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SECRET 99 /GS /CP FX 0 I Philip December 1973 C? 1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY i SECRET n c. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 irlf is t. INS?- &ff- NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS" k; The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence Grid Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing she General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A. quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thu: facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of th, United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 791 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or roceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019611. EXEMPT FrOM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES SB (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ti 7 1 t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or irternational body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attrioution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 7FkM Q/l I I I I.rn r+'iOff. Y VIM A 01.ri& =2r21VI I IVI l.rfirfi Vl t r t r t r�l t r t r a YEw, o 4 �t; 4 El qtr .r� 1 y rI L Troubled Ally The Republic of the Philippines, an archipelago of more than 7,100 islands lying some 400 miles off the Asian mainland between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, is a nation of great beauty and many problems. A 16th century territorial creation of colonial Spain, it was granted independence in the wake of World War II after nearly 50 years of American tutelage. It survived a difficult reconstruc- tion period and the challenge of a serious Com- munist -led insurgency (the so -called Huk movement) to become for a time one of the most stable and rapidly developing countries in Southeast Asia. Set apart from its neighbors by the degree to which its customs and in- stitutions have been affected by its colonial heritage (it is, for example, the only predominantly Christian country in the area and the only one �save, perhaps, Singapore �where English is so widely spoken), it remains linked to the United States by an extensive network of political, military, and economic agreements. (u /ou) These close ties between the United States and the Philippines have lost some of their earlier warmth. As the passage of time has dimmed memories of wartime collaboration and the extent of American post independence assistance, Philippine nationalism has taken on an increasingly anti -U.S. tone. But al- though it is now fashionable �and good politics for prominent leaders and journals to attack the remaining special privileges enjoyed by U.S. businessmen and government agencies, few Filipinos as yet seriously seek changes which might drive out American investors or undermine the U.S. guarantee of their co! ntry's security and territorial integrity. Moreover, since Washington has responded to Victim of violence in Mindanao manifestations of Philippine nationalism with un- derstanding and restraint, there is still a considerable reservoir of good will on both sides. For their part, Americans of all ages have become firmly accustomed to thinking of the Philippines as a friendly bastion of democracy and free enterprise in an otherwise chaotic and strife -torn region. (u ou) Indeed, the Philippine Republic's original political system� established and refined during a decade -long and war interrupted transitional period as a semiautonomous commonwealth �had many com- mendable features. It was not, nor could it have been, a carbon copy of the American model. Rather, it was a unique blend of American -style democratic in- stitutions, of a strong executive and a centralized form of government (reflecting the influence of over 300 years of Spanish colonial rule), and of a complex corn padre system of social values which placed overriding importance on real or ritual kinship ties. Firmly based on regular elections, a free press, and a tradition of civilian control over the military, the system gave the average citizen a satisfying sense of participation in national affairs (a feeling which was bolstered by the generally ready accessibility of their elected repre- sentatives) and provided aspiring politicians an avenue of upward mobility. (u /ou) This highly personalized system was, however, both vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous leaders and distinctly resistant 1 evolutionary change. Behind their democratic trappings, the political processes were run from the outset by and for an oligarchy composed of a relatively small number of extremely wealthy families. Such talent as arose outside its ranks was generally quickly coopted by this ruling elite. As a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 i I result, the country's two major political parties �the Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party� differ little in overall philosophy and have served primarily as in- struments for advancing the interests of rival factions within the oligarchy. Moreover, since ambitious of- ficeseekers are generally unburdened by any sense of loyalty to their party, switching from one to another has been common. (c) Only one of the Philippine Republic's early presidents, Ramon Magsaysay, possessed enough pop- ular support and strength of character to successfully challenge the power of the oligarchs. His enlightened administration brought domestic peace and considerable economic progress to his country in the mid- 1950's. But Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash in 1957, and his successor quickly fell back into old ways. Once again Philippine politics became little more than a game of musical chairs in which the wealthy and those who aspired to be wealthy vied for the spoils and favors of public office. A sense of respon- sibility to the national interest or the general welfare was notably lacking. With few exceptions, politicians tended to be preoccupied with assuring that benefits accrued to themselves, their immediate families, and their extended kinship groups. Nepotism and the abuses associated with it were �omrnonplace and were condoned by traditional social mores. Corruption ex- tended from the highest levels of government to the lowest officials in the most remote villages. Violence was a regular part of political life. Private armies flourished, and every election had its quota of political murders. (c) Under these circumstances, signs of trouble soon reappeared. The country's rate of economic growth began to fall off in the early 1960's. As boom con- ditions receded. the peasants and the urban poor became increasingly fretful about their government's failure to honor oft- repeated promises of a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. By mid- decade, economic grievances, resurgent nationaiism, rising popular expectations, and the unsettling impact of changes in the inter- national environment had combined io generate a clearly perceptible undercurrent of domestic discon- tent. (c) In t965, popular disenchantment with President Diosdado Macapagal enabled the tough and in- telligent young President of the Philippine Senate, Fer- dinand Marcos, to defeat his former political ally at the polls. Despite the new chief executive's vigor and evident ability, however, the next 4 years brought little progress toward remedying the country's basic ills. A 2 self -made member of the oligarchy and a politician who had not hesitated to bolt his party to run for the presidency on the opposition slate, Marcos was too much a product (and captive) of the system to be able to force through the sweeping economic and social reforms he had advocated in his campaign speeches. On the other hand, he was also too ambitious to be bound very long by the accepted rules of the game. Setting his sights on reelection to an unprecedented sec- ond (and, by constitutional provision, final) term in office, he launched a skillful public relations campaign centered on his modest but undeniable achievements in increasing rice production, building new roads and schools, and curtailing smuggling. (c) As time passed, it seemed increasingly likely that for better or for worse the 1969 presidential elections would mark something of a watershed for the Philip- pines, Most observers were agreed that Marcos was developing a sufficiently favorable image to win hand- ily. The optimists among them hoped that he would use his popular mandate to curb the stifling influence of the oligarchs and to crown his final years in office with genuine progress toward needed reforms. The pessimists, on the other hand, feared that Marcos' egoism and burning ambition might precipitate sorne sort of political crisis, and in the end they proved to be right. (c) Marcos not only wanted to win reelection, but he wanted to win by an overwhelming margin. To this end he employed bribery, fraud, and coercion on a scale unprecedented even in Philippine politics. His reckless expenditure of public funds nearly bankrupted the economy. His heavyharded tactics and his subse- quent efforts to find some way to avoid relinquishing power at the expiration of his second term in 1973 alienated many of his former supporters in all walks of life, occasioned massive student demonstrations and politically oriented street violence, contributed to a revival of Communist insurgency in the countryside around Manilla, and generally polarized the body politic as never before. These developments, coupled with the stinging rebuke he received in the November 1971 offyear elections, when opposition Liberal Party candidates registered unexpectedly heavy gains, prompted Marcos to !cO, -ore and more to the previously apolitical military for support. (c) Soon after his reelection, Marcos began to fill key military command positions with officers personally loyal to him and to blame almost all political demonstrations and violence; on Communist con- spiracies. From time to time he threatened to impose martial law, and in the late summer of 1972 he decided APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 that he could wait no longer. Disastrous floods had just compounded his country's economic woes, and there were signs of increasing opposition to his plans to secure enactment of a new constitution which would give the Philippines a parliamentary, rather than a presidential, system of government �and, coinciden- tally, enable Marcos to retain power as his country's first Prime Minister. (u /ou) On the evening of 22 September, within an hour of what seems likely to have been a staged attempt on the life of his defense secretary, President Marcos set his carefully laid plans in motion. Martial law was declared. In predawn raids, government troops seized control of all communications and n:.olic utilities, and many preminent anti Marcos critics� including newsmen, politicians, students, and some elected officials �were arrested. All newspaper and broad- casting offices were closed, and tight travel re- strictions were imposed. There was, however, no bloodshed. On the night of the 23rd of September, President Marcos went on the air to justify the moves he had made and to announce new ones, including plans for social reforms tinder the rubric of a "New Society" program. (u /ou) No one really believed the official explanation that, in strict conformity with the existing c(. istitution, mar- tial law had been imposed solely because the nation was imperiled by a Communist rebellion. The only effective Philippine Communist organization, the Peking- oriented "Marxist- Leninist" group, and its military arm, the New People's Army, were still too weak to justify such drastic action. Yet most Filipinos tended to accept Marcos' secondary thesis that martial law provided a virtual last chance for curbing crime and overcoming domestic roadblocks to reform. Pleased by the President's moves to confiscate all private firearms and to round up known criminal elements, as well as by his promise to expedite long- stolled land reform measures, the Christian majority showed little resentment over the loss of some of their civil liberties. Similarly, the heavyhanded and sometimes extralegal measures which Marcos subsequen -.1y employed to hasten passage and adoption of a new constitution and to have himself installed as the all powerful head of an authoritarian transitional government �one with an indefinite mandate and no obligation to lift martial law evoked more of a wait- and -see reaction than any great degree of public outrage. (c) Nevertheless, President Marcos' actions have in- troduced a considerable degree of instabilitv into the Philippine equation. First of all, he m st deliver on his promises of reform or lose such popuiar support as he 10 Its DECARI 1 L U W Civil ii 3O1twloc still retains, and progress here, particularly with respect to the critical issue of land reform, has thus far been painfully slow. Secondly, Marcos has both consciously involved the military in political affairs and failed to designate an heir apparent. Thus serious internal dis- orders, his assassination (an increasingly credible possibility, or simple ambition could trigger a military takeover. Finally, Marcos' attempts to disarm the pop- ulation and tighten the control exercised by the central government over all provincial and local jurisdictions have exacerbated Manila's already strained relations with the country southern :,ased Muslim Filipino (Moro) minority of some 2 million persons. What began in December 1972 as a new series of scattered clashes between Muslim insurgents and government forces in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands burgeoned into a small -scale civil war with widespread inter- national ramifications just 3 months later. Even if cool heads ultimately prevail on all sides, pacifici- and reconstruction of the affected areas will likely require a great deal of time and money. (s) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 The American Stake (s) lh.. 1' i N4:. ff wV 4 ti" �'`d. 1. World War 11 wreckage on Leyte The Philippine Republic is not, of course, the onlv developing country in Asia to experience both growing domestic difficulties and a shift from at least nominal democracy to martial law or one rule in recent years, but nowhere else has such a broad range of im- portant and long -term U.S. interests been brought directly into question. In the first place, the Philippine Islands ��bv virtue of their location near the midpoint of a lhie of friendly nations which stretches from South Korea and Japan to Indonesia and Australia acre a kev external security. In return, the Philippine Republic has provided Washington with two major bases of stra- tegic iml, to U.S. operations in East Asia and the westem Pacific �the Subic Bay naval complex and Clark Air Base �as well as with a number of smaller military installations and communications centers. These facilities are from 1,350 to 1,770 miles closer to the Southeast Asian mainland than similar in- stallations in Japan or on Guam, and they played a critical role in support of U.S. and allied forces during factor in America s Far Last �n defense system. Under the Vietnam conflict. What is Icss widely recognized is a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements dating the fact that their importance to the United States has from H47, the United States has for all practical pur- in no way been reduced by the negotiation of the Paris poses v,ssumed full responsibility for the voting nations accords. +r 4 5 >3 i` APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 u In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, which was in- troduced as the new basis for American foreign policy in July 1969, the United States has altered its posture in the Far East. It has aimed for a lower and more positive profile by working to bring an end to direct American military involvement in Indochinese affairs and exploring ways to effect a steady improvement in relations with both Peking and Hanoi. Unavoidably, American actions in this regard have shaken old Cold War alignments as well. But while Washington now places greater emphasis on self- reliance, it has no in- tention of shirking its established role with respect to Asian security and economic development, much less of simply withdrawing from the regional scene. In fact, the viability of the Nixon Doctrine depends to no small degree on the maintenance o. a sizable American presence in Southeast Asia. The U.S. naval, air, and communications facilities in the Philippines developed over a long period and extensively modernized and expanded during the Viet- nam war �are ideally suited for this purpose. Even if an acceptable alternate location could be found, these facilities could be duplicated there only at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. Under the terms of ex- isting agreements, the United States is to enjoy un- restricted access to these installations until 1991. But previous concessions extracted by the Philippine Government have demonsirated that the scope and duration of American base rights in the Philippines are not cast in concrete. President Marcos himself has repeatedly affirmed his intention of raising this issue as a bargaining counte; in negotiations covering all aspects of U.S. Philippine relations. More troublesome, however, is the possibility that th^ increase in internal instability which has accompanied the recent shift to authoritarian, one -man rule could result in an upsurge of anti Americanism or other changes in the political environment that could place the future of U.S. basing arrangements in serious doubt. Mounting instability in the Philippines could prove costly to the United States in economic terms as well. Pr American investment in that country now totals about $1 billion. Beyond this, the United State: is presently contributing some $500 million a year to the Philippine economy through such things as base expenditures, military and economic aid grants, veterans' payments, and a persistent trade deficit. By any measure, America's cumulative economic stake in the Philippine experiment is substantial. Delicate negotiations scheduled to begin in late 1973 have as their airn the protection of U.S. business interests and the development of normal and mutually beneficial economic relations following the expiration in 1974 of the reciprocal privileges set forth in she Laurel Langley Agreement. These talks could all too easily be disrupted �or such new arrangements as they ultimately astablished be upset �by some ad- verse turn in Philippine domestic affairs. Finally, the recent course of developments in the Philippines has presented the United States with a number of political problems and dilemmas. For ex- ample, it was quite acceptable for Washington to provide generous economic assistance to a popularly elected �if somewhat corrupt and inefficient� regime in Manila and to help it cope with the threat of Com- munist insurgency. Marcos still needs such aid as much or more than ever, but his at least temporary abandonment of democracy and the shift of foci's from Communist to Muslim insurgents have creased a genuine danger that any well intent:.. ^.neU help rendered to his regime by the United States might be widely misconstrued and resented not only in the Philippines but in neighboring states as well. Moreover, the growing communal conflict in the Min- danao -Sulu Archipelago area has renewed old tensions between the Philippines and Malaysia and has en- gaged the concern of other Muslim nations through- out the world, thereby threatening to reverse the encouraging trend toward greater international cooperation in Southeast Asia and disappointing U.S. hopes that the Philippine Republic was beginning to play a truly constructive role in regional affairs. Despite the troubling implications of what has been happening in the Philippines since September 1972, there has so far been little if any rcal damage to U.S. interests. What happens in the future will depend heavily on President Marcos �on his determination to press forward with needed reforms, on his skill in reaching mutually acceptable compromises with his domestic opponents (particularly with dissident Muslim groups), oa his willingness to reinstitute democratic rule at the earliest practicable opportunity, and on his simple ability to survive at least long enough to insure an orderly and legal transfer of power to a civilian successor. There is reason to hope that Marcos is sufficiently appreciative of the importance of retaining American good will to the receptive to Washington's advice. But even so, it is far too early to predict just how w sely and effectively he will employ his newly expanded po wflrs or what additional difficulties he is likely to encounter. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Rugged Land, Sturdy People (ulou) The political and social evolution of the Philippine nation has been heavily influenced by the fr. gmented and rugged nature of its terrain. Its nearly 40 million people live on a cluster of islands �the higher reaches of a partially submerged and still actively volcanic mountain chain �which stretches more than 1,100 miles from north to south arid, at its widest point, over 650 miles from east to west. Allegedly definitive but markedly varying figures for the total number of islands in the Philippine archipelago abound, but no one, not even the Filipinos themselves, really knows how many there are. Indeed, it w.)uld require major effort just to keep track. New ish rids appear from time to time as volcanoes thrust their smoking cones above the sea. Some endure, while others vanish again under the ceaseless onslaught of pounding waves. In total lard area the Philippine Republic, is slightly larger than the state of Arizona, but most of its islands are tiny. Fewer than half even have names, slightly more than 800 are inhabited, and only 462 have an area of as much as 1 square mile. In fact, just 12 islands account for about 95% of both the country's land area and population. The largest and most pop- ulous is Luzon, which is about equal in area to Ken- tucky. Site of the bustling port city of Manila (the republic's de facto capital) and its pretentious suburb, Quezon City (the official capital), this relatively fertile and mineral -rich island is the political and economic heart of the Philippines. To the south, the island of Mindanao is nearly as large but, unlike Luzon, it is largely forest covered and, despite a rush of internal 6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: migration in recent years, mo of it is still sparsely populated. The eastern rim of the Philippine archipelago marks the edge of a very old Asian continental shelf. Here towering peaks and ridges often rise directly from the sea. The floor of the Pacific drops off abruptly to the east, and the Philippine Trench, with its low point of 34,440 feet below sea level, is the second deepest ocean area yet discovered. Unfortunately, the eastern islands also lie astride a major geologic fault, and destructive earthquakes are frequent. Almost all the larger islands are mountainous, and sparsely sett'ed uplands make up some 6551 of the country's total land area. Rugged north -south trending ridges and spurs �with elevations ranging from 600 to over 9,500 feet combine with the dense forests wl;ich still cov r more than half of the land to divide the islands iut(. isolated and, in some instances, virtually unexplored sectors. (In fact, hundok, the Pilipino (Tagalog) language term for Luzon's mountain country, has entered the American language as "the boondocks"� military slang for just about as far from civilization as a person can 1;et.) In addition, numerous volcanoes, more than 20 of which are still active, stand alone rr in clusters throughout the island chain. One forms an island in the center of Lake Taal, 40 miles south of Manila. In 1911 it snuffed out the lives of more than 1,300 people, and its latest eruption �in September 1965 �also caused widespread destruction and many fatalities. Another, the equally active Mount Mayon, which CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 overlooks the southern Luzon port of Legazpi, is over 8,000 feet high and is considered by some to be the most perfectly shaped volcanic cone in existence. Most of the larger islands have narrow coastal plains, and several have excellent natural harbors, but only four� Luzon, Mindanao, Negros, and Panay �have extensive lowland areas suitable for in- tensive agriculture and capable of supporting high densities of population. Of these, the most important is Luzon's central plain, which stretches from the Lingayen Gulf south to Manila Bay. Approximately 100 miles long by 40 miles wide and covered by a 1,000- foot -thick blanket of fertile alluvial soil, it provides enough food for almost all the people in the Manila area. The Philippine archipelago lies between 4 and 21 degrees north latitude and has a tropical maritime climate typified by high temperatures, high relative humidity, and one of the highest average annual rain- falls (about 100 inches) in the world. But because of differences in elevation, in proximity to the sea, and in exposure to storms, there are many climatic variations. In general, the eastern parts have an abundance of rain in all seasons, with maximum rainfall occurring between October and April. The western parts, on the other hand, generally experience a dry season at that time of year especially those areas that are sheltered by mountain barriers from the then prevailing easterly winds �and receive a high amount of rainfall from late spring to early fall when they are exposed to the strong southwest monsoon. Typhoons periodically lash Luzon and the Visayan Islands from the east or southeast during the summer and autumn months, severe ones occurring about once a year. The high winds can cause much destruction in exposed areas, but the worst damage to life and property results from the heavy floods which usually accompany these rain filled storms and from the high waves and tides along the coast. As might be expected from the nature of the climate, the islands have many small streams which become mountain torrents in the rainy season, but there are only a few rivers large enough for navigation by even small vessels. Nevertheless, the nation's water resources are important not only for local commerce but also for their hydroelectric potential and for irrigation. Indeed, this last use is likely to become increasingly critical to the economy. The country's relatively fertile soils and tropical climate permit the raising of a wide variety of crops, including rice, corn, sugarcane, coconuts, sweet potatoes, bananas, abaca (Manila hemp), tobacco, and coffee. However, inadequate irrigation, tenant farming, and the failure to make wider use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides have contributed to keeping per acre yields among the lowest in the world. There is no question that in some ways nature has been unkind to the Philippines. Over the years, high winds, torrential rains, floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions have taken an enormous toll in life and property. On the other hand, the young nation has been rather generously endowed with natural resources. Much of the country is still relatively unex- plored geophysically, but its known mineral wealth in- cludes extensive deposits of copper, chromite, iron, nickel, and bituminous coal, rich gold fields, and com- mercially exploitable amounts of silver, lead, zinc, manganese, and mercury. Its dense forests support a substantial export trade in valuable tropical hard- woods. Its coastal waters abound with fish, mollusks, and crustaceans, which furnish the principal source of protein in the Philippine diet. In addition, the warm seas in the Sulu Archipelago area sustain a thriving pearl industry. The oldest pecFl of the Philippines �the small and dark skinned Negritos who still live a primitive, semi nomadic life in some parts of Luzon, Mindanao, and Palawan �are believed to have entered the area some 30,000 years ago across land bridges then connecting the islands to Borneo, Sumatra, and the Malay Penin- sula. Subsequently, peoples of Malay stock come from the south in successive waves, the earliest by land bridges and the later arrivals by boats called baranoays. Closely related to the pres- ent -day inh- oitants of Indonesia and Malaysia, they settled in small, isolated family groups in coastal coves and estuaries and along river valleys. The original inhabitants of these places were either assimilated or driven back into the mountainous interior regions. More than 1,000 years ago, trade brought the islanders into contact with peoples as far away as India and the Middle East. Marco Polo wrote of their archipelago in the 13th century, describing it as a place frequented by Arab and Chinese merchants. The Arabs introduced Islarn in parts of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the 14th century, ultimately ex- tending its influence as far north as present -day Manila. For their part, the Chinese built upon their temporary dominance of trade in the area to establish tributary relationships with a number of petty island chiefs for a brief period in the 15th century. 7 When the Western world in the person of Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese explorer in the service of Charles I of Spain, appeared on the scene in 1521, most of the islanders were of Malay stock. Their com- munities, called harangays after the boats in which many of their ancestors had arrived, were ruled by chieftans known as datos. Under the rulers were a nobility, freeholders of land, and a servant class which originated from prisoners taken in wars between the petty principalities or from men who had lost their freedom through indebtedness or punishment for crime. Loose confederations of datos, formed under a hybrid system of sultans and rajahs, existed in the south, but for the most part the datos were divided from one another by both geography and factional di- putes. Family kinship was the basis of the social struc- ture and, except in the areas under Muslim influence, animism was the dominant religious belief. Philippine society still reflects its origin in small, self- sufficient groups. Not one of the local languages is the mother tongue of more than 259 of the popula- tion, family and community ties remain strong, and cooperative labor is common in many areas. The ma- jority of the population still lives in small villages where nearly everyone is related by either natural or ritual kinship. Society is still mainly agricultural and largely dominated by a small landowning class. Yet for all the diversity in local dialects (the 1960 census reported as many as 75) and customs, and despite the influx of a multiplicity of racial groups in the past, the Philippine population is both relatively homogeneous and possessed of a broad cultural unity. For one thing, the islands have been a true melting pot. Over the years the dominant Malay group has simply absorbed the bulk of the other ethnic com- munities through intermarriage. Strong infusions of Chinese and Spanish blood have contributed to marked variations in physical appearance, and anthropologists speak of more than 40 distinct ethnographic groups. But in 1973, more than 95% of the Philippine population was still predominantly Malay in origin. Scattered pockets of indigenous Negritos, a sizable ethnic Chinese minority, and a number of snialler alien groups� primarily Americans and Spaniards accounted for the rest. The cultural bonds which link most residents of the Philippine Islands are, however, perhaps less a product of this common ancestry than of the impact of their colonial heritage. The Philippine nation was subjected to Western colonization before it had developed a cen- tralized governmental structure, and therefore it was especially vulnerable to penetration by alien political and cultural influences. In contrast to the situation in other nearby dependent areas, where colonial and in- digenous institutions tended to exist as competing systems, there was a general and lasting fusion of local and Western traditions. Today, just as before in- dependence, Spanish and American derived values dominate much of Philippine life. As the result of energetic missionary activities, first and foremost by Spanish Catholic orders but later as well by Americans, Germans, and Belgians of both Catholic and Protestant persuasion, some 93% of the Philippine population is Christian. Although Pilipino (derived from Tagalog) has been designated as an official national language. English is spoken by nearly 40% of the people and continues to be an of- ficial language and the formal language of both government and instruction. Spanish, while no longer widely used, is still popular in fashionable circles. Both the educational and governmental systems, albeit the latter now to a lesser degree, bear a strong American stamp, and both suffer from a continuing conflict between old Spanish elitist tendencies and newer democratic traditions. Similarly, practices and at- titudes of Spanish origin still strongly affect the agricultural scene, while American concepts and methods prevail in the more modern sectors of the economy. But little that the Filipinos have borrowed from abroad has escaped local adaptation. This is par- ticularly true in the political field where, to the oc- casional despair of both Madrid and Washington, in- digenous kinship ties a id rivalries have traditirmally played a key role. S APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 n fit- INS r&lffro The Long Road to Independence (u/ou) Although Magellan's primary mission had been to find a westward route to the E ast Indies, then Enrope principal source of spices, his landing on Cebu �well to the north of his t arget--in 1521 established Spain's clairn to what he chose to call the St. Lazarus Islands. (Some 20 years were to pass before Spain changed the name of the archipelago to the Philippines in honor of Grown Prince Philip, later King Philip II.) Magellan also gained the dubious distinction of being the first European victim of the intricacies and passions of the islands' clan oriented society. lie -*vas killed on Mac tan, it small island near Cebu, by a chieftain. While perfectly willing to swear allegiance to the remote Spanish King, this worthy was moved to mayhem by the demand that he also submit to the authority of a (:chit rajah who had accepted Christianity and allied himself with Magellan. Leaderless and with their flotilla reduced to a single vessel, a handful of Magellan's men managed to com- plete their circumnavigation of the globe and to return to Spain in 1522. In the decades that followed, other Spanish expeditions followed Magellan's route around South America and across the Pacific to the Philip- pines. But Madrid's attention was still focused on the spice -rich East Indies and it was not until 1565, when governor designate Miguel Lopez de Legaspi reached Cebu from Mexico at the head of a well -armed ex- peditionary force ;!iat the Spanish conquest and colonization of the Philippine archipelago began. Once started, the subjugation process was carried out with great enthusiasm and dispatch. Moving northward from Cebu, Legaspi founded Manila and established it as the administrative capital in 1572. Spanish conquistadores and friars fanned out over the 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 islands, and by 1600 this formidable alliance of sword and cross had brought virtual;y the whole archipelago under the control of the colonial administration. True, the Spaniards c.e never able to completely subdue the Muslim Filipino inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago� dubbed the Moros by Madrid in memory of its ancient foes, the Moors of North Africa �or the primitive Igorots in the mountains of Luzon. Nonetheless, they left an indelible imprint on their island dependency. They established the territorial limits of the future Philippine Republic and imbued the population with a sense of common national identity. They Christianized most of the in- habitants and accustomed them to centralized govern- ment. They established an elaborate judicial system based on both Roman and customary law. They in- troduced formal Western -style educational institutions in 1582, and extended them to include a rudimentary public school system some 250 years later. Toward the end of their colonial tenure they fostered the develop- ment of both export- oriented plantation agriculture and light industry. But there were negative aspects and legacies of the Spanish colonial era as well. For the first 200 years, revenues to support the colonial administration were obtained primarily from heavy taxes, payable cash or through involuntary labor, and a lucrative galleon trade involving the exchange of Mexican silver for such Chinese luxury goods as silk, carpets, and jade. The taxes and widespread corruption on the part of both civil and religious officials resulted in con- siderable popular discontent. The galleon trade en- couraged a substantial influx of Chinese entrepreneurs, generating strong feelings of envy and ill will among the indigenous population which have persisted to the present. Then toe,, Spain's persistent problems with the Muslim Filipinos not only are reflected today in the continued unwillingness of the Muslim minority to submit fully to the authority of the central govern- ment, but they also laid the foundations for the current territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah, a part of the island of Borneo that had originally been part of the Sultanate of Sulu. The British seized Manila in 1762 during the Seven Years War, and when they withdrew they took with them the Sultan of Sulu whom the Spanish had be -2n holding captive there. An official of the British East India Company subsequently returned the Sultan to the Sulu Archipelago and restored him tc his throne:. In gr Ac, the Sultan of Sulu ceded much of his do- 10 main (including his possessions in North Borneo) to t:e English company. This transfer of sovereignty was short lived. The Filipino Muslims drove the East India Company out in 1775, but in 1878 another arrange- ment was concluded between the then reigning Sultan of Sulu and two British businessmen, the owners of the British North Borneo Company. Under this agreement, Sabah was placed under the control of the two Englishmen; the Malaysians say it was ceded, the Filipinos claim it was only leased. In any event, the English c. itrepreneurs later turned over their rights and interests in tie area to the British Government. Undeterred by the fact that few Sabah residents show any desire to become Philippine citizens, Manila con- tinues to insist that the Sultan of Sulu never relin- quished sovereignty over the area, and that London therefore never had the right either to make it a crown colony or to dispose of it through incorporation into M alaysia. The intense nationalism reflected in the stubborn Philippine stand on the Sabah issue was also born dur- ing the period of Spanish colonial rule. Although a privileged class of wealthy and well educated Filipinos of mixed parentage gradually appeared, Spain made no significant effort to prepare the islanders for self government or otherwise to satisfy their nationalists, aspirations. As a result, an active Philip- pine independence movement emerged in the late 19th century. A major rebellion erupted in 1896, and despite the ultimate success of the Spanish authorities in persuading its leaders to go into voluntary exile in Hong Kong, it was stil, simmering when the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 led to war between Spain and the United States. Less than 3 months later, Commodore George Dewey sailed into Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet lying at anchor there. His victory gave new heart to the rebels. Their leader,. General Emilio Aguinaldo, returned from Hong Kong with American assistance and once again rallied his countrymen against the Spanish. Buoyed by the successes of his forces and convinced that the United States merely wished to assist the Filipinos, as it had the Cubans, to gain their freedom, he proclaimed his country's in- dependence on 12 June 1898. Although subsequently barred from entering Manila by the terms -f its sur- render `,o an American Expeditionary for(e, he con- vened it constituent assembly in the neart)y town of Malolos which drafted a constitution that was strongly influenced by American traditions. This constituti ^n was promulgated on 23 January 1899, and Aguinaldo i f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 kjr was promptly elected President of the first Philippine Republic. In the meantime, however, the United States de- cided to retain the Philippines. This decision was prompted by fear that the Philippines might otherwise fall under the domination of another foreign power, the desirability of having a base from which to protect and expand American interests in eastern Asia, and a growing feeling that it was America's duty to bring the advantages of democracy to iess fortunate peoples. Despite these considerations, many Americans actively opposed the decision. In fact, the Treaty of Paris, by which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in return f )r an indemnity of $20 million and certain temporary trade concessions, was approved by only a one vote majority in the Senate. Not surprisingly, it was even more vigorously opposed by the F "ninos. President Aguinaldo declared war on the United States in February 1899. The ensuing conflict was exceed- ingly costly and bloody for both sides. Effective Filipino guerrilla tactics prolonged the hostilities, and more than 2 years passed before Aguinaldo was captured and organized resistance to American occupation collapsed. Despite these inauspicious beginnings, the United States quickly made good on its pro.nise to train the Filipinos to govern themselves. Wi; h the end of the fighting, military government was replaced by a Philippine Commission which included a minority of Filipinos and had an American governor at its head. After 1907, this commission shared legislative powers with the elected Philippine Assembly. In 1916, land- mark legislation (the Jones Law) gave the Filipinos considerable autonomy and clearly established that the ultimate aim of American policy was Philippine in- dependence. The latter issue had been something of a political football, and America's major political parties continued to bicker over the means and timing of such action. But by the early 1930's, depression -born economic problems and growing isolationist sentiment combined to create a general consensus in the United States that it would be wise to give the Filipinos their freedom as soon as possible. In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings- McDuffie Act, authorizing the extablishment of a transitional Commonwealth of the Philippines and promising complete independence after 10 years. Under the provisic.�ns c this act, the Filipinos drew up a constitution patterned on the U.S. model. With a few amendments, this constitution remained in effect until January 1973. The Commonwealth was in- augurated in 1935 with is a election of Manuel Quezon as President and Sergio Osmena as Vice Presi- dent. The constitution provided for a unicameral Congress� changed to a bicameral body by con- stitutional amendment in 1940 �and an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court. The Philip- pines operated under this regime until the Japanese oc- cupation in early 1942. The Japanese began their assault on the Philippines just 10 hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor, and by the end of 1941 they had taken virtually the entire archipelago. Quezon and Osmena were evacuated to the United States shortly before the surrender of the surviving American and Filipino defenders on Bataan and Corregidor in May 1942. The Japanese established a puppet republic with the prominent Jose P. Laurel as President. Laurel, like Quezon and Osmena, was a member of the Nacionalista Party. Although lie en- joyed a favorable reputation, his conviction ti:at collaboration was the best way to insure the safety and well -being of the population was not widely shared by his countrymen. Many Filipinos, including future presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Ferdinand Marcos, chose to join armed resistance groups which harried the occupation forces from forest and mountain bases. One such group, the Communist -led Hukbalahi3p (Huk), later became the nucleus of an insurgency directed against the nation's own postindependence government. Osmena succeeded to the presidency of the Philip- pine Commonwealth upon the death of Quezon in August 1944 and returned to his comitry with General MacArthur in October. The problems facing his ad- ministration were staggering. Full control of the islands was not wrested from the Japanese until September 1945. Philippine society was torn between guerrilla and collaborator; the countryside had been raped and plundered; and Manila, which contained most of the Commonwealth's factories, universities, hospitals, and modern institutions, had been reduced to rubble. The country was ill prepared for in- dependence, but few Filipnos were willing to wait much longer. The general elections which had been scheduled for November 1945 under the Tydings-McDuffie Act were postponed but 5 months. When they were finally held, Osmena was defeated by Manual Roxas, a former Nacionalista Party protege who had broken with him to found the Liberal Party. On 4 July 1946, independence was declared and Roxas became the first President of the new Philippine Republic. II APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 ynrn�r�r'an The Presidential Era (c) i r In the months just prior to independence, the United States had poured more than $150 million in loans and other aid into the Philippines, but the full impact of this assistance was not felt until long thereafter. When Roxas was inaugurated, the Philip- pine scene was still in a state of chaos: two thirds of the country's sugar mills lay in ruins; most of its mines were out of operation; 60% of all farm animals had been destroyed; and moral and social values were seriously corroded, the war having promoted widespread acceptance of violence as a way of life and disrespect hor both authority and property rights. Moreover, the explosive issue of how to deal with war- time collaborationists remained unresolved. Roxas himself was not untainted, for although he had refused an offer of the puppet state presidency ultimately assumed by Jose P. Laurel, he had subsequently accepted a position in Laurel's cabinet. There were also a host of potentially troublesome political and economic questions that were sidestepped in the rush toward independence and which remained to be settled w ith the United States. Much of Roxas' time during his early months in of- fice was devoted to defining his country's new relationship to the United States. His efforts yielded some encouraging results. Generous American aid in the form of cash grants, gifts of surplus materiel, veterans' payments, and loans, was soon forthcoming. 12 In addition, the Filipinos were granted a 28 -year period to make the transition from duty -free transac- tions to full tariffs in their trade with the United States. On the other hand, Roxas was in no position to strike a hard bargain and, as it turned out, Washington proved to be somewhat less forthcoming than the Filipinos thought was their due as former colonial subjects and wartime allies. Furthermore, there were strings at- tached to American assistance which have been a cause of irritation in U.S. Philippine relations ever since:. For example, passage of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (subsequently superseded by the Laurel- Langley Trade Agreement of 1955) hinged on Manila's willingness to surrender control of its cur- rency to Washington and to enact a constitutional amendment giving U.S. citizens equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources and in the ownership and operation of the country's public utilities. Similarly, conclusion of a military assistance agreement in 1947 was implicitly tied to satisfaction of Washington's demand for a number of military bases under a 99 -year lease. A base agreement was reached, but its terms were modified in 1966, with the result that the leases on all remaining U.S. installations will expire in 1991. American assistance enabled Roxas to launch a ma- jor reconstruction program and to encourage the development of new industry. Just before he died of a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Molaconong� Philippine White House X heart attack in April 1948 :,e also managed to settle the collaboration question by agreeing that those accused of cooperating with the Japanese had acted in good faith. On the other hand, his administration established the pattern of corruption that has plagued Philippine politics to this day. Although he managed to pre- vent the Phiiippine Communist Party from securing a foothold in the national legislature, his failure to alleviate the plight of the rural population� suffering from the ills of tenancy, absentee landlordism, and grinding poverty� created fertile conditions for the growth of a Communist -led insurgency in the coun- tryside around Manila. The wartime Huk guerrilla movement, which had refused to disband after the Japanese surrender, was quick to exploit this opening. Under the leadership of Luis Taruc, it won many sympathizers by turning its guns first on the landlords and later on the establish- ment as a whole. Peasants who hesitated to lend their support to the Huks were often terrorized into coopera- tion. Despite Roxas' efforts to counter the Huk threat, the rebellion continued to grow. When Roxas died, lie was succeeded by Vice Presi- dent Elpidio Quirino, a relatively weak leader who managed to retain the presidency in the 1949 general elections through wholesale employment of fraud and strong -arm tactics. The Quirino administration was marked by a sharp rise in corruption and economic dif- ficulties and by the cresting of the Huk insurgency. The Huks stepped up their offensive operations in 1949, and within little more than a year they had succeeded in gaining control over much of central and southern Luzon as well as parts of other islands. At this juncture, President Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay �a relative newcomer on the political scene but well known as a wartime guerrilla leader �as his Secretary of Defense. Magsaysay purged and reorganized the army, initiated a civic action program, captured the central apparatus of the Philip- pine Communist Party in Manila, and combined successful field operations against the rebel forces with the promise that Huks who surrendered would be given land of their own on Mindanao. These tactics, coupled with the force of Magsaysay's personality and repu'ation broke the back of the Huk movement. M agsaysay's dedication to clean and responsive government put him on a collision course with Quirino. His use of troops to prevent foul play during the 1951 congressional elections resulted in a stunning defeat for Quirino's Liberals. In 1953 Magsaysay resigned his government post to campaign foi the presidency on the Nacionalista ticket. He won hand- ily, and his victory ushered in an era of enthusiasm and reform. Following his inauguration, Magsaysay opened the doors of the Presidential Palace to the public and es- tablished a number of commissions and agencies designed to make the machinery of government accessible to the most humble Filipino. He took firm steps to counter corruption and inefficiency in govern- ment. Important advances were made in such fields as industrialization, improved agricultural methods, irrigation, school construction, land reform, resettle- ment of landless tenant farmers, roadbuilding, and the development of rural credit facilities. Even though Magsaysay was unable to deal with the entrenched oligarchy as effectively as he wished, his concept that sovereignty resided in the people rather than with the elite profoundly influenced the thinking of a vast number of his countrymen. Both Roxas and Quirino had pursued a policy of close cooperation with Washington (the latter even drew down his meager forces facing the Huks to send a battalion to fight as part of the U.N. forces in Korea), but during the Magsaysay administration U.S. Philippine relations reached a degree of warmth unmatched before or since. In 1954 Manila hosted the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- tion (SEATO), a regional defensive alliance with headquarters in Bangkok. The following year, the United States and the Philippines negotiated the Laurel Langley Trade Agreement, which removed or softened many of the more controversial elements in the 1946 trade pact. Under this agreement, which was designed to govern the economic relations of the two countries for the next 20 years, the United States relinquished the right to control the currency ratio between the dollar and the Philippine peso. The parity provisions of the 1946 trade agreement were made reciprocal, and Filipinos were granted the same rights in the United States as Ame. icans were accorded in the Philippines. The Philippine: sugar quota was extended; gradually diminishing quotas were established for cer- tain other Philippine goods entering the United States; and provision was made for a phased mutual incease in customs duties on all other commodities over the 20 -year period. Vice President Carlos P. Garcia succeeded to the presidency when Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash in March 1957, and in 1959 he won election to a 4 -,year term of his own. Garcia was a professional politician who relied on the Nacionalista Party 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Eri 0�n0Te &5m machine to carry him to victory. An indecisive leader and manifestly le-,s dedicated than his predecessor, he failed to carry out Magsaysay's reform program. His tenure was marked by a return to much of the corrup- tion and lack of concern for the general welfare that had characterized the pre Magsaysay period. To maintain popular support, Garcia inaugurated a chauvinistic "Filipino First" program of economic nationalism and deliberately exacerbated differences with the United States. While this policy met with some positive response in the cities, particularly in Manila, it was unpopular in the rural areas. In the 1961 presidential elections notable for the introduc- tion of a rapid polling station reporting system which made it difficult to juggle the vote count� Garcia was decisively defeated by Diosdado Macapagal of the Liberal Party. Lime Magsaysay, Macapagal was not of the elite class, and also like Magsaysay he ran on a platform of socioeconomic reform and honest government. One of his first acts was to free the peso from a 2 to 1 peg to the U.S. dollar and thereby wipe out a flourishing black market trade in foreign exchange. He also managed to force an ambitious land reform bill through the Philippine Congress, but this law �like most of Macapagal's other reform measures �was never implemented. Throughout his administration, Macapagal's domestic programs suffered from a lack of trained personnel, inadequate financial resources, and his own inability to overcome the resistance of en- trenched special interest groups. In the international field, however, Macapagal did succeed in replacing the basically negative chauvinism of Garc.a's foreign policy with a more positive ap- proach to regional affairs and in d-^veloping an image of the Philippines as a distinctly Asian and totally in- dependent country. His pursuit of a separate Philip- pine identity took various forms �for example, he changed his country's annual independence day celebration from d july to 12 June, the date in 1898 when Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippines �and sometimes produced an adverse re- action in Washington. Nevertheless, U.S. Philippine relations recovered some of their pre- Garcia warmth, and by mid -1965 the two countries were moving toward resolution of a long- standing dispute over criminal jurisdiction and the negotiation of a new military base accord patterned along the lines of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Despite his positive accomplishments, Macapagal's inability to deliver on his promises of basic reform, 14 coupled with his failure to solve his country's persistent rice shortage problem, cost him much of his initial popular support. In November 1965 the electorate turned to Ferdinand Marcos in hopes that his strong personality and reputed ruthlessness would enable him to overcome the powerful domestic forces opposing socioeconomic raange. Marcos' record during his first and second ter ns as President has been summarized in earlier paragra .)hs. Operating within the framework of the then existing political system, he was unable to make much progress toward resoution of his country's basic dit;i :.,,lties. Since mid- September 1972, however, Marcos has completely changed the rules of the game. By concen- trating so much power in his own hands, he appears to have put himself in a far better position to implement needed reforms. Nevertheless, he is still faced with all the old problems including the deep- seated economic ills, the regionally, economically, and politically based dissidence, the pervading influence of the oligarchy, and the growing nationalistic sen- timent� that he and his predecessors have had to con- tend with in the past. Moreover, as indicated earlier, his moves have introduced new elements of instability into the domestic scene, provoked a virtual rebellion in the south, and seriously complicated his countrv'� relations with its neighbors and with Washington. Thus the road ahead is unlikely to be easy. The Years Ahead: Old Problems and Some New Onys (s) Most of the problems facing Marcos are in- terrelated, and thus it is difficult to analyze any one of them in isolation. Nevertheless, it is clear that much will depend on Marcos' ability to improve his coun- try's economic performance. Philippine society, like that of virtually all other developing nations today, is subject to sharply rising popular expectations. Moreover, the socioeconomic reforms� particularly land reform envisaged under Marcos' current New Society program will be expensive. Yet over the past few vears, the increase in real GNP bas barely out- paced a growth in population of about 3% anrrr311y. As a result, per capita income has registered little im- provement, and in 1972 was less than $200. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 '7 Slum in old quarter of Manila Antigovernment sign in Manila before martial law was declared w Adr. PRIT. RTI LA v Agriculture is still the backbone of the Philippine J econornv, employing about half the total labor force and accounting for the of PlliliPPillv export earnings. Despite its importance, however, the agri- cultural sec!or has been seriously neglected. Moderni- No WORS WT nation and irrigation progrnis 1111 not been pushed. Inefficient and socialk disruptive sharecropping re- Illains widespread. Even Marcos cjInIp.l to promote a "Green Revolution through the IlIctioll of high yielding varic!ies of seeds has run into difficulties. After all encouraging spurt, rice produc- tion began to lag again in 1971, and large-scale itl ports have had to be resumed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4 15 a J@TO�Wn Te &5m s; i i i t Despite a steady increase in mineral production, overall industrial performance has fallen short of ex- pectations in recent years as well. In part, this is at- tributable to longstanding protectionist policies. While intended to provide a secure market for local business, high Philippine tariffs have resulted in the develop- ment of an inefficient manufacturing sector that is plagued with the twin ills of substantial overcapacity and products which are generally noncompetitive on the world market. Marcos, aware of this problem, is attempting to rationalize some sections of Philippine industry; progress, however, has been slow. In the meantime, difficulties and imbalances in the agricultural and industrial sectors have resulted in ris- ing unemployment in the cities and underemploym�nt in the rural areas. Inflationary trends have caused a decline in :eal wages; the consumer price index rose 22% in 1971 and, despite the introduction of austere anti inflationary monetary and fiscal policies, climbed another 8% in 1972. In addition, domestic economic problems have continuc;d to hamper the government's efforts to overcome persistent balance of payments dif- ficulties. Philippine foreign economic relations in genr;ral� foreign trade in particular suffer from an oN ercon- centration of products and partners. Just four primary commodities (sugar, coconut products, logs and lum- ber, and copper) account for 70% to 75% of the country's total exports. As a result, export earnings have fluctuated widely, thereby contributing to re- current and sometimes massive trade deficits as well as to the accumulation of a foreign debt, which by 1973 had risen to over $2 billion. Moreover, although the Japanese havr. recently entered the picture in a major way (Japan presently accounts for about one third of all Philippine trade), the Philippine economy is still heavily dependent on American consumers, credits, and products. When negotiations for a new accord to replace the expiring Laurel- Langley trade and investment agree- ment begin, consideration will have to be given io the fact that the United States presently not only takes some 40% of all Philippine exports but is also the major market for a number of Philippine primary produ ^ts. Almost all Philippine sugar exports, for example, are sent to the United States. Moreover, Wvshington [as provided a total of over $1.8 billion in economic assistance to Manila since 1946, and is still its principal source of foreign aid. Despite Japanese inroads, about 25% of all Philippine imports are still obtained from the United States. 16 In addition to purely economic problems and restraints, Marcos is faced with a number of social and political obstacles to effective reform. Among other things, he must overcome the inertia and inequities in- herent in his country's deep- seated kinship system. Moreover, there is no question that his success in ad- vancing his New Society program �and thereby in reducing popular discontent �will also depend heavily on his ability to cope both with the oligarchy and with a much larger group of relatively well -to -do officials and businessmen who have a vested interest in the status quo. Marcos has silenced the opposition press and re- duced petty corruption Ile has lashed out at the oligarchy and has jailed some of its members. Little progress, however, has been made toward implement- ing his key scheme for turning over about 5 million acres nf rice and corn land to the tenant farmers working it. Furthermore, although Marcos has im- plied that he intends to dismantle the economic empires of virtually all the oligarchs, his critic:, have noted that the two wealthy families he has moved most fore -fully against �the Lopez and Osmena families �were w.d remain his bitterest political enemies. Thus the issue of the future role of the Philippines' traditional political and economic elite remains in doubt. The imposition of martial law has forced the opposi- tion Liberal Party into the background, but Marc.)s must still contend with plots hatched by disgruntled politicians and oligarchs, with a restless non -Com- munist left composed of students, intellectuals, and reformist priests, with the subversive activities of various Communist groups, and with the Muslim revolt in the south. The re!ative importance of these threats to domestic stability could well change er a period of time. Indeed, it is possible that further in- ternal difficulties could strengthen all anti Marcos forces and even encourage them to coordinate their activities. In the late spring and early summer of 1973, however, the Muslim situation was the most ominous. t 'The non- Communist left was relatively quiet. The tiny pro Soviet Philippine Communist Party (PKP) represented nu threat. The militant and avowedly Ma,.ist Philippine Communist Party Marxist /Leninist (PKP -M %L) was believed to have fewer than 20)0 members. Despite grandiose membership claims, the PKP M /l: s front organizations probably could muster no more than 3,000 activists. And although active in parts of Luzon and tit, isayas, thr PKP -M /l: s military ann �the New Peoples Army was estimated to have an armed cadre of only about 1.300 men. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 lf I@l� WE OTNF& ff C The roo of Filipino Muslim discontent in the Philippines are old and deep. The Muslims of Min- danao and the Sulu Archipelago have consistently resisted encroachment, whether Spanish, American, or Filipino Christian. In recent years their suspicions and resentments have been nourished by an influx of Christian homesteaders and speculators seeking traditional Muslim lands in western Mindanao and by governmental indifference or even hostility to Muslim: interests. Since the Muslims regard their rifles both as symbols of manhood and as their only reliable defense against the depredations of nonbelievers and the central government alike, the incidence of bloodshed has iended to increase apace. Nevertheless, the situation remained manageable until the govern- ment announced its intention of picking up all private weapons under the provisions of rre ,.'dent Marcos' martial law decree. Tliis announcement not only offended Muslim custom but also was interpreted by many Muslims as a tactic to expand and perp �tuate Christian dominance in the Mindanao -Sulu Archipelago region. They refused to s�. their arms, and for the next 4 or 5 months there was a stand- off as the two sides took each other's measure. In February 1973, Marcos commenced preparations for launching a major offensive against the Muslim dissidents, but his plans miscarried. Faced with early reverses in its offensive, the central government risked censure from Malaysia and the Arab nations by mak- ing greater use of close air support, naval gunfire, and armored r !rsonnel carriers. More ominous, it began forming armed Barrio (village) Self Defense Units �in some cases said to consist of anti- Mtislim vigilantes �in Christian areas, thereby exacerbating religious tensions and making the conflict more in- tractable. In his initial appeals for additional U.S. military assistance, Marcos laid the blame for the fighting in the south on Communist- influenced M uslim separatist organizations and foreign intervention. But like his es- timate that there were tb ^n nearly 17,000 armed Muslims facing his forces, this analysis was self serving and well wide of the mark. The insurrection had in fact been provoked by ill conceived government policies. True enough, Libya's militant President Qadhafi had loudly espoused the rebel cause, and Malaysia was working quietly to use Marcos' troubles with the Muslims to pressure him into renouncing his country's claim to Sabah. Nevertheless, the covert sup- port �arms, money, and training furnished the in- surgents by and through the tough minded and free- wheeling Chief Minister of Malaysia's self- govern- ing Sabah State had been limited. While certainly a contributing factor, it could not be counted as a primary cause of the crisis. Similarly, all the known Muslim secessionist organizations in the southern Philippines were weak, and there was no concrete evidence to support Marcos' assertion that they were dominating or guiding the uprising. Nor did there appear to be any factual basis for his claim of signifi- cant Communist influence over the rebels. While available data were admittedly fragmentary, it seemed likely that Marcos was overstating Muslim armed strength by about 10,000. Nevertheless, the situation Marcos faced in the south was serious enough. The Muslims were well armed with modern weapons, including mortars, mach neguns, and rockets, and they exercised de facto control over large areas. Moreover, they were operating over familiar terrain and among a generally sympathetic population. Although the government had deployed nearly 11,000 men, including two- thirds of its infantry battalions and most of the Philippine Constabulary's local units, it was unable to gain the initiative. The small (29,000) Philippine Army, bur- dened with its new administrative duties under martial law and confronted with the growing Peking- oriented PKP -M; L threat in the north, was taxed to the limits of its capabilities. The country's first military draft� inith ed in May 1973� offered no quick and effective solution to this mar,, ower problem. In fact, even if the United States had been willing and able to provide all the additional military assistance that Mar co had requested �which it was not �it seemed most unlikely that government forces could soon score a decisive military victory over the Muslim insurgents. Fortunately, there were signs that Marcos was heeding the urgent advice offered him both by Washington and by his ASEAN partners and was try- ing to pave the way for a negotiated settlement with the Muslim dissidents. In early April 1973 he co icedec that the Muslims did, in fact, have many legitimate grievances. Shortly thereafter, he dispatched two engineering battalions to Mindanao to help with com- munity electrification and road repair projects. He toned down his charges of foreign intervention, and as summer approached he seemed to be considering bury- ing the territorial claims that had prompted Malaysia to allow Sabah to be used as a logistical base for the rebels. The Sabah issue is, in fact, illustrative of a broader problem: how to reconcile a consciously fostcrM and 17 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 I I i growing spirit of Philippine nationalism with pragmatic considerations of national interest. Like mop' other Philippine politicians in recent years, Presi- dent Marcos has sought to manipulate nationalistic sentiment to his own advantage. His predecessor, President Macapagal, was the first to press the Sabah claim, but ii was Marcos who raised it to a point of honor in 1968. Similarly, Marcos has tended to adopt a particularly assertive posture vis -a -vis the United States whenever he has wished to distract popular attention from domestic problems. But such tactics are becoming more tricky. The character of Philippine nationalism has changed. Once confined for the most part to a small circle of leading families, it is now a broadly based and powerful political force. Moreover, as more and more members of the better educated postwar generation have come of age, there has been a weakening of many of the restraints which previously kept Philippine :nationalism fron, developing a strong and consistent anti -U. S. tone. Marcos must move very carefully if he is to avoid releasing passions which could greatly complicate his efforts to protect basic Philippine political and economic interests in the Nixon Doctrine era. However strong the urge to rally popular support under a banner of chauvinism, he cannot afford to alienate Washington o- his ASEAN partners, and neither can he risk foreclosing any movement toward limited rap- prochement with Peking. Yet he must maintain his nationalist credentials. Martial law has at least tem- porarily freed him of the worry that rival politicians or a jingoist press might attack him over such foreign policy concessions as he may feel compelled to make. But if only bottled up, Philippine nationalism could all too easily be exploited by the Maoists and other ex- tremist groups. Hence Marcos is faced with the twin �and demanding �tasks of giving his coun- tryinen's nationalist aspirations a more pragmatic and positive cast and of linking them more directly to achievement of his ;-rojected New Society reforms. 18 I i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 1 C7 K.: y i Chronology (u Jou) 1565 Spain establishes first permanent settlement at Cebu; begins colonization of the Philippines. 1572 Manila founded ')y the Spanish. 1896 August Katipunan Society under Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguninaldo begins revolt against Spain. 1898 December Philippines is ceded to the United States by Tre ty of Paris. 1899 January Malolos constitution is promulgated; Aguinaldo is elected President of first Philippine Republic. 1916 August .Jones Act creates first elective legislature and vests greater powers in Philippine Government. 1934 March Tydings- McDuffie Act provides for Philippine Common- wealth and full independence in 10 years. 1935 September Elections are held for President, Vice President, and National Assembly; Manuel Quezon is elected first Commonwealth President. November Commonwealth is formally established; United States retains control of defense and foreign relations, supervisory rights over certain financial questions, and the right to intervene to preserve the Commonwealth. 1941 December Japanese initiate air attacks on Philippines 8 December; fall of Corregidor on 6 May 1942 ends organized resistance. 1944 October United States forces under Gen. Douglas MncArthur land on Leyte and begin reoccupation of Philippines. Organized Japanese resistance ends in September 1945. 1945 November Manuel Roxas is elected President. 1946 July Philippines is granted independence by the United States. U.S.- Philippine Trade Agreement provides for an 8 -year period of free U.S. Philippine trade to be followed by 20 years of gradually imposed tariffs; Americans are given equal rights and privileges in exploiting Philippine natural resources and operating public services. 1947 March U.S. Philippine Military Base Agreement grants to United States the use of bases in Philippines for 99 -year period; is followed by signing of Military Assistance Agreement. 1948 April President Roxas dies; Vice President Elpidio Quirino assumes presidency and is elected to office in November. 1951 August Philippines and United States sign Mutual Defense Treaty; the United States pledges to act "in accordance with its constitutional processes" in defense of the Philippines. 1953 November Ramon Magsaysay is elected President. 1954 September South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Agreement "Manila Pact is signed. 1956 January Laurel- Langlcy Agreement revises 1946 trade agreement; provides for less rapid imposition of U.S. duties on imports from Philippines. 1957 March Magsaysay is killed in air crash; Vice President Carlos Garcia succeeds him as President and is himself elected in November. 1961 November Diosdado Macapagal, Vice President under Garcia, is elected President. 1962 June Philippines formally claims sovereignty over part of British North Borneo (now Sabah); joins Indonesia in opposition to proposed formation of Malaysir,. 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 J_J11717 11117 1111:a rJ7 III 7It1 11 J 1111!1111'1h IM 1963 December September Diplomatic relations with Malaysia resumed; moratorium Philippines breaks relations with-Malaysia following formal on Sabah issue continued. inauguration of Malaysian federation. 1964 1970 May January �April Jesus Lava, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Students demonstrate against Marcos' plans to Perpetuate the Philippines, is captured after many years of hiding. himself in office. Consular relations are established with Malaysia. November 1965 November National election of delegates to constitutional convention. Feaainand Marcos wins election to Presidency over incum- 1971 bent Macapagal. January �May 1966 Students again demonstrate against Marcos' political June ambitions. Full diplomatic relations are resumed with Malaysia. June July Constitutional convention convened. Marcos signs to send civic action group to South Vietnam. August September Marcos suspends writ of habeas corpus in wake of bombing at political rally; restored in some areas in September. U.S. military bases agreement of 1047 renegotiated to provide f.; a 25 -year tenure dating from 1966. November 1967 Marcos' Nacionalista Party suffers severe setbacks in Senate November elections. Marcos' Nacionalista Party wins significant gains in the 1972 off -year elections. September 1968 Marcos imposes martial law. March October Strained relations develop with Malaysia over revelation of Philippine plotting against Sabah. Long smouldering Muslim rebellion breaks out in south. July December Philiupine- Malaysian talks in Bangkok on Ph:_ippine claim Constitutional convention completes work on new con to Sabah collapse. stitution calling for parliamentary system. September 1973 Malaysia suspends relations with the Philippines as a January result of Sabah dispute. Extra-legal citizens' assemblies ratify new constitution, but December Marcos delays full implementation in favor of continued Marcos quietly suspends Philippine claim to Sabah, indefinite period of one -man rule tinder martial law. 1969 March November Sabah issue stirred tap again by Marcos claim of Malaysian Marcos re- elected to unprecedented second term. involvement in Muslim insurgency problem. 20 t l4 lr L 4 y� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 I a s i i C' Area Brief LAND (UIOU) Size: 116,000 so. mi. Use: 53% forested, 30% arable land, 5% permanent pasture 12% other WATER: (UIOU) Limits of territorial waters (claimed): Under archipelago theory, waters within straight lines joining appropriate points of outermost islands are considered internal waters; waters between these baselines and the limits described in the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, the U.S. -Spain Treaty of November 7, 1900, and the U.S. -U.K. Treaty of January 2, 1930 are considered to be the territorial sea Coastline: About 14,000 mi. PEOPLE: (UIOU) Population: 40,194,000 (estimated 1 July 1973); density 346 persons per square mile; 32% urban, 68% rural (1970 census) Ethnic composition: Approximately 96% of the population of Malay stock; 2.5% indigenous tribal peoples, and 1.5% Chinese or other Religion: 84% Roman Catholic, 9% Protestant, 5% Muslim, 2% animist or followers of traditional Chinese religions Languages: National language, Pilipino (Tagalog); leading foreign language, English; other vernacular languages include Cebuano, Iloco, Hiligaynon, Bikol, Samar- Leyte, Pampangan, Pangasinan, and Muslim Filipino (Moro) tongues Literacy: About 83% of the population age 10 and over (1970 census) Labor force: 11 million; 51.2% agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 12.2% manufacturing and mining, 3.7 construction, 12.2% commerce, 4.5% transport and utilities, 16.2% services GOVERNMENT: (UIOU) Legal name: Republic of the Philippines Type: Republic Capital: Quezon Political subdivisions: 72 provinces Legal system: Based on Spanish, Islamic, and Anglo- American law; parliamentary constitution passed 1973; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court; legal education at University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, and 71 other law schools; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations; currently being ruled under martial law Branches: New constitution (currently suspended) provides for unicameral National Assembly, a branch under a prime minister; judic Supreme Court with descending aut Appeals, courts of First instance i municipal courts in chartered cities, an nd a strong executive ial branch headed by hority in a Court of n various provinces, d justices of the pence in towns and municipalities; thr,e justices have considerably more authority than do justices of the peace in the U.S. Government leader: President Ferdinand E. Marcos Suffrage: Universal over age 18 Elections: Elections suspended for the indefinite future Political parties and leaders: Liberal Party, Gerardo M. Roxas; Nacionalista Party, Gil J. Puyat; all political party activity now suspended under current state of martial law Communists: About 1,300 armed insurgents Member of: ADB, ASEAN, ASPAC, Colombo Plan, ECAFE, IAEA, ICAO, IHB, Seabeds Committee (observer), SEATO, U.N., UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO ECONOMY: (UIOU) NDP: $6.7 hillion (est. 1972 Agriculture: Main crops �rice, corn, coconuts, sugarcane, abaca, tobacco Fishing: Catch, I million tons (1971) Major industries: Agricultural processing, textiles, chemicals and chemical products Electric power: 2.9 million kw. capacity (1972); 10 billion kw. -hr. produced, 251 kw. -hr. per capita Exports: $1,106 million (f.o.b., 1972); sugar, copper concentrates, logs and lumber, coconut oil Imports: $1,230 million (f.o.b., 1972) Major trade partners: (1972) exports -40% U.S., 34 %Japan; imports -32% Japan, 25% U.S. Aid: Economic--U.S. (FY46 -72) $1.8 billion committed; Japan (reparations), $550 million extended in 1956, $337 million drawn through 1969; IBRD (1953 -72), $268 million com- mitted Military �U.S. (FY46 -72) $673 million committed Monetary conversion rate: 6.78 pesos= USS1.00 (May 1973) (floating rate) Fiscal year: 1 July -30 June COMMUNICATIONS: (C) Railroads: 2,177 mi.: 727 route miles of government owned 3'6" -gage common- carrier lines on Luzon and Panay; 19 industrial lines of four different gages totaling 1,450 miles most are short lines of very narrow gage Highways: 45,690 miles; 2,084 miles concrete, 2,324 miles bituminous, 4,478 miles bituminous surface treatment, 23,770 miles gravel or crushed stone, 13,034 miles of earth roads Inland waterways: 2,000 miles; limited to shallow -draft vessels Pipelines: 158 miles for refined products 21 F ti. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Y SECRET Ports: 11 major, !00 minor Merchant marine: 170 ships, 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 834,931 g.r.t., 1,202,539 d.w.t. (Oct. 1972) Civil air: 83 major transports Airfields: 386 total, 273 usable; 42 with permanent surface; 6 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 26 with runways 4,000- 7,999 ft.; 6 seaplane stations Telecommunications: Excellent international radio, sub marine cable, and communications satellite ground station services; interisland services are adequate but intrrisland domestic services are inadequate; over 350,000 telephones; nearly 6 million radio sets; about 500,000 TV sets; over 100 primary AM, 8 FM, and 16 TV stations; submarine cables extend to South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Guam, and the U.S.; international satellite station; troposcatter link to Taiwan Y. DEFENSE FORCES: (S) Military Manpower: Males 15 -4.), 9,209,000; about 65% fit for military service; average number reaching military age (20), 1974 -79, about 392,000. Personnel: Total, 79,000; general headquarters, AFP, 3,400; army, 29,000; navy, 11,500 (including 3,200 marines); air force, 8,200; constabulary, 26,900 Major ground units: 2 light infan:ry divisions; 3 separate infantry brigades; 1 engineer brigade Ships: 122 ships and craft Aircraft: About 235 (54 jets) Supply: Provided almost exclusively by the U.S. Military Assistance Program; minor amounts from Japan, Australia, and Italy; virtually no domestic production capability for military equipment SECRET i i i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou) NAT E S COORDINATES o fE. o tN Agno (strm) 16 02 Agus (sirm) 8 11 Agusan (sirm) 9 00 Agusan del Sur (prov) 8 30 Albay Gulf (gulf) 13 10 Arnpayon.............................. 8 58 Angat (strin) 14 53 Angeles 15 09 Antipolo 14 35 Antique (prov) 11 1() Arayat, Mount (min) 15 12 Bacolod 10 40 Bagacay 11 49 Baguio 16 25 Balabac Island URI) 7 57 Balayan Bay (bay) 13 51 Baler................................. 15 46 Baler Bay (bay) 15 ,,o Baliwasan C r 5 Basilan 6 42 Basilan Island (isi) 6 34 Basilan Strait (str) 6 49 Bataan (prov) 1,1 1() Batangas 13 45 Batangas Bay (bay) 13 43 flauan 13 48 Bauang 16 31 Benguet (prow) 16 30 Bicol (sirm) 13 44 Bohol is *0"MWWW 9 50 NAT E S COORDINATES o fE. W. PE. 120 08 Luzon (isl) 16 00 121 00 124 12 Mactan Island (isl) 10 18 123 58 125 31 Makati 14 34 121 02 125 50 Malolos 14 51 120 49 124 00 Mandaluyong 14 38 121 03 125 36 Manila 14 35 121 00 120 46 Manila Bay (bay) 14 30 120 45 120 35 Marawi 8 01 124 18 121 10 Maria Cristina Falls (falls) 8 11 124 12 122 05 Mariveles 14 26 120 29 120 45 Masbate (isl) 12 15 123 30 122 57 Mayon Volcano (mi) 13 15 123 41 125 14 Mindanao (sirm) 7 07 124 24 120 36 Mindanao (is!) 8 00 125 00 117 01 Mindoro (isl) 12 50 121 05 120 47 Mindoro Occidental (prov) 13 00 120 55 121 34 Mountain (prow) 17 05 121 10 121 35 Muntinglupa 14 23 121 03 122 05 Naga 13 37 123 11 121 58 NRSugbu 14 05 120 38 122 03 Navotas (port) 14 39 120 57 122 05 Negros (isl) 10 00 123 00 120 25 Negros Occidental (prov) 10 25 123 00 121 03 Nueva Ecija (prov) 15 35 121 00 121 00 Olongapo 14 50 120 16 121 01 Paete 14 23 121 29 120 20 Pnkiputan Strait (sir) 7 07 125 40 120 40 Palawan (iql) 9 30 118 30 123 07 Palawan (prow) 10 00 118 45 124 10 Pain panga (siren) 14 47 120 311 �A� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4 J J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 Philippines i i Railroad (3'6 gage) Road i Airfield Major port Populated places Quezon 754,452 (1970) O Over 100,000 0 20,000 to 100,000 Under 20,000 Spot elevations in feet Scale 14,000,000 0 so 100 150 Statute Miles 0 50 100 15 Kilometers 0 0 e 0 Ph,lippine 5 'e a o Catanduanes island Industry and Mining 0 a o INDUSTRY Fabricated metal products Hydroelectric powerplant J Thermal powerplant Petroleum refining 'Narvacan Forest products processing Cu Food and tobacco processing 12 Au Textile and fiber products processing Barlo Cu Cu Cr MINING F Cr Chromite Cr C Coal QFamands Manila area Cu Copper small q%- Au Gold Que on Manila Fe Iron 11' Tagcawa, Nasugbu AF Ni Nickel b Calsugg 1- y ovrr I w.-.. .....N "on APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 )gas t U 6 angao e (f 0 (lam a Estan e E o Iloilo Silly 0 9 La ndota ISo C U C Bayaran TJ TA :'A ELVA ME a] :'JM :'A= 1M =NWA -4, A 0 incinnat, O n Balud pan T l 45 il '0 di: and Mining 0 *Ocoyo d metal products Tic powerplant Puerto Princesa werplant refining Narvacan Jucts processing Cu Dbacco processing Au fiber products processing Cu Cu Cr F Imite Cr Jr eLl'arn'annda Manila area Zamboanga w Imal QUO oaf 0 Manila y Tagcowayan Natugbu If b III Au F Batangas F e. Tabangao Leo 0 Cu .0 Estate Bog T clob a o Ilollo Je SSAY e La Cerlota e O ab Bala Cu Au N' Bayawan d 4 0 Gingooll utuan t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4 ff 11.011 �1 111 IN I If All other crops 9.6 cco I A Abaca m T Tobacco Land Utilization Major fishing port Cultivated land Commercial forest Fishpond development Uncultivated land PRINCIPAL CROPS R Rice C Corn N Coconut S Sugarcane All other crops 9.6 cco I A Abaca m T Tobacco 01: 15 on �17 W 120 58 Pampangn. (provy.'. 15 4 0 1 "Td '1 6 Duayan 0 07 125 15 Pandacan (part of Alanila) 14 36 121 00 Bukidnon (prov) 8 00 125 00 Panay (W) 1 15 122 30 Bulacan (prov) 15 00 121 05 Pasay 14 33 121 00 Butuan 8 54 125 35 Pasay (Rizal) 14 33 121 00 Cabanatuan 15 29 120 58 Pasig (sirm) 14 36 120 58 Cadiz 10 57 123 18 Poro Point (pl) 11 58 124 20 Cagayan (strm) 18 22 121 37 Porn Island (isl) 16 06 120 06 Cagayan de Oro 8 29 124 39 Port San Vicente IS 30 122 09 Cagayan Valley (val) 17 30 121 45 Pulupandan 10 31 122 48 Calarrba 14 13 121 10 Quezon 14 38 121 00 Caloocan 14 38 121 03 Rizal (prov) 14 35 121 10 Camalig 13 11 123 39 Rosario 14 25 120 51 Cam arines Norte (prov) 14 10 122 45 Roxas 11 35 122 45 Canlubang 14 15 121 05 Samar (isl) 12 00 125 00 Capiz (prov) 11 24 122 34 San Carlos 10 30 123 25 Carmen 15 01 120 32 San Fernando 15 01 120 41 Casiguran 16 17 122 07 San Fernando 16 37 120 19 Catubig (sirm) 12 34 125 01 San Fernando Point (pl) 16 38 120 17 Cavite 14 29 120 55 Sangley Point (pt) 14 30 120 55 Cavite (prov) 14 15 120 50 Sail Jose 15 48 121 00 Cavite Peninsula (pen) 14 26 120 53 San Juan 14 35 121 07 Cebu 10 18 123 54 San Jtanico Strait (str) 11 20 124 58 Cebu (isl) 10 20 123 45 San Pablo 14 04 121 19 Central Luzon Valley (pin) 15 30 120 40 San Pedro Bay (bay) 11 11 125 05 Corregidor Is!and (isl) 14 23 120 35 Santo Domingo 14 14 121 03 Cotabato 7 13 124 15 Sipalay 9 45 122 24 Cotabato (prov) 7 00 124 40 Sorgogon 12 58 124 00 Cuartero 11 21 122 40 Spratly Island (isl) 8 38 111 55 Cubi Point (pt) 14 48 120 16 Subic Bay (bay) 14 45 120 IS Dagupan 16 03 120 20 Sulu (prov) 5 30 120 30 Danao 10 32 124 02 Sulu Archipelago (i818) 6 00 121 00 Dao 11 24 122 41 Summit 11 06 122 38 Daraga, 13 09 123 43 Surigao 9 45 125 30 Davao 7 18 125 25 Surigao del Norte (prov) 9 46 125 38 Davao del Norte (prov) 7 30 126 00 Tabangao 13 42 121 05 Davao Gulf (gulf) 6 40 125 55 Taal (lake) 13 55 121 00 Digos 6 45 125 20 Taal, Mount (Yntn) 1,1 00 121 00 Dumaguete 9 18 123 18 Tacloban 11 15 125 00 Dumarao 11 16 122 41 Tarlac 15 29 120 35 Floridablanca 14 59 120 31 Tarlac (prov) 15 30 120 30 Gapan 15 19 120 57 Tawitawi Island (isl) 5 10 120 00 General ",anto. (Rajah Buayan) 6 07 125 11 Toledo 10 23 123 38 Guimaras Island (isl) 10 35 122 37 Tondo (part of Manila) 14 37 120 58 Guimaras Strait (sir) 10 30 122 44 Tuguegarao 17 37 121 44 Iligan 8 14 124 14 Valenzuela 14 42 120 58 Iligan Bay (bay) 8 25 124 05 Visayan Islands (i.31s) 11 00 123 30 Iloco8 Norte (prov) 18 10 120 45 Zambales (prov) 15 20 120 10 Ilocos Sur (prov) 17 20 120 35 Zamboanga 6 5 122 04 Iloilo 10 42 122 34 Zamboanga del Sur (pror) 7 30 122 25 Iloilo (strm) 10 42 122 35 Iloilo Strait (str) 10 43 122 36 Kalibo 11 43 12222 Selected airfields Kalinga-Apayao (prov) 17 45 121 15 Laguna (prot 14 10 121 20 Bacolod 10 39 122 56 Lanao del Norte (prov) 8 10 123 55 Baguio 16 23 120 37 Lanao del Sur (prov) 7 55 124 20 Basa A B 14 59 120 29 La Paz 10 43 122 34 Cagayan de. Oro 8 25 124 37 Larap Peninsula (pen) 14 18 122 39 Clark AB 15 11 120 33 La Trinidad 16 28 120 35 Cubi Point NAS 14 48 120 16 Lebak 6 32 124 03 D Z Rom ualdez 11 14 125 02 Legazpi 13 08 123 44 Davao 7 08 125 31) Lepanto 16 52 120 46 Fernando A B 13 57 121 07 Leyte (isi) 10 r)o 124 50 Iloilo 10 43 122 33 Ligao 13 14 123 32 I,aoag 18 11 120 32 Limay 14 34 120 311 Mactan International 1() 1( 123 59 Lingayen Gulf (gulf) 16 15 120 14 Manila International 14 31 121 01 Lipa 13 57 121 10 Sangley Point AB H 30 120 54 Lubang Island (isl) 13 46 120 11 Zambonnga 6 55 122 04 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4 ynrn�r�r�a�n Malaysia u u �CU%O valt ISLANDS it o s ski Cady J Cup San Jose a P F. 12Y f t de Buenavim, 1 110 Bacol e 8 Dumnran island Gulmaras ulupendan� I Island n e ult L"a e Car oe Pa G an Kabank o c Im Caua an m` CAGAYAN Baia o ISLANDS, i Bay Dumaguete 6 13, f I Q rsr Tagoto Point epRan S e a Dipol o w. Sindangag Li I i i r Iliana Sibuguey 83y ambulii Olutanga Point Island Moro Gulf 6asllan Shalt Basilan Island ANGUTARAN o" l TURTLE GROUP A p ��o \ISLANDS J pJOLO GROUP o Ranau Qp a SANALES Sandakan e GROUP 0 Sea s o don island O, lRomb Bub hl Rmn 5 bn Ti O- a Sibuyan l; Busuan a sy Island 2283." g tp o Manda C.II.AMIAN Bland ti blas f 9r GROUP d Island Ba led fjp Culion' Reservation SSLA o lbajay rroro, '�'BSatgPlac Islanbl ter, o d alnb Ch annPr h vlsap Linapeca oas d c Sec o Culasi r. ao a�ncia VIS, o Panay o. Deep 37 D mara0 Cape Bullluyan d c` Isl abac Island Balabac Strait Cy Cagayan Sulu Ku t 1") Island Indonesla TAPUL P GROUP V TAWI AWI 0 V �R OUP Q C f A Y SIBUTU9 q GROUP d N s 6 P 120 r 2...i. sit.^.4H.�Ut.r c ^5 2 a�% �n. TC.i. aterman r Samar o d roe Q 161, r C' Samar Ibiypg S a 0 'Sea aft Place O Catbelogan i Visayan iliren be a Sea Island try ongan Juanic San A VISA AN sire Daanb6)ttayan ral arig a o San Guivan 3 ra ISL S moo.. B Ped yro Leyte lksungiPoint ebU O a Gulf Hompn n Be Is en jc Leyte Carnotes T t 0 pu Sea Isl e me tan Is, in 2221 Island 2 Hi �a a r I se O i t Inabangii t Tncan �j S'arga0 Point 6 Island 2 r. d a Island o 0 T Sur' qC. mo o oftol tZra `bucua Grande Island maguete r0 Cambe' 1� r \f> Camiguin 'Siquijor a6 Island Tandag Island m itan I in as Lianga yan Prosp ridad Bay rP9 Illgan to t l Bay I ontee Iligan e t Me ybala lambu n Lake Mindanao Suttan A/onto 8111019 y+ +w* ee Illane 88y s E y TTT Tagn Tembulian t Caraga Point 9 F &at U f t n `a I gag 9 v Paklputan strait Dipoa Davao Gulf t i one w Maim F Cape San Agustin Genxa Santos v 6e -7 8 Pulau Wengas (Indonasia) a V SARANGANI S e a iSIANDS PULAU -PULAU NANUSA o o (Indonas4) q ulau Karakelong (Indonesia) Names and �oundary representation are not necessarily authornstive a z n dr a Bat O t D D 0 O c 0 a O 0 V Rosas G w42 0 O Q La Carlot Gmhu Asa s Lilay of v Zamboanga isilan Jolo a 0 D APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4 a _5.. i v..{i l[L'?f x UCy'7,,,' r wl'.�l'f .t a \.".iF X r p r ...x: tt.. =Y it 5 111- nv C olambu Fe e O Cotabala Aa O Zemboanga D Fe 1 .'Basco Basil J yso tt arao O a 0 o a o D a8 2 Administrative Bang ad .Tuguegaran Divisions* Vipan 5 Tahu Is an 4 .ono SO 6 La a 11 '''nvJnco boundary San Fernando 9 _a� boon Province capital 1115 r o 19- �b San pro Balant e 18 o Trace 1 0 22 .0 O b T'72 Population* an t guegarao Persona per square mile Jolo fit 0 26 130 520 1820 65 C 0 1q 50 200 lop Persons per square kilometer 'eg �M D INDEX TO PROVINCES" Because complete data from the 1s70 I. Balanes 15. Ouelon census are nor yet available. the den b 8n 1. Cagayan shies shown are based on the 1960 census O ha T r aeu a in slogan 10 Reiss La Carlou 4 V I uihu Jolo a 0 D a O Puerto Princess 66 a Q 15 ue_anl O P p' Sa5ta o 1 2 �Oaet (27 24 1 1 Lucen 2 Pili� 6 Use Lepalpi Wage lJ/ 31. 2 n Sorsopon 28 'Romblon a (((((fJJJJ Masbate Color n 33 Q 3 3' e pan I(aliho Boron6 O 3 oaaa 37 41 Tacloban Iloilo 4 0 San Jose de Bac la oil Boenavlsla 44 eh Maas 47 Suri'a 49 Z n3 ap iar Oum uete ajao a 5 Dipole 53 ,Pi roquleta ayan 56 52 wi 51 an t 0 Mal bola 7 Pagadlan`.- 58 59 62 S Tagc Pagalungan 60 J 63 J9 ada Davao City Jolo fit 65 C D INDEX TO PROVINCES" I. Balanes 15. Ouelon 28. Mindoro Occidental 41, Iloilo 54, Misamis Oriental 1. Cagayan 16 Zambales 29. Mindoro Oriental 42, Negros Occidental 55 Agusan del Norte 3. Jocos Norte 17. Tarlac 30. Marinduque 43. Negros Oriental 56. Agu:in del Sur 4, Ilocos Sur 18. Bataan 31. Albay 44, Cebu 57. L enao del Norte 5.Abra 19.Pempanga 32.Sarsagon IS. Leyte 58. Loran del Sur I Kalinga Ape;ae 20. Bulacan 33. Romblon I6. Southern Leyte 59. Bukidn in 1. Mountain 21, Rital 34, Masbate 47. Bohol 60. Cotabato 8. La Union 22. Cavile 35. Northern Samar 48. Camiguin 51. South Cotabato 9. Benguet 23. Laguna 36. Samar 49. Surlgao del Norte 62. Cava, del Norte f0. Ifugao 24 Batangas 37 Eastern Samar 50. Suogao del Sur 63 Davao del Sur 11. Isabela 25. Camannes yorte 38. Aklan 51. Zamboanga del Norte 64. Davao Oriental 12. Nueva Vizcaya 26. Camannes Sur 39. Capir 52. Zamboanga del Sur 65. Sulu 13. Pangasinen 27, C,alandusnes 40. Antique 53 Misamis Occidental 66. Palawan 14, Nueva Ecija 59 charfined apnc (Nnvrncr revel) an nor shown c,ccnf Davao der. shown are pie :970 AdeguaM mhrrmaron n not a-lahle to chow houndnrms nl the p-r-es crenred s,rce 1970: Nueva Vilcaya and Ouinno from Poeva Vilcsyt (12) Negros Oriental and Siquilor from Negras Oriental (43) Lanao del Sur and Marsnaw from Lanao del Sur (58) Colalu. Sultan Koil,,: and Maguindanao from Cotabato (60) m Sulu and Tawilawi from Sulu (65)