45,800 Jan 1965 35,000 2,300 700 38,000 Jan 1966 45,000 2,650 1,000 48,650 Jan 1967 49,100 2,600 1,100 52,800 Jar 1968 49,300 2,600 1,500 3,800 57,200 Jan 1969 50,500 3,000 1,600 3,800 58,900 Jan 1970 49,200 3,100 1,600 3,800 57,700 Jan 1971 49,200 3,100 1,600 3,500 57,400 Jan 1972 49,000 3,100 1,600 3,500 57,200 Not pertinent. *Air and naval components were part of the army. 3. Training (S) The Royal Military Academy at Meknes'' is primarily an army officer candidate school, but a few graduates are commissioned each year in the Royal Gendarmerie. Under a new program initiated in 1971, all nave and air force officer candidates are required to complete the first year course at the military academy prior to attending their respective service academies or foreign schools for 2 or 3 vears. Joint army /air force training is conducted at Rabat -Sale air base, where transport aircraft are used for army paratroop jump instruction and for heavy equipment drop training. The army administers induction and basic training centers for all conscripted personnel at El Hajeb, Sidi Slimane, and Benguerir. Morocco is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for training, particularly of air force and navy officers and technical specialists for all the services. France is the principal source of such assistance, both in- country and abroad. The annual quota of Moroccan students accepted by French military schools is about 300, and 'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of the chapter. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 some 200 French military advisers and instructors are in Morocco. The United States provides pilot and crew training for both jet and reciprocating engine aircraft; Italy has accepted a few naval trainees anO provides helicopter pilot and maintenance training; and an Iranian army advisory team has been in Morocco since 1968. Training assistance from Communist countries has been on a very small scale. In the early 1960's a Soviet air force mission of about 30 men accompanied the 14 MiG aircraft that Morocco received, but the last members of this assistance mission departed Morocco in the fall of 1965. A group of Czechoslovak military technicians was in Morocco during 1967 -70 to advise the army on armored equipment and training, and about 60 Moroccans have received armored training in Czechoslovakia. 4. Military budget (S) Estimated budgets, prepared by the various components of the defense establishment, are consolidated into a single military budget (Figure 1) that is incorporated into the total national budget. The Minister of Finance presents the national budget to the King for approval and subsequent promulgation by royal decree. Breakdowns by individual service are not published. 5. Logistics (S) Morocco is capable of providing limited economic support for its armed forces. Quartermaste- -type items, parachutes, small arms, and ammunition are produced domestically, and a few heavy trucks of some military value and communications equipment are assembled from imported components. However, the country is heavily dependent on external sources for equipping its military establishment. Total military assistance received by Morocco for the period 1954 -71 is valued at over US$156 million. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have provided infantry weapons, artillery, armor, military vehicles, and FIGURE 1. Military budgets (U /OU) (Millions of US dollars 1967 Defense budget 107.6 Defense budget as a percent of total national budget 16.9 Defense budget as a percent of GNP..... 4. 1968 1969 1970 1971 128.6 131.6 138.9 143.9 16.5 16.0 15.7 16.5 4.3 4.4 4.3 na na Data not available. *Converted at the exchange rate of 5.06 dirhams equal US81. 0 fighter, trainer, and helicopter aircraft �in all worth the equivalent of $33 million. France has been a major source for materiel and has provided infantry weapons, artillery, military vehicles, naval ships, and numerous aircraft, all valued at nearly $45 million. The United States in its Military Assistance Program, which commenced in 1960, has delivered materiel valued at $62 million, mainly in the form of grant aid. Smaller amounts of equipment have been received from other countries, including Belgium, West Germany Italy, and Israel, primarily on a purchase basis. Transactions and negotiations for the procurement of military equipment from foreign sources are handled at the government -to- government level. Such materiel is received at various ports by civilian agents under contract to the Moroccan Government for direct delivery to the armed forces. Logistic support functions for the entire military establishment are centrally controlled, coordinated, and administered at the General Staff level. Separate directorates are responsible for supply, materiel repair, engineering, communications, transportation, and medical services. The logistics system is barely adequate for normal peacetime requirements; it suffers not only from shortage-. of equipment but also from inadequate numbers of qualified maintenance technicians ai,d trained supply personnel. Actual combat operations could not be supported for more than a few days at most. C. Army (S) The mission of the Royal Moroccan Army is to defend the national territory and to assist in insuring internal security. The array has a very limited capability for defense against any large -scale attack by a well- equipped adversary and could not defend the border for more than a few days against invasion from Algeria. It is capable of performing its secondary mission of maintaining internal security in conjunc- tion with the gendarmerie, and it has contributed APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 t:. 1 effectively to civic action and nation- building programs. Its major weaknesses are in long -range artillery and antitank weapons, maintenance, technical and staff officer training, and logistics (a problem compounded by the diverse origin of equipment and arms, some of which are obsolete). 1. Organization There is no army chief of staff as such. Before the post of Major General of the Royal Armed Forces was abolished in 1972, he headed the General Staff and also directed and controlled the day -to -day operations of the army. King Hassan has assumed these functions. Territorial commands were reorganized after the coup attempt in July 1971. The former six military regions were abolished and smaller military sectors formed, probably designed to prevent individual senior commanders from developing a significant power base. Sector headquarters were established at Agadir, Ouarzazate, Ksar es Souk, and Oujda, and five others were to be established at Taza, Rabat, Marrakech, Meknes or Fes, and Tan -Tan or Goulimine to coincide with the projected establish- ment of three principal and six secondary joint territorial communications centers. However, since the second attempted coup and the King's assumption of direct control over all units and activities in August 1972, the sector commands have apparently been abolished. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition' The Royal Moroccan Army consists of 48,900 men; about 1,600 are officers and 47,300 are enlisted, including about 5,000 conscripts. As of mid -1972, the army was organized into six brigades (two motorized infantry, one mechanized infantry, one armored, one light security, and one parachute), and nine separate i4antry battalions (Figure 2), one heavy mortar battalion, two combat engineer battalions, two horse and two camel cavalry battalions, a 1,000 -man Royal Guard battalion (ceremonial), plus transport and signal battalions. Since August 1972 the infantry and armored brigades have been disbanded and their former organic elements redeployed throughout the country. Troops are concentrated in and around the principal urban centers of Rabat, Taza, Meknes, Ksar es Souk, Marrakech, and Sidi Ifni. 3 For regularly updated information, see the Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces, and the Military Intelligence Summary, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Materiel in the units is of varied origin. Armor is of soviet, Czechoslovak, French (Figure 3), and U.S. origin; artillery, mortars, and light infantry weapons, some of which are obsolete, are of Soviet, Spapish, French, and U.S. manufacture. Except for tank transporters and retrievers which are of Czechoslovak origin, motor transport equipment is predominantly British, U.S., Frc and West German. Major equipment deficiencies arc long -range artillery and antiiank weapons. Current arms and equipment holdings would be inadequate to support sizable mobilization requirements. The level of maintenance is generally low, and the condition of equipment ranges from fair to poor because of a shortage of qualified technicians, lack of spare parts, and supply problems connected with the heterogeneous equip- ment. 3. Training One of the major weaknesses of the army is the shortage of trained personnel, particularly staff officers and technical specialists. Training facilities are inadequate to rneet current requirements, and Morocco relies heavily on foreign training assistance. France is the primary provider �about 200 Moroccan soldiers attend French schools each year, and about 80 French Army personnel serve in Morocco as army advisers and instructors. Spain, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, Iran, West Germany, and the United States have provided training assistance on a much smaller scale. The Royal Moroccan Army runs over a dozen schools and training centers. The Royal Military Academy at Meknes provides a 3 -year course for officer candidates. Applicants for admission must be 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 FIGURE 2. Infantry troops on parade in Rabat (C) FIGURE 3. AMX -13 light tanks (left) and an armored car of the Royal Moroccan Army (right) (C) between 18 and 23 years of age, unmarried, and able to pass examinations equivalent to U.S. college en';rance examinations. French and Arabic languages are required. Based on examination results, about 75 of the highest ranking applicants are selected each year. The first year is devoted to general academic study (language, matbematics and science), leadership and discipline; the second year provides practical and technical military instruction; and the last year of the course is branch specialization training. Those assigned to infantry remain at the academy, and those assigned to other arms or services go to the appropriate branch training centers or to foreign schools. The academy is staffed by both military personnel (sonic French) and civilians. All instruction is in the French language. About 50 students are graduated and commissioned second lieutenants annually, including a few for service in the Royal Gendarmerie and the Auxiliary Forces. The General Staff School established at Kenitra in 1965, provides a 10 -month staff preparatory course for junior officers, usually captains, and 2 -week refresher courses in staff operations for majors and lieutenant colonels. About 35 -40 students attend the 10 -month session. The school is staffed by French and Moroccan army officers, and the course is based on French staff training modified for Moroccan requirements. All instruction is in French. The NCO Academy located at Ahermoumou, about 40 miles east of Meknes, graduates about 800 students a year and could train junior officers in an emergency. The first year of the 2 -year course is devoted to military subjects (theory and techniques, weapons, tactics, etc.) and general education, (language, geography, history, mathematics). The second year provides specialist courses in adrninistratio' avid field duty. In addition to the regular student body, about 150 NCO's from army field units attend 6 -month courses each year to improve their general military background, and about 50 a year attend 2 -month specialist courses. Instructors are French and Moroccan officers and NCO's. Equipment and training aids, especially for automotive, signal, and weapons instruction, are inadequate. The Recruit Training Center, located at El Hajeb, about 20 miles southeast %f Meknes, provides 6 -month courses for regular army recruits and 3 -month courses for conscripts. Training is extremely basic, consisting mainly of physical education, close order drill, military regulations, and individual weapons handling. Recruits receive their actual basic training in the units to which they are assigned. The center can accommodate 3,000 men. Additional conscript training centers are located at Sidi Slimane and Benguerir. The Artillery School at Fes is attended by officers and NCO's for 6 to 12 months of specialist training in field artillery, air d-�'2nse artillery, or communications. Facilities are adequate for 200 students. Training aids include large sand tables for artillery instruction, a smoke -puff range for training forward observers, and a communications laboratory. Artillery firing ranges are at El Hajeb. Instructors are French and Moroccan officers; all instruction is in the French language, and emphasis is on practical application. Some infantry personnel also attend courses at the center, and in 1971, several officer students from Tunisia and Senegal were enrolled. The Paratroop Training Center, located at Rabat Sale Air Base, has facilities for about 160 trainees. Three weeks of fundamental instruction include six practice jumps. Instructors are personnel from the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 k army's parachute brigade. Training aids are meager, but results are fairly satisfactorv. The Signal School, located at Rabat, can accommodate 30 students. Because of the shortage of qualified instructors, courses are conducted only intermittently. The Materiel School at Casablanca provides courses in automotive mechanics and in armament repair. The period of instruction varies, depending on the aptitude of students, but averages about 6 months. Size of classes for each course ranges from 15 to 30. Instructors are both French and Moroccan. The Lycee Militaire, a junior milita: school located at Kenitra, is for sons and male relatives of military personnel, whom it prepares for the Royal Military Academy or for a foreign university. Students are divided into six scholastic year levels, with approximately 60 at each level. The Engineering School at Tetouan trains officers and NCO's in both general and field engineering. The general course of two 11 -month academic years is for NCO's selected from graduates of the NCO Academy. Capacity of each class is about 70. Four general field engineering classes are conducted each year fo newly commissioned engineer officers and warrant officers from engineer units and detachments. The school also provides specialized courses of 4'/2 months duration in surveying, masonry, plumbing, carpentry, sheet metal and plaster work, and electricity. Training aids are adequate and well maintained, but the school has no heavy equipment and equipment operators are trained in foreign countries. The faculty of 50 officers and NCO's includes three French officers. The quality and effectiveness of instruction are excellent, and the Engineer Corps has demonstrated a high level of proficiency in erection of Bailey bridging and in construction of military housing projects. The Royal Equestrian School at Temara provides instruction in riding and in the training and care of horses for the cavalry and armored corps. The Royal Medical Academy, adjacent to the military hospital in Rabat, is a 6 -year school for military doctors and veterinarians. It is administered by French Army physicians; instructors are both French and Moroccan military personnel. 4. Logistics The logistic support network is a highly centralized organization, but its effectiveness is severely hampered by shortages of both materiel and trained personnel. Central control, direction, and coordination of the principal logistic functions are performed by various service and support directorates at the General Staff level. Small support units, including quartermaster, engineer, materiel repair, transport, signal and medical detachments, perform logistic services in the ,field, but technical direction remains with the parent directorate. Army units have organic transportation companies, but vehicles assigned to the individual units are not adequate to move the entire unit and its equipment at one time. To augment the transportation companies, there is an additional transport group of four companies deployed to geographic areas centered around Agadir, Marrakech, Meknes, and Rabat. Principal warehouses, supply depots, and storage areas are located in the vicinity of Casablanca. However, signal equipment is stored at a site near Rabat; ammunition is stored at Kenitra, Fes, Meknes, Taza, Ksar es Souk, Sidi Ifni, and Oued Zem; and quartermaster depots are located at Sale end Kenitra. Although Morocco produces sufficient diesel fuel for domestic consumption, army units maintain no fuel stores of their own except for day -to -day needs, and training exercises are frequently curtailed because of scarcity of fuel or ammunition. Basic load levels of ammunition do not exist; units draw munitions and supplies for normal use from small depots scattered around the country, but in event of an emergency, these items would have to be requisitioned from the main depots. Some staple items of food may be stocked, but unit commanders usually purchase food from local contractors and the army would probably "live off the land" during a combat situation. Navy (S) The Royal Moroccan Navy is a small, coast guard type organization whose mission is to protect the national coastline and territorial waters, prevent illegal entry and smuggling by sea, and enforce maritime and fishing regulations. It is capable of conducting small -scale antismuggling patrols in coastal waters but is ineffective as a naval combat force. It is handicapped by a budget that precludes expansion or development, an insufficient number of patrol -type ships, and an acute shortage of trained men. The navy is totally dependent on foreign assistance (principally French) for ships and associated equipment and for officer and technical training. 1. Organization The Commandant of the Royal Moroccan Navy, whose headquarters is at Casablanca, controls the shore establishment and the operating force of 17 M APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 ships. The naval staff ec of four sections. Personnel and Administration, Operations and Intelligence, Communications, and Logistics. There is no afloat organization; ship commanders are directly suhordinate to the Commandant. A 450 -man infantry company, known as the "marine corps," is an integral component of the navy. It is primarily a naval security force and has no amphibious assault capability. Headquarters of the company is at Ai 2. Strength, composition, and disposition' Personnel strength of the navy is 1,600, of whom only 40 are officers. There are no reserve personnel and the potential to augment present naval strength from the merchant marine is minimal. All ships are of foreign origin, primarily French, and have been acquired since 1956. As of January 1972, the fleet consisted of the following: 1 1 2 11 1 1 patrol escort (PF large submarine chaser (PC) motor gunboats (PCM patrol boats (PB utility landing craft (LCU training patrol craft (YP The patrol escort is the flagship of the navy (Figure 4). Originally a British "River" class launched it was sold to France in 1964 and purchased by Morocco in 1965. The submarine chaser, one of the motor gunboats, and t'_e landing craft were ordered from French vards and delivered since 1964; the other gunboat was transferred from the French Navy in 1960. The patrol boats are small, lightly armed 4 For regularly updated information, see Military Intelligence Summary and Automated Naval Cider of Battle (Ships), both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. f' FIGURE 4. Royal Moroccan Navy Flagship At Macuna WOU) 10 launches formerly operated by the Directorate of Merchant Marine and Fisheries. They were taken over by the navy in 1967 and are usually employed in fishery protection duties. The training craft is a former yacht, unarmed, acquired in 1967. All ships are normally maintained in active operational status. Their n;aterial condition ranges from fair to poor, and their weapons systems are obsolescent. The principal operating base is at Casablanca, and a secondary operating base is located on the Mediterranean coast at Al Hoceima. Plans exist for establishing a third base at Agadir, but no funds have been allocated. All ships are homeported at Casablanca and normally operate in hom. waters extending from the vicinity of Agadir on the Atlantic coast to Al Hoceima. They make occasional visits to France and have called at Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Dakar during annual training cruises. 3. Training The navy is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for officer and technic -al specialist training. Most assistance has come from France, and a french naval mission has been at the Casablanca Naval Base since the Moroccan Navy was establish ^d in 1960. It provides a year of shore and afloat training for enlisted men prior to their being sent to specialist training in France. Most Moroccan naval officers have attended French schools, and the entire crews of the ships Morocco has acquire -_1 from France, both new construction and transfers. have been trained in France. In addition, France provides instructors at the Royal Naval Academy in Casablanca, which provides 2 -year courses for both navy and merchant marine officer candidates. Prior to entering this academy, naval officer candidates completed the first year APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 G course at the Royal Military Academy at Meknes. Graduates of the naval academy are commissioned ensigns and then undergo one year of practical training on board a French Navy schoolship. One Moroccan officer has attended the Naval Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.; another attended the U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Va.; and one is a graduate of the Italian Naval Academy at Leghorn. The Moroccan "marine corps' formerly received basic squad -level 'tactical training at Kenitra under the sponsorship of the U.S. Marine Corps but now conducts its own training program at Al Hoceima. 4. Logistics The navy has not developed a logistic supply system of its own but submits its requirements for equipment, supplies, and POL to the appropriate directorate of the General Staff. Storage, issue, and records inventory of small stores and consumables are handled by the naval staff. Most Moroccan navy ships are of French origin. France also provides logistic support, including electronics, gunnery, navigation, and engineering equipment. Minor hull and engine repairs are performed at the Casablanca Naval Base under the supervision of the French Naval Mission, and commercial drydocking and repair facilities at Casblanca are available for navy use. However, major overh..uls and refitting are accomplished at shipyards in France. Fuel and petroleum supplies are procured from commercial sources in Casablanca. E. Air force (S) The mission of the Royal Moroccan Air Force is to provide air defense of the nation, close air support for ground fc:ce operations, airlift of troops and equipment, and surveillance of national borders and sealanes. The air defense capability is negligible; there is no early warning /ground controlled intercept radar, and fighter crews are not skilled in air defense tactics. Close air support capability is limited to engagements of short duration because of shortages of spare parts and ammunition. The air force is capable of airlifting troops and equipment to support ground operations, but this capability would diminish after about 30 days unless outside maintenance assistance and replace- ment parts were received. The force has never parti!ipath -d in counterinsurgency operations, but it is capable of assisting other security forces by performing liaison, reconnaissance, rescue, and evacuation functions and by providing airlift. Future development and capabilities depend largely on the amount and timeliness of materiel and training assistance from foreign sources. Air force planning has been aimed at refining the tactical effectiveness of fighters, improving the airlift capab0it; 11, and acquiring armed h- ticopters and air defense _far. Air force participation in the 1972 coup attempt has lowered its effectiveness drastically, and service morale is probably very poor. 1. Organization The air force was removed from army jurisdiction and established as a separate entity- in 1964, but it still depends on the General Staff for sonic administrative and logistic support. The Commander of the Air Force heads a small headquarters staff comprised of four sections� Operations, Personnel and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Inspection. Directly subordinate to him are the commanders of three operational bases, one training base, and the maintenance and repair depot. Aircraft are organized into four squadrons: two fighter, one transport, and one training. No reorganization has been announced following the attempted coup in August 1972. 2. Strength, composition, and dispositions The personnel strength in January 1972 of 3,100 (165 officers) included 130 pilots, 160 pilot trainees, 165 other aircrew, and the remainder, ground personnel. Only 300 of the total were conscripts. There were no reserve personnel. As a result of the August 1972 coup attempt, over 200 airmen were arrested. They constituted the bulk of the operational fighter force based at Kenitra, and the number of aircrews there dropped from 21 to five. The verdict of their trial was announced 7 November: 11 were sentenced to death, 32 received sentences ranging from 3 to 20 years, and 177 were acquitted. Whether or not those freed will return to active duty is unknown. 'For regularly updated information, see Military Intelligence Summary and Free World Air Order of Battle, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A hrief summary of Moroccan airfields is given in this General Survey under Transportation and Telecommunications. 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 :1irc�r I't in%entor\ `ot,iIs 182 (including 52 gist of the follo\\ing tNpes: Fighter 20 Northrop F -5 Freedom Fighter Figure 5 Reconnaissance 2 Northrop RF -5 Freedom Fighter ransport 11 Fairchild C -119G Packet 10 Douglas C -47 Skytrain Trainer 30 Fouga Magister C:11 -170 8 Nlorane- Saulnier MS -733 (in storage) 52 North American T -6 Texan 16 in storage 21 North American T -28 Utility 11 Broussard 11tH -1521 Helicopter 12 Agusta -Bell 205 3 Daman fill-43B Huskic 2 Sud Aviation Alouette II The 1st Fightcr Squadron at the 3d 11o\ ill :fir Base, Kenitra, is con)priscd of the U.S. -built F -5's, the IIF -5's, and one :113 -205 hchc�opter. The 2d Fighter Squadron at the 2d Ho\al :fir Base, Meknes, consists of T -28 and CM -170 'Trainers, equipped with light n)achineguns and rockets. 'The 1st Transport Squadron at the 1st fioxal :fir Base, Rabat -Sale, consists of C -47's and C- 119G's. The T -6 and CM -170 trainers make up the Training Squadron at the Ho\al :fir Training Base, Marrakech. :\s of januar\ 1972, 138 aircraft were operationall\ assigned. :3. Training The air force is handicapped b\ the lack of an adequate nrtntber of qualified personnel, particul;.trl\ pilots and tecftnical specialists. fe\% air force offic�cn are Sraduatcs of the I3o\al Militan Ac�adctn\, and beginning in 1971 all air force officer candidates are required to complete the first scar academic course at this school prior to altcncling the 13o\al :fir :1c�acletn\ or a foreign school for 2 or 3 \cars. Basic- ln!irting for all coux�ript and culisted personnel is pro\idc�d b\ the arnt\. Spcc�ialist instruction is acquired eilhcr on -lhc- job or in it foreign c�ountn and considerable reliance is placed on utilizing as instructors those pers,ourc�1 \%ho ha\c been trained abroad. F rance and the foiled Stale are the principal sources of Training assistance. F rench .fir Force schools accept about 50 Moroccan trainees annuall\. and appro\imalcl\ 100 French :fir Force perumncl x�n c its advisers and instructors at Moroccan air inslaCations. Over :ill(\ Moroccan pilots and ground c�re\\ personnel ha\c reccked training in the 1'niled State: the V.S. :kir Force maintains it ,mall training mission at Kenitra ill c�onnectictn \ith the F -5's and pro\idcs 1�:119lish language courses at 13abal -Sale and Mar- rakech. :1n Italian :fir Force te:tnt at Rabat -Sale it irbas( pro\i(I es pilot and n tit iutc tit ice instruction for Hie MI -205 helicopters purchased from Ital\ in 1968. Other training ill maintc�ttanc�e is supplied b\ foreign firms whic�ft arc contracted to pro\idc on the -job instruction both in the foreign c�omitr\ and in Morocco. The Koval ;fir :kc�adem\ at `larrakech air base is primarily a pilot training facilit\ for both officer FIGURE 5. Northrop F -5 Freedom Fighters (U /OU) 12 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 r cadets and enlisted personnel, but it also provides courses in aerial photography and in repair of engines, airframes, electrical and hydraulic systems, and radio equipment. All flight instruction is provided by French Air Force officers; ground instruction is given by Moroccans, mostly NCO's, under French guidance and supervision. The aviation cadet program is of 3 years duration, the first of which is spent at the Royal Military Academy at Meknes. The second and third years at Marrakech include further military instruction, flight ground school, ski and mountain familiarization, and elementary and intermediate phases of actual flight training. The elementary phase consists of 98 hours of contact flying, aerobatics, instru: :ants, day navigation, and formation in the T -6 Texan. The intermediate phase is 66 hours of day and night instruction in the T -6 trainer for propeller aircraft pilots and in the Fouga Magister CM -170 for jet pilots. Upon completion of the intermediate phase, cadets are commissioned second lieutenant in the RMAF. The 2 -year pilot training course fcr NCO's is similar to that for cadets, except that the NCO's do not attend the Meknes academy and do not receive leadership training as part of their military instruction. The average class consists of about 15 students (five cadets, 10 NCO's) in each of the two phases of the pilot course, but the attrition rate is nearly �10 and the pilot output averages about 10 a year. The maintenance training courses last for 6 months. Each class of about 70 NCO's is divided into smaller groups according to specialty. The school has 25 well maintained classrooms and another 25 training areas on the base. Training aids are adequate and include a well- equipped language laboratory, which was a gift from the Iranian Government. The quality of the entire training program is fair, but students attain little more than basic flight and technical skills and require additional specialized training in foreign schools. Lack of tactical training reduces the readiness status and operational capabilities of the force. No training is received in weather flying for either ordnance delivery or instrument proficiency. joint exercises with ground forces are rarely conducted, although joint training does include paradropping of equipment and troops. About 2,000 paratroopers have been qualified, and drops of equipment up to 2,400 pounds have been accomplished. 4. Logistics Morocco is completer depende,,, on foreign sources, primarily France and the United States, for aircraft, electronic and communication equipment, armament and ammunition, and all other associated support items. Aircraft procurement was handled at the Ministry of National Defense level before that ministry was .abolished. Procurement of spare parts and material is handled by the materiel and supply section at air force headquarters. With outside ass +stance, the air force has developed a fairly good maintenance capability for prop aircraft and helicopters. jets are flown outside the country for periodic inspection, maintenance, and repair. In- commission rates range from 80% for fighters and transports to 60% for trainer and utility types. The air force operates the Atelier Magasin General (AMG), formerly the French Aeronautical Industrial Workshop, located at Casablanca /An fa Airfiold. This facility is capable of performing major repairs and overhauls of propeller- driven aircraft and related aircraft systems. Maintenance specialists at the AMG appear well qualified. Many have received foreign, training as part of the three -phase program whereby foreign firms are contracted to provide on- the -iob training, both in the foreign country and in Morocco. Sud Aviation of Fran -e provided C -47 maintenance instruction, anild the Belgian firm Sabena is currently instructing RMAF enlisted personnel in the maintenance of C -119 transports. The AMG is also the major supply depot for the air force. It maintains various levels of stock for 28,000 different line items. Both aircraft and vehicle parts are stocked. Two systems of inventory control are used since some spare parts are of French and others are of U.S. origin. Inventory control for French parts is patterned after that of the French Air Force, and USAF practices are used for U.S. produced parts. Weekly RMAF C -119 flights are scheduled from the AMG base for delivery of requested parts to the other bases. The application of computer techniques for programming and control of logistics functions is due to commence in the near future. A small armament storage facility and underground storage for 26,000 gallons of fuel are also located at the AMG. F. Gendarmerie (S) The Royal Gendarmerie, controlled in the past by the Major General of the Royal Armed Forces and coequal to the other military services, is a well- trained and reliable force of 3,500 men. All personnel are volunteers; over one -half of its 150 officers are graduates of the Royal Military Academy, while a good many others have attended French and Belgian gendarmerie schools. Under normal conditions, the gendarmerie is capable of performing its mission or maintaining law and order in rural area, controlling highway traffic, 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 and performing military police functions for the army. Units equipped with jeeps constitute an elite counterinsurgency trained force. In the event of prolonged widespread disorders, the gendarmerie would serve as an initial shock force and be supported by the army and other security forces. The gendermere, in turn, can effectively augment the army in ^ombat operations. as it did during the border conflict wish Algeria in 1963. The gendarmerie is organized into one mobile unit, composed of one armored car squadron and three motorcycle squadrons, stationed at Rabat, plus 19 companies assigned to eight regional commands. Headquarters of these commands are at Agadir, Casablanca, Fes, Kenitra, Marrakech, Meknes, Oujda, and Tangier. Each company has three or four brigades of 10 to 40 men each, depending on the requirements of the area. Brigades are of four types: motorcycle, jeep mounted, dismounted for posts in small rural villages, and special for criminal investigation and intelligence collection. Arms and equipment include pistols, rifles, machineguns, grenades, motorcycles, jeeps, and armored cars. Equipment is maintained in good condition. and is adequate for normal requirements. The gendarmerie training and qualification center, originally established at Fes in 1957 and moved to Meknes in 1965, was relocated at Marrakech in 1967. Admission requirements, both physical and educa- tional, are higher than in the other military services. Selection of applicants is based on competitive examinations which require wr .tten and oral proficiency in Arabic and French, in addition to education equivalent to the second year of high school. About 600 students are enrolled in the 2 -year course. The first year is general military training, conducted by Moroccan personnel; the second is specialized gendarmerie training for assignment to the various detachments, taught by Moroccan and French gendarmerie officers. There are also shorter courses for refresher and postgraduate instruction. G. Paramilitary forces (S) 1. Mobile Maghzen of the Auxiliary Forces The Auxiliary Forces, of which the Mobile Maghzen is a part, have existed as a paramilitary force in Morocco for centuries. (The word maghzen, in fact, is derived from the term used historically to refer to government controlled land.) They were subordinated to the then Ministry of Interior when Morocco became independent in 1956. During times of crisis when the army was engaged in internal or external security operations, the Minister of National Defense assumed operational control of the Auxiliary Forces. 14 At such times, the military zone commanders had direct authority over Maghzen units in their zones, but the Interior Ministry retained administrative control. The Auxiliary Forces consist of three elements: the Administrative Maghzen (11,600 men), the Municipal Guard (3,000 men), and the Mobile Maghzen (6,000 men). The first two groups are auxiliary police and perform such missions as keeping order in public assemblv areas and rural market places, escorting officials, and providing local administrative support. The Mobile Maghzen units have more the character of a military force, though a poor one; principal missions are rapid intervention to quell disorders that exceed the capability of the police, and patrolling and screening key border area. The Mobile Maghzen is organized into 40 company -size units, fully mobile and armed with rifles and automatic weapons. Strength of these units is about officers and 140 enlisted men each. Eight units are kep at Casablanca, grouped administratively under a singe command, as a reserve force. The other 32 units are disposed throughout the country. Except for the companies assigned to Casablanca, which are considered the elite of the entire force, the competence of the Mobile Maghzen is generally low. Personnel are drawn from the rural areas and are educated only poorly, if at all. They are adequate for patrolling the border and for putting do -.m small local disturbances, but for operations beyond this, support from another security force would be required. 2. Mobile Intervention Companies The Mobile Intervention Companies, the mebile reserve of Directorate General of National Security (DGSN), is a paramilitary force under the control of the Ministry of Interior. The missions of the companies are ma.ntenance of public order, provision of security at public functions, and police duty during major disasters. With a total personnel strength of 2,500, they are organized into 10 companies of about 200 men each, plus six motorcycle brigades of about 30 men each attached to selected companies. They are based in the larger urban centers, mainly Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech, and Fes. Weapons include rifles, automatic pistols, and machineguns, all of which are adequate and in good condition. Transport and communications equipment are also adequate. Under normal conditions, the Mobile Intervention Companies are fully capable of performing their missions, within the limits of company strength. Under existing Moroccan internal security procedures, the companies would be called on to suppress disorders in urban areas but not rural areas. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 I Glossary (U/OU) ABBREVIATION FRENCH ENcLIsx AMC Atelir. ifagasin General Aeronautical Industrial Workshop DCSN T:rection Generale de Surete Nationale Directorate General of National Se- curity FAR Forces Armees Royales Royal Armed Forces RG Royal Gendarmerie RMA Royal Moroccan. Army RMAF Royal Moroccan Air Force RMN Royal Moroccan Navy Places and Features Referred to iri !l+Is Chapter (U /OU) COOanI.NATES o o 1E. Adyliget (see of Budapest) 47 33 is 56 3aja 46 11 18 58 Balaton (lake) 46 50 17 45 Balatonfiired 46 57 17 53 Budapest 47 30 19 05 Cegled 47 10 19 48 s Danube (st ream) 45 20 29 40 J 9 I Debrecen 47 32 21 :3S Dunaf oldv ir 46 48 1S 56 Dunakeszi 47 38 19 08 Esztergom 47 48 18 45 Gyiir 47 41 17 38 Keeskemet 46 54 19 42 Kiskunhalas 46 26 19 30 :l lindszent 46 32 20 12 ilfiskole 48 06 20 47 M or 47 23 IS 12 N y iregyhiza 47 57 21 43 Pipa 47 20 17 28 Plovdiv, Bulgaria 42 09 24 45 i Retsig 47 56 19 08 Szekesfehcrvir 47 12 IS 25 Szentendre 47 40 19 05 s Szentes 46 39 20 16 r Szolnok 47 11 20 12 Taszir 46 22 17 55 Tisza (stream) 47 30 20 40 t ijpest 47 34 19 05 Vic 47 47 19 08 Veszprem 47 06 17 55 e Voronezh, U.S.S.R 51 :38 39 12 SELECTED MILITARY AIRFIELDS Budapest /Tokol 47 21 18 59 t Debrecen 47 29 21 37 Kiskunlachaza 47 11 19 05 K un madaras 47 23 20 47 Papa 47 22 17 30 Sarmell ek 46 41 17 10 e SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 5 ec:it t-r 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3