NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 62; MALAGASY REPUBLIC; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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J
Malagasy Republic
August 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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a
Malagasy
Republic
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political cover-
age in the General Survey dated August 1968.
A. Introduction 1
B. Structure and functioning of the government 3
1. Background 3
2. National government 4
a. Executive 4
b. Legislature 5
c. Judiciary 6
3. Provincial and local government 7
4. Civil service 8
C. Political dynamics 8
1. Political forces 8
2. The military 9
SEcpxr No FomcN DissEM
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Page
Page
3. Civilian political factors
10
E. Threats to government stability
25
a. Joint Struggle Committee
11
1. Discontent and dissidence
25
b. Political parties and leaders
13
2. Subversion
27
4. Elections
F. Maintenance of internal security
28
a. October 1972 referendum
%`15
1. Police
28
b. Electoral irregularities under
2. Intelligence
29
i
Tsiranana
20
3. Countersubversion measures and
capabilities
30
p
D. National olicies
Suggestions for further .readm
G. Sh
31
1. Domestic
20
Chronology
32
f
1
2. Foreig -n
22
Glossary
33.
a
a
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 Dead'i,and wounded demonswators
Fig. 6 Political gatherings (photos)
12
photos)
2
Fig. 7 Student rioters photo)
13
Fig. 2 Gendarmes talking to demonstrators
Fig. 8 Civilian political fig,rP (photos)
15
(photo)
3
Fig. 9 Merina refugees near Tamatave
Fig. 3 Structure of government (chart)
4
(photo)
Fig. 4 Ministry of Interior photo)
5
Fig. 10 Gendarmes patrolling Tananarive
r
Fig. 5 Military leaders photos)
10
photo)
30
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
Throughout the decade of the 1960's Madagascar
stood in marked contrast to most other newly
independent countries in that its political life was
characterized by continuity and a close, harmonious;
relationship with the former netropole, France.
During the first part of his tenure, which began 2 years
before the country became independent in June 1960,
the patriarchial Phil ;bert Tsiranana was a genuinely
popular and politically adroit le; der. Although he
steadily increased his own power, he permitted an
opposition party and a considerable degree of press
freedom. Me unabashedly favored it continuing role
for France in many facets of Malagasy life, including
the armed forces and security organizations, the
government admi istration, and the educational
system. Private French firms dominated the relatively
small modern sector of the economy, while most
Malagasy remained part of a stagnant traditional
economy.
Insular, proud, and aloof, the Malagasy people had
not always been orderly and uncomplaining in the
face of domination by alien forces, even those
indigenous to the island. "I'he political consolidation of
much of the island in the 18th century by people of
the central plateau was fiercely resisted. Toward the
end of the 19"h century France mounted prolonged
and difficult military operations to subdue the
outlying tribes. Malagasy nationalists were arrested
and imprisoned d .ring World War I, and in 1947 an
uprising in widely separate parts of the island was
quelled only after considerable bloodshed and
prolonged military countermeasures.
'Toward the end of his rule, the ailing and
increasingly erratic President Tsiranana held the
Malagasy Republic on its pro- French course even
though signs of profound dissatisfaction mounted. As
his political skill waned, he., relied more and more on
repressive measures. A budgetary crisis in 1969 made
austerity measures necessary, and anti Tsiranana
leaflets appeared in the capital. In April 1971 peasants
in one of the most impoverished, neglected parts of the
country attacked government posts with primitive
weapons and were ruthlessly suppressed.
The character and policies of the government
changod with lightning swiftness in May 1972.
Tsiranana's ineptitude had porinitted a student stri.'ce
to escalate into a violent confrontation with riot police
on 13 Nlay. bate on the evening of 12 May, security
forces raided the University of Madagascar and
arrested :37:5 students, who were in nediately flown
out of the capital. By the morning of 13 May, enraged
parents and studcnts were on the sheets After a
violent confrontation with tire Republican Security
Force (FRS) which resulted in over -10 deaths and
numerous injuries (Figure I 'Tsiranana made an
incoherent speech on national television in which he
threatened to kill as many thousands of people as
necessary to restore order. Workers and other
inhabitants of the capital hacked tile. students with u
massive strike which was tolerated by the army and
gendarrncric, who openly sympathized with the self
disciplined strikers (Figure 2).
France's announcement on 17 May that its troops,
stationed on the island corder a defense accord, would
not intervene appears to nave removed the final
obstacle to the strikers' demand that the army oust
'Iiranana and assume power temporarily on It
caretaker basis. Instead, Mai. Gen. Gabriel
Ramanantsaa, a respected career soldier who had
remained aloof from politics, worked out a
compromise which permitted "Tsiranana to remain as a
figurehead. At first, Ramzcnantsoa ruled at the
sufferance of the temporary alliance of students,
teachers, workers, and unemployed who had made
Ts ;rinana's rule untenable. Ramanantsaa had
skillfully dissuaded the demonstrators from again
taking to the streets and ki October won popular
approval in a referendum to rule for 5 without a
parliament. The Office of the Presidency ceased to
exist, vrid "Tsiranana retired to the sidelines.
Ramanantsoa and his military colleagues have been
providing the country with an austere and honest
administration and have begun to reverse unpopular
domestic and foreign policies long pursued by the
Tsiranana government, but have had difficult\ coping
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r.o
Demonstrators fleeing after being fired on by Republican Security
Force. Overturned vehicle is at top right.
FIGURE 1. Tananarive demonstrators, 13 May 1972 (U /OU)
With the country's economic problems. The sporadic
labor troubles and the unruly behavior by secondar
and universih students which began during the spring
of 1972 continued throughout much of the following
year, Ramanantsoa has not been able to revive the
ailing economy he inherited, Iargely because political
uncertainty discouraged some merchants from
importing goods to restock their shelves and prompted
other businessmen to send money out of the countrv.
Meat and other foods are more expensive than during
most of the 'I'siranana era. Althotigh normally able to
feed itself, the Malagasy Republic had to import rice
in the winter of 1972/73, and labor slowdowns at the
largest port, "I'amatave, contributed to short supply in
many towns. Also, the political decision to cut hack
Madagascar's extensive ties with France could have
severe repercussions because the Malagasy cconomv
has been so closely tied to die former metropole.
Another factor in the overall lackluster performance
of the Ramanantsoa government has been its
difficulty in placating the country's mutually
suspicious and hostile ethnic elements: the better
educated, more nationalistic Merina of the highlands;
and the more numerous coastal (cotier) tribesmen,
wht-Jear their former Mcrina rulers. Generally, the
policies favored by the Merina are opposed by the
coastal tribesmen and vice versa. Ramanantsoa
himself is of aristocratic Merina lineage, but he has
2
opposed the extreme Mcrina demands for un
immediate and sweeping overhaul of the educational
system, for evacuatioi by the French of their naval
base at Diego- Sijarez, and for un end to all I-rench
assistance in military, economic, and educational
affairs.
The gover,inienl has had to back down from the
limited educational changes which it took at Merina
urging, as colier student protests set off extensive
rioting in 1'antatave in December 1972. 'flies
disorders also appear to have been rooted in the
coastal tribesmen's distrust of the Ramanantsoa
government, partly hM.use dic political changeover
the preceding May had resulted in the replacement of
coliers and 1 -rench in the gove; by Merina.
Even though these personnel changes largely reflected
the generally better educational and technical
qualifications of the Merina rather than favoritism im
Rarnanantsoa's part, the ivierina character of the
regime has made it difficult to win the confidcncc of
the coastal population. In l-ebruary 197 rioting
erupted in several cities and towns in northern
Madagascar, this time in protest partly over
educational issues and partly over the possible closing
'For diacritics on place w n es. see the list of Dames on the apron
of the Solloway N1.11) in the (:ountrn� Profile chapter and the map
itself.
.A
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Carrying a fallen comrade

of the hale at Diego Suarez. Closing the base would
%vorsen the already had economicsittntion in this city,
and in the final nalysis the coastal tribesmen would
prefer to have French military and civilian advisers in
the government rather than the hated Merina.
In December 1972 the government replied to
disorders with a minimum of force, hilt it dealt more
sternly with the February 1973 incidents. It changed
the law to provide: for easier detention of suspected
agitators, and made the ptinisunent for incitin5' it riot
death. Some -10 persons %were detained in connection
with the February rioting, among them several
prominent members of Tsiranana's part. 'I'll(-
government publicly accused some of the French in
Madagascar with fomenting intertribal rioting.
For all its good intentions, the Rarnanantsoa
government lacks the enthusiastic support of either the
Merina or the coastal people and faces the prospect
that either the radical Merina of the capital or coastal
tribesmen, egged on by old -line politicians, might
spark new disorders on it scale requiring it massive use
of force in suppression. The efficient, disciplined
genclarmerie and avvy could cope with .111y such
rioting, but Ramanantsoa and most of his military
colleagues probably have little stomach for ruling all
openly hostile populace at gunpoint.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U /OU)
1. Background
By the end of World War 11, varions Malagasy
nationalist leaders were demanding that Madagascar
become an autonomous state within the French
Union. I'aris rejccled thcsc dct::.uuls but agrcixl to
extend French alizcnship to all Malagas\ people and
to permit than to elect represenlalivcs to the French
I'arliatncnt and to consultative bodios on Madagascar.
Separate censlilucncics were maintained for the
French and the Malagasy, however, and the franchise
continued to be extremely restricte fot the latter. The
1956 -57 reforms abolished scparalc French and
Malagasy constitacuci.!s and established universal
adult suffrage. In the referendum of 28 September
1958, Madagascar opted to approve the French
constitution and to become au autonomous metubcr
of the new French Community.
While herding the autununtots government in
1959, Philibert t'siranana pushed through a
constitution that provided for it strong presidency,
even though some other Nlalaga.y politicians strongly
preferred the supremacy of parliantc::t. 'I'll(! 19:39
constitution was modified in 1960, 1962, and 1969,
with the general result that the President's powers \\cre
even further strengthened relative to parliament.
By 1972 many politically conscious
believed that the powers of the 1'resident were
excessive and that 'I'siranana had overstepped Iris
authority by haying regime opponents and critics
arreste and imprisoned in violation of constitutional
rights. Two of the most vigorous demands of the flay
1972 den-jonstrators were for the restoration of
individual liberties and the prompt establishment of a
genuinely representative parliamentary s\Aem of
government.
For his part General Rantananl has paid close
attention to legality. Shortly afte. caking control in
May he published an ordinance that cited the
constitution as one of the governments sources of
authority and specified, in brief, that ('resident
Tsiranana vested in General 11amanantsoa all
governmental authority as I lead of Government. On 8
October 1972 it popular referendum gave overwhelm-
ing approval to it constitttional law that provides the
basis for Ramanantsoa's government. This referendum
asked voter approval for it la%y providing for a 5-year
tenure for General Ramanantsoa, during which time
he is to reshape the country's institutions according. to
a statement of principles including the sep aration of
executive, legislative, .nd judicial powers, the
supremacy of the electorate, guarantees of fundammll-
tal liberties, and wider authority for local government
holies. The referendum also asked voter approval for it
statement of national; goals made by General
Ramanantsoa in August 1972 and declared that all
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FIGURE 2. Gendarmes talking with demonstrators. Mu-
tual sympathy existed between the gendarmes and the
demonstrators. (U/OU)

purls of the 1959 conslilcllion as ;unen(Icd wullld
ry Ina in Valid unless superseded Iy the constilutinilaI
lacy.
The Oc�ttIwr 1972 c�tIstitIitinl;,lI la set ford( the
n:ltional uistilutions for the transitiona! 5 -\ear period
of lianiananlsoa nl :uula:e. 'these (lire(- institutions
consist of the governnwiit: the Iligh (:tIlncil of
I list it III ion�., a legislative reyiv%, bo( Iy: :olcl ti
National flop! 11,r I)(�y(�Joprn(�IIt ouncil, I pure(%
advisory body. :\u ordinance of 3(i Deceniber 1972
c�onferwd on the I[ead of Coyernnn�nl all the clutit�s�
powers. and prerog; tives accorded the President by
the Conslitttion of 1959. This orrli -anew is to winain in
effect until a new cons[ itIQ;ou is ad:yted by the
peoltle :Intl ne%y public institutions are established.
igurt ;3 shm\s the various organs of goyenlinenl as of
early 1973.
2. National governinenl
u. h'xc�culive
The October IS);2 constiI tit jonal la%t acc�or& Maj.
Cen. Gabriel liainanantsoa bal powers for 5 years as
Ilvad of Coyerninvia. The law also provides tllat tit(.
Ilead of Coyerninent Ina\ designate it person to take
his place in case of empecheinctil (a french Ivriu
which appears ill this context to uic :ul disabilih.)
before the end of the 5-year period of (enure. The lay\
further says that this %%ill be the subji�c�I
of prior ill cluir k the IIigII (:ounciI of IllstiIkItioIIs.
Mal. Gen. Gabriel Romanantsaa
Head of Government
Subprefectures 91 Sub prefect P Subprefect Courts
Nam:-.d in 1972 Constitutional Referendum
FIGURE 3. Structure of government, 197 U /OU)
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High
Supreme Court
Council
of
Institutions
Court of Cossation 0
Administrative Chambers
Chamber of Accounts
National Popular
Council of
Development Council
Ministers
Court of Appeal
Provinces 6
Chief of Province
Criminal Courts
Courts of First Instance
Section Tribunals
Prefectures 17
Prefect
Subprefectures 91 Sub prefect P Subprefect Courts
Nam:-.d in 1972 Constitutional Referendum
FIGURE 3. Structure of government, 197 U /OU)
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These vagnely worded provisions appear to he a
partial solution to the problem of succession in the
event Ramanantsoa is unalile to carry out his
functions as I -lead of Government.
The executive consists of the Head of Government
and the Council of Ministers, which in early 1973
consisted of the following portfolios: Agriculture;
National Education and Cultural Affairs; Develop-
ment of the 'Territory; Finance and Economy; Foreign
Affairs; Information; Interior; Justice; Labor and
Civil Service; National Defense and Armed Forces;
Planning; and Social Affairs.'
The government tightened up the executive in
various ways. The new Council of Ministers was one
third the sire of its Predecessor, and the top
professional staff of each ministry was reduced. The
organization and responsibilities of each ministry wc,e
summarized in decrees published in the Official
Journal and inspection and fiscal accountability
procedures were strengthened. Salaries of government
officials were reduced, from it 25% cut for top officials
to a token 1% for persons at the bottom of the
professional ladder, and economics were made by
reducing the number of official autos. Some foreign
advisers were replaced by Malagasy.
1'he Rnmanantsoa government resembled its
predecessor in at least one respect, however, in that the
Interior Ministry (Figure 4) continued to have
extremely broad responsibilities, including some which
would appear to fit more logici under other
ministries. In addition to the more usual respon-
sibilities for provincial and local government and for
internal security, the Ministry of Interior was also
responsible for "grassroots programs. These wide
ranging programs were begun in the Carly 1960 when
the Interior Ministry was headed by the energetic and
Politically adept Andre Resampa. In 1972 "grassroots"
programs included such diverse activities its
maintaining livestock immunization facilities,
beehives, village drinking water supplies, tree
nurseries, reforestation projects, irrigation facilities,
roads, and ferries.
The High Council of Institutions (CSI), a legislative
review holy established by the 1959 constitution, was
administratively part of the presidenc�v under
Tsiranana and has been continued with functions and
personnel intact by the Ramiinantsoa government.
The CSI consists of five persons named for
nonrenewable 7 -year terms. The terms of all present
2 For a current list of key government officials consult Chiefs r,(
State and Cabinet ,Members of Foreign Governments. puhlished
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Central Intelligence
Agency.
FIGURE 4. Ministry of Interior building (U /OU)
r
CSI members expire in 1974. Al least three of the five
members are selected on the basis of legal compete tee.
The CSI is responsible for reviewing all legislation to
insure that it is compatible with the constitution, for
supervising the conduct of referendums, and �prior to
1972 �for monitoring Presidential and legislative
elections. lu this latter capacity the CSI disqualified
an entire provincial slate of opposition National
Assembly candidates in 1965 because one of the
candidates did not pay his poll tax. During the
campaign for the October 1972 referendum, however,
Andre Resampa commented that his own arrest as well
as the imprisonment of hundreds of other persons by
Tsiranana had been contrary to the safeguards of the
constitution and that the CSI had not served in these
instances as it safeguard for constitutional rights.
b. Legislature
Until 1972, parliament consisted of it National
Assembly with 107 members and a Senate with 54.
Members of the National Assembly were popularly
elected for 5 -year terms. Two- thirds of the Senators
were elected fol -year terms by provincial, municipal,
and rural authorities, and one -third were selected by
the President to represe chambers of commerce,
labor unions, cultural organizations, and such. The
constitution provided that parliament meet semian-
nually and that its principal business be consideration
of the annual budget.
Although in practice parliaments Powers were
increasingly overshadowed by those of President
Tsiranana, the constitution declared that parliament
was the major arbiter of such matters as civil rights.
national defense, organization of the judiciary, labor.
education, and the organization of elections. The
constitution also gave the Senate Powers to delay
legislation. The newly elected Sen,& took this
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CSI members expire in 1974. Al least three of the five
members are selected on the basis of legal compete tee.
The CSI is responsible for reviewing all legislation to
insure that it is compatible with the constitution, for
supervising the conduct of referendums, and �prior to
1972 �for monitoring Presidential and legislative
elections. lu this latter capacity the CSI disqualified
an entire provincial slate of opposition National
Assembly candidates in 1965 because one of the
candidates did not pay his poll tax. During the
campaign for the October 1972 referendum, however,
Andre Resampa commented that his own arrest as well
as the imprisonment of hundreds of other persons by
Tsiranana had been contrary to the safeguards of the
constitution and that the CSI had not served in these
instances as it safeguard for constitutional rights.
b. Legislature
Until 1972, parliament consisted of it National
Assembly with 107 members and a Senate with 54.
Members of the National Assembly were popularly
elected for 5 -year terms. Two- thirds of the Senators
were elected fol -year terms by provincial, municipal,
and rural authorities, and one -third were selected by
the President to represe chambers of commerce,
labor unions, cultural organizations, and such. The
constitution provided that parliament meet semian-
nually and that its principal business be consideration
of the annual budget.
Although in practice parliaments Powers were
increasingly overshadowed by those of President
Tsiranana, the constitution declared that parliament
was the major arbiter of such matters as civil rights.
national defense, organization of the judiciary, labor.
education, and the organization of elections. The
constitution also gave the Senate Powers to delay
legislation. The newly elected Sen,& took this
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M
deliberative rule seriously, but in 1961 Tsiranana
rammed through a constitutional amendment which
made it powerless.
The National Assembly played it limited role.
Almost all scats were held by Tsiranana's Social
Democratic Party (PSD), and it large part of the
opposition was left without any legislative voice. `Had
the National Assembly been selected by it more
equitable system, the PSD would probably still have`'
received more than a simple majority but several
smaller cotier parties and the Merina -based Congress
Party for the Independence of Madagascar (AKFNt)
would together have won a considerable number of
seats. As it turned out, the Marxist AKFM was the
only opposition party reprevs atc in the National
Assembly, and the large PSI) delegation rarely differed
with Tsira' ...na.
In June 1972 Ramanaut. oa issued c decree
suspending the constitutional provision that
parliament meet semiannually. The October 1972
constitutional law further provided that the
Ramanantsoa government was to legislate by
ordinance during its -year tenure. The law made no
mention of parliament but provided for it National
Popular Development Council (CNPD), a consulta-
tive body.
During the referendum campaign Tsiranana
deplored the proposal for 5 years of military rule
without an elected parliament, but the referendum
was approved by an overwhelming majority. The
main issue of the referendum was the choice between
Tsiranana and Ramanantsoa, but the results appear
also to reflect it lack of popular regard for the former
parliament.
The government's plans for the CNPD, were set
forth in a decree in March 1973. The council's
competence includes responding. to requests by the
government for advice on particular social and
economic questions and making policy proposals on its
own initiative. The council's tenure is the duration of
the period General Ramanantsoa has authority to rule
by decree, or in other words no later than the autumn
of 1977.
The election of councilors is to be based on the new
local government units, due to be established in
September 1973. The CNPD will consist of 162
councilors, 144 of wh,6m will be elected and the other
18 nominated by the government. Ninety -two seats
out of the elected 162 will be reserved for the rural
constituencies. Although this does not assure fully
proportional representation for the rural population, it
does guarantee that there will be a solid rural bloc
which can be expected to .take a generally more
0
h
co \ervative view of proposal economic and social
changes than the representatives of urban centers and
the technocrats who will probably constitute the
government's appointees to the CNPD. Councilors
will not be it salary for their services but will draw
the equivalent of about USSR per diem.
c. Judiciary
Although the 1959 constitution guaranteed the
independence of the judiciary, it did not define 0lier
the framework of the judici�a systen or the specific
guidelines under which the courts should operate. The
judicial system is patterned on that of France. The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in certain
nutters and consists of three parts: the Court of
Cassation, the Administrative Chamber, and the
Chamber of Accounts. When it lower court Kati made a
serious mistake in law the Court of Cassation Islay
annul the sentence brt cannot modify it. Individuals
and civil servants may bring action against the
government in the Administrative Chamber. 'I'll(-
Chamber of accounts annually examines all public
expenditures to insure that they have been properly'
made.
Below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeal,
which reviews decisions of lower courts in both
criminal and civil cases. At the next lower level are
criminal courts, dealing with crimes punishable by
more than M years' imprisonncul. Lesser criminal
cases are heard by Courts of First Inaance, which are
similar to American grand juries but also have
jurisdiction over certain civil cases, land registration,
and labor disputes. Each Court of First lostancc
consists of an examining magi trite (juge d *inslruc-,
lion), \\-Ito may eiN,cr dismiss charges against a person
or send him to trial, a prosecuting attorney
(procureur), and it president. Thee is it Court of First
Instance in each of the six provinces.
Lower still are 25 section tribunals, found in the
chief towns of each province. Section tribunals are
organized like the Courts of First instance and dispose
of cases either by dismissing them, by disposing of
them if they are uncomplicated, or by passing them up
to the Court of First Instance if they are deemed
sufficiently serious to require it hearing. At the lowest
level are subprefect courts, which handle criminal
cases punishable by fines of about USS90 or it nionth's
imprisonment. Subprefects do not ordinarily have
legal training.
The M:lagasy people hay( had long experience
with it formal Iegal system. In the early 1800's the
Merina monar lis began bringing together existing
customs and usages in the royal chronicles. The Code
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M
deliberative rule seriously, but in 1961 Tsiranana
rammed through a constitutional amendment which
made it powerless.
The National Assembly played it limited role.
Almost all scats were held by Tsiranana's Social
Democratic Party (PSD), and it large part of the
opposition was left without any legislative voice. `Had
the National Assembly been selected by it more
equitable system, the PSD would probably still have`'
received more than a simple majority but several
smaller cotier parties and the Merina -based Congress
Party for the Independence of Madagascar (AKFNt)
would together have won a considerable number of
seats. As it turned out, the Marxist AKFM was the
only opposition party reprevs atc in the National
Assembly, and the large PSI) delegation rarely differed
with Tsira' ...na.
In June 1972 Ramanaut. oa issued c decree
suspending the constitutional provision that
parliament meet semiannually. The October 1972
constitutional law further provided that the
Ramanantsoa government was to legislate by
ordinance during its -year tenure. The law made no
mention of parliament but provided for it National
Popular Development Council (CNPD), a consulta-
tive body.
During the referendum campaign Tsiranana
deplored the proposal for 5 years of military rule
without an elected parliament, but the referendum
was approved by an overwhelming majority. The
main issue of the referendum was the choice between
Tsiranana and Ramanantsoa, but the results appear
also to reflect it lack of popular regard for the former
parliament.
The government's plans for the CNPD, were set
forth in a decree in March 1973. The council's
competence includes responding. to requests by the
government for advice on particular social and
economic questions and making policy proposals on its
own initiative. The council's tenure is the duration of
the period General Ramanantsoa has authority to rule
by decree, or in other words no later than the autumn
of 1977.
The election of councilors is to be based on the new
local government units, due to be established in
September 1973. The CNPD will consist of 162
councilors, 144 of wh,6m will be elected and the other
18 nominated by the government. Ninety -two seats
out of the elected 162 will be reserved for the rural
constituencies. Although this does not assure fully
proportional representation for the rural population, it
does guarantee that there will be a solid rural bloc
which can be expected to .take a generally more
0
h
co \ervative view of proposal economic and social
changes than the representatives of urban centers and
the technocrats who will probably constitute the
government's appointees to the CNPD. Councilors
will not be it salary for their services but will draw
the equivalent of about USSR per diem.
c. Judiciary
Although the 1959 constitution guaranteed the
independence of the judiciary, it did not define 0lier
the framework of the judici�a systen or the specific
guidelines under which the courts should operate. The
judicial system is patterned on that of France. The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in certain
nutters and consists of three parts: the Court of
Cassation, the Administrative Chamber, and the
Chamber of Accounts. When it lower court Kati made a
serious mistake in law the Court of Cassation Islay
annul the sentence brt cannot modify it. Individuals
and civil servants may bring action against the
government in the Administrative Chamber. 'I'll(-
Chamber of accounts annually examines all public
expenditures to insure that they have been properly'
made.
Below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeal,
which reviews decisions of lower courts in both
criminal and civil cases. At the next lower level are
criminal courts, dealing with crimes punishable by
more than M years' imprisonncul. Lesser criminal
cases are heard by Courts of First Inaance, which are
similar to American grand juries but also have
jurisdiction over certain civil cases, land registration,
and labor disputes. Each Court of First lostancc
consists of an examining magi trite (juge d *inslruc-,
lion), \\-Ito may eiN,cr dismiss charges against a person
or send him to trial, a prosecuting attorney
(procureur), and it president. Thee is it Court of First
Instance in each of the six provinces.
Lower still are 25 section tribunals, found in the
chief towns of each province. Section tribunals are
organized like the Courts of First instance and dispose
of cases either by dismissing them, by disposing of
them if they are uncomplicated, or by passing them up
to the Court of First Instance if they are deemed
sufficiently serious to require it hearing. At the lowest
level are subprefect courts, which handle criminal
cases punishable by fines of about USS90 or it nionth's
imprisonment. Subprefects do not ordinarily have
legal training.
The M:lagasy people hay( had long experience
with it formal Iegal system. In the early 1800's the
Merina monar lis began bringing together existing
customs and usages in the royal chronicles. The Code
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M
of 305 Articles of M. ay 1881 classified the principles of
law, arranged them in order, and published then".
This code provided that established c of the
diverse people= 'raled by Mcrina monarchs had the
same force us written law. The several Mcrina law
codes reflected the influence of continental Europe,
but the Mcrina were also inflaeaced by Anglo Saxon
jurisprudence, and especially the important contribu-
tion of judicial decisions to the development of the
law.
French courts were established it 189(i, and for most
of the colonial period there was it dual system.
Frenchmen aril certain educated Malagas were
judged in French tribunals under French law, but the
great majority of Malagasy were judged in native
courts under Mcrina law. In 1919 native courts b
to apply French law in cases where Malagasy law was
insufficient.
A vast judicial reform begun in the early 1960's was
still underway in 1973. Accomplishments to that point
included the promulgation of three new codes �a
criminal code, a criminal procedures code, ;utd a civil
procedures code. A civil ccde was still in process, based
on an extensive and systematic inquiry into Malagasy
customs. A linguistic commission was also at work
preparing it compendium of legal terms in the
Malagasy language.
3. Provincial and local government
At different times in their history the Malagasy have
developed nearly autonomous mechanisms of local
government, particularly at the village and tribal
level. During the 'Tsiranana era, however, the central
government steadily increased its power at the expense
of local and regional authorities.
The powers allowed the provincial and local
government authorities by the 1959 constitution were
extremely limited. Each of the provinces had an
elected general council that functioned its i t provincial
assembly but had few significant powers. These
legislative assemblies had theoretical competence to
make decisions regarding primary education, health
and welfare programs, and public works, but in fact
the v had little or no control over the funds necessary to
finance even these basic social services. The role of the
general councils was further diminished by the fact
that all National Assemhly deputies and senators were
automatically members of their respective provincial
assemblies and were generally quite susceptible to
pressures from the central authority.
During the 1960'x, Interior Minister Andre Resampa
developed a system of cooperatives for economic
development and produce marketing which paralleled
and tended to donninate local govenune units. The
central government controlled the funds of these
cooperatives and thus tightly dominated thorn.
The lianauantsoa govern=ment replaced the six
civilian provincial executiv -s with military officem,
Who ill ".lost cases had already been serving in tide
provinces and simply combined their military and
their new civilian roles. During the first year after they
assunwd their ditties as provincial executives, the
perfornnance of these officers in their civilian jobs was
better than that of the provincial executives they
supplanted. Each traveled extensively over his
province and appeared well versed on the province's
econcnny.
The October 1972 constitutional law pledges the
government to provide the Malagasy people with a
revamped system of local government suited to their
needs and traditions. In March 197:3 it decree
described the new plans for local government units
which are to he established beginning with the
lowest level �over it period y
f about a ear. It the
interim, parts of the old and new structure will exist
ride by side.
In 197:3 the older units of government consisted of
17 prefectures subdivided into 91 subprcft :vtur:
Below these were 36 urban communes, -iih a
considerable degree of authority, and in rural area:;
either rural communes orcantons, together numbering
se veral hundred and having lesser authority.
The rural govenament units, the communes and
cantons, have sometimes been ineffectual and corrlpt.
In 'T and it few of the larger cities, ill
contrast, opponen.s of 'Tsiranana were strong enough
to elect it majority or a sizable minority of the council,
and the presence of articulate opposition members
tended to improve the efficiency and representative
character of these urban communes.
The Ramanantsoa government bases its plait for the
new government units below the provincial
government level on the fokonolona. Rooted in
Malagasy history, the fokonolona had emerged as a
loose system of local government comprising all the
elders of it village. The fokonolona varied rrorn region
to region, but most had headnien, who weic usually
assisted by it council of elders. At different times
powerful Mcrina rulers or colonial governors had tried
to manipulate or control the fokonolona but had never
succeeded in fully dominating this traditional
governing mechanism, largely because it is closely tied
to the Malagasy people's strong religious attachment
to, and worship of, common ancestors. Tsiranana
attempted to supplant the fokonolona or to absorb it
in modern government=al units, but at the end of his
N
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tenure it continued to exist throughout the island in a
diminished or modified form.
According to an ordinance of March 1973 the new
fokonolona is the basic community unit, which is
authentically Malagasy and thus suited to the
country. The fokonolona gathers together -!'l the
people of a fokontany, or area, which might consist of
a vilage or group of villages. Several weighl-oring
fokonolona are to be grouped into firaisampokona-
Iona, which are to supplant the existing rural
communes or cantons by the autumn of 1973. An
official of the Ministry of Interior :s to work closely
with the firaisarnpokonolona. Higher administrative
units, called fioondronampokonolona and faritany,
are planned to be established in late 1973 and early
1914, respectively.
4. Civil service
The Malagasy Republic has it modern civil service
system, including tables of organization, personnel
grades, and uniform salaries and benefits. There are
competitive examinations for appointment and a
rating system for advancement. In October 1972 the
Ramanantsoa governmen. moved to revamp the civil
service by requiring all civil servants to retire at age 55.
This had been the retirement age previously, but civil
servants with minor children had been allowed to stay
on. It would appear that many of the persons being
forced to retire got their jobs in the years just after
independence, when a large -scale replacement of
French with Malagasy took place. Some of these
individuals were probably less qualified than recent
university graduates who have been unable to find
government jobs.
One widespread problem affecting the operation of
the entire governmental apparatus is the attitude of
the civil servants and the political elite, who consider
themselves superior to the rank and file of the
population. The civil servants expect to receive above
average wages with numerous fringe benefits, but for
the most part they have no compulsion to work hard.
Rather, they are interested in comfortable posts,
mainly in Tananarive, where they can enjoy their
privileged positions.
The division of the society between the Merina and
the coastal population is also a serious impediment to
the effectiveness of the civil service. Because only a
limited number of cotiers are sufficiently trained to fill
the higher level positions, the bulk of the government
employees are still Merina.
8
C. Political dynamics
1. Political forces (iii/0U)
I
i
Of the factors which shape Malagasy politics, the
dominant one is clearly the longstanding antagonism
and distrust between the Merina, the largest single
ethnic minority, and the various coastal peoples who
together comprise over two- thirds of the population.
With the replacement of Tsiranana by Ramanantsoa
in the spring of 1972, the political leadership of the
coiintry changed from predominantly cotier to
predominantly Merina. Despite their differing bases of
support, both Tsiranana and Ramanantsoa have tried
to alleviate ethnically based fears and antagonisms.
Indeed, the gradualness with which Ramanantsoa
moved Tsiranana off the political stage and his
insistence that Tsiranana be treated with respect were
prompted by his desire to reassure the coli
The division of the Malagasy into two primary
sectors dates back to the latter part of the 18t1l
century, when an unusually strong Merina king began'
systematic raids against neighboring tribes in order to
extend his plateau kingdom to the sea. Subsequent
Merina rulers continued to expand their empire,
subjugating roughly two thirds of the island';
population before the French conquered Madagascar
All 1895. During the peak of their military prowess, the
Merina gained significant cultural and economic
advantages through their early exposure to modern
education, Christianity, and new forms of trade and
commerce. 'These advantages holstered the privileged
position the Merina had carved out for themselves and
tended to solidify the sharp distinctions between the
rulers and the ruled.
Competition between British and French colonizers
also played an important role in the crystallization of
the Merina and coastal communities that now form
the principal political bases in the country. The
British, who arrived before the French, looked upon
the Merina political dominance as an acceptable
mechanism of control over the island, and accordingl\'
provided the ruling group with military training and
exclusive opportunities for trade and commerce.
Protestant missionaries, who were among the early
British arrivals, proselytized actively among the
Merina but deliberately ignored the coastal tribes.
Likewise, the British missionaries provided modern
schools and education for the Merina alone. In
contrast to the important advances of the Merina, the
coastal peoples did not have much contact with
external influences until the arrival in the mid- 1SOO's
of a small group of French jesuii missionaries. These
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a:
>E
L
r
_,75
French missionaries w6rked principally among the
cotiers, but they di.f not provide the saner educational
and economic advantages that the British had brought
to the Merina. '['hits the differentiation between the
hvo communities grew steadily, and even with the
advent of direct French political control in 1895, the
coastal tribes, although,, comprising a majority of the
people, remained essentia!ly subordinate to the�
Merina minority.
The cotiers did not ac quire political control until
shortly before independence. Convinced that the
Merina had instigated the bloody 1947 insurrection,
the French decided to give their support to the cotiers,
and this, coupled with national elections based ()It universal suffrage, provided the.latter with their
eagerly sought opportunity to take over the runs of
government. Once in control, the cotier leaders under
President Tsiranana took it number of steps aimed at
insuring their permanent possessi6'k. of power,
including manipulation of the electoral system.
More Westernized and better educated, the I zrina
had a higher proportion of persons qualified to fill
government jobs, but if no suitable cotier was
available, the "Tsiranana regime often preferred
Frenchmen to Merina. Ratnanantsoa's shakeup of the
government has resulted in the departure of a number
of cotiers and French and their replacement to a large
extent by Merina. Ramanantsoa has attempted to
strike a tribal balance within the government, and
cotier ministers outnumber Merina, but the key
ministries �with the exception of the Foreign Affairs
Ministry �are held by Merina, and most of the
general's personal advisers are Merina. Although these
changes have probably been made primarily on the
basis of competence, the addition of Merina to the
government machinery has aroused cotier fears and
suspicions.
Merina and cotiers themselves, however, are far
from unified. The Merina among the leaders of the
present government, for example, tend to be conscious
of class and caste differences that are rooted in the
past. Some officers are from aristocratic families,
others of peasant background, and still others of
intermediate status. Furthermore, the ivlalagasy
intelligentsia consists mostly of urbanized, West-
ernized Merina who have little in common with
today's Merina peasants. Among the cotiers, primary
loyalty is to family, clan, and tribe, and generally poor
transportation and communications facilities and the
unevenness of economic development have fostered u
Fense of regional particularism.
Y
2. The military (C)
The leaders of the Malagasy armed forces are
predominantly Merina and until May 1 972 had
concerned themselves primarily with their jobs and
kept aloof from politics. As was the case in Malagasy
society as a whole, the military who were of Merina
background tended to be better educated and more
Westernized than the coastal peoples and predomin-
ated in the upper military ranks. The Merina
aristocracy had it military tradition, and Merina
tended to volunteer for the French forces. When the
Malagasy Army was formed at independence, it had a
cadre if personnel who had proved themselves in the
French Array, and the close cooperation envisaged by
the Malagasy- French ace srds provided opportunities
for Malagasy officers to increase their military skills
and to maintain high professional standards.
Tsiranana. aware of the political potential of the
army, established several security organizations and
balanced ecch against the other. He formed new
organizations led and manned predominantly by
cotiers and gave the lions share of the security budget
each year to these rivals of the armed forces. These
security organizations �the gendarmerie and the no%y
discredited Republican Security Force� together were
larger than the army and were better equipped.
The armed forces all(] gendarmerie had French
advisers in key positions, and 'Tsiranana relied on these
officers to keep an eye on the organizations they were
attached to and to report any political activity
n to him
via 1i n
s top French military advisers. Tsiraaa also
probably felt that the security forces would be deterred
From assuming it political role by the possibility that
the regular French contingent, consisting of about
2,000 troops, would come to his aid in the event of it
challenge to his rule.
General Rananantsoa h.:s brought tl,e armed forces
and internal security organizations under his close
control. Potential differences within the officer corps
between those of Merina and those of cotier
background may be offset by professionalism,
discipline, and the increased prestige and importance
of the corps. A precedent for cooperation was
established during the May 1972 disorders when both
the cotier -led gendarmerie and the predominantly
Merina army officers refused to order strong action
against demonstrators.
General Ramanantso;a and his top colleagues
(Figure 5) appear to have assumed their political roles
pretty much as a civic duty. Nonetheless, they have
quickly become accustomed to the deference shown
political figures and the sense of importance and
9
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i
I
s
Minister of Interior Richard Ratsimandrava (C)
7
stimulation in those nc\y roles. Newspaper photos of
General Ramanantsoa in the early sununer show him
to he stiff and unsmiling, hile during; the Oct�tber
referendum cani f sign he had the broad smile and
expansive gestures of the political campaigner. Didier
Ratsiraka, formerly it deskbound lieutenant conr-
nrander in it navy with little operational capability,
has unexpectedly be�conuc Foreign Affairs Minister.
During his first year in this pre stigious office he has
visited several African capitals as wdl as vloscow.
Peking. Pyongyang. Bucharest, and Paris. Ile has nret
several times with top French Government officials�
oil occasion treating them tactlessly and disdainfully.
f Itatsiraka makes the headlines in the Nlalagiu :y press
and
draws good crowds upon his arrivals and
departures from Nladagasc�ar.
3. Civilian political factors (C)
When "1'sircurana began his tenure in 1958. his
Social Democratic Party was the leading party, and it
Foreign Affairs Minister Didier Ratsiraka (1.1/01.1)
bermc even more powerful after independence in
1960. Opposition parties were able to will few elective
FIGURE 5. The military leaders offices, and from the late 1960's on the were subject
to stern, repressive measures. Students, workers, and
intellectuals alsp tended to he disorganized and easily
intimidated by government pressure.. Arbitrary arrests
of opponents characterized the later years of the
'I'siranana regirne and added to popular discontent.
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At& 'l 1
Gen. Gabriel Ramannntsoo, Head of Government (C)

The governntcnt's harsh repression of the Nlay 1972
student demonstrations shocl.ecl the disparate
Opposition groups into It least temporar cohesion and
militancy, With the evvntual result being the ouster of
Tsiranana and his followers front power by the army
(Figure ti).
a. Joinl Struggle Cornmiticc
After the sudden call 1psc of the 'Tsiranana regime,
parliament and most old -line politicians were
discredited, and the rest were still in prison. The
resulting political vacuum was filled by an
impromptu, loosely structured organization called the
joint Struggle Committee (KINI). Macle up of
students, teachers, blue and white collar workers, and
the urban unemployed, it aspired to reform all aspects
of Malagasy life. In the political discussions which
took place in 'Tananarive .,:ul to a lesser extent in other
cities in the ensuing months, the workers' component
of KIM aired grievances and considered pulitical
action to further the workers' interests. The workers
were militant, radical, and anxious for a further test of
strength with the government.
l'onthfnl unemployed persons from the slums of
Tananarive also took part in the May demonstrations
and, like the workers, continued to hold political
meetings and bectLtne a distinctive part of the KIM
organization. The unemployed young persons referred
to their component of KIM as %OANI, an acronym
derived from the Malagasy words for unennployed
Malagasy youth. The" seminars of the vonthful
unemployed, which took place in other cities as well us
"Tananarive, increased Cie political cot;scionsn, ;s of
the participants. like the other KIM c�onnponents, the
unemployed youth prepared manifestoes, apparently
drafted by worker or student components of KiNf.
which voiced the grievances of the unettployed
slumdwellers. Amon; other things, the youth
maintained that the sorry condition of uneducated,
untrained jobless Persons was part of the neocolonial
French conspiracy to keep all Malagasy in subjection.
Student organizations in the Tsiranana cra had
tended to be adjuncts of political organizations mill to
be ineffectual and easily overawed and neutralized by
the police. A strike of university and secondary
students in 'Tananarive in the spring of 1971 had
limitecl effectiveness, its the stddeWs were cowed by
stern government countermcasnres, including the
arrest of their leaders.
In May 1972, however, the deaths of several of their
fellows steeled the students to effective and unified
action (Figure 7). EAbilarated by their unexpected
success in precipitating the fall of "Tsiranana, the
students engaged in extended seminars as part of
KIM, focusing their demands oil reform of they w1jole
educational syslenn.
Once the tcnnpo of (lcnumstrations began to
accelerate in the spring of 1972, it was clear that they
wo(rlcl nut slop until some alternative to Tsiranana
had been found, and (luring his first weeks iu ,face
General R,tnanantsoa ruled at KIM's sufferance. The
general avoiclecl provoking KIM into sparking
renewed demonstrations, and gradually he undcrcnt
the Militants by promising to adopt rruuty of the
reforms thew were dctttanding. Apparentl be
con,.,idered that KIM was unable to provide any
alternative to his leadership and would exhaust itself
in cleb,tting and nnanifesto writing.
From June to September 1972 KIM members
maintained a strong sense of purpose, even though
their internal deliberations verged on anarc�h\. After
years of intimidation and repression by *he
government, thy students and other KIN", rnembc -s
luxuriated in cnc'.less discussions, ,and the rn
developed that fronn discussions at the lowest Icvel of
KIN7 woulcl come sol"rtions to all of the country's
problems.
I'll(- practice of rotating membership in the KIM
higher committees appears to have been u(loptc(l as it
(lefense against a possible government arrest of the
KIM leadership. 'I'hc students had suffered from
arrests of stucicnt leaders at Tsiranana's hands and
wanted to be on the safe side should the fill Ina rfill rrtsoa
government also take repressive measures against
them. At various KIM meetings over the summer some
participants also tended to adopt a defensive attitude
toward persons associutecl with existing political
organizations, and contended that KIN/1's objectiyc of
reforming Ntalugas\ socks' would best be served by
Chaining aloof from the� discredited preexisting
political parties, labor onions, vncl the like.
KINI's loose structure was topped by tt large
conunittec consisting of representatives of students.
workers, teachers. and the unen, ploved which met lit
freclnent intervals in "Tananarive. 'The membership of
the top cornntittee changed frequently, and there %\-its
no permanent executive. After meetings started in the
capital. KIM extended its activities to all parts of the
country, generally maintaining its division into
student, worker, t1acher, and unemployed segments,
with each lvd(ling separate meetings. In some
provinces Klu\/t encouraged the Peasants to hold their
own political meetings.
Chance played a large part in how KIM was
structured. Once it was clear that Tsiranana would be
shorn of power, the Rama Win tsoa government
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le.
A-7
a
Demonstrators in Tananarive, May
ik
7
4 W "�Z
An organized KIM meeting in a rural area in October
FIGURE b. Political gatherings. Literally thousands of these took place in Tananarive and
in various parts of Madagascar from May through October 1972. (U/OU)
1?
r.
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viJ G
low
4 6
FIGURE 7. Enraged students set fire to a police vehicle.
u This occurred sometime prior to the mass bloodshed which
occurred on 13 .May. Later, when all of Tananarive
turned out to protest the killings, the demonstrators were
impressively disciplined. (U; OU)
encouraged the. var "s ;nis elements among the
demonstrators to keep off the streets of the capital,
making space available to them in schools which had
been closed by the disorders. Secondary arrd university
students began meeting at the University of
Madagascar, and university professors and lecturers
sometimes joined them. Workers �blue and white
collar �met at the Ampefiloha secondary school
complex in the capital. Elementary and secondary
school teachers were also provided space for meetings
at Ampefiloha. ZOAM youths also held nuretings
throughout the summer.
After several post pcincinents KIM held a 2 -week
national congress in "I'ananarive in September
attended by over 10,000 delegates from all parts of the
country. As KIM had little talent for adi,ainistration, it
willingly let the government assist with the formidable
taF6; .associated with such a large undertaking.
Meetings Nvere usually held in school facilities, %yith
plenary sessions in a stadium. The government assisted
by providing transportation, tents and field kitchens,
and, according to the press, on one day th
government supplied over 3 tons of mimeograph
paper. High government officials attended the
opening plenary session of the congress, and paid
tribute to the motives and accomplishments of the
May demonstrators.
The major elements of the program which emerged
from the KIM natic;n�:1 congress included elimination
of French military bases and the U.S. NASA facility,
repatriation of uncooperative individual foreigners,
nationalization of mineral, lumber, and ciic rgy
resources, establishment of Malagasy as the only
official language +nd initiation of far7reacliing
constitutional and educational reforms.
After the national congress KIM was out-
maneuvered by General Ramanantsoa and lost
momentum. Nevertheless, the organization has had
:he lasting result of increasing the political
consciousness of many segments of Malag society
after over a decade of patcr.ialistic, one -man rule.
Since the September 1972 national congress, KIM_
has held occasional meetings in Tananarive and in
other cities. Such meetings have been well attended
and orderly, at Icat through April of 1973. In March
1973, as ter�ion mounted in the capital in the
afterinoth of renewed anti- Merina riots in northern
Madagascar, KIM held a meeting in the presence of
augmented security forces. The KIM spokesman's
demand: included transfer of the 1 rench Malagasy
talks to I'ananarivz, ejection of French Ambassador
Delauney free education for all, and abolition of all
forms of imperialism and capitalism. KIM spokesman
also denounced the instigators of the riots in the north
and the pro Soviet AKFM party, whose members they
castigated as being representatives of the upper
bourgeoisie_. Later in May 1973, the government
arrested several persons associated with KIM in order
to prevent demonstrations on the first anniversary of
'I'siranana's overthrow.
b. Political parties and leaders
Over the last quarter century the Malagasy
Republic has had v large number of political parties,
varying widely in character and vigor. In the mid
1940's the Democratic Movement for Malagasy
Renewal (MDRM), a cohesive Merina -led party,
rallied a considerable segment of politically conscious
Malagasy and led the fight for autonomy. "I'he
MDRM was blamed by the French for instigating the
19 -17 uprising, even though the party had emerged
victorious in various electoral tests of strength and
would appear to have had little: to gain by extralegal
activity. "I'he French therefore suppressed the MDRM
and encouraged the activities of parties formed by
cotier politicians, including the PSD, ,led by
Tsiranana.
just prior to independence there were about 30
parties, many of which were little more than
temporary alliances of aspiring politicians. Buoyed by
French support and aided by his considerable political
skill, "I'siranana won over some opposition party
members and outmaneuvered the others, bringing the
PSD to a position of overwhelming dominance.
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o
For several months after the M y 1972 uprising,
political party activity %vas minimal. Leading
members of the PSD avoided appearing in public for
fear of violence at the hands of the student -labor
demonstrators. Partly because of their antiaiuthority
outlook, the demonstrators' distrusted most existing
political parties, youth organizations, and labor
unions, and most of these bodes therefore derived
little advantage from the PSD's collapse. Moreover, all
political activity was inhibited by General Ramanaiit-
soa's statement that lie wanted the political life of the
country to be "put to sleep" for a while and by the
government's ban on party meetings. In the summer
of 1972, however, the various political parties warily
held meetings and issued political statements, and the
government looked the other way. Political parties
took a limited part in the campaign for the October
1972 constitutional referendum, but as the Ramanant-
soa government's troubles increased in tl winter of
1972/73 the leaders of the various parties became
increasingly bolder in their criticisms of it. In March
and April 1973 the government arrested several
prominent PSD politicians for allegedly inciting
disorders, and in June briefly arrested another leading
cotie`r politician, Andre Resampa, oil charges of
corruption. The government thus moved against its
most dangerous adversaries among the politicians but
stopped short of a proscription of all party activity.
In early 1973 the vigorous and diverse Malagasy
press reflected the existence of several established and
several new political parties, but the cohesiveness and
popular appeal of many of these associations were
extremely difficult to gage. New parties sprang up,
and others went into limbo. The statements of
principles of the various parties were couched in vague
language. All identified with the cause of Malagasy
nationalism, but they defined nationalism in different
terms. Parties tended to be cliques centered around
certain leading individuals (Figure S) or interest
groups based on regional and tribal bases.
During the winter of 1972/73 the press reported
meetings in various localities of committees to support
the Ramanantsoa government. None of the persons
identified in these press stories as officers of this
organization was a well -known individual. It is
possible that these local committees may later be
drawn together into a new progovernment political
party.
(l) Social Democratic Party �By the spring of 1973,
former President Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party
had l)k-un to recover from its earlier disarray.
Tsiranana, who had continued to live in the
14
rr v.9vvvvTv,....v
Mahazoarivo presidential residence, said in a press
interview that lie had solutions to the country's
mounting problems and was ready to be recalled to
the presidency. ;n February 1973 'he made political
trips to his home province of Majunga in the north
and to southern Madagascar'as well. The government
was reluctant to make a niartvr of Tsir either by
ejecting him from the presidential residence or by
restricting his political activity. It did, howe%, arrest
several other prominent PSD politicians, including
former cabinet minister Gene Rasidy, a close associate
of Tsiranana who was also a member of Tsiranana's
Tsimihety tribe, Paul Rawahavita, a leading
politician from Diego Suarez Province, and Leda
Abdou Lamt';�rt (known simply as Loda), the PSD
secretary general. "These three were among 40 persons
held for investigation in connection with the disorders
w hich broke out in February 1973.
The PSD was founded in 1956 by Tsiranana with
encouragement from the top French colonial officials
and with the assistance of experienced party organizers
provided by the French Socialist Party In spite of +its
socialist label, however, the PSD was little concerned
with ideology and h:id as its main purposes retaining
and expanding its power and authority.
During the late 1960's PSD membership was
estimated to be between 800,000 and 1,000,000. 'I'lle
lowest level of party organization was the secti(m, of
which there were over 3,000. Sections grouped
into federations, whose officers composed the 30 -man
executive committee, The PSD's top organ was the
108 -man Political Bureau. As president of the PSD,
Tsiranana dominated the party organization.
Even when it had the advantage of control of the
national government and all but a few lower
government units, however, the PSD was or-
ganizationally flaccid. The Confederation of
Malagasy Workers (FMM) and the Union of
Malagasy Socialist Students (UESM), tilt: PSD's labor
and youth affiliates respectively, had little genuine
popular appeal.
Very little information is available concerning the
organizational situation of the PSD and its affiliates in
the aftermath of Tsiranana's downfall. In the summer
of 1972, 'Tsiranana announced that the Political
Bureau would he supplanted by a 12 -man Provisional
Political Bureau, half of whom would be members of
the PSD youth organization, and that this provisional
bureau would select a party secretary general from its
ranks. For some reason, however, a ne%\ secretary
general was not named, and party wheelhorse Loda
continued in this post in early 1973.
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i
x
E
`1
i
a
3
,;r
3
Y
r
o
For several months after the M y 1972 uprising,
political party activity %vas minimal. Leading
members of the PSD avoided appearing in public for
fear of violence at the hands of the student -labor
demonstrators. Partly because of their antiaiuthority
outlook, the demonstrators' distrusted most existing
political parties, youth organizations, and labor
unions, and most of these bodes therefore derived
little advantage from the PSD's collapse. Moreover, all
political activity was inhibited by General Ramanaiit-
soa's statement that lie wanted the political life of the
country to be "put to sleep" for a while and by the
government's ban on party meetings. In the summer
of 1972, however, the various political parties warily
held meetings and issued political statements, and the
government looked the other way. Political parties
took a limited part in the campaign for the October
1972 constitutional referendum, but as the Ramanant-
soa government's troubles increased in tl winter of
1972/73 the leaders of the various parties became
increasingly bolder in their criticisms of it. In March
and April 1973 the government arrested several
prominent PSD politicians for allegedly inciting
disorders, and in June briefly arrested another leading
cotie`r politician, Andre Resampa, oil charges of
corruption. The government thus moved against its
most dangerous adversaries among the politicians but
stopped short of a proscription of all party activity.
In early 1973 the vigorous and diverse Malagasy
press reflected the existence of several established and
several new political parties, but the cohesiveness and
popular appeal of many of these associations were
extremely difficult to gage. New parties sprang up,
and others went into limbo. The statements of
principles of the various parties were couched in vague
language. All identified with the cause of Malagasy
nationalism, but they defined nationalism in different
terms. Parties tended to be cliques centered around
certain leading individuals (Figure S) or interest
groups based on regional and tribal bases.
During the winter of 1972/73 the press reported
meetings in various localities of committees to support
the Ramanantsoa government. None of the persons
identified in these press stories as officers of this
organization was a well -known individual. It is
possible that these local committees may later be
drawn together into a new progovernment political
party.
(l) Social Democratic Party �By the spring of 1973,
former President Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party
had l)k-un to recover from its earlier disarray.
Tsiranana, who had continued to live in the
14
rr v.9vvvvTv,....v
Mahazoarivo presidential residence, said in a press
interview that lie had solutions to the country's
mounting problems and was ready to be recalled to
the presidency. ;n February 1973 'he made political
trips to his home province of Majunga in the north
and to southern Madagascar'as well. The government
was reluctant to make a niartvr of Tsir either by
ejecting him from the presidential residence or by
restricting his political activity. It did, howe%, arrest
several other prominent PSD politicians, including
former cabinet minister Gene Rasidy, a close associate
of Tsiranana who was also a member of Tsiranana's
Tsimihety tribe, Paul Rawahavita, a leading
politician from Diego Suarez Province, and Leda
Abdou Lamt';�rt (known simply as Loda), the PSD
secretary general. "These three were among 40 persons
held for investigation in connection with the disorders
w hich broke out in February 1973.
The PSD was founded in 1956 by Tsiranana with
encouragement from the top French colonial officials
and with the assistance of experienced party organizers
provided by the French Socialist Party In spite of +its
socialist label, however, the PSD was little concerned
with ideology and h:id as its main purposes retaining
and expanding its power and authority.
During the late 1960's PSD membership was
estimated to be between 800,000 and 1,000,000. 'I'lle
lowest level of party organization was the secti(m, of
which there were over 3,000. Sections grouped
into federations, whose officers composed the 30 -man
executive committee, The PSD's top organ was the
108 -man Political Bureau. As president of the PSD,
Tsiranana dominated the party organization.
Even when it had the advantage of control of the
national government and all but a few lower
government units, however, the PSD was or-
ganizationally flaccid. The Confederation of
Malagasy Workers (FMM) and the Union of
Malagasy Socialist Students (UESM), tilt: PSD's labor
and youth affiliates respectively, had little genuine
popular appeal.
Very little information is available concerning the
organizational situation of the PSD and its affiliates in
the aftermath of Tsiranana's downfall. In the summer
of 1972, 'Tsiranana announced that the Political
Bureau would he supplanted by a 12 -man Provisional
Political Bureau, half of whom would be members of
the PSD youth organization, and that this provisional
bureau would select a party secretary general from its
ranks. For some reason, however, a ne%\ secretary
general was not named, and party wheelhorse Loda
continued in this post in early 1973.
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w
t
Philibert Tsiranana Andre Rasampa
The PSD appears to be strongest in Majunga .uul
Diego- Suarez provinces, especially among TsiranamCs
'fsintilicty trihe. The PSD has its own newspapers.
including the weekly La RepuGiiyue, which appears
in French and Malagasy.
Malagasy Soc�ialisl Union (USM) �'Ihe L?Si
f was forncd in the autumn of 197? by ;ndre Hcsampu,
O of Tsiranuna's leading associates until the two had
s
it falling -out in early 1971. Very little information is
available concerning the extent of which the IISM is
organized and the� support it enjoys. The newspaper
Baste Vasa provides Ilesampa and his party with it
press voice.
Resampa, who is ill his late forties, is a nucmbcr cif
the Sakakwa tribe and is from the west coast city of
Morondava. Por ost of the 1960's Hcsaiupa served in
the dual capacity if. PSD secretary general and
Minister of Interior. Ilis political power was further
c{ enhanced by his exclusive control of an elite
paramilitary organization, the 11cpnblican Security
-oree, which Tsiranana permitted hint to recruit,
Richard Andriamaniato organize, and control.
liesampu was the hest administrator arming the top
figures of the Tsiruana regime and served Tsiranana
FIGURE 8. Civilian political figures (C) loyally, though the� two differed on key policy
questions. For example, INesampa opposed the favored
position enjoyed by Prance, and he did not like the
15
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C
w
t
Philibert Tsiranana Andre Rasampa
The PSD appears to be strongest in Majunga .uul
Diego- Suarez provinces, especially among TsiranamCs
'fsintilicty trihe. The PSD has its own newspapers.
including the weekly La RepuGiiyue, which appears
in French and Malagasy.
Malagasy Soc�ialisl Union (USM) �'Ihe L?Si
f was forncd in the autumn of 197? by ;ndre Hcsampu,
O of Tsiranuna's leading associates until the two had
s
it falling -out in early 1971. Very little information is
available concerning the extent of which the IISM is
organized and the� support it enjoys. The newspaper
Baste Vasa provides Ilesampa and his party with it
press voice.
Resampa, who is ill his late forties, is a nucmbcr cif
the Sakakwa tribe and is from the west coast city of
Morondava. Por ost of the 1960's Hcsaiupa served in
the dual capacity if. PSD secretary general and
Minister of Interior. Ilis political power was further
c{ enhanced by his exclusive control of an elite
paramilitary organization, the 11cpnblican Security
-oree, which Tsiranana permitted hint to recruit,
Richard Andriamaniato organize, and control.
liesampu was the hest administrator arming the top
figures of the Tsiruana regime and served Tsiranana
FIGURE 8. Civilian political figures (C) loyally, though the� two differed on key policy
questions. For example, INesampa opposed the favored
position enjoyed by Prance, and he did not like the
15
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conciliatory attitude Tsiranana took toward the
iMerina up until tits late 1960's. But from 1969 on,
Tsiranana drew closer to persons from his own
Tsiniihety tribe and became suspicious of Resampa. I II
February 1971 Resampa was relegated to a minor
government post, and in June of that year Its was
arrested and imprisoned as it subversive.
Upon his release by the Ramanantsoa governincit
in June 1972, Resampa received extensive favorable
publicity in the Malagasy pre:.s, partly because he had
been it victim of Tsiranana's illegal repression of
political adversaries and partly because as un effective
and articulate politician he mode good copy. After
resigning from the PSD in June 1972 and forming the
USM, Resampa visited Europe and enrolled the USM
in the Socialist International, an action which made
the USM rather than the PSD the Malagasy affiliate
in that organization.
Resampa has been unsuccessful in his attempt to get
General Ramanantsoa to form a coalition gove rnment
with the USM and other parties. Ramanantsoa
probably considers Resampa it particularly dangerous
adversary. In April 1973 the government took steps to
discredit him for allegedly engaging in corrupt
activities when lie held high office. In June he was
arrested for fraud but released the same day because of
insufficient evidence.
(3) MONIMA �The National Movement for the
Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA) is an
ultranationalist party which adamantly opposed
French colonial rule and the pro- French Tsiranana
regime. MONIMA bore the brunt of repres:Jon by the
French and hv'fsiranana and was favorably regarded
by the student and labor demonstrators .vho overthrew
the President.
MONIMA was fomided in 19:58 by Monja Jaona, it
Protestant schoolteacher and a member of the
Antandroy tribe. Jaona was an outspoken advocate of
independence, with the result that he was imprisoned
by the French from 1947 to 1950. He was elected
mayor of Tulear city in 1959, but was removed fro:.:
this post in 1961 by the Tsiranana Ramanantsoa of
alleged misconduct, and the MONIMA- controlled
city council was replaced by a central government
administrator. Monja Jaona reportedly visited
Tanzania, Albania, and the Chinese People's Republic
in 1970.
For the first decade of its existence MONIMA was a
peasant party limited to parts of Tulear Province. In
1969 it began to proselytize among the slumdwellers of
the capital and among workers on the European
owned rice plantations in the vicinity of Lac Alaotra.
This same year, as opposition to the Tsiranana
16
government mounted while the economic situation
deteriorated, some intellectuals in the Marxist AKFM
party becane dissatisfied with AKFM leader
Andrianuutjato's insistence on legal rather than
violent methods and joined IMONINIA. One such
person was Charles ilavo ijanahury, u assistant
professor on the Faculty of Letters at the University of
Madagascar. Ravoajanahary, who had b �it an
AKFM member for it decade, is reported to have been
the animating force behind ,tit uprising in Tulear
Province in April 1971. After this uprising was
squelched he fled to Paris to escape arrest. Granted
amnesty by the Rartianantsou govc:rrun