NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 26; SOVIET UNION; THE ECONOMY

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U.S.S.R.
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the ecanor cover-
age in the Genera! SvmeV slated March 1971.
A. General
1. Introduction
2. llesouroe position
3. Economic growth
4. International econom ;a relations
A. Economic policy and development
Goals and policy
I Economic administration and control
3. Manpower
a. Size and composition of the Iabor force
b. Factors affecting productivity
4. Finance
5. Development
a. Planning
b. The 1971 -75 plan
Ster
1
2
4
6
7
7
8
10
10
11
12
14
14
14
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Page
C. Structure of the economy 18
1. Agriculture, fisheries and forestry 18
a. Problems and policies in agriculture 18
b. Main characteristics of Soviet agri-
culture
(1) Land use
(2) Resource base
(3) Farm organization
(4) Crops
(5) Livestock and livestock food
products
(6) Natural fibers
c. Fisheries
d. Adequacy of food supply and diet
e. Forest resources and products
2. Fuels and power
a. Primary energy
b. Coal
c. Petroleum
d. Electric power
3. Minerals and metals
a. Minerals
(1) Iron ore
(2) Ferroaliu;ring materials
(3) Nonferrous ores
b. Metals
(1) Ferrous metals
(2) Nonferrous metals
4. Manufacturing
a. General
b. Machinery, equipment and fabri-
cated metal products
(1) Competition between military
and civilian production
19
19
19
20
20
23
24
24
24
25
26
26
27
27
29
31
31
31
32
32
33
33
34
36
36
36
37
Page
(2) Defense production
38
(3) Civilian production
39
(a) Capital goods
39
(b) Shipbuilding
42
(c) Civilian motor vehicles
42
c. Chemicals and allied products
43
d. Textiles and wearing apparel
46
(1) General
46
(2) Production
46
e. Food processing
47
(1) Procurement and distribution
47
(2) Production
47
5. Construction and construction materials
48
a. Construction
48
b. Construction materials
49
6. Domestic trade
49
a. Producer goods
50
b. Consumer goods
50
(1) State controlled stores
50
(a) State stores
50
(b) Cooperative stores
51
(2) Collective farm markets
51
c. Illegal activities
51
D. International economic relations 51
1. Introduction 51
2. Foreign trade organization and control 51
3. Geographic distribution of foreign trade 52
4. Commodity composition of foreign trade 53
5. Exchange rate and international pay-
ments position 54
6. Soviet foreign aid 55
FIGURES
I11
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Page
Fig. 1
Strategic supply position table)
3
Fig. 7
Civilian employment by sector, U.S.
Fig. 2
Indicators of economic growth table)
4
and U.S.S.R. chart)
11
Fig. 3
Industrial output and factor pro-
Fig. 8
Labor productivity (chart)
11
ductivity chart)
5
Fig. 9
Changes in labor productivity table)
11
Fig. 4
Gross National Product by end use,
Fig. 10
State budget, 1973 plan (chart)
13
U.S. and U.S.S.R. (chart)
5
Fig. 11
Indicators of the 1971 -75 plan (table)
17
Fig. 5
Gross National Product, U.S. and
Fig. 12
Sown area, by crop (table)
21
U.S.S.R. (chart)
6
Fig. 13
Grain production, U.S. and U.S.S.R.
Fig. 6
U.S. and U.S.S.R. per capita produc-
chart)
21
tion table)
6
Fig. 14
Crop production and yields table)
22
I11
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Fig. 15
Livestock numbers (table)
22
Fig. 16
Food production table)
23
Fig. 17
Average diets, U.S. and U.S.S.R.
38
F;g. 28
(chart)
25
Fig. 18
Production of primary energy table)
26
Fig. 19
Production of fuels table)
28
Fig. 20
Production of petroleum products
40
Fig. 30
(table)
28
Fig. 21
Production of iron ore and ferro-
44
Fig. 32
alloying materials table)
32
Fig. 22
Pig iron and steel production (table)
33
Fig. 23
Supplies of principal nonferrous
49
Fig. 34
metals (chart)
35
Fig. 24
Production of principal nonferrous
50
Fig. 35
metals (table)
35
Fig. 25
Distribution of manufacturing chart)
36
Fig. 26
Growth in manufacturing branches
52
Fig. 38
(table)
37
iii
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Fig. 27
Growth of machine building and
metalworking (table)
38
F;g. 28
Distribution of machinery produc-
tion (chart)
38
Fig. 29
Production of capital goods and
consumer durables (table)
40
Fig. 30
Merchant shipbuilding (table)
42
Fig. 31
Production of basic chemicals table)
44
Fig. 32
Production of textiles and wearing
apparel (table)
47
Fig. 33
Contract construction table)
49
Fig. 34
Production of construction mate-
rials table)
50
Fig. 35
Retail sales table)
50
Fig. 36
Value of foreign trade table)
52
Fig. 37
Main trading partners chart)
52
Fig. 38
Commodity composition of foreign
trade (table)
54
iii
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the Economy
A. General
1. Introduction (C)
During the post -World War II period the U S.S.R.
has developed the second most powerful economy in
the world, one that has grown since 1930 from one
third to about half the size of the United States
economy. At times Soviet ebullience over their
economic prospects vis -a -vis the United States and the
capitalist world in general reached hyperbolic
extremes such us Khrushchev's pledge in 1960 to
overtake the United States in the production of major
industrial and agricultural commodities by 1971. Yet
the past decade has witnessed generally lower rates of
growth particularly in the early 1970'x� compared
with those experienced in the 1950's. At the same time
other industrialized countries, notably West Ger.
and Japan, as well as newcomers such as Israel,
"Taiwan, and Brazil stepped up their rate. of economic
growth to rates exceeding that of the Soviet economy.
Both the Soviet record and the Soviet model of
development have suffered unavoidably by ccnn-
parison. Nevertheless, the Soviet econorny is now so
large that its continued growth, although at even a
slower pace, provides the necessary wherewithal to
insure the preservation of power by the party, to
support un extensive defense effort, to fund manifold
scientific programs, and to extend Soviet power and
influence abroad.
The U.S.S.R. has attained this position of
ascendaney on the world scene by relentlessly pursuing
national policies determined by the self- perpetuating
elite at the top of the Communist Party. These
decisions are translated into long -terra and annual
plans for all segments of the economy: industry,
agriculture, consumption, investment, defense,
research and development, labor, foreign trade and
aid. An elaborate bureaucratic apparatus insures
compliance with these goals by each factory, farm.
and commercial enterprise through a system of
detailed directions and regulations that leaves little
room for individual initiative, entrepreneurship, or the
play of factors working toward economic rationality.
As a result, the unquestioned achievement of rapid
economic growth during the past half century has
been realized at great cost in terms of waste,
inefficiency, and human suffering. Another conse-
quence of this pattern of development was the long-
time subordination of the Soviet consumer, whose
demands on the economy's resources came after those
made for investment and defense. After Stalin, and
particularly since General Secretary Brezhnev's rise to
power, however, Soviet planners have paid more heed
to the demands of the consumer, although defense and
investment maintain their preferential position on the
scale of allocational priorities.
By means of their ability to enforce major priorities,
the Soviets have been able to mount and sustain
programs comparable to those in the United States in
the areas encompassing the sinews of national power.
Thus, although the U.S.S.R.'s total economic output is
only half that of the United States, in 1972 their
defense expenditures equaled those of the United
States (measured in U.S. dollars) and their investment
effort actually exceeded the U.S. level by a small
martin. Accordingly, the relative shortchanging in
terms of forgone consumption has continued for the
average citizen despite the considerable improvement
achieved during the past 20 years since the death of
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Stalin. On a per capita basis, consumption in the
U.S.S.R. is about one -third that in the United States, a
ratio that has not changed appreciably for many years.
This comparison, moreover, fails to take into
consideration serious limitations in terms of variety,
quality, and availability that plague most consumer
goods and services in the U.S.S.R.
Aside from a few specific areas such as large
helicopters and hydroelectric generating equipment,
Soviet production technology in general lags
significantly behind the level prevailing in the United
States, Western Europe. and Japan. In part this is
because the Soviet systam militates against the
sr iilover or transfer effect into the civilian economy of
technological triumphs in the military and space
fields. Of greater importance is the Soviet economic
bureaucracy, which is generally unreceptive to
technological and managerial innovation. Neverthe-
less, the gap in per capita output between the U.S.S.R.
and the United States continues to close in the
production of primary energy, certain industrial
materials, some foodstuffs, and heavy industrial
goods. On it sheer volume basis, the Soviets already
outproduce the United States in steel, coal, and
cement.
2. Resource position (C)
The Soviets have achieved their position of primacy
in the Communist sphere and us the second largest
economy in the world by the relentless development of
their resources in the direction of industrialization on
the basis of centralized planning and direction from
above. The basic wealth of the country in land, labor,
fuels, and industrial raw materials was evident in the
quarter century before World War I as industrializa-
tion began to accelerate in Imperial Russia. Stalin
resumed this course with it vengeance once the Civil
War and the disorders encountered in the decade
following the Bolshevik seizure of power were
surmounted. Both Khrushchev and the Brezhnev-
Kosygin regime have pursued this same goal of
industrial growth, albeit with important variations
resulting from the abiding agricultural problem, rising
consumer expectations, and the imperatives of modern
technology.
The U.S.S.R. is the largest country in the world,
occupying roughly one- sixtii (8.6 million square miles)
of the earths total land area and having the third
largest populatioi.'(almost 250 million at the end of
1972) after Chiwt .end India. The country possesses
vast resources of energy, metals, minerals, and fuels,
and produces significant amounts of basic industrial
products (Figure: I Reserves are particularly extensive
2
in waterpower, fossil fuels, forest, iron ore, manganese,
copper, chromite, lead, zinc, nickel, potassium, and
phosphates. As the more readily accessible deposits are
exploited, however, the Soviets must increasingly turn
to reserves that are affected by it combination of such
factors as lower quality, great distances from the major
consumption centers, or located in climatically severe
regions or areas of difficult terrain.
Demand for racy material resources has mounted
steadily to satisfy growing internal needs and to
maintain a high level of exports; exports of industrial
raw inaict'als have been used to further the
integration and dependence of East Europe on the
U.S.S.R. and to earn foreign exchange. Asa result, the
Soviet extractive industries are characterized by
generally high and rising c:rsts, which has led Moscow
to explore seriously the possibility of Joint ventures
with Western partners to develop these resources. The
agricultural resource base of the U.S.S.R. is relatively
meager, with 27% of the land mass classified as usable
agricultural land and only I I% as arable. Climatic
and geographic extremes rigorous winters, extensive
deserts and swampland, inadequate irrigation, and
sizable variations in temperature and moisture
levels� further restrict the potential of the Soviet
countryside.
Soviet stocks of productive fixed capital (plant and
equipment, including the value of basic herds and
draft animals) amounted to 510 billion rubles at the
end of 1972, almost three times the level of 1960.'
Accumulation of this capital stock has been
extraordinary since 1950; annual percentage additions
averaged more than 9 it rate rarely equaled in any
advanced economy for a sustained period of time. The
Soviet leadership apparently realizes that this
unusually high rate of capital formation must now be
tempered somewhat because of diminishing returns on
capital aril because of the need to boost consumption.
The 1971 -75 plan calls for an average annual increase
of 8 1 /"C,. in productive fixed capital. Although still high
by world standards, this nevertheless reflects a
downward adjustment.
The industrial sector holds slightly more than half of
Soviet productive fixed capital with agriculture
accounting for about one- fifth. These proportions
should gradually change as the share of new
investment devoted to agriculture continues to rise.
Compared with the United States, the stock of Soviet
productive fixed capital is only slightly smaller, but by
4bestern standards it is obsolescent.
The Soviet labor force of 128.1 million persons in
1972 was ai,out 45% greater than that of the United
'Undepruciated v;Jue expressed in new rubles at 1955 prices.
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FIGURE 1. Strategic supply position, 1971 (S)
(Millions of metric tons unless otherwise indicated)
PRODUCTION AS
A PERCENT OF
APPARENT APP %ISNT
PRODUCTION IMPORTS EXPORTS CONSUMPTION CONSUMPTION
Electric power (billions of kw.-hrs.)
800.4
0.0
6.7
793.7
100.8
Crude oil
371.8
5.1
74.8
302.1
123.1
Petroleum products
269.0
1.5
30.3
240.2
112.0
Natural gas (billions of cubic meters)
212.4
8.1
4.6
215.9
98.4
Coal
592.0
8.0
24.9
575.1
102.9
Iron ore
203.0
0.0
36.5
166.5
121.9
Pig iron
89.3
0.1
5.1
84.3
106.0
Rolled ferrous metals
99.4
3.4
7.4
95.4
104.2
Copper, refined
1.2
*Negl.
0.2
1.0
116.6
Tin, primary (thousands of metric tons)
22.0
4.0
0.0
26.0
84.6
Aluminumt
1.8
Negl.
0.5
1.2
142.2
Lumber (millions of cubic meters)
119.0
0.3
7.9
111.3
106.8
Cotf.on, ginned
2.4
0.2
0.5
2.1
114.4
Rubbertt
1.0
0.3
0.1
1.2
85.0
Cement
100.3
Cy. 4
3.4
97.3
103.1
Grainttt
140.2
2.7
7.9
135.0
103.9
*Apparent consumption differs from actual consumption in that it does not take into account the storage or withdrawals from
storage of mate:ial goods.
*Percentages calculated from rounded data.
*Negligible.
tThe production figure is for primary aluminum only; the import and export figures include some rolled aluminum and duralumin.
ttAll domestic production consists of synthetic rubber; imports consist of both natural rubber and synthetic rubber. Exports
consist large!y of synthetic rubber, but include some natural rubber supplied to East Germany.
tttAverage for 1968 -71. Because of large fluctuations in domestic production of grain and in imports and exports of grain from year
to year, use of average annual quantities for several years provides a mor_ reliable indication of the Soviet strategic supply position
in grain than does use of the figures for a single year.
States although the population of the U.S.S.R. was
only 20fi greater. Over half of the total Soviet
population is in the labor force compared with about
-Wi in the United States. This phenomenon is largely
explained be the much higher rate of participation of
worrlen in the Soviet labor force than in the United
States; two- thirds of all Soviet women 16 years of age
or older work its against only two- fifths in the United
States. The productivity of mane of these women is
especially low even by Soviet standards because they
are forced by the need of most families for it second
income into arduous, poorly remunerative work in
agriculture, construction, and services.
The structure of the Soviet labor force has changed
significantly since the mid- 1950's. The share of the
total civilian labor force in the agricultural sector
dropped front 5Wi in 1955 to 30% in 1973; even so,
the Soviet labor force in agriculture is roughly eight
times that of the United States because Soviet labor
productivity un the fauns has remained at it constant
and lowly 1 1 c(' of the U.S. level for nearly 20 (the
comparable figure for industry is about 40% Most of
the growth in nonagricultural ernployntent has taken
place in transportation, construction, trade, and
services. Compared with the United States, the
U.S.S.R. has appreciable fewer people employed in
the latter two sectors, but the two countries have
approximately the same proportions of workers in
industry, construction, transportation, and com-
munications. Outside of the civilian labor force, the
military accounts for about 351 of total employment in
both countries.
A summary statement on the U.S.S.R.'s resource
position must conclude that the country is fortuitously
well endowed with substantial natural and htunan
resources. Although these resources have been
complemented by an official ideology emphasizing
rapid economic growth and directed be it virtually
unchallenged, totalitarian government conunittecl to
this end, the notable ac�complishnlents of the Soviet
economy, it can be argued, could \yell have been
significantly greater if institutional restraints, perverse
incentives, hostility to innovation, and the lack of
managerial dynamism bad not combined to retard
economic growth. I lowever, as these and other factors
are indisputable part and parcel of the Soviet system,
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the more persuasive case seems to be that the
theoretical potential of the economy's growth cannot
he realized by a wide margin under the present system,
which gives no sign of chan *,ing in any significant
degree.
:3. Economic growth (S)
Soviet economic growth began to slow down in 1970
as the result of declining rates of increase in the
combined productivity of labor and capital. During
the 1950's, gross national product (GNP) increased at
an average annual rate of 6.3 but this rate of growth
fell to 5.1% during 1961 -65. The rate of growth of
factor productivity increased somewhat in the last half
of the 1960's, boosting the average annual increase in
GNP to 5.6% per year during this period. In 1971 -72,
however, economic growth again turned sharply
downward, and GNP grew by an average of only 2.4%
annually. Principal causes of the 1972 slump in
particular, when GNP grew by only tic, were a harvest
failure caused by unfavorable weather conditions, lags
in the installation of new industrial capacity, and
negligible gains in factor productivity. As it result, the
major goals of the 5 -year plan for 1971 -75 were
probably out of reach before the plan period was half
completed.
Problems in both agriculture and industry were
responsible for most of the slowdown in 1971 -72.
Agricultural production in the latter year was about
7% below the 1971 level and 7.5% under the all -time
high of 1970. In 1971 the industrial rate of growth
dropped to 5% compared with the average 7% per
year registered during the preceding decade. Harvest
shortfalls in 1971 restricted the supply of agricultural
raw materials to industry in 1972, thus contributing to
it further reduction in industrial growth to 4.5 Most
of the decline, however, resulted from three
shortcomings within the industrial sector itself: the
failure to bring new plant and equipment into
production on schedule, the inability to achieve
planned increases in factor productivity, and
continuing dereliction in economizing in the use of
industrial raw materials. As Figure 2 indicates, overall
industrial growth in 1971 -72 was influenced by
sharply diminished growth in the production of
consumer nondurable goods and machinery. The
output of industrial materials, the third component of
the official U.S. index of Soviet industrial production,
also fell below both the rates of increase achieved in
the 1960's and those required to fulfill the 1971 -75
plan.
Although 1971 -75 plan goals for industrial
production are predicated on large increases in factor
productivity, the combined productivity of labor and
capital in industry rose by only 0.5% in 1972. Capital
productivity in industry continued to decline and only
small gains were registered in labor productivity
(Figure 3). Combined factor productivity for the
economy as it whole declined by in 1972, mainly
because of the situation in the agricultural secutr
where increases in investment kept pace with high
plan goals, but output declined sharply.
The Soviets are counting heavily on technological
progress as the key to reversing trends in productivity
FIGURE 2. Indicators of economic growth (C)
(Percent per year)
Gross national product (GNP)
Agricultural production index
Industrial production index
Industrial materials
Machinery
Consumer nondurables
Selected components of GNP by end use:
Consumption
Defense
Gross fixed investment
Agricultural investment
Industrial investment
1971 -75
1951 -60 1961 -65 1966 -70 1971 -72 PLAN
6.3
5.0
5.6
2.8
5.9
4.0
2.1
4.4
-3.4
3.7
9.6
6.8
6.4
5.5
8.0
9.7
7.1
6.1
5.3
7.0
10.3
7.8
7 -1
7.6
11.4
8.7
4.
6.4
2.6
6.4
4.6
3.5
5.4
4.5
1.3
2.0
3.0
0.0
12.6
6.3
7.5
6.9
12.2
11.7
8.2
11.3
11.7
7.0
7.0
na
*Based on U.S. official estimates of GNP at factor cost computed in ruble values.
*Based on U.S. official estimates of net agricultural production in ruble values (adjustment has
been made to eliminate the double Pounting inherent in Soviet gross output data on such items as
feed and seed).
*Based on official Soviet investment statistics expressed in ruble values.
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growth. Indeed, the 1973 planned increases in output
in industry, agriculture, and construction are to he
achieved %with minimal increase in employment in
these sectors. Thus far, however, the reforms in applied
research and development introduced after 1965 have
had little effect. This area is still characterized by
inefficiency, poor coordination, and the un"villingness
of enterprise managers to adopt new products and
processes.
The economic slov,down in 1971 -72 was rcflected in
lover growth rates of component:; of GNP by end use.
Consumption, which grew by only 4.5% annually
during 1971 -72, was depressed chiefly by the poor
harvest that tightene food supplies. Although gro%vth
in consumption in 1971 -72 fell below the 5.4 annual
percentage rate registered in 1966 -70, it was above the
average 3.Wi. rate (if growth during 1961 -65. Growth
in defense expenditures fell from iii in 1966 -70 to an
average of Orb during 1971- 2, but this decline was not
related to economic shortfalls in these: years: defense
spending was in it cyclical trough in the early 1970 s.
Such expenditures will begin to grow again as strategic
(Billion 1971 Dollars)
105C
The categories shown do not exhaust the total. The difference is
accounted for by administration, civil space programs, changes in
inventories, net exports and statistical discrepancies.
FIGURE 4. U.S. and U.S.S.R. GNP by end use, 1971 (C)
programs now in the research, development, and
testing phases are deployed. Figure -I shows the
distribution of Soviet CNP by end use in 1971
compared with U.S. GNP.
The 6.9% rate of gro%%th of new fit.ed investment
during 1971 -72 was above plan, and the share of
investment in GNP reached almost one third of the
total. Much of the increase in investment, however,
was in the form of unfinished construction. Many
projects were not completed on schedule, and industry
had to do %vithout productive capacity that was to
have been commissioned during 1971 -72. The
leadership hoped to curtail this dispersion of
investment resources in 1973 by cutting the planned
growth of investment to 3.5 or by more than half
the rate of increase achieved in 1971 -72. At the same
time the growth rate of coin missionings of fixed
capital was raised from 5.8c in 1972 to 1 I `ti in 1973.
As a result of the poor economic performance of
1972, Soviet GNP declined as a share of U.S. GNP to
5290 from 54',' in 1971, and the dollar gap between
the t%vo countries' national product continued to
widen (Figure 5). Most of this gap is .iccounted for by
the low level of consumption in the U.S.S.11. rel_itiye
to that in the United States; expenditures for defense
and investment were about equal. Selected indicators
of per capita production in the two countries in 1960
and 1971 are shown in Figure 6.
5
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FIGURE 3. Indexes of output and factor productivity in
industry, 1950-72 (C)
GNP Defense New Fixed Consumption
Investment

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Billion 1971 U.S. Dollars
1.200
1,000
800
600
400
20C
0
Estimate
U.S.
Absolute
Difference
U.S.S.R.
FIGURE 5. Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. GNP (U /OU)
4. International economic relations (S)
Soviet foreign trade turnover (imports plus exports)
was valued at over $26 billion in 1971, more than
double the 1960 level. Soviet exports �about $13.8
billion in 1971 accounted for less than Sib of Soviet
GNP, and the U.S.S.R. conducts less foreign trade
than the Netherlands. As such, Soviet foreign trade is
only an adjunct to the domestic economy.
The foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. is oriented largely
toward other Communist countries, although since
1960 the share of trade with the non Communist
world has risen from about one- fourth to one -third of
total turnover. Increased commerce with non
Communist countries is accounted for chiefly by the
rapid growth in trade with the industrial West during
1966 -71. Soviet attempts to further the integration of
trade with East Europe have been largely unsuccess-
ful, a1i :tough there appears to have been some progress
in recent vears. At the same time the U.S.S.R. realizes
that the developed West is the primary source of its
most critical imports, ranging from high technology
products to grain, and that it must ship to the West
increasing amounts of fuel and raw materials
traditionally exported to East Europe to pay for these
processes and products. This is because Soviet
manufactures are generally of low quality or otherwise
noncompetitive in most western markets.
The U.S.S.R.'s imports over the last decade have
been dominated by industrial equipment and certain
consumer goods. Machinery and equipment, almost
three fourths of which originated in East Europe, was
the largest single category of imports. Imports of these
items from the West, much of which contain
FIGURE 6. U.S. and U.S.S.R.: Selected indicators of per capita production, 1960 and
1 71 (C)
U.S. U.S.S.R.
GNP
1971 dollars..................
1960
3,818
1,451
1971
5,072
2,322
Primary energy
Metric tons
1960
7.9
3.1
1971
10.3
5.3
Crude steel
Kilograms...................
1960
498
305
1971
527
493
Plastics
....do......................
1960
15.8
1.5
1971
46.1
7.6
Automobiles
Units per 1,000 persons.......
1960
36.9
0.6
1971
41.5
2.1
Cement
Kilograms...................
1960
310
210
1971
348
409
Housing
Square meters constructed.....
1960
0.8
0.5
1971
1.0
0.4
Grain
Kilograms...................
1960
1,004
434
1971
1,140
604
Meat
....do......................
1960
71
83
1971
26
36
Radios
Units per 1,000 persons.......
1960
99.4
19.4
1971
97.8
35.9
*Based on U.S. official estimates.
*Excludes energy from minor types of fuels such as peat, oil shale and fuel wood.
*Energy expressed in coal equivalents with a caloric value of 7,000 kilo calories per kilogram
M
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1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1972 1872*

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advanced technology unavailable elsewhere, has been
in support of Soviet industrial development. Soviet
imports of consumer goods from the West have also
risen rapidly during this period, with deliveries of
foodstuffs reaching significant levels during 1964 -66
and after 1969.
Soviet exports during the past decade have consisted
basically of fuels, raw materials, and semifinished
materials. Exports of machinery and equipment have
increased, primarily to other Communist countries
and to the less developed countries. Food exports have
regained much of their former importance after a
sharp decline in 1964 -66, but should decline again
during 1972 -73 following Soviet grain crop shortfails
in 1972.
'File Soviet hard currency balance of payments has
been in substantial deficit during most of the past
decade. During 1960 -1965 the U.S.S.R. financed these
deficits largely through sales of gold. Since 1965,
however, the U.S.S.R. has made increased use of
Western credits to finance its imports from the West
and has sold virtually no gold. As a result, gold reserves
have climbed from a low of 900 tons in 1965 to 1,800
tons by the end of 1972. The U.S.S.R. will be faced
with substantial hard currency deficits in 1972 -73 due
primarily to the aimost $2 billion in grain imports
from the West, but the Soviets are expected to finance
these purchases without resorting to massive gold sales.
By the end of 1972 the U.S.S.R. had extended about
$16.2 billion in economic assistance to Communist
countries and about $8.3 billion to less developed
countries in the third world. Communist countries
have drawn about 85% of the commitments whereas
the non Communist countries have drawn only about
half of their aid on the books. Annual extensions of
new aid to Communist countries averaged $2.1 billion
in 1971 -72 compared with $1.1 billion in 1969 -70;
comparable figures for the less developed countries
were more than $900 million and $580 million.
In recent years the U.S.S.R. has been moreselective
in choosing recipient countries in the underdeveloped
world, an approach intended to make the economic
assistance program a more effective political
instrument for expanding Soviet influence. As it result,
the U.S.S.R., responsible for more than half of all
Communist economic aid extensions since 1954,
accounted for only about one third of Communist aid
extended during 1972. This has also resulted in aid
dispensations being concentrated in a few countries,
with India, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iran accounting
for about half of total Soviet aid extended to
underdeveloped countries since 19541 these four
countries have drawn two thirds of total Soviet aid
actually delivered.
Since 1955 the U.S.S.R. has committed $8.5 billion
of military aid to the underdeveloped countries, with
more than half of this amount extended si -:gin 1966.
The Soviets, however, agreed to only $310 million in
arms assistance in 1972 compared with record military
extensions averaging nearly $1.'_ billion in 1970 and
197!. This decline reflected the unusually high level
during 1970 -71 of acquisitions by Egypt to build up its
air defem,es and I .v India to prepare for the war with
Pakistan. An estimated $7.1 billion or 85% of Soviet
military equipment on order had been delivered by
the end of 1972. Fully 93% of Soviet military exports
in 1972 went to Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, and Syria,
with Egypt alone receiving more than 35% of the
total.
B. Economic policy and development
1. Goals and policy (U /OU)
Since the beginning of centralized economic
planning in 1928, the primary goal of Soviet economic
planning has been the rapid development of the
country on the basis of forced industrialization.
During the first decade this policy was predominantly
inward- looking because of the need to complete the
draconian collectivization of agriculture to provide the
resources primarily labor and forced savings �to fuel
the industrialization program. Fortunately for the
Kremlin, relative international calm prevailed during
most of this period in Europe, but by the late 1930's
the Soviets realized that thev had to accelerate the
development of a military arsenal to insure their
survival as a nation and as a political system. The
U.S.S.R. emerged from World War II %vith a badly'
damaged economy but with greatly increased prestige,
a unified if terrified and browbeaten party, and a
determination to recover its economic power by
following the same policies that made preservation of
the state and the system possible in the first place. By
the time of his death in early 1953, Stalin had brought
the Soviet Union back to roughly the level of
economic output that prevailed before the war.
During the 20 years since Stalin's demise his
successors have persisted in this course despite the
mounting evidence that the Soviet economic model as
developed by and inherited from Stalin is increasingly
ill- suited to meeting the demands for growth in a
complex, industrialized economy. The centralized
allocation of resources through administrative action
together with forced draft industrialization worked
well enough during the early stages of the U.S.S.R.'s
development, although at considerable cost in terms of
.waste, inefficiency, and human suffering. However,
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the slippage of Soviet growth indices during the past
15 vears that is evident both from official Soviet
statistics and from independent Western analyses
testifies to the increasing inappropriateness of the
Soviet economic system as well as to the patent need
for its fundamental reform.
During the mid- 1950's the need for such reform was
masked by the economy's refound from the relative
relaxation of Sta!inist controls under Khrushchev.
Khrushchev also promulgated a series of programs
such as the New Lands campaign in agriculture and
chemicalization" in industry that resulted in
essentially one -time increments to economic growth.
But the impact of these and other measures was largely
spent by the end of the decade, and Khrushchev found
himself faced with increasing economic difficulties,
the combined effect of which was to turn the most
critical growth rates downward.
The Brezhnev Kosygin regime that succeeded
Khrushchev has been remarkable for its stability in all
areas, including the economy. Thus, despite several
initiatives aimed at altering the Soviet economic scene
somewhat, the net result of the Brezhnev Kosygin
stewardship has been no appreciable change from the
basic Stalinist pattern devisee: almost half a century
ago. Consumption has been accorded a higher priority
than that given it as recently as 10 year, ago, but the
steady yet relatively meager gains in this area
underscore the regime's continuing belief that high
rates of growth and a creditable defense posture
depend primarily on substantial increases in
investment (especially in heavy industry), better
e4acation and training, and the successful incorpora-
tion of new technology. Thore has not been a basic
reallocation of resources which would necessarily
reflect new priorities. As a result, the Soviet economic
system continues essentially unch::nged despite the
new demands levied on it both by the country's
leadership and by the imperatives of growth in the
advanced industrial age.
2. Economic administration and control (U /OU)
As in other aspects of Soviet life, the Communist
Pa.ty administers and controls nearly_ all economic
activity in the U.S.S.R. Ultima >e authority for
economic policy resides in the Politburo of the party's
Central Committee, which relies on the Council of
Ministers for policy implementation. This small body
is both the highest level of the executive arm of the
government and the apex of the economic adminis-
trative stricture. Ample assurance that the party's
economic policies will be carried out by the
government hierarchy is provided by the interlocking
8
membership at the top levels of both bodies; Kosygin
and Mazurov, for example, are full members of the
Politburo as well as chairman and first deputy
chairman, respectively, of the Council of Ministers.
Adherence to the party's guidelines by government
bodies at subordinate levels is insured by a strategic
distribution of party members in government posts
down to and including th soviets. At the lowest
level of economic organization, the enterprise, the
party wieids its influence through the primary party
organization, i.e., the party members in the enterprise,
as well as through top management, which typically
consists of party personnel.
The country's highest legislative body, the Supreme
Soviet, generally meets only twice a year for
proceedings lasting only a few days. As such, it cannot
and does not :vitiate economic measures, but in
rubberstamp fashion signs into law directives
formulated by the Politburo and transformed into
operational plans by the Council of Ministers and its
staff organizations. These latter entities include the
State Planning Commission (Gospfan), the more than
50 functional economic ministries (ferrous metallurgy,
fishing, petroleum, etc.), and a host of state
committees and main administrations concemed with
finance, prices, supply, and the like.
The emphasis of Soviet economic administration
since the late 1920's has alternated between the stress
on functionalism (all enterprises in the country
engaged in a particular economic activity grouped
under a single ministry) and regionalism (all
enterprises in a given area grouped under a regional
entity regardless of the nature of their activities). Over
time each type of administration tended to generate its
own peculiar excesses and thus created growing
pressure to shift over to the alternative method. For
example, u>rder the ministerial system the locus of
concern in any given industrial ministry is that
particular industry. often at the expense of overall
state interests or those of areas in which the industry is
especially important. The regional system, however,
leads to localism to the increasing detriment of
a.tional interests as well as those of the individual
.odustries and other economic sectors. As a
consequence, the ministerial system has been the more
common method of economic administration and has
been used since 1967 shortly after the Brezhnev-
Kosygin leadership took over from Khrushchev. (The
Government and Politics chapter of this survey shows
the ministerial structure of the U.S.S.R.)
Khrushchev's ouster in 196.1 can be ascribed in part
to the malfunctioning of the system of regional
economic management that he decreed in mid -1957 in
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response to the defects of the ministerial system then
prevailing. Under Khrushchey's regional system,
administration of all enterprises except these in
defense- related areas and in broad service lines
(transportation, communications, etc.) was subordi-
nated to sovnarkhozy, an acronym for "regional
councils of the national economy." The imperfections
inheent in this type of economic administration soon
became manifest, but Khrushchev's answer was to
restructure these regional councils and to divide the
party into industrial and agricultural segments.
During the later Khrushchey years the major
economic growth rates began an unmistakable decline
from the unusually high percentage increments
registered in the mid- to late- 1950's. At the same time
Soviet economists of varying persuasions began to
debate increasingly openly the causes and potential
remedies of the worsening s,tuation. One small group,
which has remained in the minority, viewed the
problems as essentially t ^clinical in nature and
advocated the use of cybernetics and computerization
of tile: economy. The majority of the reform minded
economists, however, saw Soviet ccononlc difficulties
as rooted in more fundamental factors. In general,
these liberal economists agreed that the central
authorities are increasingly unable to plan and
implement till efficient allocation of resources.
especially as the economy grows in size and
complexity. They therefore advocated greater
decentralization of economic decisionmaking xvith
increased scope for enterprise managers to make
operating decisions on the basis of profitability (the
ratio of profit to fixed and working capital) and sales
indicators instead of the old criterion of gross value of
output.
The several currents of economic reform in the early
1960's acquired the shorthand designation in the "lest
of Libermanism" after one of the chief populizers of
these concepts. Several months before he was ousted,
Khrushchev sanctioned the trial of these ideas in
practice in two textile plants. His successors brnacdened
this experiment, and in September 1965 they unveiled
it comprehensive reform of Soviet industry based on
these principles. The reform concepts were later
extended to construction, transportation, communica-
tions, retail trade, and to it limited degree, agriculture
In theory the refor n seeks to energize enterprise
management to bring about greater efficiency and
motivation by relating success criteria and premia to
performance as measured by sales and profits. In
practice, however, the regime clearly realizes that the
reform, to be truly effective, would entail tin
unacceptable diminution of the party's control over
the enterprise directors and their staffs. Accordingly,
the crucial powers to allocate resources and to
designate supplier -user relationships were retained by
the central planning authorities from the outset. Some
of the main decentralizing features of the reform.
moreover, have been eroded over the years by it variety
of explicit and implied restrictions that have been
placed on enterprise managers. In addition, the reform
does not even attempt to deal with such basic flaws of
the Soviet economic system such as the artificial and
arbitrary_ character of the pricing mechanism and the
lack of sound economic criteria necessary for even a
relatively efficient allocation of resources. Finally, the
continuing resistance of the economic administrative
bureaucracy to the mildly innovative ideas of reform
has effectively vitiated these principles as they have
been applied to a growing number of economic sectors
\%-here they are less applicable (trade. services, etc.),
and to progressively weaker enterprises.
In its early phases the reform was relatively
efficacious by encouraging a more thrifty use of
resources. Managers found it in their interest to reduce
the typically large stocks of materials, parts, and labor
that were hoarded against the mane uncertainties of
the Soviet supply system. Once these essentially one-
time gains were assimilated, however, the increase in
the rate of growth attributable to the reform tended to
fall off because its principles do not result in efficient
investneat allocations or technological progress. To
get these hypes of gains, the regime has resurted to a
variety of campaigns and experiments; largely of an
exhortatory or administrative nature. Typical
examples of the former include the hoary socialist
competition campaigns in which enterprises vie to
outproduce each other for the publicity and ostensible
prestige such extra output brings. The so- called
"Lenin Saturdays" is a similar gambit, with workers in
participating enterprises contributing an extra day's
labor without pay several times a yea;. During the
early 1970's the regime turned increasingly to these
and other devices as the benefits derived from the 1965
reform petered out. Symptomatically, Aieksci
Stakhanov, the venerable shock miner of the 1930's
whose name became synonomous with ideologically
inspired high productivity, was brought out of
retirement in 1972 to revitalize the campaign
approach for greater output.
In the area of administrative initiatives.. the Soviets
ha -e experimented with a variety of schemes such as
the "link" system in agriculture and the Zlobin
arrangement in construction; under both innovations,
personal responsibility is increased by tying premia
more closely to performance than is the general rule in
9
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the U.S.S.R. [n incustry, the most publicized device in
the early 1970's was the Slichekino experiment under
syhich it firm's wage hill stmt's constant even though
the l abor force is reduced. with the remaining workers
paid more from the wage funds of those let go. There
also is it major effort ill the current Five Year Plan
pe riod centering on "automated systems of
it tit nage met t some 2,500 of these are to be
introduced by 1976. with 1.600 ill industry alone.
Although the Soviets have never been completely clear
as to what thy e me ut by this term, at (cast initially it
connotes the mntontmtion of the most routine processes
within an enterprise such its payroll, bookkeeping, and
the like. According to the most grandiose plans, the
Soviets eventually Flan to automate coordination
inside it single plant, between enterprises, within
ministries, and ultimately throughout the economy. As
with prior experiments, however, it is unlikely that this
gimmick will be any more productive or have a lau-ting
impact than have other experiments in the past.
[n April 197:3 the Soviets unveiled their most
ambitious project in the area of administrative change
during the 1971 -75 period: the c�otsolidation of the
country's 50,000 enterprises into "production
associations, or middle level management bodies
between the ministries out the one hand and the
individual plants on the other. 'These associations,
wiich are to be formed durinu, 1973 75, will combine
enterprises in it given area that are technologically
homogeneous or integrally related in terms of the
supplier -user relationship. They will also consolidate
resea and development organizations: which
gene rally do not have the close relationships with
producing plants that is c�hantcteristically found in
advanced industrial societies in the West. The
associations will be charged with operational authority
over their subordinate enterprises, with the ministries
slated to concentrate on the long -range problems and
prospect for the ir specific industries."
Production associations have existed in the U.S.S.R.
since the beginning of the 1960's on limited, trial
basis. As with 1965 refoni; the leadership apparently
has concluded that the i)eneficicd results of this
experience warrant extension of the concept across the
country. But application if these ideas in practice is
kkely to encounter the saute type of institutional and
operational obstacles on xvhich the 1965 reform
fonndcred. "There almost certainly will be strong
resistance to the associations by the ministries.
enterprises, :std local governments, all of whicli will
'Indnstries scilh fm% enterprises sill be combined in it shudt-
association \%bile industrie} uitb nunmruus enterprises %sill be
piacelled out among secerd wgional associations.
%witness it reduction in their power to the extent that
the associations become tntly influential in the
economic life of the U.S.S.R. The associations,
moreover, will be crippled at the outset if they are !lot
given considerable autonomy in such vital matters as
setting prices, adiusting production targets, and
working out their own supply mud distribution
systems. As of mid 1973, there was no evidence that
the Brezhney- Kosygill leadership was about to change
the U.S.S.R.*s traditional riodus operandi in theseaud
other. equally crucial eco-tomic matters.
3. ;Manpower (C)
a. Size and composition of the labor force
The Soviet labor force" (125.1 million persons in
1972) is about 45 i larger than that of the United
States. The U.S.S.R.'s advantage lies in it larger
population and the fact that more than 505r of the
Soviet population is ill the labor force� participation
rate almost 10 percentage points higher than in the
United States. A basic factor accounting for the larger
share of employed persons in the U.S.S.R. is the higher
incidence of women workers. In 1972, one Soviet
worker in two was it woman, \vhcreas the ratio was
about one in thre in the United States.
Reflecting the course of Soviet economic de-elop-
ment, the structure of the labor force has undergone
significant changes. The share of the total civilian
labor force employed in agriculture dropped from 43','i
in 1960 to about 305i in 1972 as migration from rural
to urban areas continued, although at it depressed rate
after 1965. Nevertheless, the proportion of the Soviet
labor force now engaged in agriculture is about eight
times that in the United States. A comparison of the
distribution of employment in the h o wintries in
1971 is shown in Figure 7.
Important shifts have occurred in the structure of
nonagricultural cnmloyment as its share of the Soviet
labor force has increased. The growth of employment
in industry, which outstripped the expansion in other
sectors until 1955, slowed during the I960's. Although
only one fifth of the Soviet labor force is employed in
services. compared to one -third in the United States,
the Soviet service sector has increased as a proportion
of the nonagricultural labor force: �from 2Y( in 1960
to 28'i in 1071 as the U.S.S.R. has provided more of
the services demanded by an increasingly urbanized
population. Commerce, i.e., retail trade, banking,
insurance, and tic like is increasing its share of totar
employment in the U.S.S.R., but the actuml mimberof
I'ntal labor Force incbules the ukilian labor tore� and the armed
forces bid cxc�ludes militarized sec�n:ilc forces.
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Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Commerce
Serilcas
Transportation
and Communication
11%
33%
FIGURE 7. Distribution of civilian employment, by sector,
U.S. and U.S.S.R., 1971 (U /OU)
people employed in these areas is still small. 'these
activities encompass one- Fourth of the U.S. labor force
and a mere 7 5 of the Soviet labor force. Construction
takes 5'f and Hof of the labor force in the United
States and U.S.S.R.. respectively, with transportation
and communications employing 6% and 8/i,
respectively.
b. Factors affecting productivity
Labor productivity in the U.S.S.R. and the United
States has grown at about the same rate since 19 -5, as
shown in Figure 8. The productivity of labor in Soviet
industry was about 40% of U.S. levels in both 1955
and 1970; the comparable figure for agriculture in the
U.S.S.R. has remained at about one -tenth of the U.S.
level. The marked Soviet advantage over the United
States in the rate of growth of industrial output
FIGURE 9. Changes in labor productivity (C)
(Average annual rate of growth in percent)
FIGURE 8. Labor productivity (U /OU)
consequently is more it reflection of rapid increases in
employment than of productivity. Labor productivity
growth, however, has become it critical factor in Soviet
economic development due to current labor shortages,
which will continue at least until the mid- 1970's.
Shortfalls in meeting the goals for productivity
growth in the major sectors of the economy have been
a persistent problem for the Brezhnev- KoFygin
leadership. Until the rnid- 1960'x, deficiencies in la nor
productivity growth in nonfarm sectors were partially
overcome ..v bringing housewives and voting people
into the labor force. These sources are no longer
available, however.
The crucial role to he played by trains in labor
productivity during 1971 -75 has been underscored by
the below -plan rates of increment actually registered
in 1971 and 1972 Figure 9). According to the goals of
the Five -Year Plan for 1971 -75, four fifths of the
economic growth during this period is predicated on
*Derived from CIt measures of industrial and agricultural production and estimates of employ-
ment made by the Dept rtment of Commerce.
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ACTUAL
PLAN
ACTUAL
PLAN
1966 -70
1966 -70
1971 -75
1971
1972
Industry
5.9 -6.2
*3.9
6.8
*4.6
*3.8
Agriculture
7.0 -7.7
*5.8
6.6
*0.9
7.6
Rail transport
4.3 4.6
5.0
4.8
4.5
3:8
Construction
6.2 -7.0
4.3
6.5
5.0
5.4
*Derived from CIt measures of industrial and agricultural production and estimates of employ-
ment made by the Dept rtment of Commerce.
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greater prodtic�tivity, and ottly one fifth on the
ernployntent of additional fad or. By way of
co ill pit risoit, appntxi tit ately one�- third of Soviet
economic gro%%tit in the 1960's was (file to an increase
in the number of workers, while two- thirds was the
result of greater productivity. Labor productivity in
industry increased b% 4.6'( in 1971 and 3.8k7'
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Harsh climatic conditions impose severe restrictions
on Soviet agriculture. The basic environmentvi
problems are low temperatures and excess soil moisture
in the north combined with unusual heat and aridity
in the south. The short growing season and the
extremes of temperature limit the types of crops that
can be grown even in the critical "fertile triangle" of
Soviet agriculture extending from the Ukraine
eastward nearly to Irkutsk.
(3) Farm organization- Soviet agriculture is
divided into a socialized sector, which predominates,
and a private sector. The former, consisting primarily
of state and collective farms, accounts for roughly two
thirds of the total agricultural output. The private
sector consists of about 30 million small, private plots,
one of the last legal remnants of private enterprise in
the U.S.S.R. As all hard is Awned by the state, the
basic difference between these two types of
organization lies in the ownership of assets other than
land, in the method of capital formation, in the
payment for labor, and in the system of marketing
agricultural produce.
Between 1958 and 1971 the number of state farms
increased from 6,002 to ;5,502, and the number of
collective farms declined by more than half -from
67,700 to 32,300- partly through the amalgamation
of smaller collective farms and partly through
conversion to state farms. As the following tabulation
shows, by 1971 state farms and other state -owned
agricultural enterprises accounted for half of the total
sown area in the U.S.S.R.:
Small -scale private farming on plots averaging little
more than cua acre in size has been tolerated by the
reginxr for pragmatic reasons despite the ideological
contradiction inherent in this capitalistic activity. In
1971, private farming supplied 63% of the potatoes,
half of the eggs, 37% of the vegetables, and .35% of the
milk arid meat produced. The private plots, however,
tend to compete with the socialized sector for feed
supplies and for the labor of the farmers;
consequently, there have been periodic attempts by
20
the state to decrease the importance of the private
sector through discriminatory taxes and reduction in
the size of plots and the number of animals permitied.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that almost 30% of total
agricultural output originates in the private sector,
which directly holds only slightly more than 35 of the
total sown area. The private sector, however, has
access to some land controlled by the socialized sector
and uses it for pasturing privately owned livestock and
growing hay. If the area in the socialized sector that
directly or indirectly produces feedstuffs for the
private sector is added to the relatively small amount
of land directly held by households, the land area
supporting private farming equals roughly one -fifth of
the country's total arable land.
(4) Crops -The U.S.S.R. grows most crops common
to the temperate zone, but grains dominate the
pattern, accounting for 57% of the total sown area in
1971. In the same year forage crops accounted for 31
of the total, industrial crops 75 7 c, and potatoes and
other vegetables 5% (Figure 12). The total crop area
has expanded significantly since 1950, with most of
this growth attributable to the New Lands program,
largely in Kazakhstan. In 1950 -63 a drastic reduction
of clean fallowing from 79.1 million acres to 15.6
million acres aided this expansion. By 1968 the area in
clean fallow had increased to its present level of 45.0
million acres, although it declined again to 40.0
million acres in 1972. As a result, the regime has been
unable to raise this figure to a planned amount of
about 50 million acres because of the country's
continuing critical need for grain. (In clean fallowing,
the land is not planted and is cultivated only as
needed to prevent the growth of weeds; this permits
moisture and nutrient accumulation in the soil to raise
crop yields in the following year.)
The distribution of area sown to major grain crops
(including pulses) for 19x3 and 1972 is shown in the
following tabulation as percentages of the total:
1958
1971
MILLION
PERCENT
MILLION
PERCENT
45.3
ACRES
OF TOTAL
ACRES
OF TOTAL.
Sociali7.:d sector
465.3
96.3
495.7
96.8
Sta.ee agriculture
140.6
29.1
256.4
50.1
State farms
129.6
26.8
233.3
45.6
Other state agri-
cultural organi-
zations
11.0
2.3
23.1
4.5
Collective farms
324.7
67.2
239.3
46.8
Private
18.1
3.7
16.5
3.2
Total
483.4
100.0
512.2
100.0
Small -scale private farming on plots averaging little
more than cua acre in size has been tolerated by the
reginxr for pragmatic reasons despite the ideological
contradiction inherent in this capitalistic activity. In
1971, private farming supplied 63% of the potatoes,
half of the eggs, 37% of the vegetables, and .35% of the
milk arid meat produced. The private plots, however,
tend to compete with the socialized sector for feed
supplies and for the labor of the farmers;
consequently, there have been periodic attempts by
20
the state to decrease the importance of the private
sector through discriminatory taxes and reduction in
the size of plots and the number of animals permitied.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that almost 30% of total
agricultural output originates in the private sector,
which directly holds only slightly more than 35 of the
total sown area. The private sector, however, has
access to some land controlled by the socialized sector
and uses it for pasturing privately owned livestock and
growing hay. If the area in the socialized sector that
directly or indirectly produces feedstuffs for the
private sector is added to the relatively small amount
of land directly held by households, the land area
supporting private farming equals roughly one -fifth of
the country's total arable land.
(4) Crops -The U.S.S.R. grows most crops common
to the temperate zone, but grains dominate the
pattern, accounting for 57% of the total sown area in
1971. In the same year forage crops accounted for 31
of the total, industrial crops 75 7 c, and potatoes and
other vegetables 5% (Figure 12). The total crop area
has expanded significantly since 1950, with most of
this growth attributable to the New Lands program,
largely in Kazakhstan. In 1950 -63 a drastic reduction
of clean fallowing from 79.1 million acres to 15.6
million acres aided this expansion. By 1968 the area in
clean fallow had increased to its present level of 45.0
million acres, although it declined again to 40.0
million acres in 1972. As a result, the regime has been
unable to raise this figure to a planned amount of
about 50 million acres because of the country's
continuing critical need for grain. (In clean fallowing,
the land is not planted and is cultivated only as
needed to prevent the growth of weeds; this permits
moisture and nutrient accumulation in the soil to raise
crop yields in the following year.)
The distribution of area sown to major grain crops
(including pulses) for 19x3 and 1972 is shown in the
following tabulation as percentages of the total:
Other grains:
Barley
1953
1972*
Bread grains:
3.3
3.3
Wheat
45.3
48.7
Rye
19.0
6.8
Total
64.3
55.5
Other grains:
Barley
9.0
22.7
Corn
3.3
3.3
Miscellaneous*
23.4
18.5
Total
35.7
44.5
Total grains
100.0
100.0
*Preliminary estimates.
"Primarily pulses beans, peas, lentils), oats, millet,
buckwheat, and rice.
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FIGURE 12. Sown area, by crop (U /OU)
(Million acre..)
*Based on unrounded data.
*Includes food crops (primarily sugar beets and sunflower seed) and nonfood crops (primarily cotton, fiber flax, and hemp).
*Cultivated annual and perennial crops supplying hay, silage, pasture, and other feeds of a similar nutrient content.
Although the area sown to grain in the Soviet Union is
greater than in the United States, total production is
much lower in the U.S.S.R. (Figure 13). Soviet grain
production, moreover, is subject to marked
fluctuations. The 1958 level of output was not
matched until 1961 and not surpassed until 1966; in
1963 and 1965 severe droughts resulted in nearly
disastrous harvests. 'rhe bumper grain harvest in 1968,
however, ranked second only to the 1966 level of
prod until both %were surpassed by record crops
in 1970 and 1971. The shortfalls in 1969 and 1972
were caused by above normal winter -kill of winter
grains followed by unusually cool and wet growing
and harvesting seasons in 1969 and by a severe
drought in European U.S.S.R. in 1972. Data for the
average annual production and yields of principal
crops are shown in Figure 14.
After wheat and rye, potatoes constitute the most
important Soviet food crop, especially in the western
and central regions of the European U.S.S.R. Since
1960, however, the area planted to potatoes has been
falling. In 1972, 19.8 million acres were devoted to
1950
1955
1960
1965
1971
Total
P:r-
Total
Per-
Total
Per-
Total
Per-
Total
Per
area
cent*
area
cent*
area
cent*
area
cent*
area
cent*
Grain (including pulses)
254.2
70.3
305.0
66.4
285.5
57.0
316.4
61.2
291.4
56.9
Industrial crops
30.2
8.4
30.4
6.6
32.3
6.4
37.9
7.3
35.2
6.9
Potatoes and other vegetables.........
25.8
7.1
28.3
6.2
27.7
5.5
26.1
5.1
24.5
4.8
Forage crops
51.3
14.2
95.5
20.8
156.1
31.1
136.3
26.4
161.1
31.4
Total
361.5
100.0
459.2
100.0
501.6
100.0
516.7
100.0
512.2
100.0
*Based on unrounded data.
*Includes food crops (primarily sugar beets and sunflower seed) and nonfood crops (primarily cotton, fiber flax, and hemp).
*Cultivated annual and perennial crops supplying hay, silage, pasture, and other feeds of a similar nutrient content.
Although the area sown to grain in the Soviet Union is
greater than in the United States, total production is
much lower in the U.S.S.R. (Figure 13). Soviet grain
production, moreover, is subject to marked
fluctuations. The 1958 level of output was not
matched until 1961 and not surpassed until 1966; in
1963 and 1965 severe droughts resulted in nearly
disastrous harvests. 'rhe bumper grain harvest in 1968,
however, ranked second only to the 1966 level of
prod until both %were surpassed by record crops
in 1970 and 1971. The shortfalls in 1969 and 1972
were caused by above normal winter -kill of winter
grains followed by unusually cool and wet growing
and harvesting seasons in 1969 and by a severe
drought in European U.S.S.R. in 1972. Data for the
average annual production and yields of principal
crops are shown in Figure 14.
After wheat and rye, potatoes constitute the most
important Soviet food crop, especially in the western
and central regions of the European U.S.S.R. Since
1960, however, the area planted to potatoes has been
falling. In 1972, 19.8 million acres were devoted to
FIGURE 13. Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. grain production (U /OU)
21
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232
Millions of Metric Tons
206 201 199
177
183 183
182
173
163
164
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
1958 1962
1963
1964 1965 1966
1967 1966 1969 1970 1971 1972
".S.S.R. (U.S. official Estimates)
cited States
FIGURE 13. Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. grain production (U /OU)
21
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FIGURE 14. Average annual production and yields of principal crops (U/OU)
*Figures for grain crops an-1 sunflower seed are U.S. official estimates; all other production data
are given as officially reported by the U.S.S.R.
*Average annual yields, based on official Soviet data on the sown area for the respective crops.
potato production, more than 6% less than in 1950.
Although yields have increased moderately, the
average annual production of potatoes in 1961 -72 was
only 10% greater than the average during the
preceding decade. In part the small increase was the
result of adverse weather during 1972, which caused a
record decline of 16% in the output of potatoes.
The principal industrial food crops are sunflower
seed and sugar beets. (The main industrial nonfood
crops cotton and fiber flax -are treated below under
natural fibers.) Of the 35.6 million acres sown to
industrial crops in 1972, sunflower seed accounted for
about 30% and sugar beets (exclusive of sugar beets
sown For livestock feed) claimed 24 Oil from
sunflower seed is the basic edible vegetable oil used in
the U.S.S.R., accounting for roughly three fourths of
the vegetable oil produced in state industrial
enterprises. The acreage planted to sunflowers
expander) rapidly after 1963, reaching a peak of 12.4
million acres in 1966 before declining to 10.8 million
acres in 1972. This reduction has been offset partially
by higher yields attributable in part to the
development of new varieties with a higher oil
content.
The U.S.S.R. is the world's leading producer of
sugar 1 .)cets, producing more than one -third of the
global output, or roughly three times as much as the
United States, the second largest producer. Expansion
of sown area and improving yields resulted in an
upward trend in sugar beet production until 1968, but
reduced plantings and lower yields have since cut
production to less than 80% of the 1968 level.
FIGURE 15. Number of livestock (U/OU)
(Millions)
CATTLE
(INCLUD- SHEEP
ING AND
YEAR Cows) Cows SWINE GOATS HORSES
1928 66.8 33.2 27.7 114.6 36.1
1950....... 58.1 24.6 22.2 93.6 12.7
1958....... 66.8 31.4 44.3 130.1 11.9
1963....... 87.0 38.0 70.0 146.4 9.1
1964....... 85.4 38.3 40.9 139.5 8.5
1970....... 95.2 40.5 56.1 135.8 7.5
1971....... 99.2 41.0 67.5 143.4 7.4
1972....... 102.4 41.2 71.4 145.3 7.3
1973....... 104.0 41.7 66.5 144.5 no
na Data not available.
*Census date is 1 January.
*Present boundaries.
27
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1956 -60
1961 -65
1966 -70
1971 -72
Million metric ions
Production:*
Total grain and pulses
104.7
106.1
135.0
141.2
By i grain (wheat and rye)
71.3
64.5
83.1
83.9
Other grain (barley, corn, oats, pulses,'
millet, rice, bu;kwheat and miscel-
laneous)
32.4
41.6
51.9
57.3
Sugar beets
45.6
59.2
81.1
73.9
Sunflower seed
3.4
4.7
5.9
4.9
Potatoes
88.3
81.6
94.8
85.2
Other vegetables
15.1
16.9
19.5
20.0
Metric tons per acre
Yields:
Total grain and pulses
0.35
0.34
0.45
0.48
Bread grain
0.35
0.32
3.43
0.49
Other grain
0.36
0.37
0.48
0.48
Sugar beets
7.43
6.66
9.22
8.84
Sunflower seed
0.34
0.42
0.49
0.44
Potatoes
3.79
3.82
4.66
4.35
Other vegetables
4.08
4.69
5.35
5.06
*Figures for grain crops an-1 sunflower seed are U.S. official estimates; all other production data
are given as officially reported by the U.S.S.R.
*Average annual yields, based on official Soviet data on the sown area for the respective crops.
potato production, more than 6% less than in 1950.
Although yields have increased moderately, the
average annual production of potatoes in 1961 -72 was
only 10% greater than the average during the
preceding decade. In part the small increase was the
result of adverse weather during 1972, which caused a
record decline of 16% in the output of potatoes.
The principal industrial food crops are sunflower
seed and sugar beets. (The main industrial nonfood
crops cotton and fiber flax -are treated below under
natural fibers.) Of the 35.6 million acres sown to
industrial crops in 1972, sunflower seed accounted for
about 30% and sugar beets (exclusive of sugar beets
sown For livestock feed) claimed 24 Oil from
sunflower seed is the basic edible vegetable oil used in
the U.S.S.R., accounting for roughly three fourths of
the vegetable oil produced in state industrial
enterprises. The acreage planted to sunflowers
expander) rapidly after 1963, reaching a peak of 12.4
million acres in 1966 before declining to 10.8 million
acres in 1972. This reduction has been offset partially
by higher yields attributable in part to the
development of new varieties with a higher oil
content.
The U.S.S.R. is the world's leading producer of
sugar 1 .)cets, producing more than one -third of the
global output, or roughly three times as much as the
United States, the second largest producer. Expansion
of sown area and improving yields resulted in an
upward trend in sugar beet production until 1968, but
reduced plantings and lower yields have since cut
production to less than 80% of the 1968 level.
FIGURE 15. Number of livestock (U/OU)
(Millions)
CATTLE
(INCLUD- SHEEP
ING AND
YEAR Cows) Cows SWINE GOATS HORSES
1928 66.8 33.2 27.7 114.6 36.1
1950....... 58.1 24.6 22.2 93.6 12.7
1958....... 66.8 31.4 44.3 130.1 11.9
1963....... 87.0 38.0 70.0 146.4 9.1
1964....... 85.4 38.3 40.9 139.5 8.5
1970....... 95.2 40.5 56.1 135.8 7.5
1971....... 99.2 41.0 67.5 143.4 7.4
1972....... 102.4 41.2 71.4 145.3 7.3
1973....... 104.0 41.7 66.5 144.5 no
na Data not available.
*Census date is 1 January.
*Present boundaries.
27
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(5) Livestock and livestock food products -Since
1950, livestock numbers often have been increased
without regard to the available supply of feed (F:gu:
15). The total supply of feed (in standard feed units of
one ton of oat grain) averaged an estimaaed 200
million metric tons per year during 1959 -62, but it
declined to less than 180 million metric ton in 1963
and 1964. Feed supplies have trended upward since
1964, however, reaching a peak in 1971, when the
supply of available feed units was two- fifths greater
than in .1964. As a result, total livestock herds
increased moderately during this period, achieving a
peak level in 1971; it was not until 1972, however, that
hog numbers as well as sheep and goats were restored
to the level prevailing before the 1963 agricultural
debacle. Although overall livestock numbers appear
unchanged in 1972, the amount of usable product
attained per animal of most categories of livestock
suffered because of feed shortages during the year.
Estimated total production of basic livestock food
products is shown in Figure 16.' (Wool is treated
below under natural fibe.s.) The greatest increases in
output occurred during 1950 -60 before tapering off in
1960 -64. After 1964, temporary improvements in the
available feed supply provided the basis for more
rapid increases in the production of meat and milk.
The decline in meat production in the late 1960's
reflected not only the decrease in livestock numbers
but also the policy of expanding depleted herds. Better
feed supplies permitted both output of livestock
products and the number of animals to expand during
1970 and 1971 before the disastrous harvest of 1972
led to a decline in meat production during the early
months of 1973.
'Because a large portion of Soviet livestock is privately owned,
verification of Soviet statistics, especially for the production of meat
and milk, is difficult. Moreover, no attempt has been made to make
the stc.�istics conform to U.S. definitions of products. Information
on the output of meat, milk, and other food products processed in
state industrial enterprises is presented in Subsection C. 4, c.
FIGURE 16. Output of principal food products (U /OU)
(Millions of metric tons unless otherwise indicated)
Livestock products:
1950 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972
Meat* 4.9 8.7 10.0 12.3 13.3 13.6
Whole milk 35.3 61.7 72.6 83.0 83.2 83.2
Eggs (millions of units) 11.7 27.5 29.1 40.7 45.1 48.2
Fish catch (including marine animals) 1.8 3.5 5.8 7.9 7.8 na
Output of food industry:
Meat 1.6 **4.4 **5.2 **7.1 8.2 8.7
Beef 1.0 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.7 na
Pork 0.3 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.9 na
Mutton 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 na
Poultry Insig 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 na
Other 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 na
Milk products 1.1 8.3 11.7 19.7 19.7 20.0
Butter 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
Cheese 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Sugar granulated) 2.5 6.4 11.0 10.1 9.0 8.9
Vegetable oil 0.8 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8
Margarine and margarine compounds.... 0.2 0.4 3.7 0.8 0.8 na
Canned foods (billions of cans)t......... 1.5 4.9 7.1 10.7 11.3 12.0
Flour 22.0 35.0 37.0 42.0 43.0 na
Bread and bakery products 12.4 15.5 19.7 20.0 20.0 20.0
Macaroni products 0.: 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 na
Beer (millions of decaliters) 130.8 249.8 316.9 419.0 441.0 na
na Data not available.
*Slaughter weight, including edible offal.
*The sugar and margarine series cover total production. The milk products series is equivalent
to state purchases of milk. The butter and vegetable oil series exclude household production. The
meat and cheese series exclude household and collective farm production. The bread and bakery
products series excludes household, collective farm, and industrial cooperative production. The
scope of the remaining series is not defined.
*Figures do not add to totals because of rounding.
t400 -gram or 353 -cc. cans.
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(6) Natural fibers �The most important natural
fibers produced in the U.S.S.R. are cotton, flax, and
wool The following tabulation shows domestic
production meets practically all the country's
requirements for these fibers (1971 data, in thousands
of metric tons):
GINNED FLAX WOOL
COTTON FIBER WASHED)
Production
2,414
4R5
214
Imports
243
0
86
Total availability
2,657
485
300
Exports
547
9
14
Apparent consumption
2,110
476
286
Lnports of cotton and wool provide higher grades of
fibers than are gene: ,ll produced domestically. Tit
Soviet Union also exporis natural fibers predominantly
to East Europe with some of the cotton shipped to
these countries returning as finished cotton goods.
Cotton is the leading fiber crop and principal
irrigated crop in the U.S.S.R., with production second
only to that of the United States. "Cite output of cotton
more than doubled during the period 1950 -72 because
of increases in the irrigated area sown to cotton,
greater application of fertilizer, more effective price
incentives, and improved production practices.
The U.S.S.R. produces more than two- thirds of the
world output of flax fiber even though the area
planted to this crop declined from 4.2 million acres in
1962 to 3.1 million acres in 1972. Although production
of wool in 1971 was 19% above the average annual
level of 196i -65, it was still inadequate to meet the
requirements of the wool textile industry. Preliminary
estimates indicate that output in 1972 was about 2%
below the 1971 level because the harsh winter
increased mortality rates for sheep.
c. Fisheries
With a large and modern fishing fleet, the U.S.S.R.
ranks among the leading fishing nations of the world.
In 1971 the Soviet Union accounted for about 10.5%
of the world's fish catch and about 14% of the global
whale catch in the 1970 -71 season. 'Cite total Soviet
catch of fish and marine animals amounted to 7.8
million metric tons in 1971. The catch has more than
doubled since 1960 as the result of expansion of fishing
on the high seas; this portion of the catch rose from
about 65% of the total in 1960 to roughly 85% in 1971.
The 1;oviets have relied heavily on the fishing
industry to increase the share of animal production in
the Soviet diet. In 1971, consumption of fish was 14.8
'I'hc term "high eas" refers to oceanic fishing areas and thus
excludes the Black, Mediterranean, Caspian. Azov, and Aral Seas.
24
kilograms per capita compared with 8.9 kilograms in
1959. Production of canned fish increased from 200
million cans (about 71.000 tons) in 1950 to 1,500
million cans (roughly 500,000 tons) in 1971. In
addition, the U.S.S.R. has become it net exporter of
fish and fish products, although such exports represent
only a small share of the total fish catch.
Further development of the fishing industry is
planned during the course of the Ninth Five Year Plan
for 1971 -75 as shown in the following tabulation, in
thousand metric tons unless otherwise indicated:
1970
FISH PRODUCTS ACTUAL PLAN
Live and frozen fish 184 295
Smoked and dried fish 148 282
Salt herring 406 554
Fish and whale meal for livestock
feed 393 675
Canned fish products million
standard cans) 1,405 1,900
As competition for the world's fish resources has
become more intense, the U.S.S.R. has begun to
participate in international programs to regulate
fishing practices and conserve world fish resources. As
in other areas, however, Soviet national interests will
predominate, and further xacerbation of interna-
tional fishing tensions and problems can be expected.
The Soviets are likely to concentrate increasingly on
fishing in the waters of the Soutbern Hemisphere as
the rich northern grounds are depleted rr become
potential causes of conflicts with the leading non
Communist powers.
d. Adequacy of food supply and diet
The Soviet population consumes about 3,200
calories per clay per capita, or almost as much as
average per capita consumption in the United States
(Figure 17). The Soviet figure has not changed
appreciably during the past decade, but the Soviet
diet has improved markedly since the early 1950's,
although it is still deficient in terms of the share of
calories supplied by quality foods such as meat,
vegetables, and fruit. Per capita consumption of meat,
fish, and fats and oils has doubled since that time, and
sugar consumption more than tripled. Conversely, the
share of calories suppiied by the basic starchy foods
grain products and potatoes dropped from roughly
70% in 1950 to about 52% in 1971; this share is still
more than twice as large as its counteepart in the
United States. Furthermore, the lack of any sizable
area in the U.S.S.R. suitable for the winter production
of fruits and vegetables, the shortage of refrigeration
facilities, and the general inadequacy of the
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Estimated number of
rolories per person per day 3200 3320
Meat and Fish
Vegetables, Fruits, Eggs
Milk Milk Products
(Excluding Butter)
Fats Oils
Gain Products
and Potatoes
FIGURE 17. Composition of U.S. and U.S.S.R. diets,
1971 (U /OU)
distribution network have imposed a monotonous diet
on most of the population during it large part of the
yea r.
The Brezhnev- Kosygin regime is genuinely
concerned about raising the quality of the Soviet diet.
In 1965, Br(' committed the leadership to
increasing supplies of high quality foods, especially
livestock products, and he decreed it costly investment
program to stimulate agricultural production across
the hoard. Nevertheless, meat production grew
relatively slowly during the rest of the 1960'x. Fueled
by rising incomes, however, demand for meat became
particularly strong, and beginning in 1969, there were
sporadic reports of prolonged local shortages. Early in
1970 the leadership augmented domestic supplies by
importing 165,000 tons of meat. 'I'hc regime continued
its cnrnmitnlent to raising the availability of meat
supplies by importing a further 225,000 tons in 1971;
alt increase in domestic production also eased the meat
supply situation. In 1972, large meat imports were not
needed as domestic production grew sufficiently to
permit a 3 "i increase in per capita consumption of
meat.
Because of both the institutional problems besetting
Soviet agriculture and the vagaries of the weather,
crop production flt.tctuates widely, occasionally
necessitating imports of foodstuffs other than meat.
Grain was imported after poor harvesis in 1963, 1965,
and 1969, and a record amount was again purchased
abroad in 1972. For the next several years substantial
imports of grain are likely to become the rule rather
than the exception to the extent that the leadership
adheres to its program of raising the share of meat in
the Soviet diet. 'Chis is because the country produces
inadequate amounts of feed grains to support rapidly
growing herds of livestock even in the best of crop
years. Grain impo.Js in the early 1970's permitted the
regime to maintain livestock herds as well as the
quality and assortment of bread products. Further-
more, imports of substantial quantities o.' citrus and
tropical fruits in recent years are farther evidence of
the determination by the authorities to raise the
dietary quality.
e. Forest resources and products
Forests cover almost 1,850 million acres, or about
one -third of the total land area of the U.S.S.R. Nearly
one- fourth of the world's forest land capable of
producing crops of industrirl wood and about one -half
of the world's conifers lie within Soviet boundaries.
The Soviets, however, have not been able to satisfy
their combined needs for home consumption and
export despite the enormous volume of standing
timber and the fact that the U.S.S.R. produces more
timber and lumber than any other country in the
world (total log removals in 1971 amounted to 384.8
million cubic meters). This failure is in large part clue
to the unfavorable geographic location of the
U.S.S.R.'s forests in relation to the major consumption
centers; three: fourths of the country's forest resources
are located east of the Ural Mountains. The
movement of wood products imposes a considerable
and increasing burden on the transportation system.
As a result of the logging industry's concentration in
more remote areas, the average length of haul per ton
of wood shipped by rail increased from about 530
miles in 1950 to almost twice this distance 20 years
later, the highest average length of haul for any
commodity moved by rail in the U.S.S.R.
Exports of logs soared from 3 million cubic meters in
1958 to 11.6 million cubic meters in 1971. Exports of
lumber, however, grew less rapidly during this
period �from 3.6 million cubic meters to 7.9 million
cubic meters. Exports of wood products are an
important earner of hard currency, with Japan the
largest customer for logs, taking 45 c of such exports. A
substantial increase in timber exports is scheduled
during 1969 -73 in return for Japanese technical aid in
the development of the timber industry in the Soviet
Far East.
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2. Fuels and power (S)
The rapid development of sources of energy,
primarily for industrial use, has always been it priority
objective of the U.S.S.P,.'s economic development
program. 'The country possesses reserves :if mineral
fuels and waterpower that exceed those of either the
United States or Western Europe; proved reserves of
mineral fuels are adequate to meet current production
needs and to support continued economic growth.
I lowever, the inability of the fuel and power industries
to make fine adjustments in operating functions
prevents the most efficient use of these resources.
As many of the major fuel- consuming centers Lire
located great distances from sources of better qualih'
fuels, they have been forced to utilize poorer quality,
high -cost local fuels. Moreover, the difficulties of
transmitting energy over vast distances have led to the
concentration of new economic activity in areas with
already developed sources of energy. At times this
policy has contributed to an overburdening of local
energy resources and has resulted in occasional energy
shortages. The Summary Map insets in the back show
the location of major fuel resources, petroleum
refineries, and electrical power facilities. Pipelines are
discussed in the Transportation and Telecommunica-
tions chapter of this General Survey.
In the postwar period, oil and natural gas rapidly
displaced coal as the basic source of energy; in 1950,
coal supplied more than three times the amount of
primary energy available from petroleum production,
but petroleum output has increased so rapidly that
energy from coal in 1970 amounted to less than three
fifths of the energy from petroleum even though the
output of coal more than doubled during this period.
Figure 18 shows the dramatic shifts in the Soviet fuel
balance since 1950. Annual production of individual
fuels has frequently deviated from planner.) output;
moreover, the shift to liquid and gaseous fuels has
been complicated by imbalances in planning and by
the failure of the machine building industry to provide
necessary equipment. For example, there is a serious
shortage of secondary refining equipment needed to
produce high quality gasoline and diesel fuel, and the
development of natural gas resources has been
retarded by lark of deep drilling, producing,
transmission, and consuming equipment.
Since 1940 the geographical pattern of production
of the major fuels and of electric power has shifted.
The share of the total Soviet output of fuels and
electric power produced in the regions cast of the Urals
has increased significantly, as is shown in the
following tabulation (in percentages based on physical
output):
The U.S.S.R. ranks second to the United States
among the nations of the world in the total production
and consumption of primary energy (including coal,
FIGURE 18. Estimated production of primary energy (C)
(Millions of metric tons of coal equivalents
1940
1960
1971
Coal
29
36
44
Oil
6
7
21
Natural gas
1
2
31
Electric power
9
22
26
a. Primary energy
17.0
17.7
16.7
The U.S.S.R. ranks second to the United States
among the nations of the world in the total production
and consumption of primary energy (including coal,
FIGURE 18. Estimated production of primary energy (C)
(Millions of metric tons of coal equivalents
*Energy expressed in coal equivalent has a calorific value of 7,000 kilocalories per kilogram.
*Converted at the rate of fuel consumption per kw.-hr. of electricity produced in thermal
powerplants.
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1950
1960
1965
1970
1971
Solid fuels:
Coal
205.7
373.1
412.5
432.7
444.2
Peat
14.8
20.4
17.0
17.7
16.7
Oil shale
1.3
4.8
7.4
8.8
9.5
Fuelwood
27.9
28.7
33.5
26.6
26.6
Subtotal
249.7
427.0
470.4
485.8
497.0
Petroleum:
Crude oil
54.2
211.4
346.4
502.5
537.3
Natural gas
7.3
54.4
149.8
233.5
250.6
Subtotal
61.5
265.8
496.2
736.0
787.9
Total fuel
311.2
692.8
966.6
1,221.8
1,284.9
Hydroelectric power
7.7
23.8
33.8
45.6
45.3
Grand total
318.9
716.6
1,000.4
1,267.4
1,330.2
*Energy expressed in coal equivalent has a calorific value of 7,000 kilocalories per kilogram.
*Converted at the rate of fuel consumption per kw.-hr. of electricity produced in thermal
powerplants.
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crude oil, natural gas, hydroelectric power, and peat).
The Soviet share of world production increased from
about 11% in 1950 to about 17!% in 1971. Rapid
exploitation of the country's petroleum resources was
part of the program adopted after the death of Stalin
to modernize the technological structure of the Soviet
economy. The share of petroleum and natural gas in
the production of primary energy increased from
about 19% in 1950 to 59% in 1971, reflecting
petroleum's displacement of coal as the major source
of primary energy. In 1971, hydroelectric power
supplied about 3% of the primary energy produced;
fuelwood, oil shale, and peat combined accounted for
about 4
The U.S. S. R. is a net exporter of petroleum, and in
recent years such exports have been its largest single
source of foreign exchange. Exports of petroleum
increased at an average annual rate of 19% during the
period 1956 -71; in recent years, however, this rate of
increase has fallen substantially. Shipments abroad in
1971 were almost equally divided between Com-
munist (55 million tons) and non Communist
countries (50 million tons). The U.S.S.R. is also a net
exporter of coal, although in recent years total exports
of this commodity have levelled off. About three fifths
of the coal exported in the last few years was shipped
to Eastern Europe. The following tabulation for 1971
shows that imports were negligible and that slightly
less than 12% of the total domestic availability of
energy wa3 exported:
"Total primary energy output is adjusted to include 36.5
million tons of coal equivalent shown in Soviet data as
"other sources;" this comprises minor sources of primary
energy, such as agricultural wastes, together with some
secondary energy.
"Adjusted for losses in transport and storage.
b. Coal
According to Soviet sources, total reserves of coal
amounted to 6,800 billion metric tons in 1969.
Explored reserves amount to only about 500 billion
tons, however, with two- fifths of this total not
considered to be economically exploitable at present.
As these estimates of reserves do not represent
thorough exploration and study of all areas, higher or
lower estimates may be forthcoming.
About 76% of total reserves of coal are located east
of the Urals, many of them in remote and inaccessible
regions. These reserves, moreover, consist mainly of
low quality brown coals that are suitable for li'tle
beyonU the generation of steam for electric power and
heat. West of the Urals, deposits of better quality coal
are limited primarily to the Donets, Pechora, and
Kizel basins, production from which has not kept pace
with the requirements of the area. As a result, the
European regions of the U.S.S.R. consume large
quantities of bituminous coal from the Karaganda and
Kuznets basins in the east. Coal from these areas is
transported long distances (as much as 2,300 miles) to
the major consuming regions.
Coal output increased rapidly from the end of
World War II through the 1950's, when the U.S.S.R.
displaced the United States as the ieading coal
producing nation of the world. Beginning in the
1960's, the rate of growth in coal production declined
in accordance with Soviet energy policy, which called
for a more rapid growth in the use of petroleum
(Figure 19). Since 1957 the U.S.S.R. has been a net
exporter of coal; in 1971 net exports totaled 17 million
tons.
In 1971, 75% (about 442 million metric tons) of the
coal produced in the U.S.S.R. was bituminous and
anthracite; 25% (roughly 150 million tons) was brown
coal. Preliminary data for 1972 indicate that total coal
output was about 604 million tons.
e. Petroleum
The U.S.S.R. has vast resources of petroleum.
However, the lack of modem equipment and
technology and the continuation of wasteful
production practices is limiting the growth in output
of oil and gas, especially as the center of production
shifts eastward from the Urals -Volga area to the West
Siberian region with its difficult climate, terrain, and
working conditions. These Siberian deposits are
deeper, more costly to exploit and probably inferior in
quality to those in the Urals -Volga area.
The Soviet Union is second only to the United
States as a producer of crude oil (Soviet production
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MILLION TONS
OF COAL
EQUIVALENT
PERCENT
Supply of energy:
Production of primary energy
1,366.7
91.0
Imports
19.5
1.3
Balance at beginning of year
114.9
7.7
Total
1,501.1
100.0
Demand for energy:
Apparent domestic demand
1,199.3
79.9
Electric and thermal power
504.8
33.6
Technological and other uses" 694.5
46.3
Exports
180.9
12.1
Balance
120.9
8.0
Total
1,501.1
100.0
"Total primary energy output is adjusted to include 36.5
million tons of coal equivalent shown in Soviet data as
"other sources;" this comprises minor sources of primary
energy, such as agricultural wastes, together with some
secondary energy.
"Adjusted for losses in transport and storage.
b. Coal
According to Soviet sources, total reserves of coal
amounted to 6,800 billion metric tons in 1969.
Explored reserves amount to only about 500 billion
tons, however, with two- fifths of this total not
considered to be economically exploitable at present.
As these estimates of reserves do not represent
thorough exploration and study of all areas, higher or
lower estimates may be forthcoming.
About 76% of total reserves of coal are located east
of the Urals, many of them in remote and inaccessible
regions. These reserves, moreover, consist mainly of
low quality brown coals that are suitable for li'tle
beyonU the generation of steam for electric power and
heat. West of the Urals, deposits of better quality coal
are limited primarily to the Donets, Pechora, and
Kizel basins, production from which has not kept pace
with the requirements of the area. As a result, the
European regions of the U.S.S.R. consume large
quantities of bituminous coal from the Karaganda and
Kuznets basins in the east. Coal from these areas is
transported long distances (as much as 2,300 miles) to
the major consuming regions.
Coal output increased rapidly from the end of
World War II through the 1950's, when the U.S.S.R.
displaced the United States as the ieading coal
producing nation of the world. Beginning in the
1960's, the rate of growth in coal production declined
in accordance with Soviet energy policy, which called
for a more rapid growth in the use of petroleum
(Figure 19). Since 1957 the U.S.S.R. has been a net
exporter of coal; in 1971 net exports totaled 17 million
tons.
In 1971, 75% (about 442 million metric tons) of the
coal produced in the U.S.S.R. was bituminous and
anthracite; 25% (roughly 150 million tons) was brown
coal. Preliminary data for 1972 indicate that total coal
output was about 604 million tons.
e. Petroleum
The U.S.S.R. has vast resources of petroleum.
However, the lack of modem equipment and
technology and the continuation of wasteful
production practices is limiting the growth in output
of oil and gas, especially as the center of production
shifts eastward from the Urals -Volga area to the West
Siberian region with its difficult climate, terrain, and
working conditions. These Siberian deposits are
deeper, more costly to exploit and probably inferior in
quality to those in the Urals -Volga area.
The Soviet Union is second only to the United
States as a producer of crude oil (Soviet production
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FIGURE 19. Production of fuels, by type (C)
(Thousands of metric tons unless otherwise indicated)
Solid fuels:
Coal:
Hard coa l
Brown coal
Total
Peat
Oil shale
Fuelwood (thousands of cubic meters)
Petroleum:
Crude
Natural gas (millions of w1bic meters)........
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971
181,010
267,262
355,918
397,645
432,715
442,000
75,831
112,933
134,206
147,444
144,745
150,000
256,841
380,195
490,124
545,089
577,460
592,000
36,000
50,800
53,600
45,800
57,400
54,300
4,716
10,793
14,147
21,259
24,319
*26,000
105,000
121,800
108,000
104,500
86,500
86,400
37,878
70,758
147,191
241,732
348,791
271,800
5,369
8,370
45,303
127,666
197,945
212,398
*Bituminous and anthracite.
**Estimated.
data for crude are given in Figure 19 and for refined
products in Figure 20). The production of abut 372
million metric tons in 1971 represented about one
sixth of total world output and was equivalent to
about 77% of U.S. production. Of all the major fossil
fuels produced in the U.S.S.R. only crude oil has been
produced in excess of planned quantities since 1960.
Oil production has generally increased more rapidly
than the domestic need for it since 1955, and Soviet
exports of crude oil rose from 2.9 million metric tons in
1955 to 74.8 tons in 1971.
The Urals -Volga region has been the major source of
crude oil since 1955; in 1971 this area contributed
about 55% of total Soviet output. The growth of
production in this region was rapid, increasing from
29% of total output in 1950 to about 70% in 1966.
Thereafter, its relative share declined steadily to its
present level. This rapid growth is attributed primarily
to the use of the turbodrill (ideally suited for the
shallow hard rock formations encountered) and to the
extensive use of waterflooding to increase flow rates.
The waterflooding operations, however, were not
conducted properly in many of the large oilfields. As a
result, water encroachment has developed in recent
years, leading to the loss of a substantial part of the oil
in place and a more rapid depletion of reserves.
Production from the Urals -Volga fields has nearly
levelled off, increasing only from 206 million tons in
1970 to about 210 million tons 1972. It is by no means
certain that production from the Urals -Volga fields
can be maintained at the present level, and the
relative importance of the region in total output is
decreasing. Production of crude oil is planned to reach
496 million tons in 1975, out this goal will be difficult
to reach as a result of the virtual stagnation in
production from the Urals -Volga fields.
Extensive but remote reserves of oil and gas have
been discovered in West Siberia, in Central Asia along
the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and i i western
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenia. Exploitation of these
deposits is hampered by the lack of suitable drilling
equipment (primarily rotary equipment) as well as by
a shortage of large- diameter, long- distance pipelines.
There are also inadequate supplies of oil and gas on-
site processing equipment for the removal of water,
corrosives and contaminants.
FIGURE 20. Estimated output of refined petroleum products (S)
(Millions of metric tons)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971
Gasol ine
13.6
23.0
31.5
45.2
48.9
Kerosine
9.3
15.2
16.8
20.8
21.3
Diesel fuel
12.0
27.6
47.0
69.1
73.8
Lubricating oils
2.3
4.5
6.6
9.3
10.0
Heavy fuel oil and other residual products..
21.3
43.6
71.7
107.8
115.3
Total
59.4
113.9
173.6
252.2
269.3
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The increase in output of petroleum products hps
paralleled the growth in production of crude of i r^tal
output of petroleum products in 1971 was al. 1.5
times the level of 1955 as is shown in Figure 20.
Refining capacity for the distillation of crude oil
increased from 90 million tons per year at the end of
1955 to about 320 million tons per year at the end of
1971. This primary distillation capacity is adequate to
provide most of the supplies of oil products for
domestic and export needs. The major deficiency in
the refining sector has been the failure to install the
necessary secondary facilities (catalytic cracking,
catalytic reforming, hydrogen treating, etc.) as rapidly
as needed to increase the yield and improve the
quality of distillates. Diesel fuel, in particular, has
been in short supply at times both because of the
heavy demand during the harvest season and because
of the decision to �xport ibis product to earn foreign
exchange.
Natural gas is produced in association with, as well
as independently of, crude oil. About nine tenths of
the natural gas produced in the U.S.S.R. comes from
nonass.:--iated gas fields. Proved and probable reserves
of nonassociated natural gas have increased
impressively since 1950, as shown below (end -of -year
data in billions of cubic meters):
1950
149
1955
492
1958
988
1965
3,411
1970
15,795
1972
18,000
The ratio of proved reserves to annual production; has
fallen drastically as the production of natural vas
increased from about 9 billion cubic meters in 1955 to
212 billion cubic meters in 1971. The U.S.S.R. has
ranked second among the world's producers of natural
gas since 1963. Its production, however, has
repeatedly fallen short of planned output because of
shortages of equipment.
Proved and probable Soviet reserves of natural gas
are claimed to be more than two times those of the
United States, but Soviet technicians use estimating
criteria that are less stringent than those employed in
the United States. The ratio of proved reserves to
annual production at the major gas deposits in the
European U.S.S.R. has fallen drastically as output rose
from about 9 billion cubic meters in 1955 to 212
billion cubic meters in 1971. The vast Siberian
deposits are relatively unexploited, and the extent of
proved and probable categories in this area is
unknown.
Sovi -!t output of natural gas in 1971 was equivalent
to only about 33% of'U.S. output. Failures in meeting
past goals for output, primarily due to shortages of
deep- drilling, producing, consuming, and pipeline
transmission equipment, resulted in lowering the 1973
goal from the original range of 250 to 238 billion cubic
meters. The prospects, moreover, are unfavorable for
meeting the 1975 production goal of 320 billion cubic
meters. The growth of the gas transmission pipeline
system from only 3,020 miles in 1955 to an estimated
43,750 miles at the end of 1971 has been a major
accomplishment of the industry. Use of large- diameter
pipe is widespread and far more common than in the
United States. Pipeline connections enable the
U.S.S.R. to export small quantities of natural gas to
Poland and Czechoslovakia �a total of about 4.6
billion cubic meters in 1971; in the same year the
Soviets imported 8.1 billion cubic meters of natural
gas from Iran and Afghanistan. Agreements concluded
with Austria, West Germany, Italy, France, and
Finland call for the U.S.S.R. to export about 18.5
billion cubic meters annually during the latter half of
the 1970's. Commitments to East Europe will rise to
roughly 18 billion cubic meters.
As total production of natural gas has increased, the
relative importance of natural gas produced in
association with crude oil has declined from 34% of
the total output of natural gas in 1955 to about 11 in
1971. Even though an amount equal to neariy one
third of the annual production of associated gas has
been lost for !ack of gathering facilities, production of
associated natural gas increased from 16.5 billion
cubic meters in 1965 to 22 billion cubic meters in
1970; output is planned to reach 24 billion cubic
meters in 1975. Associated natural gas has become
increasingly important as a raw material for the
chemical industry. The U.S.S.R. has been slower than
the United States to recognize the potential of natural
gas liquids, particularly of liquefied petroleum gas.
Only with the establishment of a petrochemicals
industry and the desire to supply gas to rural regions
have Soviet officials taken action to increase the
production of natural gas liquids. Production of
liquefied petroleum gas increased from 0.5 million
metric tons in 1959 to 5.2 million metric tons in 1971
compared with about 62 million tons produced in the
United States in 1971; Soviet output is planned to
.each 9 million tons in 1975.
d. Electric power
The Soviet electric power industry ranks second in
the world behind the United States in capacity,
output, and general technical advancement. At the
end of 1972, installed c ^^!?city of powerplants in the
U.S.S.R. totaled approAimately 186.000,000 kilowatts
(kw.), or about 44% of U.S. powerplant capacity.
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Soviet power production during 1972 was 858 billion
kilowatt -hours (kw. -hrs.), roughly 43% of the total
generated in the United States and 37% on a per
capita basis. There are l;reat regional variations in
sower availability in the U.S.S.R., but power systems
in the developed areas of the country, where the bulk
of facilities are located, have achieved a high degree of
reliability. Exports comprise an extremely small
fraction of the total Soviet power output, with almost
all exported power transmitted to East Europe.
Limited amounts of power also go to Norway,
Finland, and Iran. Net exports in 1972 amounted to
about 7 billion kw. -hrs., or 0.8% of Soviet power
output.
Industrial consumption of electric power in 1972
amounted to approximately 58% of total output; after
discounting transmission losses, powerplant use, and
net exports, the industrial share of final consumption
was approximately 68 The principal users are
enterprises in the metallurgical, nuclear materials,
fuel processing, chemical, and machine building
branches of industry. The share of power allocated for
residential use in the Soviet Union is much smaller
than that in developed Western countries. The electric
energy consumed by industry and various other sectors
of the economy in 1972 was approximately as follows:
BILLION PERCENT OF
CLASS OF USE Kw: HR. TOTAL OUTPUT
Industrial 497.6 58.0
Municipal 97.8 11.4
Transmission losses 66.0 7.7
Transportation :2.6 7.3
Powerplant use d.3 6.8
Rural 51.5 6.0
Construction 17.2 2.0
Net exports 7.0 0.8
Total 858.0 100.0
Changes in the pattern of power use are anticipated
to be slight as only the sham foi rural electrification is
likely to show a significant increase during the next 5
,years; the overall growth of output will be reflected in
increases in consumption by all users. Except in the
most isolated regions, virtually the entire population
has some electric power supply, although domestic
service continues to be interrupted occasionally to
meet industrial needs.
Power consumption: k greatest in the industrial areas
of the central and northwestern European U.S.S.R.,
the eastern half of the Ukraine, and the central and
southern Urals. There also are a number of large power
consumers, such as uranium isotope separation plants
and aluminium plants, located in central Siberia
where conditions are favorable for the production of
30
low -cost electric energy. More than 85% of known
Soviet fuel and hydroelectric resources are located in
the eastern regions of the country, whereas 80% of the
electricity is cons ;med in the European part. About
755 of the electric power currently produced is in the
areas of heavy consumption. Capacity is growing in
the eastern areas, however, as low -cost fuel and
unexploited hydrop-^wer resources become scarce in
the west. As a r -suit, future plans call for large blocks
of power to be supplied from cast of the Urals over
very high voltage, long- distance transmission lines.
Conventional thermal powerplants contributed
approximately 82% of the total Soviet production of
electricity in 1972; hydroelectric powerplants
accounted for about 14 internal combustion
powerplants supplied about 3 and roughly 1% was
from nuclear powerplants. About half the fuel burned
at thermal powerplants is coal, with natural gas
accounting for 22 fuel oil 21 and peat 4 the
remainder is shale oil and other miscellaneous fuels.
Soviet powerplants are generally large, modern, and
fairly efficient. Almost 75% of the nation's generating
capacity is in machinery less than 15 years old, and
30% of thermal powerplant equipment is less than 5
years old. The two most powerful generating plants in
the world are the Krasnoyarsk Hydroelectric Station
(6,000,000 -kw.) and the Bratsk Hydroelectric Station
(4,100,000 -kw.). The U.S.S.R. has seven thermal
generating plants rated at 2,400,000 kw. installed
capacity. Both hydroelectric and thermal generating
plants are under construction with even greater
capacity.
Some of the U.S.S.R.'s giant powerplants
incorporate equipment of record size. The 500,000 -kw.
generators at Krasnoyarsk are the most powerful
hydroelectric generating units in the world. Even
larger units are to be introduced at the Sayan
Hydroelectric Station, now under construction to the
south of Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisey River. New
thermal powerplants are currently being equipped
with 200,000- and 300,000 -kw. turbogenerators, with
500,000- and 800,000 -kw. units being introduced.
Although smaller than the million -plus kilowatt units
in a few U.S. powerplants, the Soviet units also
operate on steam at supercritical pressure and
temperature, and are approaching the thermal
efficiency of their U.S. counterparts.
Transmission of electric energy in the U.S.S.R. is
accomplished by well developed networks which
incorporate more than 95% of the country's generating
capacity and cover virtually all developed areas. These
networks provide generally reliable service and are
adequate to meet normal demands, but there is
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relatively little provision for alternate routing among
the major intersystem ties. The seven major power
networks which serve the European areas of the
U.S.S.R. have been linked to form the Unified Power
System of European U.S.S.R., with a total installed
capacity of 120 million kw. at the end of 1972.
Extensive transmission systems also serve central
Siberia, northern Kazakhstan, southern Central Asia,
and the Soviet Far East.
Transmission lines with voltages of 220, 330, and
500 kilovolts (kv.) form the backbone of Soviet
transmission networks, with 110 kv. lines used in local
power grids. Several international powerlines are in
operation across the western oorders of the U.S.S.R.,
including 400 -kv. circuits to Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Romania, and 220 -kv. lines to Poland;
a new 400 -kv. line to Bulgaria is nearing completion.
A prototype 750 -kv. line is in operation in the Moscow
area, and a similar line is under construction in the
Ukraine. An experimental 800 -kv., direct current
powerline also has been in operation For several years
between the Volgograd hydroelectric station and the
Donets Basin it. the eastern Ukraine. Soviet power
authorities plan to develop even higher voltage lines to
make practicable the transfer of power over longer
distances. For example, a 1,500 -kv, direct- current
powerline is being designed to convey current from
giant thermal powerplants under construction near the
extensive Ekibastuz coal deposits in northeastern
Kazakhstan to the central European U.S.S.R.
The Five Year Plan calls for increasing installed
electric power capacity to 232 million kw. and annual
production to about 1.065 billion kw. -hrs. in 1975;
comparable figures for 1970 we,�e 166.2 million kw.
and 740.9 billion kw. -hrs. This increase is to come
chiefly from the addition of larger and more efficient
generating units at large regional thermal power-
plants. Hydroelectric construction during 1971 -75 will
be concentrated mainly on a few :arge projects to
complete the harnessing of the Dnepr, Volga, and
Kama Rivers in European U.S.S.R. and the Yenisey
and Angara Rivers in central Siberia. Nuclear
powerplants with a total capacity of 7,200,000 kw. are
scheduled to go into operation during 1971 -75: four
times this capacity, or 30,000,000 kw., is projected by
1980 -85. These plants will be located principally in
European areas, where fuel resources are scarce.
The extension and comolidation of transmission
facilities is planned, with special emphasis on joining
the regional networks in order to form the United
Power Network of the entire U.S.S.R. During the
current 5 -year plan, !he Soviets intend to introduce
powerlines of much greater length, voltage, and
capacity to convey low -cost power to the Urals and
European U.S.S.R. from Riant thermal and hydro
powerplants in central Siberia, where enormous
deposits of easily mined brown coal and excellent
hydropower sites exist.
The Soviet Union has achieved world leadership in
the construction of hydroelectric generating
equipment, in terms of both technology and unit
capacity. Bit in steam turbine and generator
technolog it lags behind the United States, and the
Soviets have encountered some problems in designing
and producing new large turbogenerators. The
capacity of the Soviet elect rotech n ical industry is
adequate to supply the generating equipment required
during the current plan period and to export some
equipment to East Europe and to less developed
countries. During the period 1971 -75, the output of
equipment is to be increased by adding new capacity
at machine building plants, and by increasing the
average unit capacity of the aggregates produced.
3. Minerals and metals (S)
The Soviet metallurgical industry, one of the largest
in the world, is first in the production of pig iron, steel,
and many ores and basic materials; it ranks second in
the output of copper, lead, aluminum, and nickel.
(For the location of production centers, see the
Metallurgy inset on the foldout Summary Map.(The
industry probably has the largest raw material base in
the world, but reserves of high -grade ores
particularly certain nonferrous ores �are declining.
Furthermore, considerable portions of the country's
ore reserves cannot be recovered economically with
available technology and equipment. The U.S.S.R.,
however, has demonstrated its ability to develop
special alloys essential to the attainment of its military
and strategic goals, although the general trend has
been more toward improving technology for quantity
rather than for quality production.
a. Minerals
(1) Iron ore Soviet reserves of exploitable iron ore
in 1970 exceeded 100 billion tons, accounting for more
than 40% of the world total. As this ore generally is of
only average quality, it requires considerable
upgrading, as evidenced by the large -scale program
for construction of concentrating, sintering, and
pelletizing plants. The U.S.S.R. is the world's largest
producer of iron ore, providing completely for its own
needs and furnishing more than 80% of the
requirements of Eastern Europe.
31
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FIGURE 21. Production of usable iron ore and ferroalloying materials (C
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972
Millions of
metric tons
Usable iron ore
71.9
105.9
153.4
195.5
203.0
208.0
Ferroalloying materials:
Manganese ore
4.7
5.9
7.6
6.8
7.3
7.5
Thousands of
metric tons
Chromite, Cr %content
304.0
520.0
1,160.0
1,380.0
1,400.0
1,420.0
Tungsten concentrates, 60% W% basis..........
7.5
11.4
14.0
14.5
15.2
15.5
Molybdenum content of ores and concentrates....
2.8
4.8
7.3
9.5
9.5
9.8
Mickel, ro ined
46.0
72.0
100.0
137.0
148.0
156.0
Cobalt content of ores mined
0.9
1.6
3.4
4.7
4.8
5.0
(2) Ferroalloying materials -The U.S.S.R. has
abundant reserves of ferroalloying materials
manganese, chromite, tungsten, molybdenum, nickel,
and cobalt -and is a leading producer in the world of
these ores. Production of ferroalloying materials is
shown in Figure 21.
Among the major steel- producing countries of the
world, only the U.S.S.R. is self- sufficient in
manganese. Soviet reserves of more than 2 billion tons
of ore are second only to those of South Africa. The
U.S.S.R. is the largest producer of manganese ore in
the world, accounting for about one -third of total
production. Production of manganese exceeds
domestic requirements, leaving a sizable surplus for
exports, which amounted to 1.3 Million tons, or about
one -sixth of production, in 1972.
With the largest explored reserves of chromite in the
world, the U.S.S.R. is the leading producer of chrome
ore. In 1972 the Soviets mined about 3.2 million tons
of chrome ore with an estimated chromic oxide
content of 1.4 million tons. In that year they exported
1.1 million tons of chrome ores and concentrates, of
which about 80% went to non Communist countries,
including the United States. The Soviet Union also
claims to have the world's largest explored reserves of
nickel, tungsten, and molybdenum. It is the largest
producer of tungsten concentrates, accounting for
about 30% of worlfl production in 1971, and is second
only to Canada in the production of refined nickel.
(3) Nonferrous ores -The Soviets are largely self
sufficient in nonferrous ores but imports of aluminous
i v materials have increased in recent years; lead and
zinc Tics and concentrates as well as tin and uranium
are also impo.:_ed. Reserves of aluminous raw
materials- mainly bauxite and nepheiine -arc very
large, but are inadequate for meeting the growing
requirements of the Soviet aluminum industry.
Deposits of high quality bauxite, after years of
exploitation, are believed to be nearing exhaustion,
and the economic significance of the extensive
remaining reserves is reduced by the generally low
alumina and high silicon content of most of the ores
and by the unfavorable location of some deposits.
Extensive reserves of nepheline ores represent a
practically inexhaustible source of alumina, but the
Soviets apparently have found the processing of
nepheline to be too costly to warrant wider use under
present conditions. Soviet exploitation of domestic raw
materials has not kept pace with the growth of the
aluminum industry with the result that imports of
bauxite and alumina have grown considerably in
recent years; imports represented about 40% of total
requirements in 1972.
Soviet reserves of lead, with an estimated metal
content of 18 -20 million tons, are second only to those
of the United States. The reserves are concentrated in
Kazakhstan, which contains about two thirds of total
Soviet reserves. The bulk of the ore mired is obtained
from low -grade polymetallic lead -zinc deposits which
are generally worked inefficiently by costly
underground methods. The average lead content of
Soviet reserves has been declining steadily and is lower
than that of major western lead reserves.
The U.S.S.R. also has large reserves of zinc which,
with an estimated metal content of 30 million tons, are
almost as large as those of the United States. About
one -half of these reserves is found in Kazakhstan. The
average zinc metal content of Soviet ore has declined
as higher grade reserves have been exploited and
newly discovered deposits contain lower grade ores.
Most of the zinc ore output is mined from polymetallic
lead -zinc deposits.
Measured reserves of copper amounted to nearly 5a3
million tons of contained metal in 1965. These reserves
may have been increased in recent years, but are
probably not as large as estimated U.S. reserves of
nearly 70 million tons. The -rincipal deposits
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currently being exploited are located in Kazakhstan.
Of major significance for the future is the large
Udokan ore body in the Transbaikal region of Eastern
Siberia which reportedly has the potentiai to yield
400,000 tons of refined copper for over 50 years. The
quality of the Udokan ore, according to available
information, is high, averaging 1.5% to 2% copper
content. In general, however, the quality of Soviet
reserves of copper is low, probably averaging less than
1
Tin resources are located primarily in the Far East
and Eastern Siberia. Additional deposits of tin in
Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia hold little
promise for making a significant contribution to Soviet
supplies. Soviet ores are complex and low ;n tin
content, usually requiring initial concentration at the
mine sites. Concentrates containing 10% to 30% tin
are shipped to central facilities where further
processing yields concentrates with a tin content as
high as 70 Domestic production from Soviet ores,
however, has been inadequate to meet demand, and
imports have been required.
The uranium available to the U.S.S.R. from
domestic production is augmented by imports from
East Europe, chiefly East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia. Approximately 16 to 17 thousand tons of
uranium metal per year are available from all sources
for the Soviet atomic energy program. The main
uranium mining and ore concentrating areas in the
U.S.S.R. are the Krivoy Rog iron ore district in the
Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Ore
concentration plants are well designed and have
substantial capacities (500 to 1,000 tons of ore per
day), although several plants have considerably larger
capacities. Newer plants use the modern ion exchange
and solvent extraction methods.
The principal Soviet deposits of vein and placer
gold are located in Uzbekistan and in the basins of the
Lena, Kolyma, .Indigirka, and Aldan rivers in the
northeast part of the country. Production of gold
increased from an estimated 155 metric tons in 1965 to
255 tons in 1972. Almost half of this increase is
accounted for by operations at the recently
constructed Muruntau plant in Uzbekistan, which
will achieve full production of 90 tons annually by
1975. Another Uzbek plant at Chadak was completed
in late 1972, but its capacity is not known. The Soviets
also are building new plants at Aytym in Kazakhstan
and at Zod in Armenia; these plants are scheduled to
come on stream by 1975.
b. Metals
(1) Ferrous metals �In 1971 -72 the U.S.S.R. moved
ahead of the United States as the world's largest steel
FIGURE 22. Pig iron and steel production (U /OU)
(Millions of metric tons)
producer, an accomplishment that was the cumina-
ation of years of steady growth since World War II.
Prompt reconstruction of war damaged facilities and a
r9ntinuing high priority in investment allocations
rnabled the Soviets to sustain a remarkably uniform
series of annual increases in output: 3 to 4 million
during the 1950's and 5 million tons during the 1960's
and early 1970's (Figure 22). A dominant trend has
been the concentration of production in large modern
plants. In 1972 the 10 largest plants accounted for
more than half of total production, and the two dozen
largest plants produced roughly three quarters of total
output.
Notwithstanding its record of steady growth, the
Soviet steel industry has been hampered by perennial
lags in the construction of new capacity. These
sho ills have set back programs to introduce new
technology, to retire outmoded facilities and to
improve the quality and broaden the assortment of
products. The leadership has criticized the industry
repeatedly for failing to provide the economy with
new and improved types of steel products.
Soviet production of pig iron (including blast
furnace ferroalloys) in 1972 amounted to 92.3 million
tons, of which about 90% was used for steelmaking
and the remainder for iron castings. At the beginning
of 1973 the Soviets had an estimated 98 million tons of
blast furnace capacity, the sector of the iron and steel
industry in which the Soviets have demonstrated their
highest level of technical proficiency. In 1972 the
U. S. S. R., with about 135 blast furnaces in operation
roughly half the number in the United States
exceeded U.S. production of pig iron by 14 Soviet
blast furnaces are second only to those in japan in
terms of size and productivity. Steady improvements
in performance have been achieved by converting
furnaces to high top pressure, using natural gas as fuel,
injecting oxygen into the blast, and adopting efficient
cooling and moisture control systems.
At the beginning of 197 the steelmaking capacity
of the U.S.S.R. was estimated at about 135 million
tons, or 87% of U.S. cLpacRy. Most of the steel
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PIG IRON
CRUDE STEEL
ROLLED STEEL
1950
19.2
27.3
20.9
1951
33.3
45.3
35.3
1960
46.8
65.3
51.3
1965
66.2
91.0
70.9
1970
85.9
115.9
92.5
1971
89.3
120.7
95.9
1972
92.3
126.0
99.4
producer, an accomplishment that was the cumina-
ation of years of steady growth since World War II.
Prompt reconstruction of war damaged facilities and a
r9ntinuing high priority in investment allocations
rnabled the Soviets to sustain a remarkably uniform
series of annual increases in output: 3 to 4 million
during the 1950's and 5 million tons during the 1960's
and early 1970's (Figure 22). A dominant trend has
been the concentration of production in large modern
plants. In 1972 the 10 largest plants accounted for
more than half of total production, and the two dozen
largest plants produced roughly three quarters of total
output.
Notwithstanding its record of steady growth, the
Soviet steel industry has been hampered by perennial
lags in the construction of new capacity. These
sho ills have set back programs to introduce new
technology, to retire outmoded facilities and to
improve the quality and broaden the assortment of
products. The leadership has criticized the industry
repeatedly for failing to provide the economy with
new and improved types of steel products.
Soviet production of pig iron (including blast
furnace ferroalloys) in 1972 amounted to 92.3 million
tons, of which about 90% was used for steelmaking
and the remainder for iron castings. At the beginning
of 1973 the Soviets had an estimated 98 million tons of
blast furnace capacity, the sector of the iron and steel
industry in which the Soviets have demonstrated their
highest level of technical proficiency. In 1972 the
U. S. S. R., with about 135 blast furnaces in operation
roughly half the number in the United States
exceeded U.S. production of pig iron by 14 Soviet
blast furnaces are second only to those in japan in
terms of size and productivity. Steady improvements
in performance have been achieved by converting
furnaces to high top pressure, using natural gas as fuel,
injecting oxygen into the blast, and adopting efficient
cooling and moisture control systems.
At the beginning of 197 the steelmaking capacity
of the U.S.S.R. was estimated at about 135 million
tons, or 87% of U.S. cLpacRy. Most of the steel
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produced in the U.S.S.R. is made by the traditional
open hearth process. Although only a few new open
hearth furnaces have been constructed since 1965,
production of steel by this method has expanded,
reflecting the Soviet policy of intensifying operations
at existing open hearth shops to compensate for the lag
in adopting the newer oxygen converter process. In
contrast, production of open hearth steel has declined
markedly in the United States since 1964 as rapid
gains have been made in the production of steel by the
oxygen converter. Only about 10% of Soviet steel is
produced in electric furnaces compared with about
18% in the United States and Japan.
The U.S.S.R. has performed creditably with respect
to specialized steelmaking processes required to
produce alloys for aircraft and missile programs. The
Soviets are the world's leaders in the development of
electroslag remelting and plasma are remelting; they
have licensed this technology for use in Japan an. �I
Western Europe. In the area of electron beam
remelting, the U.S.S.R. has made considerable
progress, using some domestically manufactured
equipment as well as a large number of electron beam
furnaces imported from East Germany. The Soviets
also use vacuum are (consumable electrode) and
vacuum induction melting processes, but to a lesser
extent than in the West, largely because they rely
heavily on electroslag remelting as a less costly way of
improving steel quality.
Soviet technicians have pioneered the development
of continuous casting of steel to eliminate
conventional ingot casting and associated blooming
and slabbing operations. The U.S.S.R., nevertheless,
has fallen behind the United States and Japan in the
installation of capacity for continuous casting; in
1971, Soviet capacity amounted to 11 million tons
compared with about twice that amount in the United
States and Japan. Moreover, progress in expanding
production has been slow. In 1972, annual output
from continuous casting installations was only 5.5
million tons, far behind the original 10 million -ton
goal for 1965.
Soviet rolling and finishing technology is less
advanced than in the United States. This lag stems
from past emphasis on iron and steelmaking
technology and from the long lead times required to
design, manufacture, and install the more complex
types of rolling mill equipment. The U.S.S.R. has
fallen behind particularly in the application of
automated techniques to rolling mill processes and in
the development of many types of finishing line
equipment criticar to the output of high quality
products.
ti
34
Soviet steel products do not meet all the needs of the
economy because the composition of output has been
geared to the requirements of heavy industry.
Accordingl, structural steel plate and profiles, heavy
sheet, rails, bars, and castings dominate the industry's
product mix. With the growth in the automotive,
consumer durable, and container and packaging
industries, however, the demand for light flat rolled
steel and special surface finish has been rising. During
the past decade the output of flat rolled products has
increased at a somewhat more rapid rate than that of
finished steel as a whole, but flat rolled steel still
constitutes less than 40% of the. output of rolled
products in the U.S.S.R. compared with more than
60% in the United States. In particular, the
production of cold rolled sheet especially cold rolled
sheet with deep drLwing qualities, tin plate,
galvanized sheet, and high quality transformer sheet,
whic!l are all produced from flat rolled stock �has
been lagging.
Soviet exports of steel mill products have increased
steadily from 3.0 million tons in 1960 to a stable level
of 7.0 to 7.5 million tons during 1969 -72. Imports
fluctuated in a narrow range of 1.5 to 2.0 million tons
during most of the 1960's. Towards the end of the
decade, however, they began to increase, reaching 3.0
million tons in 1970 and about 4.0 million tons in
1972, as larger amounts of foreign steel were required
to compensate for lags in domestic output. Since the
late 1960's the U.S.S.R. has obtained the larger share
of its imports of steel from non Communist countries.
Imports from these areas have consisted primarily of
large- diameter pipe, other tubular products, flat rolled
steel, and light structural shapes.
On balance, the U.S.S.R. :ias regularly been a net
exporter of steel. During 1960 -72 net exports
represented about 5% of domestic production. From a
peak level of 4.6 million tons in 1970, however, net
exports declined to about 3.0 million tons in 1972,
reflecting the pinch on domestic supplies. About four
fifths of Soviet exports of steel mill products are
regularly directed to the East European Communist
countries, with the largest share sent to East Germany.
Nearly all of the remaining exports go to the
developing countries.
(2) Nonferrous metals �The U.S.S.R. is self
sufficient in most nonferrous metals. Aluminum,
copper, zinc, and lead are produced in large enough
quantities to permit net exports, but there are
shortages of tin. The estimated supply position of
major nonferrous metals in 1971 is shown in Figure 23.
Since 1961 the U.S.S.R. has been the world's second
largest producer of aluminum (Figure 24). Exports of
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TOTAL SUPPLY
Thousands o(Metrlc tons 1,762
IMPORTS 2
PRODUCTION
ALUMINUM
EXPORTS
ESTI MATED
SUPPLY
663
LEAD
26
a
22 26
TIN
NOTE: Production ritums are for primary metal, but the import and
export rieures for aluminum and copper Include some processed
metal.
FIGURE 23. Estimated supply position of principal
nonferrous metals, 1971 (C)
aluminum ingots and rolled products also have been
growing steadily, reaching about 600,000 tons in 1972.
Soviet exports of aluminum have, in fact, increased at
a more rapid rate than domestic consumption. The
larger share of these exports has gone to Eastern
Europe, principally East Germany. Domestically,
gains have been made in certain applications,
particularly as a substitute for copper in long- distance
transmission lines, but the Soviets have not put
aluminum to the many and varied uses found in
developed non Communist countries.
FIGURE 24. Estiml.Ited production of principal non-
ferrous metals*
(Thousands of meiric tons)
*Primary production.
*Refined.
The U.S.S.R. is the second largest copper producer
in the world after the United States and a net exporter
of this metal since 1964. Only small quantities of
copper have been imported since that time whereas
the trend of exports has been steadily upwards,
exceeding 200,000 tons in 1972. The principal
recipients are other Communist countries, principally
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but appreciable
quantities also have been shipped to Western Europe.
Soviet policy, however, is to conserve copper by
encouraging the substitution of more abundant and
cheaper metals, particularly aluminum. About half of
the copper consumed is accounted for by electrical
applications such as cable, wire, busbars, contacts,
and transformers.
The U.S.S.R. is also a large producer and consumer
of lead. Although some lead ores and concentrates are
imported to augment domestic supplies, the output of
metallic lead is adequate to permit the Soviets to be
modest net exporters. The principal Soviet uses of lead
are in the manufacture of batteries, cable coverings,
and solder.
The Soviet Union imports small quantities of zinc
ores and concentrates, but it has been a net exporter of
zinc metal since 1957. The two principal recipients of
Soviet zinc are East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
although significant quantities also are exported to
Western Europe, India, and Egypt. Soviet imports of
zinc are obtained primarily from Poland and North
Korea. About 70% of the zinc metal available to the
Soviet economy is used in galvanizing, in producing
brass and bronze, or in diecasting alloys. Large
amounts of ingot metal are consumed in the
production of zinc oxide for use in the rubber and
paint industries, and efforts are being made to obtain
zinc oxide from such other sources as stack -gases of
slag- fuming installations.
Among the Communist countries, the U.S.S.R. is
the largest producer of primary tin, but domestic
consumption has exceeded production for more than a
decade. prior to 1962, however, the Soviets were able
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ALUMINUM
COPPER
LEAD
ZINC
TIN
1955.........
430
377
258
222
7.6
1960.........
630
490
324
364
10.6
1965.........
1,000
772
433
504
1:.0
1970.........
1,720
1,190
597
730
21.3
1971.........
1,760
1,180
620
810
22.0
1972.........
1,570
1,250
650
825
23.0
*Primary production.
*Refined.
The U.S.S.R. is the second largest copper producer
in the world after the United States and a net exporter
of this metal since 1964. Only small quantities of
copper have been imported since that time whereas
the trend of exports has been steadily upwards,
exceeding 200,000 tons in 1972. The principal
recipients are other Communist countries, principally
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but appreciable
quantities also have been shipped to Western Europe.
Soviet policy, however, is to conserve copper by
encouraging the substitution of more abundant and
cheaper metals, particularly aluminum. About half of
the copper consumed is accounted for by electrical
applications such as cable, wire, busbars, contacts,
and transformers.
The U.S.S.R. is also a large producer and consumer
of lead. Although some lead ores and concentrates are
imported to augment domestic supplies, the output of
metallic lead is adequate to permit the Soviets to be
modest net exporters. The principal Soviet uses of lead
are in the manufacture of batteries, cable coverings,
and solder.
The Soviet Union imports small quantities of zinc
ores and concentrates, but it has been a net exporter of
zinc metal since 1957. The two principal recipients of
Soviet zinc are East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
although significant quantities also are exported to
Western Europe, India, and Egypt. Soviet imports of
zinc are obtained primarily from Poland and North
Korea. About 70% of the zinc metal available to the
Soviet economy is used in galvanizing, in producing
brass and bronze, or in diecasting alloys. Large
amounts of ingot metal are consumed in the
production of zinc oxide for use in the rubber and
paint industries, and efforts are being made to obtain
zinc oxide from such other sources as stack -gases of
slag- fuming installations.
Among the Communist countries, the U.S.S.R. is
the largest producer of primary tin, but domestic
consumption has exceeded production for more than a
decade. prior to 1962, however, the Soviets were able
35
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to procure substantial amounts of tin because they
were able to export even larger amounts from
Cot.,munist China. During the past decade imports
from Communist China have been insignificant, and
the Soviets have had to buy 4,000 to 3,000 tons
annually From non Communist countries.
4. Manufacturing
a. General (C)
The Soviet manufacturing sector accounts for two
thirds of the country's total industrial production and
about one -fifth of its gross national product.
Manufacturing, in turn, is dominated by the
U.S.S.R.'s largest industry, the machine building and
metalworking (MBMW) branch, which produces half
of the output of th manufacturing sector. The five
other branches of t';is _actor produce soft goods (light
industry), paper and pu:p products, processed food,
forest products, and chemicals.
Since 1960 national priorities within the manufac-
turing sector have favored the MBMW and the
chemical branches. As Figure 25 indicates, the shares
of these two branches have increased at the expense of
the remaining four branches. This trend, moreover,
will continue during the 1971 -75 plan period, with
MBMW and chemicals scheduled to grow by an
average annual rate of more than 11%. If these plan
targets are `ully met, which is not likely, these two
1972
'Machine Building and Metal working
FIGURE 25. Distribution of manufacturing output (C)
36
branches would account for almost 65% of all
manufacturing by 1976.
During 1971 -72 the manufacturing sector grew by
5.7% annually, a rate well in excess of the estimated
rate of growth of 4.8% for all industry. Within
manufacturing, however, growth rates in excess of 7%
were registered by the MBMW and chemical
industries (Figure 26). Growth rates of less than 3% a
year in the processed food and soft goods branches
were chiefly responsible for the poor performsLnce of
the manufacturing sector in the early 1970's.
b. Machinery, equipment and fabricated metal
products (S)
Almost all of the machinery, equipment, and
fabricated metal products manufactured in the
U.S.S.R. are produced by the MBMW industry.'
Although this industry depends primarily on the
metallurgical industry for semifinished materials, the
production of castings and forgings is largely
concentrated in the MBMW industry itself. The
MBMW industry supplies a large part of its output to
the construction, agricultu-al, and transportation
sectors of the economy. However, machine building is
also one of its own best customers, because it consumes
a large share of the output of all types of industrial
equipment. Despite repeated Soviet announcements
of programs designed to make the machine building
industry the most highly automated in the world,
these programs have not been successfully imple-
ment. ,i; the industry remains generally inferior in
plant technology and efficiency to the machine
building industries of the West.
The MBMW industry is marked by strong vertical
integration, although less so than in earlier years. The
opportunities for greater specialization and sub-
contracting have never been fully realized, primarily
because the materials supply system is so erratic and
undependable that most producers are unwilling to
entrust the manufacture of essential work pieces, parts,
and components to other plants. As a result, Soviet
industry does not approach the level of plant
specialization and subcontracting found in U.S.
machinery industries.
6 1n addition to what is broadly defined as machinery
(nonelectrical and electrical) in the United States, the Soviet
definition of machinery includes all types of transportation
equipment, military equipment, and all professional, scientific, and
control instruments, including such products as photographic
equipment, optical goods, and timepieces. This industry also
fabricates metal products such as cable, metal fasteners, structural
metal pieces, and metal containers and utensils. In addition, a
substantial amount of repair of industrial equipment is performed in
the specialized repair facilities of the machine building and
metalworking industry.
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FOREST
PRODUCTS
9
PAPER and PULP
LIGHT
PRODUCTS 1.6
CHEMICALS 15.9
10.2
1975
FOOD
1960 13.2
1.0
14.9 6 7
19.1
14.6
v 54:2
11.5
'Machine Building and Metal working
FIGURE 25. Distribution of manufacturing output (C)
36
branches would account for almost 65% of all
manufacturing by 1976.
During 1971 -72 the manufacturing sector grew by
5.7% annually, a rate well in excess of the estimated
rate of growth of 4.8% for all industry. Within
manufacturing, however, growth rates in excess of 7%
were registered by the MBMW and chemical
industries (Figure 26). Growth rates of less than 3% a
year in the processed food and soft goods branches
were chiefly responsible for the poor performsLnce of
the manufacturing sector in the early 1970's.
b. Machinery, equipment and fabricated metal
products (S)
Almost all of the machinery, equipment, and
fabricated metal products manufactured in the
U.S.S.R. are produced by the MBMW industry.'
Although this industry depends primarily on the
metallurgical industry for semifinished materials, the
production of castings and forgings is largely
concentrated in the MBMW industry itself. The
MBMW industry supplies a large part of its output to
the construction, agricultu-al, and transportation
sectors of the economy. However, machine building is
also one of its own best customers, because it consumes
a large share of the output of all types of industrial
equipment. Despite repeated Soviet announcements
of programs designed to make the machine building
industry the most highly automated in the world,
these programs have not been successfully imple-
ment. ,i; the industry remains generally inferior in
plant technology and efficiency to the machine
building industries of the West.
The MBMW industry is marked by strong vertical
integration, although less so than in earlier years. The
opportunities for greater specialization and sub-
contracting have never been fully realized, primarily
because the materials supply system is so erratic and
undependable that most producers are unwilling to
entrust the manufacture of essential work pieces, parts,
and components to other plants. As a result, Soviet
industry does not approach the level of plant
specialization and subcontracting found in U.S.
machinery industries.
6 1n addition to what is broadly defined as machinery
(nonelectrical and electrical) in the United States, the Soviet
definition of machinery includes all types of transportation
equipment, military equipment, and all professional, scientific, and
control instruments, including such products as photographic
equipment, optical goods, and timepieces. This industry also
fabricates metal products such as cable, metal fasteners, structural
metal pieces, and metal containers and utensils. In addition, a
substantial amount of repair of industrial equipment is performed in
the specialized repair facilities of the machine building and
metalworking industry.
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FIGURE 26. Average annual rates of growth in branches of manufacturing, 1951-72 and
1971-75 plan (C)
(Percent)
By any standard, machine building and metalwork-
ing is the largest of all Soviet industries. It has
consistently enjoyed a high priority of development,
not only because it is a key industry in the
achievement of national economic growth but because
of its strategic importance as the supplier of
equipment for defense and space programs and of
instrumentation for scientific investigation.
Although highly successful in applying the
principles of mass, large -scale production to the
manufacture of standard stock items, Soviet machine
building has had an undistinguished record in the
development of technologically advanced and
sophisticated products. Thus the product mix of Soviet
machine building is obsolescent by Western standards.
This situation is largely a fault of the system; changes
in the product mix and production methods are
inhibited by the prospects of lowered output (and thus
reduced or no bonuses) for the firm during the lengthy
period needed to retool and incorporate the new
technology. Also, the estrangement in the Soviet
Union between research and development, on the one
hand, and production engineering, on the other,
contrasts strongly with the teamwork generaly found
within comparable enterprises in market- oriented
economics. This estrangement tends to rob the Soviet
economy of a source of more dynamic economic
growth.
The U.S.S.R. is a net importer of machinery and
equipment. It relies to a great extent on imports from
both East Europe and the industrial West for
transportation equipment and for equipment needed
by the motor vehicle, chemical electronics, food,
paper, and textile industries. These imports have been
dictated not only by the inadequacy of the Soviet
machine building industry but also by the aim of
acquiring foreign technology- primarily Western -in
the shortest possible time. Machinery and equipment
is the largest single category in Soviet imports,
accounting for more than a third of all imports in
1971. These items are also the most important
category among Soviet exports, but these products go
primarily to other Communist states or to under-
developed countries as they are generally not
competitive in the developed West.
(1) Competition between military and cimlian
production -The machine building industry is the
source of equipment for military -space programs as
well as the supplier of producer and consumer
durables. In the 1950's, when the output of military
hardware was growing rapidly, the competition
between military and civilian requirements was
particularly strong. This competition has diminished
as a result of the vigorous overall growth of the
industry and of the economy in general, thus enabling
the Soviets to keep the output of military hardware at
desired levels while maintaining high growth rates for
the production of civilian machinery. As Figure 27
indicates, the growth rates for civilian machinery since
1950 have constantly exceeded those for military
machinery. The latter, moreover, has declined as a
share in the total output of machinery since 1950
(Figure 28).
Although competition between military and civilian
production in the MBMW industry has declined in a
quantitative sense, there is still considerable
contention between these sectors qualitatively in the
sense of competition for the best available resources.
With its overriding priority, the military sector has
taken and continues to preempt the finest materials
and the highest quality facilities and personnel. A case
at point is the absorption by military and space
programs of the bulk of the computers produced
domestically and acquired abroad, leaving the civilian
sector with an acute and growing shortage of
computers, particularly models incorporating the
latest technology. Available evidence indicates that
the military sector is almost certainly managed more
efficiently, with better coordination and communica-
37
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1971 -75
1951 -60
1961 -65
1966 -70
1971 -72
PLAN
Manufacturing
9.1
6.4
6.7
5.7
9.3
Chemicals
10.5
18.1
9.1
7.3
11.5
Machine building and metalworking...
10.3
7.8
7.1
7.6
11.4
Forest products
6.6
3.0
3.5
8.8
5.8
Paper and pulp products
8.8
7.7
7 d
5.1
5.8
Soft goods
9.0
8.4
$10
8.9
6.6
Processed food
8.8
7.0
4.7
8.5
6.8
By any standard, machine building and metalwork-
ing is the largest of all Soviet industries. It has
consistently enjoyed a high priority of development,
not only because it is a key industry in the
achievement of national economic growth but because
of its strategic importance as the supplier of
equipment for defense and space programs and of
instrumentation for scientific investigation.
Although highly successful in applying the
principles of mass, large -scale production to the
manufacture of standard stock items, Soviet machine
building has had an undistinguished record in the
development of technologically advanced and
sophisticated products. Thus the product mix of Soviet
machine building is obsolescent by Western standards.
This situation is largely a fault of the system; changes
in the product mix and production methods are
inhibited by the prospects of lowered output (and thus
reduced or no bonuses) for the firm during the lengthy
period needed to retool and incorporate the new
technology. Also, the estrangement in the Soviet
Union between research and development, on the one
hand, and production engineering, on the other,
contrasts strongly with the teamwork generaly found
within comparable enterprises in market- oriented
economics. This estrangement tends to rob the Soviet
economy of a source of more dynamic economic
growth.
The U.S.S.R. is a net importer of machinery and
equipment. It relies to a great extent on imports from
both East Europe and the industrial West for
transportation equipment and for equipment needed
by the motor vehicle, chemical electronics, food,
paper, and textile industries. These imports have been
dictated not only by the inadequacy of the Soviet
machine building industry but also by the aim of
acquiring foreign technology- primarily Western -in
the shortest possible time. Machinery and equipment
is the largest single category in Soviet imports,
accounting for more than a third of all imports in
1971. These items are also the most important
category among Soviet exports, but these products go
primarily to other Communist states or to under-
developed countries as they are generally not
competitive in the developed West.
(1) Competition between military and cimlian
production -The machine building industry is the
source of equipment for military -space programs as
well as the supplier of producer and consumer
durables. In the 1950's, when the output of military
hardware was growing rapidly, the competition
between military and civilian requirements was
particularly strong. This competition has diminished
as a result of the vigorous overall growth of the
industry and of the economy in general, thus enabling
the Soviets to keep the output of military hardware at
desired levels while maintaining high growth rates for
the production of civilian machinery. As Figure 27
indicates, the growth rates for civilian machinery since
1950 have constantly exceeded those for military
machinery. The latter, moreover, has declined as a
share in the total output of machinery since 1950
(Figure 28).
Although competition between military and civilian
production in the MBMW industry has declined in a
quantitative sense, there is still considerable
contention between these sectors qualitatively in the
sense of competition for the best available resources.
With its overriding priority, the military sector has
taken and continues to preempt the finest materials
and the highest quality facilities and personnel. A case
at point is the absorption by military and space
programs of the bulk of the computers produced
domestically and acquired abroad, leaving the civilian
sector with an acute and growing shortage of
computers, particularly models incorporating the
latest technology. Available evidence indicates that
the military sector is almost certainly managed more
efficiently, with better coordination and communica-
37
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FIGURE 27. Average annual rates of growth of machine building and metalworking,
1950 -71 and 1971-75 plan (S)
(Percent)
na Data not available.
tion among producers and consumers than exists in the
civilian sector.
(2) Defense production Between 1962 and 1973,
the production of military machinery and equipment
increased by about 15 At the same time, a
substantial shift occurred in the mix of defense items
within the military machinery category. Research and
development (R and D) associated expenditures
increased from approximately 28% of total military
machinery production in 1963 to 42% in 1972. Missile
production, however, fell from 23% of the total in
1963 to 12% in 1972. The share of aircraft and
38
electronic equipment, which together account for
approximately 20% of military machinery production,
remained about the same at the beginning and end of
the period.
While military programs represent a direct drain on
Soviet resources, the defense burden is not as critical as
it once was. The share of GNP devoted to defense and
space programs has fallen from about 15% in 1950 -52
to 6% in rece ^t years. Increased spending on military
R and D does have an important impact on economic
growth, however. The isolation and secrecy of Soviet
military and space R and D as well as production
activities largely prevents the flow of new technology
and skilled manpower from these programs into the
civilian economy. The civilian sector is thereby
deprived of skilled engineers needed to introduce more
advanced technology in civilian production.
(a) MISSILES AND SPACE EQUIPMENT �The Soviets
have developed a formidable array of ballistic missiles,
aerody:;R.mic cruise missiles, and space equipment
since World War II. Beginning with a Soviet version of
the 150- nautical -mile German V -2 rocket, the
U.S.S.R. has extended the range of its surface -to-
surface ballistic missiles to over 7,000 nautical miles
for large ICBM's. In 1972 the Soviets began to test
several new missiles with improved guidance systems
using on -board digital computers. These new systems
could provide increased accuracy and make possible
the use of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRV's) on Soviet ICBM's. The Soviets have
also developed and deployed a wide range of other
missiles, including several series of surface -to- surface
aerodynamic (cruise) missiles, anti -tank guided
missiles, air -to- surface missiles, surface -to -air missiles,
and air -to -air missiles.
Since the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957, the
U.S.S.R. has developed a number of space vehicles
and ancillary systems, although about 60% of all of
their launches have been made by the same basic
booster �with additional upper stages �which was
used to launch the first Sputnik. More than 600 space
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FIGURE 28. Distribution of machinery pro-
duction, by category (S)
1971 -75
1951 -60
1961 -65
1966 -70
1971
PLAN
Civilian machinery
:1.7
9.3
9.1
10.1
13.4
Producer durables
11.2
9.3
7.9
9.5
13.4
Consumer durables
15.1
9.0
15.0
13.4
13.5
Military machinery and civil space......
8.7
5.5
3.6
�1.4
na
na Data not available.
tion among producers and consumers than exists in the
civilian sector.
(2) Defense production Between 1962 and 1973,
the production of military machinery and equipment
increased by about 15 At the same time, a
substantial shift occurred in the mix of defense items
within the military machinery category. Research and
development (R and D) associated expenditures
increased from approximately 28% of total military
machinery production in 1963 to 42% in 1972. Missile
production, however, fell from 23% of the total in
1963 to 12% in 1972. The share of aircraft and
38
electronic equipment, which together account for
approximately 20% of military machinery production,
remained about the same at the beginning and end of
the period.
While military programs represent a direct drain on
Soviet resources, the defense burden is not as critical as
it once was. The share of GNP devoted to defense and
space programs has fallen from about 15% in 1950 -52
to 6% in rece ^t years. Increased spending on military
R and D does have an important impact on economic
growth, however. The isolation and secrecy of Soviet
military and space R and D as well as production
activities largely prevents the flow of new technology
and skilled manpower from these programs into the
civilian economy. The civilian sector is thereby
deprived of skilled engineers needed to introduce more
advanced technology in civilian production.
(a) MISSILES AND SPACE EQUIPMENT �The Soviets
have developed a formidable array of ballistic missiles,
aerody:;R.mic cruise missiles, and space equipment
since World War II. Beginning with a Soviet version of
the 150- nautical -mile German V -2 rocket, the
U.S.S.R. has extended the range of its surface -to-
surface ballistic missiles to over 7,000 nautical miles
for large ICBM's. In 1972 the Soviets began to test
several new missiles with improved guidance systems
using on -board digital computers. These new systems
could provide increased accuracy and make possible
the use of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRV's) on Soviet ICBM's. The Soviets have
also developed and deployed a wide range of other
missiles, including several series of surface -to- surface
aerodynamic (cruise) missiles, anti -tank guided
missiles, air -to- surface missiles, surface -to -air missiles,
and air -to -air missiles.
Since the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957, the
U.S.S.R. has developed a number of space vehicles
and ancillary systems, although about 60% of all of
their launches have been made by the same basic
booster �with additional upper stages �which was
used to launch the first Sputnik. More than 600 space
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FIGURE 28. Distribution of machinery pro-
duction, by category (S)

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launchings have been attempted, ranging from small.
astrophysical and interplanetary probes through
communications and military reconnaissance satellites
up to manned space vehicles and large scientific
payloads of about 20 tons.
In the missile and space fields, the U.S.S.R. has
adopted the same development strategy that
characterizes its programs in other fields of
production �the use of proven designs, tested
production techniques, off- the -shelf hardware when
possible, and the application of one design in many
roles. All or nearly all of the items that go into
production for Soviet missiles and space systems are
supplied from domestic sources. Many industries are
involved: for example, electronics, machine building,
chemical equipment, and optical plants supply
components for a missile; metallurgical plants provide
metal for the airframe and other components; and the
trailer, tractor, and railroad equipment plants make
ground support equipment.
(b) AIRCnAN �The aircraft industry is second in size
only to that of the United States. A high priority
industry which claims a large investment in facilities
for production and research as well as a significant
share of the country's engineering and technical
personnel, the aircraft industry not only fulfills Soviet
military and civilian requirements for aircraft, but
provides military and transport aircraft for sale abroad
to both Communist and non Communist countries.
Most Soviet airframe and engine plants have some
capacity for the manufacture of consumer goods,
production of which helps provide stable employment
for their labor in an industry noted for its wide
fluctuations in output.
As a result of its priority status, the Soviet aircraft
industry has no apparent long -range bottlenecks. Its
facilities are believed to be sufficiently balanced so
that engines and components would be available to
support a maximum production effort in the airframe
plants. In general, the industry makes use of a fairly
narrow range of off- the -shelf engine types to power its
military and civil aircraft. A supersonic transport is in
production and could be in domestic service by 1975
and international service by 1976.
After a rapid decline in the production of Soviet
aircraft in the 1950'x, output generally leveled off by
the early 1960's. Since 1963 the total annual
production has varied between 1,600 and 1,900
aircraft, but there has been a substantial increase in
airframe weight. Also, there has been a qualitative
change as older model aircraft are phased out and
more efficient types with improved capabilities, longer
service life, and newer weapons systems enter
production. The estimated production of 1,630
aircraft in 1972 included a few bombers, about 740
fighters, 260 transports, 550 helicopters, with the
.remaining 75 or so consisting of reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare and trainer aircraft.
(3) Civilian production �The output of major types
cf capital goods and consumer durables manufactured
by the Soviet machine building industry is shown in
Figure 29.
(a) CAPITAL coons� Although the growth in
production of most capital goods fluctuates from year
to year, certain categories such as chemical equipment
and electronic computers have shown consistently
higher increases than that for the machine building
industry as a whole. The value of production of
chemical equipment in 1972 was more than two and
one -half times greater than the level in 1960, and the
value of output of the instrument industr has been
growing at about 13% annually since 1965. In
addition, the value of output of the electronics
industry, which includes the production of electronic
instruments and computers, has been growing at an
average annual rate of about 15% since 1965. During
the 1960's the manufacturing base of the Soviet
electronics industry was transformed from predomi-
nantly vacuum tube production to output based on
semiconductor technology. Since around 1969, the
major effort has been to improve and expand the
range of semiconductor devices in series production,
and to begin the shift to integrated circuits, the most
advanced type of semiconductors. Soviet plans for this
industry in the 1970's call for widespread improve-
ments in the quantity and quality of integrated
circuits.
The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have produced about
1.5 billion semiconductors in 1972, an increase of 15%
over probable output in 1971. More than 95% of the
semiconductors produced in 1972 were discrete
transistors, diodes, and diode rectifiers; the remaining
share consisted of the fastest growing sector of the
industry, monolithic integrated circuits and hybrid
circuits. Toial semiconductor output is expected to
grow at an average annual rate of from 10% to 15%
throughout most of the 1970's, with microcircuits
(particularly monolithic integrated circuits) growing
at much higher rates at least through the middle of the
decade.
Current levels of output of semiconductors are low
because most manufacturing facilities have poor
production machinery, inferior material inputs,
inadequate cleanliness controls and poor manage-
ment. All of these factors reduce production yields to
levels well below those prevailing in the West.
39
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FIGURE 29. Production of capital goods and consumer durables by the machine building industry (U /OU)
Capital goods:
Agricultural machinery:
Cultivators (tractor powered) (thousands of units)
Grain combines (thousands of units)
Plows (tractor powered) (thousands of units)
Sowing machines (tractor- powered) (thousands of units)
Chemical equipment (millions of new rubles'
Coal mining equipment:
Coal cutters (thousands of units
Coal combines (thousands of units)
Construction equipment:
Bulldozers (thousands of units
Cranes*** (thousands of units
Excavators (thousands of units
Electrical and power equipment:
Boilers (thousands of metric tons of steam per hour)
Generators for turbines (millions of kw.)
Turbines (millions of kw.)
Transformers (millions of kv: a.)
Machine tools:
Metalcutting machine tools (thousands of units)
Metalforming machine tools (thousands of units)............
Metallurgical equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Blast furnace equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Rolling mill equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Continuous casting equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Steel smelting equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Petroleum refinery equipment (thousands of metric tons)
Rolling stock:
Mainline freight cars (thousands of units)
Mainline locomotives (thousands of units)
Tractors, crawler and wheeled (thousands of units)
Trucks (thousands of units)
Durable consumer goods:
Passenger cars (thousands of units)
Radios (millions of units)
Refrigerators (millions of units
Sewing machines (millions of units
Electric ranges (millions of units
Television sets (millions of units
Washing machines (electric) (millions of units)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972
98.9
112.6
84.8
206.3
219.2
184.1
'180.0
46.3
48.0
59.0
85.8
99.2
102.0
95.7
121.9
103.1
149.1
165.7
211.7
220.1
'223.5
117.7
115.4
111.9
261.7
163.5
140.6
�146.5
24.0
76.0
223.0
383.0
464.0
528.0
570
0.9
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
na
0.3
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
na
3.8
7.5
12.8
20.0
33.5
38.0
40.0
5.4
9.0
10.4
15.8
21.1
21.7
*22.6
3.5
5.2
12.6
21.6
31.0
33.2
34.9
13.0
41.1
50.3
82.1
0.9
4.5
7.9
14.4
10.6
12.6
13.7
2.7
5.6
9.2
14.6
16.2
16.8
14.6
10.2
19.7
49.4
95.3
105.9
108.1
na
70.6
117.1
155.9
186.1
202.3
207.2
210.0
7.7
17.1
29.9
34.6
41.3
42.3
43.9
111.2
172.1
218.3
242.3
314.0
323.0
na
19.4
32.4
60.9
83.9
110.8
111.4
na
66.1
108.5
120.6
111.2
140.1
140.7
na
10.0
12.4
16.4
na
25.7
31.2
36.8
37.2
50.7
54.5
no
47.9
48.8
93.0
139.7
126.6
138.3
157.0
50.8
34.4
36.4
39.6
58.3
63.7
68.9
1.2
1.0
1.7
2.1
1.8
1.8
1.8
116.7
163,4
238.5
354.5
458.5
472.0
477.8
294.4
328.1
362.0
379.6
524.5
564.2
598.0
64.6
107.8
138.8
201.2
344.2
529.0
730.0
1.1
3.5
4.2
5.2
7.8
8.8
8.8
Inaig
0.2
0.5
1.7
4.1
4.6
5.0
0.5
1.6
3.1
0.8
1.4
1.4
na
1.7
4.6
6.9
6.1
9.8
10.9
na
Inaig
0.5
1.7
3.7
6.7
5.8
6.0
Inaig
Inaig
0.9
3.4
5.2
4.1
3.0
na Data not available.
*Preliminary estimates.
"Entries for 195045 are in 1955 prices, for 1970 -72 in 1967 prides.
***Includes truck cranes, cranes mounted on pneumatic tires, and tower cranes.
Moreover, since most Soviet microcircuits now in series
production are relatively simple by Western standards,
the industry's production problems make it
increasingly difficult to introduce more technologi-
cally advanced devices into series production. The
Soviets are increasing their efforts to acquire Western
assistance in order to seek a quick and an efficient
solution to these difficulties. Should U.S.' export
controls over microcircuit production technology and
machinery be relaxed, the U.S.S.R. probably would
import substantial quantities of this technology and
machinery over the next several years. Based on recent
Soviet inquiries, these orders could easily top $70
million during 1973 -75.
Soviet production of computers in 1972 amounted
to about 1,300 units compared with more than 20,000
in the United States. As of mid -1973, the U.S.S.R. had
about 8,500 digital computers in operation compared
with more than 100,000 in the United States.
Moreover, most Soviet computers currently in
production are fitted with obsolescent transistors, and
initial serial production of third generation models,
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using integrated circuits, began only recently. The
electronics industry is still unable to supply computer
producers with high quality integrated circuits needed
for the mass production of third generation
computers.
Compared with Western counterparts, the
productivity of Soviet computers is low, and the large
divergence in characteristics among models reduces
the possibilities for using standard programs.
Furthermore, the large amount of handcrafting used
in both production and assembly of Soviet computers
means that machines of the same model often differ
enough in circuitry that they cannot use the same
programs. Documentation needed to operate and
maintain Soviet computers generally is inadequate
and unreliable, and Soviet computer producers
provide their customers with little software, training,
and maintenance support. Soviet computers also are
frequently out of service because of component failure
or breakdown of peripheral equipment. The industry
is short of modern production equipment and has a
low standard of quality control.
Plans were laid in 1964 to manufacture two families
of third generation computers, the RYAD (data
processing) and ASVT (process control) series. This
program is about 3 years behind schedule, partially
because the Soviets have not been able to develop
their own production technology. As a result, the
U.S.S.R. is trying to acquire this technology in the
developed West, with special efforts directed toward
acquiring integrated circuit and computer disc
memory technology. Export controls have so far
denied the U.S.S.R. access to this technology, without
which it is unlikely that the Soviets can produce the
number of more advanced computers projected during
the current plan period. Such computers, moreover,
will be based on technology developed in the United
States during the mid- 1960's.
There have been substantial problems in the
chemical machine building sector arising from the
lack of technical know -how and the "crash" basis on
which this industry has been expected to produce. The
planned product mix has not been forthcoming, the
quality of output frequently has been inferior, and
difficulties have been encountered in the manufacture
of custom equipment. Availability of corrosion
resistant metals required for fabrication of equipment
has also been a problem. To alleviate these
shortcomings the Soviets have been buying substantial
quantities of chemical equipment from the West and
from East Europe in recent years.
The power equipment industry has substantially
increased its output of turbines, generators for
turbines, and transformers. Manufacturing methods
and techniques for producing electric power
equipment generally are similar to those used in the
United States and other highly industrialized
countries. The U.S.S.R. has lagged behind the United
States in the technology for producing thermal- electric
power equipment, especially high temperature and
high- pressure equipment. In the fields of hydroelectric
generating equipment and high voltage transmission
equipment, however, the U.S.S.R. has developed the
most advanced technology 'en the world.
The output of petroleum refinery equipment on a
weight basis has increased irregularly since 1960, with
record output in 1965 not exceeded until 1972.
Production plans have been consistently underfulfilled
in recent years. Some of the larger Soviet units are
technically inefficient, and a shortage persists of the
more modern, secondary processiiig units needed to
improve product quality. During 1968 -71, imports of
refinery equipment� primarily secondary units from
the industrialized West and East Europe �rose to
record levels of $35 million to $45 million annually as
such equipment could not be produced by domestic
plants in adequate amounts.
In 1972 the construction equipment industry nearly
tripled the output of bulldozers and excavators since
1960. The U.S.S.R. ranks second only to the United
States in world production of construction equipment,
and it produces more than all other Communist
countries combined. The industry, however, generally
fails to meet the needs of Soviet construction in terms
of quantity, quality, and product mix. Much of the
equipment is underpowered relative to its weight and
is susceptible to frequent breakdowns.
The Soviet machine tool industry is oriented toward
serial and mass production of standardized general
purpose machines. Although growth of production has
leveled off, the U.S.S.R. still produces larger numbers
of these units than the machine tool industry of any
other country- 210,000 metalcutting machine tools
and 43,900 metalforming machine tools in 1972.
However, the U.S.S.R. still lags far behind the
industrialized West in the development and
production of specialized machine tools, such as
numerically controlled machining centers and
automatic transfer lines.
The priority position enjoyed by Soviet machine
tool builders stems from the major role they play in
expanding the nation's industrial production, both
civilian and military, and the importance of machine
tools in keeping operational the vast stocks of
machinery and equipment in the transportation,
agricultural, industrial, and military sectors of the
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economy. The U.S.S.R. is a net importer of machine
tools, with an increasing share of imports consisting of
expensive, high precision, and specialized machine
tools that often embody advanced Western
technology. Soviet exports consist of relatively
inexpensive, general- purpose machine tools.
(b) SHIPBGILDINc �The U.S.S.R. is one of the major
shipbuilding nations of the world. During 1962 -71 the
Soviets completed about 270,000 full load displace-
ment tons of major surface combatant ships and about
586,000 surface displacement tons of submarines. In
addition, the Soviet shipyards completed approxi-
mately 4,323,000 deadweight tons (d.w.t.) of
merchant ships during this decade (Figure 30). They
also imported a large volume of tonnage from other
Communist countries and non- Communist nations.
Of the nearly 7 million tous imported during 1962 -71,
three fifths came from other Communist countries,
notably Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia.
Finland, France, and Sweden were the chief non
Communist suppliers of merchant ships.
While most of the ships built in the U.S.S.R. are for
the Soviet naval and merchant fleets, an increasing
amount of tonnage is exported. For example, in 1965
the Soviets sold only two merchant ships abroad.
During the 1965 -69 period, the Soviets exported
merchant ships totaling 545,000 d.w.t., but in 1970 -71
they built and exported 487,000 d.w.t. These ships
have been built for other Communist countries (East
Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cuba), and for
non- Communist states, including West Germany,
Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal. In 1970 the
export of 203,000 d.w.t. represented 40% of total
merchant tonnage built in the U.S.S.R.; the 284,000
d.w.t. sold abroad in 1971 was 46% of the total built in
that year.
Cargo ships, tankers, and fishing ships accounted
for the bulk of Soviet merchant shipbuilding tonnage
built during 1962 -71. Half of this tonnage consisted of
cargo ships, 30% were tankers, and 18% were fishing
ships. The remaining 2% consisted of passenger ships,
tugs, icebreakers, and other specialized vessels.
The continued planned growth of the U.S.S.R.'s
merchant fleet probably will keep steady demands on
Soviet shipyards for new construction. In addition to
the standard cargo and tap.ker ships b in the past,
more specialized types are projected such as container
ships, supertankers, and roll -on, roll -off ships. The
demands for new merchant ships and the apparent
trend in xports, combined with the high priority
given to naval shipbuilding, suggests that Soviet
shipbuilding will continue the rapid development of
the past decade.
(C) CIVILIAN MOTOR VEHICLES �Since 1965 the
U.S.S.R. has been modernizing and expanding its
automotive industry, which has lagged far behind
Western industries in output, vehicle design, and
production technology. Despite sizable gains, Soviet
passenger car production of 730,000 units in 1972 was
only 9% of the 8.3 million produced in the United
States; in that year there was 1 passenger car per 103
persons in the U.S.S.R. compared with 1 car for each
2.2 persons in the United States. Nearly half of the
Soviet motor vehicles produced in 1972 were trucks
and buses (649,000 units), whereas about 80% of the
vehicles built in the United States are passenger cars.
Soviet plans for 1966 -70 and 1971 -75 have stressed
the expansion of passenger car production. Output of
FIGURE 30. Merchant shipbuilding by and for the U.S.S.R., 1962-71 (S)
(Ships built)
na Data not available.
'Includes salvage tugs, icebreakers, cable layers, training ships, hydrographic ships, and dredgers.
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IN OTHER COMMUNIST
IN NON COMMUNIST
IN
U.S.S.R.
COUNTRIES
COUNTRIES
TOTAL
No.
Thousand
No.
Thousand
No.
Thousand
No.
Thousand
of
deadweight
of
deadweight
of
deadweight
of
deadweight
TYPE OF VESSEL
Vessels
tons
Vessels
tons
vessels
tons
Vessels
tons
Dry cargo..........
289
2,180
372
2,696
132
873
793
5,749
Tanker
68
1,294
65
853
77
1,070
210
3,217
Passenger..........
8
8
25
38
na
na
33
46
Fishing
456
781
305
694
87
601
848
2,076
Other'
22
60
19
19
29
45
70
124
Total............
843
4,323
786
4,300
325
2,589
1,954
11,212
na Data not available.
'Includes salvage tugs, icebreakers, cable layers, training ships, hydrographic ships, and dredgers.
42
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cars is to total 1.26 million by 1975, with half of this
amount to come from the new Volga Motor Vehicle
Plant at Tol'yatti, built under contract with Fiat. In
1967 the Soviets also began to build up the truck
industry by speeding up the remodeling of their major
truck plants and by starting construction of a large
new plant on the Kama River. This complex for
building heavy diesel trucks is scheduled for
completion in 1974, but it is roughly 2 years behind
schedule.
Although the automotive industry failed to meet
either its original or revised 5 -year goals for cars and
trucks during 1966 -70, the more realistic production
targets in the 1971 -75 period are being met in large
part. By 1975 the industry is scheduled to build 2.1
million vehicles -1.26 million cars, 765,000 trucks,
and 75,000 buses. In 1972 the industry turned out
nearly 1.4 million vehicles- 730,000 cars, 597,000
trucks, and 52,000 buses �or two- thirds of the 1975
target.
Passenger cars have always been scarce in the
U.S.S.R., but they are becoming more plentiful and
increasing numbers are privately owned. By 1975 the
U.S.S.R. will have an inventory of nearly 5 million
passenger cars, two- thirds of which will be allocated to
private citizens. As retail prices are extremely high,
cars can be afforded only by those with high incomes
or substantial savings. Service facilities, woefully
inadequate at present, are being expanded but not
rapidly enough to keep pace with the growing output
of cars and other motor vehicles.
Despite extensive unsatisfied demand at home, the
U.S.S.R. exports about one -fifth of its car output;
some 150,000 cars were exported in 1971, 86% of
which went to East Europe. The U.S.S.R. exports less
than 20,000 cars a year to non- Communist countries
but plans to expand such sales, particularly in Western
Europe. Both exports and imrx)rts of trucks are small
in relation to production.
The U.S.S.R. traditionally has supplied most A. 11w
raw materials required by its motor vehicle industry
from domestic sources, but the growing output of
passenger cars and trucks is beginning to strain
supplies of certain materials. For example, the
U.S.S.R. cannot produce enough body steel and
rubber, and must buy these materials in the West. The
industry imports steel from West Germany, the United
States, etc., and rubber products, particularly tires,
from Italy. The U.S.S.R. also began the large -scale
import of automotive parts from East Europe in 1970
to supply the Volga plant. The industry also imports
East European technology and components for
building trucks and buses. Most of the imported
automotive components are paid for in finished motor
vehicles.
Although the Soviet motor vehicle industry has
attained a high degree of mechanization, many of the
machine tools in service aye worn or obsolescent.
Automation is less advanced than in the West, but
new automatic transfer machine tool lines built in the
West are being added at major plants, principally for
the manufacture of engine blocks and other engine
parts. The U.S.S.R. also is importing the production
technology and equipment for making axles and
transmissions. The state of technology in the industry
has been advanced by the construction of the Volga
plant under the Fiat contract and by expansion of
production facilities for the Moskvich automobile
under contract with Renault. Both facilities embody
Western production technology and equipment,
including gear- cutting machines and crankshaft
grinders from the United States. The U.S.S.R. now is
concentrating on building the Kama Truck Complex,
which also will be outfitted in large part with non
Communist equipment and technology. The Kama
foundry, in particular, represents a major technologi-
cal gain for the U.S.S.R. Designed and built in the
United States, the foundry embodies advanced process
technology and equipment that the U.S.S.R. has
sought to buy for several years.
c. Chemicals and allied products (S)
The Soviet chemical ind.astry is the second largest in
the world, or more than one -third the size of its U.S.
counterpart. Large reserves of important chemical raw
materials such as salt, limestone, petroleum,
phosphate, potassium, and sulfur bearing ores provide
a strong base for the industry's development. Although
production of chemicals has been growing rapidly,
overall progress has been impeded by lags in the
introduction and assimilation of modern chemical
technology. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. is making a
major effort to overcome these shortcomings and to
catch up with the leading non- Communist countries
in the production and application of a wide range of
new chemical products. This effort involves not only
the acquisition of advanced chemical technology and
equipment for production of petrochemicals and
complex products, such as synthetic fibers and
multinutrient fertilizers, but also a significant
expansion in the production of such basic chemicals as
sulfuric acid and ammonia.
Following a period of relative neglect in the 1950's,
substantial funds were allocated in the later
Khrushchev years to accelerate development of the
Soviet chemical industry. Productive fixed capital of
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FIGURE 31. Production of basic chemicals and allied products (S)
(Thousands of metric ions)
na Data not available.
*Preliminary.
"Estimated.
***Fertilizer quantities are expressed in terms of fertilizer containing the following nutrients:
20.5% N.; 41.6% K 18.7% P
the industry in 1970 was more than 4 times the level of
1960, and per capita output of chemicals tripled
during the same period. The share of the chemical
industry in total industrial output rose from 3.7% in
1960 to 5.7% in 1970. Data on production of selected
chemicals and allied products are shown in Figure 31.
Despite substantial increases in production, delays in
construction and difficulties in bringing new plants up
to rated capacity prevented realization of goals for
major chemical products during the Seven Year Plan
(1959 -65) and the Eighth Five Year Plan (1966 -70).
Shortfalls were particularly evident in fertilizers,
plastics, synthetic rubber and man -made fibers. In
addition to retarding the industry's rate of growth, the
lag in commissioning modern facilities has adversely
affected the efficiency of the chemical industry and
the quality of its products.
Under terms of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1971 -75)
chemical output is scheduled to rise by 72% and
represent 6.7% of total industrial output in 1975, or a
full percentage point more than in 1970. Investment
in the chemical and petrochemical industry is to be
increased by 91% compared with similar investment
during 1966 -70. Progress of the industry, however, still
is hindered by lack of know -how and experience in
chemical engineering, a shortage of skilled personnel,
and the inability of the machine- building industry to
provide equipment that fully satisfies requirements for
product mix and quality. To help offset these
shortcomings, the Soviets are relying on large
purchases of equipment from the West and increased
cooperation with Eas( Europe in the development and
production of chemicals and chemical equipment.
Growth of the Soviet chemical industry is likely to
retain a fairly high priority because of the heavy
dependence of modern industrial and agricultural
technology on the wide range of chemicals developed
since World War II.
The U.S.S.R. imports man -made fibers, plastics,
and synthetic rubber, together with intermediates for
their production. In addition, large quantities of
natural rubber, paints and lacquers, pharmaceuticals,
and pesticides are purchased abroad. Important
chemical exports include fertilizers, raw materials for
fertilizers and plastics, coke chemicals, synthetic
rubber, and rubber products. On a value basis, trade
in chemicals, rubber, and allied products (including
pharmaceuticals, man -made fibers, and essential oils)
amounted to more than $1.6 billion in 1971. Imports
exceeded exports by more than $500 million, with
pharmaceuticals and natural rubber the major items
bought abroad.
The Soviets claim that gross chemical output,
originally scheduled to double during 1966 -70,
increased by only 78% (or about 56% on the basis of
Western estimates of production). Nevertheless,
growth rates for chemicals remained well above those
for total industrial output, and despite the shortfall in
plans, substantial increases were made in the
production of fertilizers, plastics, and a number of
other products. In 1971, gross chemical output
exceeded the plan, increasing by more than 10 but
continuing problems with construction, poor- quality
equipment, and inadequately skilled workers resulted
in a shortfall in 1972 as production rose by 9% instead
of the planned level of 10.5 Moreover, a reduction
in scheduled growth of chemical output in 1973-from
10.7% to 8.5% indicates that the cumulative delays in
recent years have been serious. A major effort to regain
lost ground is evident, however, in the plan to increase
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1950
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972'
Caustic soda (100%)
299
704
1,199
1,783
1,866
1,899
Chemical fibers
24
211
407
623
676
746
Chlorine
187
496
833
1,344
1,416
1,445
Mineral fertilize;
5,497
13,867
31,253
55,400
61,398
66,100
Nitric acid (100%)**
892
2,417
4,300
7,061
7,500
no
Plastics
67
312
803
1,673
1,862
2,035
Soda ash (100
711
1,793
2,727
3,485
3,629
3,850
Sulfuric acid (100
2,125
5,398
8,518
12,059
12,775
13,700
Synthetic rubber
144
347
604
914
1,000
1,060
na Data not available.
*Preliminary.
"Estimated.
***Fertilizer quantities are expressed in terms of fertilizer containing the following nutrients:
20.5% N.; 41.6% K 18.7% P
the industry in 1970 was more than 4 times the level of
1960, and per capita output of chemicals tripled
during the same period. The share of the chemical
industry in total industrial output rose from 3.7% in
1960 to 5.7% in 1970. Data on production of selected
chemicals and allied products are shown in Figure 31.
Despite substantial increases in production, delays in
construction and difficulties in bringing new plants up
to rated capacity prevented realization of goals for
major chemical products during the Seven Year Plan
(1959 -65) and the Eighth Five Year Plan (1966 -70).
Shortfalls were particularly evident in fertilizers,
plastics, synthetic rubber and man -made fibers. In
addition to retarding the industry's rate of growth, the
lag in commissioning modern facilities has adversely
affected the efficiency of the chemical industry and
the quality of its products.
Under terms of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1971 -75)
chemical output is scheduled to rise by 72% and
represent 6.7% of total industrial output in 1975, or a
full percentage point more than in 1970. Investment
in the chemical and petrochemical industry is to be
increased by 91% compared with similar investment
during 1966 -70. Progress of the industry, however, still
is hindered by lack of know -how and experience in
chemical engineering, a shortage of skilled personnel,
and the inability of the machine- building industry to
provide equipment that fully satisfies requirements for
product mix and quality. To help offset these
shortcomings, the Soviets are relying on large
purchases of equipment from the West and increased
cooperation with Eas( Europe in the development and
production of chemicals and chemical equipment.
Growth of the Soviet chemical industry is likely to
retain a fairly high priority because of the heavy
dependence of modern industrial and agricultural
technology on the wide range of chemicals developed
since World War II.
The U.S.S.R. imports man -made fibers, plastics,
and synthetic rubber, together with intermediates for
their production. In addition, large quantities of
natural rubber, paints and lacquers, pharmaceuticals,
and pesticides are purchased abroad. Important
chemical exports include fertilizers, raw materials for
fertilizers and plastics, coke chemicals, synthetic
rubber, and rubber products. On a value basis, trade
in chemicals, rubber, and allied products (including
pharmaceuticals, man -made fibers, and essential oils)
amounted to more than $1.6 billion in 1971. Imports
exceeded exports by more than $500 million, with
pharmaceuticals and natural rubber the major items
bought abroad.
The Soviets claim that gross chemical output,
originally scheduled to double during 1966 -70,
increased by only 78% (or about 56% on the basis of
Western estimates of production). Nevertheless,
growth rates for chemicals remained well above those
for total industrial output, and despite the shortfall in
plans, substantial increases were made in the
production of fertilizers, plastics, and a number of
other products. In 1971, gross chemical output
exceeded the plan, increasing by more than 10 but
continuing problems with construction, poor- quality
equipment, and inadequately skilled workers resulted
in a shortfall in 1972 as production rose by 9% instead
of the planned level of 10.5 Moreover, a reduction
in scheduled growth of chemical output in 1973-from
10.7% to 8.5% indicates that the cumulative delays in
recent years have been serious. A major effort to regain
lost ground is evident, however, in the plan to increase
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investment in the chemical industry by 40% in 1973.
Centers of chemical production are shown on the
Summary Map foldout at the end of this chapter.
Sulfuric acid is produced at about 90 installations in
the U.S.S.R., but output is not always sufficient to
meet requirements, particularly those of the phosphate
fertilizer industry. Production of sulfuric acid in 1970
was considerably below the amount scheduled for that
year in the original plan for 1966 -70. The target for
1975 is almost 20 million tons, and plans include the
adoption of improved production processes and
increases in the productivity of future units. Poland
has contracted to supply the U.S.S.R. with several
sulfuric acid installations with unit capacities of
360,000 tons and 500,000 tons per year.
Soviet technology for the production of ammonia
lags behind that used in modern Western plants; plans
for 1971 -75 call for the construction of installations
with unit capacities of 400,000 to 500,000 tons per
year based on more efficient designs and equipment.
Domestic development of such units has been lagging,
however, and in 1969 -71 the U.S.S.R. contracted with
Japanese firms to supply five complete ammonia
plants, each with a production capacity of 450,000
tons per year, and major equipment for four other
plants. In addition, Czechoslovakia is to supply the
U.S.S.R. with seven high pressure reactors for the
synthesis of ammonia. Soviet output of ammonia,
which doubled during 1966 -70 but still fell short of
plan, is scheduled to rise by about 55% during 1971-
75. Production of nitric acid also continues to expand
to meet the rising needs of the fertilizer industry.
The manufacture of fertilizers is a high priority task
of the Soviet chemical industry. Plans initially called
for production of fertilizer to double during 1966 -70 to
62 -65 million tons' per year, but actual output in 1970
amounted to only 55.4 million tons, equivalent to 13.1
million tons of fertilizer nutrients. In addition to the
delays experienced in increasing output, the Soviet
chemical industry has been slow to improve the
product mix and the quality of fertilizers. Production
is heavily weighted with single- nutrient fertilizers,
while the more efficient complex or multinutrient
types common in the West accounted in 1970 for only
about 5% of total Soviet fertilizer output. Production
of fertilizer is scheduled to increase to N million tons
in 1975, based in part on foreign technology and
equipment. To this end the Soviets have bought
complex fertilizer plants in the West, and Czecho-
slovakia has contracted to supply three large urea
'Expressed in terms of Soviet "standard" fertilizer. The 62 million
to 65 million tons would be roughly equivalent to 14 million to 15
million tons of ferthizer nutrients.
fertilizer plants as well as a superphosphate plant, the
latter a joint project with Poland and East Germany.
Output of fertilizer in 1971 and 1972 was slightly
above the targets for those years, but construction of
new capacity during 1968 -72 was behind schedule,
and investment in this area in 1973 is to be increased
by 80
Soviet output of plastics in 1972 was less than one
fifth of that in the United States. An ambitious
program to produce more than 2 million tons by 1970
had to be abandoned, although actual output in that
year was double the 1965 level. Manufacturing
techniques and the assortment and quality of Soviet
plastics have been generally inferior to those in the
developed West. As in other sectors of the industry, the
Soviets import both finished plastics and materials
used in their production to compensate for
inadequacies in domestic production. Process
technology and a number of complete plastics plants
also have been purchased in non Communist
countries to achieve a greater degree of self
sufficiency. Production of plastics is scheduled to more
than double in 1971 -75; although output in 1971 and
1972 was slightly above the targeted levels, the largest
increases are to come in 1974 and 1975.
The U.S.S.R. ranks second in the world in the
production of synthetic rubber, yet output is only
about two- fifths of that in the United States.
Confronted by increasing demands for rubber, and
handicapped by a synthetic rubber industry that has
failed to keep pace with these demands, the country
has been forced to import sizable quantities of natural
rubber, primarily from Malaysia. Soviet imports of
natural rubber from all areas averaged 305,000 tons
per year during 1966 -70, but purchases abroad in 1971
fell to 241,000 tons.
Soviet plans initially called for production of
synthetic rubber to rise by 120% during 1966 -70.
Largely because of delays in development and
commercialization of new types of synthetic rubber,
however, output increased by only slightly more than
50 Most of the growth in production during 1966-
70 resulted from increases in production of two
relatively new types of synthetic rubber, polyisoprene
and polybutadiene; their share in total Soviet
production of synthetic rubber rose from 4% in 1965 to
33% in 1970. More than one -third of the U.S.S.R.'s
synthetic rubber produced in 1970 was made by an
obsolete process using ethyl alcohol. Modernization of
the industry is scheduled to continue during 1971 -75
with synthetic rubber output planned to increase by
70
About three fourths of the synthetic rubber made in
the U.S.S.R. goes for the production of tires and
45
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technical rubber goods. Although steadily improvin
throughout the 1960's, the quality of these products
still lags behind that of the developed West. Soviet
efforts to reduce this lag include the use of improved
types of rubber, cord, and carbon black, and the
increased production of radial tires.
Soviet production of man -made fibers (cellulosic
and synthetic) in 1972 amounted to about 7.5% of
world output and one fourth of that in the United
States. Synthetic fibers (nylon, acrylics, pol;vesters)
represented only 30% of the total Soviet output of
man -made fibers in 1971, whereas such fibers
accounted for three fourths of the U.S. product mix.
Although Soviet production of these fibers is growing
fairly rapidly, substantial shortfalls in production
targets were experienced during 1966 -70. Output in
1970, for example, was only 77% of the amount called
for in the original goal for 1966 -70. The quality of
some Soviet man -made fibers, moreover, is very poor
by U.S. standards, in part reflecting the use of inferior
raw materials. In addition, the assortment is not
adequate to provide for the needs of the textile
industry. To compensate for their lagging technology,
the Soviets have purchased plants and technology
from non- Communist countries for the production of
polyester and acrylic fibers, and of associated
intermediates. The U.S.S.R. is seeking additional
equipment from the West to support the planned
increase o f 71% in production of man -made fibers
during 1971 -75.
d. Textiles and wearing apparel (0100
(1) General �The output of light industry (textiles
and wearing apparel) has increased appreciably in
recent vears, but the assortment and quality of output
still remain low by Western standards and fail to meet
the increasingly exacting demands of the Soviet
consumer. The first half of the 1960's was
characterized by severe inventory accumulation
problems as consumer resistance to the clothing and
fabrics offered rose markedly. Various measures such
as price reductions, removal of the rural -urban price
differential (which favored urban areas), and the 1965
reform (see 13, 2) were successful in the short run in
moving curtain soft goods, but the basic maladjust-
ments remained. As of the early 1970's the consumer
still could riot find the variety, assortment, and quality
he desired, and inventories of textiles, clothing, and
shoes were again gtowing more rapidly than sales.
The major share of Soviet soft goods is produced in
large, centrally directed plants which generally use
mass production methods. Some items, however,
46
continue to be produced on a small scale by local
industry, which includes many industrial cooperative
enterprises that operated outside the state sector of the
economy until 1960. Using local materials and scrap
from large -scale industry, local industrial plants
produce a wide variety of goods in limited quantities,
mainly for local needs.
A great deal of labor is used in light industry
because technological innovation has been slow in
development, and even more tardy in its application.
Not only is Soviet light industry deficient in the degree
of its mechanization, but machinery in use throughout
the industry is overage; the technology of Soviet textile
mill equipment is generally 25 or 30 years behind that
employed in the United States. As a result, even in the
textile industry, which is more highly mechanized
than the clothing and footwear industries, many more
workers are used for given operations than in the
United States.
Despite the U.S.S.R.'s backwardness in this area,
Soviet machinery designers and manufacturers have
been slow to respond to the needs of the sector for
more efficient and sophisticated equipment. To speed
the modernization of its plant and equipment, the
country has turned to Western countries for advanced
machinery and manufacturing processes.
(2) Production �The output of textiles and of major
items of wearing apparel has grown steadily since 1955
(Figure 32). The textile industry, by far the largest
single component of light industry, is dominated by
cotton fabrics, which accounted for 70% of total
textile production in 1972. In the same year the
production of cloth from chemical fibers and natural
silk ranked second to cotton cloth in volume but
accounted for only 14% of total textile production in
1972. In the same year the production of cloth from
chemical fibers and natural silk ranked second to
cotton cloth in volume but accounted for only 14% of
total production. In 1972, woolen cloth accounted for
7% of textile output, with the remainder consisting of
linen, jt:te, and hemp fabrics.
Production of footwear has increased significantly
since 1955, but output consistently lags behind
demand as the industry suffers from an inadequate
supply of domestic leather, textile materials, and
artificial and synthetic leathers used in the
manufacture of shoes. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. is a
net importer of finished footwear, tanned leather, raw
hides and skins, and artificial leather. As with textiles,
a substantial part of all work in the manufacture of
shoes in the Soviet Union is manual, whereas the
footwear industries of the industrial West are highly
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FIGURE 32. Production of textiles and wearing apparel (U /OU)
Textiles:
Cotton (billions of square meters)
Wool (b.1tions of square meters)
Linen (billions of square meters)
Other (billions of square meters)
Wearing apparel:
Knitted outerwear (millions of pieces)
Knitted underwear (millions of pieces)
Hosiery (millions of pairs)
Sewn garments (billions of new rubles)'
Leather footwear (millions of pairs)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972*
4.227
4.838
5.499
6.152
6.397
6.419
0.316
0.439
0.466
0.643
0.675
0.681
0.272
0.516
0.548
0.707
0.760
0.775
0.532
0.843
0.959
1.272
1.323
no
85
112
188
415
445
447
347
472
718
821
830
843
772
964
1,350
1,338
1,309
no
na
8.7
9.2
16
17
17.3
271
419
486
676
679
645
*Preliminary data.
**Silk, synthetic, jute, and hemp fabrics.
�**1960, 1965 in 1955 wholesale enterprises; 1970 -72 in 1967 wholesale enterprise prices.
mechanized. By Western standards, Sovit t footwear is
of inferior quality with respect to materials and details
of construction.
Although Soviet foreign trade in textiles, wearing
apparel, and footwear is increasing, it is small
compared with domestic production. In 1971 net
imports by value of textiles and wearing apparel
amounted to more this) $1.4 billion, of which nearly
one fourth was leather footwear.
e. Food processing (U /OU)
(1) Procurement and distribution �Most of the raw
material for the several food industries is supplied
through the Ministry of Procurement, which purchases
major products from state and collective farms at
centrally determined prices according to a general
schedule estal.lished by the State Planning Commit-
tee. Until 1965 these prices generally did not cover
production costs, but in March of that year
procurement prices were raised to reflect more
adequately the real costs of farm production. Since
1965, moreover, there have been several other
procurement price revisions designed to spur
production.
The supply of agricultural products to the food
processing industries frequently is erratic because the
procure.ent agencies fail to organize a smooth and
efficient distribution of farm products to the plants
within their jurisdiction. Food industry plants, forced
to operate under the handicap of an irregular supply,
experience spoilage and dowp times far highs than
would be acceptable in Western countries. The central
press is replete with stories of canning plants, for
example, that are idle for as long as 3 weeks in the
course of a month and then unable to handle the
quantities of foodstuffs received during the fourth
week. As they usually lack adequate storage capacity,
the plants are unable to hold f; products in good
condition and thus smooth out the cycle. in extreme
cases, plants have been known to refuse deliveries
rather than bear the onus for spoilage, rotting, and
other form:, of waste. In mid -1972, for example, when
processed meat supplies in a number of provincial
cities were limited, slaughter houses were refusing
animals because they had no storage capacity. In
general, processing facilities for most agricultural
products are insufficient, and storage, transport, and
refrigeration facilities, though expanding, are far from
adequate.
(2) Production �In terms of quality, variety, and
packaging, the food industries lag far behind that of
the United State., Lnd Western Europe. Industrially
processed meat and canned goods are of particularly
low quality; industrially processed milk, butter,
vegetable oil, and margarine are still largely retailed in
bulk form. Few foods are prepackaged, and those that
are precooked or frozen are almost unknown to the
:soviet consumer; a considerable portion of these
prepared products are imported.
The growth of output of the Soviet food industries
depends primarily ov the level of domestic farm
production augmented by the fish catch and by
imports of certain raw agricultural products such as
sugar. In addition, the continuing shift from home
processing to industrial processen? has stimulated
growth in the food industries. This has been
particularly true in the case of meat; the share of total
output accounted for by industrial processing rose
from 40% of total production in 1955 to 64% in 1972.
The industrial production of other commodities has
47
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followed a similar pattern of change, as illustrated in
the following tabulation showing industrial processing
as a percent of total production of selected food
products:
As might be expected, shortfalls in farm output have
a pronounced effect on processed food output,
parti%ularly in the production of vegetable oil, sugar,
dairy products, and canned goods. Although the full
impact of the poor 1972 harvest had not been fully felt
throughout the processed food sector by the end of the
year, growth in output slowed from an annual average
of nearly 5% during 1966 -71 to just over 2% in 1972.
The exhaustion of possibilities for further growth
through the substitution of industrial processing for
home processing of products such as butter and flour is
a decelerating factor in the overall growth of the food
industries. To some extent, however, this developmeat
is offset by increased agricultural output and by
improved types of processing. For example, the
production of frozen vegetables began in the late
1960's and there have been marked improvements via
increased or new processing of confectionary products,
fruits, cheese, flour, and bread.
5. Construction and construedon materials
(U /OU)
a. Construction
Following a period of extremely rapid growth
during 1956 -60, when the average annual rate of
increase in the volume of construction was about 13
a pronounced slowdown occurred during the 1960's.
The average annual rate of growth during this decade
was about one -half as great, but it picked tip again to
almost 9% in t971. The construction portion of capital
investment in that year was about 17% of Soviet GNP
and 62% of total Soviet investment, including
assembly and installation work.
In 1971, 84% of total construction was contracted
out to building enterprises. The remainder was
performed by individuals building private houses and
by enterprises and collective farms using their own
48
employees. In the case of individuals building private
housing, little of the work is done by organized
contract builders, but most of the actual construction
is carried out tinder informal contracts with workers
from these organizations.
Soviet leaders have consistently approved exces-
sively long lists of construction projects in their
national economic plans. This has spread thin
construction resources and extended the time required
to complete projects. In the late 1960's, for example,
the Construction Bank calculated that the average
duration of industrial construction was 5.3 years, or
1.5 to 2 times longer than Soviet norms for such
activity. As a result, the amount of unfinished
construction, or the value of work done on buildings
and other structures that are still incomplete and not
available for use, continues to increase at a rapid rate.
On an average annual rate of increase, this figure rose
by 6.7% during 1961 -65 to 12.1% in 1966 -70 before
declining to 10.3% in 1971. In that year the amount of
unfinished construction (excluding collective farm
construction and individual housing) reached 57.9
billion rubles, or almost three fourths of all capital
investment for 1971. Currently, the Soviet leaders are
again attempting to reduce the volume of unfinished
construction by restricting the number of new projects
started.
Poor planning and design, delays in the completion
of construction projects, and the slow introduction of
new technology have made some installations
relatively obsolete before they begin operating it
reach design capacity. In addition, the typical year-
end rush to complete the construction plan contributes
to poor quality because the builders are generally
fatigued and lack time to do a good job, climatic
conditions are unfavorable, and governme:::
commissions accept incomplete or poorly finished
structures to fulfill their construction plans. The
system thus rewards gross volume of construction
rather than the quality of workmanship or actual
completion of projects.
Military construction organizations in the U.S.S.R.
are primarily engaged in building military camps and
service facilities as well as certain civilian projects. In
general, military construction personnel are not highly
skilled, with the result that even strictly military
projects such as missile launch facilities are usually
built by civilian construction organizations.
There are seven all -union or union republic
ministries specifically engaged in building activities
plus a number of ministries and other organizations
that are also involved in construction (Figure 33).
Despite the specialization implied by the titles of the
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MILK
YEAR MEAT
PRODUCTS
BUTTER
FLOUR
1950 37
32
70
65
1955 40
40
81
81*
1960 51
48
87
90
1965 52
58
91
95
1970 58
60
90
99
1971 62
61
91
99
1972 64
63
92
100
*Estimated.
As might be expected, shortfalls in farm output have
a pronounced effect on processed food output,
parti%ularly in the production of vegetable oil, sugar,
dairy products, and canned goods. Although the full
impact of the poor 1972 harvest had not been fully felt
throughout the processed food sector by the end of the
year, growth in output slowed from an annual average
of nearly 5% during 1966 -71 to just over 2% in 1972.
The exhaustion of possibilities for further growth
through the substitution of industrial processing for
home processing of products such as butter and flour is
a decelerating factor in the overall growth of the food
industries. To some extent, however, this developmeat
is offset by increased agricultural output and by
improved types of processing. For example, the
production of frozen vegetables began in the late
1960's and there have been marked improvements via
increased or new processing of confectionary products,
fruits, cheese, flour, and bread.
5. Construction and construedon materials
(U /OU)
a. Construction
Following a period of extremely rapid growth
during 1956 -60, when the average annual rate of
increase in the volume of construction was about 13
a pronounced slowdown occurred during the 1960's.
The average annual rate of growth during this decade
was about one -half as great, but it picked tip again to
almost 9% in t971. The construction portion of capital
investment in that year was about 17% of Soviet GNP
and 62% of total Soviet investment, including
assembly and installation work.
In 1971, 84% of total construction was contracted
out to building enterprises. The remainder was
performed by individuals building private houses and
by enterprises and collective farms using their own
48
employees. In the case of individuals building private
housing, little of the work is done by organized
contract builders, but most of the actual construction
is carried out tinder informal contracts with workers
from these organizations.
Soviet leaders have consistently approved exces-
sively long lists of construction projects in their
national economic plans. This has spread thin
construction resources and extended the time required
to complete projects. In the late 1960's, for example,
the Construction Bank calculated that the average
duration of industrial construction was 5.3 years, or
1.5 to 2 times longer than Soviet norms for such
activity. As a result, the amount of unfinished
construction, or the value of work done on buildings
and other structures that are still incomplete and not
available for use, continues to increase at a rapid rate.
On an average annual rate of increase, this figure rose
by 6.7% during 1961 -65 to 12.1% in 1966 -70 before
declining to 10.3% in 1971. In that year the amount of
unfinished construction (excluding collective farm
construction and individual housing) reached 57.9
billion rubles, or almost three fourths of all capital
investment for 1971. Currently, the Soviet leaders are
again attempting to reduce the volume of unfinished
construction by restricting the number of new projects
started.
Poor planning and design, delays in the completion
of construction projects, and the slow introduction of
new technology have made some installations
relatively obsolete before they begin operating it
reach design capacity. In addition, the typical year-
end rush to complete the construction plan contributes
to poor quality because the builders are generally
fatigued and lack time to do a good job, climatic
conditions are unfavorable, and governme:::
commissions accept incomplete or poorly finished
structures to fulfill their construction plans. The
system thus rewards gross volume of construction
rather than the quality of workmanship or actual
completion of projects.
Military construction organizations in the U.S.S.R.
are primarily engaged in building military camps and
service facilities as well as certain civilian projects. In
general, military construction personnel are not highly
skilled, with the result that even strictly military
projects such as missile launch facilities are usually
built by civilian construction organizations.
There are seven all -union or union republic
ministries specifically engaged in building activities
plus a number of ministries and other organizations
that are also involved in construction (Figure 33).
Despite the specialization implied by the titles of the
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FIGURE 33. Percentage of contract construction fulfilled
by major construction organizations in 1970 (U/OU)
ORGANIZATION
PERCENT
Ministry of Installation and Special Construction
Work.......
14
Ministry of Construction of Enterprises in Heavy
8.5
Industry
13
Ministry of Industrial Construction
12
Ministry of Power and Electrification............
10
Ministry of Construction
9
Ministry of Rural Construction
8
Ministry of Transport Construction
6
Ministry of Gas Industry
4
Other organizations (Residual)
24
*Construction in this industry is now the responsibility of
the Ministry of Construction of Enterprises of the Oil and Gas
Industry, established in September 1972.
*These include urban chief directorates of construction, the
Ministry of Reclamation and Irrigation, collective farm
construction organizations, and probably military construction
organizations.
construction ministries, there is considerable
overlapping of functions and responsibilities. The
most recently established construction ministry�The
Ministry of Construction of Enterprises in the Oil and
Gas industry, founded in September 1972 attests to
the importance the Soviets place on bringing
enterprises in these sectors on stream rapidly. The
U.S.S.R. will need increasing amounts of fuels to meet
its growing domestic requirements and to be
channeled into exports to pay for its rising imports,
particularly from hard currency areas.
During the period 1962 -71, average annual
investment in housing construction increased at a
fairly uniform rate of 3.8 from approximately 9.7
billion rubles in 1962 to 14.1 billion in 1971. This
increased investment, however, did not result in more
housing units because it was accompanied by a rise in
the cost per square meter of housing constructed and
by an increase in the average apartment size; these
two trends completely absorbed the increased
investment. A more significant indicator of the low
priority accorded housing construction is the
percentage of capital investment allocated from this
purpose, a share that fell from about 22% to 16% of
the total during 1962 -71.
b. Construction materials
The Soviet concept of the "industrialization of
construction" means 1) standardized designs are used
throughout the country, especially in service- oriented
types of structures such as apartments and schools, and
2) some of the construction is shifted back from the
building site to the factory by the fabrication of
components using precast concrete methods. The
Soviet Union is the world's largest cement producer to
meet it.; growing demand for precast concrete.
Conversely, there has been a relative decline in the use
of brick as a construction material and an absolu e
decline in the use of construction lumber. The average
annual growth rate in the production of construction
materials and of certain individual materials between
1965 and 1970 is shown in the following tabulation:
PERCENT OF
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
1965 -70
Total construction materials
5.4
Of which:
Cement
5.6
Precast concrete
8.5
Brick.........................
3.3
-Construction lumber
�1.8
Construction steel
7.1
Silicate blocks
2.3
The production of various major construction
materials presented in Figure 34 is highlighted by the
phenomenal increase in the use of precast reinforced
concrete in Soviet construction.
Sporadic materials shortages, especially of cement
primarily represent problems of distribution and
inefficient usage as the Soviet distribution cyst +m
frequently fails to get the propz-r construction
materials to building sites at the appropriate times.
Large quantities of materials are lost in transit or
ruined by rough handling and inadequate transporta-
tion facilities. Once at the construction site, the use of
materials is often less than optimal. As in other sectors
of the Soviet economy, construction materials
bottlenecks could be effectively eased without
increasing output by developing a more efficient
distribution system and by providing Soviet managers
with incentives to achieve maximum efficiency in
using these materials.
6. Domestic trade (U /OU)
Domestic trade, which includes the distribution of
both producer goods and consumer goods, is
conducted largely by state- controlled institutions
according to decisions of the central planners. In 1971,
domestic trade organizations employed nearly 8
million people, or about 6% of the labor force.
Producer goods (raw materials plus semifinished and
finished goods) are distributed through the material
technical supply network. A network of state operated
retail trade outlets, state controlled cooperative stores,
and collective farm markets handle the distribution of
49
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FIGURE 34. Production of principal construction materials (U /OU)
Cement (millions of metric tons)
Construction steel (millione of metric tons)
Construction lumber (millions of cubic
meters
Precast reinforced concrete (millions of cubic
meters
Rock products (millions of cubic meters)
Wall materials
1950
1955
1960
1985
1970 1971
10.2
22.5
45.5
72.4
95.2 100.3
5.1
7.5
12.6
19.6
28.0 na
78.8 109.2 127.2 102.6 93.8 na
*1.1 *4.9 30.2 56.1 84.6 90.9
62.0 174.0 314.0 364.0 481.0 538.0
13.0 25.6 44.5 44.6 52.9 54.4
na Data not available.
*Estimated.
*Comprises brick, dimension stone, and block.
consumer goods. In addition, an extra -legal sphere of
trade exists as a result of the chronic failure of the state
to satisfy fully consumer demand.
a. Producer :7-)ods
The State Committee for Material- Technical
supply is the principal agency that supplies industrial
and construction enterprises with raw materials,
semifabricates, and equipment. This organization
converts aggregate distribution plans supplied by the
State Planning Committee into operational docu-
ments to be administered through central and
territorial organs. Twenty -one main administrations
distribute major industrial raw materials such as
metals and fuels, and 11 similar bodies distribute
equipment and instruments to enterprises under
construction or being remodeled. Territorial
administrations distribute producer goods through
more than 4,000 supply and sales organizations, bases,
and trusts that provide materials directly to enterprises
and organizations.
A few ministries have supply administrations that
are not subordinate to the State Committee for
Material Technical Supply; these agencies are strictly
within the individual ministerial hierarchies. As a rule,
they are not involved in actual distribution but are
concerned primarily with planning and administrative
functions. However, some of these ministries or parts
thereof (railroads, the maritime fleet, river fleet, civil
aviation, communications, transport construction,
power and electrification, and gas) actively participate
in the distribution of goods. A separate organization
distributes industrial goods such as farm machinery,
fertilizer, and construction materia' lirectly to the
farms.
b. Consumer goods
Consumer goods are distributed through state and
cooperative stores and through the collective farm
50
markets; the former category accounts for virtually all
retail trade (Figure 35). Collective farm markets are
subject to a minimal amount of indirect state
influence exerted through local trade administrations,
which appoint market directors and sanitary
inspectors. The state's purchasing and pricing policies
of farm products have a more important role in
determining the supply of and demand for goods
offered for sale on the collective farm markets.
(1) State controlled stores -The state controlled
retail trade network is divided into state stores, which
handled about 70% of total retail trade in 1971, and
consumer cooperatives. In addition to their retail
outlets, both the state stores and the cooperatives also
operate public dining outlets, which range from snack
bars to restaurants.
(a) STATE sTOREs -The network of retail outlets is
supervised primarily by the Ministry of Trade, which
operates food and department stores. About two- thirds
of all state controlled retail sales are accounted for by
outlets of this ministry. Public dining outlets operated
by the Ministry of Trade account for about three
fourths of the total public dining turnover.
Supplementing the outlets of the Ministry of Trade
are worker supply organizations attached directly to
FIGURE 35. State, cooperative, and collective farm
market retail sales, including public catering (U /OU)
(Billions of rubles)
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STATE AND COOPERATIVE
BALES
COLLECTIVE
FARM
TOTAL
COopera-
MARKET
YEAR
SALES
Total
State
tive
SALES
1950.....
40.9
36.0
26.1
9.9
4.9
1955.....
55.0
F0.2
34.7
15.5
4.8
1980.....
82.3
78.6
54.9
23.7
3.7
1985.....
108.4
104.8
73.8
31.0
3.6
1971.....
169.7
165.6
116.8
48.8
4.1
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producing enterprises, usually in remote areas. For
workers in selected priority industries, these
organizations also provide high quality goods not
generally available in regular stores. Worker supply
organizations account for roughly one -tenth of total
state retail trade.
There are also a number of state agencies that have
specialized distribution networks for their products.
For example, the Ministry of Health i.as retail outlets
for the sale of drugs, medicines, and associated
products; the Ministry of Communications distributes
and sells newspapers and periodicals; and the Ministry
of Culture operates bookstores.
(b) COOPERATIVE STORES� Consumers cooperatives
constitute a separate trade network, paralleling that of
the state stores but designed primarily to serve rural
areas. Cooperatives are usually composed of residents
from a single village. Their primary function is to
establish and run local stores and restaurants. In 1971,
cooperatives operated 370,500 trade enterprises and
76,000 cafeterias and restaurants. Nominally the
cooperative system is controlled by its members, but
the state actually exercises strict control over the
products sold, prices, and profits.
(2) Collective farm markets Collective farm
markets provide sales outlets for agricultural products
retained by the farms after meeting planned deliveries
to the state, for produce from individual private plots,
and for certain nonagricultural goods such as
handicrafts produced by individual craftsmen. The
products sold in the collective farm markets are
generally of high quality, a fact reflected in their
prices, which are largely determined by supply and
demand. These prices are usually higher than the fixed
prices found in the state stores. The collective farm
markets represent an important source of food supply
for urban residents. Although sales in these markets
accounted for only 4% of total retail sales of food in
1971, they played a significant role in supplying the
population with a number of items normally in short
supply in state stores, particularly perishable foods
such as eggs, meat, fruits, and vegetables.
c. Illegal activities
Although officially unreported, the magnitude of
illegal private economic activity in the U.S.S.R. is vast
and involves producer goods as well as consumer goods
and services. Chronic shortages have encouraged black
markets in which scarce products and personal services
are sold at high prices. Shortages of machinery and
materials in the producing sectors of the economy
have led enterprise managers to hire expediters to
insure that the enterprise is supplied with the resources
needed to fulfill its output plan. These expediters often
must circumvent the normal supply channels, using
bribes, influence, stolen goods, or other illegal
methods to procure the necessary materials.
Illegal activities also encompass a wide range of
ingenious ventures in the consumer sector, including a
flourishing trade in moonshine liquor, the selling of
goods stolen from the state, and the provision of
services by moonlighting taxi drivers, doctors, and
others supplying services to those willing to pay for
individual treatment. Persons caught engaging in
illegal economic activity are dealt with severely, with
punishment ranging up to and including death for
large scale abuses. Nevertheless, the rewards from
these activities are sufficiently great to sustain the
system even in the face of harsh repressive measures.
In some areas such as Georgia and Armenia economic
chicanery is a way of life.
D. International economic relations (S)
1. Introduction
The U.S.S.R.'s foreign trade has grown at a rapid
8% average annual growth rate during the past
decade. Total trade turnover (imports plus exports)
more than doubled during the period 1960 -71 �from
US$11.2 billion to $26.3 billion' (Figure 36). Although
trade with the Communist world accounts for two-
thirds of Soviet foreign trade, the growth in trade with
the industrialized West has accelerated since 1965,
spurred by increased Soviet demands for Western
machinery and technology and by a concomitant rise
in the availability of long -term credits offered by the
West. Soviet imports of Western grain caused by
occasional shortfalls in domestic grain production and
a high priority livestock program are an increasingly
important feature of Soviet trade with the West. Grain
imports from the West during 1973 alone are expected
to approximate $1.6 billion.
2. Foreign trade organization and control
Soviet foreign trade is conducted as a state
monopoly to serve the needs of the Soviet economy as
determined by the authorities. The Ministry of
Foreign Trade provides central planning and
direction, preparing the foreign trade plan with the
participation of the State Planning Committee,
adjusting it quarterly, and exercising control over its
fulfillment. It also participates in formulating the
foreign exchange plan along with the State Planning
Committee, the State Bank, and the Ministry of
"Calculated in 1972 dollars.
51
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FIGURE 36. Value of foreign trade, by geographic
area (S)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
1960 1965 1971
Exports 5,564 8,175 13,806
Communist countries.......... 4,211 5,b56 9,018
Eastern Europe 3,074 4,553 7,241
China 817 192 78
Cuba 175 375 669
Other 145 437 1,030
Pion- Communist countries...... 1,352 2,618 4,788
Developed 983 1,438 2,710
Less- developed 338 911 1,380
Other 31 270 698
Imports 5,628 8,058 12,479
Communist countries.......... 3,978 5,610 8,177
Eastern Europe 2,795 4,673 7,257
China 848 226 76
Cuba 104 342 321
Other 231 370 523
Non Communist countries...... 1,650 2,448 4,302
Developed 1,080 1,601 2,859
Less- developed 564 845 1,413
Other 6 2 30
Trade balance -64 117 1,327
Communist countries.......... 233 -54 841
Eastern Europe 279 -120 -16
China -31 -34 2
Cuba 71 33 348
Other -86 67 507
Non Communist countries...... -298 170 486
Developed -97 163 149
Less- developed -226 66 -33
Other 25 268 668
*Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and
Yugoslavia.
*Includes Hong Kong. Most of the exports are military
related exports to non Communist less developed countries.
*A minus sign indicates net imports.
Finance. The Ministry of Foreign Trade conducts
negotiations and concludes commercial treaties and
agreements with foreign countries, directs the
activities of about 50 subordinate foreign trade
corporations which supervise day -to -day trade in
particular commodities or with particular geographic
areas, and formulates and carries out Soviet customs
policy. Also in the area of international economic
relations, the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations is charged with the development of
economic contacts with foreign countries, but its
principal duties relate to technical cooperation and
the construction of installations abroad.
In recent years the State Committee for Science and
Technology has-become increasingly active in foreign
economic activities. Although its functions have not
been specified publicly, they appear to include the
coordination of technical and scientific cooperation
52
with foreign companies and countries. The committee
also plays an important role in deciding on imports of
advanced Western technology and equipment. It has
a foreign trade corporation which carries on scientific
and technical exchange with foreign countries and
provides assistance to Soviet organizations in the
implementation of scientific and technical agreements
with their foreign counterparts.
3. Geographic distribution of Soviet foreign trade
The U.S.S.R. traditionally has pursued a policy of
maximum economic independence from the West.
Planners attempt to meet most Soviet requirements for
foreign goods by scheduling deliveries from the
European Communist countries. As a result, about
two- thirds of Soviet foreign trade is conducted with
other Communist countries, primarily in East Europe
(Figure 37). The other one -third is with non-
IMPORTS EXPORTS
USS12,479 US$13,806
COMMUNIST
66 COUNTRIES 65%
Eastern
58% European 52%
3% Cuba 5
5% Other' 8%
NON COMMUNIST
34% COUNTRIES 35%
23% Developed 20%
11 Less 10%
Developed
Insignificant Other" 5%
U.S.S.R.
*North Korea, North Vietnam, People's Republic
of China, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Albania.
"Mainly exports of military-related goods to
underdeveloped countries, but unspecified as to
country. Imports and exports include Hong Kong.
FIGURE 37. Main groups of trading partners, 1971 (S)
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Communist countries; three fifths of this is with the
developed countries, largely on a hard currency basis.
Trade with the developed West has grown by almost
11% during 1966 -71, the most rapid rate of increase
among the U.S.S.R.'s major trading areas. Conversely,
trade with China, which accounted for 15% of Soviet
trade turnover in 1960, fell to a negligible proportion
of Soviet trade by 1970 before a reversal took place.
The U.S.S.R. is largely a self- sufficient economic
entity with vast and diverse resources, a well
developed but relatively obsolescent industrial base,
and a large internal market. In aggregative terms,
foreign trade plays only a small role in the economy.
Exports (or imports) represent less than 3% of GNP
compared with 4.5% in the United States. In recent
years, however, the U.S.S.R. has tempered its policy of
self- sufficiency to obtain from the West the advanced
technology and industrial equipment it needs to
accelerate growth and to reduce its acknowledged lag
in productivity behind the leading Western
economies. Imports of technology and equipment
account for a substantial portion of the increasing
volume and relative share of trade with the West.
Soviet trade with East Europe� almost 85% of
Soviet trade with all Communist countries �is
conducted largely on a bilateral basis and is one of the
chief instruments for maintaining Soviet hegemony
over the area. Soviet economic control over East
Europe is also implemented through the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), a Soviet
inspired organization designed to foster the economic
integration and specialization of production in East
Europe. The U.S.S.R. has been disappointed with the
lack of progress by CEMA towards these goals,
primarily because of rising nationalism in some of
these countries. East European leaders, however,
appear to be increasingly aware of the need to work
within CEMA to upgrade their economies. They
recognize that imported Western technology and
equipment is not a panacea for their economic ills,
and that they are hard put to generate enough saleable
exports to pay for more than a fraction of their needs.
An important move toward furthering integration was
the establishment of CEMA's International Invest-
ment Bank in January 1971. The bank's primary
function is the financing of major investment projects
deemed to be beneficial to most of the member
countries. As of February 1973 the bank had provided
financial support for at least 26 separate projects, all in
East Europe, valued at roughly $400 million.
The level of Soviet trade with the remaining
Communist nations has fluctuated over the past
decade, with the $2.7 billion in trade with these
nations in 1971 only 12% above the 1960 level. The
distribution of Soviet trade among these nations has
changed significantly, however, reflecting changing
political relationships. Trade with China, for example,
fell sharply during the past decade from $2.1 billion in
1959 to $47 million in 1970, but rose to $164 million in
1971. Conversely, trade with Cuba has expanded
rapidly as the Soviets have felt obligated to support
the Cuban economy. Soviet -Cuban trade turnover in
1971 was $1.2 billion, or more than four times the level
of trade in 1960. The vicissitudes of Soviet political
relations with Yugoslavia have been reflected in the
level of trade; Yugoslavia is now a significant trading
partner of the U.S.S.R., with trade between the two
nations exceeding $600 million in 1971.
The East European countries should maintain their
dominant position among Soviet trading partners
during the 1970's as the U.S.S.R. probably will
continue to work for forced economic integration
within CEMA. Similarly, ongoing Soviet support for
Cuba and the growing rapport with Yugoslavia are
likely to lead to the further growth of trade with these
nations. Soviet trade with the developed West should
continue its steady rise at least into the mid- 1970's as
the U.S.S.R. is expected to rely increasingly on the
West for high technology imports of plant and
equipment. The United States, in particular, could
well become a major trading partner both as a result of
the growing rapproachment with the U.S.S.R. and the
Soviet demand for U.S. grains and advanced
technology.
4. Commodity composition of foreign trade
The composition of Soviet imports and exports
remained basically unchanged during 1960 -1971
(Figure 38). Soviet imports are dominated by
machinery, equipment and consumer goods. These
vategories have accounted for about two- thirds of total
SGviet imports since 1965. Almost three fourths of
Soviet imports of machinery and equipment originate
in East Europe. The composition of consumer goods
imports has shifted over the past decade: during 1966-
68 imports. of food declined, but they have increased
since that time and will rise dramatically during 1971-
73 as a result of the 1972 Soviet grain crop shortfall.
Imports of manufactured consumer goods more than
doubled from 1965 to 1971. Although such imports
from the developed West have risen rapidly during
recent years, the hard currency required to pay for
massive grain imports during 1972 -73 may lead to a
fall in the level of manufactured consumer goods
imported from the West, with some compensatory
increase through increased imports of similar goods
from East Europe. Soviet imports of machinery and
equipment, essential to meet key plan goals, however,
should continue to increase steadily during the 1970's.
a
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FIGURE 38. Commodity composition of trade
(Percentages of total)
1960 1965 1971
Imports'
100.0
100.0
100.0
Machinery and equipment......
29.8
33.4
34.0
Fuels, lubricants, and related
1961 193
310
89
materials
4.2
2.5
3.0
Ores and concentrates..........
5.6
3.9
1.0
Base metals and manufactures..
9.7
4.9
6.0
Chemicals
2.7
4.
6.0
Rubber and rubber products....
3.5
2.5
1.0
Wood and wood products.......
1.9
1.9
2.0
Textile raw materials and semi
5
302
1971 309
manufactures
6.5
4.4
5.0
Consumer goods
27.9
33.0
33.0
Other and unspecified..........
8.4
9.0
11.0
Exports'
100.0
100.0
100.0
Machinery and equipment......
20.5
20.0
20.0
Fuels, lubricants, and related
materials.
16.2
17.0
18.0
Ores and concentram..
4.4
3.8
3.0
Base metals and manufactures..
15.1
16.3
15.0
Chemicals
2.7
3.0
3.0
Wood and wood products.......
5.5
7.3
6.0
Textile raw materials and semi
manufactures
6.4
5.1
3.0
Consumer goods
16.2
11.1
11.0
Other and unspecified�`........
13.1
16.5
23.0
*Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
�*Includes Soviet exports of diamonds, platinum group
metals, and nickel.
Soviet exports continued to be dominated by fuels,
raw materials, and semifinished materials. Foremost
among these have been exports of petroleum and
petroleum products, which almost tripled from 1960 to
1971. Thi g rowth in Soviet exports of machinery and
cquipment has paralleled the overall growth in total
Soviet exports during 1960 -71. Experts of food have
varied with Soviet crop yields, rising during the late
1960's to $1.2 billion in 1971.
The composition of Soviet exports should remain
largely unchanged during the next few years. Exports
of petroleum products are expected to continue to
grow, bolstered by continued increases in world price
levels. Soviet exports of natural gas will become a
major Soviet item during the 1970's following the
completion of pipeline networks currently under
construction. Alternatively, food exports can be
expected to decline over the short run due to the recent
grain crisis. Exports of machinery and equipment
should continue their steady rise, particularly to East
Europe and the less developed nations. The potential
for increased Soviet exports of machinery and
equipment to industrialized Western markets will
remain relatively limited.
54
i
5. Exchan k rate and international payments
position
Soviet currency is not convertible and its rate of
exchange vis -a -vis foreign currencies serves only as art
accounting device for registering foreign trade and
other international payments. There is no systematic
relationship between Soviet domestic prices and prices
in Soviet foreign trade. Commodity prices in trade
with non- Communist countries are generally in line
with world market prices; in trade with other
Communist countries, whose domestic prices are also
unrelated to world market prices, prices must be
negotiated on the basis of world market prices.
Soviet hard currency payments are generally in
deficit as the U.S.S.R. has failed to generate sufficient
hard currency exports to the developed Western
countries to offset increased imports of equipment and
technology. To meet these deficits, the U.S.S.R. has
sold gold and obtained government guaranteed
credits, both medium -term and long -term, from the
developed West as follows (in millions of US dollars,
1960 -72):
NET NIEDIU111- AND
LONG -TERM CREDITS
HARD CURRENCY
SALES OF
(COVERNNIENT-
YEAR DEFICIT
COLD
GUARANTEED)
1960 278
150
86
1961 193
310
89
1962 267
240
64
1963 310
525
-4
1964 533
520
8
1965 215
490
24
1966 267
45
06
1967
10
24
1968
10
257
1969 31;
0
303
1970 517
5
302
1971 309
20
217
1972*** 600
250-300
337
'Rounded to nearest $5 million.
"Surplus.
"Preliminary estimate.
Until 1966 the U.S.S.R. relied primarily on gold
sales to finance its hard currency deficits. During
1960 -65, for example, the U.S.S.R. sold more than $2
billion worth of gold to finance its trade deficit with
the West. This reduction in Soviet gold reserves plus
the greater availability of Western credits has caused
the Soviets to shift increasingly to the latter as the
chief element in financing Soviet purchases in the
West. Although huge imports of Western grain and
other goods during 1973 are likely to result in a record
Soviet hard currency deficit, the Soviets will have little
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difficulty financing it 0 rough a combination of gold
sales (reserves are adequate as domestic production is
rising rapidly), U.S. government backed agricultural
credits, other government- guaranteed credits, and
short- and medium -term, nonguaranteed credits.
The increasing ability of the U.S.S.R. to finance its
imports in the West is in part a function of the
continued growth of Soviet banking institutions in
West Europe. The U.S.S.R. owns banks in four major
West European financial centers, which together hold
assets in excess of $2 billion. These banks are an
important factor in financing Soviet trade with the
West and are a major source of funds for the U.S.S.R.
They have established excellent reputations in
Western currency markets, which enable them to
attract Eurocurrency deposits at prime rates and tap
other outside sources of funds.
6. Soviet foreign aid
Since World War II the U.S.S.R. has undertaken an
impressive program of economic and military
assistance to both Communist and non- Communist
less developed countries, although Moscow has been
more cautious in making new commitments to the
latter group in recent years. A total of $24.5 billion of
economic assistance has been extended, of which
about $16.2 billion was provided to Communist
countries.
Aside from $1 billion in aid extended to Poland in
1971, following the workers' riots in the previous year,
and some development aid to Bulgaria, nearly all of
the U.S.S.R.'s economic assistance extended to
Communist countries since 1965 has been to non
European countries. Nearly 40% of Soviet economic
aid extensions since 1965, about $4.1 billion, has been
directed toward Cuba, which in 1972 alone received
aid commitments of more than $1 billion �$370
million in development credits and most of the
remainder in balance of payments assistance. North
Vietnam and Mongolia were the next largest recipients
of Soviet aid, receiving about $1.8 billion and $1.3
billion, respectively, since 1965. Soviet economic
assistance credits are generally extended on generous
terms with interest at about 2% to 3% annually and
repayment in goods stretched out over 10 years or
more. In 1972, however, the Soviets extended a credit
to Yugoslavia which carries an interest rate of 4.5
Approximately 85% of the Soviet aid extended to
Communist countries has been drawn, and most of the
aid still on the books is scheduled to be drawn by 1975.
Communist countries have drawn a larger percentage
of the aid extended than have the non Communist,
less developed countries. This is largely because of the
special bilateral economic and political relationships
between the U.S.S.R. and the other Communisi
countries; the U.S.S.R. is the single most important
trading partner of these countries. In addition, due to
the close cooperation between the State Planning
Committee and its counterparts in the other
Communist countries, Soviet aid commitments are
embodied not only in the national economic plans of
these countries but also in their long -term annual
trprle agreements with the U.S.S.R. This special
,,iationship does not exist between the U.S.S.R. and
the non- Communist, less developed countries.
Moreover, the implementation of aid has been more
rapid in the Communist countries, especially in
Communist East Europe, compared with the
developing non Communist countries because of the
higher level of native skills and the official emphasis
on economic growth.
Soviet economic aid to non Communist, less
developed countries has been extended mostly to
public sector industrial projects under credits
repayable in 12 years at 2.5% to 3% interest. Since
1965, the U.S.S.R. has extended a larger percentage of
its aid in the form of medium -term credits which carry
shorter repayments periods and higher interest rates
and sometimes require downpay-nents. These credits
usually finance the purchase of machinery and
equipment, rather than the purchase of complete
plants, and sometimes are taken up by the private
sector of a developing country.
The level of annual extensions of Soviet economic
aid to non- Communist, less developed countries has
varied widely from a low of $70 million in 1962 to a
record of $1.3 billion in 1966. The fluctuations that
have occurred are to be expected in a program with
major commitments to projects, such as the Aswan
Dam, and development plans that often require
several years for implementation. For the most part,
recent peak years have reflected extensions to countries
which have initiated new development plans; the low
years often meant that major aid recipients were
working off credits previously extended. Actual
drawings of economic aid to non Communist,
underdeveloped countries total over $4 billion.
Deliveries to these countries, which are the most
reliable indicator of the scale of foreign aid in any
given year, rose to $375 million in 1964 but have failed
to achieve any sustained growth since that time. On
the other hand, a rapid rise in repayments in the face
of a relatively constant level of deliveries, has resulted
in a reduction of the net flow of Soviet aid to the
developing co:.ntries. In 1972, repayments by these
countries for Soviet economic aid debts rose to an
estimated $235 million, the equivalent of about 75%
55
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of new economic aid extended during the year. By the
end of 1972, these countries had repaid a total of
about $1 billion of their principal debt to the U.S.S.R.,
or slightly more than one fourth of Soviet aid
deliveries under credits. About half has been paid by
Egypt and India, the two leading recipients of Soviet
economic aid.
Compared with Western aid, the amount of Soviet
aid is small, but because of Soviet propaganda, the
timing of new aid commitments, and the kinds of
projects undertaken, the political impact sometimes
has overshadowed the volume of aid or its ultimate
economic effect. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has been
applying greater selectivity in its aid extensions. In
1972, for example, Moscow extended new aid to only
five countries. It is earmarking most of its new aid for a
few countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Of
total Soviet assistance extended during 1966 -72, 77%
was allocated to the Middle East and South Asia,
compared with 70% in 1960 -64. Meanwhile, Africa's
share o; the total fell from 28% to 13% and that of
Latin America rose to 10
Since 1955, the U.S.S.R. has committed $8.9 billion
of military aid to underdeveloped, non Communist
countries; over half of this amount has been extended
since 1966. The Soviets' cxtention of only $363 million
56
in new arms assistance in 1972 reflected a return to
more traditional patterns from the unusually high
level of 1970 -71 caused by substantial acquisitions by
Egypt to build up its air defenses and by India to
prepare for its war with Pakistan. An estimated $7.5
billion or 85% of Soviet military equipment on order
had been delivered by the end of 1972. About 80% of
Soviet arms exports have been delivered to the Middle
East and South Asia, with the remainder allocated to
East Asia (12 and Africa (8 Over three fourths of
Soviet military exports in 1972 went to Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, and India, with Egypt alone receiving more than
35% of the total.
The Soviet military aid program generally has been
an effective instrument for establishing a position of
influence in the third world. Soviet military
equipment has been priced competitively and credit
terms are liberal. The price of Soviet military hardware
is usually lower than for comparable Western
equipment. In addition, Moscow usually allows a
discount, which varies among recipients but has
averaged about 40% of the value of the delivered
material. Cash sales make up only 5% of Soviet exports
of military aid, with the remainder being financed on
8- to 10 -year credits, after a 1- to 3 -year grace period,
at 1% to 2.5% interest.
SECRET
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r_-40
0
v e .e
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q .0� o
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PUPULA I IUN
DENSITY OF RURAL
URBAN POPULATION
POPULATION
O Over 3,000,000
Persons per square ,to
M Ukrainians
3 26 13
p 1,000,000 to 3,000,000
I 1 10 25 50
0 300,000 to 1,000,000
P... per square kilometer
100,000 to 300,000
ITI
METALLURGY
Ferrous
Copper
Aluminum
0 Other nonferrous
The larger symbols within a category
0 denote the more important producers.
0
t
0
r Prist.n�
0
O
kP
0
%I
q 0e o
eo oQO
0
o e
El
MAIN POWERLI
In operatioi
under toes
ETI
SLAVIC PEOPLES
T
Russians
Ts
M Ukrainians
MU,
Belorussians
Tt
Mot
OTHER INDO- EUROPEAN PEOPLES
OTHER URA
M Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians,
Q Es
Moldavians, Tadzhiks, Ossetions
M
X Germans
KI
E%
A Jews
0
o e
El
MAIN POWERLI
In operatioi
under toes

IN
r
0
n
0 11
o
C Qe o
o
0
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0
v a .e
ee
e 0 QD
CAUCASIAN PEOPLES
Georgians, Chechens,ingush,
peoples of Dagestan
PALEO- SIBERIAN PEOPLES
Ctlunhi, Koryaks, Nivkhi
411s ESKWJS O KETS
Q Unint-bnd or sparsely settled
0
Neill.
It
0
iutak
0
o
0
Q zeya p
`hp aomol'akt Q
ELECTRIC
ETHNIC GROUPS
SLAVIC PEOPLES
TURKIC PEOPLES
Russians
Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
Ukrainians
Q Uzbeks
Belorussians
Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani
Other Turkic peoples
OTHER INDO- EUROPEAN PEOPLES
OTHER URALIC AND ALTAIC PEO
Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians,
Q Estonians, Karelians, Mal, K/jtni,
Moldavians, Tadzhiks, Ossetians
Mordvins, Udmurts, Mann,
X Germans
Khanty, Nentsy, Buryats, Kaayfa.
0 Jews
Evenki, Ever, Nganasany
0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0
0
v a .e
ee
e 0 QD
CAUCASIAN PEOPLES
Georgians, Chechens,ingush,
peoples of Dagestan
PALEO- SIBERIAN PEOPLES
Ctlunhi, Koryaks, Nivkhi
411s ESKWJS O KETS
Q Unint-bnd or sparsely settled
0
Neill.
It
0
iutak
0
o
0
Q zeya p
`hp aomol'akt Q
ELECTRIC
POWER
MAIN POWERLINES
POWERPLANTS
Hydro Thermal
In operation
0 Over 2,000,000 kilowatts
Under construction
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 kw.
e 100,000 to 1,000,000 kw.
PETROLEUM REFINING Kr. n, wit
AND DONE A
6A IN
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY'
Petroleum refining Nevinnomyu
Synthetic rubber
Mineral fertilizers Ras;
Various chemicals C
Yerevan
The la�gcr symbols within a category
denortrt the more important producers.
0

to
At V.,
o
t
6
rr.
�i,
ear l
.l
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f
CAUCASIAN PEOPLES
0 Georgians, Chechens,ingush,
peoples of Dagestan
PALEO- SIBERIAN PEOPLES
Chukcbl, Koryaks, Nivkhi
m ESKIMOS 0 KETS
Q uninhabited or sparsely settled
v
Hibino
0
0
0
o
F.
q Do 0
40
0
serk6a rKi
6ur'ys
ku Via{
A-1
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Ifrasnovodsk
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PETROLEUM REFINING
AND
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Petroleum refining
s Synthetic rubber
Mineral fertilizers
Various chemicals
the lerg er symbc!, within a category
denote the more important producers.
Thermal
kilowatts 0
30,000 kw. i o
D0,000 kw. o o��
aoa
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0
LAND USE
P-4
PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL
NONCULTIVATED AREAS
ACTIVITIES
Grain
0 Forest and mountain area
Livestock, grain,
and other crops
Q Desert orsemidesert
Livestock, grain, other
crops, and woodland
Q Tundra
Dairy farming
Extensive swamp
Irrigated cotton
Noncultivated areas include nomadic herding
Fruit, vineyards
0
.00
I
0
0
0
P
0
0
0
D
0
0

MACHINE BUILDING
AND
METALWORKING
Tractors, farm equipment
Automobiles and trucks
e Other transport equipment
e Other machine building and
metalworking
The larger symbols within a category
denote the more important producers.
Q
0
60 SO 1 V..
cv v0 1 C %of j I CHVKCHr SF:A
ALASKA
NORTH Sxn r C'`t I\t`z "o v 1 WRANGEL 1.
A /R C T I O ,C E A N
FRANZ JDSEF
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SIBERIAN
rman k S F.' fi St. n t
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E,U R O A N z Sa e)TjarB sO
O `essay Kursk Oor'kiY Kirov
Kha kav a p e ,rilunc eye WEST 3 a l .5 Petrop vv((ov
C Voronezh' k Kamchat z.
i Ka:oa t fginy ,EITRAL SIBERIAN Yakutsk
Sevasto
L
of 9
J t S
Perm D
nA IN
.r�, BERIAN LENA PL 1 'a OI
BLACA SI
u b s s v AT O K 11 O T S 1i
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Sr: t V 01 o "rod J P L 1 N PLATEAU
8 8. a Chelytlbinsk
lirol'sk ,1 AI a "nT o SAKHALIN
S t1AN LOWIA& Kurgan�
KWtanay
milk,
Batumi, ..n ftrakhan y S Q nn
O
S .T '.1 s 1! J U
Gur yav Makat r
Oktyabr sk #Y' F
asnoyarsk St Ku6 4 k's
N s 4 Se is
ovosibirsk wry
6eyneu TYs 'vob i
q i Tselinograd� .Nt+:.1' r F Chg6 vtk
U :on' X40 l Aralsk KAZAKH arnaul a S ta
s j (,Karsakpay UPLAND a
a Kringro e SeBria t id r
rdsnovods k wIpOD Ktyl�Orda r
LQ Sa shy an ealkhash
tURb rY g
I ivoslok
{A'shkhaliad votx a:bY r{
Tashkent S F,n. o F
MAJOR TERRAIN FEATURES 'r z"/
0 5 0 1000 Mlles
�`i,. 1. r...
J. 0 500 1000 Kilometers
tiU r0 r? n i t
501914 4.74
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0
U.S.S.R. SUMMA

l a Its T�Zf a T t
Lininsrid _M U V V Q V o
.0
Carpathian
Fields
oKiyev MOSCOWO pECHORA
MOSCOW BASIN
A BASIN
KrivoY g li BASIN North
S
i 1lebe Ka Kzan' BIN olunoahnoY� Fiel s
.eDONETS ga Fields kA'' 06.
BASIN A. A
A Ill
aratov A Awodlovsk
Krasnodar fields :A
Batum Fields A
A
�Emho�
A0TbI
I sI :Fields Novosibirsk d
�A Baku KUZNET K.
A Field BABI 0
Seat A KARAGANDA A
BASIN
TL -rkmen A Lake
Fields /Batknash
C
o
Fields Tishksnto� Alma-At
Gczl
A
ALASKA
WRANGEL I. s
S
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iY
LAN
}r
1
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0 flOTSti
7 SAKHALIN
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So
lb AlrK vsk .j
d E p13
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a
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a ,t
PA .c
i1 LnW i
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o
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0
C j S oo
COMPARATIVE AREA
AND. LATITUDE
U.S.S.R. SUMMARY MAP
Munn�nsII!
K liningr e r 1'VlAr{ 1 aTallin
R YTOMAN Keral'skaya
Velynskayan.a. La N)4oR,.Y !:f ASSR.
Oblast
Vim..
Zakarpctskaya Grad yus>+ -1 p
Oblast Nr4e Ar4ha q`'ek
U eik evsero
r 1 n I. s Nn�tskiy
n NO
Ch -now 1 \erner
rr r^� 1 kl r m, 5 de i alini �Voloq
Mo eo R p l q r OS a I Komi
K ,t'`� �t Vtad I� Iv nera Assn
s 4 R.a :a Ger'kly
Ni4olay r T� j rs4 Kire Ko
Kh� tin t`�` d en� M rdev- i skaya �rml,ratskiy
t D Pr� rev k SA NO
Krymskb d 1 r' T mb S S Ch a A Udm rtslruya Kha
Obi f b k a`{ hll d p s I'yanov A R �perm ManslIk
r arot. Tote a N T.:
K rasnadarsk Ku b er Va
nkroy Volgo2r d y y ashkirska Srndlevd k,:`
ASS 1=`.
r Urol'sk CM 1nsk Tyumen
Stavr ol
Abkho:sko 'ski rq
ASSR 2C Kray Kul 1skaY, nbu Kuryn,
OE R r0 A
3 AS ��A(1ra4hen' k1t. .Ko =ak arnk
5 10 1 wt�nay
ARMEN N 'tr' Dag�sianskayo Ko 4+1
E. a. a. ASSk qa kayo
ALAN A Z K
Oblast aku MrpysNMSkry� J plinegro ad
oblet
b r Itfd Dih�zk=q�n
kalps4Ykoya S
1 c 'Tasbuu= ASSk K\\sylArdoo
Khonsm 6yo 0 t BFK
o r r' Ostia {t' Chl mk* D:h�mbul`
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND
bards {?r hlk o!oy
�MOf
tit
OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS
sa �rhea
1
Adygeyskaya AO
2. Karachayevo- Cherkesskays AO
c
3. Kabardino- Balkarskaya ASSR
4. Severa�OsetinskayaASSR
Koshkadar'inskaya
hsI
I TAD OK
5. Checheno- Ingtishskaya ASSR
Oblast'
B e.
6. Yugo- Osetinskaya AO
Surkhandar'inskoya
7. Adzharskaya ASSR
Oblast'
�rn�-
8. Nagorno- Karabakhskaya AO
Bodakhshonskaya
9. Nakhichevanskaya ASSR (to Azerbaijan S.S.R.)
AID
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0

,r
i
l
I 19
Y MAP
a
0
0
11
(1
FUELS AND
METALLIC MINERALS
IN Coal
Nickel
Brown coal
A Copper
Crude oil
a Lead and zinc
Natural gas
A Aluminum
A Iron
Tin
at Manganese
Gold
e Chromite
t2. Keracheyevo- Cherkesskaya AO
3. Kabardino- Balkarskaya ASSR
The larger symbols within a category
denote the more important producers.
mac R 3 AS �A khan
ARMRN if:41 oaglanskaya
f.'7 NeredbinY.
Alto skiy
n rinik Kray
I
Vos
K ujen r
'TaRi
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND
Buryat- Oblast'
Nak s�
OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS
o d el
ik
A Cl/
'I.
ASSR
Adygeyyskays AO
a
t2. Keracheyevo- Cherkesskaya AO
3. Kabardino- Balkarskaya ASSR
e
lityk�KUl'ske
4. SeVara- 09atlnskeyeASSR
Kashkadar'inakaya TAD IK
Oblast' sa
041asr
5. Checheno Ingushskaya ASSR
8. Yugo- Osetinskaya AD
Surkhandar'inskaya
rna�Altayskaya AO
7. Adzharskaye ASSR
8. WQorno- Karabakhskaya AO
r 9. Nakhlchevanskaya ASSR (to Azerbaijan
I
obla.r
ohon
S.S.R.) eadakhaonskaya
AO
�Kasakhstanskaya
Oblast'
KaunlnY
.L
a Kanl'skaya
�n IAN
(ro R.e.v.s. ASSR' r
Volynskoya' LATH
Oblast� .d n arad
Zaknrpatsk Or
aya ns
\t
AA'R
O were
frhe a fe 0.... r�
kly
u11y 1, Sorel� i olint 1.0
NO
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r V
ch.,..rr J, le 1'
MoLa s at J 1�. Komi
I
nsk 01 rt 0 osrre s ASSR
i Ir
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o I
Ryo,a eaer'Yly
t S.
r KIf
i\
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Nilwlaya., d �tsk ri aka a Ke
Kh�r rdov Sit �rmlyatskiy
t
Nenefskiy
rov Y
Krymsk t orb f S Ch
dm r skayo
Khority L-.
NO
a A
Obt I e...
till ry A R �him
Mantiykkiy
Evenkiyskiy NO
ti
as *v au taA a
NV
Krasnedc'e" Kuyky .v
l nKray V.laegr d ashkinka e Sr�rdievs4
Krasnoygrskiy.
1 ti\ ASS
i r-
t�
KTay
Shave o ski
nbur
,(AbkhaASSR 2e Keay Kul Iskay� r xv 0, e C
mac R 3 AS �A khan
ARMRN if:41 oaglanskaya
f.'7 NeredbinY.
Alto skiy
n rinik Kray
I
Vos
K ujen r
'TaRi
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND
Buryat- Oblast'
Nak s�
OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS
o d el
ik
A Cl/
'I.
ASSR
Adygeyyskays AO
a
t2. Keracheyevo- Cherkesskaya AO
3. Kabardino- Balkarskaya ASSR
e
lityk�KUl'ske
4. SeVara- 09atlnskeyeASSR
Kashkadar'inakaya TAD IK
Oblast' sa
041asr
5. Checheno Ingushskaya ASSR
8. Yugo- Osetinskaya AD
Surkhandar'inskaya
rna�Altayskaya AO
7. Adzharskaye ASSR
8. WQorno- Karabakhskaya AO
r 9. Nakhlchevanskaya ASSR (to Azerbaijan
I
obla.r
ohon
S.S.R.) eadakhaonskaya
AO
�Kasakhstanskaya
J'
NO
5 Koryakakiy
.t
No
f
Yakutskoya Krn;` atskoya
J
Magadan
S. R.: i last
ASSR
r
Sakhallnskaya
Khcboirovski` Oblast'
r'
Amurskaya Kra
y f
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
BOUNDARY CENTER
Union Republic (S.S.R.) o
Oblast, Kray, or Autonomous Republic (ASSR)
Autonomous Oblast (AO) or National Okrug (NO)
All Union Republic administrative centers are shown. The only other
centers shown are for oblasts having the some name as their center.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. The United States
govemnrent has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania into
the Soviet Union.
ore y
Buryat- Oblast'
Nak s�
Buryalskiy O
skaya
I
ik
A Cl/
~J
ASSR
vl
aChita
r
aka a
Yevr�
Y Y Primorskiy
Tuvins kIs ya
Aeinskiy�
uryatskly AO Keay
ASSR
NO
rna�Altayskaya AO
�Kasakhstanskaya
Oblast'
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
BOUNDARY CENTER
Union Republic (S.S.R.) o
Oblast, Kray, or Autonomous Republic (ASSR)
Autonomous Oblast (AO) or National Okrug (NO)
All Union Republic administrative centers are shown. The only other
centers shown are for oblasts having the some name as their center.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. The United States
govemnrent has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania into
the Soviet Union.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0
r
f
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090033 -0